[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459 : October 14, 2003] th IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO H.

MEDIODEA, 12 Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo, Respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may -- without having to resign from their posts -- conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for and on their own behalf as plaintiffs or defendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff subjects the employee to administrative liability. The Case and the Facts th A Complaint[1] dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda Y. Maderada against Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea of the 12 Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo. In the Complaint, the judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law amounting to grave misconduct for failing to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in Civil Case No. 252.[2] th On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the 12 MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo -- presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an action for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages[3] covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Because complainant was the clerk of court in the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibited herself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge Tito Gustilo designated respondent judge to hear and decide the case. In an Order[4] dated September 13, 2001, respondent required the defendants in the civil case to show cause why the preliminary injunction should not be granted. Respondent judge scheduled the hearing on September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a Manifestation[5] on September 17, 2001, praying that they be given an additional period of ten days to file an answer. After the September 21 hearing, respondent reset the hearing to September 28, 2001.[6] Meanwhile, the defendants filed their Opposition[7] to complainants prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO. The September 28 hearing was held in abeyance after the defendants lawyer questioned the authority of complainant to appear on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.[8] Respondent gave the defendants ten days[9] to file a motion to disqualify complainant from appearing as counsel and thereafter to complainant to file her opposition thereto. In his Order[10] dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied the defendants Motion[11] to disqualify complainant from appearing on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff. Complainant filed a total of three Motions[12] praying for judgment to be rendered on the civil case. In an Order[13] dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied complainants Motions because of the pending hearing for the issuance of a restraining order and an injunction. He likewise denied the defendants Motion for extension of time to file an answer.[14] Complainant did not ask for a reconsideration of the denial of her Motion for Rendition of Judgment. In his Comment[15] on the Complaint, respondent contends that complainant filed a Petition for his inhibition after filing two administrative cases against him. He argues that the mere filing of administrative charges against judges is not a ground for disqualifying them from hearing cases. In the exercise of their discretion, however, they may voluntarily disqualify themselves. It is worth noting that respondent later inhibited himself from Civil Case No. 252. The case was then reassigned to Judge Loida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo. Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot be attributed to him, considering that he was mandated by law and the rules of procedure to pass upon every motion presented before him.[16] Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present evidence necessary for the immediate resolution of her prayer for preliminary injunction.[17] Moreover, she supposedly failed to exhaust the remedies available to her to question the validity of his Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to render a decision on the case.[18] Respondent likewise refutes complainants assertion that she appeared as counsel on her own behalf because she could not afford the services of a lawyer. Such claim was allegedly without basis, since her compensation and other benefits as clerk of court were more than enough to pay for the services of counsel.[19] He further alleges that she did not secure authority from this Court to appear as counsel, and that she failed to file her leave of absence every time she appeared in court.[20] Evaluation and Recommendation of the Court Administrator The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for in the Complaint should first be resolved before judgment should be rendered in the principal action. However, it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction should have been decided within 30 days from the filing thereof. It noted that both the motion for preliminary injunction and the principal action for forcible entry remained unresolved even after four months had already lapsed since the filing of Civil Case No. 252. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P1,000 with a stern warning that a similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.[21] It did not, however, find complainant completely faultless. It therefore undertook another round of investigation, the subject of which was complainants appearance in court as counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff without court authority.

According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must devote their full time to government service to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Although they are not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession, they should do so only with prior approval of this Court. The OCA added that [e]ngaging in any private business, vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court is tantamount to moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in office.[22] Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in the amount of P1,000 for appearing as counsel without authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely. The OCA also recommended that she be directed to file her application for leaves of absence on the days she had appeared in court to litigate her case. The Courts Ruling We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but modify the penalty to conform to the rules. Administrative Liability The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.[23] These actions are summary in nature, because they involve the disturbance of the social order, which should be restored as promptly as possible.[24] Designed as special civil actions, they are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure to disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of ordinary actions.[25]Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure that may cause unnecessary delays should be carefully avoided.[26] The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are designed to provide expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. Both are time procedures designed to bring immediate relief.[27] Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an action for forcible entry, parties are entitled to the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions or proceedings prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from doing a particular act or acts.[28] It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.[29] Since this remedy is granted prior to the judgment or final order, we agree with both the OCA and respondent that the prayer for preliminary injunction should first be resolved before the main case of forcible entry is decided. However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30 days from its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction -- The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff. A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (Italics ours) Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses the word shall to evince its mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the belief of respondent that since there was a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main case for forcible entry would have to wait until after he shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter how long it took. If that were so, then the main case would lose its summary nature. Respondent should have known that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lend itself to the summary nature of the main case. This is the very reason why the Rules of Court mandate that a preliminary injunction in a forcible entry case be decided within 30 days from its filing. Preliminary injunctions and TROs are extraordinary remedies provided by law for the speedy adjudication of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed party from further damage during the pendency of the original action. Time and time again, this Court has impressed upon judges the need to decide, promptly and judiciously, cases and other matters pending before their courts.[30] To a large extent, the publics faith and confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the judicious and prompt disposition of cases and undermined by any delay thereof.[31] Judges are thus enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically obliges judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Often have we ruled that their inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.[32]To avoid sanction, they should ask this Court for an extension and give their reasons for the delay. Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to rule on every motion, he cannot use this excuse to evade the clear command of the rule that cases should be decided within the prescribed period. This Court notes with concern the plethora of motions and pleadings filed in this case, which should have been tried under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Yet, even after four months had lapsed since the filing of the original Complaint for forcible entry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and the main case remained unresolved.

Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for deciding cases, judges should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in their sala.[33] They should not be at the mercy of the whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latters convenience that should be the primordial consideration, but the administration of justice.[34] To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the courts business promptly and to decide cases within the required period. They are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and duties. As held by this Court in Gallegov. Acting Judge Doronila:[35] We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a time when the clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose present leadership has launched an all-out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion and undue delay in the disposition of cases. Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and duties.[36] The prompt disposition of cases becomes even more pronounced when a municipal trial court is called upon to decide a case governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure. As eloquently put by Justice Jose C. Vitug, speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v. Judge Joven:[37] x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the first instance, a municipal trial court judge, more than any other colleague on the bench, is the immediate embodiment of how that trust is carried out. In the evolvement of the public perception on the judiciary, there can likely be no greater empirical data that influences it than the prompt and proper disposition of cases before the courts.[38] We have often held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against erring judges. Given the facts of this case, a fine of P10,000 is appropriate pursuant to current jurisprudence[39] and Rule 140.[40] As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA recommended that she be fined in the amount of P1,000 for supposedly engaging in a private vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court. The Office of the Court Administrator held that her appearance as counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, a species of malfeasance in office. Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation or profession when she appeared on her own behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the practice of law. We clarify. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from its commencement to its termination.[41] When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.[42] Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law.[43] One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.[44] The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly asattorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others.[45] Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows: x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.[46] (Citations omitted) Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law. Blacks Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as referring to the members of such a vocation.[47] In turn, vocation is defined as a persons regular calling or business; ones occupation or profession.[48] The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their own case in court. The right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from her. Her being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings in propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right cannot make one administratively liable. Thus, we need not go into a discussion of the Courts ruling in Cayetano v. Monsod[49] regarding the extent of the practice of law. However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated. Representing oneself is different from appearing on behalf of someone else.

The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not apply when a person is already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already defending the rights of another person when she appeared for her coplaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will not give complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter without permission from this Court. We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, even if we consider that this was the first time complainant appeared in court, that she appeared for her own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a fee. Again we should be reminded that everyone connected with an office that is charged with the dispensation of justice carries a heavy burden of responsibility.[50] Given these circumstances, the penalty of reprimand[51] is sufficient. This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that falls short of the exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its employees in order not to diminish the peoples faith in our justice system. But when the charge has no basis, it will not hesitate to shield the innocent court employee from any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes,[52] and that serves only to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.[53] WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby found GUILTY of gross inefficiency in failing to observe the reglementary periods in deciding cases, and is FINED in the amount of P10,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or of a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, Imelda Y. Maderada is hereby REPRIMANDED for appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without court authority and is likewise warned that a future similar act shall be sanctioned more severely. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur. [A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005] OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: This is a verified petition for disbarment[1] filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,[2] Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.[3] The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus: It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence.[4] The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter s co-accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondent s dismissal from service. On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent s dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition[5]claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents[6] in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent). In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order. [7] Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994. On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney [8] and that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession. [9]

In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law[10] and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor. Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter s co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainant s allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified. Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,[11] this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides: ORDER When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared. The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence vis--vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action.[12] On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner Fernandez s recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and recommendation.[13] The IBP Resolution states: Resolution No. XII-96-153 Adm. Case No. 4018 Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the aboveentitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation. Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors.[14] In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter[15] informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel[16] had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years. On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandez s Order dated 23 February 1996. Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondent s motion.[17] Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondent s motion for the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City.[18] On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondent s evidence.[19] This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides: RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case records of the aboveentitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board of Governors.[20] Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records.[21] Respondent insists that the investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96153 and Commissioner Fernandez s Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process. Complainant opposed[22] this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally,

complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter. In an Order dated 15 October 1999,[23] Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panel s order dated 4 August 1997.[24] Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading Atty. Mosib A. Bubong. On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit: RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice.[25] Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case.[26] Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of this case.[27] This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002.[28]According to Atty. Castillo After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City. WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date hereof. In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows: The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in: a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and, b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law. And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way, was filed against respondent s relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case. In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.[29] In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the aforequoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on respondent whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper. On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.[30] The issue thus posed for this Court s resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyer s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.[31] Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.[32]

Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,[33] we ordered the disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared [A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.[34] Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,[35] this Court found sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.[36] (Emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, respondent s grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads: Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. Respondent s conduct manifestly undermined the people s confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law. As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant s daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. [37] As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:[38] A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.[39] WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur. [A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005] OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: This is a verified petition for disbarment[1] filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged

respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan [2] Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the [3] Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent. The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus: It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence.[4] The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter s co-accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondent s dismissal from service. On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent s dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently [5] questioned said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that [6] respondents in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent). In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently [7] show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994. On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted [8] [9] with the duties of an attorney and that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession. In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name [10] of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor. Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the AntiSquatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter s co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainant s allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified. Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995, this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides: ORDER When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared. The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence vis--vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action.[12] On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner Fernandez s recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and recommendation.[13] The IBP Resolution states: Resolution No. XII-96-153
[11]

Adm. Case No. 4018 Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the aboveentitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation. Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence [14] in this case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors. In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter[15] informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline [16] (CBD) that the investigating panel had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years. On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandez s Order dated 23 February 1996. Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment on [17] respondent s motion. Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondent s motion for the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City.[18] On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the [19] referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondent s evidence. This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides: RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case records of the aboveentitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and [20] report the same to the Board of Governors. Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying that the [21] recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records. Respondent insists that the investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96153 and Commissioner Fernandez s Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process. Complainant opposed[22] this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter. In an Order dated 15 October 1999,[23] Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, [24] furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panel s order dated 4 August 1997. Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading Atty. Mosib A. Bubong. On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit: RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice.[25] Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was [26] requesting the withdrawal of this case. Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an

investigation of this case.[27] This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July [28] 2002. According to Atty. Castillo After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City. WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date hereof. In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows: The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in: a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and, b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law. And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way, was filed against respondent s relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case. In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.[29] In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on respondent whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper. On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.[30] The issue thus posed for this Court s resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyer s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.[31] Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.[32] Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, we ordered the disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared [A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.[34] Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,[35] this Court found sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a
[33]

high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is [36] burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. (Emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, respondent s grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads: Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. Respondent s conduct manifestly undermined the people s confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law. As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant s daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the [37] [38] same. As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos: A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and [39] has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991 FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent. PER CURIAM:p This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses: 1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested therein. 2. Conduct unbecoming of public official. 3. Dishonesty. 4. Extortion. 5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transaction before him. 6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)

