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Deception Operations

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Contents
Articles
2nd Airborne Division (United Kingdom) 4th Airborne Division (United Kingdom) 55th Infantry Division (United States) 58th Infantry Division (United Kingdom) 59th Infantry Division (United States) 5th Airborne Division (United Kingdom) 6th Airborne Division (United States) Operation Accumulator Operation Barclay Operation Blumenpflcken Operation Boardman Operation Bodyguard Operation Cascade Operation Chettyford Operation Cockade Operation Copperhead Operation Ferdinand First United States Army Group Operation Fortitude Fourth Army (United Kingdom) Ghost Army Gleiwitz incident Operation Hambone Operation Hardboiled Operation Haifisch Operation Harpune Operation Herbstreise Operation Ironside Operation Kremlin London Controlling Section Operation Mincemeat National redoubt Operation Scherhorn Operation Quicksilver (WWII) 1 3 4 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 20 21 21 24 25 26 27 33 35 37 40 41 42 42 43 44 44 45 48 57 60 65

Shelling of Mainila Operation Span Starfish site Twelfth Army (United Kingdom) XIV Corps (United Kingdom) Operation Zeppelin (Allies)

67 69 69 71 73 75

References
Article Sources and Contributors Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 76 78

Article Licenses
License 79

2nd Airborne Division (United Kingdom)

2nd Airborne Division (United Kingdom)


2nd Airborne Division

The divisional shoulder flash of the airborne forces Active Country Branch Type Role World War II
United Kingdom

British Army Airborne diversion phantom formation

The 2nd Airborne Division was a British Army deception unit of World War II. It comprised a small amount of personnel and equipment, especially radio communications, which aimed to mimic the activities of a real, 10,000 strong plus, division.

History
The division was first referred to as part of the British II Corps of the British Fourth Army, with units based at Skegness and Grantham in Lincolnshire. For Fortitude South II the division along with the notional United States 9th and 21st Airborne Divisons were depicted as being under the direct control of the First United States Army Group and tasked with seizing key positions inland of the fictitious Pas de Calais beachheads.[1][2] In the aftermath of Fortitude South, the notional 2nd Airborne Division, the notional United States 9th and 21st Airborne divisons and the real United States 17th Airborne Divisons to depict an airborne threat to the Kiel-Bremen area in support of Operation Market Garden. [3] The division was disposed of in December 1944, by announcing that it had been disbanded to provide replacements for the 1st and 6th Airborne Divisions. [1]

2nd Airborne Division (United Kingdom)

Insignia
Unlike the other fictitious (3rd, 4th & 5th) British Airborne Divisons, the 2nd used the same Pegasus insignia as the real 1st & 6th British Airborne Divisons.[1]

Composition
In addition to the usual divisional and support troops the 2nd consisted of:[1] 11th Parachute Brigade 12th Parachute Brigade 13th Airlanding Brigade

References
[1] Holt. 2005. p.916 [2] Hesketh. 1999. p. 418 [3] Hesketh. 1999. p. 306

Bibliography
Holt Thaddeus. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Phoenix. 2005. ISBN 0-753-81-917-1 Hesketh Roger. Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. St Ermine. 1999. ISBN 0-316-85172-8

4th Airborne Division (United Kingdom)

4th Airborne Division (United Kingdom)


4th Airborne Division
Active Country Branch Type Role World War II
United Kingdom

British Army Airborne diversion phantom formation

The British 4th Airborne Division was a deception division created as part of Operation Cascade in March 1943.

History
As created, the unit was notionally based in Palestine[1] and incorporated both the fictitious 1st Special Air Service Brigade created during Operation Abeam and the real 4th Parachute Brigade until that unit was assigned to the 1st Airborne Division in June 1943, when it was replaced with the notional 6th (Gurkha) Parachute Brigade.[1] The 4th Airborne Division was depicted as part of the British Twelfth Army in both operations Operation Barclay, where it was supposed to be destined for an assault on Greece and Crete and Operation Zeppelin, where it was presented as part of a simulated threat to Crete.[1]

Insignia
Unlike the real 1st & 6th Airborne Divisions and the fictitious 2nd Airborne Division, the 4th Airborne Division was given its own insignia. This took the form of an open white parachute with black wings on a blue background.[1]

Composition
After the departure of the 4th Parachute Brigade, the 4th Airborne Division was composed of the following units. 1st Special Air Service Brigade 1st Special Air Service Regiment Detached Special Air Service Brigade 6th Special Group 6th (Gurkha) Parachute Brigade 6th Battalion, 6th Gurkha Regiment 160th Parachute Regiment (Gurkha) 161st Parachute Regiment (Gurkha) 7th Parachute Brigade Greek Squadrons, Special Forces French Parachute Battalion

4th Airborne Division (United Kingdom)

References
[1] Thaddeus Holt. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Phoenix. 2005. ISBN 0753819171

55th Infantry Division (United States)


55th Infantry Division

55th Infantry Division shoulder sleeve insignia Active Country Branch Type Role World War II USA United States Army Infantry diversion phantom formation

The US 55th Infantry Division was a 'phantom division' created in October 1943 to cover the departure of the US 5th Infantry Division from Iceland. An entirely notional force, it's existence was reported to the Germans only through controlled agents as Iceland was too far from Europe to make use of radio deception.[1][2]

World War II
Between March and July 1944 the division (along with the fictional 7th, 9th and 10th Ranger Battalions[2][3]) was presented as being part of the British VII Corps of the British Fourth Army. It was to act as the reinforcing unit for the British 52nd Infantry Division in the attack on Narvik.[1] When 'Fortitude North' was closed down, the division was presented as being part of a force designed to follow up the German evacuation of Norway. It was disposed of by announcing during late 1944 that the division was leaving Iceland, with the final units leaving by March 1945.[2]

55th Infantry Division (United States)

Composition
In addition to the usual divisional support units the 55th Infantry Division was composed of the:[2] 78th Infantry Regiment 83rd Infantry Regiment 96th Infantry Regiment

References
[1] Hesketh 1999, p. 64 & 65 [2] Holt 2005, pp. 906907 [3] Holt 2005, pp. 910911

Bibliography
Holt Thaddeus. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Phoenix. 2005. ISBN 0-753-81-917-1 Hesketh Roger. Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. St Ermine. 1999. ISBN 0-316-85172-8

