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Interpretation

A JOURNAL

loF

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Volume 29 Number 1

Fall 2001

Eric Buzzetti

The Rhetoric

of

Xenophon

and

the Treatment of Justice the Memorabilia

in

35

Mark S. Cladis

Rousseau

and

the

Redemptive

Mountain Village: The


of

Way

Family, Work, Community,


Love
on

and

Discussion: Locke

Natural Law:

Two 55 Samuel Zinaich, Jr.

Opposing

Views
of

The Internal

Coherency
the Law of

Locke's

Moral Views in the Questions

Concerning
75

Nature
of a

Michael P. Zuckert

On the Lockean Project


Natural Law Theory: Zinaich
Discussion:
Kojeve-

Reply

to

Schmitt,
and

Colonialism, Edited

Translated

by
91
Alexandre Kojeve
and

Erik de Vries

Correspondence

Carl Schmitt
115
Alexandre Kojeve

Colonialism from
Perspective

European

Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief Executive Editor
General Editors Hilail Gildin, Dept. Leonard
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Interpretation
A JOURNAL
Fall 2001

loF

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Volume 29

Number 1

Eric Buzzetti

The Rhetoric

of

Xenophon

and

the

Treatment Mark S. Cladis Rousseau

of

Justice in the Memorabilia


the Redemptive
of

and

Mountain

35

Village: The

Way
and

Family, Work,

Community,

Love
on

Discussion: Locke
Two Samuel Zinaich, Jr.

Natural Law:

Opposing

Views
of

The Internal

Coherency

Locke's Moral
the

55

Views in the Questions Law of Nature

Concerning

Michael P. Zuckert

On the Lockean Project


Theory:

of a

Natural Law

75

Reply

to Zinaich

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism, Edited


Alexandre Kojeve
and and

Translated

by

Erik de Vries 91

Correspondence

Carl Schmitt
Alexandre Kojeve

Colonialism from

European Perspective

1 15

Copyright 2001

interpretation, All

rights reserved.

ISSN 0020-9635

Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief
Executive Editor General Editors

Hilail Gildin, Dept.


Leonard

of

Philosophy, Queens College

Grey

Charles E. Butterworth Seth G. Benardete (d. 2001) Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Hilail Gildin Howard B. White (d. 1974) Christopher Bruell John Hallowell (d.

Consulting

Editors

David Lowenthal Michael Oakeshott Amaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Ellis Sandoz (d. 1990) Kenneth W. Thompson International Editors Editors Terence E. Marshall Heinrich Meier

Cropsey Ernest L. Fortin 1992) Harry V. Jaffa Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield
Joseph

Fred Baumann Maurice Auerbach Wayne Ambler Amy Bonnette Patrick Coby Thomas S. Engeman Elizabeth C de Baca Eastman Edward J. Erler Maureen Feder-Marcus Will Morrisey Pamela K. Jensen Ken Masugi Leslie G. Rubin Charles T. Rubin Susan Orr Martin D. Yaffe Bradford P. Wilson Susan Meld Shell Catherine H. Zuckert Michael P. Zuckert

Manuscript Editor
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The Journal Welcomes Manuscripts


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in

Political Philosophy

as

Well

as

Those

Theology, Literature,

and

Jurisprudence.

contributors should or manuals

based

on them.

follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 13th or later Instead of endnotes, the journal uses the
and

editions

"reference-list"

described in these manuals, illustrated in cur discussed in a sheet available from the Assistant to the Editor (see below). Words from languages not rooted in Latin should be trans literated to English. To ensure impartial judgment, contributors should omit mention (or "author-date")
system of notation,
rent numbers of

the

journal,

of their other publications and put, on the title page

in full, E-mail address, Please send four clear copies, which will not be returned, entire text and reference list.

desired,

address with postal

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code

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and double space the

Composition

by Bytheway Publishing

Services

Printed

by

the

Sheridan Press

Binghamton, NY 13901 U.S.A.

Hanover, PA 17331 U.S.A.

Inquiries:

(Ms.) Joan Walsh, Assistant to the Editor interpretation, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y. 11367-1597, U.S.A. (718)997-5542 Fax (718) 997-5565
interpretation

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joumal@qc.edu

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The Rhetoric
of

of

Xenophon

and the

Treatment

Justice in the Memorabilia

Eric Buzzetti
Concordia University, Montreal

The

political

resurgence of

philosophy of Xenophon has been the object of a significant interest in political theory in the last decade, but this renewal has
to
Xenophon'

generally not (also known

extended

four Socratic writings, the Memorabilia

as the

Apology ago by Bertrand


is
never

of Socrates to

Recollections of Socrates) Oeconomicus, Symposium and the Jury. The biting judgment expressed half a century

Russell

"[a]

stupid man's report of what a clever man says


some

accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he hears into


understand"

thing

that he can

continues to encapsulate the

dominant scholarly

view of

their merits

phon's portrayal

(1945, p. 83). Even the recent attempts to rehabilitate Xenoof Socrates, while rightly challenging this dominant view, have
in showing that (or how) it is
erroneous.

not

been

altogether successful

More

often

than not, Xenophon 's Socrates remains a somewhat conventional figure

whose philosophic thought suffers


rates.

by

comparison to the thought of

Plato's Soc Inter

Professor Vivienne Gray's The


Xenophon'

Framing
(1998)
is

of Socrates: The
a case

Literary

pretation

of

Memorabilia
of the

in

point.

Hers is the first


over

book-length interpretation
twenty-five years; as such,
students of philosophy. what

Memorabilia to
an audience

appear

in English in

it deserves

Indeed, they

will

among political theorists and discover in Professor Gray's book

is in many ways a valuable addition to the literature on the Memorabilia. It contains insightful remarks about the text and well-aimed critiques of various

dogmas
that the

of

the recent interpretive tradition:

for example, it disputes

the view

Memorabilia lacks formal unity and organization, as that Xenophon was a vain self-promoter. Moreover, Professor length the
rhetorical

well as the claim

Gray

discusses
a

at

character or
neglected

intention

of the

Memorabilia,

dimension

of the work

frequently

by

other scholars.

Gray

treats this rhetorical


of the work.

dimension, rightly in my
want to

view,

as the

key
is

to a

proper

interpretation

In short, Professor Gray's


argue,

monograph

a positive and welcome contribution.

however,

that despite

Xenophon's Socrates Professor

against

its qualities, it ultimately fails to Russell's putdown. More specifically,


rhetorical character of

vindicate although
por-

Gray

sets out to

disclose the

Xenophon's

The

author wishes

to thank

Jeffrey Black, Amy

L. Bonnette, Christopher Bruell, Christopher


this
paper.

Nadon

and

Devin Stauffer for their

comments on the arguments of

interpretation, Fall

2001, Vol. 29, No. 1

Interpretation

trayal of

Socrates,
words,

she

fails to

bring
its

out

its theoretical

richness

precisely because

she remains captive to much of

rhetoric.

Professor Gray's Socrates remains,


At any rate, this is the I review Profes

in

other

somewhat conventional or traditional.

contention that

I defend in the first

section of this article, where

sor
of

Gray's book to introduce my treatment of the Memorabilia. The main part the article contends that when Xenophon's rhetoric is adequately taken into
contrasted with

account, and when the Memorabilia is


the work provides a

the Education of

Cyrus,

fruitful basis to investigate the Socratic question, What is


Socrates'

justice? The overarching aim of the study is to articulate Xenophon's treatment of justice to encourage a revision of the prevailing view that Xeno phon is a conventional thinker and a dull moralizer.

Professor Gray's
tion"

Framing

of Socrates is intended

as

"a

literary

interpreta

of the

Memorabilia,
aim

one which

each of the episodes of the

work, but
show

(Foreword). Its first

is to

detailed commentary on way for such a that Xenophon, no less than the other Socrat"does
not offer a prepares

commentary"

the

ics,

and

especially

Plato, "creates
that "[t]he

a coherent

image

Socrates"

of

(p. 6).

Gray
in its
un

emphasizes at the outset

key

to the understanding of the Memorabilia

certainly begins
presentation of

with the recognition that

it

adopts a rhetorical process

Socrates"

(p. 7). More specifically, the Memorabilia is best

derstood best

as a

"literary

experiment"

in

which

Xenophon "framed the


literature,"

newest and

of wise men within the traditions of wisdom


focus,"

tion "which took wisdom as its major


tradition"

while

he

also

preexisting tradi made "advances on


a

(pp.

8, 184ff). As

result, he created "a

genre"

new

in

which

he

used

"the

rhetoric"

processes of

to build on "audience

expectations"

(pp. 8, 176-77).

Xenophon

employed certain

forms
few
and

of

rhetoric,

Gray

argues, because his hero

Socrates had been

executed a

years earlier on the twin charges of

impiety
be

and corruption of the


persuasive

young

thus needed a

public

defense that

would

(i.e., generally unsympathetic) 26ff., 91, 177, 192, 194). Faced with this situation, Xenophon
to the average

audience member

(pp.

wrote an

apology
and per

in

which

he

emphasized certain aspects of

Socrates'

life

and

thought,

haps
pects

exaggerated

their

importance,

while

he downplayed

or silenced those as or

potentially

subversive of the
at which

defense he intended: "The [conventional


pitches

traditional] level
product of

[Xenophon]
and other

his image [of Socrates


a response to the

is]

not a of the

his intellectual

failings, but
helps

limits

audience and

the possibilities that the tradition of wisdom


argument

literature

offered"

(p.

191). For example, Gray's


silent about
phon makes

"speculative

philosophy"

why Socrates is generally in the Memorabilia even though, as Xeno


explain

clear, "Socrates himself knew about the more speculative areas of


absence

science"

(p. 183). This

does

not stem

from Xenophon's limited knowl


lack
of

edge of

the subject matter or

from

a personal

interest in it. Rather, "The

gentleman

had

no

[i.e., Xenophon's primary time for these pursuits ";


. .

addressee

in the

Memorabilia]

normally In

moreover, "The traditional

instructional

helpfulness

of wisdom

literature

could not

include

speculative

philosophy."

Xenophon 's Rhetoric


"Socrates'

and

Treatment of Justice
of the

word,

more scientific mission

lies beyond the limits

work"

(p. 183).

Gray's
enigmatic

emphasis on

Xenophon's
work,
and

rhetoric

helps

make intelligible

many

of the

features

of the

I believe that it is

fundamentally

sound and

fruitful. Yet
assumption.
cratic

a critic might object

that it is ultimately

premised on a

hypothetical
genuine

Indeed, how does Gray know


"one
of the

that Xenophon was a


Socrates"

So

perhaps a man

three great pupils of

(pp.

4; 22, 25,
own

95)

who understood the possibilities and requirements of apologetic

rhetoric, as opposed to the weak intellect reviled


conventional views and concerns

by

Russell for putting his

in the

mouth of

his better?
argues that when

Gray's Xenophon
fication,"
rates'

answer to this objection


wrote the

is

stated

indirectly. She

Memorabilia, he

employed the

literary
out

technique of "ampli

which

involves "progressive
teachings"
originalities"

restatement at ever

higher levels gradually

of

Soc

beliefs,

practices and

in

order to

bring

"Socrates'

more notorious
Socrates'

(pp. 16, 182; 13, 17, 27,

59, 178, 194). For


Socrates'

exam

ple,
age

lifelong

concern

to define moral concepts such as justice or cour


repeated

is

stated

attempts

in the opening chapter of the work (1.1.16). to define these concepts are then presented in subsequent
on the previous ones

chapters

in

way that each builds Xenophon "built his image


such a

(pp. 16-25). More generally,

of

Socrates

over sequences of amplification which

only gradually took his audience toward those


ated with

higher levels commonly


could therefore show that

associ

the Platonic

Socrates"

(p. 193). One


minded

Xeno

phon was not

dull

and

conventionally

by demonstrating
parts of

that

his Socrates

develops

complex theoretical views


moves toward such a

in the later

the Memorabilia. In

deed, Gray
last book is

demonstration
reaches

when she treats the

fourth

and

of the work where

Socrates

"a higher

plane of philosophic

activity"

(pp. 157, 83, 150-57, 185-91, 194). Yet


acknowledge

by
to
and

the end of her analysis,

Gray

compelled to
rather

that even book 4 turns out to emphasize

"traditional Socrates

than original
.
.

instruction, leading

banality"; "Xenophon's
only slightly
strange

remains

the content of his teachings. His range

only marginally revolutionary is

in

traditional"

(pp. 159, 191; 15, 177,

179, 186). In
Socrates
reader
.

particular, the dialectical definitions of justice and courage that

offers

in the

antepenultimate on words":

chapter of the work


are

"strike

a modem

play they radically unsatisfactory (p. 182). What justifies Gray's insistence, then, that "the Memorabilia [is] a work of
as mere

philosophic

instruction posing Xenophon's

rhetoric"

as a work of

(p. 83)?

Gray's

analysis often succeeds of


prose.

simplicity
cover

in capturing the gracefulness and charming Her paraphrases and extensive quotations un
and

interesting
a

subtleties

in the text

help

fulfill her intention to


attempt

prepare

the

way for

detailed commentary because


takes

on the

Memorabilia. Yet her

to offer

"a

Memorabilia"

systematic examination successful


she

of the rhetorical processes of the

is

less

insufficient
is
often

notice of

Xenophon's

apologetic

rhetoric

(p. 8). As

a result,

Gray

blind to the

unconventional side of

Interpretation
rhetoric conceals.

Socrates that this


point.

Two

examples must suffice

to illustrate this

In

various passages of

her analysis,

Gray

discusses Xenophon's
turning"

alleged refu

tation of the charge that Socrates excelled "at

(protrepein) human be

ings toward virtue, but


virtue

was in was

fact incompetent "to

lead"

(proagein)
a

them to
virtue

(1.4.1). Socrates

accused, in effect, of

inspiring

desire for

that did not produce deeds.


charge
now

present"

Gray rightly notes that Xenophon does not deny this but merely invites his readers "to consider the evidence he will directly which ostensibly exonerates Socrates (pp. 64-65). Since the phi
was accused of

losopher

failing

to teach self-control regarding


or

bodily

pleasures

(enkrateia), among
exhortations

other virtues

qualities, Xenophon depicts two Socratic

to self-control in the immediate sequel


of these exhortations,
one

(1.5, II. 1). Following


accept
proven

a cur

sory reading
that
Socrates'

is tempted to
"is

Gray's
to be

assertion
a perfect

teaching, far from

being deficient,

combination of protreptic and urges the practice of


virtue"

(p. 178). Indeed Socrates emphatically self-control, suggesting for example that it is "a foundation
proagic"

of
soul"

and

that a human

being
far

must

be

equipped with self-control

"first in his

(1.5.4). He

even goes so

as to recount the

famous

tale of the "Choice of


greater self-control.

Heracles"

to lead

his incontinent

companion

Aristippus to
an

(Socrates recounts, for that


which
when

companion's

sake,

exhortation

to self-control to Heracles

Virtue,
he
was
more

personified as an attractive

woman,

once addressed

only

an adolescent

[II. 1.2 1-34].)


refutes

A
tes'

careful

reading,

however,

Gray's

contention.

For one, it

would

Socra be to say the least very odd that Xenophon should have competence to (rather than merely "turn") to self-control with an exhortation to Aristippus, the man who went on to found the Cyrenaic school
"lead"

"proven"

hedonistic philosophy ! That school of thought, according to Diogenes Laertius, placed great importance on the bodily pleasures (1966, p. 219 and passim).
of

More

remarkable

still,

we recall

that

Heracles

was notorious

in the

ancient world

for his immense voracity and lack of self-control regarding food, drink and sex: Virtue's exhortation to him as an adolescent, which Socrates recounts in great detail to
"educate"

Aristippus,

proved

then to be

Aristophanes, The Frogs, lines 503 ff. On


control, see generally G. Karl
earliest writer of comic

Heracles'

resounding failure (see, e.g., selfvoracity and lack of


to

Galinsky

[1972].
the

According

Galinsky,

"The

Herakles

plays was

ished
ence

perhaps as

for

good

early as around the turn of food and drink rather than his labors

Sicilian Epicharmus, who flour the sixth [p. 85]. "Prefer


century"

was a stock characteristic

Herakles"

of the comic

[p. 82]. Compare the


not

central reference to

Epicharmus

at

II. 1.20.). In

other

words, it is

surprising

that

Xenophon fails to

comment

favorably

on the effectiveness of

Socrates'

two exhortations to self-control: far


critics'

from exonerating him, they seem to vindicate a significant part of his charge (cf. 1.5.6 and II. 1.34 with, e.g., IV.3.18 and IV.4.25). Nor are we
prised

sur
pref-

that

Socrates'

final

exhortation

to self-control in the

Memorabilia is

Xenophon's Rhetoric
aced

and

Treatment of Justice

by

what

is in

effect a

telling

admission:

"when

[Socrates]

conversed, he

turned

self-control"

(protrepein, rather than proagein) his companions most of all toward (IV. 5.1, my emphasis). To sum up: A study like Professor Gray's
to light the unobtrusive

should

bring

features
limited

of the

Memorabilia that

help

cor

rect or reveal

the depth beneath its apologetic

surface.

But

by failing

to observe
unconven of

many
tional

of these
and

features, Gray
humor

provides

help

in uncovering the

instructive truth
subtle

Socrates'

about

life
wit.

and

thought, to say nothing

Xenophon's

and

lighthearted

Gray's discussion
my Socrates
criticism.

of the

Socratic
of

education provides a second

illustration

of

In the last book

the

Memorabilia,

Xenophon describes how

his young companion Euthydemus (IV.2-7). It has been rightly observed, however, that Euthydemus was a very unpromising Socratic (Strauss, 1972; Bruell, 1994; cf, however, Morrison, 1994). He will
approached and trained various arguments and suggestions even though many inadequate. Indeed, Xenophon makes clear toward the beginning of clearly his discussion that Euthydemus was unfit to receive an education of a higher
are

rarely

object to

Socrates'

sort.

(Xenophon

says that

Socrates

would explain to

Euthydemus "in the

sim

plest and clearest manner what

he thought

best for him to


as

pursue while

stirring [or "confusing":

[Euthydemus] should know and was diatarattein] Euthydemus

little

possible"

as

mus

to question

[IV. 2. 40, my emphasis]. Socrates did not cause Euthyde himself in any fundamental way.) Why, then, did he suggest

that Socrates might take a serious interest in such a youth?

Was Xenophon

merely ascribing his own attraction to dullness to a more discerning man? The truth, I believe, is otherwise. Xenophon wished to disclose certain

key

features
getic

of a

Socratic
of the

education

but

without
a

intention

Memorabilia. As

completely undermining the apolo result, he sketched this education with


cast

a view to a pupil whose

limitations helped

provided) in

a more

traditional or conventional

Socrates (and the training he light. For Xenophon indicates

that Socrates as an educator "did not approach all [human


manner"

beings] in

the same

various

(IV. 1.3). He especially distinguished between those who resisted his arguments and those, like Euthydemus, who simply listened and gave

their

uncritical assent:

If

someone should contradict

clear to

say

...

he

would

[Socrates] about something without having anything [In bring the entire argument back to its hypothesis.
. .

this way,] the truth became visible even to the


ever

contradictors themselves.

But

when

he

went

most agreed

something in argument by himself, he proceeded (IV.6.13 15) upon, holding this to be safety in argument.
through

via what was

That is,

whenever

Socrates

conversed with someone who objected to one of

his

conclusions, Socrates endeavored to go

back, by mutually

agreed

steps, to the

premise(s) underlying it: he argued dialectically. In this way, "the truth became

Interpretation
themselves."

visible even to the contradictors


with a noncontradictor ment

But

whenever

he

"conversed"

safe,

and

he

attained

like Euthydemus, his primary goal was to make his argu it by defending conventional or publicly respectable
upon"

opinions of what used this ever an

"what he

was most agreed

opinions

that may have fallen short

regarded as the truth.


of rhetoric

We

might

surmise, moreover, that Socrates


aroused when

kind

to guard against the anger that can be


and

interlocutor's beliefs

opinions, especially

about subjects such

as

piety, justice or the noble,

are questioned or challenged

(Bartlett, 1996,

p.

4).
was

According

to

Xenophon,

these were

just the kinds

of subjects that

Socrates

constantly investigating (1.1.16). Be that as it may, Xenophon makes Socrates would not expose a youth like Euthydemus to his "more
originalities,"

clear that
notorious

and

the fact that the youth's education generally reaffirms conven

tional views is a tribute not only to

Xenophon's

skillful

rhetoric

but to the

accuracy

of

his depiction
to

as well.

Gray
her

never seems

realize

that the sketch of the Socratic education proves the conventionality of


Euthydemus'

contention that

Xenophon

emphasized or exaggerated

his hero. While


education, she

she sometimes notes the

traditional character of

nevertheless

insists that he is "an interlocutor her

of amplified sensi

bilities

capacities,"

and

"a potentially

excellent pupil marked out

for

leadership"

(pp. 152,

37;

191). The primary

cause of

error

is, I believe,
pp.

clear:

She fails

to observe that the passage quoted above distinguishes two types of interlocutors
and that affects

Euthydemus
Socrates

must

be judged in its light (cf.


various ways.

21-22). This failure is


not

her interpretation in

Above all,

Gray

led to

ask

whether

would approach

that he approached Euthydemus: took

his more promising pupils in the same manner Would he take up with them the questions he
questions

up

with

him? Would he treat these

differently

or more

deeply?

What

would

the content of the presumably more

"stirring"

treatments be?

Nor does

Gray
of

consider

how Xenophon's

other writings can

help

answer

these questions. (She

"The

place

her two-hundred-page study to barely the Memorabilia in Xenophon's wider [p. 194].) For
one page of
corpus"

devotes

example, Socrates discusses the theme of justice in


and

book 4

of the

Memorabilia

he defends in that
law"

context

the rather conventional view that


not with

"the

(IV.4.12 ff: Socrates discusses this theme


"noncontradictor,"

justice is simply Euthydemus but

with a

fellow

the sophist

Hippias

of

Elis). This discussion


a paral opened

remains rather

lel

passage

unenlightening if read alone. But when read together with from the Education of Cyrus, fruitful paths of reflection are

up (cf. Memorabilia IV.4.12-18 with Education of Cyrus 1.3.16-17). And it is reasonable to surmise that Socrates would have guided his better pupils, Xeno
phon

among them, down these less trodden but


remains a

richer paths.

In

other

words,

Gray
work

insufficiently

aware of the extent

to which the

Memorabilia be
individual
uni
apprecia-

longs to

larger

constellation of

writings,

where the richness of an

is bound up with the place that it occupies verse. It is one of the aims of the present study to

within the
show

Xenophonic
a

how

better

Xenophon's Rhetoric
tion of this connectedness can
Socrates'

and

Treatment of Justice

help bring
justice.

to light the richness of Xenophon's

presentation of

view of

I.

SOCRATES'

VIEW OF JUSTICE

Even in his
stant

own

lifetime, Socrates

was

famous

as a philosopher

for his

con

investigation

of the

question, What is justice? It is a reputation to which

the Memorabilia as a whole bears eloquent testimony: To mention point, the work

only

one

literally

begins

and ends

with conspicuous references to this

investigation. (In the first What is


.

chapter of the

questions that

Socrates

"always"

was

book, Xenophon gives a list investigating, a list in


life"

of the

which

the question,

What is just? figures prominently [1.1.16]. And in the final chapter, Socrates claims that he has "spent his whole [diabioun] doing "nothing
other

than
the

thoroughly examining
and was

what the

just

and the unjust things

are, while

doing

just

Yet Socrates

[IV. 8.4; consider also IV.4.5-6].) refraining from the perhaps equally famous for never finishing or completing his
unjust"

examination of as to what

justice; he

seemed to

have

spent

his

whole

life
a

being

at a

loss

it is (Symposium 4.1, Memorabilia IV.4.5-6). As his

result, his views

on the subject remained elusive to most of

contemporaries.

them even accused


criticized

him

of

deliberate
of

concealment.

In fact, some of For example, he was once


when

by

the sophist

Hippias

Elis for resting satisfied,


your

it

came

to to

justice,
render

with

"asking

and

an

account

to

anyone

refuting everyone, or to declare

while you yourself

do

not want

judgment

anything"

about critique of

(IV.4.9;
rates

cf. also

1.2.36-37; IV.4.1 [beginning];

Thrasymachus'

Soc

in Plato's Republic 336b8-d4). While it may be debatable whether Socra tes deliberately concealed his views about justice, it is surely not difficult to see why these views could have been thought to be elusive. For in the Memorabilia
alone,
no

fewer than five definitions


"wisdom"

of

justice

are

offered or

suggested:

(1)
and

justice is

(sophia:

III.9.5); (2)

justice is

"helping

one's
law"

friends

harming
ful":

enemies"

one's

(cf. IV. 2. 12-18);

(3)

justice is "the

(or "the law

IV.4.12ff; IV. 6. 6); (4) justice is "to know what is lawful (IV. 6.6, in fine); (5) justice is "to harm no one, not human concerning (IV. 8. 11). even a little, but to benefit human beings to the greatest
to nomimon,
beings"
extent"

That Socrates

spent

his

whole

life searching for justice may


regarded as

suggest that

he

never arrived at an

account of

it that he

fully

satisfactory.

But it

does
not

not suggest

that he was

only

searched

entirely at a loss for justice, but he was also


others.

as

to

what

it is. After all, Socrates


justice. He instructed

a teacher of

or sought to

instruct

never promised

to be a

(It is true that, according to Xenophon, Socrates teacher of justice [or of "virtue": Memorabilia 1.2.3, sec.
that he did not teach justice in actual fact. On the

8]. But this does

not mean

contrary, Xenophon states explicitly that Socrates "taught most


whatever

he himself knew

of the things

it is

fitting

for

a man who

eagerly of all is a gentleman

10
to

Interpretation
know,"

while

making

clear that

Socrates

"justice"

counted

among these
would

gen

tlemanly

topics of

inquiry [IV.7.1; 1.1.16;

cf.

IV.2.22-23]. It
not promise

seem, then,

that Socrates was a teacher of justice who did

to teach justice
students

[or
that

justice

virtue].) The question thus naturally is? What were his mature views

arises:

What did he teach his

on this

topic,

provisional as

they may
educa
place

have been? More generally, What


tion to justice? To begin to
some passages of

was the overall character of a

Socratic

answer these

questions, I

consider

in the first

story Empire. The


context of a

of the education and


passages

Xenophon's Education of Cyrus, military career of the famous founder

where Xenophon tells the of the

Persian

in

question

occur

in the first

part

of the

work, in the to which


per

description

of the old republic of

Persia,

an austere regime

Cyrus
tain

owed

(much of) his

education and which which

he later transformed.
regime educated

They

more

narrowly to the manner in

that

its

children

to

justice. This description


of

provides a useful

foil in light

Socrates'

of which

view education

justice, as well as the general justice, gradually emerges.


Toward the
that

character and goal of a

Socratic

to

beginning

public schools

Education of Cyrus (1992), Xenophon explains (didaskaleia) had been established in the republic of Persia
of the

where parents could send their children to

learn justice, among


the

other subjects

(1.2.6-7).

There, he says, the


in judgment The

children's teachers spent the greater part of the


since

day sitting
elders,
such things.

of their pupils,

Persian children, like their

accused each other of children

ished,
also

as were those who

stealing, of violence, deception, calumny and other found guilty of these and similar injustices were pun had made unjust accusations. Moreover, these teachers

judged the

accusation that

is the

greatest source of

hatred among human

beings, but
saw

which

is

seldom pressed

in

court:

ungratefulness.

Whenever they

that a child could


severely.

have been
supposed

him
to

For they

but had failed to be, they punished that ungrateful human beings were most likely
grateful

neglect

the gods, their parents, their

fatherland

and their

friends. And

shame-

lessness,

which seemed to

lead

most of all

to everything shameful, also seemed

to tread most closely on the heels of ungratefulness.

Xenophon
The
gone

adds to

his description

of the

Persian

education to

justice

a report

of a conversation that occasion

Cyrus

once

had

with

for the
Cyrus'

conversation

was as

his mother, Mandane (1.3.16-18). follows. Cyrus and his mother had
then the despotic
of about
ruler of

to visit

maternal

grandfather,

Astyages,

neighboring Media,

at a time when

Cyrus

was still a

boy

twelve (1.3.1).

When the time Cyrus

came

for

mother and child to return


in

home to Persia, however, his


grandfather.

expressed

the wish to remain

Media

with

But his

mother objected:

"And justice, my
teachers are over

child,"

[Mandane said], "how


said:

will you
at

leam it here,
"Because,"

when your

there?"

And Cyrus
you

"But this,
it?"

know

precisely."

"And how do

know

any rate, mother, I already Mandane said. he said

Xenophon's Rhetoric

and

Treatment of Justice

11

judge

"my teacher, having judged that I already knew justice precisely, had appointed me of others. Only once was I beaten because I had not judged correctly. The case was something like this. A large boy wearing a small coat had stripped a small boy wearing a large coat of the coat he was wearing and, having dressed him with
his
own

coat, dressed himself with that boy's


was

coat.

Now

when

I judged between

these, I thought that it


judge
coat

better for both

of

them to have the coat which fitted

him. But my teacher beat


of the

me

fitting, I should act belonged, I had to consider

for this, saying that whenever I was appointed to as I had, but when I had to decide to whom the
which possession was

just,

that due to force or that

due to making or buying. [my teacher] said, 'the legal is just, but the illegal is (to men nomimon dikaion einai, to de anomon biaiori) he bid the judge
forceful,'

'Since,'

always to
at

tally his

verdict with

the

law."

"Thus

you

see, mother, that the just things

any

rate

I already know

precisely.

And if I
me

should need

anything in

addition,"

[Cyrus]
The

said, "grandfather will instruct

himself."

(1.3.16-17)
children was, as this
law."

view of

justice that Persia


clear,
was

sought to

inculcate in its

conversation makes education to

quite simple

indeed: "justice is the

The Persian
aimed at

justice

inculcating
supported
nurture

habits

of

primarily an lawfulness in its

education children

to law-abidingness. It

by

the threat and use of corporal


were

punishments as well as

by

praise and

blame (see, e.g., 1.6.20). These habits These habits

in turn

by

the children's sense of shame, which Persia sought to


and this sense of

through its

punishment of ungratefulness.

shame would

each other as

insure that the young Persians would abstain from injustice toward they grew older, and become instead mutually friendly and helpful.
education to

Otherwise put, Persia's


mutual service

justice

was meant

to foster

concord and

among

the

Persians. It

represented

the first stage of a public

education whose complete goal was the who are good or enemies
rected

making of good citizens: human beings helpful to their friends (or fellow citizens) and harmful to their
education

(1.2.5 in fine). In that sense, the Persian


the outset toward an

to justice was di

from

emphatically

political goal.

For

present

purposes,

that it reminds us of
chapter of the

however, the most notable feature of this Socrates, who also argues that "justice is the

education
law"

is

in

one

Memorabilia (IV.4).

There, Socrates

answers the claim of the


matters"

sophist

Hippias that "laws

or obedience to them are

[not]

serious

by

pointing out that law-abidingness is in fact very profitable to both cities and individuals (IV.4. 15-18). He even goes so far as to suggest that "the gods too
. .

are satisfied

that the same

thing is both just


"law"

legal"

and

(sec. 25). It

would

seem, then, that Socrates

accepted the view of

To be sure, it is

not

entirely say

clear that the

justice publicly held in Persia. he had in mind was the Persian have been thinking
of the

law;

Socrates did
at

not

so explicitly, and
example.

he

could

laws in force
suggest that

Athens, for

he had

no specific

In fact, many of his remarks to Hippias law in mind but that he equated justice with any

law,

positive or

unwritten, whatever

its

content

(cf. Morrison 1995,

p.

334 ff).

On the

other

hand, his

main argument

to the sophist contains the suggestion that

12

Interpretation
is
a model

the superior law-abidingness of the Spartans


crafted

to

imitate,

and the

laws

by

the

Spartan Lycurgus bore


and

Persians (IV.4. 15; Sparta


tutional kings who
education emphasized
pense of

Persia

were

striking resemblance to those both aristocratic republics with

of the
consti

enjoyed

limited powers; their

respective systems of public

temperance,
or

endurance and obedience to rulers at also emphasized


cf.

the ex

book

learning

music;

they
with

hunting

and

training for

restricting Spartans XV. 1, II. Iff., II.7, IV.7 To determine


whether

war while

commercial

activity:

Xenophon's Constitution of the Education of Cyrus 1.3.18, 1.2.2ff., 1.2.3).


accepted

(or to

what

extent) Socrates

Persia's

view of

justice,
coats.

we must consider more will enable us to

carefully the

This

clarify the

perspective

story from

of

the two boys and their


which

Socrates

equated

justice and

legality

and, therewith, any disagreement that may have underlain

his seeming embrace of Persia. Even prior to his judgment of the two

boys,

the young Cyrus knew that in


appointed

Persia, "justice is
clear that

the

law."

After all, he had been


precisely.

by

his Persian
makes

teacher because he already knew justice

Moreover, Xenophon
case:

Cyrus

accepted the view of

justice in

question

(1.6.27). Yet despite


he
gives each could

these

facts, Cyrus disregards


coat without regard

the

Persian law in this

boy

fitting
goes

to their respective legal


of the

rights.

We

beyond the law in the direction

fitting

or the good.
at

Why

say does Cyrus

that he

do this?
appear

Judging

from his

speech to
not

his mother,

any rate, the

reason would

to be this: he holds

one, but two basic opinions about

justice,

which

happen to

contradict each other


law,"

in this

particular case.

He believes

on the one

hand that "justice is the


good"

but

also on the other that


part

"justice is something
to the extent
respective

(Strauss, 1953,
gives each would seem

pp.

146ff; Stauffer, 2001,


a

1).

Moreover,
to their

that

Cyrus

boy

fitting

coat without regard

legal

rights, it
mind

that the second opinion exerts a stronger influence on

his
or

than the first: Cyrus believes that it is just to be guided

by
his

the

fitting

the good, rather than

by
as

the

law,

when the

law turns

out

to be harmful. And

further still, inasmuch


could add that
Cyrus'

we, the readers,

typically

approve of

preference is above all

is

not

merely idiosyncratic:

we

decision, we too believe, it

seems, that justice

Yet lest

we

something fitting or good. forget, Cyrus is punished for his decision. Whereas Cyrus judges

that justice is not tains that


or

simply the legal but the fitting or the good, his teacher main the just is always the legal, even when the legal proves to be unfitting
Cyrus' disregard of clearly the case here. The teacher objects to insists on its absolute sanctity and applicability. But why insist on Cyrus'

bad,

as was

the law and


this? What

is wrong with judgment in this case? After all, both boys were clearly benefited by the decision. Indeed the common good between them could not have been better served. Why, then, did that decision deserve to be
punished?

Here
ment.

we must reflect on would

the potential political significance of

Cyrus'

judg
em-

What

the consequence be of

applying the

principle of

justice

Xenophon's Rhetoric
bedded in that judgment,
but to
all
not

and

Treatment of Justice

13

only

to this particular instance of coat swapping,

property

and even all good

things

enjoyed

in Persia? The
of

answer
could

is be

that a political revolution would result.


stated thus: all

Cyrus'

principle

justice

property, all good things

justly belong
right

to those who can use them

well or profitably,

irrespective

of their

legal

to them. That the implementa


once we reflect public

tion of such

a principle would

transform Persia becomes clear


right

that,

while

every

parent

there had a

to send his children to the


afford

schools of justice,

only those

who could

financially

to support them while


rather sent
since

they

were

in

school

them out to work.


children who

actually sent them there. The This decision was of course of successfully of the Persian
gone

others crucial

did not, but

significance,

the

had

not

through the

education

to justice (as well

as the other stages

public

education)

were not allowed

to share

in the

public

honors

and positions

of rule

later

on

in life (1.2.15). Thus the

economic

of

its

children.

scarcity existing in Persia permitted the regime to educate only some Since the decision whether to educate a child was made privately

by his
in the The

parents, and not


regime

by some public authority, the "distribution of inevitably came to mirror the preexisting distribution
this result

education

of wealth.

problematic nature of

becomes

clear once we reflect that at


certainly-

least

some of the children of the poor were almost

more capable of

benefit

ing

from Persia's
but to

public

education than

at

least

some

of the

children of the
not

wealthy. coats

Accordingly,
but talented

were we to

Cyrus'

apply
have been

principle of

justice

only to
wealthy

educational opportunities as children should

well, we

might

have to

conclude that

the poor

educated

instead

of the

but unpromising
of
Cyrus'

ones.

(Consider, for

Cyrus, II.3.7-16; VIII.3; see judgment, if applied to the enjoyment of every type of good and word, privilege in Persia, would have had revolutionary implications for that regime
because
it would

Pheraulas, Education Nadon, [1996], pp. 364-67). In a especially


example, the
case of

have

meant

the end of the

political

hegemony

of the

families. To

come

back to

Cyrus'

teacher, then,
and

we can suspect that

wealthy his insis

tence on the absolute

sanctity

desire to itself

maintain the political

applicability of the law was the result of a status quo in Persia, a regime which presented but
was

as an aristocratic republic us return

in truth
we

closer

to an

oligarchy.

have been his may wonder, view of this controversy between the young Cyrus and his Persian teacher? With whom would he have sided? At first, we might be tempted to conclude that he
But let
to Socrates.

What,

would

would

have

agreed with the

Persian teacher, since,


law"

as we saw,

Socrates

suggests
passages

to Hippias that "justice is the


of

(IV.4. 12;

see also

IV. 6.6). Yet many

Xenophon's

other

Socratic

writings point to the alternative conclusion.

For

instance, in the opening chapter of the Oikonomikos, Xenophon recounts a con versation between Socrates and his young, funloving friend Critoboulos where Critoboulos is gradually led to the very view that underlies the judgment of
young Cyrus: property
irrespective
of

justly

belongs to those
to it

who can use


cf.

it

well or profitably,

their legal

right

(1.1-15;

6.4). And

within the Memora-

14

Interpretation
seen to guide

bilia itself, Socrates is friend is dispirited


it

his

pupil

Euthydemus to the any


other

conclusion

that it would be just to steal a


and might

friend's sword,

or

weapon, when that


suggests

harm himself (IV.2.17). That is, Socrates

there again that property can


well or profitably.

justly be taken away from those who cannot use It would seem, then, that if Socrates imitates the Persian
law, he
also

teacher in equating justice with the

doubts the
at

property

rights.

Much like the young Cyrus, he looks

sanctity of from the van property


absolute

tage point of the

fitting

or the good rather than that of

legality. And

judging
i.e.,
that

from that perspective, he sees that the laws ownership that is not profitable to its legal
Are
we

often protect unjust


"owner."

ownership,

to conclude that Socrates accepted

Cyrus'

principle of

justice,

he too held that justice is the

fitting

or the good rather than the


places that

law? But if so,


law"

why did he

continue

to insist in various
principle

"justice is the

without

in any way? Didn't he see that many laws are unjust? And if he did, why didn't he advocate that such laws be repealed or improved (but cf. Memorabilia 1.2.9)? In all these respects, it seems, Socrates
apparently qualifying this
remains closer

to

Cyrus'

teacher of justice than to Cyrus himself.

To appreciate the let


us return

perspective

from

which these

difficulties

might

be solved,

to our
we

Persian

teacher of

justice

and reconsider

his

position more

closely.

Perhaps

ing the element of bility of the law, an


How,
ber
we

dismissed him too quickly a moment ago without appreciat wisdom in his insistence on the absolute sanctity and applica
element which might

help

Socrates'

explain

attitude.

ask,

would

Persia have to be transformed he


Cyrus'

so as to give

wealthy Persians be destroyed. The Persian oligarchy has to go. What will necessarily replace it? Given the economic scarcity existing in Persia, the regime can only educate the best of its children, whether they be born to the wealthy or the poor.

community him? We have already seen that, should mented in the field of education, the political
would

of that

what

can use well or profitably, or what


principle of

every mem is fitting for

justice be imple

hegemony

of the

Cyrus'

principle

thus requires the

implementation
own

of a system of class mobility,

where each child

is

assigned the education

the

identity
must go

or social class of

his

fitting to parents. Only


he

his talents, irrespective


in this way

of

can everyone

in
we

the regime come to receive the education

can use well or profitably.

But

further. Such

a system

headed

by

knowledgeable
a

or wise

only function properly if it were human being, or group of human beings,


would
nature

who would
and

be in

position, first to determine which children have the


public education and which

talents

fitting

for the

do not,

and

then to imple

ment

his (or their) decision. In fact, this

class of the wise would

ultimately have

to hold the power to assign

every

good and privilege

fitting fashion,
tation of

unhindered

by

Cyrus'

principle of

any restriction or justice ultimately


wise."

in the community in a property rights. The implemen


requires that the

"rule

law"

of

be

replaced

by

the "rule of the

Only
in

to hold

absolute political power

Persia,

could there

in this way, only if wisdom were be any hope for the re-

Xenophon's Rhetoric
gime

and

Treatment of Justice
In the end,
and

15
to

to be made just or

"fitting"

and to remain so over time.


Cyrus'

go one

final step, the implementation


and

of

principle might even require


state,"

the establishment of what we could call "the universal


ventional

where the con

arbitrary distinctions between


to
"fitting"

citizens

of various

countries would

obvious obstacles

any

redistribution of the world's

property

be

eliminated.

see that such a political system probably could never, into being. It is hard to believe that any one human being never, or group of human beings could ever come to know what is good or fitting for member of the entire human race, or even for an entire community. And every
we or should come even

From here,

begin to

if

such

knowledge

were somehow

available, it is
assent rule

not at all clear rule

that hu

manity (or that community) would ever because of their small number, could not

to the

of the

wise, who,

To

get a sense of

the magnitude of this

by force but only by persuasion. difficulty, we need only reflect on how


trained
rule of

a rich as a

Persian

would

farmer. And

even

likely react to the decision that his child must be if humanity (or the community) did assent to the
obvious that

the wise, it

is far from

the wise would

want

to exercise this rule. the needs of others

After all, this


and

would entail

spending

one's existence

fulfilling

arbitrating their disputes, all of which would be necessary to give to each what is fitting. But this sounds like an unrewarding and perhaps even a wretched
existence,
not

the life a wise man would

likely

choose

for himself. The wise, if


a scenario

they

were to rule at

all, might then have to be compelled to rule,

which

appears, to say the

least,

unlikely.

In fact, it

seems much more probable

that the attempt to do away with

human
cal
Cyrus'

being deceiving

existing laws would result in an unscrupulous his fellow citizens into granting him absolute or tyranni
p.

authority (Strauss, 1953, principle of justice is

141). In short, the

political and

implementation
even

of

grave political

possibility dangers. In that sense, there was more


Cyrus'

not a realistic

is

fraught

with

wisdom

in the Persian
304-5

teacher's insistence on law-abidingness than in

attempt

to go beyond the
pp.

law in the direction


remarks:

of the

fitting
a

or the good.

(David

Hume, [1975],

"Cyrus, young

and

unexperienced,

considered and

only the individual case

before him,
signed the
size.

and reflected on

limited fitness

convenience, when he as

long

coat to the tall

His

governor

boy, and the short coat to the other of smaller instructed him better, while he pointed out more enlarged
and

views and

consequences,

informed his

pupil of

the general, inflexible rules,

necessary to support general

peace and order

in
see

society."

For

discussion

of

the importance and limits of the rule of

law,

especially Plato's Statesman

293e7ff.)
Could it be that
Socrates'

equation of

justice

with

legality is

best

understood

as a manifestation of
possibilities of

his wisdom,

of

his

awareness of the

limits

of the political cannot

justice? Indeed, if the

view

that justice is the


so

fitting

be

implemented politically, if the


might

attempt to

do

is fraught

with grave

dangers, it
and

be better to

return

to the ordinary

view

"justice is the

law"

to

16

Interpretation
view

defend that mentality

in

a spirit of wise moderation

(as

opposed

to a

spirit of senti

or naivete, or even, as

of political opportunism or anger).

may have been Could it be, in


with

true of the Persian teacher, out


other words,

that

Socrates
would

defended the

equation of

justice

legality

just as a sensible person

defend the lesser of two evils? Socrates certainly doubted the simple adequacy of the equation in question. Xenophon makes that fact very clear in the Memora

bilia,
to the

albeit with

his

usual restraint.