As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent. Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions. Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives. On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him. The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece. Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours. On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that: ... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.) On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment. Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds. Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation. In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action. Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings. The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transactions before him. Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct. Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct. The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents, he continued with his inaction. The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the documents involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial. xxx xxx xxx

In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he neither touched nor received the money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so. ... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.) Secretary Ordoez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective immediately. As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo). Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent. The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67). As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said: A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character. Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.) The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103). A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.) This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278). The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred. WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. A.C. No. 6585 April 21, 2005

TOMAS B. YUMOL, JR., FELIX S. VENTIC, ELMER L. MANIEGO and JAKE M. MAGCALAS, Complainants, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR., Respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Tomas B. Yumol, Jr., Felix S. Ventic, Elmer L. Maniego and Jake Magcalas against Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., for grave misconduct. At all time material to the controversy, complainants were employees of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Atty. Yumol as Officer-in-Charge,1 Mr. Ventic, as Supervising Special Investigator, Mr. Maniego as Special Investigator III and Mr. Magcalas as Special Investigator I. Respondent Atty. Ferrer, Sr., held the position of Attorney IV, also of the Commission. On 17 September 2001, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy sought the assistance of the CHR for the alleged kidnapping of her child Jianzil Irish M. Dy by her husband, John Burt Dy, and the coercive act of the latter in the transfer of her account with the Porac Rural Bank. Acting on this, Atty. Ferrer, a Senior Legal Officer of the CHR, issued the two (2) Orders quoted below. The facts as above stated resulted in the heated altercation that took place on 28 September 2001 between respondent and one Mr. John Burt Dy, whereby the latter accused the CHR of conniving with his wife, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Dy, and of destroying his reputation and good name at the Porac Rural Bank. Atty. Yumol, being the OIC Head of the Office, asked Mr. Dy if he could substantiate his accusations. The latter showed him two (2) alleged Office Orders dated 18 and 19 September 2001, both signed by respondent. 2 The Order dated 18 September 2001, reads: Acting on the Complaint of Ma. CECILIA M. DY, and pursuant to the provision of the Family Code that children five (5) years and below should remain under the custody of the mother, in relation to the provisions of the Constitution vesting powers unto this Commission and in particular, Section 18, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the respondent is hereby ordered to give custody of JIANZIL IRISH M. DY to the maternal custody of the aforementioned mother. Wherefore, premises considered, pending investigation of the above-entitled case, the custody of JIANZIL IRISH M. DY is hereby awarded to the mother MA. CECILIA M. DY. SO ORDERED. City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 18, 2001. (SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO Senior Legal Counsel IV R. FERRER, SR.

The Order dated 19 September 2001,3 reads: Before this Commission is the Complaint filed by complainant wife for alleged kidnapping of her child Jianzil Irish M. Dy which happened last August 22, 2001 and the coercive mean (sic) of respondent JOHN BURT DY in the transfer of the complainant's cash deposit with the Porac Rural Bank. Finding the allegations to (sic) sufficiently established, custody of the child was awarded to the Complainant and properly executed with the aid [of] the Sangguniang Barangay of Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga and the elements of the Porac PNP. Likewise, we find that there had been coercion in the transfer of complainant (sic) deposit in bank, which was already effected by the aforementioned Rural Bank. NOW, THEREFORE, pending the final determination of this above-entitled case and by virtue of the powers and authority granted this Commission under Sec. 18, Article 13 of the Constitution, the Rural Bank of Porac is hereby ordered to reinstate the account of complainantMA. CECILIA M. DY. SO ORDERED. City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 19, 2001. (SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO Senior Legal Counsel IV R. FERRER, SR.

Complainants Yumol and Magcalas, together with their staff, witnessed the incident and were surprised to see the two (2) orders allegedly issued by respondent. Mr. Dy also informed Atty. Yumol that the two (2) orders were already enforced by respondent himself and his co-employees V. Rigor and E. Enolpe, Police Officer Larucom and the Barangay Captain of their place. 4 Concerned by the acts of respondent, Atty. Yumol tried to clarify the matter by writing a letter to the Bank Manager stating, thus: In reference to the order of Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., Attorney IV of this Regional Office, the undersigned would like to inform your good office that the Commission's participation on the matter is limited only to extend legal guidance/assistance considering that the disagreement of spouses John Burt Dy and Ma. Cecilia M. Dy is a family matter. Hence, you are being advised to disregard Atty. Ferrer's order dated September 19, 2001. Moreover, the said case is not officially docketed as part of Human Rights cases handled by the Commission. I hope this will clarify any misinterpretation of the Commission's mandate.

On 28 September 2001, Yumol required5 respondent to explain within seventy-two (72) hours the unauthorized issuance of the said Orders. It turned out later that respondent was engaged in private practice by handling private cases in courts and other quasi-judicial bodies as shown by the following pleadings: Pleadings Motion for Reconsideration in Sp. Proc. No. 01-01 Motion for Issuance of Mandatory Injunction Where Filed MTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba, Pampanga.6 MTC, San Fernando, Pampanga
7

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Issuance of Preliminary RTC-58, Angeles City8 Injunction Petition MTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba, Pampanga
10 9

Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent Motion for RTC-58, Angeles City Postponement Motion for Reconsideration - do 11

Motion for Reconsideration On Denial of the Release of - do -12 Vehicle Addendum to Motion For Re-Investigation Motion to Set Motion For Release of Vehicle Several documents were also notarized by respondent, viz: Documents Reply of Norberto San Angel dated October 16, 2001 Sworn Statement dated October 15, 2001 of May Paule, et al. Criminal Complaint of Myrna Bulaon Where Used MTC, Branch 1, San Fernando, Pampanga15 Civil Case No. 8509 filed with the MTC San Fernando, Pampanga16 Criminal Case No. 01-1401 MTC of Sta. Ana, 17 Pampanga - do-18 Special Proceeding No. 01-01 at MTC, Sta. Ana, Pampanga19 - do - do 13 14

Reply Affidavit of Myrna Bulaon Affidavit of Renato P. Canlas

Respondent also attended court hearings as shown in the following Minutes of Hearings, Orders, and Transcripts of Stenographic Notes: Date March 2, 2001 April 23, 2001 March 6, 2001 August 3, 2001 Sept. 7, 2001 October 15, 2001 Nov. 5, 2001 Time 9:00 A.M. 1:30 P.M. 2:15 P.M. 9:00 A.M. - do 8:30 A.M. 2:00 P.M. Civil Case No. 17360 Civil Case No. 8509 Case No. 01-01 (Ejectment Case) Crim. Case No. 00-1164 Crim. Case No. 00-1164 Crim. Case No. 01-1401 Court MTC/Sta. Ana, Pampanga RTC-58 Angeles City21 - do -22 MTC, Sta. Pampanga23 - do -24 RTC 42, San Frdo., Pamp.
25 20

Ana.

MTC Branch 1, San 26 Fernando, Pampanga.

Nov. 27, 2001 Dec. 6, 2001 2:00 P.M.

Civil Case No. 8509 Civil Case No. 8509

RTC 58, Angeles City

27

MTC Br. I, San Fernando, Pampanga.28

During those times that respondent attended hearings, he declared in his Daily Time Records (DTRs) that he was present at the Office as shown by the DTRs attached to the complaint. The actuations of the respondent provoked the filing of several criminal cases against him, to wit: 29 (1) Falsification of Public Documents, 30 (2) Usurpation of Functions, and 31 (3) Violation of Republic Act No. 6713. Still, despite the cases filed against him, respondent continued attending hearings in different courts as demonstrated by the following photostatic copies of the Minutes of the trials of the cases:32 Dates October 24, 2002 November 7, 2002 January 17, 2003 February 10, 2003 March 10, 2003 March 24, 2003 March 28, 2003 May 9, 2003 May 29, 2003 June 12, 2003 June 17, 2003 July 17, 2003 August 26, 2003 8:30 AM 9:00 A.M. 9:00 AM 9:00 AM 8:30 AM 2:00 PM Time 2:00 PM 2:00 PM 9:00 AM 9:00 AM 9:00 AM Court MTC Arayat, Pampanga - do MTC Sta. Ana, Pampanga
34 33

MTC Arayat, Pampanga35 - do -36 - do 37 38

MTC Sta. Ana, Pampanga - do 39

RTC-54, Macabebe, Pampanga40 MTC Arayat, Pampanga41 MTC-4, San Frdo., Pampanga
42 43

RTC-54, Macabebe, Pampanga MTC-4, San Frdo., Pampanga

44

Complainants maintained that all these acts constitute grave misconduct. We referred the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and investigation. 45 On 04 November 2003, respondent filed a motion for extension of twenty (20) days within which to file his answer, which was granted by the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP, Pasig City.46 47 In his answer, respondent admitted that Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy dropped by at the CHR to seek assistance regarding the recovery of her minor son and the restitution of her time deposit. He also acknowledged having issued the two orders but maintained that the same were in consonance with the powers and functions granted to all CHR lawyers. He argued that CHR lawyers, pursuant to CHR Resolution No. A-88-056 dated 8 October 1988 and CHR Resolution No. A89-109-A dated 19 July 1989, can file, appear, prosecute and represent the Commission for underprivileged victims and persons whose human rights have been violated or in need of protection in civil, criminal and administrative matters which are properly cognizable by the Commission. He likewise claimed that he was allowed by the CHR to file a petition for commission as a notary public and was commissioned on 01 December 2000. He denied having falsified his DTRs as the same were certified by complainant Atty. Yumol as Officer-In-Charge of their office and that his appearances in courts were for legal assistance as allowed in CHR Resolution No. A-88-056. Lastly, respondent insisted that the instant complaint was an offshoot of the administrative case filed by Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy against Atty. Yumol and the other complainants, which prevented the issuance of a certificate of clearance to Atty. Yumol relative to his impending retirement. In their reply,48 complainants claimed that respondent's commission as notary public was granted only by the CHR on 29 October 2001, and received by the CHR Region 3 on 07 November 2001, hence, the belated authority granted to him cannot be made to retroact to the notarized documents which were all done before 07 November 2001. Complainants likewise argued that respondent's act of appearing in courts as counsel is a form of private practice which is expressly prohibited by Republic 49 Act No. 6713. They further explained that the CHR has no authority to issue the questioned orders as it cannot try and decide

cases which courts of justice or quasi-judicial bodies do. Finally, they pointed out that the complaint filed by Mrs. Dy against them was already dismissed in an Order dated 15 October 2003. After investigative hearings, IBP Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her report, the dispositive 50 portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, there is merit in the complaint and it is hereby recommended that respondent ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR. be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the bar. On 30 July 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the penalty imposed:51 RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent can be held liable for falsification for making it appear that he was at the CHR office by logging in at the DTR when actually he was attending a hearing in some courts, Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent has committed gross misconduct arising from the following alleged acts: 1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a government employee; 2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records; 3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and 4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of case against him for engaging in private practice. Relative to the first ground, respondent contends that CHR lawyers are authorized to engage in private practice by invoking CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133. CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to engage in private practice (adopting the Civil Service Commission 52 Resolution) subject to the following conditions, to wit: NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves to adopt the following policy: Lawyers employed in the Civil Service Commission, upon written request, may be authorized to practice their profession subject to the following conditions: 1. It shall not entail any conflict of interest insofar as the functions of the Commission are concerned; 2. It shall not be in representation of a client whose cause of action is against the government; 3. It shall not involve the use of government funds or property; 4. It shall not impair the lawyer's efficiency in the discharge of his/her regular functions in the office, and absences incurred, if any, shall be covered by duly approved vacation leaves and pass slips; 5. It shall be subject to the provisions of RA No. 6713 and such other relevant Civil Service Laws and Rules; 6. The lawyers can appear only in courts of law, offices of state prosecutors (Department of Justice), Office of the Ombudsman and quasi-judicial agencies decisions of which are rendered by presidential appointees; 7. Authority is for one year subject to renewal after review of the lawyer's office performance; 8. Provided, that, the commission reserves its right to revoke the said authority. ... Recognizing that the dearth of lawyers committed to the civil service is due to the ". . . huge disparity in the income of government lawyers as compared to those employed in the private sector," the Commission on Human Rights is convinced that CHR lawyers may be authorized to engage in the practice of their profession to augment their income so as to encourage them in the government service. NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Human Rights adopts the above-cited conditions to authorize, upon written request, to practice their profession. However, it is the Commission (sic) position that said authority should be strictly construed to maintain efficient and effective delivery of Commission programs and services. (Underscoring supplied) Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that private practice of law by CHR lawyers is not a matter of right. Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage in private practice, a written request and approval thereof, with a duly approved leave of absence for that matter are indispensable. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any such written request or duly approved leave of absence. No written authority nor approval of the practice and approved leave of absence by the CHR was ever presented by respondent. Thus, he cannot engage in private practice. 53 As to respondent's act of notarizing documents, records show that he applied for commission as notary public on 14 November 2000, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by RTC Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., on 01 December 2000.54 However, the CHR authorized55 respondent to act as notary public 56 only on 29 October 2001. Considering that acts of notarization are within the ambit of the "term practice of law," for which a prior written request and approval by the CHR to engage into it are required, the crucial period to be considered is the approval of the CHR on 29 October 2001 and not the approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000.