58th Infantry Division (United Kingdom)

58th Infantry Division (United Kingdom)


58th Infantry Division
Active Country Branch Type Role World War II
United Kingdom

British Army Infantry diversion phantom formation

The British 58th Infantry Division was a 'phantom division' created as part of 'Operation Fortitude North' as a replacement for the British 3rd Infantry Division which was going south to take part in a D-Day rehearsal. Unlike other 'phantom divisions' the 58ths number was chosen on the basis of Ultra reports that showed the Germans believed a 58th Infantry Division existed in the vicinity of Windsor.[1] As part of the British Fourth Army's, II Corps, the division took the role of a mountain trained assault formation in 'Fortitude North' (HQ: Aberlour) and the role of follow up unit in 'Fortitude South' (HQ: Gravesend). It was disposed of by announcing that the division had moved to Hertfordshire and been disbanded in April 1945.[1],[2]

Insignia
The units insignia, a stags face full on a black square was specially chosen to support the divisions fictional back-story, that it had been formed in the Scottish Highlands around cadres from combat experienced Highland regiments.[1],[2]

Composition
In addition to the usual divisional support units the 58th Infantry Division was composed of: 173rd Infantry Brigade 174th Infantry Brigade 175th Infantry Brigade

References
[1] Roger Hesketh. Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. St Ermine. 1999. ISBN 0316851728 [2] Thaddeus Holt. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Phoenix. 2005. ISBN 0753819171

59th Infantry Division (United States)

59th Infantry Division (United States)


59th Infantry Division

Active Country Branch Type Role


United States

United States Army Infantry diversion phantom formation

The US 59th Infantry Divison was a 'Phantom Division' created in May of 1944 to cover the deployment of the US 35th Infantry Division to Normandy. [1]

World War II
The division was presented to the Germans as having established it's headquarters in the Harwich area after having been formed at Fort Custer in 1942 and undergone training in Tennessee, Minnesota and the Desert Training Center.
[1]

In Fortitude South II it formed part of XXXVII Corps, US 14th Army and was depicted as one of the divisions that would carry out the first landings on the Pas de Calais beaches.[2] During this period it carried out three simulated landing exercises with the notional Force F.[1] In the aftermath of Fortitude South II was depicted as moving to Rowlands Castle in Hampshire during August of 1944 before leaving the United Kingdom via Southampton in September of 1944.[1]

Insignia
Most 'Phantom Division' insignia were designed by the Quartermaster Corps, however in the case of the 59th Infantry Divsion, its insignia, inspired by the Gadsden flag was created by American members of the Operation Fortitude staff.[1]

Composition
In addition to the usual divisional support units the 59th Infantry Divison was composed of:[1] 94th Infantry Regiment 139th Infantry Regiment 171st Infantry Regiment

59th Infantry Division (United States)

References
[1] Holt. 2005. p. 907 [2] Hesketh. 1999. p.418

Bibliography
Holt Thaddeus. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Phoenix. 2005. ISBN 0-75381-917-1 Hesketh Roger. Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. St Ermin's Press. 1999 ISBN 0-316-85172-8

5th Airborne Division (United Kingdom)

5th Airborne Division (United Kingdom)


5th Airborne Division
Active Country Branch Type Role World War II
United Kingdom

British Army Airborne diversion phantom formation

The British 5th Airborne Division was a deception division created in late 1943 as part of Operation Foynes to cover the departure 1st Airborne Division from Italy. It was notionally built up around the 2nd Parachute Brigade, which had been left in Italy when the 1st Airborne Division travelled to Britain.[1]

History
Initially it was portrayed as part of the British XIV Corps of the British Twelfth Army in Sicily, subsequently it was depicted as being attached successively to the British Twelfth Army's Polish III Corps (Operation Ferdinand) and British III Corps (Operation Second Undercut). Finally in December 1944, it was presented to the Germans as the theater airborne reserve until the end of the war.[1]

Insignia
Like the 4th Airborne Division, the 5th Airborne Division was given its own insignia. This took the form of a bright blue bolt of lightning, formed by five zig-zags on a dark red square. In 1945 this was replaced by the standard insignia used by the 1st, 2nd & 6th Airborne Divisions.[1]

Composition
2nd Parachute Brigade 4th Parachute Battalion 5th (Scottish) Parachute Battalion 6th (Royal Welch) Parachute Battalion 8th Parachute Brigade 8th Bn Highland Light Infantry 8th Bn Cameronians 12th Bn Black Watch 9th Air Landing Brigade 4th Bn Rifle Brigade 5th Bn Royal Ulster Rifles 15th Bn King's Royal Rifle Corps

5th Airborne Division (United Kingdom)

10

References
[1] Thaddeus Holt. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Phoenix. 2005. ISBN 0753819171

6th Airborne Division (United States)


6th Airborne Division

6th Airborne Division shoulder sleeve insignia Active Country Branch Type Role World War II USA United States Army Infantry diversion phantom formation

The US 6th Airborne Division was a 'Phantom Division' created for Operation Vendetta in 1944. Like the British 4th and 5th Airborne Divisions, the notional formation was 'built up' around a real unit, the 517th Regimental Combat Team.[1]

World War II
Supposedly arrived in Sicily from the United States in May 1944. It was attached to the US 7th Army and was to be dropped on the town of Paulhan in France to support a fictional invasion of the Narbonne region. It was disposed of by announcing in July 1944 that the division had been disbanded.[1]

Composition
HQ in Sicily. 517th Regimental Combat Team 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment 596th Airborne Engineer Company 460th Field Artillery Battalion 1st Battalion, 551st Parachute Infantry Regiment 550th Airborne Battalion

6th Airborne Division (United States)

11

References
[1] Thaddeus Holt (2005-12-01). The deceivers: allied military deception in the second world war (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=hECPPwAACAAJ). ISBN978-0-7538-1917-3. .

