National Federation of Labor v. Eisma FACTS: Respondent Judge Carlito A.

Eisma who is a Regional Trial Court judge of Zamboanga City, denied a motion to dismiss filed by the National Federation of Labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union. It was an order that required the officers and members of the union to appear before the court to show cause why the said writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against them. The record discloses that the petitioner National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees of Zamboanga Wood Products,Inc. They also charged the respondent firm of underpayment of monthly living allowances. After a while a notice of strike came from the union alleging the illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca plus the other unfair labor practices. The strike began after 20days. It was contended that the acts were incidents of picketing and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter, not a court of first instance. ISSUE: Whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer Zamboanga Wood Products. HELD: Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. However, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority, which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)

minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt. Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code. Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant, found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to children. The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs. Note.- Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute. Words and phrases and clauses should not be studied in isolation or detached from the rest.(Aisporna vs. Court of Appeals, 113 scra 459) Carlo V. Gloria Arroyo vs. De Venecia Facts: Petitioners (Arroyo and other members of the House of representatives) filed a petition of certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of the imposition of sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarette (R.A. No. 8240). The respondents are Speaker of the House Jose De Venecia, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The petitioners are claiming that there are violations of the rules of the house which are constitutionally mandated and as such the violation is tantamount to a violation of the constitution. Following this logic, it is also being asserted that the said republic act is null and void by virtue of the wrong procedure by which it was passed. The petitioners specifically cited Article VI, Section 16 of the constitution which states that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings and that consequently, violation of the House rules is the violation of the constitution itself . The petitioners specified the irregularities in the procedure for the passage of the bill:

Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However,

1). There was no voting of yeas and nays, but the Chair simply asked for the approval of the motion to prevent Rep. Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum. 2). The chair ignored the question, What is that Mr. Speaker? and did not repeat Rep. Albano s motion to approve or ratify. 3). The chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano s motion and afterward declared the report approved? 4). The chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo s question. 5). Petitioners also charged that the session was hastily adjourned. The respondents, for their defence, asserted the principle of separation of powers, and the enrolled bill doctrine. They mainly argue, that the court is not the proper forum to argue procedural issues governing the congress. Secondly, they also argue that there is no justification to review the enrolled bill doctrine. Furthermore, according to the respondents, the procedures and its enforcement is only limited to the three readings of the bills in separate days and not on the conference committee. Lastly, the respondents referred to the journal entry. It is clear from the said journal that on the motion of Mr. Albano, no objection was made and as such, the conference committee report was approved. Issues: 1). Whether the procedural violation asserted by the petitioners constitute a constitutional violation. 2). Whether the alleged procedural violation a justiciable issue? 3). Whether the passage of the bill was railroaded? 4). Whether the passage of the enrolled bill is final? Held: The court dismissed the petition of certiorari and prohibition stating that entertaining the petition of the petitioners would be tantamount to an invasion of the duty of the legislative branch since it cannot allow the petitioners to use the courts as an arena for rematch where petitioners can find the remedy in their own department. On the issues raised concerning the petition, the court has these things to say: 1). No, it does not constitute a constitutional violation. What were violated were the internal rules of the house. Each house has its own internal rules in which it can change. Citing previous cases, the court was not allowed to interfere in procedural cases so as to respect the autonomy of the legal branch. A mere failure to conform to procedure will not invalidate proceedings when members agree to the measure.

2). No, it is not a justiciable issue. The court s function is merely to look or assess whether a branch of government has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jusrisdiction. In this case, there is no issue on jurisdiction, but only an issue of proper procedures. 3). No, the passage of the bill was not railroaded. The simultaneous talking of the chair and Rep. Arroyo resulted to misunderstanding. When Rep. Arroyo was about to make an objection, the approval of the conference committee report has already been declared. Furthermore, there is no need to restate the motion for approval, since there was already substantial compliance as evidenced by there being no objection when the chair asked for any objections. Lastly, in considering the fact of yeas and nays, it is only required in the first and third reading. As such, this procedure not being performed during the conference committee report is not a violation of any procedure. 4). Yes, it is final. The court even refused to look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the president contains provisions that were surreptitiously added. The enrolled bill is an established rule of evidence, and a public memorial of the most permanent character and as such, cannot be disputed. TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE GR. No. 115455 August 25, 1994 FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. Another contention is that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days, as required in the Constitution under Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) because the second and third readings were done on the same day. The President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent and the presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of the printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. ISSUE: WON RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution. HELD: 1)The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld

pending receipt of the House bill. 2) There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of bill and its distribution three days before its passage, but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days. The phrase except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: a) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and b) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. In other words, the unless clause must be read in relation to the except clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the except clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the unless clause (i.e. printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the very premise of the except clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED. Philippine Judges Association vs Prado Facts: The Philippine Judges Association petitioned against R.A 7354 Sec. 35 implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its circular no. 92-28 which withdraws the franking privileges for the judicial department (Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Registers of Deeds). The petitioners feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the RA, and that it is unconstitutional. Issues: R.A. 7354 is unconstitutional based on the following grounds: 1. The title of RA 7354 embraces more than one subject and it does not express its purposes. 2. The petitioners declared that the RA did not pass the required readings in both houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among its members its passage 3. The RA deprives the judicial department of equal rights. (equal protection clause)

Representatives. It was then presented and approved by President Cory Aquino. The court is bound by such assurance. The Supreme Court annul Sec 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec 1, of the Constitution Providing that no person shall be deprived of equal protection of laws . Accordingly the petition is partially GRANTED and Sec 35 of RA 7354 declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The franking privilege of the judicial department is therefore restored RIOFLORIDO, LEA ANGELICA R. PEOPLE VS. PURISIMA FACTS: These 26 petitions for review filed by People of the Philippines, represented respectively by the office of the city fiscal of Manila, the office of the provincial Fiscal of Samar, and the joined solicitor general, are consolidated in this one decision as they involve one basic question of law. These petitions and appeal involve three courts of first instance. Before those courts, information were filed charging the respective accused with ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON in violation of P.D. No.9 . An order quashing or dismissing the Information, on ground that the information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. no.9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. The information filed by the people That on the or about the 14 day of December, 1974, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly have in possession and under his custody and control one carving knife with blade, wherein the said accused carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in the connection therewith. (the other In formations are similarly worded) ISSUE: Whether or not the Information filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under P.D. No.9? Held: The information filed by people is insufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under P.D. No. 9. In this case there is an ambiguity in the presidential decree manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. In cases of Presidential Decrees, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and the spirit of law. Because of the problem of determining what
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Held: The Supreme Court sustain RA 7354 against the attacks that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribe procedure. They further rule that its adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. The Supreme Court stated that the bill was duly approved by the Senate and House of representatives. It was enrolled with the certification by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of

acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events which satisfy the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. It is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. No. 9 are those related to the desired result of proclamation 1081 and general orders nos. 6 and 7 refers to firearms and therefore no relevance to PD no. 9 (3) which refer to blunt or bladed weapons. The court ruled, in order to constitute a violation of P.D. 9 the two elements of carrying bladed or pointed weapons outside one s residence and of (1) carrying such a weapon (2) in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, lawless violence, chaos and the like must be present.

HELD: 1. Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads:

"The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos." When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation "other emoluments". This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments." "Emolument" as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites." It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. 2. Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states: No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. In the light of the history and analysis of RA 3836, it is deemed void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Republic Act No. 3836 is declared null and void, in so far as it refers to the retirement of Members of the Congress and the elected officials thereof, as being unconstitutional.

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. vs Gimenez No. L-23326 (December 18, 1965) FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 entitled insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary. ISSUE: 1. 2. 3. Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional. Whether or not RA 3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in Art VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. Whether or not the title of RA 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.