(For example, Socrates he

says on one occasion

"law-makers"

Critias

and

Charicles that he is

prepared

to obey the

"law"

prohibiting
"law"

conversation with

the young, and yet

goes on to

disobey

that

precisely

on the grounds that


"laws"

it is

"something
"laws"

contrary to the laws": in


Socrates'

appar

ently, at least some

were not

really
when
and

view

[Memora

bilia 1.2.33-34,
law,"

cf.

IV.4. 3]. Besides,


was

Socrates
he

asserted that
proved

"justice is the

the sophist

Hippias

his addressee,
at

to be a

very bad

one

[cf.IV 4.12-25]. He

was no

better

Euthydemus. Thus in
suspect that what
law,"

accord with what said

Socrates

conversing I suggested in my introduction, we must to Hippias, including the claim that "justice is
to make "the
truth"

than

Socrates'

onetime student

"visible."

the

was not

primarily

meant

In short,

we

have here
whose

another example of

Xenophon choosing

an addressee

for his Socrates

limitations

help

cast

the philosopher in a

more

traditional

light.) Besides,

can we could

really believe that a man who spent his whole life investigating justice have thought that all laws are equally just? That a law imposed by force

on a political

That

bad

or

community is as just as harmful law is as just

law to

which the

as a good or wise

community consented? law? This seems very


One may readily justice would be

implausible.
At this point, it is necessary to
admit that the complete

address a serious objection.


Cyrus'

implementation

of

principle of

impossible

or

dangerous, for

the reasons just indicated. But this is not yet to


of that principle would

concede that some partial

implementation
a

impossible

or

dangerous. After all,

less

oligarchic

Persia

would

be

be similarly more just


to take at

than a more oligarchic one,

least

some steps

away from
case

oligarchy.

for example, In

and

it is certainly
words,

possible

Socrates'

other

insistence that

the just
at

is in every

the legal may seem like wise moderation when looked

from

a somewhat extreme point of

view, but it is also a

questionable
Cyrus'

insis
view

tence,

very that the just is the fitting, why didn't he


the
"unfitting"

at

least in the

case of

unjust

laws. If Socrates repealing


would

shared or

advocate

improving

at

least

very distribution

laws,

and

especially those maintaining an unconscionable


have had little to
gain

of property?

It is true that Socrates

personally from such improvements in because of his outstanding frugality and

the laws: he needed


self-control

very little for himself

(Memorabilia

1.2.1, 1.2.14,
to

1.5.6, IV.5.1, IV. 8.1 1). But


was?

wasn't

it his

duty

as a good citizen to

try

improve

the lot of his fellow citizens, who weren't as

frugal

and

self-controlled as he

To

address

this objection, we must

penetrate

more

deeply into

our subject

Xenophon's Rhetoric
matter.

and

Treatment of Justice
Socrates

17

I have

suggested throughout the analysis that


Cyrus'

accepted the prin


perhaps

ciple of justice
not

underlying formulated this principle

judgment

of

the two boys. But

I have

correctly.

If

the

judgment in

question seemed so

unquestionably just, it was, I would argue, because both of the boys received a coat that was fitting for their respective needs. Each one was benefited to the
greatest possible extent.
ple

That is, the Cyrus

most adequate

formulation

Cyrus'

of

princi
good."

is

not

that "justice
principle

is the

fitting,"

but

rather

that "justice is a common


as could

This is the

that

shares with

Socrates,

by

particular. reconsidering Euthydemus to agree, for example, that it is just to steal a friend's sword he is dispirited and might harm himself, Socrates was clearly describing a

the

Memorabilia in

be easily shown (When Socrates got his pupil


when situa

tion where two people are bound


ests:

by

a common good

[or

community
two

of

inter

Memorabilia IV. 2. 17]. The

same

is

also true of the other

examples

in that passage.) But what if to adjudicate between a small boy


given
at all? as well?

no such

community
coat,

exists?

What if

one

had

with a
coat

big
be

and a

Would Socrates insist that the


be

given to the
fitting"

big boy big boy

with no coat

in that

case

Would he insist that "the just is the


the whole, this would
a

even then?

Now it is true
could use

that,
the

on

better

arrangement:
can.

the

big boy

big

coat more

efficiently than the small


smaller

for

each

individual: surely, the


coat.

boy
of

his inadequate
reflect

The importance

Yet this would not be better boy deriving at least some benefit from this difficulty becomes clear once we is

that,

at

the political

level,

a common good understood

along the lines

of

the coat example may never exist or, at


circumstances.

We

recall that

of the children could

any rate, may exist only under rare in Persia, because of economic scarcity, only some be publicly educated. Now it may be true that, on the
educate

whole, it would be better to


would not

the most promising children. But to do so


a very unpromising child, born to benefit from the Persian public educa

be better for

each

individual. Even
at

wealthy
tion.

parents, will

derive

least

some

By taking
would

this educational opportunity away, we sacrifice that child's good

to that of another, at least to some degree.

What insist
on

Socrates say that justice demands in


coats or educational opportunities

such a case?

Would he
way,

distributing
out

in the best

possible

pointing

that this is all that we can do? Perhaps he would argue that those

whose good must common

be

sacrificed

have

an obligation to

be just,

or to serve the

good,

and therefore that

wouldn't this
good

be to

beg

they have no just basis for complaint. But the fundamental question, since there is no common
of sacrifices

in this

easel

What kinds

does justice demand from us,

as a

matter

of obligation,
on the

according to Socrates?

To be sure, this

question

bears

directly
to
rule.

issue

of the political possibilities of

justice,

since,

as we saw,

while perfect

justice

requires

the rule of the wise, the wise are not

likely

to

want

They

do

not want

to spend their whole life allocating to each "what is


an

fitting,"

since this might

be

what about

their

obligation

unrewarding and even a wretched existence. But to rule? That is, even if all other difficulties had

18

Interpretation
would

been disposed of,

justice impose
And
what

on the wise an obligation

to serve the

common good as rulers?

if

better life

was available to them

(cf.

Memorabilia 1.6.14)? Socrates does


not

directly

address

this

far-reaching
not might

question

in the Memora
whether

bilia,

at

least

not

in any

obvious way.

We do

know,

therefore,
so.

he

addressed

it,

or the manner

in

which

he

have done

from venturing some heuristic suggestion. his analysis of justice to focus on certain powerful and enduring opinions which human beings, or at least just human beings, hold about it, and especially on
vents us

But nothing pre Perhaps, then, it was part of

the opinion or insistence that


good.

justice,

whatever else
at

it is, is

above all
Cyrus'

It is this insistence,

as we

recall, that was

the root of

something judgment
we

of the two
must add

boys,

as well as of our own agreement with that as

judgment. But
scope.

that this insistence is,

it were,

comprehensive

in its

For it
must

would seem to

include the demand that justice, if it is to be true


good

justice,

only for the the just action but also for the doer of it, for the just man himself. beneficiary of Thus we ordinarily speak and think of justice as a "common and a genu
be something
for
everyone

involved,

which

is to say,

not

good,"

ine

common good would

necessarily include the

good of the

just

man

himself,
think

along

with

that of the individual or community which he serves

(cf,
say

again, the
and

three situations described at that it is good


souls are
we also

Memorabilia IV.2.17). Moreover,


at

we

for

us to

be just,

least in the
p.

long
18).

run, or in the sense that our


and to the extent

thereby benefited (Bolotin, 1987,


and

Finally,

that

say

think that justice requires self-sacrifice, don't we expect, or at

least
will

hope,
be

that these sacrifices will

made

good,

we

believe, by

ultimately redound to human beings or by the


we

our

gods?

benefit, for they Indeed, if our

just

actions prove

simply harmful to us,


reward

believe that

an

injustice has taken

place:

we

did
our

not get what we

divine for

just

deserved. We may even come to look to the in the next life. But, Socrates might have argued, by

insisting
and

that true
of

justice

must as a

be

good

"for

involved,"

everyone

or
we

by thinking
grant

speaking human being


justice
doesn't
would our

justice

"common
or at

good,"

don't

implicitly

that a

would

be just,

least

not

unjust, if he

attended

to his good in

a situation where no common good existed?

Don't

we grant that the voice of

be,

so to

speak,

silent

in

such

a case?

Or to

put

it otherwise,
amount

belief in,

or insistence

on, the

complete goodness of

justice

to a recognition
obligated

that, precisely

on grounds

of justice,

the wise would not be


"whole"

to sacrifice their personal


or

happiness to that Socrates


in have

of the

community
the question with

if

better

happier life
we

was available to them?

To repeat, In fact,

do

not

know

whether

confronted

which we are now concerned or the manner


one could

which

he

might

have done
too

so.
not

reasonably

object that we

now gone much

far,

evidence

only in ascribing certain concerns and arguments to Socrates, with scanty textual (but cf. Memorabilia III. 9.4), but also in our disregard of what is arguably the
most conspicuous

feature

of the

Memorabilia

as a whole:

Socrates

Xenophon's Rhetoric
is
presented

and

Treatment of Justice

19

in it

as a most

just

man

little, but benefited his associates to emphasis). That is, the overarching premise
even a

precisely because he "harmed no one, not the greatest (IV. 8. 11, my the Memorabilia's apology is of
extent" others"

that the essence of

justice lies in

"serving
and

(cf. 1.3.1,

II.4.1, III. 1.1, 8.1,


accepted the

10.1, IV. 1.1, 4.1). But if Xenophon,


of the premise

his teacher Socrates,

truth

in question, how

can the

foregoing

analysis

be

on the mark (cf.

especially Hellenika VII. 3. 12)? What is more, the analysis flawed in another respect. For while it is surely significant,
sized, that we speak and think
and of

would appear to as we

be

have

empha

justice

as a common good,

don't

think that justice makes certain


we

demands
draw
a

on us, that we must


other

say be devoted to

we also

that very common good? Don't just behavior and selfish pursuit

distinction, in

words, between
we

of self-interest?

By

what right

did

seemingly
sec

disregard this distinction? It


significant revisions.

would

seem, then, that

our analysis requires some

Thus I

shall return to this question


Socrates'

in the concluding

tion of this article, after


must go

treating

education

to justice. But for now, we

back to

our earlier claim

to demonstrate it more adequately, the claim,


law,"

namely, that when Socrates equates justice with "the

he is

not animated

by

what

I have

called

I have
with the

suggested

sentimentality regarding law. that when the Persian teacher of justice


or naivete animated

equates the

just

legal, he may be

by

the less than respectable wish to maintain


political class

the political

hegemony

of the

wealthy Persians, the

to which,

not

surprisingly, he himself belongs (Education of

Cyrus,

1.2.5). Yet

while there
obscures an

may be some and even important point which have

considerable

truth to this suggestion, it also

we

can

no

longer disregard.

Cyrus'

teacher seems to
not

genuine respect and even reverence when

for the Persian laws. He is

simply
this

disingenuous
reverence?

he insists

on

law-abidingness. What is the

source of

rus, where he explains to his


forceful"

It is adumbrated, I believe, toward the end of his instruction to Cy pupil that while "the legal is just, the illegal is
Cyrus'

(or "violent": biaios, 1.3.17).


opposes the rule of

teacher equates

illegality

with

force; he

law to the
at

rule of

force. His

reverence

for

the

Persian law

seems to

be based,

least in

some

significant

measure, on his
escape

belief that law is

a noble guardian against

force,

or that

human beings

violence, and the harm that results

from violence, through legality. Moreover,

his

reverential

attitude, and the belief on which it is


respect

based, is

not some

kind

of

Persian idiosyncrasy. After all, we, too,


at

the laws to which we are subject

least in
set
law"

part

because

we see

in them

noble guardians against violence.

We,
"rule

"law"

"force"

too,
of

and

in

opposition: the goodness and

nobility
force."

of the

with the
would

badness

and shamefulness of the

"rule

of

What

Socrates have thought

of such an opposition
provided

(and therewith

of

the attitude of
reported

mind

that it fosters)? The answer is


on

by

a conversation

in the Memorabilia
did
not

the subject of law (1.2.41-46).

It is true that Per


infa-

this

conversation

directly
of the

involve Socrates, but

rather the statesman

icles,

the

famous leader

Athenian

democracy,

and

Alcibiades, later

20

Interpretation
for his
in
mind
political activities

mous

during

the

Peloponnesian War. Yet

we

must

keep
took

that

Alcibiades,

who was at the time of the conversation not yet


Socrates"

Pericles'

twenty
taken

and still

ward, was also


says

"[a]

companion of
conversation

when

it

place

(1.2.39). (Xenophon

only that the

"is

said"

to have

place

[legetai: Memorabilia
Pericles,"

1.2.40].)
said, "would
you

(41) "Tell
law
is?"

me,

[Alcibiades]

be

able

to teach

me what

means,"

"By "By

all

said

Pericles.
then,"

the gods, teach it

said

Alcibiades, "for

when

I hear
not

certain ones
what

praised as would not

law-abiding justly obtain


you

men, I think that


this

someone who

does

know

law is

praise."

(42)
law
is,"

"But
said

do

not

desire anything
all things are

hard, Alcibiades, in wishing


laws
be

to know

what

Pericles. "For

that the assembled multitude


done."

has ap

proved and

written, pointing
lad,"

out what should and should not

"Do they hold that one "The good, by Zeus,

should

do

good

things
not

or

bad

things?"

he said, "and is

the

bad."

(43)
should

"What if it is

not

the multitude, but the assembled few who write what one
oligarchy?

do,

as

is the

case wherever there called

What is

this?"

"Everything,"

he said, "is

law that the overpowering


do."

part of

the city, upon

deliberation,
"So
should even

writes that one should

if

tyrant who overpowers the


law?"

city

writes

for

the citizens what

they

do

this too is
what

writes,"

"Even

the ruling tyrant

he said, "this too is


anomia),
weaker
best?"

law."

called
Pericles?"

(44) "But
it

what

is force is

and

lawlessness (bia kai

he

said.

"Is but

not when one who

stronger compels one who

is

not

by

persuasion

by

the use of

force

to do whatever is in his opinion


least,"

"In my opinion,
"And

at

said

Pericles. do
without persuad

whatever the tyrant writes and compels the citizens to

ing

them

this is

lawlessness?"

"In my

opinion,"

said

Pericles. "For I take back

what

said about what the

ty

rant writes without persuasion

being

law."

the few write, without persuading the many but overpowering say that it is force or shall we not say said Pericles, "that one compels someone to do "Everything, in my without persuading him, whether he writes it or not, is force rather than

(45) "And

what

them,

it?"

shall we

opinion,"

law."

"And
ers

whatever the whole multitude writes without persuasion, when

it

overpow

those

having

wealth,

would

be force

rather

than

law?"

(46)

"Alcibiades,"

said

Pericles, "we
For

too were quite clever indeed

at

things of

this sort when we

were your age.

we too practiced such things and made pre

cisely the
ing."

sort of sophisticated arguments that

you, in my opinion, are

now practic

And Alcibiades said, "Would that I

could

have been

your companion at

that

time,

Pericles,

cleverest."

when you were at your

(Memorabilia

12.41-46)

At the

outset of

this

charming

and

sway

of the

opinion, whose influence


a simple opposition

revealing exchange, Pericles is under the we already saw in the Persian teacher,
and

that there is

between law

force, between

the rule of law

Xenophon's Rhetoric
and the rule observation of

and

Treatment of Justice

21

force. For that reason, he is easily unsettled that the first (revised) account of law "everything
part of

by
.
.

Alcibiades'

is

called

law

that the
do"

deliberation, overpowering fails to give any expression to this opposition (sec. 43). first account has brought it about that law has become indistinguishable from force; it has come to light as nothing higher or nobler than an act of public coercion.
writes that one should
Pericles'

the city, upon

But Pericles is unwilling to accept this consequence, and he is accordingly dis satisfied with his first account (sec. 44). Alcibiades encourages this dissatisfac
tion

by offering
to

what seems to

Pericles'

expression

way out belief that there is an

be

of the

difficulty,

opposition

way to give full between law and force.


a

This opposition, Alcibiades suggests, is


the consent of the ruled), the rule of
compulsion.

rooted

in the
rule

opposition

between

persua

sion and compulsion: whereas the rule of

law is

based

on persuasion

(or

on on

force (or

lawlessness)

is

rule

based

Pericles

seizes on that

distinction. In the later

part of

the conversa

tion, he is accordingly led to claim that a law is only a law if it is fully consen sual, if it involves no compulsion at all but only persuasion: "everything in my opinion that one compels someone to do without persuading him, whether
.

he

writes

it

or not,

is force

rather

than

law"

(sec. 45). But

as

points

out, this view entails that most, not to


are not

say

all of the

Alcibiades quickly democratic

"laws"

of

Athens

really laws.

They
e.g.,

exercise against

the rich

(see,

are acts of force, the force that the poor Oikonomikos, 2.5-6; Symposium 4.30-32,

sec.

45). Thus

Pericles'

while

first

account of

law

could not

do justice to his
second account

opinion that there cannot support

is

an opposition

between law
of

and

force, his

democratic Athens, in the making of some of which he presumably participated, are indeed laws. We conclude that the opposition between the rule of law and the rule of force
not

his belief that the laws

is

as

clear as

assume.

In fact, the

Pericles (and, before him, the Persian teacher) seemed to simple opposition between them has come to light as untena
law is
always created and main

ble since, for


tained partly
rather

all practical purposes, the rule of

by

force.

Every

manmade

law derives

some of

its

power

from force

than persuasion, and conversely (although this


never

point

is

not emphasized since the

in the exchange) force can cannot be ruled


"enforcers"

dispense entirely
even the tyrant

with persuasion,
must rule

by

force:

by

persuasion at

least his army of bodyguards. (Admittedly, the tyrant might be able to rule even his bodyguards by force, or at least by fear, by playing them against each other.) There might appear to be, then, no difference in kind, but only a difference in

degree, between
the "rule of

political communities under

the "rule of

law"

and

those under

force."

Yet this

appearance needs of political


rule

to be properly qualified. For one,

it is
more

clear that some types

are

qualitatively

much

better

and

decent than

others: even

Alcibiades

admits as much, and so


Alcibiades'

does Socrates

in

various passages of the at sec.

Memorabilia (see
see e.g.

first

question to and

Per
as a

icles

42;

as

for Socrates,

Memorabilia 1.2.32

III. 1-7

whole). more

Nor

should we

forget that the

more consensual

forms

of rule

tend to be

stable

than,

and to this extent superior

to, those relying

more on

force.

22

Interpretation
other

The distinction in question, in 1.2.10). But the

words,

while

it is something
significant

of an oversim

plification, does remain meaningful and

politically
put

(cf. Memorabilia

conversation suggests that even the


a reliance on

best

political order will not

be entirely free from something higher


politeia, the

force. To

the same

conclusion

differently:

the conversation reveals that the laws of


or more

every

political order are produced

by

"regime"

fundamental, what Xenophon calls in (see, e.g., Memorabilia IV.6.12). Yet the
different
put it, parts of

other places the


regime

is itself,

in essence,
their

an arrangement of the as

the community defined


.

by

relative strength: part

Pericles

"everything

is

called one

law that the


do"

overpowering (sec. 43, my

of the city,

upon

deliberation,

writes that

should

emphasis).

Putting
a

these two points together:

the conversation

teaches that the simple opposition between law and force is untenable because

law is itself

tally by
meant

preexisting factual arrangement defined fundamen begin to understand how Xenophon's report of force. (From here,
produced

by

we

Socrates'

interview
prepare

with

Critias

and

to

the reader

for his

report of the conversation

Charicles [Memorabilia 1.2.31-38] is between Pericles


summoned

and

Alcibiades [sees. 41-46]. Socrates had been


two of the

by

Critias

and

Char

icles,
or, as
art of

Thirty

in

public.

they had

Thirty Tyrants, after he had allegedly criticized the rule of the They proceeded to forbid him to "converse with the written in the laws, they commanded him to stop "teaching an
[sees. 33, 31]. The story in
question makes

young"

speeches"

abundantly

clear

that the rule of the


prohibition

Thirty

was violent and oppressive

and, in particular, that the

conversing with the young was an act of pure force [see sees. 35, 37]. Yet both Xenophon and Socrates go out of their way to call the prohibition in question a while Xenophon calls Critias and Charicles
against
"law,"
"law-makers"

[sees. 31, 33-34]. At

first,

one

is tempted to treat these


Alcibiades'

character

conversation with merely ironic. Yet once we reflect on Pericles, we begin to understand the seriousness behind them. Alcibiades offers,

izations

as

so to

speak,

a systematization of the

lesson intimated

by

the

"law-makers"

Crit

ias

final step in our analysis, we might even ask Charicles.) whether the reported conversation leaves any room for the existence of any For we generally believe, with Pericles, that law is both different from,
and

To

go one

"laws."

and

higher

or nobler

than, force. To
exist, but

the extent that the conversation


we could

has

shown

that this simple

distinction is untenable,
"laws"

say that it

presents us with an

alternative: either

they

are not nobler than

force,

or, if we insist

that laws must be nobler than

force to be laws, then

there are no

laws. It is
which

doubtful, in
which,
as

other

words, that there exists a

being

"law"

or concept

combines all

the opinions we have on this subject into a coherent whole of


a rational account could

such,

be

given.
came

It is
law
and

almost certain that the

young Alcibiades

to these

insights

about

law-making

through his association with


was still

Socrates,
and

an association

which,

as we

have mentioned,

going

on at the time of the conversation.

In fact,
a

Alcibiades'

whole manner of

questioning

Pericles,

especially his raising

Xenophon's Rhetoric
What is
moment

and

Treatment of Justice
contrast,
return
now

23
for
a

? question,
to

was that of a

Socratic.

By

Professor Gray,
not

who contends that the conversation shows the cor


man who

rupt nature of

Alcibiades, "a young


say that

Socrates but did surely


have
to see.
ment

have the morality to apply it


Alcibiades'

learned mastery of speech from (p. 116). Gray is


properly"

correct to

character was

suspicious, but
that

she should

at

least

considered whether

he did

not see

something

Pericles failed
argu

Gray

does

not seem

to appreciate that Xenophon

put an

instructive

in the

mouth of a villain who could and she

notorious
ment.

hubris,
a

be easily dismissed because of his then intimated that his hero was the source of that argu

In

word,

falls

victim to

Xenophon's

apologetic
politicians

rhetoric.

(More

specifically,

Gray

argues that

"Pericles is like those


no

in Plato's Meno
not

98ff. been

who

have

correct

belief but

knowledge because their beliefs have

reasoned

through. He knows that

democracy
sets

is justifiable but is

unable

to

win the contest of


right

opinion

reasoning but is in command it


on

which

Alcibiades
of the

in train. The

pupil

lacks the
answer

ironic

style of question

and

refutation and uses


refuted.

his

guardian to elicit a

definition
a

which will

be easily

Partial

wisdom meets partial wisdom

in

deconstruction it. The

of the tradi
corrupt pupil

tional

form

which

is

a measure of

Xenophon's

control of

has

technical victory over the symbol of political wisdom, as Critias and Char icles had their limited political victory over Socrates as the true symbol of wis 1.2.31-38]" dom in the earlier conversation [at [p. 116]. I would agree with
a

Gray

that

democracy

is justifiable, but

she should

have

explained

why Alcibi

ades'

victory over Pericles is merely "technical.") We conclude that unlike Pericles, and unlike
simple opposition

Cyrus'

knew that the


untenable;
most,
not

between "rule

law"

of

Persian teacher, Socrates and "rule of is


force"

unlike

them, he

fully

appreciated the element of of

force
"the

at the root of
law"

to say all, human

laws; his equating

justice

with

was not

the result of a sentimental failure to appreciate one important aspect of legality.

II. THE SOCRATIC EDUCATION TO JUSTICE

What I have

said so

far

aimed

to shed light on the


not

perspective

from

which

Socrates

equated

justice
of a

with the

law, but it has


education to

brought

out

character and goal


was such an

Socratic

justice. In

what respect,

sufficiently the if any, Here again, I

education

different from its Persian

counterpart?

begin from

a consideration of the was

Education of Cyrus.
of about twenty-six or
came

When Cyrus
after the

already
headed

a man

twenty-seven,

and

death

of

his

grandfather

Astyages, Media
the

to be threatened
new ruler of

by

large military
Astyages'

alliance

by

king

of

Assyria. The

Media,

son

Cyaxares,
Cyrus
As Cyrus

responded

to the threat

allies,
sent

and

it

was

who was chosen


and

appealing to his Persian to lead the Persian contingent to be

by

in

relief.

his father Cambyses

rode out of

Persia together,

24

Interpretation
a

they had
which,
part of

long

conversation about the tasks and

duties

of a general, a subject
crucial

Cyrus'

given

situation,

was

obviously

of

interest to him (1.6). The


"gain"

that conversation arose out of

Cambyses'

suggestion that a good general

should

only
gain

attack

his

enemies

if he is going to
asks, how

(pleon echein) from it be


most capa

(sees. 26-34). But, Cyrus ble to

immediately
At

would someone

from his

enemies?

first,

the wise Cambyses

appears reluctant

to

question: swearing by Zeus, he says that Cyrus is no longer him about low (phaulos) or simple (haploos) matters. "But know questioning he continues, "that whoever intends to do this must be a plotter, a con

answer

this delicate

well,"

cealer,

deceiver, a cheat, a thief, a robber, and in every way greedy to get the (sec. 27). Cyrus is naturally taken aback by (pleonektes) of his the suggestion: "By Heracles, what kind of man do you suggest, father, that I (sec. 27). Indeed, Cambyses seems to be urging his son to transgress all the precepts of Persian justice (cf. 1.2.6). Yet, the father insists, he is only
a

better

enemies"

become!"

suggesting that Cyrus become a most just and law-abiding man. "Why Cyrus reasonably replies, "were we taught the opposite of these things when
adolescents?"

then,"

we

were children and


precepts of

(sec. 28). Cambyses

explains

justice in

question remain

in force

with regard

that, indeed, the to friends or fellow


the enemies, you

citizens.

But, he

adds, so that you may be capable of

harming

were also taught

many

ways of

ill-doing. When Cyrus


reminds

responds that

he,

at

least,

was never taught other

any young Persians, he

such

things, Cambyses
how to

was taught

use

him that along with the the bow and the javelin, and human being, Cyrus I
even appeared

especially, on the occasion of public to deceive an animal is not the same

hunts, how
thing
was
as

to deceive the game. And yet,


a

to deceive

reasonably wish to deceive javelin


against

retorts.

"And I know that I


beings,"

beaten

whenever

to

anyone"

(sec. 29). "Nor did

we allow you

to use the bow or the


to throw

human

Cambyses responds, "but

we taught you

at a target

not so

that you would use these skills against your

that you would be capable to shoot at the enemies should war


we

friends, but so arise. Likewise,

taught you to deceive and to be

not of

human beings but


order that you not

of

but in

greedy in getting the better (pleonektein) that you would harm your friends, animals, be untrained even in these things should war
not so

arise"

(sec. 29).

Cyrus If

remains

dissatisfied

with

his father's

somewhat reticent explanation.

how to harm human beings is useful, they knowing should have been taught both these things regarding human beings. "It is said,
good and a

how to do

child, that there was once

teacher

ancestors,"

"who taught justice to the

children

among our just as you bid

Cambyses

replies,

that one should not

lie

and

lie,

not

deceive

and

deceive,

not calumniate and

calumniate,

be greedy guished between


mies.

(pleonektein)"

(sec. 31). But in

all these

not be greedy and things, this teacher distin and what

what one should

do to

one's

friends,

to one's ene

He

also taught that were

it

would

be just to deceive

even one's

friends,

or to

steal

from them, if it

done for the

sake of the good.

And

as

he taught these

Xenophon's Rhetoric
things,

and

Treatment of Justice

25

the children necessarily began to practice them toward one another. The Cambyses explains, was that some of these children, who were result, naturally gifted for deception and for greed (pleonektein), and perhaps also not without a
natural

love

of gain

(philokerdein),
love

did

not refrain

from attempting to be greedy


manner of

(pleonektein)
led to
a other and

even with their of the

friends. (That is, this


of gain of the

teaching

justice

liberation

children, who turned against

each

their fellow

ten law was


must

Persians.) For that reason, Cambyses explains, an unwrit established at the time, and is still in force today, that the children
"simply"

be taught justice

(haplos), i.e., by
deceive,"

means of absolute and uncondi


steal,"

tional precepts ("never

lie,"

"never Those

"never

and so

on), just as

it is taught to house
so

slaves.

who

transgress these

precepts are punished

that,

once

they have

acquired the proper

habits, they

will

be

gentler citizens.
now

But

when the children

have

reached

it is thought

(dokein)

to be safe

full adulthood, as Cyrus himself to teach them what is lawful regarding

has,

enemies.

Indeed, Cambyses

concludes, it is thought

(dokein)

that those who have been

brought up to respect each other would toward their fellow citizens (sec. 34). I
mentioned earlier that the good citizens

not allow

themselves to become harsh

Persian

education to

justice

was aimed at produc


place

ing

(1.2.5). To be

a good citizen means

in the first

to be

gentle or

friendly

toward one's fellow citizens. The the earliest age that

young Persians

were accord

ingly
never

taught

from

they

should never

lie,

never

deceive,

steal,

and so on.

Obedience to these

absolute precepts was secured

by

corporal punishments and

and But good citizenship also ability to defend one's country in time of war: the good citizen is not only friendly to his fellow citizens, he is also harsh with his enemies. He must possess the virtues associated with war (see Memorabilia III. 1.6). In particular,

would

become

by praise and blame, and remain friendly to each other.

it insured that the Persians

means the

he

must

be trained in the

arts of

deception,

which

Persia inculcated in its

youths

by
the

organizing frequent

hunting

expeditions

difficulty

then arises as to what

(Education of Cyrus 1.2.10-1 1). But is to prevent the Persians, once they have
against each other.

learned these arts, from using them culty


boys
might never arise

Admittedly,
as

this diffi

or, at

least,
out so

would not

be

so serious,

if the Persian laws


the

always secured the good


and

for

each

individual Persian. But

story
seen

of the two

their coats brought

beautifully,

the

legal

prescriptions can

in Persia

were not always good.


public

The

same

fundamental dilemma
prospect of war

be

in Persia's

teaching regarding justice. The


"simplicity"

the original
a partial

of that

teaching; it

compels

forces Persia to qualify her to sanction as just


that

liberation

of the

Persians'

acquisitiveness,
outward

inasmuch,

is,

as that

acquisitiveness

is directed

toward the enemies of the

country.

Persia is

forced
justice

to teach, reticently and with infinite care, what the ancestral teacher of
also taught

his

students:

that justice is
apparent

helping

one's

friends

and

harming
of

one's enemies.

But

as was

already
runs

in the

case of that a

teacher's students,

"complex"

this

teaching

the risk of

producing

complete

liberation

26

Interpretation Persians harsh


even to each other.

acquisitiveness, or of making the


risk of

It

runs

the

which the

weakening the authority of the stern and simple precepts of justice under Persians lived in their youth. For Persia's foreign policy provides a justification for the be
pursuit of self-interest
if

kind

of

by

individuals:

indeed, how
it is If
collective greed?

could such a pursuit

legitimately blamed,
powers on

Persia herself

teaches that

just to deal
greed

with

foreign
least

the sole basis of

self-interest?

is just,
as

or at

not

unjust, mustn't the same be said of individual

Be that

it may, it is
once

clear that once the

Persians had

attained

adulthood, and

especially they had learned the arts of deception, the only real bulwark their becoming harsh even with fellow Persians was their acquired preventing habits of law-abidingness and the respect (or shame) they felt toward each other. As
Cambyses'

general reticence

intimates, it is far from


particular

clear that this

bulwark
dokein

was always
at sec.

up to the task. (See in


justice in the

Cambyses'

double

use of

34. More generally, Xenophon

adumbrates the
way.

less than

complete success educa

of the education to

following

When he describes the


rulers

tion to moderation

[sophrosune],

to obedience to the

[peithesthai tois

archousi]

and to continence

[engkrateia]

which the children received

in

addition

to their education to justice, he says in every instance that the children's educa

tion was facilitated

[sumballesthai] by
[1.2.8]. Xenophon

the sight of their elders, who possessed


never says that

all of these qualities


was

the education to justice


not

facilitated

elders'

by

the sight of the


elders

justice. This is

to

deny

that the

children

imitated their

in this

case as well:

they, too,

accused each other

of all manners of

The
us of a

mention

injustices [see Education of Cyrus 1.2.8, cf. sec. 6].) of the ancestral teacher of justice by Cambyses should

remind

Socrates. Indeed the summary description of that teacher's teaching bears striking resemblance to the brief dialectical examination of justice which Soc

rates

is

seen

to conduct with his pupil

Euthydemus in

the

last book

of the

Memorabilia (cf. Education of Cyrus 1.6.31-32 with Memorabilia IV.2.14-18). There, too, the conclusion is reached that to lie to, or to deceive one's enemies is just, while to do so to one's friends is unjust; and that deceiving even one's friends
or stealing from them can be just, provided it is done for their own good. (The enemy described by Socrates at Memorabilia IV.2.15 is also an unjust enemy, however. He later drops this important qualification, but without any
explanation.

Needless to say, Euthydemus does


be done "for the

not ask

for

one

[sec. 16]. More only that the


words, the

over, in the passage

from the Education of Cyrus, Cambyses


sake of the
good"

says

deception

must

[1.6.31].)

In

other

Persian

unwritten
a

teaching in
justice
and goal?

law regarding the teaching of justice prohibited its Socratic manner. But how precisely did the Socratic education to
with

"simple"

compare

its Persian

counterpart?

What

was

its

specific character

The Persian
was aimed at

education

to

justice was a public

education,
of

which

is to say that it

every young Persian, irrespective


saw, only the children
of the

his

natural

talents or abilities

(although

as we

wealthy

received that education

Xenophon's Rhetoric
in in
actual
nature.

and

Treatment of Justice

27

fact).
It

By

contrast, the Socratic education to justice

was more private

was addressed whom

only to a

limited
in?

number of youths
natures"

and, ultimately,

only to those
judged the

Socrates

regarded as

"good

(Memorabilia IV. 1.2).

What, then, did

a good nature consist

According

to

Xenophon, Socrates

good natures

from three

qualities:

turned their minds the subjects of

to; they

remembered what

they learned quickly what they they learned; and they desired all
nobly (kalos) (to holon
. .

learning
and

through which

one can

manage a
eu

house
of

hold

and a

city, and, altogether,

make good use

chresthai)

human beings

human

matters

(IV. 1.2). That


a

is,

a good nature combined of a certain


occa

intellectual quickness, a good memory, and sort. The young Euthydemus, for example,
sion to emphasize
shows

desire for knowledge

whose

limitations I have had

but

whose attitude on this point pursuits such as

is probably representative,

little interest in theoretical


of

least in the beginnings


whole).

his

acquaintance with

geometry or astronomy, at Socrates (IV.2.10, cf. IV.7 as a


wishes

Rather, he desires
Athens'

to know whatever seems necessary to the success of

the political ambitions which he


preside

has been harboring. (Euthydemus


and passim].

to

over

democracy [IV.2.36; IV. 2. 1-7

As for his

desire for knowledge, it is admittedly


collects

of a somewhat perverted

the writings of wise poets and sophists


meets

initially

[IV.2.1]. Moreover, Socrates, he believes that he already knows what he


successful:

kind: he merely when he


needs

to

know to be politically

he lacks the

spontaneous

desire for knowledge

characteristic of the good natures.

But these facts merely

confirm that

he is

not

himself fit to beings

such a

nature.) Euthydemus desires the

so-called

kingly

art or

kingly

virtue, "that

virtue

through which human beings become fit for political affairs,


competent to

manage

households,
makes
a

rule, and beneficial to other human

themselves"

as well as

(IV.2.1 1;

cf.

rV.1.2). It is this

particular

desire for

knowledge that

him, despite his


Socratic

otherwise poor

intellect, in

one respect a

typical addressee of
pointers

education.

His training, therefore,


an education.

gives us some

regarding the character and goal of such Given that the three qualities constitutive of a
we might

good nature were conclude

all,

broadly
did
not

speaking, intellectual qualities,


character of a youth was of
need

be tempted to

that the moral

little importance in

Socrates'

view: a youth
promising.

to be

just,

or concerned with

justice,

to be

But this

conclusion

is

off

the
not

mark.

We

recall

that a good nature

desires to learn
And to

whatever
of

is

condu or

cive,

merely to the

profitable

or effective

management

households

cities, but to their


noble

noble

management as

well.

manage

fashion

would seem to require that

it be

managed with

something in justice. In keeping


could not

with

this,

we observe that when

Euthydemus
it
clear

told

Socrates that he desired the be


good

"kingly
at

virtue,"

the youth made


without
justice"

that in his view, he


put

exercising it

justice. (As he

it,

"it is

not possible

to be

a good

citizen without

[sec.

11].) The
Indeed,

noble

rally issues, in
affairs,
or

other

words, in

a concern

to act

longing for justly

the

kingly
public

virtue natu

in

and private

to be just

oneself.

to go one step

further,

Socrates'

treatment

28
of

Interpretation
Euthydemus Socrates
suggests that the concern to
approached

be just

was

when

mus, a good

nature

promising youths (IV.2 as a longs to be "a good and he believes


citizen,"

especially important whole). Like Euthyde


that he cannot

be

good at

this without

being

just. But

where will

this

concern

lead him if he is
not

made

to realize, through a Socratic


or

"elenchus,"

that he does

know

what

justice is
other

demands, inasmuch
remove

as

his

opinions on the subject contradict each

(see IV.2. 12-23)? He

will want to

become

a pupil of

Socrates,

quite natu

rally, eager to

the ignorance of which he is now, for the


reaction to
Socrates'

first time,
IV.2.40).
postpone

painfully That is, the


the

aware

(see

Euthydemus'

refutation at

discovery
his
of justice.

of

his ignorance

will prompt the good nature

to

pursuit of

political ambition until such time as

he

possesses an adequate

knowledge

Only

when

this important task has been

accomplished will

he think himself ready to turn to political affairs, confident that he can now be Euthydemus' To put the same point otherwise, (or become) a "good
citizen."

example suggests

that the Socratic education to

justice, like its Persian

counter

part, presented itself as a preparation

for

political

involvement (cf. Memorabilia


means, to the

1.6.15). Like that education, it


political end of good

presented

itself

as a means, a mere
pp.

citizenship (Bruell, 1987,

104-5).

But

were these

two types

of education also similar

in their

content?

Here,

there would seem to be significant differences.


relied

For one, the Persian

education

primarily

on corporal punishments to

inculcate its teaching regarding jus

tice. Socrates on the other hand made no use of such methods but educated

entirely

by

conversation or speech
"cognitive"

(cf. Memorabilia 1.2.18). Not surprisingly,

therefore, the ited than that


were taught

content of the

Persian
We

education was much more

lim

of

its Socratic

counterpart.

recall that

in Persia, the

children

justice

by

means of absolute and unconditional precepts:

the Persian

regime was eager

to present the demands of

justice

"simply"

as

as possible.

In

fact,
good

the success of its education

of a certain

ignorance,
as a

or

apparently depended on the conscious fostering innocence, in its children. (Cyrus himself provides a
conversation with

surprised that steal

seems genuinely military general he will have to deceive his enemies or to from them! This innocence is all the more remarkable given the otherwise

illustration

of this.

In his

his

father,

he

sophisticated understanding of the Persian way of life, and its limitations, that Cyrus had demonstrated in his speech to the Peers [see Education of Cyrus 1.5].)

By contrast, dialectically

Socrates

sought to remove

his

pupils'

ignorance

by bringing

out

the full complexity of the question of


would

justice,

of what

justice is

or

demands. He

begin from

a pupil's

preexisting

opinions on the subject,

from his opinion, for example, that

lying

or

deceiving

is absolutely unjust,

and

gradually bring out the inadequacies and even the contradictions in those opin ions (cf. Memorabilia IV.2.14 ff.). In this way, Socrates' addressee might be led to abandon his former views, or at least to begin a search for a adequate

truly

account of

justice,
each of

an account that would

do justice,

so to

speak, to the

element a
nut-

of truth

in

his contradictory

opinions.

To

put

this

difference in

Xenophon's Rhetoric
shell:

and

Treatment of Justice
opinions about

29

Persia

was satisfied to

inculcate politically salutary


addressees to genuine
a

justice,

whereas

Socrates tried to lead his

knowledge

of

it. (This

is

not

to suggest,

however,

that
a

Socratic

education could act as a

kind

of

sophisticated replacement
education was a

for

Persian

education.

On the contrary,

Persian

necessary prerequisite for undergoing a Socratic training. Thus in the opening of his first conversation with Socrates, Euthydemus is seen to hold the view that lying or deceiving is absolutely unjust [IV.2.14]. Opinions like these would provide the needed material from which the Socratic investigation of justice could begin its work of clarification. The investigation
"Persian"

would sense

bring

out,

if he is

guided

among other things, that a human being is just in the ordinary in his actions not (or not merely) by his knowledge of
a nonrational or suprarational or the

justice, but (also) by


the "good
Socrates'

element,

what we can call

intention"

"good

will"

[see Memorabilia IV.2. 19-20]. For

attitude

toward the good will, see

Memorabilia

1.2.52.)
Socratic educations,

perplexing difference between the Persian given that both were meant to prepare for however,
most respective

The

and

a political

life, is
a

their

duration. In Persia, the It

education to

justice lasted only for


reached

finite

number of years.

was completed when the

young

adulthood,

around

their twenty-sixth or twenty-seventh birthday. In its final stage, the young Per sians would be taught that it is just and lawful to be greedy in getting the better
of the country's enemies.

(We

Cyrus'

recall

conversation with
would turn

his

father.)

After

learning
tion

this, the

now adult

Persians
affairs,

their attention away from

educa

tion and engage in

political

as

Cyrus himself did

following
other

the conversa
was

in

question.
a

The Persian life

education to

justice, in

words,

truly

instrumental to

of political activity.

By

contrast, the Socratic education to

justice,
into

while

it

came

to sight as a means to the same end,

apparently turned
a

an end

in itself

after a while.

It

proved

to be a

lifelong

task,

task that was


given

not completed

in any finite

period

of time.

No indications

are

in the

Memorabilia,

any (or returned) to politics after himself refrained from direct


whole

at

rate, that the politically ambitious

Euthydemus

ever turned

becoming
political

a pupil of

Socrates.

Besides, Socrates
to speak his

involvement

and spent so

6.15, IV.4.5-6; Symposium 4.1). It is true that some of his students, most notably Alcibiades and Critias, did become politicians after leaving his side. But according to the Memorabilia,

life

investigating

justice (Memorabilia 1.1.16,

their

behavior

was

bound up

with their rejection of

Socrates

and what

he

stood

for (1.2.12-48).
Are
we

to

conclude

that the Socratic education to justice could not prepare

its

addressees

for

good

citizenship because it failed to

answer the question of

what

justice is? Is

this the

Socrates'

troubling

significance of

lifelong
Or

investiga it be,

tion of justice

and

his

concomitant

abstention

from

politics?

could

rather, that Socrates was successful

in answering this question,

and that

his

answer to it is bound up with, or amounts

to,

a critique of the political

life?

Could it be, in

other

words, that the Socratic education to justice, while

it came

30

Interpretation

to sight as mere preparation for a political


not

life, led in
meaning

truth to ask whether or


of the second example

to live such a life? (Consider the possible

given at

Memorabilia IV.2. 17.)

III. CONCLUSION: FROM THE POLITICAL TO THE PHILOSOPHIC LIFE

Let

me

try

to spell
so

out

in

preliminary way how this


to reflect once again on

suggestion should
pupil

be

understood.