Operation Accumulator
Operation Accumulator was an Allied naval operation near the Channel Islands on the night of 12/13 June 1944, in support of Operation Overlord, the invasion of France. As part of Operation Fortitude, a series of deception operations had been used to divert attention from the Allied landings by suggesting that a second invasion force was still waiting to land. This caused the defenders to divert their forces from the fighting in Normandy, holding them in reserve for an invasion in the Pas de Calais, to the east. Some days after the initial landings, it was decided to mount a smaller operation to simulate a follow-up landing force heading for Granville, at the western side of the Cotentin Peninsula. The desired effect would be to force the German command to pull units from the front line and redeploy them to protect the western coast. The plan was for two Royal Canadian Navy destroyers, Haida and Huron, to make a series of fake radio transmissions, which would be intercepted. The beginning of the operation went smoothly, with the two ships signalling that the invasion fleet had been delayed by engine problems, and giving a revised plan. However, the radios on the Haida broke down, forcing the Huron to continue alone; the two ships were also spotted by an Allied reconnaissance plane, which radioed back that it had found "unidentified warships". The operation was a failure; whilst the signals were made, there was no reaction from the German force. This may have been helped by the Allied air report - a major invasion fleet would have been known to the pilot! - and by a lack of any corroborating evidence; for example, there was no attempt at spoofing radar signals, as had been carried out for the main invasion by Operations Glimmer and Taxable.

References
Operation NEPTUNE (Naval Aspects of Operation OVERLORD) Administrative History, 1948 [1] Land Force Information Operation - Deception [2], pp. 26-7.

References
[1] http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ library/ online/ comnaveu/ comnaveu-8. htm [2] http:/ / armyapp. dnd. ca/ ael/ pubs/ B-GL-354-003-FP-001. pdf

Operation Barclay

12

Operation Barclay
Operation Barclay was an Allied deception plan in support of the invasion of Sicily, in 1943, during World War II. This operation was intended to deceive the Axis military commands as to the location of the expected Allied assault across the Mediterranean and divert attention and resources from Sicily. It specifically indicated an invasion through the Balkans, by use of bogus troop movements, radio traffic, recruitment of Greek interpreters, acquisition of Greek maps and Operation Mincemeat, the planting of false Allied plans. The Allies created a sham army, the "Twelfth Army", in the eastern Mediterranean, which consisted of 12 fictitious divisions. Hitler had suspected that the Allies would invade Europe through the Balkans and Barclay served to reinforce this opinion. The deception was successful. The German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht - OKW), assumed a much greater concentration of Allied forces in the eastern Mediterranean than was the case and held to this assessment, making subsequent deceptions more credible. German forces in the Balkans were reinforced from eight to eighteen divisions. In addition, the Balkan threat diverted the Italian fleet into the Adriatic, away from Sicily. Operation Husky thus achieved surprise.

Further reading
Jon Latimer, Deception in War, London: John Murray, 2001

References
World War II deception operations [1]

References
[1] http:/ / www. au. af. mil/ au/ awc/ awcgate/ wright/ wf05. pdf

Operation Blumenpflcken

13

Operation Blumenpflcken
Operation Blumenpflcken ("Operation Flower Picking") was a counter-resistance operation in occupied Norway, planned and carried out by the Gestapo/Sicherheitspolizei in 1944 and early 1945. It was planned by Ernst Weiner, and was a part of the Gegenterror organized to weaken the Norwegian resistance. The purpose was not to terrorize or liquidate central resistance leaders, but rather to capture and kill other known Norwegians and hide the real purpose. According to Arnfinn Moland, the killings were made to look like actions by the Norwegian resistance (Home Front), specifically the Communist parts of it.[1] Many believed the deception well into the 1990s. Egil Ulateig's 1996 book Med rett til drepe, with consultant help from Hans Fredrik Dahl, made such a claim about two of the Blumenpflcken victims.[2] During the war, even some of the German participants thought the initiative had come from Siegfried Fehmer or the Reichskommissariat Norwegen. Arnfinn Moland also claimed that the Norwegian Nazi police Statspolitiet were not informed.[3] Historian Tore Pryser has stated that Statspolitiet were indeed involved.[4] According to Moland, Weiner participated and, between 12 June and 1 July 1944, shot the first three of the eleven victims, Einar Hrland (long thought to have been liquidated by Norwegians), Sigurd Roll and Gunnar Spangen.[5] According to Berit Nkleby in Norsk krigsleksikon 1940-45, a woman named Sigrid Hammer was also killed,[6] the operation's only female victim. The next seven killings took place in November and December 1944. The first was carried out by two Norwegian perpetrators and a German helper, Erwin Morio. The next three were carried out by Germans only; Heinz Vierke was legally acquitted for one killing during the legal purge in Norway after World War II. The next killing was by two Norwegians. The last three were carried out by Nickerl (first name unknown, participated twice) or Heinz Vierke (once) with Norwegian helpers. The last victim, Georg Henrik Resch, killed in Drammen on 6 January 1945,[5] was the wrong person.[7] Two attempts failed, one on 4 September 1944 and the other on 30 October 1944.[8] All but three killings took place in Oslo or Aker.[5] Of the eleven killings that went to trial after the war, there were convictions in each case, except the one with Heinz Vierke. Ernst Weiner was among the arrested, but was said to have shot himself and a fellow inmate while in prison.[9] Historian Tore Pryser has cast some doubt on the "official version" that is was a suicide.[10]

References
[1] [2] [3] [4] Moland, Arnfinn (1999) (in Norwegian). Over grensen?. Oslo: Orion. p.282. ISBN82-458-0337-5. Moland, 1999: pp. 283, 286 Moland, 1999: pp. 282283 Pryser, Tore (2000) (in Norwegian). Okkupasjonshistoriske sideblikk. En artikkelsamling. Lillehammer: Lillehammer College University. p.7879. ISSN0806-8348. [5] Moland, 1999: p. 285 [6] Nkleby, Berit (1995). "Blumenpflcken" (http:/ / mediabase1. uib. no/ krigslex/ b/ b3. html#blumenpflcken). In Dahl, Hans Fredrik. Norsk krigsleksikon 1940-45. Oslo: Cappelen. . Retrieved 5 July 2010. [7] Moland, 1999: p. 287 [8] Moland, 1999: p. 284 [9] Moland, 1999: pp. 284285 [10] Pryser, 2000: pp. 6566

Operation Boardman

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Operation Boardman
During World War II, Operation Boardman was a deception operation that supported the Operation Avalanche invasion at Salerno, Italy. This deception continued the false threat of an Allied invasion of the Balkans.

