Three Musketeers

THREE MUSKETEERS, The. If a Note were taken in Europe and America as to the best historical romance ever penned there can he little doubt that it would favor 'The Three Musketeers' ('Les trois Mousquetaires)) of Alexandre Dumas. Published in 1844, just three decades after (Waverley,' this work ex emplified Scott's theory of the historical novel to perfection. It focussed interest upon certain minor figures whose fate was linked with that of famous personages and great move ments of a bygone day. Unlike the fictions of Scott, however, it freely ordered and changed the facts of history, implying the romancer's emancipation from actuality and his right to shape his story at will so long as it should reflect in general the spirit of the time represented. Dumas had read the 'Memoircs de M. d'Artagnan,) by Gatien Cotirtilz de Sandras (Cologne, 1701-02). His imagination, thus incited, played over the pe nod of Richelieu's ascendancy, ana with un flagging verve and brilliance he described what might have happened to a more courageous and chivalrous d'Artagnan caught in the counter-currents of amorous and political in trigue in 1628. The plot turns upon the enmity between the queen of Louis XIII and his Minister, Richelieu. The latter seeks to control the queen through his knowledge of love for Buck ingham, attested by her bestowal upon the English lord of certain diamonds, the gift of her husband. Richelieu, for his own ends, arouses the jealousy of the king, who demands that the queen wear the diamonds at a state ball. It behooves the queen, therefore, to recover the gems in all haste, and the difficult mission is undertaken by d'Artagnan and his gallant friends, the three guardsmen. After encoun tering well-nigh insuperable obstacles d'Artag nan succeeds, but he incurs the enmity of Richelieu's most dangerous agent, Milady Cla rik. He falls enamored of her, yet escapes her toils assassination and poison only to learn that she is the cardinal's emissary sent to England to threaten Buckingham with ex posure unless he will cease his efforts to aid the besieged Huguenots of La Rochelle. D'Artagnan and the musketeers, thereupon, thwart Milady, who, languishing in prison, ere long prevails upon her Puritan jailer to re lease her and to achieve the murder of Buckingham. Then she contrives to poison d'Artag nan's sweetheart, but, pursued by the avenging guardsmen, is overtaken and adjudged to suf fer death for her many crimes. Richelieu, secretly pleased to be relieved of so wicked an ally, pardons d'Artagnan and commissions him a lieutenant of the musketeers. From first to last, the romance moves at a rapid pace in a world of passion and daring, of hot blood and ready swords, of intrigue and revenge, of jaunty heroism, of splendid loyalty and of dauntless love and friendship. It kicks up its heels, too, now and then, in the mood of rollicking humor. For all its de partures from historic fact, it paints in vivid colors a living picture of France in the 17th century. Especially memorable are its portraits. Though Milady prove the villain of melodrama in petticoats, she is far from being a mere lay figure; and Buckingham, Richelieu, the queen, even the lackeys of d'Artagnan and the musketeers, above all these gallant gentlemen themselves, are vital creations. D'Artagnan, the impetuous and generous Gascon, is well matched by his friends, the shrewd and dainty Aramis, the boastful and dandified Porthos, and the melancholy Athos. It is small wonder that the four should have enthralled the minds of readers of every race and clime, and that Dumas, yielding to popular demand, should have continued their adventures in 'Twenty Years After' (1845) and the 'Vicomte de Brage lonne' (1848-50). These

sequels and 'The Three Musketeers' are discussed in monographs on Dumas, in French, by Glinel (1884), de Bury (1885), Parigot (1902) and Lccomte (1904), and in English by Fitzgerald (1873), Spurr (1902) and Davidson (1902). The re lation of Dumas to Scott is made clear in Louis Maigron's 'Roman historique en France> (1898). (carte despre Franta in timpul lui Richelieu) http://books.google.ro/books? id=Knk6zVEUQcEC&pg=PA128&lpg=PA128&dq=strateg+richelieu&source=bl&ots=FM8YJljxp&sig=tDrgVNUzFKDEzip53HqvIGp8aZ4&hl=ro&ei=Qj6kTt-WKPTb4QS49j0BA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=st rateg%20richelieu&f=false

Cardinal Richelieu Prime Minister of France

1585 1642 9.9. 1585 - 4.7. 1642 If you give me six lines written by the most honest man, I will find something in them to hang him.
Cardinal Richelieu http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Cardinal_Richelieu

Savoir dissimuler est le savoir des rois. o Deception is the knowledge of kings. o Maxims, Testament Politique (1641) Secrecy is the first essential in affairs of state. o Maxims, Testament Politique (1641) Pour tromper un rival l'artifice est permis; on peut tout employer contres ses ennemis. o We may employ artifice to deceive a rival, anything against our enemies. As quoted in Dictionary of Quotations from Ancient and Modern English and Foreign Sources (1899) by James Wood

Variant translation: To mislead a rival, deception is permissible; one may use all means against his enemies. Ultima ratio Regum o The last reasoning of Kings. A comment upon artillery fire, as quoted in Dictionary of Foreign Phrases and Classical Quotations (1908) edited by Hugh Percy Jones, p. 119; these words were later inscribed upon cannon of Louis XVI of France. Had Luther and Calvin been confined before they had begun to dogmatize, the states would have been spared many troubles. o As quoted in The Catholic Encyclopedia (1913), edited by Charles George Herbermann Harshness towards individuals who flout the laws and commands of state is for the public good; no greater crime against the public interest is possible than to show leniency to those who violate it. o As quoted in Champlain's Dream (2008) by David Hackett Fischer
o

Disputed

Qu'on me donne six lignes crites de la main du plus honnte homme, j'y trouverai de quoi le faire pendre. o If you give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest of men, I will find something in them which will hang him. As quoted in The Cyclopedia of Practical Quotations (1896) by Jehiel Keeler Hoyt, p. 763 o douard Fournier, in L'Espirit dans l'Historie (1867), 3rd edition, Ch. 51, p. 260, disputes the traditional attribution, and suggests various agents of Richelieu might have been the actual author. o Variant translations: o Give me six lines written by the most honest man in the world, and I will find enough in them to hang him. Attributed in Dictionary of Foreign Phrases and Classical Quotations (1908) edited by Hugh Percy Jones, p. 327 o If one would give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest man, I would find something in them to have him hanged. As quoted in America Debates Privacy Versus Security (2007) by Jeri Freedman o Give me six lines written by the most honest man, and I will find something there to hang him. As quoted in Champlain's Dream (2008) by David Hackett Fischer (1585 - 1642) became the most powerful person in France during the reign of King Louis XIII. In part because Louis was a weak king and in part because Richelieu, himself, was so strong. Richelieu in his role as chief of the Royal Council, and later First Minister and Chief of State, had control of almost every facet of French politics, from the daily activities of the court to foreign policy and affairs. His dual role as head of the church in France and chief of state, allowed him to control the very direction he wished the government to go.

http://www.naples.net/~clutchey/cardinal.htm

Under Richelieu the strategy of colonization was two fold. The Jesuits the strongest and most influential of the religious orders, established the goals of converting the Indians to Christianity. The thought was that the Indians, once converted, would become role players in the settling of the land. The strategy proved unsuccessful, the Indians while in some cases accepting Christianity, had no desire to give up their way of life. It soon became obvious that if the land was to become developed in the image of France, it would be through immigration using settlers from France, not through the integration of the Indian into the agriculture or socio-economic structure of the French way of life. In France, Richelieu granted a charter to the Company of One Hundred Associates in 1627. Under the charter, the Company was granted full title to land extending from Florida to the Arctic Circle. In return the Company was obliged to bring out 200- 300 settlers in 1628 and 4000 more during the next 15 years. The Company had an investment of 300,000 livres ( the livre being the basic monetary unit worth about $2.00 US.) Unfortunately for the company, their first convoy of four ships and 400 settlers was captured in the Gulf of St. Lawrence resulting in a total loss of supplies to the settlers already in New France and the Company was forced to look at other means of colonizing. The French devised a scheme of Land Grants to persons of means. For gentlemen of France who had served their country well, huge grants of land were made in New France, but with these grants came certain obligations. The system known as the 'Seigneurial System' obligated the 'Seigneur' to bring settlers out from France who then were given portions of the land grant in return for providing services to the 'lord' (seigneur). The services were such activities as helping the seigneur to develop his land, building the seigneurial mansion, government buildings and churches.. In return the settlers received their passage from New France to the New World, a stipend identified by the 'contract' signed before leaving France, and, where warranted, a portion of the land grant for the settler to farm on his own. Religion, however, did play a significant role in solidifying and maintaining the presence of the church and the strong fabric of French society. The parish priests held together the communities, keeping together the family units whose most important link was the parish church. Consequently the building of the local church held a high priority in every seigneury. It was here the early Cloutiers played so prominent a role. Zacharie Cloutier was recruited by Giffard not for his potential as a farmer, but for his skills as a builder. He was first a carpenter but later also became a skilled mason as well. His responsibilities were to construct the Government buildings, the Manor House, and the Parish church. Consequently he never did 'farm' in the true sense of the word. After he completed his 'servitude' with Giffard he took his trade to other communities to build their churches.

In short Cardinal Richelieu's policies with regard to the spread of Christianity, and his seigneurial system approach to settlement molded well with the skills and ambitions of Zacharie Cloutier I who put these policies into practice in the new land.