Practice of law has a settled meaning. It refers to any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or 57 service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainants, the belated authority granted to respondent cannot be made to retroact to the notarized documents dated prior thereto. As to the alleged falsification of DTRs, records show that respondent has been actually attending hearings in different courts as shown by the minutes of hearings and/or orders issued by different courts. Since it has been amply established that he was not properly authorized to do so as no written request by him and approval thereof of his request and of his leave of absence was made by the CHR, it is an ineluctable conclusion that he falsified his DTRs when he certified thereon that he was at the office on the same days and time. Needless to say, he could not be at two different places at the same time. We shall now discuss respondent's authority to issue the two (2) Orders. The following are instructive: . . . The [1987] Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission [on Human Rights] the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. . . But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: 'to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry.'" The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "to follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" to "inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing . . ." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or 58 condemn. x x Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." The Commission on Human Rights having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not try and resolve the subject matters involved in the Order dated 18 September 2001, which awarded the custody of the child to her mother, and Order dated 19 September 2001, which ordered the Rural Bank of Porac to reinstate the account of the mother of the child. These matters are undoubtedly and clearly within the judicial and adjudicatory powers of a regular court. As to the fourth charge, suffice it to state that despite the cases filed against respondent in courts, he continued without the proper authority and approved leave of absence, to engage in the private practice of his profession as shown by certified true copies of the minutes and orders of the different courts where he attended hearings. 59 In Spouses Jeneline Donato and Mario Donato v. Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr., we explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such conduct is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. To our mind, respondent's acts of issuing the subject orders, engaging in private practice without prior written request and authority of the CHR and duly approved leave of absence, notarizing documents even before being so authorized by the CHR and falsifying his DTRs, constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, per the dictates of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 27. Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. . . . The question now arises as to the penalty to be imposed. Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. On imposing the supreme penalty of disbarment, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.60 While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the 61 evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In the case

at bar, the IBP Investigating Commissioner Rebecca V. Maala recommended the suspension of respondent for two (2) years while the IBP Board of Governors recommended a lighter penalty of six (6) months suspension. Taking our cue therefrom, we find one (1) year suspension to be sufficient sanction against respondent - suspension being primarily intended not as a 62 punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession. WHEREFORE, Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Sr., is hereby found guilty of Gross Misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as to the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. A.M. No. R-705-RTJ August 23, 1989 LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, LEONILA FUERTES and EDGARDO SERVANDO, complainants, vs. JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, RTC, Br. 51, Puerto Princess City and ANNA BELLE CARDENAS, respondents. A.M. No. R-698-P August 23, 1989 JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant, vs. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 52, Puerto Princess City, respondent. A.M. No. 2909 August 23, 1989 JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant, vs. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 52, Puerto Princess City, respondent. FERNAN, C.J.: In a complaint under oath dated July 21, 1986, docketed as Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then 1 Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Puerto Princess City Mrs. Leonila Fuertes and Mr. Edgardo Servando charged Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, then Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 51, Puerto Princess City 2 with: 1. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents, by verifying official hours rendered by one employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who never reported for duty from August 1983 to May 1984 by encashing and receiving salaries of said Miss Cardenas through forgery of payee's signature in the treasury warrants, thus deceiving the government and defrauding the Government treasury of a big amount of money; 2. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting, demanding, receiving bribed (sic) money in exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants in Branch 52, where said Judge was temporarily assigned from November 1984 to April 1986 and of which one of the undersigned complainant (sic), LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court; 3. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as part and condition of his continued employment in Branch 51, where Judge Abaya is the presiding judge., Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August 29, 1986, filed in compliance with the Court Resolution of August 12, 1986. He asserted that these charges were concocted in retaliation against the administrative complaint docketed as Adm. Matter No. 698-P he earlier filed on July 18,1986 against one of his accusers, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and grave misconduct in having forged his signature in a probation order in Criminal Case No. 4995 of the RTC, Branch 52, Puerto Princess, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cruz," for attempted murder. Adm. Matter No. 698-P was followed by a petition dated August 5,1986 docketed as Adm. Case No. 2909 for the disbarment of Atty. Ligaya GonzalesAustria based on the same alleged offense. After Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria had filed her comment on the charges against her, the Court resolved to consolidate these related cases. On October 28, 1986, the Court granted the motion of the complainants in Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ to amend their complaint by including Annabelle Cardenas as defendant in the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. It was averred therein that the initial exclusion was due to oversight and that it was never intended to exclude her as a co-principal. By resolution of December 11, 1986, the cases were referred to Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera for investigation, report and recommendation. Based on the evidence presented by the parties, Justice Herrera finds the respondents guilty of the charges against them and thereby recommends: 1. The FORFEITURE of retirement benefits of Judge Abaya except earned leave credits; 2. The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas from office as Court Stenographer; 4 3. A one-year SUSPENSION from office as Attorney of Atty. Ligaya G. Austria in AC-2909. We now consider these well-thought out recommendations. I. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. R-705-RTJ:

a. Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents by Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas. The gravamen of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who was appointed as Stenographic Reporter of Branch 51, RTC, Palawan in August 1983 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya as Presiding Judge therein, was a ghost employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as she never reported for work during said period, being then employed at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide. Notwithstanding, with her knowledge and consent, Judge Abaya verified as true and correct her daily time records as stenographic reporter purportedly showing that she rendered service and incurred no absences or tardiness from August 9 to September 30, 1983 and rendered service for the period from October 1, 1983 to May 31, 1984 and was granted leave of absence from March 14 to 30, 1984 and from April 23 to 27, 1984. Thus, she was paid her salaries corresponding to the periods allegedly worked. Some of the Treasury Warrants covering her salaries were, according to complainants, encashed by Judge Abaya by forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature. Both Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas vehemently denied the charges, countering that the latter worked as stenographic reporter from August 1983 to May 31, 1984. We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be supported by substantial evidence. Especially damaging to the pretensions of the respondents that Annabelle Cardenas rendered service as stenographic reporter during the period under consideration are the school records of the Holy Trinity College, showing that Annabelle Cardenas was attending school 5 in the first semester of school year 1983-1984 from 2:00 P.M. to 8:15 P.M. While she claimed to have been permitted by her teacher to attend her typing and stenography classes after office hours, the school records reveal that she has other subjects such as Business Organization and Management (3 units), Ten Commandments (3 units), Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas (3 units) and Accounting for Single Proprietorship (3 units), her attendance in which can be safely concluded from the passing grades she 6 received in said subjects. Equally damaging to respondents' assertion are the Daily Time Records of Princess Tours showing that Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide on 43 working days when she was supposedly rendering service as stenographic reporter. Her explanation that her name was placed on the daily time record as team leader, although she did not actually conduct the tours reflected therein is too shallow to merit belief. It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period under consideration, the court calendar for Branch 51 never once carried Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify her attendance at a court session. Moreover, she could not produce any single order, transcript or official stenographic notes that had been taken by her in any case, civil or criminal. All she presented were so-called practice notes. Judge Abaya stated in his comment that it was Annabelle Cardenas who was collecting her salary "without intervention from 7 your respondent. It was however proved that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries on several occasions, as in fact, said Annabelle Cardenas even executed a special power of attorney in his favor authorizing him not only to collect the treasury warrants but to endorse and negotiate them as well. 8 Be that as it may, we find the evidence insufficient on the one hand to overthrow the explanation of respondents that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries in Manila so that he could bring the same to Candon, Ilocos Sur for delivery to her mother, who is a good friend of the Judge; and on the other hand to support complainants' theory that Judge Abaya appropriated the money for himself. b. Charges of Gross Dishonesty and Corruption by Soliciting, Demanding and Receiving Bribe Money against Judge Abaya. The act complained of was allegedly committed by Judge Abaya while temporarily assigned to Branch 52, RTC Palawan vice Judge Jose G. Genilo Jr., who was temporarily assigned to Batangas City. It must be recalled that complainant Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria was then Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 52. It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 entitled "People vs. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot for murder, in consideration of the sum of P 2,000.00 given by Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, complainant and mother of the victim in the aforesaid case. Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, a school teacher, testified that she went to Branch 52 at about 5:00 P.M. on August 13, 1985 in response to a telephone call from court stenographer Nelly Vicente that Judge Abaya wanted to see her personally. Nelly Vicente referred her to Carmencita P. Baloco, the officer-in-charge who then called Judge Abaya from the other branch. Judge Abaya directed her to the adjoining courtroom where he told her, "Ang kaso ninyo ay medyo tagilid, 50-50 dahil walang eyewitness." (Your case is shaky with only a 50-50 chance of winning because there is no eyewitness.) She retorted that there was an eyewitness but the Judge insisted that there was none because the supposed eyewitness had his back turned when her son was stabbed. Nonetheless, the Judge assured her that he would be able to do something about it ("Ngunit lahat ay magagawan ko ng paraan dahil ako ang nakakaalam sa mga decision dito").lwph1.t When Mrs. Fuertes asked the Judge what he wanted, he told her that he has a problem. "Kailangan ko ng pera Limang Libo at Ide-deny ko ang bail na mga acusado" (I need Five Thousand Pesos and I will deny bail to the accused). Mrs. Fuertes expressed puzzlement on why she had to give money when she was the aggrieved party, but the Judge cut her off by saying he needed the money badly before he leaves for Manila. Mrs. Fuertes answered that she would have to consult her brothers-in-law about the matter. The Judge told her to see him at his house at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Mrs. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law as well as the then prosecuting fiscal, now Judge Angel R. Miclat about the matter. Although they were all against the Idea of her acceding to the Judge's demand, she delivered the amount of Pl,200.00 to Judge Abaya on August 15,1985 in his chambers, telling him that was all she could afford. Judge Abaya looked dissatisfied but said 9 "Never mind" and that he would just contact her at the next trial for the final judgment.