Operation Bodyguard

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Operation Bodyguard
Operation Bodyguard
Part of World War II

Stalin, Roosvelt and Churchill at the 1943 Tehran conference, where Operation Bodyguard was proposed Operational scope Planned Plannedby Objective Executedby Outcome Strategic 194344 London Controlling Section Strategic surprise of the Allied landings in Normandy SHAEF Ops (B) & Others Success

Operation Bodyguard was the code name for a high level World War II deception plan employed by the Allied nations during the build up to the 1944 invasion of north-western Europe. The plan set out a general strategy to mislead German high command as to the exact date and location of the invasion. It was implemented as a number of independent operations, eventually culminating in tactical surprise during the Normandy landings on June 6, 1944 (also known as D-Day) and a delayed German re-enforcement of the region for some time afterward. Planning for Bodyguard was begun in 1943 under the auspices of an organisation called the London Controlling Section (LCS). A draft strategy, referred to as Plan Jael was presented to Allied high command at the Tehran Conference in late November and approved on December 6. The major objective of this plan was to lead the Germans to believe that the invasion of northwestern Europe would come later than was actually planned, and to threaten attacks at other locations than the true objective, including the Pas de Calais, the Balkans, southern France, Norway, and Soviet attacks in Bulgaria and northern Norway.

Operation Bodyguard

16

Background
During World War II the Allies made extensive use of deception - developing many new techniques and theories. The main protagonists were 'A' Force, set up in 1940 Dudley Clarke and the London Controlling Section, chartered in 1942 under the control of John Bevan.[1][2] At this stage of the war, Allied and German intelligence operations were heavily mismatched. Through the signals work at Bletchley Park much of the German lines of communication were compromised - intercepts, code named Ultra, gave the Allies insights into how effectively their deceptions were operating. By comparison, most of the spies sent into Britain had been caught (or handed themselves in) and turned into double agents under the XX System. Some of the compromised agents were so trusted that, by 1944, German intelligence had stopped sending new infiltrators.[3][4]

Operation Cockade
In 1943, after it had been decided to defer the invasion, Operation Overlord, until the following year, the Allies conducted a series of deceptions intended to threaten invasion in Norway and France. Operation Cockade was intended to confuse the German high command as to Allied intentions, and to draw them into air battles across the Channel. In this respect Cockade was not a success, with German forces barely responding even as a fake invasion force crossed the channel (turning back some distance from their "target").[5]

Plan Jael
Planning for Bodyguard began even before Operation Cockade was fully under way, following the decision that Normandy would be the site of the coming invasion. The departments responsible for deception, 'A' Force and the London Controlling Section, began to address the problem of achieving tactical surprise for Overlord. It was realised that it was impractical to try to hide the invasion build up indefinitely. Early ideas that later became Operation Bodyguard revolved around efforts to convince the Germans to reduce their force in Northern France and that the overall Allied plan was to establish an initial bridgehead at Pas de Calais.[6] Between November 28 and December 1 1943 the Allied leaders met in Tehran to agree on strategy for the following year. Colonel John Henry Bevan, head of the London Controlling Section, attended the conference to present a draft Plan Jael (a reference to the Old Testament heroine who killed an enemy commander by deception).[7][8] Bevan's outline was approved on December 6 and he returned to London to begin working on Operation Bodyguard. The new name was chosen based on a comment by Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin at the Tehran conference; "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies."[7][9]

Operation Bodyguard

17

Objectives
The main part of Operation Bodyguard was the plan to deceive the enemy as to the timing, weight and direction of the Normandy invasion. Roger Hesketh, who helped plan and carry out the operation while working at 'Ops B', the deception sector of SHAEF, recalled in his book the three main goals of this part of Bodyguard. These were laid down in Appendix Y of COSSAC, a previous deception plan, and were: 1. To induce the German command to believe that the main assault and follow up will be in or east of the Pas de Calais, thereby encouraging the enemy to maintain or increase the strength of his air and ground forces and his fortifications there at the expense of other areas, particularly of the Caen area. 2. To keep the enemy in doubt as to the date and the time of the actual assault. 3. During and after the main assault to contain the largest possible German land and air forces in or east of the Pas de Calais for at least fourteen days.[10]

Memorandum on Bodyguard prepared for SHAEF in February 1944

The London Controlling Section divided Bodyguard into three major sub-operations (Operation Fortitude North and South, and Operation Zeppelin). A number of smaller operations were also designed to support the objectives of the three.

Fortitude
Operation Fortitude, one of the largest components of Bodyguard, was intended to convince the Germans of a greater Allied military strength Inflatable tanks were used during Operation than existed, and that this would be deployed to invade both Norway Fortitude, one of the three major operations and Pas de Calais. Fortitude employed similar techniques to a 1943 making up Bodyguard operation, Cockade; fictional field armies, faked operations to prepare the ground for invasion and leaked information about the Allied order of battle and war plans. Fortitude North centred around the fictional British Fourth Army, based in Edinburgh. The Fourth Army had first been activated the previous year, as part of Cockade, to threaten Norway and tie down the German divisions stationed there. The Allies faked the existence of the army via fake radio traffic (Operation Skye) and leaks through double agents.[11][12]

Operation Bodyguard

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Zeppelin
The aim of Operation Zeppelin was to indicate landings on Crete or in Romania.

Special means
A large part of the various Bodyguard operations involved the use of double agents. The British "Double Cross" anti-espionage operation had proven very successful from the outset of the war.[13] The LCS was able to use double agents to send back misleading information about Allied invasion plans.[14] By contrast, Allied intelligence was very good. Ultra, signals intelligence from decrypted German radio transmission, confirmed to planners that the German high command believed in the Bodyguard deceptions and gave them the enemy's order of battle.[15][16]

Normandy Landings
Elements of the Bodyguard plan were in operation on June 6, 1944 in support of Operation Neptune (the amphibious assault of Normandy). Elaborate masquerades were undertaken in the English Channel by small ships and aircraft (Operation Glimmer and Operation Taxable) to simulate invasion fleets lying off Pas de Calais. At the same time Operation Titanic involved the RAF dropping fake paratroopers to the east and west of the Normandy landings. Joan Pujol Garcia, a British double agent (code named Garbo) in high standing with the Germans, transmitted information about the Allied invasion plan with a further warning that the Normandy invasion was a diversion.