To do

it is

Socrates'

useful

Euthy
virtue,"

demus. We

saw earlier

that Euthydemus shares with the good natures the yearn


possess what

ing

to be

a good

citizen, or to

Socrates

called the

"kingly
will enable

the virtue of the good citizen (IV.2. 11).

This virtue,

as

he believes,

him to

perform

the work of the citizen, which consists in the essence of good

in

all of

its

needs:

devotion to the
discussion

common good

serving his city well lies in service to others or in citizenship according to Euthydemus. (For a more extensive
citizen, see IV. 6. 14.) But we
must now add

of the work of the good

that Euthydemus also yearns to be a good man, or, as he puts


good"

it,

to be "noble

and

(IV.2.23). He does

not explain what

he thinks

a good man

is

or

does,

however,
that

although

he indicates that

such a person must


perhaps

know the noble, the just

and the good

things (IV. 2.22-23).

Or

Euthydemus believes that human

a good man

good citizen:

goodness as such view.

would be more accurate to say in essence, the same thing as a is, lies in service to others or in devotion to asks

it

the common good

in his
he

(When Socrates

Euthydemus

what

he

wishes

to become good at when he gathers the writings of wise


youth answers that
tue,"

poets and

sophists, the

wishes to acquire

[what Socrates calls] "the

kingly

vir

or,

as

he

puts

it,

to be "a good

Socrates has
that

convicted was

him

he thought he [.
.

[IV.2.1 1, my emphasis]. Yet after ignorance regarding justice, Euthydemus says "pursuing in my philosophizing a philosophy through
of educated to the

citizen"

which

.]

would

be

highest degree in in
Euthydemus'

what

befits

a man

yearning for nobility and the same thing as a "noble demus


correct

goodness"

[IV.2.23, my
Is

emphasis].

good citizen

is

man"

and good

view.) But is

Euthy

in

holding
thing

this view?

a good man

the same

thing

as a good

citizen, or the same

as a serviceable man?

Xenophon, for

one, seems to

have had doubts


the

about the correctness of

this equation. In his historical work

Hellenika, for

example, he observes that "most people, as it seems, define

those who are their


of that remark that

benefactors
he

men,"

as good
"definition"

and

he indicates

by

the context

views the

in

question as crude or vulgar

(VII.3.12). And

indeed, how
a good

couldn't it

be

crude

to think that a bank robber,


given us some of

for example, is inasmuch


when other

human

being simply

because he has have


a

his loot? But Xenophon's


as our
are

observation could

deeper

significance as well,
even or

fellow

citizens are our

everyday benefactors,
There
with
Euthydemus'

precisely

they

devoted to the

common good.

are reasons to

suspect, in

words, that

Xenophon

was

dissatisfied

simple equation,

Xenophon's Rhetoric
an equation which

and

Treatment of Justice
and, in Euthydemus

31
at

is

not

idiosyncratic but very

common as

least, apparently
one of

still unconscious.

Moreover, insofar
Xenophon
a

"service to

others"

is

the most

basic

meanings of justice (cf. was connected with

Memorabilia IV. 8.1 1),

we surmise a

that this

dissatisfaction
life

having
human
be

investigated in

Socratic
to the

manner the question of what


at

justice is. For if

being is
(in the

attracted

political

least partly because he

yearns to

good

sense of

serviceable), then the enduring attractiveness of that life will

presuppose

his

continuing justice

acceptance of this particular

the quotation

from

the

understanding of human goodness. But Hellenika intimates that the Socratic investigation of into
contact with

might not

have

allowed those who came

it,

and who

understood and accepted

its results, to

continue

to share in the understanding in


continue to

question, and therewith to

desire,

or at

least to

desire in the

same

way, the life

for

which

they may have

once

longed. In this way, this investiga

tion could have led to a

lowering

of the appeal of the political

life,

and also

indirectly

to the elevation of some other

life,

what we might call the philosophic

life, to judge at least from Socrates and his pupils (cf, e.g., Symposium 1.4). Admittedly, important difficulties would have to be solved before these con
jectures
can

become satisfactory

suggestions.

For one,
the

we would need

to spell
as

out more

fully

why

the philosophic

apparently is,

once the political

fundamental alternative, life has been demoted in this way. And

life is

it

more

obviously perhaps, the fact that philosophy did not entirely supplant politics or political ambition in Xenophon's own life suggests that there exists a viable
"middle
stand clude

successfully blends these two kinds of lives: they need not as irreconcilable alternatives. But be that as it may, we may safely con from the foregoing this much: the Socratic education to justice would
that
addressees a

way"

naturally foster in its

heightened
goodness.

awareness of

their hitherto un

conscious supposition about

human

And

since to

become

aware of

this supposition is also,


that it must
else

almost

inevitably,

to

realize

be,

at

least,

examined and argued

for,

it achieved,

one essential consequence of the

obviously true, say that whatever Socratic education to justice


not

that it

is

we could

was

to steer its addressees toward greater self-knowledge

(cf. Memorabilia

IV.2.24-30).

Professor

Gray

emphasizes

in

various parts of

her

monograph that

Xeno

phon's portrait of

Socrates is

above

that of a serviceable

human

being

(pp. 10ff;

170, 179). She


which
could not what

notes that

Xenophon has been widely criticized for this emphasis,


a superficial
and

has been thought to bespeak


Socrates'

vulgar mind: the pupil


and

grasp he did understand,

the complexity of the master's


usefulness

teaching
in

therefore he stressed

mundane matters such as solv

ing

disputes among friends


philistine

or relatives

(e.g., II.2-3). Besides, it


goodness to

was

the sign of a
acknowledges

to reduce

Socrates'

surely

his usefulness.

Gray

that

Xenophon's

portrait

is

frequently "useful,

banal

and thera-

32

Interpretation
but
she

peutic,"

insists

that

"Xenophon

levels"

also operates at

higher

(p. 13).
of

Gray
In

does

not raise a crucial

question, however: What did Xenophon think


view

the identification of goodness with serviceability? Did he


one passage,

it

as satisfactory?

Gray

surmises that the equation

in

question suggested wrote the

itself to

Xenophon for its satisfy


an

rhetorical

usefulness,
to

i.e.,

that

he

Memorabilia to
wise

audience

accustomed
rather

"wisdom literature": "The


(p. 179). But
of

man

was

expected

to be

helpful

than

harmful"

Gray

does

not pursue

this fruitful thought very far despite the

evidence

its

correctness.

Indeed,
reading:

Gray

ultimately

recants and ends

up

defending

a much more traditional

the superior goodness of Socrates

lay, in Xenophon's

eyes, in his

superior use

fulness to

others and

especially to young

men such as

Glaucon, Plato's

older

brother (p. 194). To be sure, this reading of the Memorabilia is not indefensible insofar as Xenophon's Socrates does put forward in his own name, and on more
than one occasion, at least a version of the equation of goodness with service

ability (or with usefulness: see Memorabilia III. 8. 5-7; cf. Symposium 5.3-8). But what is the specific character of this version? Gray correctly senses that
Socrates'
"utilitarianism,"

as we might call

it,

was not

was a

"distinct
values"

advance"

on yet she

tradition,
might

albeit one which could


not

it entirely traditional "threaten tradi


way"

tional

insists that Socrates "does

himself apply it that


to
prove

(pp. 180; 179). Professor

Gray

have taken had

a significant

step toward the


this conten

recovery

of

Xenophon's Socratic

wisdom

she sought

tion adequately.

REFERENCES

Bartlett,

Robert

C,

ed.

1996. Xenophon: The Shorter Socratic Writings. Ithaca, NY: In

Cornell

University
and

Press.
"Thucydides."

Bolotin, David. 1987.

History
In

of Political Philosophy. 3d. ed.,


of

edited

by

Leo Strauss

Joseph Cropsey. Chicago:


"Xenophon."

Bruell, Christopher. 1987.


ited

by

Leo Strauss

and

Joseph

University History of Political Philosophy, 3d. ed., Cropsey. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Socrates."

Chicago Press. Pp. 7-32.


ed

Pp.

90-117.
1994. "Xenophon
and

His

In

Memorabilia,

translated

by Amy

L.

Bonnette. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pp. vii-xxii. Galinsky, G. Karl. 1972 Herakles Themes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Gera, Deborah Levine. 1993. Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Style, Genre,


nique.

and

Literary

Tech

Oxford: Oxford

Gray, Vivienne.
phon's

1998. of Socrates: The Memorabilia. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.


1975.

University The Framing

Press.

Literary Interpretation
ed.

of Xeno

Hume, David.
ford

Enquiry Concerning

the

Principles of Morals. 3d.

Oxford: Ox

University University

Press.
1966. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Vol. 1. Press.
et

Laertius, Diogenes.
vard

Cambridge, MA: Har

Lucciom, Jean.

1953. Xenophon

le

socratisme.

Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Xenophon's Rhetoric
Marchant, E. C.
MA: Harvard
1923.

and

Treatment of Justice

33

Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium, Apology. Cambridge,


Press.
Teacher."

University

Morrison, Donald. 1994. "Xenophon's Socrates


edited

as

In The Socratic Movement,

Paul A. Vander Waerdt. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, Pp. 181-208. 1995. "Xenophon's Socrates on the Just and the Ancient Philosophy

by

Lawful."

15:329-47.

Nadon, Christopher.
mon

1996. "From Republic to Empire: Political Revolution


Cyrus,"

and

the Com

Good in Xenophon's Education of 90 (June): 361-74.

American Political Science Review


Writings."

Pangle, Thomas L. 1994. "Socrates in


The Socratic

the Context of

Xenophon's Political

In

Movement,

ed.

Paul A. Vander Waerdt. Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University

Press. Pp. 127-50.

Russell, Bertrand. 1945. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster. Strauss, Leo. 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1972.
Xenophon'

Socrates. Ithaca NY: Cornell


to the

University

Press.

Stauffer, Devin. 2001. Plato's Introduction

Question of Justice. New York: State

University
University
Xenophon.

of

New York Press.


and

Vlastos, Gregory. 1991. Socrates, Ironist


Press.

Moral Philosopher.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell

1992. Education of Cyrus. Translated

by

H. G. Dakyns. London: J. M.

Dent & Sons Ltd.


1994. Memorabilia. Translated

by Amy

L. Bonnette.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni

versity Press.

Rousseau
The

and

The Redemptive Mountain Village:


and

Way

of

Family, Work, Community,

Love

Mark S. Cladis
Vassar College

The tension between the hopes


ments of a shared public
and

and

desires

of the

individual
of

and the require

life

are at the

heart,

or the

knot,

Rousseau's thought
that issue

life. He

wrestled with the various

conflicting

claims

from the
vo

public and private

life:
and

prerogatives and obligations

to self,

friends, family,
and

cation,

civic

life,
could

to humanity. He grappled with these

found

ways to

mitigate

the tension

between them.

wish

maintain commitment

say that Rousseau provided a solution to how society can to both the pluralism that individualism requires and the

commonality that the common good requires. Still, he did illuminate this mod ern drama of the contingent yet inevitable storms that bluster as we attempt to find
public and private

meaning
public

and contentment.

Few

writers

have

portrayed

more

poignantly the strain of loneliness in a hollow

private

life,

or the weight

of alienation

in

barren

life; few

writers

have depicted

more

movingly

the peace and satisfaction of an ample private


and purpose of a

life,

or the sense of

belonging

lively

public

life.

Rousseau imagined

time of human innocence in what he described as Na


nature.

ture's Garden or the state of


and

Next, he detailed

our

fall from the Garden, in the


ques

imagined
are at

redemptive ways of

life that,

if not as guileless as existence exhausting.

Garden,
posed

least satisfying

and not

too psychologically

The

tion of restoration or redemption dominated two

much of Rousseau's thought.

He

different,
path, as

even contrary, remedies: a public path and a private path.

The

public

found in On

the

Government of Poland,
within a

recommends

that

individuals

ensconce themselves private

snugly

highly

nationalistic,

educative

community; the
recommends

path, as found in 77i<? Reveries of the

Solitary Walker,
that ex

that individuals

Solitaires

cultivate a

spiritual, interior life and

extricate themselves

from

commitments and other social entanglements one calls

acerbate the

human propensity to inflict harm. The

for

the complete

loss

of the private

life,

the other the

loss

of the public.

Both

are effective,

if the

goal is to live undividedly; both are inadequate, if the goal is to live a full, flourishing human existence. The Flourishing City, as depicted in the Social

Contract, is Rousseau's
There is
the
another

middle

way, his

attempt

to

bring

together the two paths.

option,

however,

the way of the Mountain Village. This is

way

of

friendship, love,

marriage, community, and agreeable work. This

INTERPRETATION,

Fall 2001, Vol. 29, No.

36

Interpretation
between the
"private,"

path runs

private path and

the middle way,

and

hence it

can

be

called the moderate private path.

"Moderate,"

because it does

not revolve around


not

the

Solitaire;

because

at

its

center stands the

household,

an

inclu
a

sive

common

good.

It incarnates Rousseau's deepest


solitariness and sociability.

fantasy

and

attempts

precarious

balance between

MOUNTAIN MANNERS, ALPINE GEOGRAPHY

Rousseau's famous novel, Julie

or

the

New Eloise,
us

for this

moderate private path.

This way leads

be my principal book to the Mountain Village with


will

its warm,
nating

supportive

seasons of

families, strong friendships, agreeable work, and its alter solitude, family, and outdoor public festivities. "Friendship,

are the themes Rousseau himself identified in Julie (Les con love, and in QZuvres completes, 1959 [henceforth, O. c], i, 545; J. M. Cohen, fessions, trans., Confessions, p. 504. Translations in this essay are my own. For conve
virtue"

nience, the second part of the reference refers to an

English translation,

when

available.) In fact almost all of Rousseau's favorite subjects and ideals appear, and mostly in Julie's character. Julie, like Rousseau, places common sense
above

philosophy, candidness and

sincerity
her

above

tact and tactics, the useful

and agreeable above

frivolity

and

luxury,

and character and virtue above wealth

and social status.

Also, Julie,

unlike

atheist

husband, Wolmar, is
God

religious a service

la Rousseau. She discovers God in beauty,


others and

and worships

by

to

(see Julie, O. c,
name of

ii, 590-91). Clarens is

the name of

Julie's household,
was never

the

Rousseau's domestic fantasy. Rousseau's ideal home

Nature's Garden inhabited


dent folk
more

by

the Solitaires.

Rather, it

was the

Mountain Vil

lage. The Village is inhabited


who experience

by simple, good natured, hardworking, indepen daily the necessity and beauty of nature. Clarens is
of

than a home. It
also a

is

way

life.

Clarens is

geography.

Rousseau had drafted

or

outlined

what

he

thought could become one of his most

Materialism of the materialisme du

helpful works, Moral Sensitivity, or The Wise (for Rousseau's description of "Moral sensitive, ou le
see

sage,"

Confessions,
show

pp.

380-81; O.

c,

i, 408-9). In

this

project, Rousseau wanted to

that our character and morals come not

only

from

our social climate

but

also our physical surroundings.

It is

no coincidence

that Clarens is located high

in the Swiss

mountains.

The mountains,

and the

hardy

way

of

life that they demand, The

endow the residents with virtue and charac

ter. Rousseau was one of the first to associate rugged


estimable character.

landscape
air,"

with

stalwart,
to

"salutary

and

beneficial

mountain

according
are

Julie's tutor, St. Preux, is "one


(O. c,

of the great remedies of medicine and

morality"

ii, 78-79; Julie,

p.

66). The salutary

aspects of

Clarens

not, of course,

due to geography

alone.

mountain manners.

The Alpine geography works together with Clarens's Like Emile's tutor or the Social Contract's Great Legislator,

Rousseau
the mountain manners at

and

the

Redemptive Mountain Village

37

Clarens

nourish the self without

and amour-propre: that anxious and anomie self-love and pride, so on public opinion.
confronts

prompting false needs dependent

At the

same

time, the difficult Alpine geography constantly


in
which the
with

the self with natural necessity and curbs excessive, dangerous sociabil these

ity.

Together,

form

context

individual is

neither extin and

guished nor
nature.

inflated, but is

placed

in

harmony

itself,
or

neighbors, work,

After Rousseau,
place

others such as

Thomas Mann

Martin Heidegger

would

their Utopias or places of


of simple
of

race

but

wise

in towering mountains inhabited by a folk. This elevated, bucolic landscape and tranquil,

healing

hardy way

life

support a modest

community life. It

resembles

Gemeinschaft

(cooperative community) more than Gesellschaft (competitive society), to use Tonnies' Ferdinand terms; or country life more than city life, to use Rousseau's
vocabulary.

In the

warmer

months, the mountain inhabitants enjoy fetes in the


visit each

open air.

In the

colder

months, families occasionally


groups of

other,

and there and

are even some social

"circles":

families

who

enjoy song, games,


a

wine.

(For Rousseau's description


Arts: Letter to

of these mountain social circles, see


pp.

Politics
pp.

and the

d'Alembert,

99-113; Lettre

M.

d'Alembert,

193-214. These

circles are

ever wrote approvingly.

among the few secondary groups of which Rousseau Although they inhabit a space between the public and
"decent"

private,

Rousseau

noted that nor

they

were

"dangerous"

and not
public"

because

they "neither wish to, bert, p. 207; Politics


because the
coupled. or self.

can, hide that which is

[Lettre

M. d'Alem
modest

and the while

Arts,

p.

108].) The community life is


are

social

ties,

affectionate,
of

entirely voluntary

and

easily

un

This is
is

not the

land

devoted

citizens who put nation above

family

Nor

this the land of urbanites who celebrate novelty more than tradi

tion, diversity more than affinity, dynamic street life more than habitual family life. The way of Clarens exemplifies the simplicity of rural life, the beauty and ruggedness of mountains, and the character of those immersed in both moun
tain manners and unmannered mountains.

The Garden-Fall-Restoration

narrative can

illuminate Julie

and

Rousseau's
the gentle,

depiction In her

of

the

public

and

private

in tension. Julie begins


as a

with

peaceful existence of one as gardenlike

innocent

Solitaire in Nature's Garden: Julie.

existence, she is surrounded


and a

by

natural

her dear friend, Claire;


attempt to recapture sioned

devoted tutor, St. Preux.


complex

beauty; loving parents; Yet, like the Solitaire's,


leave the
garden and

if Julie's innocence is to become


features
love

virtue,
albeit

she must

of the

garden,

transformed. Her fall is occa

by

and

its

artificial obstacles. and

her is

and

St. Preux becomes tangled


then thwarted

initially innocent romance between emotionally debilitating when their love


An
status-conscious

consummated and

by

Julie's father, the

Baron

d'Etange. He forbids Julie to marry St. Preux, a man without a title. As Julie and St. Preux's relationship becomes increasingly concealed, their private lives hidden from
public

view,

they

resort

to lies and deceit. In their idyllic garden,

38
Julie
an

Interpretation
notes

to St.

Preux,

their
and

relationship
"purity."

was

"easy

and

marked

by

"elegant

simplicity"

Now,

after

their fall into sex,

lies,

and

social

artifice, "that

happy

time is no longer. Alas! It cannot return, and as the


ceased

first
each
no

effect of so cruel a
other"

change, our hearts have already


p.

to

understand

(O. c,

ii, 102; Julie,

83). Cast

out

of their garden,

they

can

longer openly

share their most private

hopes

and

fears.

They

now

suffer

tremendously, equally unhappy whether together or separated. How does this gentle tale, that begins in such innocence, turn bitter
cruel? alone:

and

Although Julie

and

St. Preux

are exceptional

humans, they
a

are

incomplete is
ob

they

need

love,

and

love is dangerous. Their love for

each other

structed

by

social convention: since

St. Preux lacks

title, his

merits will never and

be

enough

to gain Julie's father's approval. In her innocence

youth, Julie

never saw

the serpent, amour-propre, in her garden. She didn't know her garden
a world where concern

belonged to

for

social appearance and status ruins

love.

Many
"in

eloquent and persuasive arguments against

her father's

social prejudices

are offered.

Of St. Preux, Lord Bomston (a he is

family friend)

says to
of

spite of your prejudices


prerogative.
. .
.

Vain in ink

on old

worthy But he has nobility even so, do not doubt it, not written parchment but engraved on the foundation of his heart in indelible
a

of all men most

her.

Julie's father, Nobility?

characters.

In

word, if you
your

prefer reason

to prejudice, and if you love your


her"

daughter better than

titles, it is him

you will give

(O. c, ii, 168-69;


social she

Julie,
has
a

pp.

137-38). Still, her father


to him. Julie's private love
obligation

will not relent.

His

attachment to

status runs

deep. For her part, Julie loves her father,

and more

important,

duty

by

her filial

for St. Preux, then, is thwarted ultimately to her father and her duty to uphold public appearances,
properly.

to marry well, to marry


and titles

Lord Bomston,
drive
will you

a man who wears

his

wealth

lightly,
only

characterizes

Julie's fall
will

and abyss when

he

writes to

her, "the

tyranny
[with

of an

intractable father
after the

into the
obliged

abyss which you will

recognize

fall.

You
your

be

to contract an alliance

Wolmar] disavowed by santly by the cry of your


abyss

heart. Public

approval will

be
pp.

refuted

inces

conscience"

(O. c, ii, 200;

Julie,

168). Julie's

is

characterized as a world

in

which private

love

and public

duty

are

in

conflict, causing

deep

Claire, "whom duty, I

will

among its inhabitants. As she writes to I support, my lover or my father? Sacrificing myself to
strife within and
.

cannot evade

both unhappy and is torn between love

culpable"

I take, I must die crime, committing (O. c, ii, 201; Julie, p. 169). Like Antigone, Julie and duty, between private happiness and public appearance.
a

and whatever course

Eventually,
riage

their mutual redemption is occasioned,

in part,

by

Julie's

mar

to the Godlike atheist


a

Wolmar. Wolmar

enables the

former, fallen Julie

to

become

new, redeemed Julie:

a virtuous yet no

longer innocent
As for St.
and

woman who

discovers happiness in her


heals him, too,

duty

as wife and mother.

Preux, Wolmar

by

engineering his

return to

Clarens

his

reconciliation with

Rousseau

and

the
the

Redemptive Mountain Village


and

39
that

Julie; he becomes
friendship.
virtuous

trusted

friend

of

family

derives

much

joy from

for

Living duty above romantic love, while cultivating a seasoned, spousal love Wolmar and a friendship love for St. Preux. Every aspect of the household,
with
men under the same

her two

roof, Julie leams to

place

we will a

see, is arranged to tension


remains

reconcile

the public and


passion

private

harmoniously. Still,
and

lingering
icy

between Julie's

for St. Preux

her

to Wolmar.

Only

upon

her death is that tension

erased completely.

After

duty diving

into

waters to save one of

her children, Julie


the line of
redemption

contracts and
not a

from
virtue

pneumonia.

By

this

death, in
her

duty,
is

eventually dies fit of romance, her


St. Preux, too,
can

is entirely

vindicated and

complete.

be

by performing his duty, for, after Julie's death, he is to remain at Clarens and tutor Julie's children. The circle of his Garden-Fall-Restoration can
saved

be

closed: as

his

garden and

fall began

with

instructing Julie,
At the

his

reclamation

is

to be

made complete

ever, it is not clear outsider, with


no

by educating her whether St. Preux


return to.

children.

close of

the novel, how


appears as an

will return to

Clarens. He

home to

The tale found in Julie is the many may live


universe,
complex of

same one told

in the

second

Discourse

and

in

Rousseau's
as

other works.

As

long

as we

dwell in

a private

universe,

we

innocents, doing little good or harm. When we enter the social however, our innocence is sacrificed for the possibility of achieving
virtue, but
also

aspects of the gardenlike path the

For this transition to be relatively successful, existence must be preserved. On the extreme public
vice.

serpent, amour-propre,

was

to the
private

group.

When

all

is public,
as

one

deflected away from the self and redirected is not divided between public duty and
one

love. Moreover,
of a

in the Garden,
socialized

is

confronted with
extreme

necessity, the
path,

intractability
contrast,
one.

highly

society.

On the

private

in

where

When

all

lives entirely is private, one does


one motivated

within

oneself, the

not suffer

strategy from dividedness. Also, as in the


de
soi

opposite

saves

Garden,
is

one

is

principally

by

amour

(that is, gentle,

healthy
and one

self-love as opposed to amour-propre,


confronted with

anxious, destructive self-love),

the necessity of

nature.

In

contrast to these two extreme paths, the

way

of

Clarens is

neither

strictly
natural,

public nor private.

Its

mountain manners and

social context that enables

Alpine geography individuals to integrate the public

create a

and private.

At

Clarens,

one enjoys

that does not

bring

Garden, many into play the destructiveness


aspects of the

as well as a modest
of amour-propre. unstable.

sociability

Yet,
For

as we

will see, unlike the other two paths, the

way

of

Clarens is

eventu

ally love and duty, the private and public, is as fleeting as it is precarious.
Wolmar
natural
alone

will come

into

conflict.

Clarens, then,
such

is

not

the

way

of

Clarens. The way

of

Clarens includes

and social circumstances as stellar

marriages, useful and agreeable

characters, strong friendships, good work, community fellowship, moments of


soli-

40
tude,

Interpretation
natural

beauty,
and

and the

necessary discipline

and

hardship

of

living

in the

Alps. Nature

artifice, working

harmoniously
of

together,

create

this Second
nature

Garden, Clarens. (For a helpful account Julie, see David Gauthier, 1979.)

how

artifice works with

in

CLARENS, THE SECOND GARDEN


Julie's transformation is
concomitant with

the transformation of the Clarens

household,
tion of the
arrival of
plete

a physical embodiment of a
public

and private.
Preux'

way of life that permits the reconcilia The household transformation begins with the letter to Lord Bomston
contains the most com
pp.

Wolmar. (St.
of the

description

changes; see O. c,

ii, 440-70; Julie,


without

301-4,

although
now

much

is

abridged and

in the English edition.) The household, St. Preux notes, is


without

orderly

peaceful, "and

show,

ceremony, everything there is

gathered and

directed toward the true human

destiny!"

In the

absence of

injuri
other,

ous social

conventions, humans can work and dwell

at peace with each

nature,

and self. altered:

The house itself is


be
inhabited."

"it is

no

longer

house

made

to be seen but to
ornate

Inordinately
"nothing
"The

large

rooms are made comfortable

into

useful

apartments;

antiques are replaced with


and

simple,

cheerful, and

there smacks of

furniture; everything is pleasant The yard, too, riches and


luxury."

has been transformed. In


and a

place of

the old billiard room are

now a wine press

dairy

room.

vegetable garden was too small

for

the cooking;

they
are

had
the

made a second one out of

the

flower bed, but

one so well put


before."

together that

flower bed thus

converted pleases

the eye more than

Vineyards

planted, and decorative trees are replaced

by fruit,

nut, and shade trees. All in

all, "everywhere
useful

they have

substituted the useful

has

almost always
farmyard,"

become
the

agreeable."

for the agreeable, and yet the St. Preux mentions the delightful

"noises

of the

crowing

of the

cocks, the

lowing

of the cattle, the

harnessing
fields,
the
new

of the

horses. He

also notes the

simple,

pleasant meals

taken in the

the shared

labor in cultivation, and many other rural aspects that make Clarens "more lively, more animated, more gay than it had been in
. . .

its

dreary

dignity."

In sum, Clarens has become

a place

"of joy
a

being"

and well

(O. c, ii, 441-42;


wonders

Julie,

pp.

why

anyone would

301-2). St. Preux, leave Clarens, where


than
a

once a world one

traveller,
of

now

finds

way

life that is

natural, productive, and

happy.
more

Clarens, however, is
social atmosphere

house

and

yard; it is

also an open and

frank
say.

in

which people

say

what

they

mean and mean what

they

There is
strolling,

no need or

to be unduly cautious about one's speech.


language."

Whether eating,

working, whether "in private conversation, or before everyone, one

speaks always the same


and that

The

transparency

that Julie lost in the fall


existence

is

absent

in

the City that symbol of perfidious social

is

Rousseau
re-established at

and

the

Redemptive Mountain Village

41

Clarens. And
is

with this arrival of

tween

public and private

removed.

This is

not to

transparency, a barrier be say, as St. Preux notes, that


(O. c,

the household members


p.

"indiscreetly
not

affairs"

spill all their

ii, 468; Julie,


which

302).

Everything

need

not, and should not, be told to

all.

But that

is
of

revealed or concealed

is

based

on

advancing

social status or other

forms

narrow, personal gain. Concealment at


ment of edge

Clarens,

such as

it is, is

an acknowledge

privacy
At

as a

fundamental

aspect of what

it is to be human. Some knowl

is appropriately

guarded and

protected, or

cretion.

Clarens, then,

there remains some


not

only at one's dis distinction between public and


else revealed

private, but that

distinction is

based

on

baneful

conventions and pursuits.

The distinction fosters harmony,


The

not

injury.

public and private are made

harmonious way
of

not

tion, but

by

the "useful yet

agreeable"

life

at

only by open communica Clarens. Work and home


and private are

are not relegated to

strictly

public and private

domains. Public
at

intertwined,
while one one

as are work and pleasure.

is

doing
and

chores, as

opposed

Clarens mainly takes place to scheduled, formal entertaining in which

Sociability

dresses

behaves to

make a public statement.

As

one

works,

one enjoys

interaction

with

family,

neighbors,

and

ant endeavors reconcile

the public and

and pleas community private at Clarens. Without idleness and members.

Useful

luxury,

one's powers and

desires

are

more

time or care to imagine what one needs to make others


about public manipulation

easily matched, for one has little envious. Private thoughts


not

disappear. This leads

only to

personal

but

social

well-being.

Labor
concern
more

rests

at the

heart

of

Clarens. Alienation from


that as capital
all

work was

an

for Rousseau. He feared


as profit

in international
and as

markets

abiding became
of

fluid,

dominated

other goals,

the

division

labor

increased,
work.

workers

increasingly
they

found limited meaning Labor


at

and satisfaction

in their

Their jobs

were more

specialized, curtailed,

for

whom or what

worked.

they did not know Clarens, in Rousseau's imagination,


and often

challenges these
single sentence:

gether

sums up the Clarens alternative in a unhappy "One sees nothing in this household which does not join to the agreeable and the useful, but the useful occupations are not confined

trends. St.

Preux

profit"

to

pursuits which yield

(O. c,

ii, 470; Julie,

p.

304). At

Clarens,

the

very
re

idea

of work

is

redefined.

Not

reduced

to profit, nor to efficiency, work is yoked

to that which is purposeful and agreeable.


mind us that we are congenial work.

Rousseau, like Marx,

sought

to

sensuous, tactile creatures who find our

natural vocation

in

I
ond and

am

crafting
the

an

image

of

Clarens from

material

in Julie. This fantastic Sec


second

Garden, however, is
in
nature.

not

limited to Julie. It is found in the


other places.

Discourse

Confessions, among
Less
well

Rousseau,
regard

we

know,

often cele a

brated

known is his high

for farm life. There is


activities,
and

connection,

he

maintained,

between

one's character and

the

activ

ities

of

farm life,

meaningful work

in

alliance with nature,

brought both

strength

42

Interpretation
joy. In the Confessions he
recounted

of character and of

how,

when on the verge

death, he

quit

his doctor's

pharmaceutical prescriptions and

instead immersed
gardens,

himself in life
grape

on the

farm,
c. are

with

its chickens, pigeons, cows,


and above

vegetable

harvests, fruit gathering,


p.

all,

honey

bees (see, for example, descriptions


and

Confessions,
est chapters

220; O.

i, 231). Rousseau's

various

of the

happi

in his life

invariably

rooted

in farm life,

they

often read

Julie. In his happiest recollections, he is in the country, not in solitude, but with some company, involved in useful yet not overly burden
like
chapters out of
some activities.

Why
purpose?

are

these the settings in which Rousseau discovered

tranquility

and

Why

Clarens? As in the

Garden, Rousseau's

state of

nature, Clarens

is free
one

of
not

is

hurtful artificiality and unjust social conventions. As in the Garden, free of necessity, but encounters a necessity rooted in the rhythm of
household activities,
rather

nature and

than in the compulsion of convoluted and


and greed.

obsessive social

artifice, competition,

As in the Garden,

one experi

ences an

intimate

relation with nature.

Yet,

not as

human

company.

With

amour-propre

curbed,

one can

in the Garden, one enjoys delight in nature and hu is "directed toward

mans, both. As St. Preux notes, without pomp and pretense, with everything
arranged so as

to

unite the useful and

the pleasant, Clarens

the true human

destiny!"

If here St.
rooted

is Rousseau's, and I think it is, then Rousseau Clarens in human nature. Rousseau usually had a generous sense of the
s voice of

Preux'

malleability

human nature,

and

he

often warned

Europeans

against sanction

ing

by attributing many of us, Clarens must seem nothing but parochial. Rousseau, however, felt he was on firm ground when he identified Clarens with nature, including human
nature.

their cherished yet parochial ideals

them to nature. And to

Clarens

seemed to

have it

all:

beauty,

useful of

work,

domesticity, friend
artificiality.

ship, community, solitude, was, we

and the absence

injurious

social

It

have said, his


and

Marriage

fantasy of the good life. family are part of that life. Rousseau's
with

celebrations of

domes

ticity
he
over

are not

limited to those found in Julie. In the

Confessions, for example,


lived
with

noted

his domestic happiness


years

Therese,

the woman he

for

twenty
what

walks

before marrying her. Reflecting on their simple meals and together, Rousseau wrote, "friendship, confidence, intimacy, sweetness of delicious
after
are!"

soul,
with

seasonings
political

they
of

Similarly, recollecting his

reunion

Therese

banishment had

briefly
and

separated
intimacy!"

them, he
(O. c,

ex

claimed, "Oh
and

friendship, union 582; Confessions, pp. 330


like
accounts of marriage

hearts, habits,

i, 354
sound

and

538). Such passages, I realize, may

more

friendship

than marriage.

Friendship
principally

and

companionship,
that he
rejected

however, defined

for Rousseau. We have already

noted

the then pervasive view that marriage should


nomic and social position.

advance one's eco

Intimacy

and

companionship,

not wealth and

station,

characterize the

Rousseauean

marriage and

family.

Rousseau
When Rousseau
wrote

and

the

Redemptive Mountain Village


endured

43

Julie,

he had already

the pain of moral

isola

tion. He understood how one can


prevails

feel

alone even

when one's options are radical


with an

social

among a crowd. Loneliness disengagement isolation or


Clarens
rescues the
productive moral and

engagement alienated

insipid

social existence

emptiness.

offering the warmth, joy, and purpose of a closely knit, family. Clarens anticipated the modem family, that center of one's
social

by

life. Julie,

as

wife, is Wolmar's intimate


and

companion and

friend.

They

are

also coworkers.

Julie

Wolmar

address

together

all matters that pertain

to

the

household. Yet the Clarens

household,
an

unlike the

households

of

today, is
work

not a narrow

domestic space, but


and
not

inclusive

space that

brings together

and pleasure,
we

utility noted, work is

aesthetics,
confined

public and

private, men and women. In

Julie,

to specialized labor outside the home. Julie

and

Wolmar, then, have

much to

discuss together,

and much work

to

pursue

together.

ston and

Clarens is the way of marriage and family, but also of friendship. Lord Bom St. Preux, St. Preux and Julie, Julie and Wolmar, St. Preux and Claire, Claire
and

and above all,

Julie: there

are

many friendships
generous

at

Clarens. These
of

friendships, like Clarens's family life,


warmth, and intimacy. Yet whereas

provide

portions

support,
and

family
no

members are yoked

by

both love

duty,
flows

the union of
as

friends imposes
as one's own

duty. Love for the friend, Rousseau held,


amour

naturally

self-love,
a part of

de

soi.

"Self-love [amour de
law
except

soi], like

friendship

which

is but

it, has

no other

the senti

ment which out of

inspires it;
delight"

one

duty, but

does everything for his friend as for himself, not ("Letter to Mme Correspondance, 1967,
D'Houdetot,"

iv, 394). Rousseau


neither

often

dreamed
would

of a

society
where pp.

of

friends,

of a

society "where
alone

duty

nor

interest

enter,

pleasure

and

friendship friendship
These

would make the


one another's grates

law"

(O. c, iv,
and

683; Emile,
slavish

348-49). Friends

acknowledge

equality do

independence. Without these, the


side,

deni

into

patronage on one

dependency
he

on the other.

condi

tions of

friendship

not

lessen but
of

enhance the emotional


emotion"

depth. Rousseau,
each

for example, described the "tears walked the eighteen miles to see his
p.

would

shed

time

he

good

friend, George Keith (see Confessions,


was

551; O.
The

c,

i, 597). This strong friendship


Clarens may be
age.

based

on

respect, equality, and

independence.
world of
and

fantasy, but it is

also a social protest.

Its

family
wealth,
of

friendships
of

condemn the utilitarian character of the marriages and

friendships

Rousseau's

In

the effort to accumulate public status and


useful.

spouses and

friends

were

deemed

Clarens

challenges

this

utility

the

private

life for
are

public attention and personal gain.

Family

and

friends, in
pub

Rousseau's view,
and status.

to

offer

the gifts of affection and moral support, not wealth


at

The

realms of

intimacy

Clarens

oppose the

cold, calculating,

lic

world of

Hobbesian

market relations and

Parisian

social climbing.

Once in

fected

with amour-propre, players

in

such public spheres threaten to undermine

44

Interpretation
friendships. In the

even private

Confessions, Rousseau
a public

claimed that

his friend
knew

ships were ruined the moment


ship. me.
. . .
.

he became

figure: "I I
was

was

born for friend


all who

So

long
p.

as

I lived

unknown to the public


a name

loved

by

But

as soon as

I had

no

longer had any

friends"

(O.

c,

i, 362;

Confessions,
friends

lizing

can make one an object of utility or envy among equality and independence necessary for friendships. Uti the Garden-Fall-Restoration narrative, Rousseau would often describe and erode the
graced

338). Fame

times in his life

by

strong,

private

friendships,
own,

and

then, inevitably, Resto


way, became
time
pain.

something
ration,

or someone

from

the outside would sabotage the relationships.

however,
chief

seldom occurred.

Clarens, in its

fictional,

Rousseau's
much

compensation,

use of

time, really Clarens as

he dwelt in
a private

imaginary restoration. For some this fantasy and it thereby eased his
an

too

This

salve,

however,

should not cloak

Rousseau's

public

service of

ingly

envisioning Clarens as an alternative and challenge to a world increas engaged in the manipulative pursuit of wealth, status, and power.

WOMEN, COMMUNITY, AND SOLITUDE


Of
all the

AT CLARENS

friendships

at

Clarens,

that of Julie and Claire is the

most notewor

thy. What Montaigne once said of his best


well of

friend, La Boetie,
blend
.

could

be

said as

Julie

and

Claire: "our

souls mingle and

with each other so com


"
.

pletely that they efface the seam that joined them 139). In fact, Julie and Claire's friendship resembles in

(Montaigne, 1958,
was

p.

most ways

Montaigne's
inspired

description

of the

ideal friendship. One


Friendship"

wonders

if Rousseau
his

by

Montaigne's essay, "On do

and also challenged

claim

that women

not have the capacity for the sacred bond of friendship (see Montaigne, The Complete Essays, p. 138). Julie is perhaps the most effective eighteenth-century

refutation of virtues of

Montaigne's

friendship.

insulting claim, for They freely share their


best,
and

Julie

and

Claire

exhibit all the

hopes

and

fears,

their

joy

and

suffering.

They

sustain each other with moral and emotional

support,

encourage

each other

to do their

they delight in
or

each other's company. of

Often

they

seem to compensate each other

for the inadequacies

their

male

friends,

St. Preux's rashness, for example,

Wolmar's

reserve.

Rousseau's

portrait of

this

strong

friendship

between two

women adds to the

perplexity of assessing Rousseau's depiction of women in Julie and elsewhere. On the one hand, Julie exemplifies Rousseau's ideal human: self-possessed, yet
engaged
public

in the company

of others.

Julie "knows

and

follows

rules other

than

opinion,

[her]

principal
p.

honor

being

what

[her]

conscience

delivers

[her]"

(O. c, ii, 91; Julie,

73). It is

Julie, therefore,
society On
the other

and not

her father,
spite of

who sees

through the pretensions of


above

a patriarchal

that places status and wealth

intelligence

and character.

hand, in

her

indepen-

Rousseau

and

the

Redemptive Mountain Village

45

dence, Julie
band. Julie is
to

yields to patriarchal

authority, first to her

father,

then to her hus

a companion at

to

Wolmar,
God

but

she

is

also a

helper,
so

much as

Eve

was

Adam,
Adam,

least

as

that tale is

traditionally
was a

understood.

(There are feminist

accounts which argue that as

helper to Israel,
see

Eve

was a

helper

to

that is, as

leader

75.) Although
are

all matters
out that

household. It turns

Phyllis Trible, 1979, p. are discussed together, Wolmar is the head of the in the Second Garden, at Clarens, social conventions
and not a

subordinate;

in place,

conventions that
would

Rousseau
us

supports.

Men's authority

remains su

preme.

in Unlike Emile's Sophie, Julie is a strong, independent woman, and she is not consigned to live out her life in a narrow domestic cage. At Clarens, women's lives are not radically relegated to the private, because the very distinc
such conventions are rooted
nature.

Rousseau

have

believe that

tion between

public

and private

is

not

strict.

Julie,

unlike

Sophie,

need not

sustain an acute private space as an antidote to the corrosive affects of the

City.
as a

The

City

is far from Clarens,

and

hence Julie's home

need not

function

mighty, defensive fortress. Julie, then, is not Sophie. Still, neither is she a woman liberated from patriarchy. She speaks her mind openly; she challenges

existing prejudices;
ties.

she

is

working
s

woman with

Ultimately, however,
dominance for

she yields

to her

men.

many significant responsibili She trades her father's over


In
either

bearing
remains

Wolmar'

unimposing

patriarchy.

case, Clarens

entirely patriarchal. Yet Clarens also implicitly


a marriage

advanced the cause

and rights

of women.

By

portraying
notion

based

on

friendship
and

and

compatibility, it challenged the

that women were chattel subject to contract.

By displaying

the vivid and


women were

admirable

interior life

of

Julie
And

Claire, it defied the idea that


a sphere of

docile
and

and unimaginative.

trust, Clarens
right

contributed

to an

by highlighting effective history


has
publication of

intimacy, fondness,

that would eventually give

birth to the

to privacy, a right that

protected and empowered women

in democratic
significance

societies.

With the

Julie, Rousseau highlighted

the

of a

exposure such

privacy that allows people to share without fear intimacies as letters, emotions, and beliefs. The privacy
us a

of public
portrayed

in Julie has become for

given, an essential aspect of

what

it is to be human.

This in

realm of

trust has also become a


and

striking

contrast

to what we experience
while

our contractual

litigious

public

existence.

At

Clarens, however,

privacy is found, the harsh contrast between public and private is not. The public life is as supportive of human flourishing as is the private, in part because the distinction between the two is The
public

softened.

streets of

life surrounding Clarens is not the interesting, diverse, crowded London or New York. Nor is it the Spartan arena where citizens gather
past

to

remember

victories

and cultivate

an

intense

patriotism.

Public life

at

Clarens is

more

like the county fair. Like the

fair, it is

seasonal:

it

arrives with

46

Interpretation
This is
not

warm weather.

to

say

that

during

the cold months there

is

no public

life. There
people events

are

the social circles, the


gather to

taverns,

and other places or occasions where

informally

play cards, chat,

and

drink. But inclusive

public

take place when travel

is easy

and when celebrations can occur

outdoors,
a

under the

bright sun, At

where all are

fully

illuminated.
old,

Group dancing
female,

is

favorite

activity, because it integrates young


employer.

and

male and

employee and

such

intergenerational,
for
all

public

tertainers,
with

no stage

to stare

at.

fetes, Rather, the

there are no professional en


people entertain

themselves,

song,

dance,

games,

and music.