Cardinal Richelieu was born Armand Jean du Plessis in Paris on September 9, 1585. He took the name Richelieu from the name of his family's estate. Armand was extremely intelligent and at the age of nine was sent to College de Navarre in Paris. In 1602, at age seventeen he began studying theology seriously. In 1606 he was appointed Bishop of Luon, and in 1622 Pope Gregory made Richelieu a Cardinal. Cardinal Richelieu rose from his provincial post in Luon to become France's Secretary of State for foreign affairs in 1616, and then on to head the royal council as prime minister of France in 1624. His powerful, analytical intellect was characterized by a reliance on reason, strong will, the ability to govern others and use political power effectively. Even before becoming Prime Minister, Richelieu's political views were well-defined. He had a clear idea of how society should function. Everyone played a specific role in the system, making their unique contributions: the clergy through prayer; the nobility with arms under the control of the king, and the common people through obedience. Richelieu believed in the divine right of the king, whose role it was to promote peace and order in society. Richelieu adhered to the maxim that "the ends justify the means." Although he devoutly believed in the mission of the Roman Church, he sought to assign the church a more practical role. Richelieu argued that the state is above everything, and that religion is a mere instrument to promote the policies of the state. When Richelieu rose to power France's King Louis XIII had not solidified his authority in France. A combination of political corruption, an independent nobility, and the power of a Protestant group called the Huguenots, threatened the monarchy's rule. In 1627 Richelieu set out to secure the authority of the crown through force and political repression. By 1631 he had crushed Huguenot resistance, severely punished nobles who plotted against the king, and replaced his enemies in the government. In addition, he expanded the king's authority in the provinces through the use of royal agents called intendants. Richelieu insisted that the king apply the law with severity, otherwise the state could not survive. He emphasized that rigorous punishment of even small crimes would forestall greater ones. Through this reasoning, Richelieu provided his sovereign a rationale for the harsh rule he knew to be requisite with strengthening and maintaining the authority of the French State. Cardinal Richelieu has been admired by many historians for his intelligence and energy. During his service as prime minister he helped France become the leading power in Europe. He supported the French navy and the establishment of French colonies in Africa and the Caribbean. Richelieu was also a great patron of the arts. He rebuilt the Sorbonne in Paris, supported promising writers and founded the French Academy. Many French historians consider Richelieu as the founder of French unity, as well as the person who released France from its medieval nature.

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/cardinal_richlieu.htm

Cardinal Richelieu was born in 1585 and died in 1642. Richelieu dominated the history of France from 1624 to his death as Louis XIIIs chief minister, succeeding Luynes who died in 1621. Richelieu is considered to be one of the greatest politicians in French history. Richelieu was the third son of the Lord of Richelieu. He was educated in Paris at the Collge de Navarre. From here he went to a military school and then on to the Collge de Calvi where he studied theology. The plan was for Richelieu to take over the family bishopric at Luon in Poitou. In April 1607, after receiving a papal dispensation as he was only 21, he was ordained as a priest and bishop. How did a man born into a minor noble family and who administered a small and poor diocese, come to dominate France from 1624 to 1642? Richelieu had huge ambitions to achieve far reaching power. By 1614 had achieved a reputation as a fine administrator in his diocese and he was considered a very good speaker at the meetings of the Estates-General. He became known as a dvot (a very strong supporter of Roman Catholicism) who then held pro-Spanish views. These were made known to the regent, Marie de Medici, who rewarded Richelieu by bringing him to the Royal Court in November 1615 where he was appointed Chaplain to the new queen, Anne of Austria. The royal favourite, Concini, also believed that Richelieu was talented and had him appointed Secretary of State for War and Foreign Affairs. When Concini was murdered in 1617, it appeared as if the political career of Richelieu was over. Marie de Medici was exiled to a chateau at Blois and Richelieu went with her. Between 1617 and 1622, Richelieu faded into relative obscurity. The one avenue he had to the king was, ironically, via Marie's association with rebellion. Richelieu acted as a go-between when mother and son fell out over her associations with those who were deemed less than trustworthy in the royal court. In 1622, Marie was successfully re-instated at court as a result of Richelieu's skilled negotiations with Louis XIII. Marie persuaded her son that Richelieu was a highly skilled politician. None of the politicians who had replaced Luynes on his death in 1621, proved to be successful and with France becoming more and more involved at a non-military level in the Thirty Years War, Louis knew that a long term replacement for Luynes was needed and in April 1624, Richelieu was given a seat on the Royal Council and in August 1624, was made Chief Minister. Richelieu's time as chief minister is notable for many reasons. He attacked the Huguenots; reformed the navy and army; crushed any rebellions and advanced royal absolutism; he raised money by any methods required and he supervised a foreign policy that was designed to make France the greatest power in Europe. It was said that you either liked Richelieu or hated him - there was no half-way.

In November 1642, Richelieu fell ill. He died on the 4th December 1642. His time as Chief Minister had brought untold suffering to the general population of France but he had pushed the nation on to the path of glory. Just days before he died, Richelieu wrote to Louis XIII:
"I have the consolation of leaving your kingdom in the highest degree of glory and of reputation."

Louis XIII died shortly after in May 1643. His son Louis was only 4 so a regency was formed headed by Anne of Austria, the Queen Mother, and the Duke of Orleans, the former noble rebel. In Louis will, Anne was ordered to work with the ministers appointed by Richelieu to succeed him so that Richelieus policies would continue. Anne succeeded in forcing the Parlement de Paris to free her from the restraints of the will and allowed her to rule as she wished on behalf of her son.

http://www.diplom.org/Zine/S1995R/Szykman/History.html Simon Szykman

Diplomacy: An Historical Perspective
Introduction
Most of us probably realize that Diplomacy didn't just come into existence in 1976 with the introduction by The Avalon Hill Game Company of a game by that name. However, for many of us, that is probably the extent of what we know about diplomacy outside of the game. I say "us" and "we" because until I wrote this column, that was the extent of my own knowledge on the subject. It was this realization that prompted me to take what was going to be just a very brief etymological definition of diplomacy (i.e. where the word "diplomacy" came from), and expand it into an article on the history of diplomacy. Surely the concept of diplomacy goes farther back than does recorded history. However, trying to think that far back I can't help conjuring up an image of a Far Side cartoon illustrating an aborted attempt at diplomacy between two Neanderthals named Ugh and Urk involving a rock, a

club and maybe a stone wheel. I will therefore stick to what I was able to find out doing a little research, which necessarily limits this article to the written record.

On "Diplomacy"
According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, two definitions for "diplomacy" are:
1. The art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations for the attainment of mutually satisfactory terms. 2. Adroitness or artfulness in securing advantages without arousing hostility: address or tact in conduct of affairs.

To begin, I will return to my original intention for this piece and describe the origin of the word "diplomacy". The word stems from the Greek word , or diploma, which literally means two fold (not "twofold", but as in folded in two). In ancient Greece, a diploma was a certificate certifying completion of a course of study, typically folded in two. In the days of the Roman Empire, the word diploma was used to describe official travel documents, such as passports and passes for imperial roads, that were stamped on double metal plates. Later, the meaning was extended to cover other official documents such as treaties with foreign tribes. In the 1700's the French called their body of officials attached to foreign legations the corps diplomatique. The word diplomacy was first introduced into English by Edmund Burke in 1796, based on the French word diplomatie (the -tie in French is pronounced like the -cy in English and therefore diplomatie sounds very much like diplomacy only with a French accent).

Diplomacy in Primitive Societies

The concept of diplomacy may seem like one that would follow naturally once any society reaches a certain level of sophistication. As it turns out, this hypothesis is supported by the fact that ideas relating to diplomacy have arisen in many primitive societies, seemingly without external intervention. As an example, the idea of diplomatic immunity is known among the Australian aborigines. A study of the diplomacy of primitive peoples encompassing societies in Australia, Asia, Africa and the Americas showed familiarity with ideas such as messengers and envoys to maintain intertribal relations. Some had beliefs that messengers are in possession of a protecting taboo that should not be violated. Others received envoys and their messages according to a given ceremonial. Messengers were often selected not from among the expendable members of the society, but from the leading men and women of the tribe.

Diplomacy in Ancient History

Due to a lack of a preserved written record, very little is known about diplomacy in ancient history. While few in number, there are references to diplomatic concepts across many societies, such as the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Hebrews, the Chinese and the Hindus. Documents dating back to ancient Egypt have been discovered that describe the exchange of envoys between the Egyptian pharaohs and neighboring monarchs. In addition to these descriptions, a treaty dating to 1278 BCE between the pharaoh Ramses II and Hatursi II, the king of the Hittites, was found. Thanks to a cuneiform library founded by Sargon II in the 700's BCE, there is a plentiful record of envoys between Assyria, Babylon and Elam during the reign of Assurbanipal of Assyria, which lasted until 626 BCE. The ancient Chinese were isolationists and did not encourage contacts or relations with outsiders. However, records have been found that describe protocol and rules to be used in such dealings when they occurred.

The Hindus also recognized the importance of diplomacy as is shown by the following quote from the Laws of Manu (an important Hindu text): "Peace and its opposite (that is war) depend on the ambassadors, since it is they who create and undo alliances." A political treatise by Kautylia written circa 300 BCE includes a chapter about envoys that outlines their responsibilities, including transmitting points of view of their rulers, preserving treaties, defending their countries' positions and gathering information. The most abundant source of information is the books of the Old Testament which document many points in the history of the Hebrews. The book of Judges describes the dispatching of messengers by Jepta to negotiate with the Amnonites, and the book of Samuel describes the sending of messengers from the house of Saul to the house of David to bring peace to the two houses.