Lidasan vs. Comelec GR NO. L-280892 Petioner: BARA LIDASAN Respondent: COMELEC

FACTS: The Chief Executive signed the House Bill 1247 which is now known to be Republic Act 4790, An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur . Such new Municipality includes 21 barrios, 9 of which are from Lanao del Sur, and the other 12 are from Cotabato. (From Lanao: Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,Dagowan,Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung and From Cotabato: Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,Tangabao,Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamawakan). The Comelec, prompted by the coming election adopted the resolution which provides for the barrios that will be included in Lanao del Sur. Apprised by this happening, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to the Comelec that the said resolution be suspended until clarified by the correcting legislation. But the Comelec stood by its own interpretation, and declared that the RA 4790 should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. This events triggered the original action for certiorari and prohibition filed by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. Affected by the implementation of RA 4790, Lidasan now questions the constitutionality of the said Act. ISSUE: Is Republic Act 4790 valid considering that such Act creates a Municipality which includes barrios from another province. HELD: RA 4790 is declared NULL and VOID. 1.) Constitutional requirement no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill . This provision imposes limitations upon the legislative power. a.) Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogenous subjects. b.) The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. These were all not complied with because the title of the Act provides that it is An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur . The part which says in the Province of Lanao del Sur projects that it is just Lanao del Sur which is affected by the creation of Dianaton, where in truth it also affects barrios in two municipalities of Cotabato. Therefore, the Court finds the title deceptive for the Act has actually two purposes , and those are : 1.) to create the municipality of Dianaton allegedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. The title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. Thus, the limitations on the provision of one subject in a bill and the requirement as to the language of the bill were violated. Removal of the barrios of Cotabato included in the new municipality of Dianaton will not treat the defects of the Act and shall still render the Act unconstitutional because the valid part is not independent of the invalid portion.

Government of the Philippine Islands v. Municipality of Binalonan Case No. 117 G.R. No. L-8243 (December 24, 1915) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No. 44

FACTS: This is a registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands under Sec.61 of Act No. 926, seeking to compel the registration of all private property within a prescribed area in the municipality of Binalonan, Pangasinan on two parcels of land. Act No. 926 is not applicable to any other than public lands, or, at most, lands claimed by the Government. The Act does not touch upon the compulsory registration of private titles. Cadastral Act (No. 2259) authorizes the Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all owners and claimants of property within any area which has been regularly surveyed and platted under the procedure prescribed in the Act.Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 does not permit of similar proceedings. The title of the Public Land Act contains no mention of compulsory registration proceedings. No reference is made in Act No. 2259 to the repeal or amendment of Sec. 61 of Act No. 926.

ISSUE: Whether Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands.

HELD: Act No. 2259 was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of existing legislation on the same subject. The fact that the new Act does not expressly state that it amends or repeals Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 does not necessarily rebut this conclusion. NOTE: Guys alam ko nakakalito tong case, but I ll explain it in simple terms So ganito yan, diba inooblige na nung director of lands yung mga tao sa community nila na iregister yung private properties nila? Ang nangyari nagkaroon ng issue sa Sec 61 Act No. 926 to which he grounded his appeal. Whether Sec 61 Act No. 926 authorizes the compulsory registration of private titles or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands. So what happened was the Act was

considered insufficient because it did not provide the methods for the registration of lands. And this is where Act No. 2259 comes in. This Act was enacted to solve the many questions and difficulties arising under the old Act (Act No. 926), like yung specifying of procedures. Curative statute siya and from the word CURE, it cures the short-comings of the existing legislation on the same subject. It repeals the old law by implication. So even if the Act did not state that it repeals the existing statute (Act No 926) it already did by implication So ayun, sorry guys kung medyo Malabo pagkaka-explain ko. I tried. :( haha good luck sa atin!!! Cawaling Vs COMELEC Subject: Statutory Construction FACTS: On August 16, 2000, R.A. 8806 Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor was passed into law. A plebiscite on December 16, 2000 was conducted in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification, and was declared ratified and approved the next day. Petitioner invoked his right as resident and tax payer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon and filed a petition to declare R.A. 8806 unconstitutional on grounds that the plebiscite went beyond the 120-day period from its approval.[1] Petitioner filed another petition for prohibition, seeking to enjoin the further implementation for R.A. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending that: (1) the creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only a municipality or cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city and (2) RA.8806 violates the one subject-one bill when it (a) creates the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolishes of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8806 is constitutional. Whether or not the petitions were granted. HELD: The petitions were dismissed on grounds that every statute is presumed to be constitutional since it has gone under careful scrutiny to ensure its accordance with the Constitution. Merging of existing local governments into one is recognized under the Constitution given that it complies with the requirements in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, and R.A. 8806 complies with such requirements. It also embraces only one subject since the abolishment of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon is only the logical consequence of creating the City of Sorsogon. Furthermore, the Courts are allowed only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and may not annul an act of the political departments simply because they feel it is unwise or impractical. The argument of petitioner that there was no compelling reason for the merger since the Municipality of Sorsogon alone qualifies to be upgraded to a component city is a question of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. NOTES:

[1] First petition seemed irrelevant to StatCon since the issue was really just about a misunderstanding regarding the date of approval and when it actually took effect. R.A. 8806 was approved on August 16, but its publication was only completed on September 1 so it falls under the 120-day period. IN THE MATTER OF TH PETITIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF UNSUCCESFUL CANDIDATES OF 1949 TO 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL., PETITIONERS Facts: Regarding Republic Act No. 972 also known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 According the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar in order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, nwithout failing below 500 per cent in any subject. Nevertheless, considering the Post-War (World War II) difficulties and the varying degree of strictness in assessing the examination papers, the court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948 and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent. Issue: 1. Held: 1. RA No. 972 is Unconstitutional RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional. ____________________________________________ Republic Act No. 972 AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTYSIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HINDRED AND FIFTY FIVE Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine in Congress assembled: Section 1: Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twentyseven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972

any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hindred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, that for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considred as one and included as part of the next whole number; Section : Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent In any subject in any bar examinations after July fourth. Nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such a subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take. Section 3: This act shall take effect upon its approval.

2.

3.

Moral damages are explicitly authorized in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Good faith, however, is always presumed and any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to the acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith, with malice, or with ill motive. In the instant case, petitioners have failed to show malice or bad faith on the part of PNB in failing to render an accounting. Absent such showing, moral damages cannot be awarded. The power to declare law unconstitutional does not lie within the jurisdiction of the legislature but it lies with the courts. The settled rule of statutory construction is that repeals by implication are not favored.

US vs Pons Baliwag, United States vs. Pons G.R. No. L-11530, August 12, 1916 FACTS: Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914. HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

*Note: The Philippine Report of this case jumped from 588 to 597 and did not properly conclude the said case. 9 pages were missing from the book itself. Please refer to other cases citing the said case for further understanding. One citation can be found in the Agpalo book. (I don t know what page it is but It was cited there.) MIRASOL VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The challenged decision was reversed by the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. The Mirasol Planters had a business agreement that the present private respondent would shoulder the financing of the petitioners crops. However, the Mirasol group conveyed the real properties by way of dacion en pago to settle their balance on due given by the Private Respondent. The parties in this case had conflicts regarding with the collection of the unpaid balances that was left despite the dacion en pago payment of properties by the Mirasol group. The case was brought upon the Regional Trial Court, the order was rendered in favor of the present Petitioner requiring the Respondents to pay certain amount but not granting the whole prayer. However, not being satisfied with the previous judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, the present Petitioner filed an appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals for faulting the trial court for not nullifying the dacion en pago and the mortgage contracts and failure to award them the full money claims and damages sought from both PNB and PHILEX. The said Court reversed the Decision of the lower court. The petitioner filed an instant Motion for Reconsideration which was Denied. Hence, this present petition brought upon the Supreme Court. ISSUE: 1. 2. 3. RULING: 1. The petition was Denied and the Honorable Court Affirmed with the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Whether or not the Petition be granted. Whether or not the Court erred in not awarding damages to the petitioners. Whether or not the power to declare a law unconstitutional lies with the legislature.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

HELD:

RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners vs THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents FACTS: Petitioners, suing in their capacities as members of the House of Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters, are seeking the court to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy The aforementioned Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices, is a consolidation of the following bills originating from the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; and Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES carried out by the reconvened Bicameral Conference Committee formed to reconcile conflicting provisions of said bills, approved and certified, amidst expressed doubts and irregularities in the enactment procedure, by respondents Senate then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and by the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives Robert P. Nazareno, respectively, on February 7, 2001, and finally signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on February 12, 2001. And aforesaid petitioners come into Court: 1) alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title, and thus constitutes a proscribed rider,

2) asserting that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution for it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus: SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. 3) claiming that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law, as Sec. 16 of the law providing that This Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which requires publication of the law before it becomes effective, thus, in effect, urging the court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill, and 4) maintaining that the respondents, upon the petitioners belief that the repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed, have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy. ISSUES: 1) Do the petitioners have standing to sue? 2) Is Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 a rider provision? 3) Is Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 a contravention to the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution? 4) Should the entire law be declared null and void by reason of the irregularities that attended its enactment into law? 5) Is the effectivity clause valid? 6) Is the repeal of Sec. 67 in the Omnibus Election Code justified? HELD: 1) YES. Notwithstanding the requirement that a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and that the rationale in requiring such is to to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions , the overarching significance of the issue posed by the petitioners deriving its existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, justifies the Court s adoption of a liberal stance vis--vis the procedural matter on legal standing.

Moreover, the exceptional character of the situation, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, with the national elections being barely six months away, behooves the court to reinforce its stand. 2) NO. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. In addition, as the constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes only provide that such (1) be NOT so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation, (2) should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction[pertaining to the subject] and (3) be comprehensive enough to reasonably include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object, in order to (1) apprise the legislators and of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and (2) prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public, to require the repeal of Sec. 27 of the Code as made in Sec. 14 of RA 9006 expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content, which, as obviously put impractical. 3) NO. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. It is against (1) undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as (2) hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed. 4) NO. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. In the absence of violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals, the court has NO CONCERN over parliamentary rules and their observance. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. 5) NO. The Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effect immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon

approval, or on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended 6) YES. Congress is NOT precluded from repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. It may find it imperative to repeal a law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved. Moreover, the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute for that is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case. CASE DIGEST CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC (vs) GIMENEZ No. L- 13945 February 28, 1963 FACTS: On July 1, 1959, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued Circular No. 95 pursuant to the provision of republic Act No. 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law). Said Circular fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Later a memorandum was issued by the bank establishing the procedure for the exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said RA No. 2609. A manufacturer of synthetic resin glues, Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc., bought foreign exchange and paid the corresponding margin fee for the importation of urea & formaldehyde, which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues. Casco sought refund for the margin fee previously paid declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee voucher for the said refunds, however, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approval said vouchers upon the ground that exemption granted by the Monetary Board for the separate 1 importations of urea & formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of RA No.2609. Casco maintains that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in the provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde citing in support o his view the statements made on the floor of the Senate during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. ISSUE: 1. 2. HELD: Urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from law.

Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of aforesaid margin fee. Whether the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts.

Urea Formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde , as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde . Furthermore, the said enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts. The court cannot speculate if there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified and approved by the Congress and the President. If such really is the case, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation and not by judicial decree.

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. (Emphasis provided.)

Astorga v. Villegas April 30, 1974 Original action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory prohibitory injunction. Denied. Facts: House Bill No. 9266 which was filed in the House of Representatives passed on 3rd reading without amendments. It was sent to the Senate for concurrence and it was referred to the appropriate Senate Committee, which recommended approval with a minor amendment recommended by Senator Roxas. (instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter s incapacity to act as Mayor). When the bill was discussed on the Senate Floor, substantial amendments to Section 1 was introduced by Senator Tolentino, which amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that the House Bill had been passed by the Senate by the Senate with amendments. Attached was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas, and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. House of Representatives signified their approval. The printed copies were then certified and attested to by the Secretaries of Senate and House of representatives and the Senate President. The bill with the Roxas amendments were signed by the president of the Philippines and it was subsequently named RA 4065. It was later made public by Senator Tolentino that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed into law by the President was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate and approved on the Senate Floor. Senate President admitted the mistake in a letter to the President. As a result, the president sent a message to the presiding officer of both houses that he was officially withdrawing his signature from HB 9266. Mayor of Manila issued circulars ordering the disregard of the provisions of RA 4605. He also issued an order recalling 5 members of the city police who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under the authority of RA 4065. Vice Mayor Astorga filed this petition with the court. Respondents contend that RA 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.