This, in Rousseau's view, is

truly
life

natural

public

life.
natural public existence of

The
that

Clarens is far from the desert


of a

public

of

Paris,

is, City

life. In

Paris,
and

that "vast

world,"

St. Preux finds himself

"alone in the

crowd"

(O. c, ii, 231; Julie,


appearance

p.

Clarens, hiddenness
at all emerge

identify

196). If transparency characterizes Paris: "the men to whom one

speaks are not at all those with whom one converses.

Their
all

sentiments

do

not

from their hearts, their insight is


not at all represent
"

not at

in their spirit, their


"vast

discourse does
appearance
diversity"
. .

their thoughts. One sees of them only their


p.

(O. c, ii, 235; Julie,

196). St. Preux

admits that the

of

Paris

offers much entertainment.

But the hectic


and

entertainment of
spirit"

Paris requires,

or compensates
p.

for, "an empty heart


speaks

frivolous
he

(O. c,

ii, 245; Julie,


insipid

201). St. Preux

for Rousseau
yet

when

suggests

that an

public existence produces

amusing,

mindless, distractions. theo


wrote

In his Letter
retical

to

M. d'Alembert, Rousseau

provided what can serve as a

account,

and

justification,
and

of the public

life

at

Clarens. Rousseau

this treatise to oppose the installation of a professional theater in Geneva.


main topic

Its

is the

nature

function

of entertainment.

In

city like Paris,

professional entertainment serves a

to distract individuals from their hollow


escape.

lives, life,

providing for city dwellers, because, like television, it providing This form
are an

temporary, if intense, intermission in

The theater is

favorite

entertainment

suspends the viewer's actual or

an otherwise

chaotic, empty,

lonely

existence.

of recreation,

in Rousseau's view,

provides some

benefits, but they


members to

highly

limited. His

main critique of

city

recreation

is that it ultimately fails

to

re-create

the human spirit; that


with each

is, it fails

to enable

community recreating

engage

meaningfully

other, thus refreshing

their lives

and social relations.

prejudicial.

We may be tempted to dismiss Rousseau's antiurban sensibilities as quaint or I know I have. In this essay, I have used "the City" as a Rousseauean

metaphor

for

an

impersonal, banal

public existence

intense,

self-indulgent private

life. For

than a metaphor. He distrusted and

increasingly requires an Rousseau, however, the City was more disliked big cities, especially Paris, but also
prejudice,

that

London, among
our eyes of

others.

This

narrow

however,

should not

diminish in
plights

his achievement, namely, his success in naming one of the great modernity: moral and social isolation. At the heart of his critique

of the

Rousseau
theater we

and the

Redemptive Mountain Village

47

find his

concerns about alienation and

isolation. "People think that

they

gather together at the theater with


each

is there that

Rousseau wrote, "but really it is isolated. It is there that they go to forget their friends,
"
.

others,"

neighbors, and relations

(Lettre
who

M. d'Alembert,

p.

66; Politics

and

the

Arts,

pp.

16-17). Like

Marx,

sympathetically

acknowledged

that religion

brings

comfort

to the alienated, and yet it

thereby distracts

them from discover


acknowl

ing

the true cause of their oppression,

Rousseau, too, sympathetically

edged

the value and need of city entertainments. He understood that

they

ease

one's

pain, and that the

need

for

such entertainment reflects one's suffering:

"It

is discontent
natural

with one's self, it

is

the weight of

idleness, it is forgetting
necessary."

simple,

tastes, that

makes outlandish amusement so ourselves

If

we experience

the need to

occupy
p.

constantly
the

with the

stage,

or television and video


ease"

games,

we might

add, it is because "inside of us we are ill at


and

(Lettre

M.

d'Alembert,
limited to

66; Politics

Arts,

p.

16). Rousseau's insights

are not

urban existence.

of geographic

in contemporary Western society, location, dwell in the City.


of us

All

regardless

Clarens
a

was

Rousseau's

attempt

to awake us to a different kind of existence,

way Parisian based

of

life in

which the private and public

nourish,

not

ruin, each other. If


a

entertainment

is

antisocial

(one

sits alone,

watching

stage)

and

is

on appearances

(actors wearing masks), then


of professional

entertainment at

Clarens is
the role of

communal, and in
"But,"

place

actors,

everyone assumes

entertainer.
tainments?"

Rousseau asks, "what then

will

be the

objects of needed.

these enter
middle

The community itself

can provide all that

is

"In the

of some place plant a stake crowned with

flowers;

gather together there the

people, and you will have a fete. Better still: let the spectators give entertain
ment

to themselves; make them actors themselves; make it so that each sees (Lettre a M. loves himself in the others, thus all being the better pp. 233-34; Politics and the Arts, p. 126). In this community enter d'Alembert, tainment, participants are moved not by scripted lines, but by the spontaneous
united"

and

emotion that comes

from

palpable

interaction: touching, moving, smiling, sing


cultivated

ing. At Clarens, love

of self

(amour de soi) is
of others.

in private,

yet

it is

also

reflected, and nourished, in the face

Community fying our true

life is

season, a

rhythm of

Clarens. So is

solitude.

After identi

vocation as

"this

oscillation

between labor

recrea

and

St.

Preux describes Julie's "recreation in


vorite walk and which she calls

a secluded place where she takes

her fa
304).

her

Elysium"

(O. c, ii, 470-71;

Julie,

p.

Julie's Elysium is
locked door
with

secluded,

hidden,
to the

private
public.

garden, "which is always carefully

would

Upon entering the Elysium, whose It is a have been impossible to find without Julie's assistance, St. Preux
closed

key."

was struck

by

the dense

foliage,

the abundance of

flowers,

the sound of a run


wildest place,

ning brook,
trated this

and the singing of birds:

"I thought I

saw the

the

most solitary in nature, and it seemed I was the first


desert."

mortal who

had

ever pene or at

With St. Preux,

we are

back in Nature's Garden,

least

48
it

Interpretation

The Elysium knows nothing of the symmetry or artifici formal, eighteenth-century French gardens. It appears to St. Preux as ality "uncultivated and beautifully wild. When Julie intimates that the Elysium
would seem that way. of
wild,"

is entirely of human
Julie is
dered"

under

her direction, St. Preux balks, "I do


and

not see at all

work,"

patient yet

he insists that "it only cost Julie firm with St. Preux: "It is true that

neglect."

any evidence As is her way,

nature

has done every

thing, but

my direction, and there is nothing here which I have not or (O. c, ii, 71-72; Julie, p. 305). the state of nature that If this is Nature's Garden, it is not the original one
under second

Rousseau described in his


alone.

Discourse. That
a work of
p.

garden was the work of nature

Julie's

Elysium, in
no

contrast, is

art, or

"desert

artificiel,"

as

St. Preux

would

later describe it (O. c, ii, going back to the


now

474). Rousseau

again seems

to

declare that there is


solitude,
places

original garden.

Gardens
and

places of

of redemption

require

human effort,

imagination.

Julie's Elysium is natural, insofar

flower

or a

only nature, not Julie, can give birth to a bird; natural, also, insofar as Julie chooses not to import "exotic
as

fruits,"

plants or

but

rather to utilize those that are

"natural to the

country."

Still,

it is Julie
grapes,

who planted and cultivated the raspberries,


and so on.

currants, lilac bushes,


who

wild

hops, jasmine, hazel trees,


birds to

It is Julie

diverted the water,

and who enticed the

reside

in her

private sanctuary.

Julie's garden, like working together,


society,

the rest of

Clarens, is
is

the result of nature's laws and human art

in harmony. Rousseau is famous for


not

having

said on a
of

few

occasions that

nature,

the source of the vast


not contrast

majority

human
rather

woe.

In Julie, however,
societies to worse

Rousseau did
societies, in

society to nature, but

better

accordance with whether

they

encourage or

impede human flourish

ing. Like Julie's garden, Clarens itself may look entirely natural, as if it emerged organically from its mountain soil. In fact, however, every aspect of Clarens is
shaped

by

human hands way

and

imagination, in

cooperation with nature.

This

cooperation entails a

of

life that

recognizes such natural

limits

as

human

hardship, suffering,
sive and

and

death,
with

and that rejects such unnatural

burdens

as exces

competition,

luxury

living

without

meaning

or purpose.

its attending discrepancy between rich and poor, Clarens is a society, assembled by hu

mans, in

agreement with nature.

Solitude
elaborate

and

beauty belong
of
and solitude

to the social order at Clarens.


underscores the

Rousseau's lengthy,
and neces

description

Julie's Elysium in this

importance

sity

of

exclaims that

privacy in Julie's
an

well-run

household

and society. out of the

St. Preux
world,"

garden

he is transported

"entirely

at

least for

hour

or so

(O. c,

ii, 478; Julie,


of the garden

p.

310). After his

respite

in the

garden, his time for contemplation and refreshment, he returns to the world to
resume

his

work and

life. Use

is

one of

Julie's

greatest gifts to

St. Preux. With little money, herself


and

some

effort,

and much

love, Julie fashioned for


understands

her friends
solitude

place

of restoration.
as

Julie

that in the

rhythm of

life,

has its season,

does

work and community.

"The

re-

Rousseau
pose

and

the Redemptive Mountain


past

Village

49

which serves as relaxation


no

from

labors

and which encourages other

labors is
304).

less necessary to

man than

the labor

itself"

(0. c, ii, 470;

Julie,

p.

nents of

Solitude, love, family, friendship, community, work: these are the compo Clarens, Rousseau's fantasy and moral measuring rod. Clarens is also a possible home for Emile, Rousseau's favorite, imaginary pupil. Emile does not belong in Rousseau's Poland, for Emile was not trained to place citizenship
above all else.

He did

not receive a public education that would shape

his heart

and mind

in the image Of

of

the state. On the other


garden.

hand, Emile does


was not raised,
moral

not

belong

on the private path

in the Solitaire's
all

He

his tutor tells

us, to live alone.


perhaps

the places

in Rousseau's
made

geography, Emile is

best

suited

for Clarens. Emile is


measure of

for family, friendship, work,

solitude, and a modest

taigne,

mayor of

community and civic participation. Like Mon Bordeaux, Emile fulfills his civic duty, but that duty can never Neither Citizen
nor

capture, or satisfy, the entirety of his heart and soul.

Soli

taire, Emile

walks

Julie's

path of gentle sociability. would seem that

Given his

affectionate per

sonality and religious sensibility, it ideal companion for Julie.

Emile,

not

Wolmar, is

the

REDEMPTION AT CLARENS

The
public propre

redemptive

logic

of

Clarens
all

is

similar to that of

Rousseau's

extreme
amour-

and private paths.

In

three cases, the destructive fallout of


extreme public

is kept to
to

a minimum.

On the

path,

private amour-propre

is

redirected

public soi

ends, to the glory of the nation; on the


curbs amour-propre.

extreme private
maneuvers em

path, amour

de

(gentle self-love)

Both

public and private ploy Rousseau's strategy for reducing friction between the conflict. Whether one embraces by dodging those situations that put the two in

an absolute public or private

existence, disillusionment and strife abate as one

pursues well-defined aims with predictable outcomes.

At Clarens,

amour-propre

is forestalled

by

good marriages,
agreeable

strong friendships,

private

retreats,

public cele

brations, demanding,
we

work, and a difficult

terrain and climate.

Here,
moun severe and

have

a multitude of miraculous
manage

balancing
in place,

acts. at

Its

mountain manners and

Alpine geography

to

keep

all

least

provisionally.

The

tain manners provide moral sustenance while checking false needs. The Alpine geography brings natural necessity into the daily life at Clarens,

it
a

discourages dangerous,
place where

excessive

sociability.

Together,

these

form Clarens:

the self is

neither squelched nor puffed

up, but lives in

harmony

with

itself,

others, work, and nature.


of a mountain

community

Read Rousseau's description, in his Letter to M. d'Alembert, he once visited in his youth:

50

Interpretation
An
entire mountain covered with arranged such

homes,

each at the center of the


.

land

on which

it

depends,

that these houses

offer to the

numerous

inhabitants of
society.

this mountain both the

meditation of a retreat and

the sweetness of

These

happy farmers,
labor

all at ease

free

of poll

taxes, tariffs, commissioners,

and assigned

cultivate

the soil, with all possible care, the

bounty

and produce of which


make

is

theirs,

and

handmade

goods.

employ the leisure that this cultivation leaves them to In the winter especially, a time when the deep
...

thousands of

snows

hinder

easy communication,
wood, which

each

family

stays warm at

home in

pretty

and neat

home

of

they

themselves

built, occupying

themselves with
to their

numerous enjoyable

labors that

chase

boredom from their

refuge and add

well-being.

Never did

a professional

carpenter,

locksmith,

glass-maker, or lathe-operator enter this coun


.

try;

all

do everything for themselves.

(Lettre

M. d'Alembert,

pp.

133-34; Poli

tics and the

Arts,

pp.

60-61)

Rousseau like "a


skill
no

goes on

to note their useful


workshop"

books,

their

living

rooms that

look

more

mechanic's and their

or a

"laboratory

in

physics

experimental mountain

their

in drawing,

doubt

served as a model
a

singing for Rousseau's Clarens. It

and

dancing. This Swiss

carries the

community design of the


Its
em

Second Garden,
phasis on

fragile balance between


stays slavish

solitariness and sociability.

self-sufficiency

dependency,

a source of misfortune that

travels with

amour-propre.

With the

specialization of

labor

comes

the multipli
come

cation of commodities and complex systems of exchange, and


arenas of

from these

competition,

injustice,

and oppressive or

dependency. When
are

we stand

in

need of each other

for basic goods,

for luxuries that from

deemed basic, the

more powerful exploit

the more vulnerable, and

such exploitation come the


and

ills that Clarens is

protected

from, humiliation,

envy, contempt,
sphere of

injustice.
mountain
place

Dependency
community.

is found, of course, in the domestic But domesticity, for Rousseau, is

Rousseau's
a safe

by

definition

for

To this belief he clung in spite of his own disappointing domestic experience with his father and later with Madame de Warens.

intimacy

and trust.

to

Clarens, and perhaps even the mountain community that Rousseau described D'Alembert, is nothing less than an elaborate, fictional portrayal of Rous
social assimilation.

seau's vision of

fatalistic

humanity's happiest state, lodged neither in Clarens is placed between the

radical solitude nor extreme public and

private paths.

reach.

Its location, high in the Swiss mountains, makes it difficult to This geography is not incidental. Few can achieve it. Many wouldn't There is
no theater.

want to.

There

are no ethnic restaurants.

There is little
a place even

pluralism.

There is little

anonymity.

And

even

if

you

desire to live in

like Clarens,
cruel.

such sites are


or

scarce,

and their counterfeits can

be oppressive,

"Misfits"

"imbeciles"

in

a small

community

are sometimes

"eccentrics"

"geniuses"

or
are perhaps

in the City. Or, if that is too just ignored, a condition that


places

romantic a notion, in the most would prefer to

City they
and

derision

scorn.

When I say

like Clarens

are

scarce, I mean,

empirically speaking,

there

Rousseau
are

and

the

Redemptive Mountain Village

51

like it. This is mostly because its pivotal, delicate components are subject to breakdown. Clarens can easily cease to be Clarens. The marriage could have turned sour, with both partners caught up in amour-propre, compet
places

few

ing
The

with each other to attract other suitors or somehow gain the upper

hand.

friendships, too,
The
or public and

could

have become

competitive and

been destroyed for

by

envy.

private retreats could

have become

occasions to scheme

personal

revenge

conquest.

The

work could

have turned

oppressive

for the

employees

obsessive

for

the employers,

if Clarens

strove

to

accumulate

riches and status.

Finally,
for

the climate could have turned mild, and the roads and thus providing
more occasions

heating

systems

improved,

for

social

interaction,

more opportunities

amour-propre

to ignite. Much could have gone wrong.

populated

When I say Clarens is a fantasy, I mean Rousseau imaginatively created and it out of deep longing and angry protest. It was a protest against
of

those market economies that were

division

labor,

and alienation

encouraging anomie, acquisitiveness, a fierce from self, work, and community. Clarens, then,

was a powerful social complaint against

developing

modern economies and the was

destructive,
gate

self-centered

individualism that flowed from them. Yet Clarens

also a personal sigh.

It functioned, in Rousseau's heart,

as an emotional surro

for intimacy, friendship, and community. For some, the way of Clarens is the most promising path to redemption. It reinstates many features of Nature's Garden simplicity, natural necessity,
curbed amour-propre

while also

introducing

a set of

human

goods and

joys

Yet Garden intimacy, family, friendship, missing from its redemption, like that of the preceding paths, is provisional and incomplete. Clarens culminates in death and sorrow. Julie's romantic passion for St. Preux
that
and community.

is

never

fully

extinguished.

There is
to

still a tear

in her heart
in her

caused

by

her love
her

for St. Preux


in
as

and
a

her

duty
more

Wolmar. We

might

be tempted to
past.

attribute

dividedness to
caught
a

merely

contingent mistake made

Yet Julie

seems

quandary

fundamental

and

inevitable. As

alone,

long

as we enter relationships, conflict

between One

long as we are not duty and love is bound


it coming, divided
subject to

to arise. Even at
until

Clarens, love
chaos,

can surprise one. well-ordered

might never see

it is too late. At that point, the

household is

ness,

deception,

and pronounced suffering.

As

long

as we are social crea

tures,

and we are not on the extreme public

path, there is

no sure

way to

protect

ourselves and with

from ourselves, from diverse loves that can personal and public duties, from loves that
are sheltered

collide with each other

can

lead to bitter

grief.

Only

Solitaires

from

such

risks, only those who

lead

a still

life,

nature morte.

Julie

ends

in death

and

sorrow, though there is nothing lifeless about these.


names

On the final page, Claire


them demolished:
the earth has

the central features of Clarens and declares


pleasures, playful games

swallowed

"Confidence, friendship, virtues, As for her relation


all."

to friends and community,

Claire

confesses,

"I

am

alone

in the

everyone."

midst of

The only

voice she

52

Interpretation
of the

hears is that

dead,

the ghost of
are you

Claire, 745; Julie,


joys
of

where
p.

are you?

What

her best friend, Julie: "Claire, oh my (O. c, ii, doing far from your
friend?"

409).

Only
.

in death, it

would

seem,

can

Claire

again achieve

the
not

Clarens. With this final


contain

sentence the novel ends:

Julie's "coffin does


.

entirely
long."

her

it

awaits

the remainder of its prey


of

it

will not wait

for

Freedom from
death. The

the pain

loneliness, longing,
offer

and

dividedness only

comes at

redemption

Clarens has to

is

not complete.

Moreover,

its

redemptive powers

Julie;
of

too much at

frail. Clarens probably cannot survive the death of Clarens hangs together precariously. Clarens, it turns out, is
are a

indeed the Second Garden: it, too, is


how things
could

fleeting

moment

in time that

reminds us

be if

we maintained the and

fragile balance between


and

solitude

and

sociability, independence
public and private.

dependence, love

duty, desires

and pow

ers,

CLARENS AND DEMOCRACY

If human is there

flourishing

entails, among other things, both the


public

public and

private,

a path

that includes a broader sense of the


outset

than what we found


path.

in Clarens? At the
"Moderate,"

called

the way of Clarens the moderate private the

because it does

not revolve around not

Solitaire;

"private,"

because

at

its

center stands the

household,

Clarens has

no political

community or an inclusive common good. life. Perhaps it would not be Emile 's ideal home. At
with
or

Clarens, we encounter stellar individuals friendship, and good work. But could Julie
citizens?

immense

capacities

for love,

St. Preux

ever or

become

committed

Could their intense

relationships and their

self-

family-sufficiency
that attempts to

be incorporated in include
to

a city-state

like Geneva? Is there


and commitment

a path

enjoyment of

intimacy
justice,

to

a common

good, devotion
of common

family

and to global

acceptance of

diversity

and

love

goals, self-assertion and renunciation, private


personal

perfection and public

compromise,

insouciance

and social seriousness?

If

our

society

were marked

exclusively

by intermediate

spheres that sought

to integrate

then it would resemble


racy.

home, family, friends, associates, Clarens, and it would

work, pleasure, and community,


not promote a workable

democ

It

could not

the

society. In spite of my for something like Clarens, and my attempt to achieve it in longing my life and community, I fear anything resembling a national Clarens. The threat of coercion, implicit or explicit, that haunts Clarens 's integration and of of own

heart

tolerate, for example, the very tension the shared moral life of liberal, democratic

and conflict that are at

harmony

public appeal

and private

should

worry

us more than

its

pleasures

and satisfactions

to

us.

Any

all-encompassing,

national communitarian aspirations should

give us pause.

Still,

the

way

of

Clarens has

much to offer

local

attempts to achieve

lively,
and

just, and

flourishing

communities.

It

seems clear that since the

European

Rousseau

and the

Redemptive Mountain Village

53

American industrial revolutions, the work sphere and the domestic sphere have become increasingly segregated. This development coincided with sequestering women and children to the private, domestic sphere. New research suggests that in many rural, preindustrial communities, fluid, as the domestic and work spheres
women's and men's roles were more
were

less divided (see, for example,

Hansen, 1997). home,


does
and
a model

Today, many
and children

are

seeking

ways to

bring

employment of

into the

home

into

employment.

Rousseau,
home,

course, is

hardly

for

battling
helpful
more

the seclusion and oppression of


vision

women.

But his Clarens

offer a

in

which work and

children and adults are

less divided, Yet


what

integrated.
should not

if

local community

home, but
roles? rights.

also to

keep,

say,

women's vocations

only seek to integrate work and limited to traditional domestic


to safeguard individual
to enforce rights and

Clarens has

neither a government nor a culture require a

Democracies

robust,

national government require more

prohibit

discrimination. Yet democracies

than that.

They

need cul

tural resources that support democratic that

laws

and practices.

Rousseau

understood

only from law, but from common, shared traditions and commitments, from something like a because it intimates common, secular faith. I employ the concept of

freedom,

equality,

and

individual

rights require support not

"faith"

notions

like commitment, hope, virtue,


partisan.

a shared

history

and

future,

and also

because faith is

beliefs,

and practices

There is nothing neutral or value free about the virtue, of a liberal democracy. There is nothing neutral about

supporting individual rights, or supporting a culture, a way of life, that incul cates the character and habits of citizens engaged in democratic practices.
Rousseau has
much

to teach those of us dedicated to civic liberalism


and practice of a common

about

the

importance
not reside

of the

language

faith. But these lessons do


of

in Clarens, but
Rousseau

rather

in the

Flourishing City

the Social Contract.

Ultimately,
Rousseau's
be oneself, variety
a

was not satisfied with

Clarens. Human flourishing, to

mind, entailed the


even

ability to be

self-possessed

(as he

once put

it, "to
a

in the

middle of

society")

and also to maintain and

enjoy

of social commitments,
not the

including
of

civic ones.

Clarens, then,

represents a

component, but

fullness,

human flourishing.

Endeavoring

to fashion the

democratic

republic

in

which the private

life is

nurtured and protected and

public

life is inclusive, lively, and just is a worthy challenge. It was Rousseau's challenge. We will often fail. No perfect harmony will be achieved. Still, the
endeavor

is the way forward. It is probably the


century.

challenge of

democracy

in the

twenty-first

REFERENCES

Gauthier, David.

"The Politics of

Redemption."

University

of Ottawa

Quarterly 49
En-

(1979): 331-33.

Hansen, Karen V. "Rediscovering

the Social:

Visiting

Practices in Antebellum New

54

Interpretation
gland and
and

the

Limits

of the

Public/Private

Dichotomy,"

in Public

and

Private Thought

Practice. Edited

by

Jeff Weintraub

and

Krishan Kumar. Chicago:

University

of

Chicago Press, 1997.

Montaigne, Michel Eyquem. The Complete Essays. Translated by Donald Frame. Stan ford: Stanford University Press, 1958. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Confessions. Translated by J. M. Cohen. New York: Penguin Books, 1953.
CEuvres
Lettre
completes.

Edited

by

Bernard Gagnebin

and

Marcel Raymond. Paris:

Pleiade, 1959-69,
a

vols.

i-iv.

M. d'Alembert. Paris:
complete

Garnier-Flammarion, 1967.

Correspondance Geneva: Institut


et

de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Edited

by

R. A. Leigh.

Musee Voltaire, 1967.


and abridged

Julie,

or

the

New Eloise. Translated

by Judith H. McDowell. Uni


Books, 1979.

versity Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968. Emile. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Politics
and

the Arts:

Letter

to

M. D'Alembert. Translated
Reread."

by

Allan Bloom.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989. Trible, Phyllis. "Eve and Adam: Genesis 2-3
Carol Christ
and

In Womenspirit Rising. Edited


and

by

Judith Plaskow. New York: Harper

Row, 1979.

Discussion: Locke

on

Natural Law

The Internal

in the

Coherency of Locke's Moral Views Questions Concerning the Law of Nature


Calumet

Samuel Zinaich, Jr.


Purdue

University

they

In this essay I defend the internal coherency of John Locke's moral views as appear in Questions Concerning the Law of Nature (Locke 1990). John
about the called the

Locke's initial thoughts


essays which and the

law

of nature are recorded


on

in ten different

have been

Questions

Concerning

Law of Nature (Locke, 1958) the Law of Nature (Locke, 1990). This work by
the

Essays

Locke

remained unpublished until purposes of this

W. Von Leyden first

published

it in 1954.

For the

essay, I use the

Horwitz, Clay

and

Clay

edition, hereaf

ter referred to as Questions.

While

not much

the examination of the correctness of either tion. M. A. Stewart has discussed the

scholarship has been published on edition, there is one notable excep


of the

limitations

Horwitz,

et

al., edition

(1992,
1956

pp.

145-65).

Many

scholars take

Locke to be
partial

an advocate of a version

of natural and

law morality in this document (a

list includes: Von Leyden, latter


view

1958; Lenz, 1956; Yolton, 1958; Hancey, 1976, Colman, 1983; Zi


not.

naich, 2000). Others do

Two worthy

examples of the

are the

late Robert Horwitz (Horwitz, 1992) and Michael Zuckert (Zuckert, 1994). I will proceed by considering the views of Robert Horwitz as they are found
in

his commentary

on the

Questions. He

points out that

Locke

contradicts

him

times; as Horwitz explains, however, Locke contradicts himself in tentionally. The reason is that the style of writing Locke used reflected his
self several attempt to articulate

something

other than a coherent view of the

law

of nature.

argue

that Horwitz

is mistaken

because he has failed to

understand the context

in which

the alleged contradictions occur.

will then consider the views of

Michael Zuckert. Zuckert


be taken

argues

basically

the same
more

thing

as

Horwitz;

unlike

Horwitz, however, his


understand the

arguments are much

detailed

and

forceful. (This

should not

as a criticism of the philo

sophical

had time

ability of to finish his

Horowitz. As I
commentary.

story, Horwitz died before he

It

was published

posthumously

by

his friends

in his honor. See Horwitz only

editor's note

in Horwitz, 1992,

p.

251.) For

example, while

gives us one example of a

contradiction, Zuckert gives us several.

interpretation,

Fall 2001, Vol.

29, No. 1

56
In

Interpretation
each case

argue that

Zuckert is

mistaken as well.

As

with

Horwitz,
in

all of

my believes the

comments against

Zuckert

rest upon a close

scrutiny

of texts

which

he

alleged contradictions exist.

Horwitz writes, "The Questions


tions"

abound with manifest and massive contradic

(1992,
in

p.

252). More specifically, Horwitz

claims that

Locke
on

argues

for
a

the existence of the law of nature


premise

in the first question, but later


explains that

he denies

each argument.

Horwitz

Locke does this intentionally,

and that this

is just the

style of

writing that he
thereby
in

used:

Initially
is
wise

he strongly

states a position, and

gives

it

an authoritative

cast, but

then he gradually

raises

doubts

about

it,

or even

flatly
the
of a

contradicts

it. For this reason, it

for the

reader to regard

every

assertion

Questions

as provisional

in

char

acter,

rather

than

as a pronouncement

by

Locke

definitive doctrine. (P

253)
which

The text

of

his commentary,
one of

however,

reflects

only I

one example

in

he

believes Locke denies

the premises of the arguments


will

for

the existence of

the law of nature, namely, Locke's second argument.


second argument

briefly

describe Locke's
objection.

found in

the

first

question and then consider

Horwitz's

Locke

argues that the

law

of nature exists

because this is the best

explanation

for the

existence of men's consciences.

Locke believes that

each person pro

nounces upon

himself

a verdict when

he has

performed some moral action.

For
is

example, Locke explains, quoting

Juvenal, Satires XIII 2-3, "no


judge"

one who

guilty

wins acquittal when

he himself is

(fol. 17; I Leyden

cite

Locke's Questions

by
of

the

folio In

number as printed

in both the

von

and the

Horwitz,

et al.

editions).

other

words, according to
even

Locke,

no one can escape the

judgment

his

own

conscience,

though he may escape the

censure of the

legal

or

moral community.

The

alleged contradiction occurs

in

questions seven

(fols.

62-81)

and ten

(fols. 91-104). Horwitz

briefly

explains:

For example, he

[i.e., Locke] flatly


Questions he
.

contradicts

here his

earlier contention that the

workings of conscience established the existence of the

law

of nature.

Near

the
a

beginning
when

of the

asserted

that "men's

consciences"

prove

"that

very law

of nature exists;

that

is, from

the fact that 'no


p.

one who

is guilty

wins acquittal

he himself is

judge.'"

(1992,

283)
a

To determine
the passages

whether this

is really

contradiction, I

will attempt to compare contradict

in

questions seven and ten that

allegedly

Locke's

view

of the conscience

in the first

question.

Discussion: Locke
Horwitz
men pass
authority.

on

Natural Law
the earlier
view

57
that

claims

that
on

Locke

contradicts

in

question seven

judgment

themselves in the
argues

absence of

For example, Horwitz

(p.

283)

that

any kind of civil or religious Locke denies this claim in from Locke indicates, reflection of the dominant

the seventh question


conscience opinion:

because,

as the

following

passage

becomes for Locke nothing

more than a

For

men

have judged themselves

not

to have violated, but to have observed, the law

of nature, since

they have been


to others, the

guided

by

the then

dominant

opinion

[and]

have

per

formed

one action or another

in conformity
of

with the custom of their race, actions

which seem perhaps

and not without

reason, vicious
nor

and

impious. And
the

they have felt


which
ered

none of

lashes

conscience,

that internal

goad of

heart,

usually
(Fol.

wounds and torments those

guilty

of a crime,

because they

consid
praise

their action, whatever

it was,

not

only

permissible

but

even

something

worthy.

17)
Locke I do is the
interpretation.

But is this

what

means?

not

think this

correct

To

why I think it is wrong, I must first expound upon the context of Here Locke has been arguing against consensus as a means of knowledge of the law of nature. He distinguishes two kinds, positive and natural
explain

this

passage.

consensus.

Positive

consensus

is

an agreement which
argues that at

issues from

either a tacit

or expressed compact

(fol. 63). Locke

"Neither

of these

kinds

of

agreement proves the existence of a on a

law

all, since

compact,

and

issue from

whatsoev

no principle of nature

they both depend entirely (fol. 63). Natu

ral consensus

is "an

agreement

to which men
of

are

brought

by

kind

of natural

instinct

without the

if this
about

precept

any is true, then knowledge


of natural

intervention

compact"

(fol. 65). Locke

reasons that

of the

law

of nature would

be brought
actions,

by

kind

instinct,

either

in the

consensus of conduct or

opinions, or

principles.

He denies

all three of these natural


second part of

instincts.
argument under

The
natural

passage above

is discussed in the

this

the

instinct in the

consensus of opinions.

Specifically, Locke is

discussing
men.

why

no consensus of opinions

concerning

right conduct exists

among

He

argues

first

that one

there is no such

has only to consult the histories of the world to see that consensus. In fact, as Locke writes: "should we survey, one by
vices,

one, the kinds

of virtues and

[virtues]
not

which no one

doubts

constitute

the

law

of nature which

itself, it
men's

will soon
opinions

become

evident

that there exists no kind con


not confirmed

cerning

do

vary

and are

by

public

practice"

approval and

(fol. 69).

Next, he
from
place

argues that

"were the

consensus of mankind

to be

considered

the

rule of morals, there would either exist no law of nature, or this law would
place"

vary
a

to

(fols. 69

and

70). Locke adds, however,


(fol.

that this

is

some

acknowledge"

thing

that

"no

one

will
about

70)

because

each

culture,

i.e.,

culture with some view

the law of nature, believes that it is acting in

58

Interpretation
the law of
nature.

accordance with reasons

Its

members

believe this to be true for two

witz's

(and understanding these reasons is the key to understanding why Horinterpretation is mistaken). First, they believe this because "they have

been

guided

by

the then dominant opinion


with the custom of

[and]

have

performed one action or

another

in conformity

their race, actions


impious"

which seem perhaps

to others, and
though

not without

reason, vicious and


are

(fol. 70). That

is,

even

they

think that

they

obeying

the law of nature,

they have been


of the

guided

instead

by

the mistaken view of the dominant opinion of the culture.

Second,
of

they believe this to be correct because "they have felt none conscience, nor that internal goad of the heart, which usually
crime"

lashes

wounds and

tor

ments those of the

guilty

of

(fol. 70). That is, because


so

each

individual believes his

view

law

of nature

is

correct

each can generate evidence

for his
his

own

view of

the law of

nature.

He does

by

appealing to his own psychological

experience of not culture.

feeling

guilt when

he

performs actions approved

by
I

own

After making

explicit

my

alternative

interpretation

of this passage,

see noth

ing

that contradicts the earlier view that men pass judgment on themselves

in

the absence of

says that people civil opinion


in

any civil authority or religious authority. For example, this claim judge themselves even when there is no dominant religious or
place.

This

claim

does

not mean that

they judge

themselves

passage

according to the specific laws of nature, only that they judge themselves. The in the seventh question says that individuals often defend their own
views of the

law

of nature

by appealing

to the fact that

what

they

are

doing

is

confirmed

by

their own consciences. the law of nature are

even of

if
it

views of

In fact, as Locke makes clear, they do so mistaken. This claim is, then, not a denial
conscience

Locke's
was

earlier

claim, but a support for it because the


praise and

is

doing
under

what

designed to do, namely, is in the tenth

blame.
a

The
stand:

other passage

question.

It is

difficult

passage

to

[T]hat

men

have

various and manifold opinions

concerning

the law of nature and

the basis of their


same

duty

is

perhaps

the

only thing

about which all mortals

have the

opinion; [a truth] which, even if their tongues were still, their

conduct would

clearly enough as they diverge in some different directions. Not only are a few to be discovered here and there, not only men of private condition but even en
express

tire nations,

among

whom there can

be

observed no sense of

law,

no rectitude of of these
who

conduct; there are other peoples too


without

and

there are a great

many

of wrong pay no heed to at least some of the precepts of the law of nature; for whom it is not only customary but praiseworthy to commit and
any
conscience

sanction crimes which are proper objects of the greatest who think

detestation

to other peoples
permitted

soundly

and who

live according to

nature.

And so, theft is

among

some peoples and

praised; and the grasping hands of

robbers are not re

strained

from

violence and crime

by

any fetters of conscience.

Among

others there

Discussion: Locke
exists no shame

on

Natural Law

59

in debauchery, in

one place there exist no temples or altars to the

gods, in others these are splattered with human blood. (Fol.

91;

emphasis

is mine)

Here Horwitz

points

out that

Locke

contradicts

himself

by

pointing

out that

there are people who


are not restrained

without any conscience about wrong and any fetters of conscience. This passage shows, according to Horwitz, that conscience is nothing more than a reflection of the dominant

do bad things

by

opinion

(1992,

p.

283).

Does the
view? means

I think the

bear any evidence of contradicting Locke's earlier for two reasons. First, regardless of what Locke in this passage, he states that from these considerations, "it seems neces
above quotation

answer

is

no

sary to
people

conclude that either there


are not not view at

is

no

Law

of

Nature

anywhere or that some

bound

by

this law and thus that the obligation of the Law of


passage

Nature is is
not

universal"

(fol. 93). This

indicates that the

above quotation

Locke's

all, but

only

an objection

that he is considering.

Unfortu

nately, Locke never addresses these objections

fully

except

to assert

flatly, in

head-to-head law
of

fashion,

that regardless of what anyone says no one

is

above the

nature;

everyone

has

other

duties

depending

upon

his

or

her relationship

with other people:

Against these objections,

which are not

decisive,

we assert that the obligation of the


obliga obliga

Law

of

Nature is

perpetual and universal.

tion of this
tion. (Fol.

law;

we must now proceed

We have already established the to a discussion of the extent of this

93)
us suppose that the passage
at all that contradicts

Second, let

in

question

is Locke's
in the

view.

Does

Locke say anything


civil

his

earlier view?

No, because Locke


absence of

never states that men

do

not pass

judgment

on themselves
what

authority or exactly what he says in the the dominant opinion, their


religious

doctrine. In
passage

fact,

he

says

in this

passage

any is
of

in the

seventh question:

that, in the light

consciences approve and sanction crimes which are

often the proper objects of the greatest detestation to other people. regardless science of what
someone's what conscience approves

Therefore,
con

or

disapproves, his
contradicts

is

still
are

doing
points

it

was

designed to do.

There
self.

apparently
out

other texts a number

in

which

Locke allegedly

him
pp.

Zuckert

of these

in his

excellent

book (1994,

118-215). I

will now turn

to consider Zuckert's

views.

why there is not a coherent natural law view in the Ques show that tions, Zuckert argues along two different lines. First, he attempts to

In

order

to

show

60

Interpretation
nature penned

the first three arguments for the existence of the law of


are

by

Locke

inconsistent

with

Locke's definition

of what makes an edict a question of the

law. (Locke

discusses both Zuckert

of these

issues in the first

Questions.) Second,
he
uses

argues that

Locke denies

a premise

in

each argument that

to

justify
To

the existence of the law of nature. The contradictions occur in the text

of the other questions that


make

follow the first


s

question.

Zuckert'

clear

first line

of argumentation,

will

first discuss for the


exis

Locke's

view of

law. After that I

reconstruct

Locke's

arguments

tence of the law of nature, and then

I discuss the

elements

from both discussions

that Zuckert believes are inconsistent.

To

convince

us

that the law of nature


what

is, in fact,
case

law, Locke lays

out

(without argumentation)
a

he takes to be the
is
a

conditions that make an edict

law (fols. 11

and

12). An
on

edict

law just in

it is

(1)

the

declaration

of

a superior will
effective or

(Later

in folio 86 Locke describes the first

condition as the and

the efficient cause of

law.); (2) it

prescribes what

is to be done

what

is to be avoided;

(3)

it is

binding

upon men,

i.e.,

there are terms of the

law that

prescribe what we are

to do or what we are to avoid

doing

(Also in

folio 86, Locke describes the third condition as that which binds terminatively.); and (4) it is sufficiently promulgated. Locke makes clear that the law of nature
satisfies the

four

conditions that make an edict a

law:

From these
law
are

considerations

found in this [law

of nature]: of

it is readily apparent that all the conditions necessary to For 1, it is the declaration of a superior will,
law
seems to consist.
and what

in

which the

formal definition

law: it

prescribes what

is to be done
in itself

is to be

avoided.

2, [It has] the property of 3, It is binding


to obligation;

upon men,

for it

contains

all of the conditions requisite

[and]
of rea

although, in
ever,

fact, it is

not promulgated

in the
it is

manner of positive possible to

laws, it is, how

sufficiently known to
(Fol.

men

since

know it

by

the

light

son alone.

12)

Immediately
law
of this

after this

discussion, Locke

writes:

"Once these five different

considerations

have been laid down in this manner, the

following
rehearses

arguments persuade that a


arguments

kind

exists"

(fol. 13). Locke

for

the existence of the law of nature.


ment

in the first

section of this paper.

I have already I will now

reproduced the second argu


reproduce

the first and third

arguments.

In the first argument, Locke


exists some

argues that a
everywhere"

law

of nature exists

because "there
prem

law,

which obtains

(fol. 13). Locke derives this

ise from Aristotle in two different

ways.

First, Locke derives it from Aristotle's


argues that
growth,"

famous
"some

argument

for the function


either

the human

function is
life

For example, Aristotle living, i.e., "the life of nutrition and


of man. or

or

sort of

perception,"

of sense
reason"

"some

sort of

life

of action of the

[part

of the

soul] that has

Aristotle argues,

however,

the

(Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a34-1098a4). As function is neither the life of nutrition and growth

Discussion: Locke
nor some

on

Natural Law

61

sort of

cludes that

the

itself

having

life of sense perception (1097b 34-1098a4). Aristotle con human function is the "soul's activity according to reason [as reason] or requires reason [as obeying (1098a7-8). Locke
reason]"

derives

an additional

conclusion

immediately

from Aristotle's argument, that

"consequently (fol. by
actions

man must

reason"

necessarily perform those actions which are dictated 13). Locke evidently means that if man must perform those

which

are

according

to reason, then some law exists which applies

everywhere.

Next, Locke
follows. He
since
force"

advances

another argument

from Aristotle. The

upshot

is

as

reasons that since


argues

Aristotle breaks law into

civil and natural, and


everywhere the exists some

Aristotle

"this natural law is that law which has


reasons

same

(fol. 13), he

"it is rightly inferred that there

law

of

nature, since there exists some

law,

everywhere"

which obtains

(fol. 13).
objec

Later, Locke

considers two objections to the

first

argument.

The first

tion states that the law of nature

is

nowhere to

be found:

[A]t this point,

some object to the

law

of nature,

claiming
of the

that no such law exists at

all, since it is discovered nowhere, for the greatest


were no
nize.

part of mankind

lives

as

if there recog

guiding

principle

to

life

at all, nor

any law

kind that

all men

(Fol.

15)
that this objection is unsound because it is
obtains everywhere

Locke

argues

possible

to have a law

of conduct
people.

which

but be

which

is

not recognized

by

many
or

Its precepts, for example,


of

could

neglected

because

of

idleness,

because The
of the

bad habits,

or

because

of mental

defects.
no agreement about what the edicts
part

second objection argues that there

is

law

of nature

are,

even as

among those who are of the sounder

of

mankind.

Locke's reply is

follows:

that,

even granted that this sounder part of mankind

itself does

not

fully
not

agree

what the

law

of nature

is,

what

its

certain and

known

edicts

are, it does

in truth

follow from this that

no

law

of nature exists at all.

(Fol.

17)
does believe in the

Moreover, Locke argues that the sounder same natural laws, but differs in how they

part of mankind

are

to be interpreted (fol. 17).


argument

Having
of the

stated

Locke's

view of

law

and

his first
s

for

the existence
short.

law

of nature,

now

turn to

Zuckert'

first

objection.

The point, in

is

as

follows:

The first

argument appeals

to a combination of Aristotelian points, one to the


reason,"

effect

that "the function of

Locke,
tated

concludes

is activity according to from which Aristotle, or that "man must necessarily perform those actions which are dic
man

reason"

by

(fol. 13). But Locke has

on the

preceding

page

explicitly

rejected

62

Interpretation
the idea of law of the "law of
nature as

"dictate

reason,"

of

and therefore

it does
as

not appear

that

nature"

Locke

attributes p.

to Aristotle can be the same

the law

Locke

seems to accept.

(Zuckert, 1994,

193)
his
own view of the

Zuckert
nature: reason

appears

to be

right as

Locke

writes about

law

of

"Less accurately, it

seems

to me, some say it is a dictate of reason; for


and

does

not so much a

lay

down is

decree this law

of nature as power and

it discovers

and

investigates

law

which

ordained

by

higher

has been im

planted

in

hearts"

our

(fol. 12).
to
Zuckert'

One way to "dictate of

respond

s objection

is to

point out

that the phrase,

reason,"

as the editors of

is equivocally in folio 12 the Questions (1990) point out on


used

and
page

folio 13. For example,

101,

note

9 (and

even

Zuckert
law

on page

of nature:

his book), Locke is referring to "Natural law is a dictate of right reason, 190
of

Grotius'

view of

the

which

indicates the

presence of either moral

turpitude or moral

necessity in
either

a given act

by

reason

of

its

agreement or as a

disagreement

with our rational nature

itself

and which

indi

cates,

consequence, that such an act

is

forbidden

or commanded

by

nature."