The Greeks
One of the first diplomatic figures appears in Greek mythology. Hermes, the brother of Apollo, was known for his charm, cunning and trickery. What better qualities for a diplomat? Zeus having a similar opinion, employed Hermes for the most sensitive diplomatic missions and he came to be regarded by the other gods as the intermediary between the upper and lower worlds. The Greeks regarded him as the patron of travelers, merchants and thieves. Moving from mythology to history, among the earliest diplomats were the heralds of the Homeric period (the eighth century BCE) The heralds were, among other things, official agents of negotiation and were chosen for such qualifications as a good memory and a loud voice. As relations between the Greek city-states became more sophisticated, so did the qualifications for diplomatic representatives. By the sixth century BCE, only the best orators were chosen to be ambassadors. By the fifth century BCE, the Greeks had implemented a system of continuous diplomatic relations. A good deal of what is known about diplomacy in ancient Greece comes from histories recorded by Thucydides, which include an account of a diplomatic conference that took place in Sparta in 432 BCE. This conference included such "modern" concepts as making speeches, debates, proposing motions and carrying out votes. Also interesting is the fact that the idea of diplomatic immunity had already taken root, allowing representatives from city-states with antagonistic relationships to take part in these conferences. Demosthenes, another important historical figure, acted as an ambassador for Greece for a time.

The Romans and the Italians

The Greek system of diplomacy acted as a foundation for that of the Roman Republic, which grew over the next several centuries and became the Roman Empire in 27 BCE. The contribution of the Romans to diplomacy was not to its practice, but to its theory. The Romans stressed the importance of adhering to agreements and treaties. Rather than producing skilled negotiators, the Romans produced a skilled archivists who specialized in diplomatic procedures. Thus, the Roman diplomat was more an administrator than a negotiator. Whether it was due to a lack of skilled negotiators or those darned leaded goblets, the Roman Empire eventually started to decline and gave way to the Byzantine Empire in the sixth century AD. The Byzantine emperors recognized the importance of diplomatic skill and revived the art. Under Emperor Justinian's rule, the Byzantine Empire grew partly through the use of three diplomatic strategies: (1) weakening the barbarians by inciting rivalry between them, (2) securing the friendship of frontier tribes with money and flattery, and (3) conversion of heathens to Christianity.

As the Byzantine Empire, too, eventually declined, the playing of one despot against another became a common diplomatic strategy. In this period, the skills desirable in diplomats changed from simple orators to trained observers who could also provide reports about internal politics in the courts of the despots as well as in foreign countries. In the dark ages in feudal Europe, there was little in the way of an established system of dialogues between countries. The Italian city-states more than any other nation at the time remained outside the feudal system. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the diplomatist-statesman began to appear as a consequence of both common interests and rivalries between city-states. The Venetians were reputed to be among the best in this capacity. Their archives include diplomatic documents spanning from the ninth to the eighteenth centuries and include written instructions given to their ambassadors, replies brought back from foreign countries, and reports written upon completion of missions.

The French
Diplomacy did not become a true profession until the fifteenth century, at which time the Italian States began to appoint permanent ambassadors. Among the more well known ambassadors were Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio and Machiavelli. Although the profession of diplomat started with the Italians, it was the French who began to create the very early framework for modern diplomacy. In the 1600's, Cardinal Richelieu made significant advances in diplomatic theory and practice. He stated in his Political Testament that diplomacy should be a continuous process aimed at creating durable relationships rather than attempting to make opportunistic advances. At the time, this was an important shift of the emphasis and purpose of diplomacy. Up until the eighteenth century, the language of diplomacy was Latin. Diplomats both wrote and conversed in Latin; documents such as the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the Anglo-Danish Treaty of 1670 and the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1674 were all drafted in Latin. During the eighteenth century, the French repeatedly tried to have French adopted as the language of diplomacy. The idea was so disliked by other powers that four major treaties that were signed in French had special articles inserted into the treaty specifying that these should not be considered precedents. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, French had become the de facto language of diplomacy and at the Congress of Vienna and the Congress of Paris all proceedings were conducted in French. It was only at the Paris Conference of 1918-19 that an English text - the Treaty of Versailles - was recognized as official. Diplomacy was conducted by statesmen and politicians until the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was not until after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that diplomatic service was recognized as a profession unto itself in various countries. It was then that rules and protocols of modern diplomacy began to take form, based on the precepts set forth by the French during the preceding two centuries.

Modern Diplomacy
The next major revolution in diplomacy came with the end of the World War I. The most famous of all peace proposals following World War I was the program of Fourteen Points, delivered by President Woodrow Wilson in 1918. Two of the fourteen points were: open covenants openly

arrived at (which implied an end to "secret" diplomacy) and the establishment of a League of Nations. Before the establishment of the League of Nations, diplomacy was conducted between individual representatives of nations or for larger treaties at congresses such as those described above. The new idea accompanying the League of Nations and carried later to the United Nations, was diplomacy through a somewhat permanent state of conference between representatives of many nations. This system of "multilateral diplomacy" is still in place today, for better or worse; diplomatic relations are presently regulated according to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a document that was written in 1961 and was adopted in 1964. A great deal of the world's diplomacy that has been conducted since the creation of the United Nations in 1945 has been done in the same building at the United Nations Plaza in New York City. The continuity of the diplomatic institution throughout thousands of years and in all known civilizations shows that diplomacy is an institution inherent to international life itself, one that may undergo transformations or may be used with more or less intensity, but cannot be dispensed with. - Jos Calvet De Magalhes

References
Barnhart, R. K. (ed.), The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology, H. W. Wilson Co., 1988. Klein, E., A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, Elsevier Publishing Co., 1966. Lerner, R. E., Meacham, S. and Burns, E. M. Western Civilizations, Vol. 2, W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1988. Magalhes, J. C. D., The Pure Concept of Diplomacy, Greenwood Press, 1988. Morris, W. and Morris, M., Morris Dictionary of Word and Phrase Origins, Harper & Row, 1988. Nicolson, H., Diplomacy, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1939. Nicolson, H., The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, Constable & Co. Ltd., 1954. Perry, M., Chase, M., Jacob, J. R., Jacob, M. C. and Von Laue, T. H., Western Civilization: Ideas Politics and Society, Vol. 1, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1989. Simon Szykman Carnegie Mellon University (simon@diplom.org)

http://www.probertencyclopaedia.com/cgi-bin/res.pl? keyword=Richelieu&offset=0 DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy is the science or art of conducting negotiations, arranging treaties, etc, between nations; the branch of knowledge which deals with the relations of independent states to one another; the agency or management of envoys accredited to a foreign court; the forms of international negotiations. The Cardinal de Richelieu is generally considered as the founder of that regular and uninterrupted intercourse between governments which exists at present between almost all countries; though the instructions given by Machiavelli to one of his friends, who was sent by the Florentine Republic to Charles V (Charles I of Spain) show that Richelieu was not the first to conceive the advantages that might be derived from the correspondence of an intelligent agent accredited at the seat of a foreign government. Diplomatic agents are of several

degrees: 1, ambassadors; 2, envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary; 3, ministers resident; 4, charges d'affaires; 5, secretaries of legation and attaches. Their rank was regulated in Europe, in the above order, by the congress assembled at Vienna in 1814. Amongst the European powers it is agreed that of ministers of the same rank he who arrives first shall have the precedence over his colleagues. Research Diplomacy

ARMAND RICHELIEU

Armand Duplessis Richelieu was a French churchman and statesman. He was born in 1585 in Paris and died in 1642. In 1624 he became minister of state to Louis XIII and dominated the weak King, ruling France himself. Research Armand Richelieu

ARMAND RICHELIEU
Armand Jean du Plessis Richelieu (Duc de Richelieu) was a French cardinal and statesman. He was born in 1585 at Paris and died in 1642. He was the son of Francois Duplessis, seigneur de Richelieu in Touraine, and was originally destined for the army; but his brother, Alphonse, having resigned the bishopric of Lucon, this was bestowed on him by Henry IV in 1606. He obtained from the pope a dispensation allowing him to accept the office though under age, and in 1607 was consecrated by the Cardinal de Givry in presence of the pope himself (Paul V). For several years he devoted himself to the duties of his see, reforming abuses, and labouring for the conversion of Protestants. But his ambition always made him turn his eyes towards the court, and having come to Paris in 1614 as deputy of the clergy of Poitou to the states-general he managed to insinuate himself into the favour of the queen- mother, Marie de Medici, who obtained for him the post of grand-almoner, and in 1616 that of secretary of state for war and foreign affairs. When Louis XIII quarrelled with his mother in 1617 Richelieu fell with her, and was banished first to Blois and then to Avignon. In 1620, however, he managed to effect a reconciliation between Mary of Medici and her son. He now obtained, through the influence of the queen-mother, the cardinal's hat, and in 1624 was admitted into the council of state. From this date he was at the head of affairs, and he at once began systematically to extend the power of the crown by crushing the Huguenots, and overthrowing the privileges of the great vassals; and to increase the influence of the French monarchy by undermining that of the Hapsburgs, both

beyond the Pyrenees and in Germany. The rallying point of the Huguenots was Rochelle; and Richelieu laid siege to that city, commanding the army in person. Rochelle, supported by supplies from England, held out for some time, but was compelled to surrender by famine on October the 29th, 1628. In order to overthrow the power of the great nobles he ordered the demolition of all the feudal fortresses which could not be used for the defence of the frontiers. After the suppression of the Huguenots his next step was the removal of the queen-mother from court, she having endeavoured to effect his fall. This he accomplished in November 1630. But this step, and the almost total annihilation of the privileges of the parliaments and the clergy, united all classes against the despotism of the cardinal, and several risings and conspiracies took place, which were suppressed by prudent and vigorous measures. In 1631 Richelieu was raised to the rank of duke. In 1632 a rising in favour of the Duke of Orleans, the king's brother, was suppressed by the royal forces directed by Richelieu, and the Duke of Montmorency was executed. The whole period of his government was marked by a series of conspiracies of the feudal nobility, the queen-mother, the queen herself, and even Louis, against the royal power exercised by Richelieu. But he was prepared at every point and his vengeance sure. During the Thirty Years' War the cardinal employed all the arts of negotiation and even force of arms to protect the Protestants of Germany, for the purpose of humbling the power of Austria. For the same object he declared war against Spain in 1635, and the separation of Portugal from Spain was effected by his assistance in 1640. He also endeavoured to weaken Austrian influence in Italy, and procured the transfer of the duchy of Mantua to the Duke of Nevers. Among the last to be crushed by him were Cinq-Mara and De Thou, who, with the king's approval, attempted to ruin the great minister. Before his death he recommended Cardinal Mazarin as his successor. Richelieu was a great statesman, but he was proud, arrogant, and vindictive. He was a patron of letters and art, and founder of the French Academy and the Jardin des Plantes. He was the author of Memoires relating to the years 1624-1638; Histoire de la Mere et du Fils, etc. Research Armand Richelieu http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/164602/diplomacy/233744/The-development-ofthe-foreign-ministry-and-embassies