Issues: 1. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill s due enactment. 2. WON RA 4065 can be considered as valid in the absence of the attestation required Held: 1. No. Senate President declared that his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. This declaration should be accorded greater respect than the attestation that it invalidated. Certification that was made by the presiding officer is merely a mode of authentication. The essential thing is the approval of congress and not the signature of the presiding officers. Function of attestation is not approval because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both houses. Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officer should sign the bill before it is submitted to the president. Rationale of the enrolled bill theory the signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the president of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the president, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. (Field vs. Clark) Enrolled bill theory based mainly on the respect due to coequal and independent departments which requires the judicial department to accept as having passed Congress, all bills authenticate in the manner stated. 2. No. Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but he argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting that it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all but would not affect the validity of the statute. The argument of the petitioner would limit the court s inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine within the bill had been duly enacted? In such case, the entry in the journal should be consulted. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the president and signed by him. Bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. VICTORIAS MILLING CO. INC. VS. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION 114 Phil 555 Petitioner: Victorias Milling Co. Inc. Respondents: Social Security Commission Ponente: J. Barrera FACTS: On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 stating: Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee s remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of Php 500 for any one month.

Victorias Milling Co. Inc. protested in writing, through counsel, against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 date October 7, 1957, expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers and employees respective monthly premium contributions. Said company also submitted their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words compensation , remuneration and wages . Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term compensation contained in Section 8(f) of R.A 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: (f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of Php 500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so. Republic Act 1792 changed the definition of compensation to: (f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of Php 500.00 received during the month. It became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of deletion or elimination of the provision that bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded or exempted from the definition of the term compensation . ISSUE: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act. HELD: No. Circular 22 was issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. Municipality of Malabang vs Benito Facts:

The municipality of Balabagan (Benigno and other officials as respondents) was once part of the municipality of Malabang, having been created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of then President Carlos P. Garcia. In relation with this, the petitioners (Municipality of Malabang) brought an action of prohibition nullifying E.O 386 and restraining the respondents of the municipality officers to perform their functions in their respective offices. Under the case of Pelaez where the ruling was binding stated that the President s power to create a new municipality under Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code is unconstitutional for it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and it affronts Sec. 10 (1) of Art VII of the Constitution limiting the power of the President over local governments to mere supervision and that it should be repealed by the subsequent adoption of the 1935 Constitution for it is utterly inconsistent and incompatible therewith. Respondents argued in their behalf that the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation, having been organized under the color of a statute before it was declared unconstitutional. It has been contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not as an individual. According to an article in the Yale Law Journal, it stated there as a requisite for the color of authority of a de facto municipal organization that (a) no de facto municipal corporation can exist where there is no de jure corporation authorized by any legislative fiat and (b) an unconstitutional law valid on its face has been upheld by the time of the courts or not yet declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or the constitution, therefore, there can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone. Executive Order 386, based on the rulings of Municipality of San Juan and Norton, created no office. However, the acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are not to say to be null because the E.O is in legal contemplation, as inoperative though it has never been passed. For the existence of executive order 386 is an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored. Hence, there is no basis that the invalidation of the executive order would have an effect on the acts done of the officers in reliance upon the validity of the creation of the municipality. Issues: 1) Whether the municipal of Balabagan is a de facto corporation, as based on the executive order 386, promulgated by the President. 2) Whether a statute can lend color of validity to an attempted organization of a municipality despite the fact that such statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional. Held: The petition was granted. Executive Order 386 is declared void for the reason that the Administrative Code that gives the President the power to create new municipalities is unconstitutional, for the power to create a new municipality is not within the delegated legislative power but entails a negation of bigger power to create a new municipality or barrio according to R.A 2370 (b) it is utterly inconsistent and incompatible with the present constitution. And the respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS 227 SCRA 509 Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines; The Solicitor General Respondents: Court of Appeals, Henrico Uvero, Et al.; Raymundo T. Nagrampa for private respondents