God,

the author of

It is

thing in fol. 13, however,


reason,"

since

entirely clear that Locke means the same in folio 13 Locke's use of the phrase, "dictate
not

by

appears to mean the same


statement

thing

as

Aristotle's phrase,

"according
is

to

reason."

If this

is true, then, in folio 13 Locke

must mean

that man

must perform

those actions, which reason, after it has found what


prescribes with

consistent

with man's

function,

authority

to the desires that such an action

is

right.

This latter interpretation is


a

consistent with

Locke's

view of
nature

the law of
or man's

nature

because it is

law that is

consonant with a rational

function. Zuckert
also

finds fault

with

Locke's

second argument

(reproduced in the

first

section of this essay).

He

points out

that the kind of law implicit in this


of the

argument

does

not

satisfy Locke's definition


not

law

of nature.

This

statement

is

so

because it does

satisfy the requirement that the law be knowable 'light


nature'

by

the light of nature, when the term


stood as that
ments

of

appears to

be

reason under

faculty
law

of the
p.

intellect

by

which

it

articulates and
no

deduces

argu

(Zuckert, 1994,
of the

194). This

argument

is in

definition

of nature,

however. The

reason

way inconsistent with his is that Locke is not using knowledge


be
of the

the existence of men's conscience as a means to the


nature.

law
the

of

Instead, Locke
have

argues that

many

explanations can

given

for

fact
not

that all men

some sort of conscience.

This

use of conscience

does

imply

way concerning actions. It only implies that they judge themselves. Locke reasons that the existence of the law of nature is not only one of these explanations, but it is also the best explanation. In

that all men judge themselves in the same

describing

Locke's

argument

this way, we can say the law

of nature

in the
law
of

second argument and the


nature remain

law

of nature

described in his definition

of the

identical.

Discussion: Locke
The third
there
or
argument

on

Natural Law

63

by

Locke is teleological: The law

of nature exists

because

function for man, i.e., a function that leads to human happiness flourishing. To justify his argument, he brings forward the following points.
a proper

is

Locke

argues that

everything [except man]


set

observes a

fixed law,

which

is

suited

to its own nature. Of these laws designed

for

animals

departs from the law

down for it

not as much as a

"each individual thing (fol. 18). nail's


breadth"

Here, Locke has in


kind
of

mind the essence given

to all species that determines the

thing it is and what its function will be. If this essence can be described in causal terms, it is a subset of the causal laws (which include for example the
law
of

gravity) designed to do something very


other

specific.

The

essence

requires,

among join with This

things,

each

individual

of the species to preserve

its

own

life,

to

and propagate with others of

its

own

kind,

and

to

protect

its

offspring.

essence acts as a

kind

of

law because the

animals

do

not

have the ability

to act otherwise.

Although

man

is

not without

laws that he
man

shares with all animals, neverthe

less,
also

there are also additional

laws

is

subject

to that

nonhuman animals are

not required

to observe.

According

to

Locke,

this difference is so because man

"has

a prescribed mode of action which suits


view rests upon

his

nature"

(fol. 18). Locke's

reason

for this kind

the fact that man also has an essence that deter

mines the

of

thing he

will

be

and

his function. From this

essence also arise

laws for

man to

observe these

Locke, however, points out that while the animals must fixed laws, the laws for man, which arise in virtue of the kind of
his nature,
are not

follow.

thing he is
To

and which suit

fixed. On the contrary, these laws


'prescribed'

prescribe a special or unique make sense of

way

of

living.
the term

this

distinction,

is typically
notion of

contrasted

'fixed.'

with the term

The term

'fixed'

brings
with

with

it the

determinacy.
notion.

The term

'prescribed,'

however, brings
a set of

it

a quite

different

This

term indicates that there is


advises a certain

laws

or rules that

instructs,

recommends, or
such a

kind

of

life. This

means that man

is designed in

that

if

he follows the

prescription

of these rules, the observance will

way lead to

human happiness.
Zuckert
clause of what
again argues that own

"Locke's third
of the natural
phrase

argument
law"

his

definition

fails to embody the final (p. 194). While I am unclear in the


quotation

Zuckert

means

by
of

the

"final

clause"

above, the

fundamental line
of

of thought can

be

summarized

in this

way.

Locke's definition
argument

law (and the law

nature) is inconsistent with the third


the
prescriptive nature

because,

while

his definition
argument

emphasizes

of the

law

of nature, the

third

describes the law


effect

of nature

in fixed

or

deterministic terms. For

Zuckert, then,
He
and of quotes

the

is this:

Hippocrates in

support of

this

notion of

in

great

fulfilleth the task


nature points

which
a

destiny

law: "Each thing in both small (fol. 18). His definition hath set
down"

the law of

to

very different kind

of

law, however, for

the law

64

Interpretation
Locke has in
ture
mind

"commands or forbids some


not

action"

(fol. 11). Locke's law

of na

is prescriptive,

determinative. (P.

194)
in the consistency

Zuckert'

s argument seems to expose an


writings.

important

problem

of

Locke's

There is

way

to understand what Locke says that remains

faithful to the text


mental
ent

and alleviates the

approach, then, is this.


of natural

consistency problem, however. The funda In the third argument Locke contrasts two differ Of this
law Locke

kinds

laws.

The first kind


writes:

applies

only to

nonhuman animals. observe a

natural

"all things [other than man]


to their own

fixed law

of their operations and


points out

nature"

a measure suited

(fol. 18). As Locke

(quoting

Aquinas
tic

and

Hippocrates), however,

these laws are

largely

fixed

and

determinis

in

nature:

destiny
for it

"each thing in both small and in great fulfilleth the task which hath set down, and each individual thing departs from the law set down
breadth"

not as much as a nail's

(fol. 18).

Immediately

after,

however,

and one

this is the crucial point, Locke points out a different kind of natural
which alone

law,

only applies to humans: "Since this is the case, it does not seem that man is free of laws, while all others things are bound by them, but he has a his
nature"

prescribed mode of action which suits

(fol. 18). This

second

kind

of

natural

law is in fact the


and the same one

same

law

of nature

that he discusses in the definition


with

of

law

he

attempts to

defend

five

arguments

in the first
law
of

question. nature

Therefore,

Zuckert has failed to

establish that the notion of the with

in

the third argument

is inconsistent

Locke's definition. (Of the last


these two arguments

two

arguments

Zuckert

writes:

"Properly

adumbrated,

could

indeed be

consistent with

Locke's definition,

although

they

neither

imply

it,

nor

it

them"

[p.

194].)
in
each argument which

now

turn to Zuckert's second line of argumentation. Zuckert argues that


a premise

Locke denies
of the

he

uses to

justify

the

existence

law

of nature.

The

alleged contradictions are question.

found in the text his first

of the other

questions that

follow the first

Zuckert

argues that

Locke denies the

premise of

argument

for the

existence of the

law

of nature.

His basic approach, then,


argues that the

can

be described in

this way.
cause

According
and

to

Zuckert, Locke
principles

law

of nature exists

be

"there

exist certain

of conduct which with

the entire human race


unanimous
exists

agree

recognizes

which as

men

everywhere embrace points

(fol. 13). Later,

Zuckert correctly

out, Locke argues: "There


conduct"

among men no common consensus concerning right both statements clearly contradict one another, Zuckert's argument appears to be correct.
Zuckert's
approach to the

(fol. 68). Since first

assessment of the

first
not

argument
argue

is

mistaken on two

counts, however.

The first is that Locke does


"there

that the law of nature exists because the entire

exist certain principles of conduct which

human

race recognizes

and which men everywhere embrace with unanimous

agreement."

On the

con-

Discussion: Locke
trary, as I have made clear above, Locke argues that because "there exists some law, which obtains
nately, there seems to be
ment one
a problem

on

Natural Law

65

law

of nature exists

everywhere"

(fol. 13). Unfortu


argu

here. Zuckert describes Locke's first

I describe it in entirely different terms. How can this issue be resolved conclusively? The issue appears to be based on two different inter pretations. I can resolve the issue by explaining the second reason why Zuckert's
way,
and

approach

is

mistaken.

To

sum

up, Zuckert's crucial

mistake

is

as

follows: He

quotes a passage of

Locke's

B (fol. 13, 11. 18-19) that is part of a large portion of text that Locke himself deleted (fol. 13, 1. 18-fol. 15, 1. 15). The editors of the Questions briefly discuss the deletion. Even though they include this passage in
manuscript

the main text

they are careful to point out that it was deleted (see n. 15 on p. Locke's Questions, 1990). W von Leyden also points out that these pages were deleted. Instead of printing them with the main text, he reprints them at the back of his own translation (see von Leyden 's Note B to his translation of
105
of

Locke's Essays

p. 282). Of course, the reason why Locke deleted this early passage seems obvious. He understood that the two passages could not fit together. In the end, the deletion probably represents an
on

the

Law of Nature, 1958,

evolution

in Locke's

own

thinking

as

he

wrote

the Questions.

Zuckert takes up Locke's second argument. It is the same problem that Hor witz discusses as well. Since I have already examined the problem at length and found
no

contradictions, and since Zuckert does


will move on to consider

discussion, I
argument and

anything new to the Zuckert's problem with Locke's third


not add

direct the

attention of the reader to the and attack on the

first

part of

this essay.

While Zuckert's discussion


the essential
commit
point

third argument are complicated,


roots of

is

as

follows: The intellectual


that he

Locke's third

argument

him to

a position

later

contradicts
points

in folio 61: "So far

as

Locke's

third argument, his Thomistic argument,

to the Thomistic natural law

theory, it is known

points to the natural


knowable"

inclinations
p.

or

(1994,

way in which the natural law 201). One line later he writes, "According to
as the

Question VI,
of

the law of nature 'cannot

be known from the

natural

inclinations

mankind'

(fol.

61)"

(p. 201).

The

following

points

may be

noticed at once.

One is this.

According by

to Zuck
a view

ert, Locke's third

argument

logically

implies

or

logically

commits mean

him to

that he contradicts later. This is what I take Zuckert to

the phrase,

While I may be mistaken about this, we may speculate that the phrase may have at least three meanings. First, the phrase may mean simply that Locke's third argument reminds us of another position, a position that is

"points

to."

logically connected. Second, Zuckert may mean that Locke's third argument logically implies or even, thirdly, his argument logically entails another view.
not

Zuckert
dust

cannot mean

the first

because he

wants to argue that


cannot

Locke

shakes the

of the third argument


at

from his boots. He


view

maintain

this without
to"

saying,

least minimally, that the

his third

argument

"points

is

logi-

66
cally

Interpretation
connected

to the third argument,


we

a claim which

he denies later,

valid method

(modus tollens),

may reason that Locke means to

by a deny the
and

third argument itself. He may even mean

logically

entails the consequent view.

something stronger, that the argument Zuckert does not have to maintain such a
a

strong position, however. He merely needs to maintain tion. The meaning is that Locke's argument at folio 18
to
another

basic logical

connec

logically

commits

him

idea that the


of the

natural

inclination
law

of a

human forms the


At folio

epistemic

foundation

knowledge

of the

of nature.

61, however, he

explicitly denies the epistemic role the natural inclinations may play. Next, Zuckert attributes the roots of Locke's third argument to Thomas Aqui
nas.

It is from this

source that

Zuckert brings forward the


natural

all-important natural natural

discus

sion of natural

inclinations. In the

law literature, the

inclinations
inclinations

play three
make the

roles.

The first role, in short, describes how the


act

disposition to

in

certain ways possible.


within

For example, in this litera


other

ture,

a well-formed woman

finds

herself, among
offspring.

things, the disposi


to propagate

tion or propensity to
own

form

or enter and

societies, to know

God,

her

species, to

preserve

herself

her

The

result of

having

these

dispositions is that the dispositions become the basis


because
to be
without a willingness

of moral

accountability,

to

pursue

these ends, one's action cannot be said

voluntary. consequence of

The

the second role is that the natural


of nature.

dispositions
the

correspond

to the precepts of

the law

For example,

we read

following
God,

in

Aquinas: "Thus

man

has

a natural

inclination to know the truth


whatever pertains to this

about

and

to live in society;

and

in this respect,

inclination be

longs to the

law"

natural

(1997, Summa Theologica I II, Q. 94, Art. 2).


and certainly in Aquinas, the natural foundation of the knowledge of the law of

Finally,

sometimes

in this literature

inclinations become
is

the epistemic

nature, or as Zuckert points out: "the means


promulgated

by

which the

Thomistic

natural

law

to

humanity"

(1994,

p.

201). In Aquinas, for example,


good

we see

the

role

that Zuckert is referring to:

"[Sjince, however,
are

has

the nature of

an end, and evil, the nature of the which man

contrary, hence it is that

all those

things to
reason

has
and

a natural

inclination

naturally
pursuit,

apprehended and

by

as

being

good,

consequently

as objects of

their contraries as evil,


I

avoidance"

and objects of

(Aquinas, Summa Theologica


well-formed person natural

II, Q. 94,

Art. 2). I
not

take Aquinas to argue that

the

faculty

to

recognize

any her own

has

within

herself

only

inclinations

and the ends which each

one gives

her

reason to pursue,

but

also the

ability to know

by

means of reason

that the ends of her natural


ones she should pursue.

inclinations

are good and, as a

consequence, the

am now

in

a position to consider

Zuckert's

attack on

Locke's third

argu

ment.

There

are two problems. argument.

First, Zuckert's

attack

is

not an attack on the

premise of

Locke's
an

he takes to be

On the contrary, it is an attack on a premise that implication of Locke's third argument. As I pointed out above,

Discussion: Locke
the premise of the third argument
a

on

Natural Law

67

is that there is
or

a proper

function for man, i.e.,

function that leads to human happiness

the text of the

Questions

to see

if I

am

flourishing. One has only to consult correct. The end result is that Zuckert's
the moment.

attack seems to miss the mark.

pose

Nevertheless, let us ignore this problem for that Zuckert has, nonetheless, discovered
contradict one another.
of argumentation.

Instead, let
in

us

sup

two statements

the text of the

Questions that
support

Such

supposition, if true, may


supposition

indirectly
is
correct

his line

Nevertheless, Zuckert's
argument
phrase

only if it is true that Locke's third Zuckert to mean minimally by the


tions are the epistemic
question accept

implies (again, this is

what

I take

foundation

of the

"points to") that the natural inclina knowledge of the law of nature. The
we should

for

us now

to consider is whether there is any reason why


answer

Zuckert's interpretation. The Either there has to be textual


is
evidence that

is

yes

only if

one of two arguments

is

true.

evidence that supports

Zuckert's interpreta in this discus

tion,

or there

Locke

meant us to understand that

sion the topics of metaphysics and

kept separate)

epistemology (normally two topics that are may be collapsed together. The first reason is obvious; the second one may not be so obvious, however. The underlying line of thought, in brief, seems to rest partly upon the view that Locke's third argument contains
are or

within

it

not

only

elements which support of nature,

his

metaphysical commitment

to the

existence of the

law

but these

same elements

may

also

be

used to

draw

certain epistemic conclusions. reasons are

Both

false. The first

reason

is false because there is inclinations


as

no evidence

in the

text at

folio 18 that Locke


knowledge

accepts the natural

the epistemic
no

foundation

of the

of the

law

of nature.

In fact, there is

discussion

of the natural
more

inclinations in the third


one

argument at all.

Additionally,

and perhaps

may argue that such a discussion is irrelevant because, as discussed above, the focus of Locke's third argument is on his elaboration of his premise, namely, that there exists a proper function for humans to follow.

importantly,

Additionally,
all that

even though

Locke

makes reference to

Aquinas, it is

not clear at

he

wants us

to

understand that

his

epistemic roots are

the same as the

epistemic method of

Aquinas.

The

second reason

is false because Locke

understands

that the topics of

meta

physics and

view rests upon the

evidence of this epistemology are to be kept separate. Part of the in which he organizes the Questions. The first question way

is is

largely
a

dedicated to showing why the law of nature exists. Such an endeavor metaphysical enterprise, because metaphysics is dedicated to the question does
not exist.

of what and what

After he finishes his

work

in the first question,

Locke moves to consider a different but equally important question. How is the law of nature known? This is an epistemic discussion because epistemology
studies the questions of what can and what cannot

be known. Questions two, become known to

four, five,
question

and seven contain


not contain

Locke's

answer

to this question (Locke's third


of nature

does

any text: "Does the Law

68
us

Interpretation

by

tradition?

It does

not"

[fol. 36]. Likewise, the

sixth question

does

not

contain

any text: "Can the law of Nature be known It [fol.

from

the natural

inclination

of the mankind?

61].)
is
as

The

result of

these two objections

follows: Since there is

no

textual
as

evidence

in folio 18 for Locke's foundation


of

reliance upon the natural

inclinations

the
of

epistemic

the law

of

nature,

and since

Locke keeps both topics

metaphysics and

epistemology

separate and

distinct,
at

there are no explicit state


contradict

ments

in folio 18

or statements

derivable

folio 18 that

Locke's
The

remarks about

the natural inclinations in folio 61.

I
best

now consider

Zuckert's

objections

to Locke's fourth

and

fifth

arguments.
existence

fourth

argument states that the

law

of nature exists

because its

is the

explanation

for the continuing

existence of societies.

But

what

this statement come to?

Apparently

to this

conclusion:

It

seems

exactly does as if Locke is

positing

some causal

the existence of

relationship between the existence of the law of nature and societies. The law of nature, then, creates societies in some sense. Locke
means can

Perhaps Since
selves

what

be
a

made a

little

clearer

in this illustration. like them


of nature

most normal people

have both

disposition to live

with others

implanted in them

by

God

and some sense of what the


prescribe

law

prescribes in ensure

virtue of this

disposition, they

laws for themselves to


mentions

that their own societies remain intact.

For example, Locke is


19). Since

the

act of covenant

keeping. He

explains that the covenant

one of the

foundations

on

which

human society

seems

to

rest

(fols. 18

and

most people censures

understand that

keeping

promises

is important
to

and that moral and

legal

are needed to correct those who refuse


are organized

keep
were

their covenants, many societies

partly

upon

this foundation. Locke adds: the law

"These removed,

all

community among

men

collapses, just as,

of nature removed, these

[foundations]
Zuckert's
Locke's

themselves"

collapse central

(fol. 19).

line

of attack on the
and

argument

in folios 18

19

with

fourth argument, in brief, juxtaposes Locke's discussion of the epistemic

viability of consensus in the seventh question (fol. 62). For example, in the fourth argument, Locke argues that the law of nature exists because its existence
best
explains

why human

societies

form. Zuckert

adds:

"the law

of nature as

thus understood confirms or assumes that

human beings

are sociable

in

nature"

(1994,

p.

204). In the

seventh

question,

however, Locke

argues that whether we


agree

consider consensus

in

positive or natural

terms neither of these kinds of

ments proves the existence of a

law

of nature at all.

By

conse

'positive

Locke
as as

among people that "issues from compact, either tacit, when some common human necessity or advantage draws men to it, such the free movement of ambassadors, a free market, and other things of this
means consensus

kind;

or

expressed,

as the establishment of

boundaries among neighboring


certain

na

tions, the

embargo against
kind"

buying

agreements of this agreement

(fol. 63).

to which men are

importing By 'natural brought by a kind


or

goods,

and

many

other

consensus'

Locke

means

"an

ol natural

instinct

without the

Discussion: Locke
intervention
it is based
ever"

on

Natural Law

69

compact"

of

any
on a

(fol. 65). Positive

consensus will not work

because

"entirely

compact, and issues from

no principle of nature whatso

(fol. 63). Natural


of conduct or

consensus will not work either


no

because there is
or no

no con of

sensus

actions,

consensus of

opinions,

consensus

principle

among the for Zuckert because,


the law of nature
on

nations
as

(see fols. 65ff). The


clear, Locke's

end result seems

promising
of

he

makes

view of

the

futility

seeking
reliance

in the

consensus of mankind

in folio 63

contradicts

his

his

premise

that the law of nature best explains


point

Unfortunately, Zuckert's
contradiction?
ment

is

still not clear.

why human societies form. Why does this look like a Locke's fourth
argu

The

reason

is that Zuckert
are

points out that


nature.

assumes that

humans

sociable

in

seems to

be

committed to some sort of consensus so

If this is true, then Locke that he later denies. Why is


law
crucial point.

this?

This is

because Locke

argues that

in

virtue of the existence of the

of nature,

humans have

a sociable nature.

Notice the

Apparently,
no matter

it is from this
societies.

sociable nature that

humans
his

compact with one another to create own view

Later, he

seems to undermine

by

arguing that

how

we

describe this compact,


cannot

whether positive or natural, the conclusion


of nature

is

always

the same. We
now

know the law

through either means.


objection.

will

make

some comments

about

Zuckert's

First, let

us

assume that views

in the

Zuckert has correctly described Locke's fourth argument and his seventh question. Has Locke contradicted himself? No, because in
point; in the seventh ques
me attempt

fourth argument, Locke is making a metaphysical tion, however, he is making an epistemic point. Let
the
point.

to clarify this

Let

us suppose that the

law
or

of nature exists. some

Also let

us suppose that the

law

of nature gives rise

to,

in

sense,

explains

sociable nature.

Finally,

suppose that a

in

virtue of a sociable

why humans have a nature, humans are


to
protect

inclined to

agree to

live together in

community
is the

and make promises

that community. tent with the

In sum, let

us suppose that all these claims are true and consis

fourth in

argument.

But

what

relevance?

In short,

all these

assertions are metaphysical statements about the world

because they

purport

to

describe

or mirror

some sense the

way the world is.

Let

us

turn

now

to the seventh question.

Again,

what

does Locke merely

argue?

He
at

argues that we cannot

know that the law

of nature exists

by looking

the kinds of agreements humans make, whether those agreements are positive

But why is this true? Locke gives us several reasons. On the one hand, Locke argues that one cannot find any universal convergence about the agreements humans make (see fols. 63-78). On the other hand, Locke in
origin or natural. argues that
agreement

"even if there

were to exist

among

men a unanimous and universal


agreement would not prove

concerning that opinion to be a law


short, follows: A

some opinion or

another, this

nature"

of

(fol. 79). Why? Locke's basic reason, in


to

unanimous agreement might point

something that is
challenge

not

the

law

of nature
out

(see fol. 79 for Locke's

extended reductio of this point). of

Having
follows.

spelled

Zuckert's understanding

Locke, my

is

as

70

Interpretation
contradiction?

Where's the

The

answer

is

simple enough.

There is

no contradic

tion because both Locke's

purpose

in his fourth

argument and

his

arguments

in

the seventh question point to a completely different line

of reasoning.

My
fourth

second comment
argument.

While he

is that I think Zuckert partly misunderstands Locke's understands the basic thrust of the argument, namely,

the law of nature exists because it is the best explanation

for

the creation of
suggest

human societies, he

attributes

too much to Locke's

argument.

What I

is

that Zuckert attempts to elucidate

by missing it were, in Locke's argument, i.e., the sociability of human nature. He thinks that accounts for why societies form in the first place, for without the
views prem

Locke's

pointing to a

ise,

as

sociability

of

human nature, how


a

would

humans

agree not

to live with another in


point

community?

Such

detail

seems

plausible; it is

Locke's

in

the

fourth for

argument, however. Locke's

point

is

much narrower.

He merely
"since

argues

that the

law

of nature exists

because its

existence appears

to be the best explanation


without

why human there can be


tunately, he law

societies exist.

Of course, he does
how

write:

this law

themselves"

no association or union of men

among
to
make

(fol. 18). Unfor he believes


superim

never makes clear

we are supposed

the move from the

of nature to the creation of associations, or which associations


creation of societies.

presumably form the backbone of the poses sociability; Locke is silent.

Zuckert

My
law

third and

final

comment

is that

while

Locke does discuss the

role of the

in the fourth argument, it is nothing at all like Zuckert's interpretation. This is what Locke says. First, society cannot exist
of nature and agreements
without of the

"the

keeping

agreements"

of contracts and

(fol. 20). Next, the

existence

law

of nature ensures

that, in

and agreements that

they

make.

sense, humans take seriously contracts Locke thinks this is true because "there would
some

be
to

no reason

to expect a man to abide

by

an agreement

unless the obligation


man"

fulfill

promises came

from

nature and not argues. a

from the story

will of
about

(fol. 20)

But

notice

carefully

what

Locke

It's

not a

why

people make

agreements; on the contrary, it's


to

story

about

why

people are

earnestly inclined The


and
end result

keep
Now

a promise. what

do the
no

second and third comments comprise?

is

that there
question

is

contradiction

between

the

fourth

argument

the seventh

because Locke does


to the metaphysical

not tie

together the epistemic


of the

role of consensus

in

any

sense

justification fourth

law

of nature.

If I

am correct,

then there can be nothing in the

argument that contradicts

Locke's

text

later

on.

Locke's fifth
be
no virtue or

argument states that

"without the Law

of

Nature there

would

vice, no

praise

for probity

or punishment

for

wickedness"

(fol.

20).
tion

Here, he

means that the

law

of nature exists

because it is the best Locke

explana

for both the

existence of virtue and vice, and the existence of praise

for

praiseworthy
most normal

actions and punishment

for

untoward actions.

means that
of

individuals have

some sense of right and

wrong because

the

Discussion: Locke
existence of some of

on

Natural Law

71

the precepts of the law of nature within their minds. It is because of this sense of right and partly wrong that individuals create moral systems for themselves and society in general in order to give to themselves some indication of moral order. Without the existence of the law of nature and
the

corresponding dispositions, Locke

argues that man would

only have himself


him. He
(fol. 20).
would

to determine what his

duty

is. This

concept would mean that man's will would


or pleasure urged upon
actions"

be

subject

only to

what either

interest

be "the

absolutely free judge of his own Zuckert's challenge to the fifth argument is as follows:
supreme and

As stated, Locke clearly and decisively rejects this argument. As we have already seen, he traces human practices of identifying virtue and vice praising and punish ing them respectively to forces quite other than the law of nature. (1994, p. 206)

In

support of

his attack, Zuckert follows through

with a passage

found in the

fourth

question:

Indeed,

these opinions

concerning
on their

what

is

right and virtuous which we embrace so

firmly

are, for the

most part, the

kind

which are

infused into

our minds, at an age

when our minds are


we can yet

little

guard, when we

are still of a

tender age, before

form
are

selves.

They

judgment concerning them or notice how they insinuate them instilled by our parents or teachers and by others with whom we
a

as

sociate, who,
mation of a

since

they believe

that these very opinions contribute to the

proper

for

life,

are

these same opinions in the same manner, inclined to

themselves, possibly because they have been themselves taught instill those opinions they think
yet

necessary to a happy and blessed life into the young. (Folios 42 and 43)

inexperienced

minds of

the very

In addition, Locke

argues that since our minds cannot

find

the source of these


opinions are

beliefs,

there is a
our

inscribed in
Zuckert's

strong tendency in humans to think that "these hearts by god and (fols. 43-44).
nature"

objection appears to

be

on the

mark, because in the fifth argument,


explanation

Locke both

argues that the

law

of nature exists

because it is the best

for
this

the existence of virtue and vice, etc.

However, Locke
explanations

seems to

deny

remark and argue ents and teachers.

instead

that there are

better

in terms

of our par

I think that Locke


writes

we should reject

Zuckert's line
he

of attack writes

because,
way.

again,

what

in the fifth

argument and what

in the fourth

question are

not related.
point

This truth in

can

be illustrated in the

following

What is Locke's judge themselves But


what

in the fifth

argument?

He

argues that the reason people

is

explained

terms of the existence of


mean?

the law

of nature.
argues

exactly
when

does

this statement

Apparently
some

this.
an

Locke

that the

presence of

the law of

nature causes

(in

sense)

individual to

condemn

herself

72

Interpretation
an action she

she commits

believes is wrong
crucial point,

and to praise

herself

when she

commits a right action.


presence

Locke's

however, is that the


to the
content

existence or

of the

law

of nature

does

not contribute

of what an

individual may happen to believe is praiseworthy tributes to our feelings of guilt or admiration.
The
question of the origin of our

or condemnatory.

It only

con

beliefs

still remains.

Locke's

answer would

may be too cursory for such an en deavor. This shortcoming is understandable, because such a discussion is outside of the purpose of his book. It is sufficient for our purposes to indicate some of
take too

long

to discuss and,

in

the end,

the sources. As the passage above


our teachers and parents.

indicates, many of our opinions come from Elsewhere Locke discusses the role that tradition plays
of our moral

in the formation

of

many

beliefs (see, e.g., the

second question).

Apart from these sources, Locke is

silent.

Ill

Zuckert
law

and

Horwitz

argue that

Locke does

not articulate a coherent natural

view of morality.

As I

evidence

for this account, both

scholars

bring

forward

passages exist.

that appear to be contradictions.

argue that no such

contradictions

In

fact,
and

as

far

as

can

tell,
a

there

does

not appear to
contradiction.

Questions that Zuckert There is Zuckert


and

qualifies as

true

logical

be any passage in the I conclude that both Questions.


moment

Horwitz have failed to defend their


one

attacks on the

last

question to address. are correct about

Let

us suppose aim

for the

that
are

Horwitz

Locke's

in the Questions. If they

correct, then what was he


that what

trying

to achieve

in the Questions? Horwitz

maintains

secretly trying to do or, at least, attempting to hide, in some sense, is revealed in the very last question, the eleventh: "Does the private interest of each individual constitute the foundation of the law of nature? It does
was
not"

Locke

(fol. 105). In short,

what

Locke

was

attempting to do

was akin

to a

project

found in the Leviathan (Hobbes, 1995). Locke


traditional discussion of natural law with a
the natural law
ert's view

was attempting to replace the discussion that attempts to derive

from

the right of self-preservation

(Horwitz, 1992,

p.

300). Zuck Ques

is

basically

the same

(1994,

pp.

213-15). Such

a vision of the

tions
a

is

correct

only if two

other elements are

traditional natural law view, and second, what


question

true, however: first, Locke rejects Locke actually argues in the

last

is

similar to the project


am

former is false. The latter view, I discussion for another day.

in the Leviathan. As I have shown, the convinced, is also mistaken, but that is a

REFERENCES

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. In The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas. 2 vols. Edited by Anton C. Pegis. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.

Discussion: Locke
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated

on

Natural Law

73

by

Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub

lishing Company,
1983.

1985.

Colman, John. John Locke's Moral Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,

Hancey, James. "John Locke


439-54.

and the

Law

Nature."

of

Political

Theory 4,

no.

4 (1976):

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995. Horwitz, Robert. "John Locke's Questions Concerning the Law of Nature: A Commen Edited by Michael Zuckert. Interpretation 19, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 251-306.
tary."

Lenz, John W. "Discussion: Locke's Essays on the Law of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27, no. 1 (1956): 105-13. Locke, John. Essays on the Law of Nature. Edited and translated by W. von Leyden. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958. Questions Concerning the Law of Nature. Edited by Robert Horwitz, Jenny Strauss Clay, and Diskin Clay and translated by Diskin Clay. Ithaca: Cornell Univer sity Press, 1990. The Locke Newsletter 23 (1992): 145-65. Stewart, M. A. "Critical Von Leyden, W. "John Locke and Natural Philosophy 31, no. 1 16 (1956): 23-35.
Notice." Law."

Nature."

Introduction to John Locke: Essays

on

the

Law of Nature. Edited

and translated

by

W.

von

Leyden. Oxford: Clarendon


"Locke on the Law of

Press, 1958.
77!e Philosophical Review 67,
no.

Yolton, John.
477-98.

Nature."

4 (1958):

Zinaich, Jr., S.

"Locke's Moral Revolution: From Natural Law to Moral

Relativism."

The Locke Newsletter 31 (2000): 79-114.

Zuckert, Michael P. Natural Rights University Press, 1994.

and

the New Republicanism.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton

On the Lockean Project

of a

Natural Law

Theory

Reply

to

Zinaich

Michael P. Zuckert

University

of Notre Dame

Almost

fifty

years ago

Leo Strauss
the
a

stunned the

Locke-speaking

world

by

arguing be, John Locke


philosopher of argued

that

far from
was

being
in fact

easygoing

anti-Hobbesian

he had been taken to

nearly orthodox but surreptitious follower of the Malmesbury. In order to support that substantive claim Strauss
practiced an art of philosophic rhetoric

whereby he partly his philosophy by emphasizing his connections to such traditional and orthodox thinkers as Richard Hooker and obscuring his agreements with such untraditional and unorthodox thinkers as Thomas Hobbes
concealed the

that

Locke had
true

foundation

of

and

Benedict Spinoza. The initial

reaction

to Strauss's Locke was mixed; some

were

pelled

genuinely intrigued by the new Locke Strauss revealed; others were re by the violence his picture did to their received views of Locke and the
uncover this new

methodology deployed to
virtue of

Locke. This initial Locke.

reaction

had the

fomenting
Strauss

lively debate,

both

on the substance of

Locke's philosophy

and on the

esotericism thesis as applied to

At

some point,

however,

the debate was declared over, prematurely

opinion.

There

were those who were


a greater or

impressed

lowed his lead to


and

lesser degree.

by Among

in my Strauss's reading and fol these were Robert Horwitz


path was so mistaken

I. There

were also those who concluded the of


a

Strauss

as no

longer to be worthy
review when

slurring book
Order
autonomous

any notice, Strauss-influenced treatment


world

except perhaps

for the
of

occasional
appeared.

Locke

was restored to the


"traditions"

Locke
or

by
of

the development of several relatively


scholarship.

"schools"

Locke

Strauss-influenced
continu

scholars continued to

pay

at

least

some attention

to the others, although

ing
that

to

attend

far,

more or

mostly to each other. The anti-Strauss partisans did not even go less ignoring Strauss himself and those whose work bore the
now

marks of

his influence.
written a very powerful attack against two of the Locke. Robert Horwitz is no longer alive to de
me

Sam Zinaich has


Strauss-influenced

readings of

fend himself,

so

it has fallen to

to reply for both of us to Zinaich's

critique.
philo

Apart from its many intrinsic


a

merits

Zinaich's

effort represents rather

truly

sophic response, reasoned and civil


welcome

disagreement

than mere silence. I


closed.

his reopening The disagreement between Horwitz

discussion that

ought never

to have been

and

Zuckert

and

Zinaich is in toto

quite

interpretation.

Fall

2001, Vol. 29, No. 1

76

Interpretation
but the threshold issue
and

complex

can

be

put quite simply:

As Zinaich

presents

it,

Horwitz

Zuckert

maintain that

Locke's Questions
attentive reader

contain

many inconsisten

cies and contradictions that

lead the

from

a surface endorsement
a critique of

by

Locke

of a traditional and orthodox natural and the endorsement of a

law philosophy to

very different and untraditional view orthodoxy instead. Zinaich maintains that Horwitz and Zuckert have not successfully made out the first component of their position, that is, the claim that the Questions is
that
riddled with

inconsistencies

and contradictions.

He

argues the work and orthodox

consistent and position

consistently endorses just the traditional Horwitz and Zuckert see Locke rejecting.

is entirely natural law

Professor Zinaich
nization

is

both

systematic and

thorough,

and

will

follow his

orga

here. He begins
claims

with two points about

Horwitz's

essay:

(1) Although
in Locke's
gener

Horwitz

there are "manifest and massive


manages to

contradictions"

Questions, he only
ously
explains the
reference

identify

one such contradiction.


promise and

Zinaich

disparity
in

between Horwitz's

his

performance

by

to the fact that


mistaken

Horwitz died before he

could

finish his

commentary.

(2) Horwitz is
example

believing

that Locke contradicts himself in the one

Zinaich finds Horwitz


curious that

presenting.

I find it

Professor Zinaich

should put

his very

weakest argument

first,

for he is

quite mistaken on the points

he

raises against and therefore

Horwitz. Horwitz did


not gather

organized gether

his discussion in commentary


one place

form,

to

in I

the many contradictions he believed he had seen in Ques


not

tions.
of

confess

I have

tried to count them all up,

but, in

the first two pages

Horwitz's

comments on

Question I, I labelled

see

four

contradictions

identified

by

Horwitz,
human
law."

although not

in

all cases

as such.

(1) In his essay (p. 253) he


agreement of the entire existence of natural

claims that

Locke first
"

appeals to an

"alleged 'universal
argument

race'

"foundation"

as a
points

for "the

for the

Horwitz

out,

exists"

ment
science"

(p. 253).

"alternative"

as an
also

however, that Locke later "finds that no such agree (2) Horwitz also says that Locke at first appeals to "con foundation for the existence of natural law, but later
this appeal to conscience (pp.

"rejects

outright"

253, 257). (3) Horwitz


Stoic Stoics
notion of

also points out that

Locke identifies the

natural

law

with the

"right

reason,"

but later

rejects the notion of reason

deployed in that definition,


what the
spoke of

implying

that

any

natural

law he
still

accepts cannot

be

(pp. 253-54).

(4) Horwitz,
social

discussing

"suggests that
law"

life

would collapse and points out

Question I, points out that Locke would be impossible without natu


and elsewhere that

ral

(p. 258). But Horwitz


natural
few,"

here

Locke

also

insists that the


to very

law is "hidden from

men and

therefore

is,

at

best, known
can a

an observation

that contradicts the initial claim,

for how

Locke

on

Natural Law

11

voluntary law nearly completely unknown serve the function Locke attributes to it? (5) Horwitz adds in his comments on Question II that Locke's insistence on men's general ignorance of the natural law "flatly contradicts the opening sentence of this where he spoke of 'that law of nature to which very Question,
men

offer obedience consent to and

with such
a

unanimous consent,
of which
more

inasmuch
have

as

they

could

hardly

obey (p. 262). Although I know

law

'most

mortals

knowledge' "

no

of

many

cases, I do

not propose

to continue
to

this exercise any further. I trust I have


strate that

presented enough evidence

demon

Horwitz

can

by

no means

be

said

to supply only one example of a

contradiction

in Locke's Questions.
considerable space to

Professor Zinaich devotes


of contradiction

he finds in Horwitz. Horwitz's law. Even


are either

point

analyzing the one example is straightforward: In


as
a proof

Question I Locke looks to the


existence of natural

phenomena of conscience

for the

men

"who
or

recognize the commands of no other


recognize

law

by

which

they

directed

bound"

the verdicts of con


condemn as a wit

That shows, says Locke, there is a law under which they themselves, a law natural not positive. Locke quotes the poet Juvenal
science.
ness:
judge"

"no one who is guilty wins acquittal when he himself is (fol. 17). Juvenal's saying is especially useful to Locke at this point in his argument, for the Roman poet makes the kind of connection Locke is seeking between the inner judgment of conscience and law: "for without some law there can be no
judgment."

The law in this is


said

case

(where

conscience

judges those
innate"

who recognize

no other

law)

by

Locke to be "not written, but

(fol. 18). Horwitz

also quotes a statement

by

Locke in the

context of the

latter'

s exposition of the
conduct of men.

lack
law

of consensus on

any

standard of right and

wrong in the

Locke there

states that nonetheless

"men's

conscience confesses

to that inner

which their vices often


rightly"

think

deny"; "those very persons who act wrongly, yet (fols. 67-68; Horwitz, p. 282). That is to say, the judgments men
prove

make against

their own actions

that there are natural standards that

they

know

even when
a

they fail to
different

conform their

behavior to those

standards.

Zinaich has
themselves"

view of

Locke's

point about conscience:

Conscience

attests to the existence of the

law

of nature

by

the mere fact that men "judge


of conscience

in the

absence of positive not

laws. The business

is to

praise and

blame, but

necessarily according to the true or proper standards

specified under the

law

of nature. and Zinaich, then, is the narrow one of whether later in Questions (e.g, Question TV), that the judgments or even

The issue between Horwitz

Locke's view,

expressed

of conscience are

extraordinarily variable, inference from human

in

some cases nonexistent existence

among

men, contradicts the argument

presented

in Question I for the Horwitz


says

of natural says no. appeals

law

as an

conscience.

yes, Zinaich

Horwitz judges yes, because he believes the argument in Question I to or requires a more or less invariant conscience. Zinaich says no,
argument

because he believes the

in Question I is perfectly

compatible

with

78

Interpretation
character.

conscience of a variable

For the

sake

of concision,

let

us

refer to

these two

different

notions of conscience as

and

Cv

respectively.

Zinaich's I is
not

argument about

depends

on an

important distinction: Locke in Question


the law of nature is known but how its

talking
is is

how the

content of

existence

shown or

inferred. Zinaich
instrument for

concedes that conscience

(according

to

Locke)

not a reliable

knowing

the content of the natural

law,

for the deliverances


a sufficient

of conscience

do vary

significantly.

But Cv is

nonetheless

basis (or

so

infer the
all
ral.

existence of

the law of nature. The

Locke is arguing, according to Zinaich) on which to fact that men judge themselves at

indicates they know of some law above them which is not positive but natu Zinaich also very helpfully characterizes Locke's argument in Question I as
"inference to the best
posited
explanation."

an

That is to say, the

existence of a natural

law is

by

Locke infers

as the

best

explanation

for

the

facts

of conscience.

It is is

an argument that

unseen natural

law

as the

best

explanation

for

what

seen, the acts of


tween

conscientious

judgment Locke
be
restated

observes.

The difference be

Horwitz

and

Zinaich

can

then in these terms:

Horwitz:

(1) C,

(but

not

Cv) is

basis

on which one can

infer the

existence of

the law

of nature.

(2) In Question I Locke infers


science.

the existence of the law of nature

from

con

(3) Therefore, he must be invoking C[ in Question I. (4) But later in Questions Locke insists that Cv is the case, not C,. (5) Therefore, Locke later contradicts the argument he made in Question
Zinaich:

I.

(1) Cv is a basis for inferring the existence of the law of nature. (2) Locke infers the existence of the law of nature in Question I. (3) Later on Locke makes clear that Cv is the case, not Q. (4) But this is compatible with the argument in Question I, and
Locke has
not contradicted

therefore

himself.

The issue between Zinaich


respective

and of

Horwitz then

comes

down to step

(1)

in their
must

arguments.

Which

these is true to Locke is the


one

point

we

attempt

to establish.

In

order to

do so, there is
case

further
is

point we must

keep

in

mind.

Whatever may be the


clear applicable

for the judgments


nature

rendered

by

conscience,

Locke is very
content,
tion

throughout that the law of

one and

invariant in

to and

binding
that

on all men universally.

(See especially Ques


as

X, fols. 99-100). With


Locke's

fact in hand,

we must now examine which of

the two versions of

argument is correct.

Zinaich,

I said, has

helpfully

Locke
called attention

on

Natural Law

79

to the fact that

Locke's
not

argument

is

of the

"inference to the best

explanation"

form, but he does


give

himself

present

that argument, nor

for

that

matter

does Locke

anything

more

than the

following highly

suggestive

comment:

For that
law of
the

verdict which each pronounces upon

himself is
. .

evidence

that there exists


come about
.

nature.

For if the law


those who

of nature
recognize

did

not exist

how does it
no other

that

conscience of

the commands of

law

passes

judgment
crime?

on their

very life

and conduct and either acquits or condemns

them of

(Fols.

17-18)
arguments to show that

I have four

and that therefore when

in Question I Locke is appealing to Q he later denies Q and affirms Cv he contradicts himself:


"inference to the best
argument

(1) Q
for the

but

not

Cv

explana

can serve as an

existence of the

law

of nature.
refers an

(2) In Question I
proved as

Locke

to the law of nature whose existence is there

"innate,"

allegedly (3) Later in Questions


another explanation

inference from Locke


affirms

but

not

from Cv.

when

Cv

and

denies

Q he

presents makes

for

conscience

than the

-law

of nature.

That is, he

clear that the

law

of nature,

in his opinion, is
of

not

the "best

explanation"

for Cv.