The development of the foreign ministry and embassies

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The first modern foreign ministry was established in 1626 in France by Cardinal Richelieu. Richelieu saw diplomacy as a continuous process of negotiation, arguing that a diplomat should have one master and one policy. He created the Ministry of External Affairs to centralize policy and to ensure his control of envoys as he pursued the raison dtat (national interest). Richelieu rejected the view that policy should be based on dynastic or sentimental concerns or a rulers wishes, holding instead that the state transcended crown and land, prince and people, and had interests ... (100 of 18116 words) Diplomacy is a method of influencing foreign governments through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence. The word "diplomacy" is derived from the ancient

Greek diploma, meaning an object folded in two-a reference to the documents through which princes granted permission to travel and other privileges. http://asrudiancenter.wordpress.com/2008/07/18/diplomacy-history-1450-1789/

Diplomacy : History 1450-1789

By asrudian By De Lamar Jensen

Diplomacy in one form or another has had a long history, dating back to the beginning of political states. Since the nature, size, and composition of these states varied, so did the system of relations between them. Usually such relations were simple and personal, but in time they became more complex as the political entities became better organized and more tightly controlled. The Origin and Testing of Early Modern Diplomacy By the middle of the fifteenth century the principal city-states of Renaissance Italy had reached a tenuous balance of power and began establishing more permanent diplomatic relations with one another through the instrument of resident embassies. Resident ambassadors were accredited representatives of one government to another, assigned for an extended period of time for the purposes of negotiating, providing a constant source of important information to the home government, and safeguarding the honor and prestige of the ruler they represented. Primary negotiations of treaties and alliances, as well as other specific assignments, were still carried out by special envoys sent with plenipotentiary powers for that purpose, but the more permanent resident became an additional aid in this process. The system in the early modern period was far less structured than it was later to become. In the first place, not everyone was convinced that it was the safest or wisest course to follow. Rulers, especially, were reluctant to have representatives of other states snooping around their capital, randomly inquiring about matters that they would just as soon the ambassadors not know. But that led to one of the key dictums of diplomacy, quid pro quo (something for something), interpreted to mean that the best way to get information is to give it. Diplomats needed to be well informed so they could exchange their own information for equally or more valuable information possessed by someone else. Even the shrewd Cardinal Richelieu (15851642) advised, A great prince should sooner put in jeopardy both his own interests and even those of the state than break his word. This advice was not often followed, especially by Richelieu, and agents had to be constantly on the alert not to reveal more than they received. By the seventeenth century it was becoming evident that honesty was the best policy for diplomats because honesty inspired confidence and that, more than anything else, gave credibility to what an ambassador was trying to accomplish. The counsel of Charles Colbert, Marquis de Croissy (16251696), French secretary of state for foreign affairs, to his son who was leaving for an embassy to Portugal in 1684, to gain the reputation as a perfectly honorable man, and deserve it, was good advice, even though it was not always followed. The testing period came in the second half of the sixteenth century when Europe was split into hostile camps as a result of the Reformation and the Wars of Religion. The religious wars, wrote Garrett Mattingly, the authority on early diplomatic history, nearly wrecked the diplomatic institutions with which Europe had been trying to adjust its quarrels. . . . Successful diplomatic negotiations require that parties involved can at least imagine a mutually satisfactory settlement, . . . But the clash of ideological absolutes drives diplomacy from the field (pp. 195196). Nevertheless, diplomacy was not driven from the field. Compromises and adjustments continued to be made, and some states, especially France under the cautious Catherine de Mdicis (15181589), found ways to balance ideology and necessity with theory and practice and to give early modern diplomacy a valuable new impulse. Early Modern Diplomats At War

By the seventeenth century the machinery of diplomatic relations had reached an impressive level of organization. This is not to say that it operated in a totally logical and systematic way, but many of the misgivings associated with its earlier years were being worked out as diplomacy was increasingly applied to European rulers changing needs. The selection of ambassadors was determined by several factors: birth, political and family connections, loyalty to the government, and the likelihood of acceptance by the government to which they were being sent. Depending on where he was going, an ambassador of noble rank was usually chosen; sometimes a man of the cloth was preferred, although this was less likely in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than it had been in the sixteenth. A mans experience in negotiation and familiarity with the political affairs of the country to which he was being sent also made a difference. Language proficiency was another factor in such a selection. Several Italian dialects were used effectively during the Renaissance, but Latin was the most common language of diplomacy, especially for written correspondence and treaties. After the middle of the seventeenth century, when the court of Louis XIV (16381715) set the tone for European culture, French became more widely used, and in the next century it became the lingua franca of diplomatic discourse. What rulers wanted most in their ambassadors, however, was loyalty and dedication to the cause they represented. Ambassadors were accompanied byor they recruited after arrival at their assigned posta number of lesser officials: secretaries, scribes, stewards, grooms, and assorted personnel. These were normally paid for by the ambassador himself, although by the eighteenth century, the principal embassy secretaries were being appointed and paid by their home governments. Once a selection was made, there were several steps that had to be taken before the new ambassador embarked on his assignment: ambassadorial staff and other household affairs were arranged and approved, and sometimes negotiation over salary and expenses took time. If the new ambassador was not well acquainted with the court to which he was assigned, or was unfamiliar with the policies preferred by his home government, he had to take the time and effort to acquaint himself with them. He also needed to learn as much as he could about the people, policies, and preferences of his host government, as well as other sources of information he might be able to tap. Then, after receiving his letters of appointment, introduction, instructions, credentials, passport and safe-conduct, cipher keys, and any other documents or household goods, he was ready to depart. The arrival of an ambassador at his new assignment was the occasion for elaborate ceremony and ritual, beginning with an impressive procession of troops, carriages, and musicians escorting the ambassador through the streets of the city to a reception spot where he would be received and welcomed by an official responsible for receiving ambassadors. Following a second procession to court, the ambassador presented his letters of credence and instruction to the sovereign and delivered his formal oration. The ceremonial entry was simplified in the eighteenth century, and the ambassador was sometimes received at court to present his credentials without prior processions. However, the entry ceremony continued to play a large role both for resident ambassadors and for special agents and ambassadors extraordinary. Maintenance of ambassadors at foreign posts was traditionally the responsibility of the government to which they were assigned and depended upon the rank and importance of the envoy and the respect due his government. Because this added to the problem of precedence that plagued the ceremonial practices of diplomacy, it gradually became more common for the home government to provide for the maintenance of its embassies abroad. On the periphery of Europe, however, governments continued to provide maintenance allowances to foreign ambassadors and, of course, expected the same consideration for their own representatives abroad. The victory of the concept of extraterritoriality (meaning that the ambassador carried with him the laws of his own country) reduced the issue of maintenance by recognizing the prime responsibility of the home government for maintaining its diplomats. Along with the principle of extraterritoriality came the comparable assumption of diplomatic immunity. Some degree of immunity had been claimed for embassy personnel since before the Renaissance, but its general approval was less broadly accepted. Through the next three centuries legal

immunity of diplomats became more clearly defined and recognized. Consequently, problems and disputes over immunity declined as people came to agree that ambassadors and their staff were entitled to extensive immunity from both civil and criminal litigation and that they were specifically allowed to practice their own religion even though it clashed with that of their host. Sometimes diplomats abused this right of immunity, but by the end of the eighteenth century it was an accepted principle. Salaries and other payments to ambassadors by the home government varied a great deal during the early modern period. In most cases an agreement was reached before embarking on the mission as to the amount and kind of compensation to be received. But this was sometimes vague and almost never followed completely. Papal nuncios were among the first to receive a monthly allowance, but it was usually insufficient, and the nuncio was expected to supplement this allowance with money from benefices he held. Likewise, secular agents, with or without specific salaries, were expected to get by partly on their own initiative and the promises of future compensation, usually in the form of titles, land, or other symbols of value. But these did not pay for current needs. Ambassadors letters to their home governments related sorrowful stories of their financial problems and pleas for assistance. Franois de Noailles, for example, wrote to the French king in November 1562: I humbly beseech Your Majesty to please remember that for nine or ten years I have been almost constantly in your service, during which time I have never shrunk from giving freely of my money, labor, or industry, nor of the resources of my friends and parents, or employing all my means of credit for Your Majestys service. . . . But my present need is such that serious damage could be done to both my desire and my duty. There follows a marginal note about his creditors closing in on him, and then a concluding plea: Which moves me to beseech Your Majesty . . . to assist me in whatever way you can . . . before my true poverty is discovered here in Italy and the dignity and grandeur and honor of Your Majestys name suffers incalculable damage. (Lettres indites de Franois de Noailles, vque de Dax, Revue de Gascogne, VI (1865): 8788). Had it not been for the custom of giving a departing gift to ambassadors when they completed their missions, their plight would have been greater. The amount or value of such donations depended on so many variablesthe rank of the recipient ambassador, the length of his service, the evaluation of his accomplishmentsit is unlikely that all parties to the transaction were equally satisfied. The most common gifts were gilt plate, gold chains, jewelry, or any item of recognized worth. As the office of ambassador became more professional, the number of such presents declined although there were many other occasions when gratuities were still granted. Ambassadorial Duties The primary duty of resident ambassadors was to obtain and transmit information. This was done in many ways and varied greatly in extent, reliability, and difficulty. The most open method, which had many drawbacks as far as reliability is concerned, was direct interviews with the sovereign or with leading ministers. When at court, the ambassador could pick up information from other agents, but this too might be laced with misinformation and lies; tapping many such sources increased the chances of getting good intelligence. As printed newsletters and newspapers began to appear in the eighteenth century, it became easier to acquire overt information. For more vital and furtive intelligence, ambassadors still relied on paid informants and spies, although the complex implementation of international espionage was increasingly conducted through contacts outside the official diplomatic system. To communicate this variously gathered intelligence to his home government, the early modern diplomat used the methods available to him: national post, paid couriers, commercial caravans, and private messengers. More confidential communications were put into increasingly complex ciphers. Duplicates and triplicates of important messages were often sent by different routes to insure the delivery of at least one. On occasions demanding extreme secrecy, messages, or parts of them, were given verbally to a courier or other confidant who then delivered the message orally to the proper authority. Such precautions were felt to be necessary because, with increasing frequency, written communications were intercepted and ciphers broken.