Roselyn Teologo, stenographic reporter of Branch 52 corroborated that portion of Mrs. Fuertes' testimony relating to the phone call of Nelly Vicente to Mrs. Fuertes, the latter's arrival on August 13, 1985 at Branch 52 and Mrs. Fuertes having been closeted with Judge Abaya inside the courtroom for about 20 minutes. She further testified that Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and Mrs. Fuertes' conversation remarked, "Grabe ito, nanghihingi ng pera." (This is terrible, he is asking money.) She added that when Judge Abaya emerged from the courtroom, he instructed her not to tell anybody that Mrs. 10 Fuertes had been there. Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge Angel R. Miclat, then acting City Fiscal for Puerto Princess City handling Criminal Case No. 5304. He testified that Mrs. Fuertes came to him in August of 1986 to inform him that Judge Abaya was asking P5,000.00 from her so that the bail application of the accused would be denied. While he advised her to file a complaint against Judge Abaya, he was informed later on that Mrs. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya not the amount being asked, but only about P1,200.00. 11 Likewise submitted in evidence by the complainants were the entries in Mrs. Fuertes' diary, thus: 12 August 13, 1985 called by Judge Abaya to see him after office hours. He asked me for my case was 50-50. 13 August 15, I went to town to see Baby Francisco, gave P2,000 and I brought the money to Judge. July 2, 1986 Judge Abaya with companion Rufo Gonzales and Celia Fernandez. Purpose they convinced me to sign my name in the affidavit stating that I will deny the previous affidavit I made stated that Judge asked from me certain amount and his request was granted. But I did not sign and asked me to see him in town at the residence of Menchie his niece personally nakiusap kay Baby upang mai-deny ang affidavit ko through Atty. Austria ay nakiusap pa rin. He is talking care Nanette na idinay 13 ko. -A Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of money from Mrs. Fuertes. He alleged that the bail application of the accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 was denied, not because of any outside interference, but because the evidence of guilt was strong. He surmised that Mrs. Fuertes and Nelly Vicente had been pressured by Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him out of sheer vindictiveness and that Mrs. Fuertes might have been blaming him for the delay in the resolution of the criminal case against her son's alleged killers. We quote with approval Justice Herrera's perceptive reasons for giving full faith and credence to Mrs. Fuertes' testimony: We find no improper motive as to why Mrs. Fuertes, a school teacher, would impute such a serious offense against a judge unless it be the truth. Mrs. Fuertes is not a disgruntled litigant. Judge Abaya having denied the petition for bail of the suspected killer of Mrs, Fuertes' son, she should, under normal circumstances be grateful to the Judge. Yet she charged him with a serious offense, and travelled all the way from Palawan to Manila to testify against the Judge. Under the circumstances, We cannot accept Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs. Fuertes perjured herself just to accommodate the vengeanceful ire of Atty. Austria against Judge Abaya. That would be contrary to the ordinary prompting of men. Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mrs. Fuertes is too rich in details brought out on cross-examination which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrications. They find support in collateral but highly significant circumstances pointed to by Mrs. Teologo, such as (1) the visible presence of Mrs. Fuertes in the courtroom in conference with Judge Abaya at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 15, (should be 13) 1985; and (2) the highly credible testimony of Judge Miclat on the report made to him by Mrs. Fuertes, as then acting City Fiscal, on the solicitation of Judge Abaya. It certainly cannot be said that Mrs. Fuertes merely concocted her story at the time regarding the solicitation of Judge Abaya in connection with the pending case of the 14 suspected killers of her son. There was absolutely no motive for her to do So. c. Charge of illegal Exaction against Judge Abaya. It is alleged that Judge Abaya exacted portions of the salaries of two (2) employees in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC as a condition for their continued employment. Edgardo Servando, one of the complainants herein, and who was appointed stenographer on September 3, 1984 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya, declared that such recommendation was made in consideration of his agreement to give Judge Abaya Pl,000.00 from his initial salary and thereafter a monthly amount of P400.00, which undertaking he complied with. However, in December when the Judge before leaving for Manila for the Christmas vacation asked him for Pl,000.00 from as fringe benefits, medical allowance and year-end bonus, he was unable to comply as he did not then have cash, the payment of said benefits having been in checks. A week later, he received a notice of termination effective at the close of business hours on December 31, 1984 from the Supreme Court upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya. 15 Nilo Jamora, a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since his employment in said Branch, Judge Abaya had been exacting from him P350.00 every payday, which exaction ceased only in March 1986 when Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria filed her charges against Judge Abaya. He further stated that when he refused to retract his charges against Judge Abaya before the 16 Sangguniang Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of money, the latter demoted him to process server. Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge, labelling the same as sheer vindictiveness due to Servando's termination and Jamora's demotion, fanned by Atty. Austria's proddings. He insists that the personnel action taken on Servando and Jamora was due to their inefficiency. While the investigating officer, Justice Herrera observed that both Servando and Jamora "testified in a natural and straightforward, albeit in an angry manner without attempting to conceal their contempt for Judge Abaya, 17 he concluded that "the evidence in this regard would be unable to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample corroboration. It would simply be 18 the word of one against a judge.

We are in accord with this observation, for indeed, the charge if true is so demeaning to an RTC judge that it requires more than a bare allegation to sustain it. In this regard, we give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt. In summation, we find Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting Ms integrity and moral character which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had his resignation not been accepted. The office of a judge exists for one solemn end to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially. In regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price, Judge Abaya betrayed the very essence of magistracy. In complicity with Annabelle Cardenas, he likewise abused the trust and confidence of the people, shortchanging them of services undoubtedly vital to the speedy administration of justice. The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey 19 the law. For him then to transgress the highest ideals of justice and public service for personal gain is indeed a demoralizing example constituting a valid cause for disenchantment and loss of confidence in the judiciary as well as in the civil service system. By these acts, Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the honor and requisites attached to his office. As he had previously resigned, we hereby order the forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except earned leave credits, as recommended by the investigating officer Justice Herrera. We further mete out to Annabelle Cardenas in consequence of her grave misconduct as above-described the penalty of removal from office as Court Stenographer with prejudice to her re-appointment to the Judiciary. II. A.M. No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909 The complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct in A.M. No. R-698-P and for disbarment in Adm. Case No. 2909 against Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Clerk of Court of Branch 52, RTC Palawan, stem from her act of having allegedly forged the signature of Judge Abaya in a probation order dated April 22, 1986 in Criminal Case No. 4999 of said court entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cruz" for attempted homicide. Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation order and of having promulgated it, but explains that these were done with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya, who had asked her to prepare orders and decisions in Branch 52 to ease his load of presiding over two (2) branches. She adverts to Judge Abaya's order of November 4, 1985 which granted accused Leonardo Cruz' motion for reconsideration of the order denying probation. This order, which carried certain conditions, set the promulgation of the probation order on January 16, 1986 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. In the meantime, Judge Abaya requested Atty. Austria to prepare the probation order with the day and month in blank for the signature of the Judge. On January 16,1986, Judge Abaya was absent so the promulgation was reset to April 16, 1986. On the latter date, the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court, hence the promulgation of the probation order was again reset to June 3, 1986, with Judge Abaya allegedly giving instructions before he left for Manila to promulgate said order even in his absence should the probationer Leonardo Cruz arrive in court. On April 21, 1986, Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the probation order be promulgated the following day, April 22, 1986 as he had to leave for Coron in the same pumpboat that brought him to Puerto Princess and he had no money to sustain him up to the time the Judge arrives from Manila. As requested, the promulgation was set on April 22, 1986, only for Atty. Austria to discover that Judge Abaya had neglected to sign the probation order. In view of the predicament of Leonardo Cruz and the authority granted to her by Judge Abaya, Atty. Austria signed Judge Abaya's name to the probation order and promulgated it. 20 Atty. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency (Art. 1881 of the Civil Code) in that having been granted full authority to promulgate the probation order, she necessarily had the authority to sign the Judge's name if the need arose. She further maintains that as Judge Abaya never complained about the alleged forgery, he is deemed to have ratified it and is now estopped from questioning her authority. Lastly, she compares the probation order to a writ of execution which is usually done 21 by the Clerk of Court. Respondent's arguments are quite novel but unpersuasive. As thoroughly explained by Justice Herrera: .....her explanation that she is the one preparing decisions and orders in Branch 52 with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya during the time that the latter was acting as Presiding Judge of said branch and that she was directed to promulgate the probation order in favor of Leonardo Cruz only to discover that the judge overlooked to sign the order, even if true, is not a valid justification for her to simulate the signature of Judge Abaya in the probation order. This is patently illegal. As a lawyer and branch clerk of court, she ought to know that under no circumstances is her act of signing the name of the judge permissible. She could have probably released the order with the statement that it is upon orders of the judge or by authority of the judge but she could not under any circumstance make it appear as she did in this case that the Judge signed the order when in fact he did not. The duties of the clerk of court in the absence of any express direction of the Judge is well defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which reads: Sec. 5. Duties of the Clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. In the absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and may also, when directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to guardianship, trusteeships, or receiverships, and forthwith transmit such reports, accounts,

and evidence to the judge, together with his findings in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and include the same in his report. Signing orders in the name of, and simulating the signature of the judge is not one of them. Atty. Austria's theory of agency that she lawfully acted as agent of the Judge is wholly devoid of merit. The judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly personal to the Judge because of, and by reason of his highest qualification, and can never be the subject of agency. That would not only be contrary to law, but also subversive of public order and public policy. Nor could her void act in signing the name of the judge be validly ratified by the latter. Judge Abaya himself is bereft of any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign his name in his official capacity in a matter pending adjudication before him. The issuance of the order in question is strictly judicial and is exclusively vested in the judge which is beyond his authority to 22 delegate. Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in 23 the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on 24 such ground. We find Atty. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect her qualification as a member of tile Bar, for precisely as a lawyer, she ought to have known the illegality of the act complained of. WHEREFORE, finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, Annabelle Cardenas and Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria guilty as charged, except that of illegal exaction against Judge Abaya, the Court hereby orders: 1. In Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, the FORFEITURE of the retirement benefits of Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, except his earned leave credits; and the DISMISSAL from office of Annabelle Cardenas as Stenographic Reporter with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary; and, 2. In Adm. Matter No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909, the resignation of Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria as Branch Clerk of Court IS ACCEPTED as of December 31, 1987 and any and all benefits accruing during her government service are declared forfeited, except her earned leave credits. Her SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar for a period of one year from the finality of this decision is further decreed. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for the filing of appropriate criminal charges against respondents if warranted. Copies of this resolution shall be attached to the respondents' respective personal records. Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. PNBvATTYCEDO Fac t s : P N B f i l e d a c o mp l ai n t ag ai n s t A t t y . Ce d o f o r v i o l at i o n o f R u l e 6. 02 t h at s t at e s : A lawyer shall not, after leavinggov t. service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter which he had intervened with insaidservice. Cedo was the former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset management Group of PNB.Du ri n g Ce d o s s t i n t w i t h P N B , h e b e c ame i n v o l v e d i n 2 t r an s ac t i o n s : 1. ) s al e o f s t ee l s h e e t s t o Ms . O n g an d 2. ) i n t e rv e n e d i n t h e h an d l i n g o f a l o an o f s p o u s e s A l me d a. W h e n a c i v i l ac t i o n aro s e b e c au s e o f # 1, Ce d o ,after leaving the bank appeared as one of the counsel of Ms. Ong. Also, when #2 was involved in a civil action, theAlmedas were represented by the law firm Cedo,Ferrer,Maynigo&Associates of which Cedo was a Senior Partner.Ce d o c l ai ms t h at h e d i d n o t p art i c i p at e i n t h e l i t i g at i o n o f Ms . O n g s c as e . H e al s o c l ai ms t h at e v e n i f i t was his law firm handling the Almeda case, the case was being handled by Atty. Ferrer.Issue: W/N violated Rule 6.02.Held: Cedo violated Rule 6.02.In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between the atty. and the client, inquiry of then at u re s u g g e s t e d w o u l d l e ad t o t h e re v e l at i o n , i n ad v a n c e o f t h e t ri al , o f o t h e r mat t e rs t h at mi g h t o n l y f u r t h e r p r e j u d i c e t h e c o m p l a i n a n t c a u s e . Whatever may be said as to w/n the atty. utilized against his former c l i e n t i n f o rmat i o n g i v e n t o h i m i n a p ro f e s s i o n a l c a p ac i t y, t h e m e re f a c t t h at t h e i r p re v i o u s re l at i o n s h i p s h o u l d h av e precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side. I t i s un pr of e s s io na l t o r e pr e s e nt c on f l ic t in g in t e r e s t s , e xc e p t by e xpr e s s c o ns e nt o f a ll t he pa r t i e s c onc e r ne d a f t e r t h e di s c l os ur e o f f a c t s . A la wy e r r e pr e s e n t s c o nf l ic t i ng in t e r e s t s whe n, in be ha l f of o ne c l ie n t , i t i s h is du t y t o c on t e n d f or t ha t wh ic h d ut y t o a not he r c li e nt r e qu ir e s h im t o oppose.