(4)

His

appeal to the
nor

Neither Horwitz

authority Zinaich is

Juvenal implies Q.
explicit

in presenting his

construction

of

Locke's

argument

in Question I,
have in
mind.

so

venture the

following

as a reconstruction

of what each must

Horwitz:

(1) C, implies L.N.


sal
of

(law

of

nature), because the invariant judgments of con


the existence of an
or present

science men make

imply

equally invariant

and univer

L.N.,
Q.

somehow

known

to

men's minds, which

is the

cause

(2) Cv does
function

not

imply L.N.,

because

an

invariant

and universal

L.N. does

not

as a causal explanation

for Cv,

on the principle that a uniform

cause produces a uniform effect.

Zinaich:

Cv implies L.N. But


variable effects.

why?

uniform cause must

is

not the

best inference from

Therefore, Zinaich

be

mistaken

to think Locke is appeal

ing
I
the

to

Cv in Question I.
in passing that the
of the
argument

must note

I have just

presented

does

not prove

nonexistence

law

of nature.

The

transcendent natural
compatible with

law I discuss in
argument

my

chapter

in Natural Rights is perfectly

Cv. The

80

Interpretation
as

does establish, however, that conscience,


basis
on which

Locke

understands

it, is

not a valid

to infer the

existence of must

the law of

nature.

The

latter'

s existence,
which

if

that

is to be established,
what

be

established

in

different way,

is

exactly
proved

Locke

presents

in his Question V,
proclaims

as

explained

in Natural Rights.
nature

Moreover, in Question I Locke


to
exist on

that the law of

the basis of conscience is


or present

"innate."

To

call

it innate

allegedly means it
a claim

is

"inborn,"

and

known
of the

directly
Q
and a

to the human

mind.

This is

about

knowledge

law

of nature, not

only
law

about

its

existence.

Again, it is
of nature.

easy to see a connection between

of nature that
of the

is innate: indeed judgments


described

it is
But

reasonable

to describe

as the

deliverances
of nature.

innate law
the

Cv is

not evidence of an

innate law
variable.

If it is innate,

of conscience should not

be

A tipoff that the law

of nature

in this

argument

for Question I is
it
as

not one

to which Locke declares

allegiance

is

Not only the Locke of the much later this very description of Essay Concerning Human Understanding, but the younger Locke of Questions already denies the innateness IV, fol. 37). Since
natural

"innate."

of

knowledge

of the

law

of nature

(see Question

conscience as

law
of

only works as a warrant for inferring the existence of a its best explanation if the judgments of conscience show a high
then the facts of
great

degree
calls

invariance,
outlined

attention

to are quite

devastating

variability that Locke insistently for the argument from conscience to


acknowledges the significance of after

natural

law

in Question I. Locke

the

variability
these have

of conscientious

judgment when,

noting the variability, he pre


phenomena of conscience as

sents a quite

different "best

explanation"

for

the

now

been brought to light. He does

not

trace the

judgments

of con

science to natural societies.

law, but

rather

to the varying dominant opinions in different

Judgments

of conscience,

Locke

shows us,

do

existence of natural

law, but only


they live,

the

force

within us of

rightly imply the what he later came to


not

call

"the law

opinion."

of
which

Human beings

are sensitive to the opinions

dominant

in the society in
nature.

so much so that

they

tend to confuse the

standards of moral

judgment they learn in the nursery with the promptings of It is that confusion Locke means to expose in his apparently vacillating between
conscience and the

approach to the relation

law

of nature

(see

espe

cially Question IV. fols. 42-43). Finally, it is clear from other


science

evidence

that when Locke introduces con

in Question I

as

testimony
quotation

to the existence of the law of nature he has

in

mind

Q. Consider the
"guilty,"

from Juvenal: "no


(fol. 17).

one who and

is guilty

wins

acquittal when

he himself is

judge"

Juvenal,

Locke, following

him,
have

says
no

without qualification.
we read

point) if

The saying would make no sense (or it in Zinaich's way. Zinaich takes a statement, which,

true or

the world and turns


who

force of right and wrong in it into the completely uninteresting tautology that no one believes himself guilty believes himself innocent.
meant to make a claim about the

false, is

Locke

on

Natural Law

81

of

Natural Rights

Zinaich discerns two threads to my treatment and the New Republicanism. I

of the

Questions in
Locke's

chapter

claim that

arguments

purporting to establish the existence of a law of nature in Question I cannot be arguments he accepts, because they depend on conceptions of the nature of the
law
of nature out

different from the definition


me

of the

law

of nature

Locke himself

lays

in that Question. Zinaich has he goes, but before I

arguing, next, that Locke also denies

the premises of these arguments as the


correct as

Questions

proceeds.

Zinaich is
replies

quite

far

as

consider

the specifics of his


the broader position

to my

arguments, I would like to restate

very

briefly

maintained

in my book. There was indeed much overlap between my chapter and Horwitz's essay (and Strauss's earlier essay), but my thesis was somewhat different from
Horwitz's. I treat the
there
arguments

in Question I

as arguments that

"persuade"

that

is

law

of nature,

arguments persuade

Locke carefully does not say that these him. Given the fact that we can relatively readily identify
notice that

but

different

precedent

thinkers (some

one or another of was

the

five

arguments

explicitly cited by Locke) who forwarded Locke summarizes, I surmised that Locke
of that convince the partisans of natural similar catalogue of

presenting the
such a

arguments
exists.

he knew

law that

thing

Pufendorf, in his

arguments, is
with others
while

very

clear that some

(at

least)

of these arguments are and

inconsistent

and most are


explicit about

inadequate for their purpose,

argue that makes

Locke,

less

it, presents them in such a way that inconsistencies relatively apparent. My hypothesis, then, was that Locke pre sented in Question I a series of arguments raised and held to be persuasive by
earlier suade

the differences and

thinkers, but that he does not there endorse them as arguments that him. The rest of the Questions represents an attempt by Locke to
evaluate

per

sort

through and

these arguments.

My

point, therefore, is

not

that Locke is

contradicting himself, but that he is recon not by himself but by his sidering and ultimately rejecting the positions taken predecessors. I do agree with Horwitz, however, that Locke is less than perfectly

throwing dust in

our eyes or

directly

clear that the above

is his

project

in Questions,

and

he does
attribute

execute

it in

way

that

makes possible what most modern scholars

do:

to

him

an endorse

ment of

the arguments

in Question I

and therewith of a

very

eclectic or confused

theory

of natural

law.
natural

Both Locke's interest in

law

and

his

cautious or

gingerly

manner of

treating it

reflect a most

important intellectual

and political

development

of

the

early years after the had just undergone


civil conflict
lic,"

restoration.

As I

argued

in Natural Rights, the British

nation

a theological-political crisis of great magnitude: pervasive


a civil war

culminating in universally

a regime

seen

culminating in the Cromwellian "repub to have failed by 1660. The civil conflict, civil had
all

war,

and

Cromwellian

dictatorship

found their

source

in the disruptions
attempts

produced

by

the Protestant

Reformation,

and the

conflicting

to find a

82

Interpretation

(or the) proper political embodiment of the Reformation. Given the ambiguities of Protestant political theology and the differences among the sects, the quest for the holy grail of a true Protestant politics had led to disaster. Locke was just
one of

many thinkers

of the post-Restoration world who sought a nontheological

grounding for
biblical

political

life. The

exploration

of natural

law,

guiding

set of

moral and political principles meant to

be independent

of specific

revelatory
he

or

commitments, was the


came

dominant intellectual
share

response

to this situation.
seems to

As Locke

forward to

in this

widespread project,
mind:

have had two

somewhat
adequate

conflicting imperatives in way


Protestant

(1)
As

to examine

in

philosophically ward political life in


such an examination

the resources of natural law as an orientation to


political theology. one engaged

place of

in

Locke

was predisposed,

it seems, to take

a critical stance
Descartes'

toward the
novel

tradition, for he had already been much influenced by philosophic system, an influence that led him to be critical of the
invoked in
attempt

premises

and style of argument

scholastic natural

that, in Aristotle.
phy
a

(2) To

to find

in

some

law philosophy and, behind version of natural law philoso


committed

basis for

political

life. Locke

appears to

have
of

to the agenda of

moving politics off the biblical-theological basis (with its repeated disasters) and onto more
accessible various

the first half of the

century

"neutral"

grounds, in

principle more

to human reason and therefore to human beings as such than the

sectarian principles that

had

guided such

Robert Filmer,

Phillip Hunton,

and

John Milton.
on

widely disparate figures Very much in Locke's corpus


attests

as

from the Questions themselves to the Letter

Toleration, The Reasonableness


to
a commit

of Christianity and An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke's commitment to this agenda. His agenda involved not merely
ment to some one particular version of natural

law, but

a commitment

to that

general style of political


a

philosophy

and practice.

While his first

goal of

finding
agenda

philosophically

adequate

theory

of natural

law indicates theoretically incisive


the second

examination and critique of received


mandates a muffled exposure of

doctrines,

half

of

his

the

flaws

of the natural

law theories, for

as an

approach to politics natural

law

as such was superior to political

theology based
point

on one or another

revelatory tradition. The two agendas together

to just

the difficult kind of rhetorical exercise that


sor

Questions in fact

was.

Thus Profes

Zinaich,

who thinks political

ments, misses this broader context of


would was

philosophy largely has to do with making argu Locke's political philosophic activity. I Locke
never published the

guess,

by

the way, that one reason


not

Questions

because he did

believe he had
set

quite succeeded

in meeting the very

difficult expository imperatives he

himself here.

Ill

In

order

to prevent my reply
propose

from my

being

longer than Professor Zinaich's

original

essay, I

to limit

response

mostly to his

critique of the

first

Locke
line
of argument

on

Natural Law
of

83

he identified in my
relevant to

chapters.

The line

above

discussion

Horwitz

on conscience claimed

is

my

own second

of

argument, for

I, too, had
argument

that Locke

subsequently

rejected the premise

for his initial Horwitz is

regarding defense of

conscience and natural


one of

law.

My

defense

of

thus also a

the

key

claims

I had

raised

suade"

I argued, it may be recalled, that three of there is a natural law could not be the
appeal to conceptions of natural
replied

in my second line of argument. Locke's five arguments that "per


arguments that persuade one

Locke,

for they Zinaich

law different from the

he

endorses.

by insisting
reasons

that the notion of natural law implicit

in those three
invoked

arguments

is

consistent with

Locke's

own

definition.

I identified two
notion of natural and

for

doubting
with

that Locke's
own.

first

argument

law identical

his

Professor Zinaich

entered a

long

subtly argued objection to one of these reasons, but completely ignored the other. Since either one alone suffices to make my point, I could save space by merely restating the second point: according to Locke's definition, the "law of
nature can
will"

be

so

described (as

law) because it is

the command of the divine

"the

proper

(fol. 11). But Aristotle, Locke's authority in his first argument, speaks of a matter to be discerned by reference to the natural function of
man,"

constitution of man.

of the argument

he

Neither Aristotle himself explicitly nor the general structure makes requires or involves any reference to a divine will (or
These Aristotelian
principles of

to any will
are not

for that
as

matter).

"proper

functioning"

laws

Locke

understands

law; law
lack

requires an authoritative

lawgiver

and obligation.

Aristotle's
speaks

principles

an authority, a

lawgiver,

and obliga

tion.

Thus Aristotle

in
is

a place cited
not of

by

"well-performed,"

actions which are

Locke (Ethics, bk 1, chap. 7) of obligatory actions (or duties). The

authority for the notion that there are natural standards of human action, but not for the notion that those standards have the character of law, a distinction Locke's own definition of the law of first
argument

Locke

cites

perhaps an

nature

brings to the fore. The Aristotelian first

argument

is therefore
One

no author

ity
out as

at all

for the

natural

law Locke

purports

to be

establishing.

could with

any defined

contradiction accept

the Aristotelian

position and not accept natural

law

by

Locke. Locke's first


argument was even simpler.

My
must

other claim about

"From

some

texts in Aristotle's Ethics Locke (on behalf of

Aristotle?)

concludes that man

necessarily But Locke has on the preceding


as

perform

those actions which are dictated


page

by

reason

(fol. 13).

reason,'

'dictate

of

and therefore

explicitly it does not

rejected

the idea of law of nature

appear that the

'law

nature'

of
accept"

Locke

attributes

to Aristotle can be the same as the law Locke seems to


p.

(Natural Rights,
of

193). Zinaich
and that

counters

reason"

is

equivocal

it

by insisting that the phrase "dictate is being used differently in Locke's first
earlier rejected.

argument than

"Locke's
same

use

in the theory Locke of the phrase 'dictated


Aristotle's
phrase

Zinaich instead

says that

reason'

by

(in fol.

13)

appears to mean the which

reason,'"

thing

as

'according

to

Locke had

quoted

from the Ethics.

84

Interpretation
Zinaich's instincts here
are

good;

one ought

to construe a text according to to understand it

the principle of interpretive charity, that


so as to
not

is,

one should attempt

be

as

intelligible

and

internally
and

consistent as possible.

But

one should

interpret it

to be more intelligible and consistent than that.

I believe both
here
speak

Locke's

specific against

formulation

the

substance

of

the

thought
ea

strongly
reason

Zinaich's dictat
put

reading.

First, Locke

says

"ut

homnu

necessario

agenda sunt quae


dictates,"

ratio":

"so that
more

men must

necessarily do those things

to

it slightly

literally

than the translators of the text

do. The

word

Locke

uses to refer to reason's action which the word

is dictare, to dictate, the


phrase

same root word

from

dictate

of

reason) is

constructed.

dictatum rationis, Given the fact Locke has just made much of

dictatum (in the


law

rejecting the
use of the

understanding
unlikely.

of natural

as

dictatum

rationis on

folio 12, his

very

same word on

folio 13 to

mean

claims) is
rationis

highly

Locke's
view

objection

something different (as Zinaich to the law of nature as dictatum

derived from his


"

that "reason does not so much


and

lay

down is

and

decree this law

of nature as

it discusses

investigates

law

which

ordained

by

higher

power

(fol. 12).

"Reason,"

Locke continues, "is


effect claims

not the maker

of this

law, but its


for

interpreter"

(ibid). Zinaich in

that Locke claims

no more

reason

in his first argument, but Zinaich's


suggestion that

construal

does

not

fit

with as

Locke's text. Zinaich's

"quae dictat

ratio"

means

the same

Aristotle's

reason"

"according

to

does

not

help, for
rationis

the

latter is

almost as not

contrary to Locke's point as the phrase dictatum


believe that reason, "since it is only The problem is twofold: us
laws."

itself. Locke does


us,

faculty

of the mind and a part of

gives

First,

reason

lacks the authority


understands reason

needed

to

make

a precept

into

law;

and

second, Locke

discursive,
son

that is, as possessing no substantive legislative. The Aristotelian "according to

principles that could attributes no attribute

purely possibly be
rea

as

reason"

authority to

in the

sense

Locke insists on, but it does


prescriptive

to reason substantive

principles

that allow it to be

if

not

fully

legislative. Locke denies it


as to

can

be

either.

reason can

To say that reason can discover laws is not the same dictate or give laws. Aristotle's notion of human function

say

("activity

according to reason") clearly has a more substantive and prescriptive character than Locke is willing to grant to reason, as is visible in his treatment of knowl
edge of the ends of action

in book 6
on

of the

Ethics in his discussion


(the
appeal

of phronesis.
"dictating"

I conclude, therefore, that


and the
appeal

both

grounds

to reason as

to nature rather than the divine will) the alleged natural law
argument

invoked in Locke's first


law Locke
argument natural

is inconsistent

with the

definition

of natural

presents

in his

own name on the previous page of

his text. The first

is

one

that persuades some,

law. At most, however, it


"proper"

supports the claim that there

Locke thinks wrongly, that there is a is a natural human

good, or

natural activity for human beings, but without much more (or something less in the case of "dictates of reason") this argument, even if sound, falls well short of establishing the existence of a law of nature.
a

Locke
Locke's
from
second argument

on

Natural Law

85

is

somewhat

familiar already, for it is the

argument
of

conscience

Zinaich

witz's

claims about

I have already discussed in the context "contradictions." Locke's The issue now is not
and

Hor

whether

Locke later
argument

contradicts what
conscience

he

says

from

implies

a natural

in Question I, however, but law as Locke defines


law is defined
as a

whether the
natural

law.
of

My

claim was no,

because Lockean

natural

deliverance
response

discursive reason, and conscience does not qualify as this. Zinaich's familiar. "Locke is not using the existence of men's conscience as
the

is

a means to

knowledge

of the

law

nature."

of

He

reiterates

his

earlier point:

The

exis

tence of the law of nature


reiterate

is "the best
It is

explanation"

for the fact

of conscience.

my
and

previous rejoinders:

not

the

best

explanation on

Locke's

own

account,
of the with

the only argument that makes sense

law

of nature

from

the
of

fact

of conscience
as

for establishing the existence is that conscience supplies us

knowledge

of the

law

nature,

Locke indicates

by declaring

the law

of nature as

(fol. 18). allegedly implied by conscience to be In Natural Rights I argued that Locke's third argument for the existence

"innate"

of

the natural law as little


previous arguments.

implies

the law of nature as he

defines it

as

do

the two

Zinaich

again makes a

to Locke's text. I had

pointed out

that

very smart reply, but one not true Locke's law of nature is prescriptive (it

issues

commands and prohibitions

that can be obeyed or violated) but the law

of nature

implied in

argument

three is determinative. Zinaich rejects this claim;

Locke, he maintains, speaks of the law of nature in a double sense. Some beings (e.g., nonhuman animals) are governed by a fixed or determinative law, a law
which operates

causally

rather

than

by

address

to their

faculty

for free

action.

Human beings, however, are governed by a law of nature that is prescriptive. In so arguing Zinaich attributes to Locke a doctrine that is fairly standard in the
antecedent natural

law tradition. What is


resonate

most

striking, though, is how little


own

Zinaich's

subtle

distinctions

with

Locke's

discussion. Unlike

Thomas Aquinas, Locke does not distinguish the operation of the law in rational animals from its operation in other beings. Zinaich, it is true, claims one impor
tant
us
piece of

textual evidence in support of his interpretation.

Man, Zinaich
his

tells

Locke tells us, "has is


not

nature.

a prescribed mode of action which suits

To

prescribe

the same as to determine or to fix.

to a text in which Locke says, in effect, that

Indeed, Zinaich calls the law binds (tenere)


would

attention

all other

things, but
that

prescribes

(praescribere) for

man.

This

be

a more powerful

argument than

it is if Locke had

not spoken

in the

same paragraph of the


rest observe a

law

binds

all the nonhuman things as

follows: "all the

fixed law

of their operations and a measure suited to their own nature.

For

what prescribes

to each
law"

thing

the form and manner and measure of its activity proves to be a


emphasis

(fol. 18

added).

Locke is

not

deploying

Zinaich's distinction

between prescribing binding, for the fixed or bound things are also said to have their law prescribed. We thus have no reason to suppose Locke means to
and

draw the distinction Zinaich

supplies

for him.

86

Interpretation
Zinaich's
construal of

this argument, again motivated

by

an admirable

desire

to

make

the best sense possible of


sight of what were

Locke's argument, has

the opposite effect.

He loses
said

Locke actually says,

as opposed to what

he

might

have

if he

actually restating, say, the Thomist natural law doctrine.


passes over without notice the which

Zi
law

naich's

interpretation

truly noteworthy

aspect of

Locke's third argument,

is his insistence

on

in the
things,
"each
gives

terms Aquinas reserves


or

for

the eternal law as

speaking it applies to
notion of

of the natural

nonhuman

in the terms Zinaich

Hippocrates'

of
passes over

deterministic

thing."

the actual arguments and

governing illustrations Locke

the law

in favor

of arguments and

illustrations he does
real point

misses what seems to


a natural

be Locke's

not explicitly give. He thus here: Some are persuaded there is

law from the

causal regularities of nature, a confusion of one sort of

natural order

(a

causal

order)

with another

(a

moral order).

Locke

seems eager

to expose the questionable presuppositions behind the acceptance


natural

by

many

of a

law. This is

of course not to

say there is

no natural

law; it

to say that belief in it is often based on intellectual confusion and


reasoning.

is merely inadequate

I have
admire

now

followed Zinaich
careful

about

halfway

through his essay. Although I

his effort, the

reading

and close argumentation

he provides, I

am

not convinced

that the rest of the essay succeeds any better at


of the of

discrediting
not

the

Horwitz-Zuckert reading to follow out all the rest


or two about

Questions than the first half does. I do

intend
a word

his arguments, but before closing I must say his treatment of the first part of my "second line of in his essay where he calls me that Locke had deleted from his
out

argumentation."

This is the
make

place

my
not

point

for using a piece of text to manuscript. Zinaich is correct;


am grateful to

I did

pay

sufficient attention to an editorial

footnote in the text that informed Locke. I

that the text I was citing had been deleted

by

Zinaich

for calling my attention to this error; nonetheless, the point of my argument in Natural Rights is unchanged and unshaken by this textual correction.

I have two
mentation:

general responses to

Zinaich's

objections to this part of

my

argu

(1)

Although Locke deleted

part of

the text on which I relied, he

I claimed he was making in the text he left in his manuscript; (2) Zinaich has grossly oversimplified my arguments about Locke's first argument for the existence of the law of nature. Had he followed
nonetheless made the same point out

my

argument

in full, he

would

have

seen that
show

bring

out

the very point he this also.

uses to refute

me, and that, moreover, I


make

Locke to have

refuted

In

order to

all

this

between Zinaich

and me.

less abstract, let me begin by stating the issue I had pointed out that Locke begins his arguments for

the existence of the law of nature

by invoking
I then

"consensus"

among

mankind

"on

conduct."

certain principles of

showed that

Locke, both later in Ques

tion I and in subsequent


sus.

Questions, had denied


could not

that there was any such consen


universal consensus on moral

concluded that

Locke

believe that

standards

implied the

existence of natural

law,

since

he denies the

premise of

Locke
that argument.
consensus

on

Natural Law
to the

87

Zinaich

maintains that

could

find Locke

committed

moral

only by relying on the deleted passages. Zinaich believes that all Locke is actually claiming in his text is that "there exists some law, which obtains Zinaich has Locke appealing to the universal fact of the existence of some law everywhere, not to an agreement on the same law. The
everywhere."

lack

of consensus

Locke later

concedes

is, in

other

words, irrelevant to the


we

point

Locke is making according to Zinaich's reading. As should be evident, here a variant on the earlier disagreement about conscience.

have

We

also

have here the

product of

the equivocality of the word

"some."

The

bare text

of the sentence

Zinaich

quotes can

bear

either meaning.

explicated

it in terms

of the

deleted passage,

which

definitely

In my book I gave it the "con


context of

sensus"

meaning.

Even

without this

deleted passage, however, the interpretation. The


he

this disputed sentence shows that Locke intends that sentence to denote the
consensus

reading

and not

Zinaich's

substitute

contested sen claims

tence is

presented

by

Locke

as a restatement of an argument chapter

to have

found in Aristotle's Ethics, book 5,


since there exists some

7. Locke's Latin

version goes

like

this (in translation): "it is rightly inferred that there exists some law of nature,

law

everywhere"

which obtains

(fol. 13). Locke

means or

this, however,
rather

as a

Latin

version of the

Aristotelian Greek text he


us.

quotes

misquotes,

as the editors of the use of the

Questions inform
material

In the

editors'

En

allegedly taken from Aristotle reads: "Dividing law into civil and natural, he [Aristotle] says, 'this natural law (fol. 13). (The italicized parts is that law which has everywhere the same
glish version,

Locke's

Greek

force'

'"

of this sentence are

in Greek in Locke's

manuscript:

to

de

nomikon physikon esti

to panaxou ten auten exon there

dynamin.)

is

law
that

which

has

everywhere

the same

Locke has Aristotle saying in effect that force (dynamis), and this is the
same

very law thus it is

is the law

of nature.

This law has the

force everywhere,

and

clear the

Greek

text Locke employs as an equivalent of the contested

bear the reading Zinaich gives it: If different laws prevail in one cannot say there is a law with the same force everywhere. different places, further What Locke says immediately following the passage from
sentence will not
"Aristotle"
"consensus"

confirms the

reading

of the

first

part of

Locke's first

argument:

At this

point some object

to the law of nature, claiming that no such law

exists at

all, since it is discovered nowhere,


were no
nize

for
all,

the

greatest part of mankind

lives

as

if there
recog

guiding principle to life (Fol. 15. Emphasis added.)

at

nor

any law of the

kind

that all men

"consensus"

This

objection

clearly is

addressed

to the

passage,

for it

would not count as an objection

reading of the Zinaich reading to the


Locke's first

contested at all.

This
to

objection makes a good

transition to the second set of comments


of

wish

make about

Zinaich's treatment

my

rendition of

argument on

88

Interpretation
In reply to this The law of nature is not known
the
"objection"

the existence of the law of nature.


concedes the main point:

Locke in

effect

everywhere.

Locke

eventually close (but very

ends
not

up his

presentation of

first in

argument with a position rather

identical)

to the one

Professor Zinaich
as
a

claims

he

affirms at the

outset of

Argument I.

"Indeed, just

state, it is wrong to conclude

that there exist no laws since various interpretations of those laws are to be

discovered among those expert in the laws, so too in Ethics, it hardly follows that there exists no law of nature, since in one place one thing is considered to (fol. 17). something else What Professor Zinaich does not bring out in his critique, however, is the fact that I had already traced the development of Locke's first argument to this be
a

law

of nature,

in

"

another

conclusion, emphasizing along the way that the


the

"consensus"

claim was merely tentative, stage of that argument, from which Locke retreated, dialectical step by dialectical step, until he concluded with the above quoted passage. Zinaich, in a word, failed to mention how I had shown Locke

first,

and

it turns

out

revising his
reader with

own argument as

he

went along.

the impression

attributed the consensus version

Zinaich thus wrongly leaves the to Locke as his


mounted

last

word on the subject.


and

Once again, Professor Zinaich has

his

critique

omitting important parts of the argument under examination. He also omitted the last stage of my presentation on Locke's first argument. Let me merely quote the last part of my treatment of Locke's argument. I begin

by ignoring

by

restating the

position reviewed

just

above:

Although the only uniformity in


variability,
nonetheless

what

human beings take the

natural

law to be is

"concerning

this law all hold the same opinion, and differ


nature"

(fol. only in its interpretation; for all recognize that vice and virtue exist by 17). The nearly universal variation in what people take the content of the law to be is less important than the universal agreement that nature is the source of moral dis

tinctions; the differences ognized law. Locke thus


not present

are mere retreats

differences

of

"interpretation"

of a

universally
but the

rec

to a second-order immanence: the law's

content

is

in

universal or widespread or even elite opinion and practice,

law's

existence even

is.

Yet

this

fallback

position must also

suade others and not which


noted.

Locke, for
is
not

again

be among those arguments that per he denies in his own name the premise upon
themes we have already

it is built. In Question IV he
.

reiterates the relativist

The

problem

only the familiar is held to be

one conceded

in Question
a

I,

that "in

one place one

thing, in

another

something else, is declared to be


virtuous

dictate

of nature

and of right reason; and what


others."

among Locke
of

some

is

vicious

More

significant

in

our present context

than that "some recognize


claims to

among differ

ent

law

nature"

of

is that "others
nature

[recognize]
who

none."

know

of peo

ple, those closest to


to take no account

in fact, is

"live ignorant

at all of what

virtuous"

right and

any law, as if they needed (fol. 42; cf. fol. 9). Human
of

beings do
ral

not agree even on p.

the second-order

immanence

the

natural

law. (Natu

Rights,

199)

Locke
Locke's argument, then, is both
than
much more

on

Natural Law
far

89

dialectical

and

more radical

Zinaich
an

allows.

Nonetheless his careful, if

at times

overly

selective

critique,

provides

excellent vehicle

Zinaich's essay can in taking seriously the issues and arguing so strenuously for his different inter pretation. It is invigorating to have such an adversary.
and tact.

for reappreciating Locke's philosophic acumen serve that function so well because he is exemplary

REFERENCES

Horwitz, Robert.
tary."

"John Locke's Questions

Concerning

the
no.

Edited

by

Michael Zuckert. Interpretation 19,


the
and translated

Law of Nature: A Commen 3(1993): 251.

Locke, John. Questions Concerning

Clay and Diskin Clay University Press, 1990.


Strauss

Law of Nature. Edited by Robert Horwitz, Jenny by Diskin Clay. Ithaca, NY: Cornell

Zuckert, Michael P. Natural Rights University Press, 1994.

and

the

New Republicanism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

Discussion

Alexandre Kojeve-Carl Schmitt Correspondence


Alexandre
a

and

Kojeve, "Colonialism from


Perspective"

European
and

Edited
Carleton

Translated

by

Erik De Vries

University

purposes. First, it provides some background con cerning the little-known, and perhaps surprising, friendship between Alexandre Kojeve and Carl Schmitt. Second, it outlines the importance of their correspon dence and, especially, the lecture Kojeve gave at Schmitt's invitation in 1957, for an understanding of Koj eve's thought as less systematic and more ambigu ous

This introduction has two

than the reading

English-speaking

students often give

it. Because Kojeve,

particularly during his lifetime, published nothing as overtly political as Schmitt did, these documents add more to our understanding of Koj eve's thought than
to that of Schmitt.

At first glance, the


seems

friendship

between Alexandre Kojeve

and

Carl Schmitt

improbable. When they began corresponding in 1955, Schmitt was some of an academic pariah; in 1933, the legal scholar had joined the Nazi Party, thing publicly declared his anti-Semitism, was later interrogated (but not charged) at

Nuremberg,
the

and retired on

from his
Hegel's

his famous lectures

post at the University of Berlin Phenomenology ended in 1939,

in 1946. After
Kojeve joined 71). After the

Resistance (Auffret, 1990,


he
wound

pp.

270-71; Sombart, 1998,

p.

war's end,

worked until

up in the French ministry of economic affairs, where he his death in 1968. Schmitt's anti-Semitism was sufficient to divide
other scholars with whom and

him permanently from


p.

he had been friendly,

including
did
not

Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer


301). We
note
permitted

Carl Joachim Friedrich (Schwab, 1993, among them Leo Strauss,


who

can

probably

also count

Editorial
longer

The journal has

the use of notes

in these

articles

because the two


edited

authors

can

no

make changes

in their

work and

because the

articles

have been

by

a third person.

Translator'

s note

I gratefully acknowledge the kind assistance of Kirsten Nellen in translating the most difficult of Kojeve's unusual German passages, and of Piet Tommissen and George Schwab, who provided corrections to the translation. I would also like to thank Charlotte Masemann both for her translation
of

Latin

phrases and

her

advice

throughout the production of this translation.

Any

remaining

errors

are mine.

interpretation,

Fall 2001, Vol.

29, No. I

92

Interpretation
his

resume

friendly

correspondence with

Schmitt

after the

latter failed to reply

to

letter in 1933 (Meier, 1995, p. xvii). How Kojeve was able to look past such
is unclear, but
we

a monumental obstacle as owed

Schmitt's
in 1943,

anti-Semitism

do know that he

Schmitt

a considerable

debt. Kojeve's Esquisse d'une

phenomenologie presented

du Droit,

completed

in his Concept of the Political, relied largely on Schmitt's argument, that the friend-enemy distinction is the primary political division (Kojeve, 1981, p. 144). For Schmitt, establishing this distinction as primary was meant to pre serve the possibility of a serious political theory by overcoming liberalism's
tendency, particularly when combined with democracy, to obscure and neutral ize the political, that is, the possibility of battle to the death against an enemy (Schmitt, 1996, p. 23). Kojeve's use of the friend-enemy distinction in the Es
quisse echoes

his

earlier

insistence, in his Introduction


recognition as read.

on the anthropogenetic

battle for

la lecture de Hegel, the lens through which Hegel's


a

Phenomenology
for purely
meaning

must

be

nonbiological

In both instances, the human capacity to risk life reasons engenders a historical and political world with

not reducible

to the universal satisfaction of biological desires

(Kojeve,
Europe

1973,

p.

143).
when

By 1955,

Kojeve

and

Schmitt began corresponding,

western

had been astonishingly transformed by the Marshall Plan and the creation of the European Economic Community. If Kojeve's "universal and homogeneous
state"

had

not yet

arrived, neither did the

concept of

the political have the force


written:

it had had in Weimar Germany. In 1932, Schmitt had

If
be

the

different states, religions,

classes and other

human

groupings on earth should

so unified that a conflict


civil war should

among them is impossible and even inconceivable and


a realm which embraces

if

forever be foreclosed in
and

the globe, then

the

distinction

of

friend

enemy

would also cease.

What

remains

is

neither poli etc.

tics nor state, but culture, civilization, economics, morality,

law,

entertainment,

If

and when this condition will

appear, I do

not

know. At the moment, this is

not

the case. And it is


would

self-deluding to believe that


.

the termination of a modem war


pp.

lead to

world peace

(Schmitt, 1996,

53-54)

With

the advent of "Point


western

IV

politics"

(discussed in Kojeve's letter

of

May
both

2, 1955, below), in
been
replaced

Europe

after

World War II, it became


states
state,"

clear to

men that while the political

by

had already nearly vanished, Kojeve's "universal and homogeneous

had
or

also not

Schmitt's

"administrative
peared

state"

(Verwaltungsstaat) (Schmitt, 1980,


in

p.

instead

were groupings of states allied

"empires"

11). What had ap engaged in competi

tion stripped of the political.

Both
1957
at

the correspondence and the presentation

Kojeve

gave

in Dusseldorf in both
men on the

Schmitt's invitation
twilight world

shed some

light

on the thought of

nature of the

they

were observing.

In both Der Nomos der Erde

Discussion:

Koj eve -Schmitt, Colonialism

93

im Volkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europeaum (1974, first published in 1950) and Land and Sea (1954b), Schmitt argued that the exhaustion of exploitable

lands
the

nineteenth-century colonialism had historical distinction between land and sea obsolete; colonial
had
given

by seafaring

empires under

rendered

"taking"

(Neh-

men)

way to

global
and

"grazing"

(Weiden). Kojeve's Dusseldorf


his
kind
plan

speech, his

response

to Land
of the

Sea, lays

out

for the

new

European
colo

Empire's domination
nialism"

Mediterranean basin
so much as a

with a
of

policy

of

"giving
his

which resembles

for North Africa. The

plan

nothing Kojeve

European Marshall Plan


reflected own

advocated

in Dusseldorf

administrative project within the

French

government's

Direction des Relations

Economiques Exterieures (D.R.E.E.). An unpublished, posthumous report of Kojeve's administrative career describes both his advocacy of a unified Euro
pean economic

policy

and the

dismantling
grounds

of trade

agricultural products of third world countries.


reveals the ants of the

barriers, particularly for the In his Dusseldorf lecture, Kojeve


colonialism": the

explicitly political former European

for this

"giving
are

inhabit
clients,"

colonies

in Africa

clients, but "poor


clients."

Kojeve tells his audience, are "bad, or even dangerous, This last admission illustrates Kojeve's ambiguity concerning history's
pacity to determine or attenuate political action. Until at least

ca

1939, Kojeve

read

Hegel through
tion;
both

the

lens

of the master-slave

dialectic, binding history both


life for the

to the

slave's work and to the master's willingness to risk

sake of recogni

the universal recognition accorded to citizens at the end of


master and slave

and, therefore,

risk and work

obsolete.

ing
of

the serious possibility of mortal

danger from the is


Kojeve

global

history rendered By recogniz working class during


(see Kojeve's letter

a period

in

which

he

also claimed that warfare

obsolete

July 11, 1955, below),


risk
and

the postwar

severed the

bond between the


remained possible.

master's

history; if

the latter had ended, the

former

Man's capacity to risk life after history's end receives two distinct interpreta tions in Kojeve's postwar works. The first interpretation appears in the wellknown
addition to the second edition
"Japanized"

of the

Introduction in the form

of the

posthistorical stead of the

man, perpetually capable of "gratuitous

suicide"

in

"re-animalization"

(Kojeve, 1968,
end

p.

437)

Kojeve had

posited as

the

only

possible outcome of

history's

in the first

edition.

According
is
animalization

to this

interpretation,

posthistorical man's

gratuitous and therefore apolitical.


and gratuitous suicide

If

posthistorical man's choice

capacity for mortal risk between resuggests

is determined,
satisfied

as

Kojeve

in the

Introduction, by his
and

willingness to

be

by

the recognition the universal


of the

homogeneous
the

state provides of

him,

then the gratuitousness

latter

option

lies in
pilot

impossibility

Kojeve

uses as an example

achieving in 1959 has been in the he


near

recognition through action. replaced

The kamikaze

in

our time

by

the

suicide

bomber,

and, perhaps,

future,
(or
risks

a radical

wing

of anti-WTO rather once

protesters:

the value

for

which

perishes

perishing) is
and will

"formal"

than historical; that

is, any

success

is temporary,

be forgotten

94

Interpretation
Posthistorical
men
cannot negate

overcome.

the universal and homogeneous


of

state

because it is formless (see Schmitt's letter play the enemy.


clients"

Dec. 14. 1955,

below)

and

will not

"dangerous

There is, in contrast, nothing formal or gratuitous about the risk from the in Kojeve's Dusseldorf lecture. In 1950, Kojeve had written

to Leo Strauss that those dissatisfied


are

by

the posthistorical

brand

of recognition
p.

instead

"sick"

up"

classified as a world of

and are

simply "locked

(Strauss, 2000,

difference between the merely sick and the dangerous, however. His recognition of this difference suggests that the later Kojeve re
255). There is
mained open

to (if

not convinced

of) Strauss's alternative to his own

position:

that the

human capacity for

meaningful political action

is

rooted

in

nature rather

than in
A

history
the text

and therefore survives

history's

end.

note on

The

original

letters

and

lecture from

which this

translation

is

taken are in

German, in

which all

nouns are capitalized.

Consequently,
writings

the liberties Kojeve

frequently, but
Master
and

unpredictably, takes with


etc.)

capitalization
not appear

in his French

(with

such terms as

Slave. Justice, State,

do

in this translation.

The

correspondence and

Kojeve's Dusseldorf

speech

below have been translated

directly from
was

Piet Tommissen's meticulously annotated edition (Tommissen, 1998). While Kojeve to publish the lecture himself, a French translation has since been published in two

forbidden

parts

(Kojeve,
from it.

1980; Kojeve, 1999),


I have included those I have
errors

although some passages


passages

from the

original

German

text were omitted

here, but

enclosed

them in square brackets.


where there were obvious

made minor corrections

in the few instances


have
noted these.

typographical

in the Tommissen

edition and

All

notes are mine.

Round

and square of

brack

ets are

Schmitt's
is

and

Kojeve's; curly
uncertainty

ones

({ })

are editorial and appear

in two types

instance:

where there

some

about the original text

(owing

to difficulties in reading

Kojeve's

handwriting)

and

in

cases where

I have

provided

the original German word because of ambiguities,

puns, etc. Italicized text was underlined in the original letters.

Alexandre Kojeve-Carl Schmitt Correspondence


Paris, 2/V/55
Dear Professor!

Thank

you

very

much

for

kindly

sending
it

your

extremely brilliant Nomos


of

essay.1

I had already been "Gemeinschaft und

made aware of

and read

it in the November issue

Politik."

Rereading
an

it

was a useful pleasure.


performance!

To say every
so

thing

essential

in 10

pages

is

extraordinary

Of course I have something to say about it, but it is impossible to do letter. On the whole, however, I am fully in agreement.

in

With
like this:

respect

to your "last

questions"

in short, I

would answer

something

1) "in

itself"

there is

related attempts

(certainly have failed)

since

Napoleon)

no

longer any

"taking"

(all

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism

95

2) 3)

"for

us"

(i.e. for "absolute


consciousness

knowledge")

there

but "for

itself"

(for instance

only "producing"! US/USSR) there is also "di


now

is

vision."

The

goal

is

unfortunately!

homogeneous distribution. Whoever


be "the
last."

in his
will
etc.

hemisphere
"distribute"

attains
more

it first

will

The

Americans'

"Point
and

IV"2

slowly than the agreement between the


world"

USSR

China,

But in the

"worldly

there

is

more

to distribute. Thus a

concrete prognosis

is difficult! Most respectfully,

Faithfullv,

(s)
1.

Schmitt, 1953.

2. President

Harry
new

Truman's Point IV
program

1949,

as

"a bold

progress available

for

the

was introduced in his inaugural speech on January 20, for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial improvement and growth of underdeveloped namely, in Western
areas,"

Europe. It

marked an

important

advance over

the provisions of the

European

Recovery

Program
not

(the Marshall
on

Plan),

which

focused

on economic

recovery through direct financial transfers, but

technology

transfer.

Plettenberg (Westphalia)
9/5 55

Dear Mr. Kojeve, I I


am

risking sending Dr.


Schnur'

you the

received about you seven years ago

the first information accompanying document (summer 1948). Your letter of the 2nd of

May,

which

conveyed

to me, gives me the courage to take this risk.


you would subsume me under

Otherwise I

would

have to fear that

Leon Bloy's

categories,2

if

you saw a card such as this.


a

Everything
on

crucial appears on page not

215

of your

Introduction

la lecture de Hegel/ I do

know if Dr. Schnur

correctly for me. Many have

conveyed

to you what the


portrayed

Hegelian "take
"atheist,"

God"

[Gott-Nahme]

is

Hegel

as

and we
Judgement."4

Bruno Bauer's amusing "Trumpet of the last yours on page 215 would have to change all present
phers right

certainly all know But this point of if the


philoso

philosophy,

who, in the
to the
your

course of

the academic division of


were

labor,

administer the legal

firm

"Philosophy"

really to interrogate you. I do not,


ceased since

however, today

share

opinion

that

"taking"

has

Napoleon,
remains

and

that

there

is only
he

production
.

(grazing

{geweidet}). There

{ausgeweidet}
cause

creates

The earthly God, who now only gives and no from Nothingness, creates Nothingness first of
he creates, i.e. takes.

only destruction longer takes be


all

before every interest

thing, from

which

May I,
you

at the same

time,

send you a printed

essay

which will

hardly

for

other reasons

(it has to do

Festschrift3

with a

for Ernst Jiinger's 60th

96

Interpretation
in which, however,
a remark

birthday)
modem

is reported, for

which

I recognize,

on the

earth,

no other competent judge

than you, Mr. Kojeve.

Faithfully,

(s)
1. At
although

Iring Fetcher's

suggestion,

Roman Schnur,

legal scholar, introduced Schmitt to Kojeve,

Kojeve had already been aware of Schmitt's work, according to evidence gathered by Tommissen (1998, pp. 57-63). Kojeve's 1943 Esquisse dune phenomenologie du droit uses the

friend-enemy
translated

distinction Schmitt first

presented

in his 1933

edition of

Die

Begriff des Politischen,


poet.

2.

by George Schwab as The Concept of the Political (Schmitt, 1996). Leon Bloy (1846-1917) was a passionate convert to Catholicism and a
page

It is

unclear

to

which categories

3. This

Schmitt is referring here. of Kojeve's Introduction a la lecture de Hegel interprets

pp.

476-77

of the Hoff-

Hegel's Phdnomenologie des Geistes; 678 (p. 412) in the Miller translation (Hegel, 1977). In this passage, Kojeve starkly presents his view of Hegel as atheist: "Briefly, Man
meister edition of

who seeks to understand

with an atheistic anthropology.

himself thoroughly and completely as Spirit cannot satisfy himself except And this is why Schicksal, the Destiny of all Theology, of all Reli
atheism.
...

gion,

is, in
it

the

final analysis,

does

in the

mode of

"stellt sich

vor'

In theism, Man becomes conscious of himself. But he Vor-stellung [re-pre-sentation]. That is, he projects himself outside himself, [re-pre-sents himself), and, no longer recognizing himself in this projection, he

believes that he is in the


the

presence of a transcendent God. And it is thus that Hegel could say that only difference between his Science and Christian Theology consists in the fact that the latter is a Vorstellung, while his Science is a Begriff, a developed concept. In fact, it is enough to over

come the

Vorstellung, it is
enough to

enough to of

jected, it is
atheistic

say

anthropology which 4. Bruno Bauer, 1841; translated into English

grasp [be-greifen], to know or to understand what was Man everything the Christian says of his God in order to have the is at the foundation Hegel's
Science."

pro-

by

5. Mohler, 1955. Schmitt's

contribution appears on pp.