By the mid-seventeenth century, London postal officials were routinely opening and copying many of the dispatches intended for foreign diplomats. A secret office was established in 1653 for such activities and by the end of the eighteenth century, it maintained an active staff of semi-undercover employees who deciphered and read foreign correspondence. The same thing was happening in France, where the cabinet noir (black chamber) conducted a similar type of surveillance during the ancien rgime. Other countries had their appropriate procedures. Negotiation Early modern diplomats were involved in many functions other than information gathering. They might be assigned to important negotiations, according to the powers and instructions given by their home government. Normally, negotiation was the primary duty of special representatives with precise powers for that purpose, but resident diplomats were also involved in a variety of negotiations, especially at major diplomatic conferences and congresses. After four tortuous years of negotiation, the major settlement ending the Thirty Years War took place in 1648 at two locations in Westphalia: at Mnster, where ambassadors and other representatives of the Holy Roman emperor, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and delegates of the German Electoral College met; and at Osnabrck, where other emissaries of Sweden, the emperor, France, several German principalities, and others also convened. The total number of delegates at these two locations reached one hundred thirty-five, the largest assemblage of diplomats ever seen by that time. The resulting Treaty of Westphalia marked a new direction in the political composition of Europe toward secularly oriented, sovereign, almost absolute states. The various states of the empire were given territorial sovereignty under the nominal authority of the emperor. Calvinism was officially recognized along with Lutheranism. Sweden was given a voice in the imperial councils and a vote in the Diet. France emerged as the leading power in Europe as imperial unity disintegrated and Habsburg Spain declined. Switzerland and the Dutch Netherlands were both declared free and sovereign. Similar congresses met at Nijmegen in 16761679 following the Dutch Wars, at Ryswick in 16961697 at the conclusion of the War of the League of Augsburg, and at Utrecht in 17121713 after the War of the Spanish Succession. The Treaty of Utrecht, especially, created a new order in Europe based on an equilibrium of power among the leading states. Belief in this balance of power became a recurring feature of eighteenth-century diplomacy. Negotiation included far more than treaty arrangements. It also comprised a large range of topics and goals set out by the home government, including interpretation of the rules of trade, persuading a sovereign to follow agreements previously made, convincing the sovereign to pursue policies favorable to the ambassadors master, and in general trying to maintain good relations between the two governments. A good diplomat might be involved in negotiations over many issues, from alliances, boundary disputes, and commercial regulation, to territorial treaties and usurped property. Ceremonial Another duty of early modern diplomats was to represent their ruler as if he were present. The ambassador stood in the place of his master and therefore represented both his person and prestige. If an ambassador failed to receive, or assert, the proper respect for his ruler, he was held accountable. But not everyone recognized the same hierarchy of station, and therefore ambassadors were locked in a rivalry of rank at public functions, especially those offering high visibility, such as official state gatherings and processions. Public entries of new ambassadors still served to reflect the power and importance of the states they represented, and no expense was spared to make the carriages and horses magnificent and the dress of the ambassador brilliant. Assertions of precedence at such occasions frequently led to awkward dilemmas or even open conflict. In London in October 1661, for example, the Spanish ambassador, thinking he merited a more honored position than the French ambassador, tried to overtake and pass the French coach in a state procession through London. In the ensuing fray several people were killed. Following the elaborate first audience, proper etiquette still had to be maintained at subsequent official visits of the ambassador to the head of state and to the diplomats of other nations, being especially

careful to visit those of highest rank first. Throughout his tour of duty the ambassador was expected to participate in many public functions, from state banquets and weddings to frequent funerals of prestigious persons. Even at these gatherings the issue of precedence continued to arise and sometimes awakened strong feelings and even disputes among diplomats. Points of honour, rank, and precedence are the most delicate articles of political faith, wrote Rousset de Missy in 1746. How could it be otherwise in an age when hereditary differences in the social orders were universally justified and even considered essential to the survival of any state? The maintenance of that same social stability on the international level was thought to be just as fundamental to the existence of international sociality. The Theory of Early Modern Diplomacy The theory and practice of diplomacy did not always correspond in real life. Diplomatic practice continued along lines determined primarily by precedent and practicality rather than by the suppositions of political theorists. Still, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries their correspondence was closer than it had ever been, due in part to the fact that it was practical diplomats themselves who wrote most insightfully about diplomatic theory. The first of these practitioner/theorists was Juan Antonio de Vera, a distinguished Spanish nobleman and diplomat who published his El embajador (The ambassador) at Seville in 1620, better known in its French version of 1642 as Le parfait ambassadeur (The perfect ambassador). In this dialogue de Vera talks about the conduct of embassies, privileges of ambassadors, diplomatic procedures, and the qualities needed for success. The leading prerequisite, he insisted, was moral virtue, which meant not only obeying the letter and objectives of his master, but also being true and honest in his dealings with the ruler to whom he was assigned. The illustrious Dutch lawyer and diplomat Hugo Grotius (15831645) provided a reasoned repertory of maxims in his 1625 De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the law of war and peace), allowing for the compatibility of a world of sovereign states committed to their own self-interest and yet consistent with the notion of peace and justice. He also argued convincingly for the extraterritoriality and diplomatic immunity of accredited ambassadors. Another Dutch writer, Abraham de Wicquefort, published his widely popular book on practical diplomacy, called Lambassadeur et ses fonctions (The ambassador and his functions), in 1681. In this diplomatic manual Wicquefort abandoned the myth of a perfect ambassador and supplied diplomatic examples, especially contemporary, of how diplomacy operated in the late seventeenth century. In 1716 an important treatise appeared in Paris, written by a man who had spent his life in the service of Louis XIVs diplomatic business. De la manire de ngocier avec les soverains (On the manner of negotiating with princes), by Franois de Callires, was another book of reflections on the principles and conditions of successful diplomacy, arguing in favor of the careful selection and specialized training of career diplomats rather than relying on the erratic behavior of capricious nobles. Expansion and Specialization of Diplomacy Although much in the operation of eighteenth-century diplomacy was still reminiscent of the procedures and attitudes of earlier times, many changes had taken place and gradual modification continued. Notable among these was the expansion of diplomatic activity. In the time of Louis XIV, European diplomatic relations were still concentrated in western Europe, with fewer continuous contacts with the Ottoman Empire, Poland and eastern Europe, and tsarist Russia. The eighteenth century saw notable expansion of these contacts. Relations between Moscow and the West increased dramatically during the reign of Tsar Peter I (16841725) as reciprocal diplomatic representation was established with western states from Vienna to London. Similarly, connections were expanded between Europe and the Turkish Empire, and even China, although not as fast nor as completely as with Russia. More permanent relations were also established with Scandinavia and with eastern Europe. In the eighteenth century budding foreign offices also began to appear as the need for greater continuity and order required more specialized effort. Developing out of the earlier royal chanceries, the foreign office became the principal department for handling relations with other states and for dispatching ambassadors to them. Such offices were still small and rudimentary but indicated the direction of later

growth. In France the secretary of state for foreign affairs became one of the chief ministers of the government. England and other states also developed more effective machinery for the conduct of foreign affairs. To operate this new diplomatic machinery, a more professional bureaucracy slowly emerged. This gradual growth of professionalism in the management of foreign affairs was one of the marks of more modern times. Bibliography Adair, E. R. The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. London and New York, 1929. An old but very valuable book. Anderson, M. S. The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 14501919. London and New York, 1993. A useful survey yet frustratingly disjointed. Barber, Peter. Diplomacy: The World of the Honest Spy. London, 1979. Examination of early modern diplomacy and catalog of the British Library exhibition. Carter, Charles H. The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs: 15981625. New York, 1964. Well-crafted study of Spanish diplomacy and espionage at the court of James I. . The Western European Powers, 15001700. Ithaca, N.Y., 1971. Emphasizes the use of diplomatic sources. Chaytor, H. J., trans. and ed. Embajada espaola [Spanish Embassy]. Camden Miscellany, vol. 14. London, 1926. Anonymous contemporary guide to diplomatic procedure at the end of the seventeenth century. Spanish and English texts. Hatton, Ragnhild, and M. S. Anderson, eds. Studies in Diplomatic History: Essays in Memory of David Bayne Horn. London, 1970. Valuable collection of articles primarily on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century diplomatic affairs. Horn, David Bayne. The British Diplomatic Service, 16891789. Oxford, 1961. Comprehensive yet detailed study of a century of British diplomacy. Jones, Dorothy V. Splendid Encounters: The Thought and Conduct of Diplomacy. Chicago, 1984. In conjunction with the 1984 University of Chicago exhibition. Lachs, Phyllis S. The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II and James II. New Brunswick, N.J., 1965. A thoughtful analysis of a segment of English diplomacy. Lossky, Andrew, International Relations in Europe, The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 6, pp. 154192. Cambridge, U.K., 1970. Excellent summary of diplomatic relations in the lateseventeenth century. Mattingly, Garrett. Renaissance Diplomacy. Boston and London, 1955. The best study to date of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century diplomacy. Roosen, William J. The Age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy. Cambridge, Mass., 1976. Many insights and extensive research, but too many printing errors, and no index. Thompson, J. W., and S. K. Padover. Secret Diplomacy: Espionage and Cryptography, 15001815. New York, 1963. Simplistic but very interesting.