A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995

PHILIPPINE vs. ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent. RESOLUTION

NATIONAL

BANK, complainant,

BIDIN, J.: In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened. Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy. Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission. Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant s Asset Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners. In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among them. In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation. During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."

The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer. Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the client s secrets and confidential records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times. From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he expected to earn. The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years. The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994, submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid pleadings. In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the investigation of the AntiGraft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled: The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him, that even if respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to information regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos: "Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause." Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the case ofHilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said: Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit: It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in Metro Manila. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur. EN BANC A.C. No. 5438 March 10, 2004 LIM* and RICHARD C. TAN, complainants,

DAN JOEL V. vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO BARCELONA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM: On May 9, 2001, Dan Joel V. Lim and Richard C. Tan, both businessmen, filed a complaint for alleged robbery or extortion and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Atty. Edilberto Barcelona, a lawyer formerly employed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The complaint was simultaneously filed with this Court and the Integrated Bar of 2 the Philippines. Complainant Lim alleged that on the first week of August 2000, respondent phoned him and introduced himself as a lawyer and chief of the Public Assistance Center, NLRC. Respondent informed him that his employees filed a labor complaint against him in his office and it was necessary for him to see and talk with respondent. From then on respondent would often call him. Respondent visited him in his office and told him to settle the case or else his business, Top Gun Billiards, would be shut down. Lim recalled that on August 14, 2000, at around 7:30 p.m., respondent again visited his establishment and told him to settle the case for P20,000.00. In support of his allegations, Lim submitted a written complaint of Arnel E. Ditan and Pilipino Ubante; an endorsement letter dated August 2, 2000 of Atty. Jonathan F. Baligod of the Presidential Action Center; handwritten calling cards of the respondent; and an affidavit of desistance executed by Ditan and Ubante.
1

In their joint affidavit, Ditan and Ubante confirmed the filing of their complaint against their employer, Lim, and that after some dialogue, the aforenamed employees executed an affidavit dated August 8, 2000 withdrawing their complaint. According to Ditan and Ubante, they met the respondent in Top Gun Billiards where the latter often played billiards. One day, respondent gave them a letter and asked them to sign it. Since they were busy at that time, they signed it without reading and understanding its contents. Their employer, Lim, asked what it was about and they told him that they were just made to sign a document without their understanding it. They added, they did not have any complaint against their employer. Despite such withdrawal, respondent still called Lim threatening the latter that he would pursue the case, have his establishment closed and he would be jailed if he did not come up with P20,000.00 as settlement. In the evening of August 14, 2000, respondent reiterated his demand for P20,000.00, again with the threat of closure of the billiard center and putting Lim in jail. Complainant Lim said that after his meeting with respondent, he agreed to give the amount but did not fix any date when payment would be made, whereupon, respondent gave notice that he would drop in at around 7:00 in the evening, on August 16, 2000, to pick up the money. Aurora Cruz y Libunao, owner of the carinderia adjacent to Top Gun Billiards, stated in her sworn statement as well as court testimony that she met respondent when he ate in her carinderia. She recalled that the respondent told her that he would shut down the billiard business if the owner would not talk to him. She also recounted that on August 14, 2000, at around 8:30 p.m., she saw on the second floor of the pool house, the respondent and Lim talking. After a while, the respondent came down and passed by her carinderia. The respondent then informed her that he and Lim talked about the P20,000.00 which respondent would give to his alleged boss in Malacaang. During the hearing, she also recalled seeing Lim hand money to respondent who in turn put the cash in his attach case and immediately thereafter, she saw three men arrest respondent.3 Notably, almost nine months before the filing of his complaint, or on August 14, 2000, complainant Lim personally submitted a letter to the NBI requesting the NBI to investigate respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona.4 According to the NBI report, after due investigation, it decided to conduct an entrapment operation. On August 15, 2000, Special Investigator Marvin de Jemil, sent nine five hundred peso bills and five one hundred peso bills for fluorescent powder dusting to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division. Further, the NBI reported that thru the NBI Identification and Records Division, it found no record of such person named Edilberto Barcelona. The NBI report also stated that on August 16, 2000, Lim informed the NBI operatives that at around 7:00 p.m. respondent would drop by his pool house to collect the money. At around 6:30 p.m., the operatives went to the pool house and strategically positioned themselves and posed as pool players. At about 7:20 p.m., respondent arrived, sat on a plastic chair and talked to complainant Lim. At around 7:30 p.m., Lim handed the marked money to the respondent who, in turn, received it. While respondent was counting the money and about to place it inside his bag, he was immediately arrested. The respondent initially resisted and tried to create scandal but was later pacified. The NBI averred that the respondent was informed of his constitutional rights and was brought to the NBI office where he was booked and fingerprinted. In his fingerprint chart, the respondent indicated that he was a government lawyer and assigned at the office of the Chief, Public Assistance Center, NLRC, Banawe, Quezon City. He showed his identification card. Later he was brought to the Forensic Chemistry Division for ultraviolet examination. The certification issued by Forensic Chemist Loren G. Janobas stated that there were "yellow fluorescent specks and smudges" on the back and palm of the left and right hand of the respondent. On August 17, 2000, the NBI turned over respondent to the City Prosecutor of Manila who eventually indicted him for robbery/extortion.5 Complainant Richard Tan, owner of Tai Hing Glass Supply, a co-signee in the herein complaint, executed a sworn statement dated August 16, 2000. In it he alleged that he went to the Criminal Intelligence Division, Intelligence Service of the NBI to complain about respondent Barcelona. He said that sometime during the last week of July, respondent called him, introduced himself and informed him that one of his employees filed an illegal dismissal case against him. He remembered that before respondent's call, he had suspended an employee, Bryan Tellen, for leaving his workplace without permission. Tellen received several warning letters from him regarding his misdemeanors. Tan remembered that Tellen once hinted that he knew someone in the Department of Labor, who turned out to be herein respondent, Atty. Barcelona. Before Tan sent his accountant, Ditas Guitierrez, to respondent's office to represent him, he told her to bring a copy of Tellen's suspension letter and to inform respondent that Tellen had not been dismissed. When Guitierrez returned, she told him that respondent wanted him to pay his employee. She added that respondent did not give her any copy of a formal complaint on the alleged illegal dismissal. After two days, according to Tan, respondent went to his office, showed him an identification card and gave him a handwritten calling card. Respondent told him to pay his employee P20,000.00 to P30,000.00, otherwise respondent would go on with the filing of the illegal dismissal case. When he said he did not have that kind of money, respondent lowered the amount to P15,000.00.

Complainant Tan added that when he gave respondent the money, the latter promised to take care of the illegal dismissal complaint. On July 29, 2000, according to Tan, respondent came to see him again. Respondent appeared drunk and told Tan to go to the respondent's office because a problem regarding the case arose. Tan stated that before respondent left, respondent invited his employees to a game of billiards. Tan said he did not consent to the employees playing because they had work. On July 31, 2000, respondent went to him a third time and asked for an additional P10,000.00 allegedly for his employee, Tellen, since the P15,000.00 Tan gave earlier was for respondent only. After a few more visits by respondent, Tan finally told the 6 respondent to show him the formal complaint and he would just get himself a lawyer. The Joint Affidavit of Arrest, signed on August 17, 2000 by Agent Don R. Hernandez, SI Felix O. Senora and SI Marvin de Jemil, 7 cited complainant Tan's allegations. Respondent Atty. Barcelona filed his Comment on December 10, 2001, praying for the dismissal of the complaint against him. Respondent, in his defense, alleges that he normally played billiards at the Top Gun Billiard Center where he would drop by from his office before going to his residence; that when certain employees of the billiard center learned that he was a lawyer and Chief of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC, they confided in him their grievance against their employer, Lim, for alleged violation of labor laws, there respondent gave them assistance; that with the proper complaint and required documentation accomplished, respondent's office scheduled the case for a dialogue-conference between the complaining workers and their employer; that on instigation and coercion of complainant Lim, respondent became a victim of theft, billiard hustling, swindling and syndicated gambling on August 9, 2000; that on or about August 9, 2000, respondent filed a complaint for theft of cellphone and pack of cigarettes, billiard hustling, syndicated gambling, and swindling against Lim and his three workers, eventually docketed as I.S. No. 38251 to 53.9 Respondent's Comment narrated his version on how the money allegedly was given to him. According to the respondent, on August 16, 2000, at about 3 p.m., he received a phone call from complainant Lim informing him that Ian Gonvan,10 one of the accused in I.S. No. 38251, admitted taking his cellphone and was willing and ready to return it at around 7 p.m., at the Top Gun Billiard Center. It was the birthday of his daughter that was why he took the day off from office. At about 7:30 p.m., he arrived at the billiard hall and there found Lim with one of his complaining workers, fixing the lamp of one of the billiard tables. He did not see Gonvan within the premises so he sat and watched the billiard games going on while he waited. After about 15 minutes Lim sat beside him and told him that Gonvan could no longer return the cellphone and instead Gonvan entrusted Lim with the equivalent value in cash. According to respondent, Lim persistently whispered to him to accept and count the wad of paper money Lim pulled out. According to respondent, he consistently refused to touch the money and he insisted, "Gusto ko munang makaharap ang sinasabi mong si Gumban,"11 continuously refusing to accept, much less count, the offered wad of money. Respondent added that when Lim realized that he could not be prevailed upon to accept it, he placed and inserted the wad of money in the open side pocket of respondent's shoulder bag that respondent normally carried, again pleading to respondent that he should count the money. Respondent added that Lim's behavior was rude and intimidating so much so that respondent protested such rudeness. But respondent said while he was trying to retrieve the wad of money to throw it back to Lim, about five or seven burly men accosted respondent and handcuffed him over his vehement protestations.12 On Tan's complaint, respondent declared that he never demanded nor received money from Tan, and Tan's accusations are but a product of the former's fertile imagination as leverage because he actively assisted a complaining worker of 13 14 Tan. Respondent added that a formal labor complaint has been filed against Tan. Eventually, we referred the complaint against Atty. Barcelona to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Its report with recommendation is now before us. We shall now proceed to the merits of the complaint. Respondent's version seeks to discredit the NBI report to the effect that respondent accepted the marked money which Lim handed to him. His version, however, fails to explain why he was found positive for yellow fluorescent specks and smudges in his dorsal and palmar aspects of the left and right hands by the Forensic Department of the NBI. Respondent claims that he continuously refused to accept, much less count, the offered wad of money. Because of such refusal, according to respondent, Lim inserted the wad of money in respondent's shoulder bag's open pocket while complainant Lim was still pleading to count the wad of money. Respondent alleges that the alleged bribery or extortion is a mere concoction of complainant and as leverage for the cases against Lim and Tan.
8