Lawrence Stepelevich (Bauer, 1989). 135-67 (Schmitt, 1955).

Pans, 16/V/55
Dear Mr. Schmitt, Thank The
you

very

much

for

your

letter,

the

accompanying card,
comes

and

the Jiinger

essay, which

I have just
"Hegel

read.
France"1

"Icon"

vient en

{"Hegel

to

France"}
certainly
. .

very

priceless

and appears to

be

quite a

"serious"! I
few
K."

would

not

is really have

"subsumed"

you under

Bloy: I knew

of your writings.

That I dislike

the expression "commentaire existentialiste de

{"K.'s

existentialist com

extremely2

certainly goes without saying. But unfortunately it is gen in France. The only truth about it is that I sought (and now am erally customary again seeking) to reach a "mise a {"update"} of Hegel. If
mentary"}
jour"
"existentialist"

"modem,"

means as much as agreement.

or even

"a la

mode"

{"fashionable"}

then I am in

page

on my In my course I spoke of Hegel's anthropo-theism, but I also emphasized that it has to do not only with a mortal but really with a dying (and perhaps already dead) God.

You are,

of

course, completely correct: everything essential appears

215,

as you cited.

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


But how few Englishman. In
publisher)
a

97

understood that!

discussion (which I have lost


.

Besides them, I have only heard it from an and forgotten the name of the
us."3

was the sentence: ".

but Mr. K. is human,

as the rest of

Real

Anglo-Saxon

irony

and

"Ver{?}zenheit."4

this sentence either.

But it

used to

For nobody (besides me) understood be completely different. Heinrich Heine, e.g.,
going for help, I say whose buildings are
asks

knew it very well. In the Pariser Tagebuchern5 (page forgotten!) it goes some like this: "Since I am no longer a Hegelian, it is also well for me. thing Now if somebody comes to me, complains about life, and to him: / am no longer God! Turn to a suitable institution,

usually

equipped with towers and


what people said about

bells."

Yes,
people

God for thousands


we

of years as

it

pertained

to

(i.e. to themselves [there


understand

have

"existentialism"!!] is
even after

top.

Just to

it is

so

difficult that

really my books only

over the
a

very

few

understand

it. And

who takes that seriously?!

At the time

of

my

course

(i.e. before the war) I


World"

always

inwardly

"Stalin"

read

instead
nology.

"Napoleon"

of

and nevertheless
=

interpreted the Ph.d.G. [In


=

your

termi
=

Stalin

"the Alexander
empire].

of our

"industrialized

Napoleon"

World

(=

Country)

Now I believe that Hegel


over after the

enlarged and
ble"

was completely right and that history was already historical Napoleon. For, in the end, Hitler was only a "new improved of Napoleon ["La Republique une et indivisi
edition"

{'The

single and one

indivisible

Republic"}

"Ein Land,

ein

Volk,

Fiihrer"

ein

{"One country,
time

people, one leader"}]. Hitler committed the errors which

you characterize so well on p.

166 (towards the


would

middle)6:

now, if Nap. in his

had done it

as well as

Hitler, it

unfortunately Hitler did it 150 years too brought nothing essentially new. And the first one was just an intermission. What did Napoleon want? To ["aufheben"} the state as such, in
"sublate"

certainly have been enough. But latel Thus the second world war

favor

"society."

of

And he believed himself


war.

able

to attain it through a

"total"

victory in the

"total"

(Through this

"total"

war the state and

ing

territorial unit] as such is brought "to


want

completion"

war-wag is thus "sublated.")


same

[state

But the Anglo-Saxons

(and

could

already then) the nothing

thing (cer

tainly

with more success). of

And Marx

also meant

other than this with

his "Realm Who


thus

freedom [to do

what?!)."

could

do it? Are there, then,


which
are

still

States in the

real sense of the

word,

governments

anything

other than

administrations

and politics

{Politilc](- war) which meant something more than Police.

The Americans do
not

have

never

known
are

what

war,

politics and state mean

(the

"boys"

die

as

soldiers, but

killed

as police

agents, and, naturally, nobody sees anything


all

good about that.

[But

you

know

that better than I do]. And Europe is about

to forget this. ("Mourir

pour

Dantzig"10?!) Africa,
for
vie"

Asia?

correctly say,
attain the

history

is

unique and

these countries
of

completely it is too late: until they


of the

No,

as you

famous "niveau de

{"standard

living"}

"American way

98
of

Interpretation
life""

and

thus can think of


wage war.

"armament"

there

opportunity to
success!

The disarmament

conference

is certainly is well

no on

longer the its way to bureaucrat

When I [foreign
was no
political

entered
=

the modem democratic

"state"

after the war as a

foreign "policy") I thought (only after several yearsl) that there longer any State at all. Parliament and government (i.e. the formerly
trade

structures)

maintained

the balance so well that neither of the two could


at all.

decide,
tion"

determine

or

do anything

And thanks to this

mutual

"neutraliza

of the political the administration could


"administer"

carry

out

its

work

unencumbered,

i.e.

guage).

[could] Certainly
no

rather

(= organize the

"grazing,"

to speak your lan

there is still a kind of "foreign


exists:

policy."

Domestic politics,

however,

longer

nothing; for

they

are,

by

and

everybody wants, of course, the same thing, namely large, if not satisfied [befriedigt] at least contented
elite

[zufrieden]
only if

[and the

most

dissatisfied

is

a revolutionary, so-called

i.e.

political power

the masses are

discontented]). But this

foreign policy has only


appears

one goal: to rid the world of politics (= war).

Externally, everything
street"},
who can no

to

be "as it

used to":

armament, alliances, etc. But it is so different that it is clear


rue"

even to the

"homme de la

{"man

of the

longer take

it

seriously.

When I had
ply
and
a

seen

(and experienced) that, I


than the others.

understood that the

USSR is

sim

bit

"modern"

more

Here,

one could get rid of government

Parliament

gotten rid old

anything of; the Revolution did


without

without

having
not

changed.

install

a new government

And in the USSR they were in place of the

government, but

a new administration.

Government Thus
end a

Parliament is
=

"fascism"

(tyranny). Thus it
clear that
not

was

at

tempted to set down that Hitler


a

Stalin. It became
(=

it doesn't

work. what

Russian

"Parliament"

was when there

desperately
"king"

sought, but
=

found. But to

Parliament

is

Regius

State)?! Or,

otherwise:

to
of

what end a revolution

Parliament
exists to

when everybody remains quiet anyway and "parliamentary" be dealt with in a way (or

no

danger
a

"king"

by

without

"Parliament").
"anticommunist"

What do

such

Russians

as

may be

want?

The
the

same as the

"communist"

ones, namely, "to live well and


want

peacefully."

Only
vs.

former think is
not a

that the
political

latter

it too fast (Krushchev


to that

Malenkov12). But

that

problem, and

end neither war nor revolution

is necessary,

nor a

state at all,

but just

an administration. on
a

So
ment

"World

prognosis"

And there already is Hegelian basis:


{Endriistung},"

one.

"Appeasement"13

Disarma

{Abriistung} politics (for otherwise {?} unemployment in the {pun}!) "Point of raw materials and industrial products (= "graz USA14) "rational without "destruction") in the West equalization of income within each
IV" division" ing"

("without indignation

to make a calembour

country
And

and after

between

countries

("underdeveloped
"non-Hegelian"

countries"15). will notice

10-20 years,

even a

that East and West

Discussion:
not only want the same thing (in fact, "alignment" Then will be easy.

Koj eve -Schmitt, Colonialism 99


Napoleon),
but do {the
same

since

thing}.

All (with

of

this as

commentary

on my:

"whimsical"

production, which
"education"

"no longer any taking, but only depends on working time, which is
of not

grazing"

func

tion of

[Bildung],
Sea"16

i.e. the possibility

being

bored "at home").

Your "Land
I
agree with

and

remains.
"brilliant"

everything (of what is certainly know it yourself) except for the but is no longer. And this you say yourself, p.
you

in it, I

will

question of time.
156.17

say nothing, for That was true,

it something like this: longer any but only "inland [One needs the anachronism of Mussolini's Italian foolishness in the 20th century to believe that the Mediterranean is still a political phenome
one could express no

Superficially,

economically, there is
"Roman"

"ocean,"

water"

non:

today everything is surely "Mediterranean"].


Sea"

strategically, "Land "air": but


"attacker"

and

has been

"sublated"

in

a war would never

be "pulled And

out of the

air,"

Hegelian way in and nobody likes an


a
"Alexander."

fend"

only want and are able to "de themselves, there is no longer any history and thus no Please forgive the long and confused letter. But I also wanted to put my
where all
. .

anymore anyway.

"timely

considerations"

before

"competent"

judge.

Faithfully,

(s)
1. Tommissen identifies Kojeve's 2.
subject

here

as

Dufrenne, 1948.

Reading

dusserst where

Tommissen's

edition reads dussert.

3. In English.
4. Illegible in the original, according to Tommissen's edition. 5. I was unable to find any work by Heine by this title, although Kojeve may be referring to collection of Heine's Paris articles, since published as Pariser Berichte 1840-1848 (Heine, 1979).
view

Tommissen's

is that the

quote

is

not

Heine's;

nonetheless, the sentiment is.

In

letter from

April 15, 1849, Heine writes, "In manchen Momenten, besonders wenn die Krampfe in der Wirbelsaule allzu qualvoll rumoren, durchzuckt mich der Zweifel ob der Mensch wirklich ein zweybeinigter

Gott ist,

wie mir

den

selige

Professor Hegel
mehr

vor

funfundzwanzig
p.

Jahren in Berlin

versichert

hatte

...

ich bin kein

gottlicher

Bipede

(Heine, 1982,

112). ("In

certain moments,

especially
years ago
croire que
par

when the cramps rumble all too

mind whether man

really is in Berlin 1 am
...

two-legged god, as the late Professor

agonizingly through my spine, the doubt crosses my Hegel assured me twenty-five Hegel m'avait fait biped.") From Nov. 3, 1851: ". divinite, je me croyais si grand que, quand je passais
.

no

longer
si

divine
ma

j'etais

un

Dieu! J'etais
ou

fier de

la

porte

Saint-Martin
c'etait une made me

Saint-Denis, je baissais involontairement la tete,


qui est passee

craignant
''

de

me

heurter
146).

contre

l'arc

belle epoque,

depuis longtemps
my Saint

(Heine, 1972,

p.

divinity, I believed myself so great that, when I passed through the door of Saint Martin or Denis, I involuntarily lowered my it was a belle epoque, which is long gone. head for fear of hitting myself on the arch ") gener 6. This error, according to Schmitt, is to respond to the contemporary "call of
(".
. .

Hegel

believe I

was a god!

was so proud of

history,"

ated

by

the dialectic between land and sea, with "the old answer": "While
and

people

believe themselves

to be historical
once."

stay

with what was once

true, they forget that

historical truth is only true


"policy"

7. Kojeve's meaning throughout is ambiguous, since Politik means both tics"; Aussenpolitik is translated here in its common English usage as "foreign

and

"poli

policy,"

whereas

100

Interpretation
no real

Innenpolitik, having
mestic

meaning if translated
appears

as

"domestic

policy,"

is translated below

as

"do

politics."

The

"Police"

word

in brackets

immediately

after the

German

word

Polizei here.

9. In English.
10. "Mourir based L'Oeuvre
orator
Dantzig?"

pour

was the

headline

of an article

in the

May 4, 1939,

edition of Parisa collab

by Marcel

Deat (1894-1955), then

a socialist and pacifist,

but, from 1941,


peasants.

in the

Vichy

government as

founder Polish

of the

Rassemblement National Populaire. In the article, did


not concern

Deat
to

argued

that the matter of the

corridor

French

am

indebted
pp.

Tommissen for identifying the


11. In English.

source of this quotation.

See

also

Cointet, 1998, especially

146-48.

12. Georgi Malenkov (1902-1988) leader


and prime minister on

was chosen

by Stalin

to

replace

him

as

Communist Party
ten days.

the latter's death in

1953,

which

Malenkov

did, for

Nikita

Krushchev (1894-1971),
split the

who was second

two

posts.

They

agreed, and

secretary of the party, persuaded Politburo members to Krushchev became party secretary, while Malenkov took the

significantly less power. On February S, 1955, Krushchev Malenkov, installing Nikolai Bulganin (1895-1975) as prime minister. At the time Kojeve wrote this letter, Krushchev had taken a staunch anti-Western position, and would thus have ap peared an unrepentant Stalinist (and hence "communist"). Malenkov, on the other hand, had advo
post of prime

minister,

a position with

ousted

cated

foreign policy

of reconciliation

with the

West

and a shift

in domestic

economic

policy

away from

heavy industry towards consumer goods (thus playing, in Kojeve's terminology, the "anticommunist"). In fact, Krushchev proved to be anything but a loyal Stalinist, as evidenced by his 1956 "secret denouncing Stalin's practice of political persecution; moreover, his concil iatory foreign policy came to resemble Malenkov's almost immediately after the latter's ouster
speech"

(Marantz, 1975).
13. In English.
14.

Partially

illegible in the original, according to Tommissen's


not

edition.

15. In English. 16. Kojeve is


to

referring to Schmitt's

eponymous

book Land

und

Meer (Schmitt, 1954b), but

Schmitt's essay in the Jiinger Festschrift (Schmitt, 1955). 17. Here Schmitt discusses the radical separation of the technological {die Technik) from the normative standards of criticism and from "dialectical-historical
thought."

26/5/55

Dear Mr. Kojeve,

received

your

letter

11/51

of

on

journey

in

southern

Germany: I

will

answer

it from

Plettenberg
IV"

after

my

return

(next week); today just this

confirma

I certainly understand "K. remains hu That "Point is our constitution is confirmed to me here every single day; I flee from the overcrowding of the streets back into my shelter.
tion of
receipt and

the assurance that

man."2

At the

same time

would

like to
und

send you a print of the

2nd

edition of

my

harmless little pamphlet, "Land


Anima): however, it is actually

Meer"3; forgive

me

for

you a world-historical observation which was told to a

presupposed

young in the East- West

daring girl (my

to submit to

daughter

essay4

and

is hence

forgivable.

Many
ceived

thanks
your

for the

abundance of your

thoughts and the stimulation I

re

in

last letter!

Yours, (s)

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


1. Schmitt
almost certainh means

-101

Kojeve's letter
rests
human"

of

16/5.

2. Kojeve's original reads, "Kojeve 3. Schmitt, 1954b. 4. Schmitt's essay in

(in English).

Mohler, 1955.

Paris,
Dear Mr. Schmitt, many thanks for
Meer."

28/V 55

your

letter

and the

friendly

transmission

of your

"Land

und

read

the little book with great happiness: it is a great art to formulate


questions

important

clearly
I

and simply! am

I already told

you that

completely in
And

agreement with you

concerning

the past, with respect to the

"elements."

now

see

that our opinions about

the future are also less different than one could believe on the basis of the

Jiinger
few

essay.

Your

answer to

my letter interests
know

me extraordinarily:

today

there are

very

people who still were.

what state and politics

(and thus

"history")
with

are, or

rather,

Yesterday
and

spent the entire


about

day

in bureaucratic discussions
was a good

Englishmen
as much of

Americans
"Land-Sea"

"Convertibility"': that

illustration,

the

contrast as of

the anachronistic exploitation of the "lecons de

l'Histoire"

{"lessons
one2

of

history"}!

Really
danger

{?}

the philosophy

(or the "wisdom")


real.

{?}2

epochs where the

of anachronism

for nonphilosophy becomes

Most respectfully,

Faithfully, (s)
1.
"Convertibility"

is in English. Under the

agreement reached at at

ber

states

were

to make their currencies

"convertible"

fixed for

rates

Bretton Woods in 1944, mem into the U.S. dollar, itself


exchange rates

convertible

to gold. In practice, this only happened at the end of 1958. France was never an enthusi

astic participant non-U. S.

in Bretton Woods because it

placed

the onus

keeping

fixed

on

members

(a fault

which

led to the

agreement's collapse when the

U.S. dollar became

overvalued

2.

during the period 1968-71). See Bordo, Partially illegible,. according to Tommissen's

1994.
edition.

Plettenberg
7/6/55

Dear Mr. Kojeve,


it is
can
all over with the
changed about
Dasein"

"state,"

that

is true; this

mortal

God is dead, nothing (I do


not

be

that; the present-day,


"state"

modem administration-apparatus of
"government"

the "care of

is

not

in Hegel's sense,

not

know if

you

were

able

to

follow, from Paris,

the grotesque (on

both sides)

102

Interpretation
which played
arts'

comedy
tion and

itself

out

in Gottingen because
the "Gottingen
and

of the minister of educa of

Seven"

a parody-reprise of

1837);

no

longer

capable of war or the

death penalty;
grant

hence

also no

longer

capable of

making

history. Nonetheless, I
that

that you are correct. I am,

however,

of the view

for the

next3

stage the magni are

homines {great men}

now major

homines

{greater men}

concerning themselves with disputations of


not consider our

Grossraum4;
how
and

Grossraum, i.e.
row's

a planning-space suited

to the dimensions of today's and tomor

technology [Technik]. I do

Earth,

no matter

small even

it may have become, to be a planning leave open if it ever can become one.
sense of a contrast to and
"small-space"

unit

not

by

long
not

shot;

have, for me, the KleinI {say} only in passing { Raum} (which
does

"Grossraum"

glancing backward), but


enmity,
to the

the sense

enables meaningful
an opposition

and

is hence

is} a plurality and, therefore, justifiably historically noteworthy of

{which

unity of the world, i.e. against the assumption that the cycle of time is already over. That is what I do not believe. Le cercle n'est pas encore parcouru {The circle has not yet been travelled}. The contemporary world-dual
ism (of
end of
to-date"

east and

west, or land and sea) is not the final dash for unity, i.e. the
which

history. It is, rather, the bottleneck through


magni

the

road

to

new "upnew
no-

mos5

of

homines {great men} leads. I am thus looking for the the Earth, a geo-nomy; this does not arise from the dictate of

lord

of

the world,
arises

into
a

whose

hands

few Nobel

prize-winners maneuvered
powers."

power; it

from

tremendous,

reciprocal

"match

of

I am writing that in all directness in answer to the questions of both your letters (of 16/5 and 28/5), because I cannot withhold my answer from you. I
know how misleading every such discussion is today, but it I were not to speak to you bluntly. I fear (and see) that the
ended.

would

"taking"

be wrong if has not yet

Recently

asserted

(in

a radio

discussion for the Frankfurt broadcaster):


discussion
as soon as

man remains a son of the appears.

Earth. I

will send you the

it

I am eagerly looking forward to your Hegel book. It ought to appear in German. It is outrageous that the German public takes no notice of the Introduc
tion a la lecture de Hegel. But you will experience the truth of Goethe's expres

"I already know the dear Germans: first they are silent; then they carp; then (sic: twice in August 1816, namely in Riemer and in Zelter) a they nice 5-stage law. I have, therefore, advised a German publisher (Eugen Diedersion:
eliminate"7

ichs)
and

to consider the possibility of a


such

German

edition. your

I personally

no

longer

get

involved in
is

matters; but my gratitude for


me

Introduction
able

was too

strong,

still too

strong, for

simply to have been

to remain silent.

Faithfully, (s)

1. Franz Leonhard Schluter


pointed

(1921-1981),
1955

member of the of

Free Democratic Party,

was

ap
was

education minister in the

parliament

Lower Saxony. The Senate

of the Georg-

August

University

of

Gottingen publicly

opposed the appointment on the grounds that

Schluter

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


a

103

allegations, but

Nazi defender. Premier Heinrich Hellwege (1908-1991) appointed a committee to investigate the Schluter resigned four days later, long before the committee reported. See Marten,
2. In 1837, Emst August
members
at

1987.

(1771-1851), King of Hanover, rescinded the 1833 constitution. Seven of Gottingen, including the brothers Jacob (1785-1863) and Wilhelm (1786-1859) Grimm, protested and were subsequently dismissed.

faculty
3.
4.

the

University
where

Reading

ndchste

here

Tommissen's

edition reads ndchse.


space,"

"Grossraum."

including
in
which

roughly translatable as "great Schmitt's beginning in the 1920s. Joseph


the term acquired currency
nomos

appeared

in German legal scholarship,


the context

Bendersky
pp.

provides an account of

(Bendersky, 1983,
"law"

250-61). Schmitt insists


tied to the
on a more precise of territory.

is crudely translatable as meaning of the term. For Schmitt, nomos is a founding See Schmitt, 1974, pp. 36-48.
6. Schmitt's "Gesprach iiber den Neuen
Raum"

5. Although

"norm,"

or order

directly

division

was

broadcast

on

Hessische Rundfunk
as

on

April

12, 1955. It
und

was published, together with the text of another


zum

broadcast,

Gesprach iiber die Macht

den

Zugang

Machthaber; Gesprach
cites

uber

den Neuen Raum (Berlin: Akademie Verlag,


64.
kenn'
sie."

1994). The

passage passage

Schmitt

here

appears on p.

ich schon: erst schweigen sie, actually reads, "Denn die lieben Deutschen dann makeln sie, dann beseitigen, dann bestehlen, und verschweigen ("For I know the dear Germans: first they are silent, then they carp, then eliminate, then steal and conceal.") The passage
appears

7. The

identicalh in

letter

of

August

1833, 1841,

p. p.

298)

and

in Riemer's

own report of a

9, 1816, from Goethe to Carl Friedrich Zelter (Riemer, dinner speech by Goethe on August 29, 1816 (Riemer,

719).

Paris, 11/VII55
Dear Mr. Schmitt,
please

forgive
on

me

travelling
Morocco).

business,

for only today answering your last letter (of 7/VI). I was then much work in the office (Sicily, Brussels, Tunisia,
"state."

It
not,

pleases me

that we think the same about the modern so-called

I do

however,
as

understand

how

you can speak nonetheless of a


hat1

coming

political-

"conflict."

military But
not

For me, Molotov's cowboy


mentioned

is

a symbol of

the future.

I have

a philosopher, and a

Hegelian in addition, may

play

the

prophet.
"dualism"

And

is there
and

nowadays rather

really, then, a

of

East

and

West? I believe But here, too, it

in "Land

Sea"

than in the directions

of the compass.

is

significant

that war

fleets
am

belong

to the

past.

Be that

as

it may, I

you very be ready, wrote to my pub my book. Kohlhammer Publishing appeared to lisher, but since then I hear nothing more of it, not even from the translator, Mr.

Thank

much

looking forward to your future works. very for your intervention in the matter of the translation
much

of

Fetscher.2

On

the other

hand, I

received

lecturer from Israel (J.


Kojeve"

Taubes3)

a New York letter today from America who writes to me that his Hegel lectures "a la a

have interested the

students there

very

much.

Faithfully,

(s)

104

Interpretation
(1890-1986), foreign minister from 1939-1949 all his life; he was openly hostile to Krushchev
after attempting, with and and

1. Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov

1953-1956, in fact
was expelled

remained an ardent

Stalinist

from the Communist Party's Central Committee in 1957


as

others,

Of Molotov's cowboy hat, alas, I could find no trace. Hegel: eine Vergegenvartigung seines Denkens. Komentar Phdnomenologie des Geistes (Kojeve, 1958).
to
remove

Krushchev

first

secretary.

2. The translation

appeared as

zur

struggled

3. Jacob Taubes (1923-1987) for most of his adult life


met

was a with

Judaist

scholar and

lifelong

admirer of
while

Schmitt. Taubes

Schmitt's anti-Semitism, and,


Taubes'

he

corresponded with

Schmitt, only
Free

him in

University
I

of

in 1978. In 1967, at Berlin. Taubes writes, "I asked him


person

request, Kojeve gave a lecture at the the voyage was going


now

where

from

Berlin (he had


although

come

to us

directly from

Peking). His

answer:

'to

Plettenberg.'

was

astonished,

was somewhat used

to surprises from Kojeve. Kojeve continued:

For

where must one


me.

travel to in Germany? Carl Schmitt is surely the only one worth

talking

to. That stung

For I had

denied

myself a visit

to Carl

Schmitt,

and somehow envied


p.

Alexander Kojeve his

uninhibitedness

in

associating

with

Carl

Schmitt"

(Taubes, 1987,

24;

see also

Mohler, 1995,

pp.

116, 120-22. 253).

Paris, 1/VIII 55
Dear Mr. Schmitt,
thank you very much
the

for

your

friendly
as

letter
were

25/VII1

of

and

ballads,

which were as

funny

they

sharp-witted,

of

for sending me Erich Strauss

(who is

he,

anyway?).2

Lines

such as

"Hylisch
are

verdreckt"3

chthonisch und
Morgenstern.4

{"Hylic,

chthonic and

filthy"}
as

worthy For me, it is


wars.

of a self-evident that revolutions

have become just

impossible

as

Both

are waged

precisely

by

states,

which no

longer

exist!

Revolutions, like wars, belong, in my opinion and in your terminology, not division, but to taking. And you will certainly agree, if I add, with Hegel, that taking is only political insofar as it takes place on the grounds of prestige
to
and

for

prestigious ends.

the slave capture in Africa

Otherwise surely even animals in the 19th century was also


"take"

could wage war and a war?

On the
vice

other

hand, Athens certainly did not have much to except for i.e. precisely prestige.
"hegemony,"

from Sparta (and

versa)

It

pleases

me, in any case, that I misunderstood


was

you

(for

which

I apologize,

however). It difference

of opinion

certainly between

the only point on which I believed there to be a


us.

recently in an automobile accident and am sitting with a broken arm in Paris, instead of being in Yugoslavia as I had anticipated. Thus it will please
was
me

very much to see your daughter. I am writing to her in this context. Mr. Fetscher writes me to say that you have recently spoken about many thanks!

me to

professors and students:

Faithfully, (s)
1. This letter is
missing.

2. "Erich

Strauss"

is Schmitt's

poetic pseudonym.

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


3. The ballads Schmitt
4. Christian
sent

105
p.

in the missing letter

fortunately

also appear

in Mohler, 1995,

192.

Morgenstern (1871-1914),

satirical poet and student of philosophy.

Plettenberg
14/XII 55 Dear Mr. Kojeve, for months since August
express

I have been wanting to

write to

you, just to

my

gratitude to you

for

having kindly

entertained

in Paris,

about which she wrote me an enthusiastic report.

my daughter, Anima, I have, however, been


again

frequently
which

distracted

the opportunity.

during these Certainly it is a


put

last months,

and

only today do I
has

find

question which

long

occupied me and

would

like to

to you, as an observant reader and one who has

worked

await your stood.

That it is in this capacity that I eagerly Hegel book and, at the same time, in a German edition, is under It would also interest me whether the translation by Dr. Fetscher is pro
well and

through your

"Introduction."

ceeding

if it

will appear soon.

Now my
ness,"

modest question:

it

concerns the concept of

enemy in Hegel,

and

particularly the word


p.

"enemy"

in the

section about the

"unhappy

conscious
Pretre1

Hoffmeister, p. 581 of your Introduction (Le Moine, Le {The Monk, The Priest}; what do the asterisks *** there mean??2). It has
with the expression: the

168 in

to do

enemy in his

most characteristic
form.3

[eigensten]
enemy?

(a few

lines later: in his typical


possible

[eigentumlichen])

Who is this

is it

that he shows himself precisely in the animal functions? What does he


Salus,"4

seek there?

In my booklet "Ex Captivitate on "enemy," a verse (from Theodor Daubler5) is

page

89/90 in

a remark about the

quoted:

The enemy is To this verse,


An important
section:

our own question a gifted

in form.
who was at
no

German6

said to me recently:

young The USA has

enemy because it has

Harvard for three years, no form [Gestalt]. 89/90 (in the


you own the
me

problem.

Wisdom

of

May I ask you to try to the Cell) once attentively?


will

read those pages

I do

not

know if

booklet Ex Captivitate Salus. If not, it it to you immediately.

be

a special

delight for

to send

It is generally as with the question of the possibility of a the system of Hegelian philosophy the question whether there
emy"

"dictatorship"

in

can

be

an

"en

in Hegel
and

at all.

For:

either

he is only
animal

or

invalid
be

insubstantial. Of the
which

necessary passing stage of negation, functions, it means (p. 168) that they for
itself."

would

"something

is invalid in

and

would

be sincerely

grateful

for

line

on this

theme,

while

am not

impa

tient, for I know that Faithfully,

you are occupied with much work.

(s)

106

Interpretation
the

Recently

book

by

appeared about

Hegel's
it to

Nuremberg (and social-democratic) editor, Beyer, time in Bamberg as an editor; biographical, under the
a
Logik"7

title "Zwischen Phanomenologie und

(Hegel

as

"coward"). If it interests

you, I

will send

you.

these are Kojeve's own titles for these paragraphs, which appear in Monk, The 225 and 226, respectively, of Miller's translation of the Phenomenology (Hegel, 1977). 2. The passage cited (Kojeve, 1958, p. 583) is not part of Kojeve's Introduction proper, but an appendix to it, showing his schema of the structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The aster

1. "The

Priest,"

isks

are part of Kojeve's numbering system. 3. See Hegel. 1977, 223 and 225; Miller translates both terms 4. Schmitt, 1950.

"characteristic."

as

poet. His most famous work, Das Nordlicht (1910), a poem lines, was much revised during his lifetime. Schmitt's fascination with Nordlicht went back to 1912; in 1916 he published a commentary on the poem (Schmitt, 1991). 6. According to Tommissen, this is Hans-Joachim Arndt, later professor of political science in

5. Theodor Daubler (1876-1934),

of

30,000

Heidelberg. Amdt in 1948.


Taubes'

met

Jacob Taubes (see

note

3 to Kojeve's letter

of

description

of the encounter appears

in Taubes (1987),

1 l/VII/55 above) at Harvard p. 23 and pp. 67-68.

7. Beyer, 1955.

Paris, 4/1 56
Dear Mr. Schmitt,
thank you very much for your
reply:

letter

of

14/XII

and please

forgive

the

late

I was,

until

recently,

in

Tunis because

of the negotiations about the cus


now

toms union (which turned out very well). And

it is

about you

Morocco.

Before I

answer your

letter, I

would

like to

wish

a good new year.

Perhaps

have the opportunity to meet personally? Of the publication of the German edition of my old book I know
we will not

nothing:

Dr. Fetscher has

written me
overcome.
.

in

long

time.

I do

not

even

know if

all

difficulties have been The


old

precise about a a

not know anything book is concerned, it is still always project. I have certainly written about a thousand pages, but all of this is only Anyway, for six months I have no longer worked on "preparatory

book is

also to

appear

in America, but I do
as the

that either. And as

far

exercise."

it:

no time.

Still, I
know

think about it

now and again and matters are

gradually becom
read

ing

clearer.
not

I do

your

"Ex

salus"

captivitate

and would

like to

it, like

everything The book


do
not want

that

flows from

your pen.

about

Hegel's time in

Bamberg

would also

to burden you with it. I will

surely have the opportunity to

interest me, but I really see it

here

somewhere.

Now,
The

the enemy question:

"enemy

in his

characteristic

form"

is certainly the devil,

more

precisely

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


the

107

Christian devil,
or man

who also appears


are

in the "animal
"invalid"

functions."

For Hegel ("for


them,
and

us"

"in itself") these functions


and not

because

man negates

is only
slave

just

an animal
religious

as this negation alone.

"unhappy
reality One The

consciousness"

(i.e.

man,

more

before death
and

and the risk of

life in the

struggle

precisely for recognition (his human


what

For, while the Christ) appears as


is
animal

honor)
thus

and avoids the

struggle, "for

itself"

is

not

"invalid"

but powerful, i.e.

"diabolical."

can real

say

the following:

body

and

enemy is the enemy to the death: he can kill and be killed, is thus If one is prepared to kill him (i.e. if one is thus, if one likes,
"form."

prepared

to risk one's own


as

life),

then the

enemy is
one

"invalid"

[nichtig]

and can

(at least
"slave"

enemy) be destroyed.
"diabolical"

If, however,
not

is

afraid of

the enemy, then


and one

he becomes

and

thus "powerful": he is the

"master"

is his

(at least insofar


can

as one

does

flee from him into "another


all,"

world").

"Whether there
and

be

an

enemy in Hegel

at

you ask.

As

always:

Yes

No. insofar
as. and as

Yes,
tory.

World

history

is the

long as there is a struggle for recognition, i.e. his history of enmity between peoples (which does not
"fight"

exist at all

No,
of the

among insofar as

animals: animals

for something,

not out

of

enmity).

and as soon as

history

(= struggle

for recognition) has been


"moment"

"sublated"

"Logic,"

in Absolute Knowledge. Thus enmity is, after all, only a i.e. of human speech. The fulfilled reason of the wise
also speaks

man

(of

Absolute

Knowledge)

(in the Phen.

of

S.)

about

the

but the

of enmity, differently: enmity is sublated, i.e. destroyed, in


wise

man never speaks out

nor to enemies.
mutual

(past) enmity, Or, expressed


also preserved

recognition; but one can

only really (sublated) in


500

recognize

[former]

enemy,

so that the

enmity is

the recognition, although


us this

in

a sublimated

(sublated) form.
oneself, if in about
will still

Hegel takes

far. Now

one could perhaps ask

years the speech of the wise man

(Hegel)

about

enmity

be

under
"state,"

stood.
"war,"

Already today
"history"

mean.

only Most

few
are

"enemy,"

understand what
"against"

the words

all this and

in this

understand, to a certain extent, what


one will perhaps no
no

it

means.

But if

all this

they still really disappears,


respect

longer

understand what

that

meant.

Then there

will also

be

Hegelian

"wisdom."

And

as

long

as enmity still exists, there is still a wisdom


"for"
"against,"

"about"

in Hegel's something

sense.
.

For then

one speaks

only

or

and

only

with

my best wishes,

Faithfully,

(s)

108

Interpretation

Plettenberg
1 1/5/56 Dear Mr. Kojeve,
"Hegelian"

I certainly
of

understand

your

language

and

there

is, for

me, no

greater satisfaction

than to read your


grateful to you

explanations about

Hamlet in

your

letter

5/5

'

am

eternally

for it,

as well as

for

the passage on p. 253


and meditated.

of your

Introduction,
a

a passage which

I have

long

known

But I

am still not clear about

the tragic in Hegel.

is only
take

lecture,

which

had

a particular

My small essay "Hamlet or theme (Hamlet = James, i.e. the intru


as content.

Hekuba"2

sion of the

historical

present of

1600 in the play) Please

I did

not want

to

up the
at the

general problem

of the tragic
state.

in the lecture. I did, however


note

in

Excursus 2

want

to speak of the

the passage on p.

65, lines
to the

6-12

top in the book "Hamlet


after

or
of

Hekuba"! The

state puts an end

hero-tragedy
the addition

in Lasson3), 359
an

218; Hegel; Philosophy on barbarism; in 218 it says: "In


and at
ancients"

Right 93

93 (hero-W:
the time of

heroes (see the tragedies

of the

etc.

Shakespeare is thus

still

barbaric.
an obvi

Nonetheless, is Hamlet
ous way:

"intellectual"? I find that the play is


to the

split

in

Part I
ballad

a street

(including up [Moritat]. Only

death

of

Polonius) is
without

a revenge

play, Part

in Part I does the father's


a

ghost appear.

What
no

does that longer


reality.

mean?

In Part 2 he has disappeared

trace, is simply

mentioned.

The tragic thing does not lie in the play, but outside it, in It is splendid that you say: James 1 only died a natural
"coincidentally"

death. Correct.

I do
express

not want

to write more

healthy
a

my best wishes for your distresses me very much. I had attempted, for several weeks, to organize lecture for you at the Rhein-Ruhr Club in Dusseldorf. This club not to be
the heavy-industrial
and

today, but to thank you for your letter and to health. The notification that you are not feeling

confused with mid-sized

Industrie Club in Dusseldorf


entrepreneurs as
Briining4

has mainly

industry

independent
which,
e.g.

and a good platform, of

members, is very exclusive (the former Reich Chancellor, now

in the USA), Carlo


made

Schmid5

(my

namesake,

a social

democrat)
you

and others

have
to

use.
a

The Club has

asked me

to ask you

if

would

be

prepared

deliver
oped

lecture (with discussion),


or another

perhaps about

the problem of the underdevel

regions6

consider

it

or

is it

pointless

(not purely philosophical) theme. Would you really to pursue this idea: please write me that in all
me

openness and sincerity.

For

it

would

be
you

a particular

joy

to

procure a platform

(if also a modest one) in the possibility of

Germany

for

in this way,

and

for

me

personally,

getting

to know you and to

have

discussion

with you.

Please forgive this

attempt to see you

personally; it stems from a

lively
your

wish

to thank you personally and to continue our


endeavor

discussion;
and

there

is,

moreover, the

to make your name known in


scholastic

Germany

to

introduce

Hegel
or

interpretation to the
at

mediocrity

of the modern

university business,
would perhaps stir

least to

make an attempt at

it. A lecture in Dusseldorf

up

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


more attention under

109

than

lecture in

the aegis of

"cultural

exchange"

university city, which today stand together and have become hotbeds of conformity
it
suits you

without

ideas.

So

will you send me a word about whether


perhaps

if I

pursue

the

Dussel

dorf plan,

for this fall

or winter?

Yours sincerely,

(s)
Hamlet is
at
"play,"

jeu {game},

street

ballad,
.

on the edge of comedy, except

both intrusion

points

[Einbruch-Stellen]

This letter is

missing.

2.

Schmitt, 1956. 3. Hegel, 1921. In

the passage at

93, Hegel
ethical

considers

hero-law

as possible

nature, i.e. where there are no


critical moment of action

existing
and

institutions. Schmitt

was

only in the state of particularly interested in the

which precedes and grounds these

between

Verfassung (constitution)

institutions, and thus differentiated Verfassungsgesetz (constitutional law), and the corresponding
Gewalt
the power which cre
pp.

powers of verfassunggebende ates a

Gewalt

and verfassungsgesetzgebende

constitution, and which issues constitutional

laws,

respectively.

See Schmitt (1965),

75

ff.

and

98. The full

sentence at

the citizens did not


one which

"In heroic times, as feel themselves injured by wrongs which


reads,

218

we see

in the tragedy

of the ancients,

members of

the royal houses did to


Realm,"

another"

beyond."

(Hegel, 1967, p. 140). Section 359 appears under the heading "The Germanic is, in Hegel's descriptions, divided into two realms, one mundane, and the other "a world Before the advent of the state (360), both are externally barbaric (pp. 222-23).

of

4. Heinrich

Briining (1885-1970)
1930 to 1932,
to
when

was

leader

of the

Catholic Center
von

Party,

and

Chancellor

of

Germany from

he

was replaced

by

Franz

Papen (1879-1969). He

escaped

to the United States in 1934 and held an

appointment at

Harvard

1951, he returned nes, 1999, p. 14).


Baudelaire into

Germany,

where

he taught

political science at

University from 1937 to 1952. In the University of Cologne (Manpolitical

5. Carlo Schmid (1896-1979), German

professor

of

law

and

science, translator of

German,

and, from

1949-1972,

sitting

member of

the

Social Democratic

Party

in

Germany.
regions"

6. "Underdeveloped

appears

here in English.

Paris, 21/5 56
Dear Professor,
thank
you

very

much

for

your club.

friendly
In

letter

of

11/V,
be

as

well

as

for the

invitation of lecture there. Because I am, however, ill for the moment, I cannot, unfortu could foresee something for January nately, promise anything firm. Perhaps one
principle

the Dusseldorf

would

pleased

to give a

or

February
The

1957?
seems to me
"Hegelian"

theme: "underdeveloped

to be very

good.

On

this

occasion

could perhaps also make

known:

what was

the

proletariat

developed"2

in the 20th,

with

my in the 19th century has become the "under as theory and everything that follows from that,

interpretation

of

Marx

practice.

110-

Interpretation

On the tragedy problem in Hegel: 1. I believe that Hegel himself did not
Yet I believe that my interpretation is 2. If I understand Hegel correctly,
geois
as

see the

"tragedy

of the

intellectuals."

"orthodox."

a citizen

is de facto,

also always a
prehistory):

bour
either state

(the

"master"

real

[Herr]

belongs in the (rich

"mythical"

"aristocrat"

"bourgeois"

or as actual

or poor).

If it is so, then the

"struggle for recognition) in the puts an end to the tragedy: precisely because there is no "actual state (more precisely: because the "real can however only be deathreplaces the
masters"

(= each actual state where the

"authority"

master"

worthy
people

criminals).

agree with

this. Yet

I believe that there


who are not are

are

(or

can

be)

in the

state

(and thanks to the state)

"bourgeois,"

on the

simple grounds

that

they

are not citizens.

These

(and monks??) who live (or at least would mune") Republique des Lettres. And in this 3. Your interpretation
with

precisely the like to live) in an autonomous ("im


republic

"intellectuals"

there are also tragedies.

of tragedy (as "history") is, in my opinion, certainly Hegelian (somewhat "Marxist") interpretation. Roughly thus: there is also an actual "struggle for in the state. Not only between individuals, but between (to speak with Marx). Thus there compatible

the

recognition"

"classes"

are also

"tragic historical
are not

situations."

Only Hegel

and

Marx

would notice that

these

"situations"

(i.e.

more

absolutely tragic, for there is precisely bloody) escape from them.

always a

revolutionary

Faithfully, (s)
1. In English. 2. In English.

Vanves, 30/XI 56
Dear Professor,

lately

you

had the kindness to


you

plan a

lecture for
could

me

in Dusseldorf. In the

meantime, as
acceptance.

know, I

was

ill. Thus I

Now it

appears

that I will be coming,

unfortunately not give a firm for several weeks, to see


this occasion. Perhaps that
would suit me

friends in Germany, in January 1957. I would be very happy if I could


could well

meet you on

be

combined with the could

lecture in Dusseldorf? It

particularly

if I

hold this lecture between the 10th

and

the 20th of January.

With many thanks in advance,

faithfully,

(s)

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism

-111

5/12 56 Dear Mr. Kojeve, I am very happy


that you are
personally.

about your

letter

of

30/XI; first

of all

because

of the news
you

healthy

again,

and

secondly

at the prospect

getting to know
on the

am available to you
a

during
at the

all of

January 1957; only


like.

evening
can also

of

January

21st I have

lecture

Technical College in Aachen. I is difficult to


in the

come, at

any time, to Dusseldorf,


of small steel

or wherever you would and

Plettenberg

is

dreadful hole analogy


a

industry
refuge

reach

winter: the

with

Machiavelli's

in San Casciano does not, unfortunately,

ex

tend to the

beauty

of the landscape. Therefore it is more practical

if

we meet

in

larger

city.
communicated with

I have

the Rhein-Ruhr-Club. Due to the break in discus

sions over the summer


can still

it is

uncertain whether a

lecture for the

middle of

January

be successfully organized. Time is a little bit tight, because the winter program has already been established. Still, I want to do my best. I will keep
you posted about

it. If I

can

be

useful to you

in any

other

way for

your

journey

to

Germany, it will be Sincerely, (s)

a genuine pleasure.

Plettenberg (Westphalia)
23/12 56

Dear Mr. Kojeve,


may I ask you, in haste, for some information regarding the planned lecture in Dusseldorf? The board of the Rhein-Ruhr-Club asked me to ask you about
the theme: could you link your ideas with a current theme: the Suez

Canal,

or

French

colonial

policy, or

something if the

of

the kind? The Club would like to hold


with the shortness of

the lecture
not enough

in the

middle of

January, but fears that,


if the lecture
share of
came

time,

listeners

will come

theme does not have


about.

a current aspect.

would

be eternally
the
am

happy
larger sending

Naturally, in
great

city

such as

Dusseldorf,
I
you

important listeners is in

demand;
previous

hence

our concern.

you as an example an

invitation to the

lecture. Could

immediately
in

send the

information

about yourself

(a few bio
the

graphical notes, as general

the accompanying sample) which will be

printed with

invitations?
give you

Please forgive the haste! I hope that


we meet

my best

wishes

for the coming

year and

in

January

in Dusseldorf!