http://paulslayer.blogspot.com/2010/05/cardinalul-richelieu-strategul-in.html

Cardinalul Richelieu, strategul n purpur (I)

de Ulrike Moser, 37 de ani, istoric i ziarist din Berlin (Traducere i cuvnt nainte de Paul Slayer Grigoriu) CUVNT NAINTE Convingerile influeneaz viaa cotidian a omului i viceversa. E un lucru tiut demult, pe care personalitile cretine l-au pus i mai hotrt n eviden. Acolo unde cele dou nu se suprapun apar, mai devreme sau mai trziu, distorsiuni

existeniale i intelectuale. Cum trim se afl n direct legtur cu ce tim i ce credem. De aceea, dintr-o perspectiv ortodox, abaterile dogmatice care au aprut n Apusul cretin au dus la atitudini ce se ndeprteaz din ce n ce mai mult de adevratul duh al nvturii lui Hristos. Setea de putere a papilor care, socotindu-se lociitori ai Fiului lui Dumnezeu i monarhi ai Bisericii, au considerat c trebuie s dein i puterea pmnteasc, a dus la nenumrate conflicte. Este doar un exemplu, dar e relevant pentru cazul de fa. Nu ne este nou dat s judecm, ns este evident c, privind viaa i cariera lui, cardinalul Richelieu a fost departe de idealul cretin. Trebuie desigur s inem cont de vremurile cu totul diferite de cele n care trim noi, dar nici aa nu putem face abstracie de intrigile, comploturile sau uciderile n care a fost implicat aceast figur marcant a istoriei franceze i europene. De aceea, ne e greu s spunem dac i se cuvine chiar i numirea de omul lui Dumnezeu, pe care o folosete autoarea articolului de mai jos. La o prim vedere am spune c nu, dar lsm aprecierea aceasta n seama unor studii exhaustive asupra persoanei lui Richelieu i, n cele din urm, n seama Judecii de Apoi. Un lucru sigur este ns c o imagine complet a lui trebuie s depeasc percepia exclusiv negativ din romanul lui Dumas, Cei trei muchetari, altfel splendid. Din multe puncte de vedere, cardinalul a fost un personaj negativ. Dar ce trebuie vzut este c, dincolo de orgoliile i capriciile lui, exist un ataament i un devotament neobinuite fa de Patrie i Rege. Vorbeam mai devreme despre legtura ntre credin i via. Chiar i cele mai nobile idealuri credina i patria se transform n lucruri monstruoase atunci cnd sunt nelese greit. Aproape toate dezastrele i izbnzile istorice se definesc pe marginea prpastiei ntre ideal i nelegerea corect a binelui i a rului, facultate esenial, dat doar ctorva alei. Dar ce avem de nvat din cazul Richelieu este i o lecie despre loialitate i onoare, despre pstrarea unei mreii n cele din urm altruiste, chiar i n mijlocul prbuirii morale ce duce la crime sngeroase. Cardinalul francez a pus n practic n mod strlucit maxima cinic i anticretin a lui Machiavelli, scopul scuz mijloacele. Dar n acelai timp, acest om obinuit cu puterea i cu luxul i-a druit toat energia, sntatea i n cele din urm viaa unui ideal. Conflictul nemilos ntre bine i ru n mijlocul cruia a trit, pe care l-a ntreinut i care l-a strivit, l face pe cel care a fost ntiul prim ministru n sensul modern, una dintre cele mai tragice figuri ale istoriei lumii. PAUL SLAYER GRIGORIU Omul lui Dumnezeu plnge. Durerile i febra l chinuie pe cardinalul Richelieu, Primul Ministru al regelui Franei. Nervii slbii, epuizarea. mparte porunci pe care le revoc furios puin dup aceea. Pentru ca apoi s spun, cu voce jalnic, aproape de prbuire, c vrea s se retrag n singurtate. Departe, foarte departe. Suficient de departe de palatul su din centrul Parisului, pentru a nu trebui s fie de fa la cderea capitalei. Este dimineaa zilei de 16 august 1636, iar spaniolii se afl la nord de Paris. n timpul nopii clreii lor s-au apropiat pn la 70 de kilometri de capital. Orenii fug i iau cu ei ce pot din lucrurile lor. Strzile sunt blocate de trsuri, care i crue. Sub ferestrele palatului cardinalului s-au adunat oameni furioi care cer moartea ministrului detestat: pentru ei, Richelieu a dus Frana la pieire i a sacrificat sigurana Parisului. ntr-adevr, cardinalul a pus s fie drmat o parte din zidurile oraului pentru a face loc palatului su cu grdin mare. Pe zidurile acestuia sunt acum lipite afie denuntoare. Circul pamflete mpotriva politicii monstrului n

purpur de cardinal. Ctre amiaz regele Ludovic al XIII-lea i strnge consilierii la Luvru. Iar Richelieu se grbete s ajung de la palatul su i se ridic primul. Vocea i este tioas, dar propunerea disperat: regele i curtea s prseasc Parisul i s mearg ntr-o poziie defensiv dincolo de Sena. Ludovic nu a respins niciodat sfatul primului su ministru dar de aceast dat refuz: predarea oraului ar demoraliza armata i poporul. Dup amiaza regele vrea s ias cu trupele sale n ntmpinarea spaniolilor. Dar Richelieu rmne n urm. Niciodat regele nu l-a vzut att de neajutorat pe cel mai nsemnat sftuitor al su. De doisprezece ani cardinalul Armand-Jean du Plessis, duce de Richelieu, este cel mai puternic om de lng Ludovic: primul slujitor al Franei, arhitectul unei reforme a rii n egal msur brutal i ncununat de succes, strateg excepional i aflat n centrul unei pnze diplomatice care cuprinde continentul, urzitor a nenumrate planuri, nelegeri i intrigi. Pentru unii, puterea lui Richelieu este att de mare, nct i bnuiesc influena n spatele fiecrui rzboi, al fiecrui acord de pace, al fiecrei aliane, al fiecrei legturi rupte. El trimite emisari n Catalunia i Portugalia, n Anglia i n rile de Jos, n Italia, n Sfntul Imperiu Roman de Naiune german. Pentru c scopul vieii lui Richelieu este s frng puterea dominant a habsburgilor. Vrea s-l slbeasc pe mpratul de la Viena i mai ales s-l nfrng pe regele Spaniei cu care acela este nrudit. Dar acum la dou zile de mers de Paris se afl o armat spaniol care amenin s-i ruineze toate planurile. Ascensiunea plin de strdanii a lui Richelieu, de la nobil de provincie la ntruparea puterii, pare s se transforme n tragedie. nceputurile sunt modeste, chiar ntunecate: pe 9 septembrie 1585 se nate Armand-Jean, al treilea fiu al familiei du Plessis. Este un copil bonvicios i va rmne toat viaa sensibil, suferind de febr, dureri de cap i depresii. Dar este mai nelept dect muli, cu o voin puternic i orgoliu nemsurat. Familia face parte din nobilimea inferioar, deci este ndatorat. Sediul episcopal din Luon este una dintre puinele sale proprieti. Pentru a asigura familiei sale acest beneficiu, Armand-Jean trebuie s intre n slujba Bisericii. Tnrul nobil, care ar fi trebuit s devin ofier, studiaz deci teologia cu atta seriozitate i succes, nct la 21 de ani este hirotonit episcop, dei nu mplinise nc vrsta canonic. n anii ce urmeaz se ocup temeinic de administrarea eparhiei sale. ns de la nceput vrea mai mult: ca muli prelai francezi, tnjete dup Paris, dup Curte, pentru a face acolo carier politic i a obine o demnitate n ierarhia statal. nc tnrul episcop de Luon vrea putere personal i consider c este datoria lui s fie n slujba lui Dumnezeu i a regelui, precum i s ajute monarhia s ating mreia. Cariera este sfnt pentru el, cci, aa crede, va fi sfnt i pentru Frana. Cnd regele Henric al IV-lea este asasinat n 1610 de un catolic fanatic, starea naiunii este precar. Dei cumplitele rzboaie religioase, care au zguduit Frana ntre 1562 i 1598, s-au sfrit, hughenoii, protestanii francezi, au trupe proprii i formeaz un stat n stat. Iar monarhul a cumprat pur i simplu linitea nobilimii rzvrtite. Apoi mai este i ameninarea habsburgic, din partea Spaniei i a Imperiului. Spania este cea mai puternic ar a Europei: trupele sale se afl n Pirinei i n Italia i mrluiesc prin teritoriul Imperiului spre rile de Jos, aflate sub stpnire spaniol, pentru a se rzboi cu provinciile rsculate din nord. Astfel, Madridul amenin Frana din sud i din nord. i mpratul de la Viena este