Aftermath

Joan Garcia, "Garbo"

In his 2004 book, The Deceivers, Thaddeus Holt attributes the success of Fortitude to the trial run of Cockade in 1943; "FORTITUDE in 1944 could not have run as smoothly as it did if the London Controlling Section and its fellows had not gone through the exercise of COCKADE in the year before."[17]

List of operations
Whilst Bodyguard was the overall deception strategy for the Allied invasion, under Operation Overlord, the implementation took the form of many sub-operations. Operation Fortitude (North and South) Operation Quicksilver (South) and Operation Skye (North) Operation Ironside Operation Titanic Operation Taxable and Operation Glimmer Operation Zeppelin Operation Royal Flush Operation Vendetta Operation Graffham

Operation Bodyguard

19

References
[1] Latimer (2004), pg. 148-149 [2] Cruickshank (2004) [3] Latimer (2001), pg. 207-208 [4] Holt (2004) [5] Holt 2004, pg. 478 480 [6] Holt 2004, pg. 494 496 [7] Holt 2004, pg. 504 505 [8] Jablonsky 1991 [9] Cave Brown 1975, pg. 110 [10] Hesketh 2000, pg. 12 [11] Holt 2004, pg. 486 [12] Cave Brown 1975, pg. 464 - 466 [13] Masterman 1972 [14] Ambrose 1981, pg. 269 [15] Cave Brown 1975 [16] Lewin 2001, p. 292 [17] Holt 2004, pg. 493

Bibliography
Jablonsky, David (1991). Churchill, the great game and total war. Frank Cass. Cave Brown, Anthony (1975). Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary True Story Behind D-Day. Hesketh, Roger (2000). Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press. ISBN1585670758. Latimer, John (2001). Deception in War. New York: Overlook Press. ISBN978-1585673810. Masterman, John C (1972). The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945. Australian National University Press. ISBN978-0708104590. Ambrose, Stephen E. (1981). "Eisenhower, the Intelligence Community, and the D-Day Invasion". The Wisconsin Magazine of History (Wisconsin Historical Society) 64 (4): pp. 261277. ISSN00436534. Lewin, Ronald (2001) [1978], Ultra goes to War (Penguin Classic Military History ed.), London: Penguin Group, ISBN978-0141390420 Focuses on the battle-field exploitation of Ultra material. Mallmann-Showell, J.P. (2003). German Naval Code Breakers. Hersham, Surrey: Ian Allan Publishing. ISBN0-7110-2888-5. OCLC181448256. Sexton, Donal J. (1983). "Phantoms of the North: British Deceptions in Scandinavia, 19411944". Military Affairs (Society for Military Histor) 47 (3): pp. 109114. ISSN00263931. Holt, Thaddeus (2004). The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Scribner. ISBN0743250427. Cruickshank, Charles (2004). "Clarke, Dudley Wrangel (18991974). [[Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30937)]"]. Oxford University Press. Retrieved 6 Dec 2011.

Operation Cascade

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Operation Cascade
Operation Cascade was the codename for an Allied deception operation during World War II for the Middle East and North Africa. Operation Cascade was one of the first successful Allied deception operations in World War II, and provided valuable experience for later operations.

Background
In 1942, the British forces in the Middle East were very weak. To deter the Axis from attacking, a deception operation was planned. This operation was started by 'A' force under command of Colonel Dudley Clarke[1] in 1941, and in 1942 eventually evolved into Operation Cascade.[2] The goal of the operation was to create a false order of battle in order to keep the Axis guessing as to the strength of the Allies in the Mediterranean theatre, by use of bogus troop formations, radio traffic and double agents.

Implementation
In 1941, 'A' force (the British organization responsible for army intelligence operations in the Middle East) had already created three bogus formations to deceive the enemy in the Mediterranean Theatre: the 1st SAS Brigade[3], the 10th Armoured Division in the Western Desert, and the 7th Division to guard Cyprus. This fictional buildup was expanded into a systematic plan to inflate British strength throughout the Middle East. In March 1942, the real strength stood at 5 Armoured and 10 Infantry divisions. Cascade intended to increase this strength, for the benefit of enemy intelligence, to 8 Armoured and 21 infantry divisions.[2][4] Bogus units had to be created, and actually shipped from their bases in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, India and South Africa. An order of battle had to be drawn up for these units, crests and signs had to be created, and some form of physical presence was needed to convince enemy agents that the units really existed.[2] False radio traffic, and information gathered by civilian informers in Egypt, increased the Axis impression that these units were real and present in the theatre. Most of the civilian agents, however, were double agents controlled by 'A' force through a double-agent network called Cheese.[5] Enemy documents, captured during and after the battle of El Alamein, showed that Cascade was a success. An analysis by 'A' force, published on 19 November 1942, showed that enemy intelligence overestimated the armoured strength of the British forces by 40%, and infantry strength by 45%.[6]

Influence
Operation Cascade gave the Allies valuable experience in planning deception operations, which was later used to good extent in the deception operations covering the invasion of Europe (D-Day landings in Normandy, and the invasion of Southern France).[2] The British forces built up during Operation Cascade were later used in Operation Zeppelin to tie down Axis forces in the Balkan and Greece, and prevent the Axis from using these forces against the Allied invasion of Sicily in Operation Husky.[7] In 1944, the actual Allied strength in the Mediterranean totalled about 52 divisions; Axis intelligence accepted a strength of about 70 divisions in the theatre.[8]

Operation Cascade

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Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Howard, pg 33 Howard, pg 43 Howard, pg 34 Crowdy, pg 168 Latimer, Pg. 155 Howard, pg. 44 Crowdy, pg 281 Howard, pg 137

Further reading
Jon Latimer, Deception in War, London: John Murray, 2001 Howard, Michael Eliot. Hinsley, Francis Harry. British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 5, Strategic Deception. Cambridge University Press, 1990. ISBN 9780521401456 Latimer, Jon. Alamein. Harvard University Press, 2002. ISBN 9780674010161. Crowdy, Terry. Deceiving Hitler: Double Cross and Deception in World War II. Osprey Publishing, 2008. ISBN 9781846031359.