Based on the NBI report, this case appears to be an entrapment operation. Notably, Atty. Don Hernandez and his team of arresting officers confirm the entrapment operation against respondent on the basis of complainant Lim's call for NBI assistance. While respondent alleges that complainant Lim merely concocted a charge of extortion against him in retaliation to a complaint for theft which he had filed, it may be noted that the complaint for theft was not directed against Lim but only against his workers who were accused by respondent. Hence, there appears to be no strong reason for Lim to resort to a counter-charge for extortion against respondent. The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP concluded that it is highly improbable that the NBI could be misled by complainant Lim into conducting an entrapment operation against respondent, if there was no merit to his complaint against respondent. From a reading of the NBI Report as well as the documents attached to said report, it is evident that the NBI considered the merits of Lim's complaint of extortion against respondent. Finding it worth pursuing, the NBI conducted an entrapment operation against respondent. On the basis of the entrapment operation conducted by the NBI, respondent was caught in the act, so to speak, of attempted extortion. Respondent was brought to the City Prosecutor of Manila for inquest and the appropriate complaint for Robbery/Extortion was filed against respondent.15 Based on its own evaluation and the NBI Report, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline 16 recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of two years. In the final resolution dated September 27, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP imposed the penalty of disbarment for the reason that respondent in fact attempted to extort money as Chief of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC to threaten/coerce Lim and that no less than the NBI caught him in the act of receiving and counting the money extorted from Lim.17 The grounds for disbarment or suspension of an attorney are: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.18 The NBI found that respondent's hands had yellow fluorescent specks and smudges with which the money used for the entrapment of the respondent had been powdered. We find no reason to doubt the NBI report. Also, we see no basis to overturn the presumption that the NBI had done its duty regularly. Respondent would make us believe that the specks and smudges of yellow fluorescent were in his hands because Lim offered him what was allegedly the payment for the stolen cellphone by a certain Gonvan. Regrettably, there is no corroboration from Gonvan nor anyone else on this matter. Thus, respondent's story appears to us entirely self-serving. We had held previously that if a lawyer's misconduct in the discharge of his official duties as government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as a member of the Bar on such ground.19 More significantly, lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a 20 responsible public office. Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Extortion by a government lawyer, an outright violation of the law, calls for the corresponding grave sanctions. With the aforesaid rule a high standard of integrity is demanded of a government lawyer as compared to a private practitioner because the delinquency of a government lawyer erodes the people's trust and confidence in the government. Needless to say, lawyers owe it to the court and to society not to stir up litigations. Employees of the billiards hall, Ditan and Ubante, swore that respondent public officer encouraged complainant Lim's workers to file a case against the latter. Rule 1.03 of the same Code states that a lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. Noteworthy, as an Attorney IV and Chief of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC, respondent failed to observe prudence by hanging out and playing in the billiard hall. By so doing, he exposed himself unnecessarily to certain elements and situations which could compromise his official position and his status as a lawyer.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment.21 More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the 22 loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers, but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of the lawyer's oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.23 These pronouncements gain practical significance in this case, considering that respondent is a senior lawyer of the NLRC. It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their 24 professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye. As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession. In Montano v. IBP,25 this Court said that only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer may disbarment be imposed as a penalty. In the instant case, the Court is convinced that the evidence against respondent is clear and convincing. He is administratively liable for corrupt activity, deceit, and gross misconduct. As correctly held by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, he should not only be suspended from the practice of law but disbarred. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona is found administratively guilty of corrupt activity, deceit, and gross misconduct and is hereby ordered DISBARRED. Let his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately, and this resolution spread in his record in this Court and circulated to all courts in the Philippines. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C. J., Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur Fernando 200 SCRA 584 Collantes v. Viente Renomeron

Facts: This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter s irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.

Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent suspended the registration of the documents with certain special conditions between them, which was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent s Quezon City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.

Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the documents. Despite the resolution of the Administrator, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted in his previous denial.

Issues: (1) WON the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for his malfeasance as a public official, and (2) WON the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge of official tasks.

Held: (1) Yes, a lawyer s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer s oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer s oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

(2) Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man s cause for any corrupt motive or interest (Rule 1.03)

People vs. Tuanda AC 3360, 30 January 1990 Resolution En Banc, Per Curiam Facts: In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission bases. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made noeffort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Issue: Whether violation of BP 22 involves moral turpitude to allow the suspension of a member of the bar from the practice of law. Held: Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effect of the issuance of a worthless check transcend the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The Court affirmed the suspension of Tuanda from the practice of law.

Roberto Soriano vs Atty. ManuelDizonA.C No. 6792January 25, 2006 Facts: A c o m p l a i n t - a f f i d a v i t f o r t h e d i s b a r m e n t o f A t t y . M a n u e l D i z o n , f i l e d b y Roberto Soriano with the Commission on BarDiscipline (CBD) of the Intergrated Bar of thePhilippines. Complainant Soriano alleged thatrespondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01o f t h e C o d e o f P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d t h a t t h e c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e l a t t e r f o r frustrated homicide, which involved moralturpitude, should result in his disbarment.A c c o r d i n g t o t h e u n r e f u t e d s t a t e m e n t s o f c o m p l a i n a n t , A t t y . D i z o n , w h o h a s y e t t o comply with this particular undertaking, evena p p e a l e d t h e c i v i l l i a b i l i t y t o t h e C o u r t o f Appeals Issue: Whether or not the atty. Dizon violatesCanon 1 of rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilities Held: Yes. It is also glaringly clear thatrespondent seriously transgressed Canon 1o f t h e C o d e o f P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y through his illegal possession of anunlicensed firearm his unjust refusal tosatisfy his civil liabilities. He has thusbrazenly violated the law and disobeyed thelawful orders of the courts. We remind himthat, both in his attorney s oath

and in theCode of Professional Responsibility, he boundhimself to obey the laws of the land. All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through thisi n c i d e n t t h a t h e i s w a n t i n g i n e v e n a b a s i c sense of justice. He obtained thebenevolence of the trial court when its u s p e n d e d h i s s e n t e n c e a n d g r a n t e d h i m probation. And yet, it has been four yearssince he was ordered to settle his civill i a b i l i t i e s t o c o m p l a i n a n t . T o d a t e , respondent remains adamant in refusing tofulfill that obligation. By his extremeimpetuosity and intolerance, as shown by hisviolent reaction to a simple trafficaltercation, he has taken away the earningcapacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudgescomplainant the measly amount that could

never even fully restore what the latter haslost.

ROBERTO SORIANO v. ATTY MANUEL DIZON AC no. 6792 | January 25, 2006 PER CURIAM: FACTS Atty Manuel Dizon was driving under the influence of alcohol along Abanao st. in Baguio citywhen a taxi overtook him. Enraged, Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over and berated and threatenedRoberto Soriano, the taxi driver. To stop the aggression, Soriano opened his door which caused Dizon tofall to the pavement. Soriano tried to help Dizon up but had to punch Dizon because he was going topunch him. Soriano prevented another attempt by Dizon to hit him. Dizon went back to his car to get hisgun, the handle wrapped in handkerchief. Dizon shot Soriano who was then picking up Dizon seyeglasses to return it to him. After shooting Soriano, Dizon sped off with his car and left him to die onthe street. The bullet hit Soriano in the neck and lacerated his carotid artery. According to the doctorswho treated Soriano, he would have easily died if not for the timely medical assistance. Nevertheless,the left side of Soriano s body was paralyzed, leaving him unable to drive anymore.A complaint for Frustrated Homicide was filed against Dizon by Soriano. Dizon was eventuallyfound guilty but was allowed probation. One of the conditions of the probation is the payment of thecivil liabilities. Four years after the judgment was rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligationto Soriano.A Complain-Affidavit for disbarment was filed by Soriano before the Commission on BarDiscipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Dizon was declared in default and an ex-parte hearing was held. The Commissioner of the CBD recommended to the IBP the disbarment of Dizonfor violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for conviction of acrime involving moral turpitude. The IBP adopted the recommendation of the Commissioner and sent itsresolution to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES 1. Whether the crime committed by Atty Dizon involved moral turpitude. 2.Whether Atty Dizon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, warranting his disbarment. RULING The Supreme Court approved the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines andordered the disbarment of Atty Manuel Dizon. 1stIssue The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Commissioner that the frustrated homicidecommitted by Atty Dizon was attended by moral turpitude. The Court defined moral turpitude aseverything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness ordepravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.Atty Dizon exhibited moral turpitude when he shot a taxi driver for no valid reason. His act didnot constitute self-defense. In fact, he was the aggressor. It was him who first tried to punch the other.Soriano was merely defending himself and fending off the aggression when he counterpunched Dizon.Furthermore, the trial court also ruled that the crime was committed with treachery. Dizon shot Sorianowhen he was not in a position to defend himself. Soriano was picking up Dizon s eyeglasses which fell onthe road when Dizon fell to return it to him when he was shot. Furthermore, Dizon tried to escapepunishment by wrapping the handle of his gun in handkerchief. He intended not to leave fingerprints onthe gun he used. 2nd Issue

The Supreme Court also ruled that there was indeed a violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 provides that lawyers must obey the laws of the land and promoterespect or law and legal processes. Atty Dizon was in violation of the law because he was in illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. He also failed to obey the lawful orders of the trial court when hefailed to settle his civil liabilities, a condition for the grant of the probation.Atty Dizon also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibitslawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Dizon tried to reach anout-of-court settlement with the family of Soriano but when the negotiations failed, he instead made itlook like it was the family who approached him to get a referral to a neurosurgeon. In addition, Dizonfabricated a story saying that it was Soriano and two other persons who mauled him. According to threedoctors, there was no proof of assault on Soriano

CATHERINE ATTY. A.C. September TINGA, FACTS:

JOIE DIOSDADO

P. M. No. 7,

VITUG, RONGCAL,

complainant,

vs. respondent. 6313 2006 J.:

Catherine Joie P. Vitug sought the service of respondent Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal who was introduced to her by a common friend. Complainant asked Atty. Rongcal to represent her in the support case she was going to file against her former lover, Arnulfo Aquino. Soon after, herein complainant and respondent started having sexual relationship with each other. According to Vitug, respondent also gave her sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino. On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer which the latter signed without reading the said affidavit. It was said that Aquino will give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter. Complainant argues that respondent's acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer. She filed an administrative case against Rongcal which was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which recommended the suspension of Rongcal from the practice of law. The same was approved by the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: RULING: One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. ON SEXUAL RELATION AND ON RESPONDENT S SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE: By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. We believe that complainant s allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases. We are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part. WON respondent be disbarred for immorality.

ON THE AFFIDAVIT SIGNED: Complainant does not deny being a college graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent. It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court. This court finds Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and imposes on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

ABANDONMENT OF LAWFUL WIFE AND MAINTAINING ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP ASGROUND FOR DISBARMENTJOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO VS. ATTY. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO andMARICRIS VILLARIN AC No. 4256. February 13, 2004 PER CURIAM Facts: Complainant submitted a photocopy of the marriage contract between her andrespondent Atty. Alejandro in support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage against thelatter and Villarin. She also submitted a photocopy of the birth certificate of a child of therespondent and also stated that they were married in May 1, 1990 in Isabela, Province.The Supreme Court directed respondents to file their comment on the complaint within 10 days but they failed to comply. Copies of the resolution, complaint and its annexes were returned to both respondents unserved with notation moved, same as when served personally.Complainant was required anew to submit the correct, present address of respondents underpain of dismissal of her administrative complaint. She disclosed respondents address at 12403Develop Drive Houston, Texas in a handwritten letter.The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that both respondents be disbarred.The Supreme Court ordered Atty. Alejandroto be disbarred while the complaint against his co-respondent Atty. Villarin was returned to the IBP for further proceedings or it appears that acopy of the resolution requiring comment was never deemed served upon her as it was upon Atty. Alejandro.Issue: Whether or not abandonment of lawful wife and maintaining an illicit relationship withanother woman are grounds for disbarment.Held: Sufficient evidence showed that respondent Atty. Alejandro, lawfully married tocomplainant, carried on an illicit relationship with co-respondent Atty. Villarin. Although theevidence was not sufficient to prove that he co0ntracted a subsequent bigamous marriage, thatfact remains of his deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as member of the bar. A disbarment proceeding is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife andmaintains an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child. We can do noless in this case where Atty. Alejandro even fled to another country to escape the consequencesof his misconduct.Therefore, Atty. Alejandro disbarred from the practice of law while the complaint against Atty. Villarin was referred back to the IBP.