vr cu regele de la Madrid; ar putea ataca din est. Henric al IV-lea dorise deja s scape Frana de aceast situaie periculoas. Cine s-i continue ns opera? Urmaul la tron al lui Henric, Ludovic al XIII-lea, nscut n 1601, are opt ani cnd moare tatl su. Un biat singuratic, blbit, neiubit, neglijat, prost hrnit. Este privit ca bolnvicios de inhibat, se ocup doar cu jocul de rzboi i i formeaz repede o pasiune ngrozitoare pentru vntoare. Mama lui preia pentru el regena: Maria de Medici, nepoata unui mprat habsburgic. Ludovic nu este nici mcar nvat s citeasc. Se pare c mama lui sper s poat urca pe tron un idiot fr ambiii proprii. i, spre deosebire de soul ei, Maria de Medici vrea s se mpace cu Spania. n 1612 se ncheie o alian franco-spaniol. Trei ani mai trziu, regele, n vrst de 14 ani, se cstorete cu infanta spaniol Ana. Cei doi copii regali trebuie s-i consume cstoria sub ochii medicilor i ai asistenilor lor un dezastru. Dup noaptea nunii vor trece patru ani pn cnd regele i va vizita din nou soia. Pentru amndoi legtura rmne penibil de-a lungul anilor, mereu marcat de nencredere. Richelieu respinge politica de apropiere cu Spania a reginei. Dar nu ar putea face carier dac nu ar lsa impresia c o aprob. Visul su este s conduc politica extern francez, deci se adapteaz. l linguete fr jen pe juctorul de noroc italian Concino Concini, amantul reginei i eful secret al guvernului. Calea spre centrul statului pare s treac doar prin el. i Richelieu se aga de putere, oriunde aceasta i se ofer. ntr-o scrisoare i promite linguitor lui Concini s-l slujeasc oricnd cu cea mai mare vrednicie. Italianul, dispreuit n general ca parvenit, se bucur c a gsit un aliat. Richelieu devine favorit al favoritului. i ateapt, ateapt, resemnndu-se mereu i mereu, cuprins de team i febr. n cele din urm regina l observ la rndul ei pe tnrul om al Bisericii, de o nelepciune copleitoare, att de elegant i graios, care poate fi foarte armant. i care i laud fr msur meritele n public. Richelieu i ctig ncrederea. Pe 25 noiembrie 1616, la 31 de ani proaspt mplinii, devine secretar de stat pentru afaceri externe i probleme de rzboi. Cu toate acestea, cele mai importante hotrri sunt luate n continuare de Concini. Pe minitri i trateaz ca pe nite lachei, iar pe rege l umilete de cte ori are ocazia. Pe 24 aprilie 1617, regele njosit riposteaz. Ludovic are o curte ridicol de mic. Este cel mai copilros copil, i bate joc Concini de el. Dar toate acestea sunt disimulare: monarhul se preface prost pentru a scpa de intrigile curii. M-am prefcut c sunt copil, avea s explice, muli ani mai trziu. Pn cnd avea s se simt suficient de puternic pentru a pune mna pe putere. Cu doar puini curteni, copilul de 15 ani ndrznete n sfrit s dea lovitura: singurul su om de ncredere, oimarul Carol dAlbert de Luynes, un cpitan i civa soldai. Cnd Concini vrea s intre la Luvru, n dimineaa de 24 aprilie, cpitanul l mpuc. Rsturnarea este ncununat de succes. Prin palat rsun strigtele Vive le Roi! Ludovic aresteaz mai muli minitri i pe regin o trimite ntr-un castel de pe Loara. n suita ei: Richelieu. n anul 1618 episcopul ambiios trebuie chiar s plece n exil, n Avignonul papal. Nimeni nu tie exact ce se ntmpl n sufletul lui Richelieu. Numai un lucru pare

sigur: poziia amical fa de habsburgi, care domin politica Franei de la moartea lui Henric al IV-lea, i repugn. Mai important dect o alian a tuturor forelor catolice i se pare acum interesul naional al Franei iar acesta nu poate fi promovat, dup prerea lui, dect prin lupt mpotriva Spaniei i a mpratului. Richelieu vrea un stat francez puternic i pentru acest lucru este nevoie de un monarh puternic. i vrea s ajung cu orice pre napoi la putere. Dar cum s-l atrag de partea sa pe Ludovic al XIII-lea, care l detest i nu are ncredere n el? Richelieu nu vzuse n rege dect un prost bun de nimic i l ignorase. Drumul de ntoarcere la curte al lui Richelieu trece n cele din urm pe la duhovnicul su, Pre Joseph. Clugrul capucin cu barb roie, cu relaii la curile europene, se implic insistent n favoarea episcopului. Joseph este un fanatic religios, neobosit n lupta mpotriva hughenoilor. n Richelieu el vede unealta potrivit. ns Maria de Medici, vechea binefctoare a lui Richelieu este cea care, n cele din urm, i netezete calea. Pentru c el reuete s mijloceasc ntlniri, discuii, nelegeri i n cele din urm chiar mpcarea dintre regina-mam i fiul ei; Mariei i se permite s revin n consiliul regelui. Pentru acest lucru ea se revaneaz: Ludovic cedeaz n cele din urm n faa puterii ei de convingere i a mijlocirii lui Pre Joseph, care l impresioneaz profund pe rege. Regele, care recunoate repede intelectul excepional al lui Richelieu, se arat mrinimos. La propunerea sa, papa l numete pe episcop cardinal. i n 1624 Richelieu este convocat din nou n consiliul de stat. n puin timp i asigur poziia celui mai influent sftuitor, chiar dac abia n 1629 primete titlul de principal ministre. Este nceputul unei legturi pe via, care hotrte viitorul Franei i pe al Europei ntre rege i ministru. nceputul unei colaborri ntre doi oameni fragili, dificili, opui. Pe de o parte Richelieu, cu inteligena sa tioas, cu mndria sa. Cnd amabil, cnd rece i dispreuitor. Uneori ndrzne, adesea ns paralizat de depresii chinuitoare. Ipohondria, hipersensibilitatea i izbucnirile sale de mnie sunt nemsurate. ip, url, se ascunde sub pat, de unde nu poate fi scos dect cu mare osteneal. i bate pe servitori i chiar pe minitri. Un cuvnt greit i cardinalul este aproape de lacrimi. De cealalt parte un rege cu o cultur jalnic. Care se simte bine mai ales n rzboi, ntre soldaii si, i la vntoare. Care st bucuros la sob i face marmelad, dar urmrete fr s se implice i cscnd negocierile complicate. La serbri adoarme. Este timid, dar tnjete dup apropierea uman; i e team de femei i sufer de pe urma cstoriei sale cu frumoasa Ana din casa de Habsburg, creia i reproeaz numeroasele pierderi de sarcin. (Cei doi vor trebui s atepte 22 de ani apariia unui urma la tron.) Dar n spatele blbielii sale, a solitudinii i a capriciilor, se ascunde un monarh hotrt, care nu se ndoiete niciodat de chemarea sa. ntr-unul dintre primele sale buletine ctre rege, Richelieu scrie despre starea Franei: Medicii sunt de prere c o slbiciune intern, fie ea i de mic nsemntate n sine, este mai de temut dect o pagub exterioar, fie ea mare i dureroas. Din aceasta noi ne dm seama c trebuie s amnm cele ce in de politica extern, pn cnd vom fi fcut ceea ce se cere fcut acas.

nainte de a porni la lupta mpotriva habsburgilor, cardinalul vrea s ntreasc Frana n interior. Iar aceasta nseamn: s consolideze puterea regelui i s frng orice opoziie. Pe cea a naltei nobilimi. i pe cea a hughenoilor. Pentru ceea ce i propune nu trebuie s conteze nici pe nobilime, nici pe puternicele curi supreme de judecat, nici pe catolici, nici pe protestani. Cel ce st n slujba statului trebuie s se poarte ca o stea i s le lumineze cinilor, fr s in seama de scheunatul lor, afirm cardinalul. Ludovic sufer adesea din cauza puternicului su ministru. Pentru Richelieu regele simte o repulsie aproape fizic. Dar n scopul de a ntri autoritatea i puterea coroanei, regele i al doilea su eu cad de acord. Sunt aliai i n cele din urm vor deveni, n msura n care diferena de rang permite acest lucru, chiar prieteni. Se poate ca regele s fie, alturi de Pre Joseph, singurul confident pe care l-a avut vreodat Richelieu. Cci Richelieu frnge pentru nceput fr mil puterea egalilor si n rang: mereu i mereu nobilii din provincie se ridic mpotriva monarhiei i obin nenumrate privilegii. Richelieu vrea acum s le anuleze. Trimite intendeni n provincii funcionari care i sunt direct subordonai. Acetia limiteaz cu fora puterea vechilor familii ale nobilimii: toate fortreele care nu sunt la grani sunt drmate. Intendenii colecteaz impozitele, ndeplinesc sarcinile guvernului i i raporteaz lui Richelieu toate aciunile mpotriva statului. Acesta nfiineaz tribunale speciale care pot condamna la moarte orice duman al statului, fie el cetean obinuit sau i aici este partea cumplit membru al marii nobilimi. Richelieu este unul dintre primii politicieni care vorbete despre raison dtat, interesul statului pe care l ntrupeaz n chip implacabil. Statul este cel care conteaz, nu poporul. i dei nenduplecarea lui are acordul lui Ludovic, doar Richelieu este privit ntre nobilii de acelai rang cu el, crora le-a fost luat puterea, ca monstru. Richelieu trebuie s-i mreasc garda de corp i curnd aceasta este compus din 120 de clrei, mai mult de 100 de jandarmi i 200 de muchetari. n timpul exercitrii funciei exist comploturi mpotriva lui n cele mai nalte cercuri, chiar i n snul familiei regale. Un contemporan noteaz: Cnd cardinalul intr la Luvru este nconjurat de oameni, fr a ntlni vreodat un prieten. Al doilea scop al lui Richelieu este doborrea hughenoilor: Atta timp ct ei vor fi stat n stat n Frana, scrie el ntr-un memorandum ctre Ludovic al XIII-lea, regele nu va fi stpn n propria cas i nu va putea duce la capt o aciune important n strintate. n rzboaiele religioase dintre 1562 i 1598 au obinut prin lupt liberti nsemnate: au voie s nfiineze tribunale proprii i s aib numeroase fortree ntrite cu soldai, printre care i La Rochelle, cel mai important ora-port al Franei. ns Richelieu nu a poruncit doar naltei nobilimi s drme fortreele, ci i hughenoilor. Cnd acetia refuz, dar n schimb i solicit regelui s renune la punctele militare din apropierea lor, cardinalul ncepe, la sfritul lui noiembrie 1627, asediul cetii La Rochelle. Armata lui are 30 000 de oameni. Trece aproape zilnic printre soldai pe calul su, n calitate de generalissim regal: cu mantaua purpurie n vnt, n armur, vest de piele i cizme. Dar, dei mobilizeaz toate mijloacele financiare ale statului i i pune la btaie i propria avere pentru echipament, atacurile rmn fr succes pn la jumtatea lui septembrie 1628. Apoi ns foamea devine unul dintre principalii si aliai. Cei asediai mor cu sutele,