Operation Chettyford
During World War II, Operation Chettyford was a tactical deception in support of the 1944 Allied invasion at Anzio. George Patton made a well-publicized visit to units based around Cairo. A number of double agents were used to misinform the Germans that a major invasion of the Balkans was planned.

Operation Cockade
Operation Cockade was a series of deception operations designed to alleviate German pressure on Allied operations in Sicily and on the Soviets on the eastern front by feinting various attacks into Western Europe. The Allies hoped to use Cockade to force the Luftwaffe into a massive air battle with the Royal Air Force and US Eighth Air Force that would give the Allies air superiority over Western Europe. Cockade involved three deception operations: Operation Starkey, Operation Wadham, and Operation Tindall. Operation Starkey was set to occur in early September, followed by Operation Tindall in mid September, and lastly Operation Wadham in late September 1943.

Planning
The three plans were interwoven into one large deception story, called Operation Cockade.[1] The Allies sent the Cockade story to the Germans by using many different methods, double agents, decoy signals, fake troop concentrations, and increased reconnaissance and bombing missions into the areas of Boulogne, Brest, and Norway.[2] The plan was developed and under the control of Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC);[] at the time the Supreme Allied Commander had not been appointedEisenhower would assume the position in December 1943.

Operation Cockade

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Operation Starkey
Operation Starkey involved a sham British and Canadian amphibious invasion into the Boulogne area of northern France. For the United States, the original Starkey deception plan involved 2,300 heavy bomber, 3,700 fighter, and 400 medium bomber sorties to strike targets near Boulogne. This was done with the goal of convincing the Germans that the British and Canadian invasion preparations were authentic.[3] The British were to provide another 3,000 heavy bomber sorties into the Boulogne area.[4] Starkey was to culminate with a large feint involving sailing an amphibious force, consisting of 30 ships, off the Boulogne coast, hoping to lure in the Luftwaffe. The Starkey plan encountered difficulties from the start. One of the opponents to the plan, Major General Ira C. Eaker, Eighth Air Force commander, criticized the Starkey plan by saying that it would force the Americans to abandon their strategic bombing offensive. In a letter to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Eaker said Starkey called for 2,300 heavy-bomber sorties over 14 days "when the command had only flown 5,356 combat sorties in the past 8 months."[5] Although Eaker convinced SHAEF to lower the American commitment to three-hundred heavy-bomber sorties, he promised to provide as many bomber sorties as possible from newly organized bomber units undergoing training. By the time it was over, Eighth Air Force had flown a total of 1,841 bomber sorties. Other problems were encountered as well. Headquarters, VIII Air Support Command noted that Starkey planners had difficulty agreeing on the rules of engagement for striking targets in occupied France. The British and Americans unknowingly duplicated efforts on several occasions by flying the same missions within a few days of each other.[6] The Royal Navy did not fully endorse the deception plan either; Starkey planners had wanted to place two of the Navy's battleships within the amphibious force to act as bait for the Luftwaffe, but they were unwilling to risk their battleships in such a manner.[7] Because of this opposition, the Starkey planners had to make several amendments to the deception plan.

Operation Wadham
Planners for Operation Wadham wanted the Germans to believe that the Americans were going to invade in the area of Brest, a seaport on the Breton peninsula. This story, which was totally fictional and involved minimal "real" forces, had an amphibious group sailing directly from the United States and another force from Great Britain, 10 divisions in all[8], to conduct an invasion at Brest.[9] The premise of this story was that the Americans were planning to invade Brest following the successful invasion at Boulogne. Although the air commitment for this plan was considerably less than Starkeys, Eaker also criticized Wadham by saying that the combined bomber offensive would provide more effectiveness at destroying the Luftwaffe than the diverted bomber resources could provide in support of Wadham. Other than air assets, the Americans only had to provide 75 dummy landing craft to aid in the deception effort.[3] The primary weakness in Wadhams story was that the US forces were going to land outside of Allied tactical air support range. Prior to the operation, the Army Operations Branch called Wadham a "very weak plan," but "essential as a part of Cockade to reinforce Starkey."[10] The notional order of battle for Operation Wadham included:[8] Task Force 'A': Headquarters V Corps, the 5th Infantry Divison, the 29th Infantry Divison, the 46th Infantry Division, the 3rd Armored Divison, and the 101st Airborne Division. Task Force 'B': Headquarters VII Corps, the 2nd Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, the 8th Infantry Division, the 31st Infantry Division, the 4th Armored Division, and the 76th Artillery Brigade.

Operation Cockade

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Operation Tindall
Operation Tindall involved the story that the British and Americans were going to attack Norway, with the hypothetical goal of capturing Stavanger and its airfield. Stavanger and its airfield were critical to the story, for once again the Allies were planning a deception operation outside of tactical air support range and needed a way to increase the plausibility of the plan.[11] The five divisions that were to be used in the sham invasion were actual divisions camped in Scotland, and the Allies had adequate aircraft and naval assets in Scotland to make the deception plan plausible. The only shortfall the Allies had with Tindall was their lack of military gliders.[12] The Allies hoped Tindall would induce the Germans to maintain the 12 divisions they had assigned to Norway.

Result
Operation Cockade failed to achieve its objectives, mostly because German leadership did not believe the Allies were going to invade western Europe in 1943, and Cockade did not trigger the air battle the Allies desired.[13] The main exception to German High Command was Generalfeldmarschall (Field Marshal) Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander in chief of Western Command, who believed the Allies were going to invade at Boulogne and was angry at the German High Command for removing 10 divisions from France. The invasion stories, particularly Starkey and Wadham, were not plausible and lacked credibility, and so were not believed. There were no significant German reactions to these deception operations. The most notable of these non-reactions is the lack of air reconnaissance and naval or Luftwaffe response to the Starkey amphibious feint.[14] The fact that the Germans moved 10 divisions out of northern France to other theaters indicated that Starkey and Wadham were complete failures. In Norway, the Germans did keep force levels at 12 divisions, indicating the Germans assessed a higher threat there. Besides being implausible, Cockade also failed because the Allies did not work hard enough to make the deception look real. The Royal Navy would not risk its battleships, and Eaker did not want to divert resources from the strategic bombing offensive.[15] Cockade did have one success: the Germans believed the story that the Allies had 51 divisions in the British Isles, when in reality there were only 17 divisions. This became a factor for deception operations in 1944. Overall, however, Cockade was best summarized by Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris, commander of RAF Bomber Command, when he said the deception plan was "at best a piece of harmless play acting."[2]