Case: JOSELANO GUEVARRA vs. ATTY.JOSE EMMANUEL EALAA.C. No. 7136August 1, 2007 Facts: H e f i r s t m e t r e s p o n d e n t i n J a n u a r y 2000 wh en his (complainant's) then-fianceeIrene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent tohim as her friend who was married toM a r i a n n e ( s o m e t i m e s s p e l l e d " M a r y A n n " ) T a n t o c o w i t h w h o m h e h a d t h r e e c h i l d r e n . A f t e r h i s m a r r i a g e t o I r e n e o n O c t o b e r 7 , 2000, complainant noticed that from Januaryt o M a r c h 2 0 0 1 , I r e n e h a d b e e n r e c e i v i n g from respondent cellphone calls, as well asmessages some of which read "I love you," "Imiss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."Complainant also noticed that Ireneh a b i t u a l l y went home very late at night o r e a r l y i n t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y , and sometimes did not go home from work.When he asked about her whereabouts, shereplied that she slept at her parents' housei n B i n a n g o n a n , R i z a l o r she was busy w i t h her work. In February or March 2001,complainant saw Irene and respondentt o g e t h e r o n t w o o c c a s i o n s . O n t h e s e c o n d occasion, he confronted them followingwhich Irene abandoned the conjugal house.On April 22, 2001, complainant wentuninvited to Irene's birthday celebration atw h i c h h e s a w h e r a n d r e s p o n d e n t celebrating with her family and friends. Outof embarrassment, anger and humiliation, heleft the venue immediately. Following thati n c i d e n t , I r e n e w e n t t o t h e c o n j u g a l h o u s e and hauled off all her personal belongings,p i e c e s o f f u r n i t u r e , a n d h e r s h a r e o f t h e household appliances. Complainant laterf o u n d , i n t h e m a s t e r ' s b e d r o o m , a f o l d e d social card bearing the words "I Love You" onits face, which card

when unfolded containeda handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000,the day of his wedding to Irene. Complainantsoon saw respondent's car and that of Irenec o n s t a n t l y p a r k e d a t N o . 7 1 - B 1 1 th Street,New Manila where, as he was to later learnsometime in April 2001, Irene was alreadyresiding. He also learned still later that whenhis friends saw Irene on or about January 18,2002 together with respondent during aconcert, she was pregnant. The relationshipgave birth to Samantha Louise Irene Moje.Respondent specifically denies having everflaunted an adulterous relationship. He averst h a t t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s l o w p r o f i l e a n d k n o w n o n l y t o t h e i m m e d i a t e m e m b e r s o f thei r respective families. Although, fromrespondent's Answer, he does not denycarrying on an adulterous relationship withIrene. The IBP-CBD found the charge againstr e s p o n d e n t s u f f i c i e n t l y p r o v e n . T h e Commissioner thus recommended 19 thatrespondent be disbarred for violating Rule1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code. However, the IBP-CBDannulled and set aside the recommendationof the Investigating Commissioner anda c c o r d i n g l y d i s m i s s e d t h e c a s e f o r l a c k o f merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006.Hence, the present petition before this court. Issues: 1. Whether or not an illicit relationshipw i t h a m a r r i e d w o m a n i n a d i s c r e e t manner would constitute a grossimmoral conduct that would warrantdisbarment against a lawyer.2. Whether or not the acquittal of anaccused in a criminal charge is a barto an disbarment proceeding. Ruling :U n d e r S e c t i o n 2 7 o f R u l e 1 3 8 o f t h e R e v i s e d R u l e s o f C o u r t , T h e i m m e d i a t e l y - quoted Rule which provides the grounds fordisbarment or suspension uses the phrase"grossly immoral conduct," not "underscandalous circumstances." "Whether alawyer's sexual congress with a woman noth i s w i f e o r w i t h o u t t h e b e n e f i t o f m a r r i a g e should be characterized as 'grossly immoralconduct' depends on the surroundingcircumstances." 35 The case at bar involves arelationship between a married lawyer and am a r r i e d w o m a n w h o i s n o t h i s w i f e . I t i s immaterial whether the affair was carried outdiscreetly.

Although it may be true that the RTCo f Q u e z o n C i t y g r a n t e d t h e n u l l i t y o f t h e i r marriage (complainant s) and later thecomplainant withdraw the criminal complaintagainst the respondent thus leaves acquittalof the respondent, the same would not haveb e e n a b a r t o t h e p r e s e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e complaint. Citing the ruling in Pangan v.Ramos, the acquittal of respondent Ramos[of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these[administrative] proceedings. The standardsof legal profession are not satisfied byconduct which merely enables one to escapethe penalties of criminal law. Moreover, thisCourt, in disbarment proceedings is acting inan entirely different capacity from that whichcourts assume in trying criminal case. Also inGatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v.Atty. Naldoza, administrative cases againstlawyers belong to a class of their own. Theyare distinct from and they may proceedindependently of civil and criminal cases. Held: Petition granted, ATTY. JOSEEMMANUEL EALA disbarred. Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. MelencioL. Mauricio, Jr. A.C. No. 7199,July 22, 2009 CARPIO MORALES, J.: FACTS: T h i s i s a d i s b a r m e n t c a s e a g a i n s t A t t y . M e l a n i o L . M a u r i c i o , J r . , popularly known as Batas Mauricio by Foodsphere, Inc. (complainantunder the brand name CDO after a certain Alberto Cordero purportedly bought a can of CDO Liver spread discovering a colony of worms in it.He filed a lawsuit and asked CDO to pay Php150,000 on a conciliationdone by BFAD but CDO refused and instead offered to pay the actualmedical and incidental expenses of Mr. Cordero. He brought the matter tothe media where Atty Mauricio threatened CDO that he would publisha n d a i r i n h i s T V a n d R a d i o p r o g r a m s t h e r e t h e s a i d i s s u e . A f t e r a K A S U N D U A N w a s m a d e b e t w e e n A t t y M a u r c i o a s w i t n e s s a n d t h e Corderos of a money settlement of Php 50,000 including placing paida d v e r t i s e m e n t s i n t h e t a b l o i d s a n d t e l e v i s i o n p r o g r a m w h e r e A t t y . Mauricio is working, respondent (Mauricio) still not satisfied with theoffer threatened to proceed with the publication of the

articles/columns .He then made several libelous write ups and comments about CDO.Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent for Libel a n d T h r e a t e n i n g t o P u b l i s h L i b e l u n d e r A r t i c l e s 3 5 3 a n d 3 5 6 o f t h e Revised Penal Code. The complaints were pending at the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint but Atty Mauticio didn t s t o p f r o m m a k i n g w r i t e u p s a n d c o m m e n t s a b o u t t h e m a t t e r a n d questioned the integrity of the prosecutors officeusing coarse languages. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mauricio has violated: 1.C a n o n 1 1 o f t h e C o d e o f P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y w h i c h provides: A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect[ d ] u e [ t ] o [ t ] h e [ c ] o u r t s [ a ] n d [ t ] o [ j ] u d i c i a l [ o ] f f i c e r s [ a ] n d [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y[o]thers. 2.R u l e 1 . 0 1 - A l a w y e r s h a l l n o t e n g a g e i n u n l a w f u l , d i s h o n e s t , immoral or deceitful conduct. 3.R u l e 1 3 . 0 2 - A l a w y e r s h a l l n o t m a k e p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinionfor or against a party. 4.C A N O N 8 - A l a w y e r s h a l l c o n d u c t h i m s e l f w i t h c o u r t e s y , fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shallavoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. 5.Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, uselanguage which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, 6.CANON 7 - A Lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity anddignity of the legal profession RULING: Y e s A t t y . M e l a n i o M a u r i c i o v i o l a t e d t h e l a w y e r s o a t h a n d h a s committed a breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in theC o d e o f P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y m e n t i o n e d a b o v e a n d i s there fore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effectiveupon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of thesame or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. 178 HECK v SANTOS Facts:-In a previous case entitled Flor v. Heck which was lodged at the Regional Trial Court, defendants therein, includingHeck, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction since the case involved an intracorporatematter which was within the jurisdiction of the SEC.-The motion was denied by Judge Santos.-Counsel for therein defendants, Atty. Jardin, subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as counsel which was granted bySantos, who reset the hearing date from April 1 to June 10.-As the defendants never received a copy of the order granting Jardin s motion to withdraw, neither defendants nor theircounsel appeared at the hearing on June 10.-At the said hearing, Santos admitted the evidence of the plaintiff and considered the defendants as having waived theirright to present evidence.-The judge then authorized the counsel for the plaintiffs, Atty.Singson, to draft the decision. The defendants did notreceive a copy of such order.-In October, Santos rendered a decision which was copied verbatim from the draft decision submitted by Atty. Singson.Issue: W/N Judge Santos act of ordering the counsel for one of the parties to draft a decision warrants disciplinarysanction.Held:YES.-Santos violated Canons 2* and 3** of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Section 1 Rule 36 ( A judgment or final orderdetermining the merits of the case shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge ) of the RevisedRules of Court.-By such order, the judge abdicated a function exclusively granted to him by the Constitution. Decision making is the mostimportant duty of a judge. He must use his own perceptiveness in analyzing the evidence before him and his owndiscretion in determining the proper action.-Lack of malice or bad faith in issuing the questioned order is not an excuse.-Such act falls under the classification of a serious charge. The sanctions provided by Rule 140 Sec.10 are 1) disbarment2) suspension for 3 mos, or 3) fine P20,000 40,000.-Since Santos had already retired, his dismissal or suspension is no longer feasible. He is thus ordered to pay a fine of P20,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.*A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.**A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence adjudicative responsibilities In re Edillon (A.M. No. 1928; 84 SCRA 554 [1978]) Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governorsunanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court theremoval of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay hismembership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of hisconstitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining hisstatus as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay

the correspondingdues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization towhich he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty andproperty guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the aboveprovisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Courtbut is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." Issues: Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues? Held: It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he ishereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. Ratio Decidendi: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutionalfreedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he isnot already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-definedb u t u n o r g a n i z e d a n d i n c o h e s i v e g r o u p o f w h i c h e v e r y l a w y e r i s a r e a d y a m e m b e r . B a r integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or notattend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as hechooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. TheSupreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashionbe shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers. Moreover,there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional power and duty topromulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of thePhilippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution), from requiring members of aprivileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeedimposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives andpurposes of integration. Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under thenecessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right topractise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation andinquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penaltydesigned to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is notvoid as unreasonable or arbitrary. It is sufficient to state then that the matters of admission,suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have Page 1 of 2

been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and theauthorities holding such are legion. Thus, the Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1 9 7 3 C o n s t i t u t i o n w h e n i t e x p l i c i t l y g r a n t e d t o t h e C o u r t t h e p o w e r t o " P r o m u l g a t e r u l e s concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain amember of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court