apoi cu miile. ntr-o singur zi, 18 octombrie, sunt numrai 400 de mori. Nimeni nu-i mai poate ngropa. Dup zece zile, La Rochelle capituleaz. Din 25 000 de locuitori mai triesc 5000. n anul urmtor hughenoilor li se retrag toate drepturile politice speciale, statul lor n stat este distrus. Cu toate acestea: au voie s-i practice mai departe religia. O blndee tactic: tolerana lui Richelieu trebuie s aib ecou n lumea protestant cci aceasta st deja n slujba politicii sale externe. Prin victoriile sale asupra nobilimii i a celor de alt credin, Richelieu a fcut ordine n Frana, cu o mn de fier. Acum cardinalul se poate ndrepta cu totul ctre politica extern: lupta mpotriva habsburgilor. Posted by Paul Slayer Grigoriu at 3:30 AM

6 comments:
Donkeypapuas said... This post has been removed by the author. May 11, 2010 7:41 AM Paul Slayer Grigoriu said...

Frate, ce legatura au una cu alta? Societatea era divizata, dar tuturor nobililor, indiferent daca erau catolici sau hughenoti, li s-a impus sa-si darame fortaretele care nu erau pe granita. Doar ca hughenotii au refuzat. Deci masura a fost valabila pentru toti, "la gramada", cum spui tu. Iar apoi a fost asediat La Rochelle, pe care englezii au incercat sal apere, dar au fost respinsi. Asta e tot. Nu se spune nicaieri in articol ca ar fi fost adusa vreo atingere Edictului de la Nantes - dimpotriva, este subliniat faptul ca protestantilor li s-a lasat libertatea religioasa.
May 11, 2010 9:23 AM Anonymous said...

@ Donkeypapaus In functie de ce criterii definesti tu 'binele' si 'raul' in conducerea unei tari ? "S scoi ara din rahat nu este tragic, este mre. Ori Frana era n rahat pe vremea aia. S vrei binele rii i s te trezeti pe eafod, asta ntr-adevr este tragic - cazul regelui Ludovic al XVI-lea." Poate asa a gindit si Ceausescu inspre dusmanii poporului, si Stalin, si Hitler pe care pari sa-l consideri. Punctul doi : ce insemna o tara in "rahat" ? LR
May 26, 2010 12:42 AM

http://www.clutchey.com/CardinalRichelieu.html Cardinal Richelieu's influence on the Clutchey Family Cardinal Richelieu

This is Cardinal Richelieu - ( 1585 - 1642 ). He became the most powerful person in France during the reign of King Louis XIII. In part because Louis was a weak king and in part because Richelieu, himself, was so strong. Richelieu in his role as chief of the Royal Council, and later First Minister and Chief of State, had control of almost every facet of French politics, from the daily activities of the court to foreign policy and affairs. His dual role as head of the church in France and chief of state, allowed him to control the very direction he wished the government to go. Under Richelieu the strategy of colonization was two fold. The Jesuits the strongest and most influential of the religious orders, established the goals of converting the Indians to Christianity. The thought was that the Indians, once converted, would become role players in the settling of the land. The strategy proved unsuccessful, the Indians while in some cases accepting Christianity, had no desire to give up their way of life. It soon became obvious that if the land was to become developed in the image of France, it would be through immigration using settlers from France, not through the integration of the Indian into the agriculture or socio-economic structure of the French way of life. In France, Richelieu granted a charter to the Company of One Hundred Associates in 1627. Under the charter, the Company was granted full title to land extending from Florida to the Arctic Circle. In return the Company was obliged to bring out 200 - 300 settlers in 1628 and 4000 more during the next 15 years. The Company had an investment of 300,000 lives (the lire being the basic monetary unit worth about $2.00 US.) Unfortunately for the company, their first convoy of four ships and 400 settlers was captured in the Gulf of St. Lawrence resulting in a total loss of supplies to the settlers already in New France and the Company was forced to look at other means of colonizing. The French devised a scheme of Land Grants to persons of means. For gentlemen of France who had served their country well, huge grants of land were made available in New France, but with these grants came certain obligations. The system known as the 'Seigneurial System' obligated the 'Seigneur' to bring settlers out from France who then were given portions of the land grant in return for providing services to the 'lord' (seigneur). The services were such activities as helping the seigneur to develop his land, building the seigneur mansion, government buildings and churches.. In return the settlers received their passage from New France to the New World, a stipend identified by the 'contract' signed before leaving France, and, where warranted, a portion of the land grant for the settler to farm on his own. Religion, however, did play a significant role in solidifying and maintaining the presence of the church and the strong fabric of French society. The parish priests held together the communities, keeping together the family units whose most important link was the parish church. Consequently, the building of the local church held a high priority in every seigneur.

It was here the early Cloutiers played so prominent a role. Zacharie Cloutier was recruited by Giffard not for his potential as a farmer, but for his skills as a builder. He was first a carpenter but later also became a skilled mason as well. His responsibilities were to construct the Government buildings, the Manor House, and the Parish church. Consequently, he never did 'farm' in the true sense of the word. After he completed his 'servitude' with Giffard he took his trade to other communities to build their churches. In short Cardinal Richelieu's policies with regard to the spread of Christianity, and his seigneur system approach to settlement molded well with the skills and ambitions of Zacharie Cloutier I who put these policies into practice in the new land. Read the complete history from 1500 - Zachary Cloutier's entrance to Canada here.

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/568259/strategy /272991/Strategy-in-the-early-modern-period

Strategy in the early modern period

The development of state structures, particularly in western Europe, during the 16th and 17th centuries gave birth to strategy in its modern form. War makes the state, and the state makes war, in the words of American historian Charles Tilly. The development of centralized bureaucracies and, in parallel, the taming of independent aristocratic classes yielded ever more powerful armies and navies. As the system of statecraft gradually became secularized - witness the careful policy pursued by France under the great cardinal Armand-Jean du Plessis, duc de Richelieu, chief minister to King Louis XIII from 1624 to 1642, who was willing to persecute Protestants at home while supporting Protestant powers abroadso too did strategy become more subtle. The rapine and massacre of the Thirty Years War (161848) yielded to wars waged for raison dtat, to aggrandize the interests of the ruler and through him the state. In this as in many other ways, the early modern period witnessed a return to Classical roots. Even as drill masters studied ancient Roman textbooks to recover the discipline that made the legions formidable instruments of policy, so too did strategists return to a Classical world in which the logic of foreign policy shaped the conduct of war. For a time, the invention of gunpowder and the development of the newly centralized state seemed to shatter the dominance of defenses: medieval castles could not withstand the battering of late 15th- or early 16th-century artillery. But the invention of carefully designed geometric

fortifications (known as the trace italienne) restored much of the balance. A well-fortified city was once again a powerful obstacle to movement, one that would require a great deal of time and trouble to reduce. The construction of belts of fortified cities along a countrys frontier was the keynote of strategists peacetime conceptions. Yet there was a difference. Poliorcetics was no longer a haphazard art practiced<script src="http://adserver.adtechus.com/addyn/3.0/5308.1/1371256/0/170/ADTECH;target=_blank;gr p=485;key=false;kvqsegs=D;kvtopicid=568259;kvchannel=HISTORY;misc=1319387037352"> </script> with greater or lesser virtuosic skill but increasingly a science in which engineering and geometry played a central role; cities fell not to starvation but to methodical bombardment, mining, and, if necessary, assault. Indeed, by the middle of the 18th century, most sieges were highly predictable and even ritualized affairs, culminating in surrender before the final desperate attack. Armies also began to acquire the rudiments, at least, of modern logistical and health systems; though they were not quite composed of interchangeable units, they at least comprised a far more homogeneous and disciplined set of suborganizations than they had since Roman times. And, in a set of developments rarely noticed by military historians, the development of ancillary sciences, such as the construction of roads and highways and cartography, made the movement of military organizations not only easier but more predictable than ever before.

Strategy began to seem more like technique than art, science rather than craft. Practitioners, such as the 17th-century French engineer Sbastien Le Prestre de Vauban and the 18th-century French general and military historian Henri, baron de Jomini, began to make of war an affair of rules, principles, and even laws. Not surprisingly, these developments coincided with the emergence of military schools and an increasingly scientific and reforming bentartillerists studied trigonometry, and officers studied military engineering. Military literature flourished: Essai gnral de tactique (1772), by Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, comte de Guibert, was but one of a number of thoughtful texts that systematized military thought, although Guibert (unusual for writers of his time) had inklings of larger changes in war lying ahead. War had become a profession, to be mastered by dint of application and intellectual, as well as physical, labour.

The French Revolution and the emergence of modern strategies

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty_Years%27_War