References
Notes
[1] Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of the War Cabinet, Operation Cockade (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 505.61-15, IRIS no. 00286425, 3 June 1943). [2] Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 75 [3] G-5 Section, ETOUSA, U.S. Commitments to Operation Cockade. [4] Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of the War Cabinet, Operation Cockade. [5] Ira C. Eaker to Lt Gen Jacob L. Devers, letter, subject: Operation Cockade, 7 June 1943, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 505.61-15, IRIS no. 00286425. [6] Headquarters, VIII Air Support Command, Starkey Summary (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 532.5401B, IRIS no. 00232197, 30 September 1943). [7] Historical Subsection, Office of Secretary, General Staff, Supreme Head quarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), The History of COSSAC (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 506.01A, IRIS no. 00206749, 1945), 19. [8] Jonathan Terrell. 'Lies, Spies, and GIs: Operation WADHAM and the Beginning of American Deception in the European Theater of Operations, American University Thesis 2010 (http:/ / dspace. wrlc. org/ bitstream/ 1961/ 9427/ 1/ Terrell, Jonathan - Spring '10. pdf) [9] Army Operations Branch, Operation Wadham (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AF-HRA, USAF Collection, call no. 502.451, IRIS no. 00205091, 15 June 1943). [10] Army Operations Branch, Operation Wadham. [11] Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of the War Cabinet, Operation Tindall (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 505.61-45, IRIS no. 00206455, 1943). [12] Historical Subsection, Office of Secretary, General Staff, SHAEF, The History of COSSAC, 19.

Operation Cockade
[13] Royal Air Force, RAF Narrative on the Liberation of North West Europe (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 512.041-38 vol. 1, IRIS no. 00895753, 1946), 59. [14] Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters VIII Air Support Command, Memorandum Concerning Feedback on Operation Starkey (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 532.4501B, IRIS no. 00232193, 1943). [15] Royal Air Force, RAF Narrative on the Liberation of North West Europe, 58.

24

Bibliography
Cruickshank, Charles (1979). Deception in World War II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN019215849X.

Operation Copperhead
Operation Copperhead (originally called "Operation Telescope") was a small British-run deception operation run during World War II. It was one of many deceptions run prior to the invasion of Normandy (Operation Overlord). For instance, General Patton was supposedly in command of a fictitious army massing for a crossing to Calais. This was one aspect of a deception called Operation Fortitude. An Australian actor, M. E. Clifton-James, depicted Field Marshal Montgomery on a well-publicised visit to Gibraltar and North Africa. This was to suggest to the Germans that the Allies were planning to invade Southern France. On 25 May 1944 Clifton-James flew from Northolt to Gibraltar on Churchill's private aircraft. At a reception at the governor-general's house, hints were made about Plan 303, a plan to invade southern France. German intelligence picked this up and ordered agents to find out what they could about Plan 303. Clifton-James then flew to Algiers where over the next few days he made a round of public appearances with General Henry Wilson, the Allied commander in the Mediterranean theatre. Clifton-James was then secretly flown to Cairo where he stayed until the invasion in Normandy was well underway. He then returned to his job after an absence of five weeks. This operation was the subject of the book and movie I Was Montys Double. In the movie Clifton-James appeared both as himself and as Montgomery. Some sources wrongly refer to this operation as Operation Hambone, the name used in the book for the operation.

References
Howard, Sir Michael, Strategic Deception (British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 5) (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990), p. 126 Holt, Thaddeus, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (Scribner, New York, 2004), pp. 561-62, 815 British National Archives, "A" Force Permanent Record File, Narrative War Diary, CAB 154/4 pp. 85-90

Operation Ferdinand

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Operation Ferdinand
Operation Ferdinand can refer to 2 operations in World War 2: In 1944, Operation Ferdinand was an Allied deception plan, which supported the invasion of southern France (Operation Dragoon) in August 1944 by leading the Germans to believe that the objective of the invasion was the Genoa region of Italy. In 1942, Operation Ferdinand was the network of coast-watchers operating on Japanese-held islands throughout the Philippines and the South Pacific region. This system of observers consisted of civilians and some military volunteers who radioed reports on Japanese ship movements.

First United States Army Group

26

First United States Army Group


First United States Army Group

Insignia of First United States Army Group Active Country Type Role 1944 United States of America Army Group diversion phantom formation

Commanders
Notable Omar N. Bradley commanders George S. Patton

First United States Army Group was a fictitious Allied Army Group in World War II prior to D-Day, part of Operation Quicksilver, created to deceive the Germans about where the Allies would land in France. To attract Axis attention, prominent US general George S. Patton was placed in command of the fabricated formation.

History
First U.S. Army Groupoften abbreviated FUSAGwas activated in London in 1943 as the planning formation for the Allied invasion of France under General Omar Bradley. When Twelfth United States Army Group was activated on 1 August 1944, Bradley and his staff transferred to the headquarters of the new army group. Despite a lack of personnel, FUSAG continued to exist on paper as part of the deception of Operation Quicksilver. In order to make the German forces believe the Allied invasion would come at Pas de Calais, the phantom force was stationed at Dover, directly across the English Channel from the site. To further attract the Axis commanders' attention, General Dwight D. Eisenhower placed George Patton in command of the phantom force and increased the formation's apparent size to be larger than the British-led Twenty-first Army Group under Bernard Montgomery. Patton was considered by the Germans to be a formidable offensive commander; he was temporarily unemployed as punishment for slapping a battle-fatigued soldier in Sicily.[1] The deception worked so well that even long after the real invasion at Normandy, significant German forces remained in the Pas de Calais region to defend against what they thought would be the true invasion force. Agents infiltrated by Germany into Britain who became double agents acting for Britain in the Double Cross System played a vital role in persuading the Germans that FUSAG was real. After it had become clear that Normandy, not Calais, was the invasion site, to preserve the credibility of the Double Cross network's agents in spite of the totally false information they had persuaded the Germans to believe, the Germans were persuaded that FUSAG had been real, but had been disbanded and attached to the forces at Normandy because the Normandy "diversion" had been so successful that the Calais landing had become unnecessary.