P e t i t i o n f o r L e a v e T o R e s u m e P r a c t i c e o f L a w , B e n j a m i n M . DacanayB.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007Facts: Petitioner was admitted to theP h i l i p p i n e b a r i n M a r c h 1 9 6 0 . H e p r a ct i ce d l a w u nt i l he mi g ra t ed t o C a n a d a i n D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 8 t o s e e k medical attention for his ailments. Hes u b s e q u e n t l y a p p l i e d f o r C a n a d i a n c i t i z e n s h i p t o a v a i l o f C a n a d a s f r e e medical aid program. His application wasa p p r o v e d a n d h e b e c a m e a C a n a d i a n citizen in May 2004.O n J u l y 1 4 , 2 0 0 6 , p u r s u a n t t o R e p u b l i c Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention andR e A c q u i s i t i o n A c t o f 2 0 0 3 ) , p e t i t i o n e r reacquired his Philippine citizenship. Ont h a t d a y , h e t o o k h i s oath of a l l e g i a n c e as a Filipino citizen before the PhilippineC o n s u l a t e G e n e r a l i n T o r o n t o , C a n a d a . Thereafter, he returned to the Philippinesa n d n o w i n t e n d s t o r e s u m e h i s l a w practice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner lost hismembership in the bar when he gave uphis Philippine citizenship. Holding: The Constitution provides thatt h e p r a c t i c e o f a l l p r o f e s s i o n s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s s h a l l b e l i m i t e d t o F i l i p i n o citi zens save in cases prescribed by law.Since Filipino citizenship is a requirementf o r a d m i s s i o n t o t h e b a r , l o s s t h e r e o f terminates membership in the Philippinebar and, consequently, the privilege toe n g a g e i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f l a w . I n o t h e r words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practicelaw in the Philippines. The practice of lawis a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenshipi s l o s t b y r e a s o n o f n a t u r a l i z a t i o n as ac i t i z e n o f a n o t h e r c o u n t r y b u t subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA9 2 2 5 . T h i s i s b e c a u s e " a l l P h i l i p p i n e citizens who become citizens of anothercountry shall be deemed not to have lostt h e i r P h i l i p p i n e c i t i z e n s h i p u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f [ R A 9 2 2 5 ] . " T h e r e f o r e , a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to havel o s t h i s P h i l i p p i n e c i t i z e n s h i p i f h e reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.A l t h o u g h h e i s a l s o d e e m e d n e v e r t o have terminated his membership in theP h i l i p p i n e b a r , n o a u t o m a t i c r i g h t t o resume law practice accrues.U n d e r R A 9 2 2 5 , i f a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t o p r a c t i c e t h e l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n i n t h e Philippines and he reacquires his Filipinoc i t i z e n s h i p p u r s u a n t t o i t s p r o v i s i o n s " ( h e ) s h a l l a p p l y w i t h t h e p r o p e r aut h o ri t y f o r a l i cens e o r per mi t t o e n g a g e i n s u c h p r a c t i c e . " S t a t e d o t h e r w i s e , b e f o r e a l a w y e r w h o reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant toRA 9225 can resume his law practice, hem u s t f i r s t s e c u r e f r o m t h i s C o u r t t h e authority to do so, conditioned on:( a ) t h e u p d a t i n g a n d p a y m e n t i n f u l l o f the annual membership dues in the IBP;(b) the payment of professional tax;( c ) t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f a t l e a s t 3 6 c r e d i t h o u r s o f m a n d a t o r y c o n t i n u i n g l e g a l education; this is specially significant tor e f r e s h t h e a p p l i c a n t / p e t i t i o n e r s knowledge of Philippine laws and updatehim of legal developments and( d ) t h e r e t a k i n g o f t h e l a w y e r s o a t h w h i c h w i l l n o t o n l y r e m i n d h i m o f h i s d u t i e s a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a s a l a w y e r a n d a s a n o f f i c e r o f t h e C o u r t , b u t a l s o renew his pledge to maintain allegianceto the Republic of the Philippines. The Court granted the petition subject toc o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s s t a t e d a b o v e a n d s u b m i s s i o n o f p r o o f o f s u c h c o m p l i a n c e t o t h e B a r C o n f i d a n t , a f t e r w h i c h h e m a y r e t a k e h i s o a t h a s a member of the Philippine bar

[A.C. No. 4148.August 31, 1999] REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR vs. LAURO L. TAPUCAR.

Tapucar A.M. Per

vs. No. 4148 July 30,

Tapucar 1998 Curiam

FACTS: Complainant Remedios Tapucar and respondent Atty. Lauro Tapucar were married with 11 children. When respondent became a CFI judge, he cohabited with Elena Pea of whom he had 2 children. A certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. But his dismissal as a

judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways, and even continued living with Elena. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children. Respondent later contracted marriage with Elena while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists. Upon knowing of that her children allegedly misery because of their father's acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Complainant filed the present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. ISSUE: Whether

or

not

the

respondent s

actuations

merit

the

penalty

of

disbarment?

HELD: Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. RATIO: The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that: Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Members of the Bar, must live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly. In the case at bar, keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates his professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be free from any appearance of impropriety. For a judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law. Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.

G.R. No. L-18727

August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant, ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant. Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee. Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofilea for defendant-appellant. Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants. MAKALINTAL, J.: This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui. The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926. Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows: Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu. Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision. Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position. Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of theHospicio in their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion." The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of theHospicio de Barili. The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor. We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset. Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443) Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.) The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816). As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out. This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose. Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of theHospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator. Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of theHospicio. Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the Hospiciocommenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of

the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of theHospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal. On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an action inquo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161. Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur.

[A.C. No. 2756 : December 18, 1990.] 192 SCRA 381 PRUDENTIAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a Decision, dated 12 November 1987, this Court, upon finding that respondent Benjamin Grecia had "proven himself unfit to continue in the pursuit of his profession," ordered his disbarment. Respondent Grecia thereafter sought a reconsideration of the said Resolution on 14 December 1987. This was denied in the Resolution of 12 January 1988 for lack of merit, the issues raised having previously been duly considered and passed upon. Undaunted, respondent filed, on 10 February 1988 a "Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition," praying that the decision of 12 November 1987, and the resolution of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision be set aside and a new one entered dismissing the administrative complaint and exonerating him. We denied his plea in a Resolution dated 15 March 1988, it being in the nature of a second Motion for Reconsideration filed without leave of court, besides the fact that the first Motion for Reconsideration filed by him had already been denied with finality on January 12, 1988.:-cralaw This notwithstanding, respondent filed another Motion requesting an extension of time to file a Motion for Reconsideration, this time, of the Resolution of 15 March 1988 simultaneously praying that the Bar Confidant furnish him with a certified true copy of the Solicitor General's Report and Recommendation. These requests were denied in the Resolution of 5 May 1988. Seven months later, or on 29 December 1988, respondent, through counsel, filed a "Petition for Reinstatement as a Member of the Bar," this time praying for "justice, leniency, understanding and mercy from the Members of this Honorable Court," citing several cases of lawyers previously disbarred but who were eventually reinstated. Respondent averred that he comes to court "on bended knees asking for the same kindness, understanding, liberality and leniency." This was once again denied in the Resolution of 15 June 1989 the same being substantially a repetition of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 12 November 1987, which was already denied with finality in the Resolution dated 12 January 1988. A "Motion for Leave to File Testimonials to Support Petition for Reinstatement" was filed on 11 May 1989 which Motion was accompanied by various testimonials from prominent members of the Bar urging the Court to grant his plea for reinstatement, which the Court Noted in its Resolution of 30 May 1989. Unrelenting in his efforts, respondent Grecia, on 13 July 1989, filed a "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution Denying Petition for Reinstatement." Varying the tenor of his previous submissions, respondent in this instance: ". . . begs to apologize to this Honorable Supreme Court for repeating in his petition for reinstatement what he already alleged in his Motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Honorable Court dated 12 November 1987. There petition was due to his confused state of mind caused by the tremendous impact of the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. To rectify the error committed, and with the kind permission and leave of this Honorable Court, respondent is hereby openly and unequivocally retracting, withdrawing and abandoning all the statements and arguments of, and allusions and references to, the previously denied motion for reconsideration which have been alleged or used in his petition for reinstatement. In consequence, respondent respectfully prays that this Honorable Court ignore them and treat the petition for reinstatement of respondent, as one limited to, and mainly and exclusively predicated on, his plea for leniency, understanding, liberality, mercy and judicial clemency." Unmoved, we denied the motion with finality in our Resolution of 19 October 1989 there being no compelling reason raised to warrant reconsideration of the questioned Resolution.:-cralaw On 24 November 1989, respondent filed a "Motion for Permission to Reiterate his Petition for Reinstatement" stating that he humbly begs permission to plead again for its forgiveness and clemency; that he has suffered the harsh and supreme sanction of disbarment for two long years now; that this is his first offense; that he solemnly declares that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he is fully repentant and learned the most bitter lesson of his life to such an extent that he solemnly vows never to commit any offense again; that his sufferance of the extreme sanction of disbarment has changed him for the better; that he had fully purged himself in the proper and irreproachable manner and that he prays that he be forgiven and pardoned by this Court. The Motion was denied with finality in the Resolution of 21 December 1989.

On 21 May 1990, Mrs. Maria Luisa B. Grecia, wife of respondent wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court stating that she has long wanted to write and if it need be, on bended knees, to ask the Court sincerely to forgive her husband and permit him to practice his profession; that it is not only he who is suffering the anguish and shame caused by his disbarment but also his children and herself; that it is now two and a half (2 1/2) years since her husband has been disbarred and completely without any means to support his family; that their youngest daughter may altogether have to stop studying; that during these years, her husband has deeply repented and is now very humble and prayerful and has reformed for the better and that she pleads that her husband be forgiven and reinstated as a lawyer. The letter was Noted for the time being in the Resolution of 28 June 1990. On 17 October 1990, the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar, submitted to the Bar Confidant for the Court's consideration, Resolution No. 90-057, adopted on 9 October 1990, praying that the Court extend its judicial clemency to respondent Grecia and reinstate him as a member of the Philippine Bar, reasoning among others, that he has been "sufficiently punished," has reformed and rehabilitated himself, and can again be entrusted with the exercise of the noble profession of law. In a letter, dated 21 November 1990, addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Court, respondent Grecia pleaded anew that once the Court restores him to the practice of law, he "unreservedly bind(s)" himself "henceforth to act and behave carefully as a worthy member of the Philippine Bar." Without overlooking the charge which caused respondent's disbarment, reinstatement may now be warranted, predicated on the following objective and criterion: "The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to practice, by one previously disbarred, is to determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by positive evidence that the effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be readmitted to a profession which is intrinsically an office of trust. (In Re: Rusiana, Adm. Case No. 270, 29 March 1974, 56 SCRA 240).:-cralaw "The criterion for reinstatement has been stated as follows: Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the Bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement." (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443, cited in In Re: Juan T. Publico, February 20, 1981, 102 SCRA 721). The testimonials submitted in respondent's favor are from well-respected and prominent members of the legal community namely: Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Querube Makalintal, Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla, former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, Lourdes Paredes San Diego, former Supreme Court Justice Ruperto Martin, Senator Neptali Gonzales, Attys. Dakila F. Castro, Camilo Quiason, Gregorio Purugganan, Teofilo F. Manalo (Past Governor, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 1975-1977), Manuel T. Molina and Diosdado P. Peralta, President of the Capitol Bar Association. All their testimonials attest to respondent's good moral character and to the fact that he has mended his ways towards the rehabilitation of his character such that his reinstatement "will not only be an act of compassion but also of justice" (Records, Vol. II, Testimonial of former Supreme Court Justice Querube Makalintal). Cognizant, therefore, "that the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle," (In re Juan T. Publico, supra), we heed respondent's plea for reinstatement. His expiation subsequent to his disbarment; his realization of his mistake and the gravity of his offense; the testimonials from exemplary members of the Bar as to his fitness to resume the practice of law; and his solemn pledge to the Court, that if his disbarment is lifted, he will always closely and faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the legal profession, call for this affirmative response.: nad ACCORDINGLY, respondent Benjamin M. Grecia is hereby ordered READMITTED to membership in the Bar. SO ORDERED. Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.