Ever faithfully,

(s)

112

Interpretation
Vanves 24/XII 56

Dear Professor,

many thanks for

your

letter,

which

I have just

received.

Enclosed

some

bio

certainly be deleted. We previously considered the theme of "Underdeveloped does one say that in German, by the way?). It seems to me to be very Such as: The title could, nonetheless, be somewhat "spiced
graphical notes: some of these can
up."

Countries"1

(how

current.

The

problem of the underdeveloped

(?)

countries

[or (?)]

so-called

"colonial
"princi

ism"

[and the

"Euro-African"

idea].
careful and

Still, I
ples"

must, as a

bureaucrat, naturally be very


large
public.

deal

with

rather

than concrete questions.


put no value on a

Personally, I

But I

understand that the

Club

is interested in it.

In any case I thank you very much for your efforts in the matter. I will be extraordinarily happy to get to know you personally and to
with you.

speak

With best

wishes

for the New Year,

Faithfully,

(s)
PS: I
assume that the

Club

will cover the travel costs?

Or

what are the arrange

ments?

1. In

English; reading

"Underdeveloped"

where

Tommissen's

edition reads

"Unterdeveloped

"

Vanves, 23/1 57
Dear Professor, I would like to thank
you most

sincerely,

once

again,

for

the extremely

friendly

and nice reception


you

in Dusseldorf.
after all

I hope that
agreeable and

will

decide

to come to Paris. The city is really

beautiful.
power1

I
tion.

read

the booklet about

in the train

as

always, with

great satisfac

am

in full

agreement with the content.

On this
As far
refrain

occasion

would

like to

ask you to

convey to

your

daughter

the most

cordial greetings.
as the publication of

my lecture is concerned, I

must

unfortunately

from

doing

so

for

now: at

the urgent advice of my superiors! I hope that


Koch2

the

RR-Club
At the

will understand that.

same

time I am

writing to Mr.

to express my thanks and to

apologize.

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


With
respectful and

-113

friendly

greetings,

Faithfully, (s)
1.

Schmitt, 1954a. See

also note

6 to Schmitt's letter

of

7/6/55

above. acted as a at the

2. Then
counsel

Rhein-Ruhr-Club, Justus Koch (1891-1962) had for Paul Komer, Goring's permanent deputy, in the "Ministries
(Trials of War Criminals, 1997,
p.

president of the

defense

Case"

Nuremberg

Military Tribunals

10).

Plettenberg
Dear Mr. Kojeve,
many thanks for
that you
your

31/1 57

letter
to

of

23/1 ! For

me

it the

most

not regret your

trip

Dusseldorf. Once I disregard

the personal

important thing is benefit

I took from it myself, I must above all state that your name has now become effective for at least 20 young, intelligent Germans. That seems to me to be a
good result.

Besides, I hope

that you repeat this attempt

in

Germany
at

under

better
a

external conditions and

that this

Dusseldorf

experiment

did not,

least, have
articles

deterrent

effect.

I
it

can

hardly

open a

daily

newspaper without

immediately finding
German
public.

in

on the theme of your

lecture.

Perhaps, however,
today
with a

you also received an

impres
Schacht1

sion of the

difficulties

one encounters

Dr.

wrote me a

80th birthday. I
often makes

longer letter; he just travelled to Munich, where he celebrated his am sorry that he was not there, for despite his advanced age he very

interesting
whom

comments

in the discussion. Also Mr. Kaletsch

of

the

Flick

companies,2

met

the

following Friday,

was

sorry

not

to have

heard the lecture. He But I find,


the most
as

was occupied with the unfortunate

de Menthon

incident.3

I already said to you, that the young people who heard you were important. From my "Gesprach iiber die Macht und den Zugang zum
you

Machthaber"

will

have

understood

the hidden

pessimism which power

fills

me

towards everyone who


as

participates

in

power.

A friend in
and

is

friend

lost,4

it

goes

in the "Education I
would also
cannot

Adams,"5

of

Henry
add:
published

from the "Re-Education


is if
a

of

Carl

Schmitt"6

like to be

A foe in

power

foe

doubled.7

That the lecture For me, the


of

is

regrettable,

also understandable.

personal

meeting

with you remains a great moment of the autumn


"Introduction"

and my life. The reading of your because of it, a discussion of immediate liveliness.

of your

letters becomes,

I remain,
ever

with

best

greetings and

wishes,

sincerely faithfully,

(s)

114

Interpretation

Song

of the

old man

of the Mosel 1957

humanity is
the mosel is

now

being integrated being canalized


the chalice

the sacrament remains turned around the

laity

remains without

hidden

remains

the

dear

god
pot8

the whole world

becomes

melting

the automatic becomes global the

laity

takes veronal

Alexandre Kojeve
to commemorate the
over

discussion
in Dusseldorf

Palatinate
C.S.

wine

1. Hjalmar Schacht (1877-1970): Banker

and politician.

President

of the

Reichsbank (Imperial
resigned as

Bank)

1923-1930

and

1933-1939,
feud
with

member of

Hitler's

cabinet

1935-1943. He

finance
but
re

minister

in 1937

after a

Hermann

Goring (1893-1945)
1943. While he

over economic policy,

mained a cabinet minister without portfolio until

espoused the

Nuremberg Laws,

Schacht

opposed

the invasion of

Poland,

was

in

contact with resistance groups

and conspired

in the failed coup


at

attempt against

Hitler in

July

1944. He Schacht

was arrested and

from 1940 onward, imprisoned


the

for these

activities

Military

Tribunal

shortly afterward, but Nuremberg in 1946,

escaped execution. and

was tried

by

International
1954).

ultimately

cleared

(Fischer, 1995; Peterson,


Flick
tried in
slave one of

2. Konrad Kaletsch

(1898-1978)
and

was a

high-ranking

executive of the

companies

begin

ning in 1937. In 1947, he


not

five

other

Flick

executives were

three

Nuremberg
was

trials directed against corporations on charges of employing

Jewish

labor. Kaletsch

found

guilty, although three of his colleagues

(including
was.

Flick

president

Friedrich

Flick)

were con

victed and served prison time

(Jung, 1992).
incident
at

3. I

was unable to uncover what this

1984), France's chief prosecutor and justice minister for France's


4. "A friend in
power p.

the

Nuremberg
appears

trials

This is probably Francois de Menthon (1900in 1945-1946, as well as resistance leader

provisional government
lost"

from 1943-1945.

is

friend

here in English.

5. Adams, 1995, 6. In English.


7. "A foe in

107.
doubled"

power
pot"

is

foe

appears

here in English.

8.

"Melting

appears

here in English.

Vanves 12/11 57 Dear Professor,


thank you very much

for the amusing

poem.

Although

it

seems that the good

laity does

not even need

Veronal. I have
with
so-

recently
called

experienced

something completely
decide
on a

remarkable

in this field
it

"politicians."

Perhaps

you will

trip

to Paris after

all:

would make me

very

happy !
With
respectful

greetings,

Faithfully,

(s)

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism

-115

Paris 4/IV 60 Dear Professor!

Thank
which

you

very

much

for the

friendly

transmission

of

Tyrannei der

Werte,1

I,

as

always,

read with great

interest

and satisfaction.

I hope that

we will soon

have the opportunity to talk.

With

respectful

greetings,

Faithfully, (s)
1.

Schmitt, 1979.

Colonialism from

European Perspective

Alexandre Kojeve

Ladies

and

Gentlemen!
the

Before I begin my lecture, I would like to thank sincerely for the friendly invitation.
And then I
a

Rhein-Ruhr-Club

most

would also

like to

apologize

for my

poor

German. It is, however,


much to

joy

to give a lecture in

desired, and Finally, I


that
not

Hegel's language. But my German leaves therefore I must ask for a good deal of indulgence.
would

be

like to

repeat what

Mr. Koch already


which

said to you.

Namely,
former

opinion, everything as a French bureaucrat, but exclusively as private


Heidelberg].'

that is said here

is my

own

I present, throughout, [if


also as a

citizen

student at

would also

like to

remark

that in

ately want to avoid anything which be so. I intend radically to depoliticize


concept of so-called colonialism.

my lecture I very consciously and deliber is in any way political or could appear to
all the concepts

I discuss,
deal

above all the

Thus I

will examine and

with all problems

from

purely economic, exclusively


perspective.

political-economic

[national- okonomi-

schen]

The
this

"capitalism"

word

was coined

in the 19th century,

and

Karl Marx

gave

concept a

very

precise,

specifically

economic meaning.

Marx

understood

by

"capitalism"

an economic system characterized

by

the

following. First: the


the industrial

"capitalist"

economy is

an

industrialized

economy.

Second:

means of production

belong, in
"leading,"

this system, not to the

laboring

(with the

help

of these

means) majority

of the population,

physically but to a
so-

"guiding"

politically

as well as

economically
system

minority

or elite of

called capitalists.

Third: this

is

set

up

so that the

working majority, the

116-

Interpretation
"proletariat,"

so-called
ress of

industrialization,
progress of

derives absolutely no advantage from the technical prog of production. or, if you like, of the
"rationalization"

The
tivity"

as

industrial technology increased the labor yield, the "produc it is called today. It thus creates a surplus value from labor. This
was

"surplus
tained

value"

not,

however,

by

the

capitalist minority.

paid out to the working mass, but was re Thus the working majority of the population

remained, in spite of technical progress, at the same standard of

living,

which

was, moreover,

a minimum

for

subsistence and thus could

lowered. In contrast, technical


talist minority's

progress permitted a constant

absolutely not be increase in the capi

income.
income"

I say deliberately: "increase in and not in standard of living. For just as there is a minimum for subsistence, there is also a maximum for living

[Lebensmaximum]
And this

or, let us just say a

living

optimum which

is

not surpassed.

optimum had already been attained by the before industrialization. Marx called it very good, moreover,

"leading"

minority

long

and said so even

in his

scientific works.
a very tiny Almost everything was
part of

Thus, in fact only


sumed.

the capitalist surplus value was con


and

"invested"

thus served the further progress,


of

i.e. the

"perfection"

constant expansion and

[?]

industrialization Marx has in

or rational

ization

of the national economy.


as

However,
up
And
while

I have mentioned, the

"capitalism"

view was set

so that the

working majority absolutely did not profit from this progress. they did not become poorer in absolute terms (which was completely

impossible anyway), they did become so relatively: the difference between {their income and} the combined income of the elite became ever greater. From
this Marxist

theory

of capital

formation

and surplus

value, Marx him


well-known social was prophesied on surplus value

self and the so-called

Marxists
It

of the

19th century derived the

and political consequences. as a

The

so-called

"social

Revolution"

historical

necessity.

was said: capital

formation founded
"social

destroys the

social

equilibrium; the

entire system will thus collapse sooner or


revolution."

later. And this

violent collapse of capitalism was called

Now, it
erred.
tion."

can

be ascertained,

without

further ado,

that the

Marxist

soothsayers

For precisely in the really capitalist countries, there was no "social revolu [And today not a single serious person seriously asserts that there is still
such a revolution
no

any possibility for But while it is


possible to

in these countries.]
to

longer

possible

deny

these

interpret them falsely. One

could assert

facts seriously today, it is that Marx erred in his predic false. [And

tion because the theoretical


that was
asserted

foundations

of these predictions were

is

not

cause

actually very often.] But, in my opinion, such an interpretation false in itself, but also dangerous. For Marx erred, in fact, not be only he was theoretically wrong, but rather right.

about?

For how did this error, certainly generally recognized today, actually come It was not that there was no revolution in the West, although the capital-

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


ism Marx described
continued to exist there.
one

-117

It

was also not

because

of

this that

Marx erred, because (as

liked to

assert

ing

like the

capitalism

he described its

existed.

in the last century) absolutely noth In fact, Marx erred, first of all,
what

because in his time because this


dictions"

capitalism was

exactly

he

said

it was,

and

secondly,

capitalism resolved
and

economic

defects

or, if one

likes, "contra
but in

discovered

described

by
a

Marx. Namely, in the direction Marx


"dictatorial,"

himself indicated. To be sure, not in a peaceful and democratic way. Marx


and the

"revolutionary"

and

Marxists really

erred

in only

one

way.

They

assumed

that

shortsighted,2

capitalists were as the

exactly bourgeois political

as naive and

economists and

exactly intellectuals generally,

as unwise and

blind,

who

believed

Marxist theory in books of varying thickness. Now, had it really been so, Marx would certainly not have erred in this way. But it was, in fact, not this way. The capitalists published the books, sometimes even (as young students) read them, but they did exactly the
"anti-Marxist"

themselves to have

"refuted"

opposite of what could

be drawn from these books. Namely, they


capitalists saw
of

rebuilt capital

ism in

Marxist

way.

To
said

put

it briefly, the

exactly the

same

thing

as

Marx

saw and

[although

independently
progress,

him,

and with some

delay]. Namely, that

capi

talism can

neither

nor even
not

exist, if the "surplus

value"

produced

through industrial technologies is


and the

divided between the

capitalist

minority

working

majority.

In

other

words, the

post-Marxist capitalists under

stood that the modem,

highly

industrialized

capitalism of mass production not of the

only permits, but


standard of

also requires, a constant of the

increase in the income (and

working masses. And they behaved accordingly. In brief, the capitalists did exactly what they ought to have done according to Marxist theory in order to make the "social impossible, i.e. unnec

living)

revolution"

essary.

This

"Marxist"

reconstruction

of the

original

capitalism

was

accom

plished more or

less

anonymously.

But,

as always, there was a great we can

ideologue
was the

here,
were,

too. He was called


authentic

Henry

Ford. And thus 20th

say that Ford

only great, in
order to

Marxist

of the

century.

[All

other so-called theorists

"Romantics"

more or

less,

who, moreover, distorted the Marxist theories


economic sys

apply them to noncapitalist relations, i.e. precisely to tems Marx did not have in view.]

Nevertheless,

after

Ford

fully

consciously did

what advanced capitalists


came

had

already done before him, more or less unconsciously, along theorists who developed Fordist ideas under the name "Full
a

intellectual in

Employment,"3

learned language incomprehensible to

the average person; and

they

were so

successful

with

in this that it became really difficult to understand that it had to do Fordist ideas, which were properly Marxist and therefore, as soon as they
actually
refuted pseudo-Marxist theories. capitalism

were realized,

Be

that as

it may, the fact is that today, the


old-style

described

and criticized

by

Marx, i.e.

capitalism, which created

investment

capital

by

artifi-

118-

Interpretation
the income of the

working class to the minimum for subsistence, except for Soviet Russia. Where in any industrialized country if not it is, moreover, called [, but demonstrates the same sociopolitical (police-related on the one hand, and revolutionary on the

daily limiting
no

longer

exists

"socialism"

"communism"

other)

side effects as the

European

capitalism of the

19th

century.

In full

confor

mity with Marxist theory. For, from this theory's perspective, it does not matter whether the surplus value is invested by private individuals or state bureaucrats.
It is only important that the capital -forming surplus value is calculated the working masses are kept close to the minimum for subsistence.]
such that

II

Now, ladies
are

and

gentlemen, what

I have
will

said

is absolutely

not new.

[These
am

plainly truisms
about
"colonialism."

today.] And
more

speaking but

it. All the

certainly because my lecture is


and you

you

ask yourselves
not entitled

why I

"capitalism"'

Now, I have
ful
and

spoken about

Marx
if

Marxist capitalism, like

as well as

its

peace

democratic

"political,"

overcoming, because, in my
so

opin

ion,

this old-style capitalism

has

not

been

totally

and

finally
less
on

overcome as

appears at

first

glance.

Indeed,

not

only because it
under the

continues to exist
more

in Soviet

Russia (and in the


"socialism,"

so-called

satellites)

or

correct name

but

also

because it

unfortunately
today.

also

lives

in the

West,

where

it is

"colonialism"

also called

that was also

Marx himself, however, had only western Europe in mind. And in his time fully justified. It is less justified, however, that even today many him have
the same world view as an ancient
of
political economist might

of those who repeat or who criticize

Roman

have had. Except that the United States


terrarum"

North America

are also

included in this "orbis

{"earthly

globe"}.

In reality, however, after the 2nd World War in any case, the so-called "Western is absolutely no longer just European or Euro-American. It is also, and perhaps even predominantly, at least in the long term, African and
world"

Asian.

Now,

when this

World is looked

at as a

whole, i.e.

as

difficult to

see that the

Marxist definition
"necessarily."

of capitalism

this world, and indeed with all the consequences which


"actually,"

it really is, it is not is very well suited to follow i.e.


"logically,"

not

only
we see

but

also

Indeed,
longs to

that nowadays the most

important

means of production

be

a Euro- American

minority

which alone profits

from technological prog

ress, as it expands this minority's

income from

year to year, while the Afro-

Asian majority does not become poorer, to be sure, in an absolute sense (which is certainly physically impossible), but does become relatively more impover ished. At the same time, it is absolutely not true that this is a matter of two

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


economically divided
one, smaller
one part

-119

systems.

For there is

a vigorous economic

interaction be

tween Euro- America and Afro- Asia. But the system is constructed such that the

becomes

richer

every

year through

it,

while

the other, larger

absolutely In other words: in


"proletariat"

never raises
no

itself

above the absolute minimum except

for

subsistence.

industrialized country

for Russia

today is

there a

tion who

"capitalist"

in the Marxist sense, i.e. really poor classes of the popula can only just subsist and have no real affluence. [In the so-called countries everybody is, more or less, equally rich and not poor; for
relative, to be sure
then one

everybody there lives in


real world as a

affluence.] But if

one takes the

whole,

however,

immediately

sees a gigantic proletariat,

precisely in the true Marxist sense of this word. And because it has to do with an economic unit, i.e. an economic system, one can thus certainly say that there is
also a

"surplus

value"

in the Marxist

sense of the

term,

which

in its totality
pro

only reaches those duction. The way in


economic

countries

which, alone, govern the industrial means of

which this

"surplus

value"

is

obtained and retained

is, from

the
sur

perspective,

completely irrelevant. It is important only that this


to the capital accumulation in the industrialized
not

plus value contributes

countries.

And thus

one

can, although

calmly

and

confidently, nevertheless still say


"capitalist,"

that the modern

Western

economic system

is

also

completely

in the

Marxist but

sense of the word.


an

Nonetheless,
value

important difference,

not

only in the psychologico-political,


the country and that where
termino-

also in the economic respect, exists between the system where the surplus

is

extracted

from the working

masses within

this surplus value is taken in other countries. And this difference can be

logically fixed if the concepts capitalism, in the following way. By capitalism we


capitalism of the

socialism and colonialism are can understand the

defined is

classic, European
ex

19th century, i.e. the

system where the surplus value

tracted within the country and is invested

by

private persons.

By

socialism

(I

do

not mean the theoretical

socialism,

which existed nowhere

yet, but the

system

which

actually

exists

today in
in

the Sovietized countries),


which the surplus value,
where

by

Soviet
as

socialism will

be

understood that system

is, just

in capitalism,

raised within

the country, but

this surplus value

is invested

by

the state.

"colonialism"

Finally,
as not

the word
not

will

indicate

the system where the surplus

value,
raised

in capitalism, is
inside but

invested

by

the state, but privately, but where

it is

outside of the country.

These definitions

immediately indicate,
one understands

then, that

real

capitalism

does

not

exist anywhere anymore, as well as that colonialism

is

still related to

this van

ished
take a

capitalism. position

Thus

how it is that contemporary Marxists


analogous

on colonialism which

is

to that which

Marx took up

against classic capitalism.

On the

one

hand, they

establish that {the

difference}

between the Afro-Asian majority and the Euro-American


expanding; on the other

minority is constantly infer from this that this system, because of hand, they

120

Interpretation
collapse.

this lack of equilibrium, will

In addition, they assume, like Marx, that


will

they

are

the only ones to make these observations and to draw these conclusions
whereas the

from them,

and stupid as the capitalists were

present-day colonialists, in contrast, in Marx's day.


neo-Marxists could

be just

as

blind

Now,
at

were

it really thus, the


of

certainly be

correct

in their I said,

prediction

concerning
that

capitalism.

And it is for precisely this

reason that

beginning falsely the facts


the

my lecture,

that it would be extremely dangerous to interpret

Marx's

prediction with respect

to capitalism went wrong.


"contradiction"

[For

we saw that capitalism

did

not

collapse, although its

re

vealed

in the

In reality by because Western capitalism itself West, Marx


continued to exist.

there was no social revolution


eliminated

this contradiction, in
"economy"

in a reconstructing its way. And] From this historical fact one can logically draw only one conclusion: namely that, in order to prevent the collapse of colonialism, this
a peaceful,
"Fordist"

democratic way,

at

that,

while

colonialism will

have to be

reconstructed

in

a rational

way,

which

is

analogous

to the

way in

which the capitalists

before,

around and after

Ford

reconstructed

the old capitalism.

Ill

The

situation

is

quite peculiar

and, in a certain way, disturbing. In

old capital

ism,

the

"Marxist"

contradiction was
capitalists themselves.
Employment4

actually
and

and

by

"Fordist"

Only

after this

actively did the

overcome

in

practice

new scientific

theory

of so-called

Full

emerge, system, only

states, in

accordance with

the

already-

existing

economic

adjusted

later. In contemporary colonialism,


context of the

however,

the situation is perfectly reversed. There are already many good theo the problem

retical works about

(as, for

example, in the

United (such

Nations);
of the
whole

statements5

there are also positive governmental

and programs

as, for example) President Truman's famous "Point IV"6). But the

practitioners

economy take a reserved, even sceptical position and behave business has nothing to do with them, because it has to do with a

as

if the

so-called

political problem.

of the

Now it is certainly a political problem and perhaps even the political problem 20th century. But, as has been mentioned, I would like to disregard that And that
all the more

completely.

so,

since the problem

even, perhaps,

above all

an economic problem.

For,

to

put

is undoubtedly and it colloquially, i.e.

appropriately: poor clients are are

bad clients,
a

and

poor, i.e. bad, then the firm itself is


not when

if the majority of a firm's clients bad firm in any case, not a sound
order to avoid

one, but particularly


expand year.

the

firm, in

every bankrupt one fine day. [Expressed in


called the

And

not one person will


"nobler"

be

surprised

going bankrupt, if such a firm

must goes

language,

this simple assertion is

"law

[?]."

of

But it

remains true

today

nonetheless.]

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


really ask the nomically reconstructed in a
are

-121

Thus

one must

question today:

how

can colonialism

be

eco

"Fordist"

way, so to

speak?

On the face

of

it,

there

three conceivable methods, and all three have already been suggested.

First,
one can

one can work on the

famous "terms

trade."7

of

That is, in

good

German,

pay

more

veloped countries

for goods, i.e. mainly raw materials, produced by the underde than has been the case until now. The purpose is to stabilize

the prices of raw materials, and to do so at a level which not

only allows the exporting countries to live, and not only to live securely, but also to live continu ally better, just as the importing countries continually live better. In other words:
modern colonialism could
understand not

do the

same

thing

as old capitalism

did,

namely, to

that it

is

not

to pay as little as

possible

only politically, but also economically advantageous for labor, but as much as possible. That was the
agreements."8

real purpose of the much-discussed

"Commodity

Well, they

were

much discussed, anyway, and in many languages, too [: five months at the Havana conference of '47, four months in the GATT in Geneva in '54]. And all countries were

finally

ready for it. It

was

all the more pleasant when

it

was established that there countries who could

were underdeveloped people


not understand

in

the underdeveloped
produced

absolutely

why, for example, oil

in the Middle East


also

should cost almost

half

as much

less than

oil

in Texas. Or
raw materials

why, if there were a so-called world union, precisely these

for almost nothing at all, while industrial prices would change rela little. And so on. So, as has been mentioned, all countries were in agreement tively in Geneva. But: one country was against it and, what is more, on "principled
would go
grounds."

But that

was enough.

And thus nobody


principled

speaks about

it

for the
USA.

mo

more.9

ment

any from

For the only

Secondly,
value

one could proceed

country directly. One could, namely,


else

was called the

collect

the surplus

raw materials and

anything

colonial, as

before, but

not

invest it

countries

in the already industrialized and rich countries, but in the underdeveloped, poor in which the surplus value is being extracted anyway. And this could
something of the kind. This has also already been much discussed: for years, and "internation way, as it [Although not exactly as I have just done, but in a industrialized countries were to come to the aid of the underde meant that the were to be financed by an international investment in that veloped be done

by

world organizations suited

to it:

SUNFED,10

or

"noble"

ally."

ones,

they

institution. And then everybody


conferences)
without

was

finally
.

(I

mean after

years of studies and

exception

in

agreement

to

find,
so

altogether,

$250
But

the million, and to put it at the disposal of all

underdeveloped

countries.

the sum has still

not

been

found

And it is

still

being

spoken about

probably because it is in the United Nations!


not

very

small

Thirdly,
That is,
the one

one can proceed

directly,
as all

internationally, but nationally instead.


countries

a given

industrialized country
the right)

can extract the colonial surplus value with

(indeed,

hand,

industrialized

do nowadays, but
more

with the other

(thus the

left)

hand invest this

surplus

value, or even

than

1 22

Interpretation
one

that, in
be sure,

or more underdeveloped countries.

Now, if

such a

country really

invests the
no

entire surplus

value, or even

more

than that, in this way, one can, to


conventional sense.

longer

speak of colonialism
no

in the

For then

one

longer taking anything, and is even giving something. facto, And when the country in question spends far more than is collected by it, then it must even really be called anticolonialist.
is certainly, de
As far
as

namely by how high one


the

France

I know, this third method is applied by only two countries today, and by England. As far as France is concerned, no matter
calculates the extracted colonial surplus value to

be, i.e. including

markup for French goods, preferential tariffs, etc., nonetheless it emerges that, since the war, France invests five to six times more in its colonies and
former
And
colonies while

that about

than these colonies and ex-colonies supply in surplus value. I know the corresponding English figures less precisely, I do know the same is true for England.

To

summarize the

contemporary
of

situation

in the Western world,

one can

thus

say the following: First: the stronghold Second: England.


all

"principled"

colonialism
countries are

is in Washington;
except

industrialized

de facto

colonial

France

and

IV

I certainly do
been it
said should
was a

not need

to

bring

to anybody's attention that what has

just

be taken

cum grano salis

{with

a grain of salt}.

joke. But the

philosophers call such a

joke "Socratic

moreover, can be
meant

more or

less
one

successful).

In

other words:

Or, in German: (which, lecture is, at root, my


irony"

seriously way What is meant seriously is that the real problem is not political, but economic colonialism. For in
longer
exists at all.

and

is, in

"pedagogical."

or another,

of our time and of our world


general political colonialism under a

no

Only
even

"regime."

colonial

And

very few countries today are still if, because of these, local difficulties
a

truly

exist or could

arise, then the

whole

Western longer

world will

This

colonialism

is

no

a world problem.

nomic colonialism

is

a world problem and meant

certainly not be destroyed by them. In my opinion, however, eco a mortal danger.

What is

also

seriously

is that

not

only is it

possible

to conduct colo
countries

nialism without
less11

having

colonies, but that, in


are

fact,

all

industrialized

more or

alone

derive

advantage

unconsciously from technological

colonialist, in the
progress

sense that these countries richer

in that they become

every year, while the backward countries remain exactly as poor as before, and therefore become relatively poorer every year. What is seriously meant, finally, is that the problem cannot really be solved

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


as

123
colo

long

as the practitioners of economics continue to stand aside.


"Ford"

Modern

nialism requires a new collective needed

just

as

urgently
at

as the old capitalism


people

many Fords, for

who emerged

spontaneously

the time. I mean

who produced

a mass

market, which

they

created themselves

only

when

they increased
out

the wages, i.e. the production costs, for economic reasons, with
the state would

expecting that
of

only

create

this mass

market

for theoretical

or political reasons.

All

this seems to

me

to be the law of the contemporary world. In Greek:

the nomos of the

Western Earth.
one of the wittiest and most

I just read, in
division
to be

brilliant

essays that
roots:

I have

ever

read, that the ancient Greek nomos


and

develops from three Greeks did

from taking, from


seems to me
modem

from grazing, i.e. from


right.

use or consuming. not

And that

absolutely nomos also has a fourth,


socio-political ancient
great

But the

ancient

know that the


giving.

perhaps

central, root, namely


of the

This

root of the

and economic
maybe

law

modern

Western

world escaped the


and not a

Greeks:

Christian

power?

because they Who knows?

were a small

heathen people,

One thing I know for certain. Namely, that what has just been said is abso implicitly in lutely no criticism of Professor Carl Schmitt. For his
"division"

my "giving": if everything has already been taken, one can naturally I only wanted to point divide only if some give away what the others perhaps sounds out that, from the etymological perspective, the verb "to
cludes
give"

receive.12

better than the


we

verb

"to

take"

even

if it

means

practically the

same

thing! Thus

say, for example, that we pay our taxes ourselves,

and not

that

they

are

taken

away from us! And words have even final analysis,


after

a much man

the

all,

larger meaning than is normally believed. In is distinguished from animal by language. And
it is
not

precisely from this linguistic


ern world. as possible, was rechristened

perspective

going

at all well

for

our

West
little

The old, taking capitalism,

which gave the

domestic
after

masses as

"socialism"

in Russia (at least

it

was national

giving capitalism, which gives the domestic masses as has no name. At least, not insofar as it is giving. For And insofar as it is taking, even if only from abroad, it is called latest thing, I want to who does not know this name nowadays? But the very backward countries more than it takes say giving colonialism, which gives the anonymous. It is, to be sure, only a newborn child [thus small from them, is still accordance with the and weak, but is it not also unusually beautiful?]. But, in
ized). But
our modem,
still much as possible,
"colonialism."

modern

Christian custom,
a

a newborn child should

be baptized

and named

[And

that seems to be a good,

smart, custom.]
the nomos of the modern
an

But

named or unnamed

Western

world

is, for

me, undoubtedly

what

I have called, in
And because this

improvised

and

"living

colonialism

is

"law,"

thoroughly bad way, all industrialized

124

Interpretation
will,
sooner or

countries

later,

submit

to it: particularly,
to which

however,

those coun

tries which have no so-called

"colonies"

they

give

anything, and which

thus abandon themselves to the purest


over

form

of

taking

colonialism, and, more

normally

with an excellent conscience.

Were it really so, then it


the

would

be time to

ask oneself:

in

what

amount, in
made

which way, and to whom are the

legally-required disbursements to be

in

framework
So first

of

giving
How

colonialism?

would

just like to take up this That is


a

question

before I finish.
of all:
much should one pay? a position on

difficult

question and

would not

like to take

that generally. I can only remind that the

United

Nations'

experts calculated that the entire problem of the underdeveloped

countries could
cent of

be

solved

if

all the

developed

countries

invested

about or

per

their national revenue

in the backward
that 3

countries.

If

that

is true

not, I
would

do

not

know. [I do

know, however,
In

per cent

in the United States

mean a considerable amount.

western

Europe, too,
its

that would yield a

lot.]

But I know that,

independently
about

of the theoretical calculations mentioned,


per cent

France

has, in fact, invested


annually

of

national revenue
ruined

in its
.
.

colonies con

since the war.

Moreover,

without

being
purely

by

that

[But I

cede that the operative motives there were

of an economic

kind. At least

they were not always And, if one might


that

so,

and not everywhere.].

extrapolate

the French experience in this area, it appears


world as a whole could manage on
a

colonialism"

"giving

in the Western

$10 billion. That is certainly a burden, indeed French example shows that this burden is, by far, not
about

heavy

burden. But the

unbearable.

Secondly: How
speak about

should one give?

Now, I have
[I
would

neither

time nor the desire to


remark

Agreements.13

Commodity

only like to

sincerely

that I have never succeeded in


aversion.

understanding

the grounds

for

the American

But I

could also

Thus I personally tend, of course, to see a so-called prejudice in that. be wrong.] I must, however, confess that I think our American in
one

friends

are right

respect, namely that

Commodity
be

Agreements14

alone

cannot solve the entire problem.

Direct

contributions would

have to be
given

added

in

any

case.

And here the

question arises of what should

in this direct

manner.

To this, in fact, two very different


contributions
are

even, if

one

likes, contradictory

answers are given today.

The American direct


of consumer goods

consisted,

until

now, almost exclusively


Cocaand

[which

certainly absolutely
asserted].

Cola type,

as

is

sometimes

maliciously
not given

primarily of the In contrast, the French


not

English direct

contributions are

exclusively

on-the-spot

investments (in usually

which

consumer goods are not

only

away, but

are even

sold more

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


expensively than they
in

125

cost on the world market). respect the

[And I

would

like to remark,

passing, that in this

Anglo-French
methods

method

is

analogous to that

which

Russia is applying in China today.] It is difficult to say which of these two

is to be favored. For,

on the

hand, it is, psychologically, decidedly goods than to invest, particularly where


one

easier to give
we are

away

surplus consumer

dealing
give

with

investments in
than noth

competing firms. And it is

perhaps

better,

anyway, to

something

ing

at all.

But

on the other

hand, it

must not

be forgotten that the industrializa


a world-myth nowadays and

tion of the
until

backward

countries

has become
realized

that,

now, this myth is

being
I

in

a spectacular a

Western world, by
is hard to better!
see

which

mean

in China. From
which

long

it, but from India,


is just

is closer, it

one

way only way off, in Europe, it can already see it much

outside the

[Moreover,

I believe that the industrialization


as

of the

backward

countries

with gigantic populations production to raise the


nomic necessity.

buying

be necessary for mass necessary power of the domestic masses {; it} is an eco
as would

Thus I

must confess

that I personally greatly

favor

the English-

French

method of on-the-spot

investment to

the American method of

giving
on the

away readymade goods.] Thirdly: To whom should


one

one give?

hand,
Even

the

international

means of aid

For many is by far

reasons
not

I believe that,
preferable

the best one, and that, on to national


still

the other
aid.

hand,
on

a regional aid would

be, in itself, greatly

purely

economic grounds.

Namely

because there are,


are,

today,

actually
of

natural economic regions.

But these

regions

from
the

the perspective

recently became politically and economically reestablished. There we see, in contrast to the 200 million relatively industrialized Russians, about 700 million underdevel
oped

of

giving colonialism, not equal. Let us, to begin with, take the regions, which lie outside the Mongolian empire, first founded by Ghengis Kahn,

Western world,

and which

Asians. I

e.: each

ple on

his

shoulders

perhaps still not an

have to carry 3.5 peo for many decades. That is a heavy, very heavy burden. But unbearable burden [provided, however, that the Russians
would
course of police-supported consumer asceticism].

Russian

"underdeveloped"

continue to

follow the

Let
each

us then

look

at the

sterling

zone.

Here things look

much worse.

For here
on

Englishman

shoulders.

have to carry about 10 And that would be absolutely unbearable. In


would

"underdeveloped"

Asians

his

spite of the much-prized


"ascetic"

British

"austerity,"15

which
and which

is, however, decidedly less


seems that

than Soviet

socialism,
police

rests, moreover, on a pure

moral-religious and not on a

[polizeiliche]
colonialism

foundation. Thus it be
not

in this region, the future


Anglo-

giving

must

purely English, but Anglo-Saxon, i.e.


with

American.

If, however,
North
and at a per capita

one also adds

India,

Indonesia

and

Indo-China,

to the total

South American region,

burden

on

if only partially, in this way one arrives the Americains which is proportionately larger than is
even

126
the

Interpretation
on the

burden

Russians
national

run, the American

Chinese. Because however, in the very long product is becoming much higher than the Russian
of the

one, it

will thus
without

be

possible

for America to

attain of

decidedly
life"16

better

results

than

Russia

giving up the "American way


least,17

[,

which, moreover, is

"austerity,"

not a path of

to say nothing of "asceticism"].


the European region. Like the Mongolian one,

And now, last but

not

very old, history. For this region was once called the Imperium Romanum and economically preserved itself astonishingly viably and robustly. Indeed, modern historians have established that this economic re
this region also has an old,
gion would

have

preserved

itself, i.e.

reestablished

barian wars, if the Islamic

conquest of

the

itself, even despite the bar Mediterranean, which was the con
converted

necting link of one single economic world, had not between two worlds, so that for centuries it longer
but became
almost

it into

border
traffic,
time

served commercial

exclusively
meanwhile

a theater of

military

games. more at

But

people

have

become

more no

serious,

adult;
all.

and the

is certainly

not

far
and

off where

they

will

longer play

Thus

one can

confidently say that the economic conditions of the Medi terranean region's economic unity have been restored. And here one must say that, from the perspective of giving colonialism, this economic region is a region

certainly calmly

which

has been blessed

by

God. For

each

inhabitant

of the

industrialized

coun

tries

north of the

Mediterranean only
or even

needs

to look after one half of an inhabit

ant of

the backward southern and eastern countries of this region

in

order to

attain the

same,

better,

results as

anywhere else

in the

whole world.

And half

a man per

head is, for Europe,

no

burden

at

all, but instead

is,

so to which

speak, just stabilizing


nonetheless

ballast,

does

not make

known to be very useful, but itself felt directly.


which

is

well

Thus
giving

one

is

all the more astonished when one reads

in the

newspapers resources

that

colonialism

in the Mediterranean
resources could

must get

its financial
much

from

far

away.

For these

in fact be found

farther away, indeed.

For the

sums concerned, and which are spoken of, are


europeenne"

they

are really "a l'echelle likes to speak, rightly, of

relatively so small that {on the European scale}, even if one


"smallest"

"small"

or even

Europe, in

contrast to the

contemporary [These sums


at

superpowers. are all

the more natural when in this "small

Europe"

there are

least two
are

or

three countries which must notice that the high rate at which
wealthier

they

becoming

is economically destabilizing. Thus these


slowly,
and

countries

would

like to become

wealthier somewhat more

they
etc.

use

perfectly

adequate means

for

that: more

importing, reducing tariffs,


to improve life
France"

All

of this

is,

undoubtedly, very clever and even wise. But it should

perhaps not

be forgotten

that, in fact,

all these resources can serve

place where one

The really poor richer in this way. If nothing

by only a little in a [wie Gott in Frankreich] already lives "like God in members of the economic Mediterranean region will not become
more serious

than this is

done, if giving

colonial-

Discussion: Kojeve-Schmitt, Colonialism


ism is
will
not practiced as

127
clients

well, then the southern and eastern


poor

Mediterranean
bad
or even

remain,

as

before,

clients;

and that also means:

"danger

ous"

clients.]

I
that
an

must

I have

stop here! I have already spoken a lot, as well as long. And I notice not even begun my actual lecture. For what was just said was only
must summarize reads:

introduction to it.
Thus I The title

Colonialism from

my lecture very briefly. the European

perspective.

I
at

should thus

have

explained

how colonialism looks from this

perspective:

least in my

opinion.

Now, how does it look


In is the following:
be
a

to me? Or: how should

it, in my

opinion, look

in

reality?

other words: what should

it be?

My

answer

First: it

should not

taking but
be

colonialism.

[And it

would

good to

giving (if you like: a dividing, find a fitting name for it.]

or

sharing)

Secondly: it
on the spot.

should not give

away

readymade

goods, but invest productively

Thirdly:
(and

as

perhaps

really European giving colonialism it should cover the entire area only the area) which lies around the Mediterranean and which has

historically

proven

itself to be

a viable economic

region; an

area which

is, how

ever, nowadays only half-covered


colonialism.

in my view, adequately

by

French giving
of this

That

can suffice as an outline of


no more

theme, however, I have That for listeners, But I must


because they

time
so

my theme. For the actual execution and I'm very sorry for that!

all the more so as

I have,

far, only

stated mere truisms.

And that

is,

always somewhat
confess

disappointing. So I

must also apologize

for

that.

that I personally have a weakness

for truisms, precisely


not

are truths.

The original, however, if it is


sooner or

always runs the risk of

showing itself,
to
avoid

later,

perfectly brilliant, simply to be wrong.

And I absolutely

wanted

the risk of coming to Dusseldorf at the

friendly

invitation

of the

R-R Club, but stating something false.


appeared

1. Text in 2.

square

brackets

in the German text but

was omitted

from Kojeve's French

version of the text as published

Reading kurzsichtig
Employment"

in Commentaire (Kojeve, 1980 and 1999). where Tommissen's edition reads durzsichtig.
here in English.

3. In English.
4. "Full
appears
edition

5. In Tommissen's French
translation

these two words are


p.

illegible,

but they

appear

in Kojeve's

own

(Kojeve, 1999,

560).

6. In English.
7. In English. 8. In English. 9. Several commodity agreements were subsequently successfully but all called New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s,
constructed

under

the

so-

except

for the

rubber com

1996). agreement failed, mainly due to lack of political support (Gilbert, modity Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development was proposed by developing 10. The alternative to the World Bank, controlled by wealthy states, particularly the nations in 1952 as an

128

Interpretation
committee was

United States. A UN

formed

and recommended the

formation

of

SUNFED,

$250

million third-world capital

fund, in
with

1953. The third-world

states pressed

hard, but

the United States

ultimately
tion
run

prevailed offered

in 1959

its

compromise solution: the

International Development Associa

(IDA) by the World Bank (Nossiter, 1987, pp. 34-37; United Nations, 11. Reading weniger where Tommissen's edition reads eniger.
12. Schmitt takes up this
point

the third world loans on much easier terms than the

World Bank did, but

was

1953).

in

1959

essay:

"In

a world made

by

people

for

people

and

taking"

sometimes

unfortunately

also against people appears

man can give without

(Schmitt, 1995,

p.

583).

13.

Agreements"

14.

"Commodity "Commodity

here in English.
here in English.

Agreements"

appears

15. In English.

16. In English.
17. "Last but
least"

not

appears

here in English.

18. I.e. in luxury.

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Humblot, 1980. die Elemente, den Geist und die Aktualitat des Werks. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991. Gesprach iiber die Macht und den Zugang zum Machthaber; Gesprach iiber den Neuen Raum. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994. In Carl Schmitt: Staat, Grossraum, Nomos, edited by Gunter Maschke, pp. 573-91. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995.
Theodor Ddublers
"Nordlicht"

Legitimitat. Berlin: Duncker &


:

drei Studien

uber

"Nomos-Nahme-Name."

_.

_.

don:

University

The Concept of the Political. Translated of Chicago Press, 1996.


and

by

George Schwab. Chicago

and

Lon

Schmitt, Carl, Eberhard Jungel

Sepp

Schelz. Die Tyrannei der Werte,


the

edited

by Sepp

Schelz. Hamburg: Lutherisches


mann."

Verlagshaus, 1979.
United States: The Case
of

Schwab, George. "Carl Schmitt Hysteria in


am

Bill Scheuer
zum

In Politische Lageanalyse: Festschrift fur Hans-Joachim Arndt


15. Januar 1993,
"Kojeve."

70. Geb

urtstag by Bruchsal: San Casciano Verlag, 1993. In Schmittiana VI, Sombart, Nicolaus. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998.
edited

Volker Beismann

and

Markus Josef Klein.


64-74.

edited

by

Piet Tommissen,

pp.

Strauss, Leo. On Tyranny,


London:

ed.

Victor Gourevitch

and

Michael S. Roth. Chicago

and

University

of

Chicago

Press, 2000.

Taubes, Jacob. Ad Carl Schmitt: Gegenstrebige Fugung. Berlin: Merve Verlag, 1987. Tommissen, Piet. Schmittiana VI. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998.
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Tribunals No. 10, vol. 12. Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., 1997. United Nations Department
of
under

Control Council Law

Economic Affairs. Report

on a

Special United Nations

Fund for Economic Development. New York: United

Nations, 1953.

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