Ponente: J. Vitug FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned by the private respondents for the widening and concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section, Philippine-Japan Highway Loan (PJHL) road. Said private respondents demand that just compensation for the property should be based on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessors or the declared valuation by the owner, whichever is lower. The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals ruled for the private respondents. In Export Processing Zone Authority ( EPZA ) vs. Dulay, etc., et al., this Court declared Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree No. 1533, as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial prerogatives. ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question should only have prospective, not retroactive, application. HELD: A legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and legal purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if it had never existed. In this case, we refer to the law itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution. However, it may well be valid in its general import but invalid in its application to certain factual situations. An otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of contract. A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a decision. A situation that may aptly be described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further inquiry, let alone be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of a governing statute. The instant controversy however, is too far distant away from any of the above exceptional cases. To this day, the controversy between the petitioner and the private respondents on the issue of just compensation is still unresolved, partly attributable to the instant petition that has prevented the finality of the decision appealed from. In fine, we hold that the appellate court in this particular case committed no error in its appealed decision. Petition is DISMISSED. Note It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided (Union Carbide Labor Union VS. Union Carbide Philippines, Inc. 215 SCRA 554) Rutter VS Esteban 1953 Facts: On August 20, 1941, the plaintiff Royal L. Rutter sold to defendant Placido J. Esteban two parcels of land with an outright payment of half of its cost and two equal payments of the balance, on

or before August 7, 1942 and August 27,1942, with interest as a mode of payment. To secure the payment of said balance, a first mortgage over the same parcels of land has been constituted in favour of the plaintiff. The deed of sale having been registered, a new title was issued in favour of Esteban with the mortgage duly annotated on the back thereof. Esteban failed to pay the two instalments and its interest so on August 2, 1949, Rutter filed an appeal in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the balance with interest and attorney s fees specified in the contract. The defendant admitted to the accusations against him, but invoked in his defense, as a war sufferer, the moratorium clause embodied on Republic Act No. 342. Section 2 of the said R.A. provides that all debts and other monetary obligations contracted before December 8, 1941, any provision in the contract creating the same or in any subsequent agreement affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding, shall not be due and demandable for a period of 8 years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission. Issue: Whether Republic Act No. 342 is constitutional. Held: It was declared that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 was unreasonable and oppressive and should be declared null and void and without effect being violative of the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts (Article III, section 1, Constitution of the Philippines) because the period granted to the debtor as a relief was found unwarranted by the contemplated emergency. Obligations had been pending since 1945 and would continue to be unenforceable during the 8 year period granted to pre-war debtors which means that the creditors would have to wait for at least 12 years before being paid of their investment dating as back as 1941. Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay the balance with interest and attorney s fees. Failure to pay will render the properties mortgaged to be sold at public auction and the proceeds applied to its payment in accordance with law. Tanada v. Tuvera GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446) Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court). Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause unless otherwise provided. Held: The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual

fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. Reasoning: The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

The effort of respondents to question the legal standing of petitioners also failed. The Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner s locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. In the case, petitioners pose issues which are significant to the people and which deserve the Court s forthright resolution. It is also contended that Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. The Court did not concur with this contention. The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The Court held that Sec. 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners also assail Sec. 15 of RA 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry for being violative of the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Congress expressly provided in RA 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Petitioners also argued that some provisions of RA 8180 violate Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution. Section 19, Art. XII of the Constitution espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution which cannot be violated by RA 8180. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. As the dominant players, they boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products therefore works to their immense benefit. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of RA 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost.

Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

Facts: The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180 entitiled the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996. Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy (2) Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the law (3) Whether or not Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 violates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution (4) Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power (5) Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition

Held: As to the first issue, judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void.

The most important question is whether the offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire RA 8180. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. RA 8180 contains a separability clause. The separability clause notwithstanding, the Court held that the offending provisions of RA 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of RA 8180. Congress could not have regulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces.

** As a general rule, exceptions will not be implied to the statues of limitations of criminal offenses. Respondents cite the provision of Sec.31 of the Revised Administrative Code which requires the filing of the information within 2 months/60 days from the date the crime was th discovered by the offended party. Since the 60 day or last day for the filing of the information in this case fell on a holiday, according to the respondents the law should allow the filing of charges to be done on the next succeeding business day. ISSUE: WON a Sunday or a legal holiday is a legal efficient cause which can interrupt the prescription of an offense. HELD: NO. The case is not dealing with a simple rule on when a pleading may be filed. The case at hand does not involve the simple issue of when to do an act. It deals with the prescription of a criminal action. Under unquestioned authorities, the question to be resolved is when the State is deemed to have lost or waived its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. The Rules contained in Sec. 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Sec. 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules do not apply to lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute those who committed a crime against it. If the last day of the prescriptive period falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the fiscal cannot file the information on the next following working days as the crime has already prescribed and it would tantamount to extending the prescriptive period fixed by law. -------Alalayan et al., vs. National Power Corporation

Yapdiangco vs. Buencamino FACTS: February 1, 1965, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed before the City Court an information for slight physical injuries committed by the petitioner, Rafael Yapdiangco, on December 2, 1964 against Mr. Ang Cho Ching. On September 10, 1965, the petitioner moved to repress the criminal prosecution on the ground that the information having been filed on the sixty days prescriptive period had already lapsed following the commission of the offense. Sep.14, 1965, the City Court of Quezon City denied the motion to repress stating that the th 60 day fell on a Sunday and considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a pleading falls on a Sunday, the same may be filed on the next succeeding business day, the action had not prescribed. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The latter dismissed the petition. The petitioner raised some assignments of errors: 1. 2. The lower Court erred in finding that Sunday is a legal efficient cause to interrupt prescription of an offense. The Lower Court erred in finding that the period fixed by law within which to commence criminal prosecution may legally be extended with the intervention of a Sunday or legal holiday. The Lower Court erred in denying the petition for Mandamus and preliminary injunction. ** Statutes of limitations in criminal cases differ from those in civil cases. The latter are statues of repose while the former create a bar to the prosecution.

Facts: It was started in the lower court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Power and Development Company, both franchise holders of NAPOCOR electric plants in Laguna, to test the validity of a section 2 of an amendatory act , empowering NAPOCOR in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder, thus, receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses. Hence, under such provisions, NAPOCOR could likewise renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric 3 power and energy, so that the provision of the Act could be given effect . This statutory provision

Section 3. REPUBLIC ACT No. 3043 AN ACT TO FURTHER AMEND COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED TWENTY, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED TWENTY-SIX HUNDRED AND FORTY-ONE. Section 3. The National Power Corporation is hereby authorized to represent and transact for the benefit and in behalf of the public consumers, and it shall in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder require as a condition that the franchise holder, if it receives at least fifty percent of its electric power and energy from the National Power Corporation, shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses. The National Power Corporation shall renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy, in order to give effect to the provisions hereof. In the event that the net
3

3.

assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be express in the title. Issue: Whether or not Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 3043 is a rider therefore unconstitutional. Held: According to the Supreme Court, it is not a rider, therefore Section 3 of R.A. 3043 is constitutional. As such, where the title is comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statutes seeks to effect without expressing each and every means necessary for its accomplishment, mere details need not be set forth. Congress is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The constitutional provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. If the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference is made to the legislation to be amended; there is no need to state the precise nature of the amendment.

profit as verified by the Public Service Commission should exceed the said twelve percent, the Public Service Commission shall order such excess to be returned pro rata to the customers either in cash or as credit for the future electric bills.