First United States Army Group

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Subordinate units
(formations were shifted in and out of FUSAG periodically to aid deception efforts and to accommodate actual needs) British 2nd Airborne Division United States 9th Airborne Division United States 21st Airborne Divison Fourteenth United States Army Fourth Army (United Kingdom)

References
[1] University of Texas - article on Operation Fortitude (http:/ / www. cah. utexas. edu/ museums/ military_artpub. php?articles=militaryarticles_hatfield_fortitude3)

Further reading
Jon Latimer, Deception in War, London: John Murray, 2001

External links
GlobalSecurity: First US Army Group (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/fusag.htm)

Operation Fortitude
Operation Fortitude was the codename for a World War II military deception employed by the Allied nations as part of an overall deception strategy (code named Bodyguard) during the build up to the 1944 Normandy Landings. Fortitude was divided into two sections, North and South, with the aim of misleading the German high command as to the location of the imminent invasion. Both Fortitude plans involved the creation of fake field armys (based in Edinburgh and the south of England) which threatened Norway (Fortitude North) and Pas de Calais An inflatable dummy tank, modeled after the M4 Sherman. (Fortitude South). The operation was intended to divert Axis attention away from Normandy and, after the invasion on June 6, 1944, to delay reinforcement by convincing the Germans that the landings were purely a diversionary attack. The operation was one of the most successful military deceptions employed during the war and, arguably, the most important.

Operation Fortitude

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Background
Fortitude was one of the major elements of Operation Bodyguard, the overall Allied deception stratagem for the Normandy landings. The plan's principle objective was to ensure the Germans would not increase troop presence in Normandy by promoting the appearance that the Allied forces would attack in other locations. After the invasion (on June 6, 1944) the plan was to delay movement of German reserves to the Normandy beachhead and prevent a potentially disastrous counter-attack.[1][2] The planning of Operation Fortitude came under the auspices of the London Controlling Section, a secret body set up to manage Allied deception strategy during the war. However, the execution of each plan fell to the various theatre commanders, in the case of Fortitude this was Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) under General Dwight D. Eisenhower. A special section, Ops (B), was established at SHAEF to handle the operation (and all of the theatre's deception warfare). The LCS retained responsibility for what was called "Special Means"; the use of diplomatic channels and double-agents.[2] Fortitude was split into two parts, North and South, both with similar aims. Fortitude North was intended to convince the German high command that the Allies, staging out of Scotland, would attempt an invasion of occupied Norway. Fortitude South employed the same tactic, with the apparent objective being Pas de Calais.[1]

Means
It was initially envisioned that deception would occur through five main channels: 1. Physical deception: to mislead the enemy with non-existent units through fake infrastructure and equipment, such as inflatable rubber tanks and plywood artillery. 2. Controlled leaks of information through diplomatic channels, which might be passed on via neutral countries to the Germans. 3. Wireless traffic: To mislead the enemy, wireless traffic was created to simulate actual units 4. Use of German agents controlled by the Allies through the Double Cross System to send false information to the German intelligence services 5. Public presence of notable staff associated with phantom groups, such as FUSAG (First U.S. Army Group), most notably the well-known US general George S. Patton. During the course of Fortitude, the almost complete lack of German aerial reconnaissance, together with the absence of uncontrolled German agents in Britain, came to make physical deception almost irrelevant. The unreliability of the "diplomatic leaks" resulted in their discontinuance. The majority of deception was carried out by means of false wireless traffic and through German double agents. The latter proved to be by far the most significant. In fact, Fortitude was so successful that Hitler regarded the Normandy invasion as a feint: he kept his Panzer units where he expected an attack, and away from Normandy, until the battle was decidedin Normandy.

Double agents
The Germans had about 50 agents in England at the time, but B1A (the Counter-Intelligence Division of MI5) had caught all but one of them (he died in unclear circumstances). Many were recruited as double agents under the Double Cross System. They were used throughout the war to feed German Intelligence a misleading picture, and particularly in the pre-invasion period misleading information about invasion preparations. Reports sent by these agents were carefully composed and coordinated to support the view of forces in the UK the Allied deception planners wished to present. The three most important double agents during the Fortitude operation were: Joan Pujol Garcia (Garbo), a Spaniard who managed to get recruited by German intelligence, and sent them abundant but convincing (mis)information from Lisbon, until the allies accepted his offer and he was employed by the British. He created a huge network of imaginary sub-agents by the time of Fortitude, and the Germans

Operation Fortitude unwittingly paid the British Exchequer large amounts of money regularly, thinking they were funding a network loyal to themselves. He was awarded both the Iron Cross by the Germans and an MBE by the British after D-Day. Roman Czerniawski (Brutus), a Polish officer. Captured by the Germans, he was offered a chance to work for them as a spy. On his arrival in Britain, he immediately turned himself in to British intelligence. Dusan Popov (Tricycle), a Yugoslav lawyer.

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Fortitude North
Fortitude North was designed to mislead the Germans into expecting an invasion of Scandanavia. By threatening any weakened Norwegian defence the Allies hoped to prevent or delay reinforcement of France following the Normandy invasion. The plan involved simulating a build up of forces in northern England and political contact with Sweden.[3] During a similar operation in 1943, Operation Cockade, a fictional field army (British Fourth Army) had been created, head-quartered in Edinburgh Castle, HQ of the fictional British Edinburgh Castle.[4] It was decided to continue to use the same force Fourth Army during Op. Fortitude during Fortitude. Unlike its Southern counter-part the deception relied primarily on "Special Means" and fake radio traffic, since it was judged unlikely that German reconnaissance planes could infiltrate Scotland without being stopped.[3][5] False information about the arrival of troops in the area were reported by double agents "Mutt" and "Jeff", who had surrendered following their 1941 landing in the Moray Firth, whilst the British media cooperated by broadcasting fake information, such as football scores or wedding announcements, to nonexistent troops.[6] In the early spring of 1944 British commandos attacked targets in Norway to simulate the pre-cursor to invasion. They destroyed industrial targets, such as shipping and power infrastructure, as well as military outposts. This coincided with an increase in Naval activity in the northern seas and political pressure on neutral Sweden.[6]

Operation Skye
Operation Skye was the code name for the radio deception component of Fortitude North, involving simulated radio traffic between fictional army units. The programme began on 22 March 1944, overseen by Colonel R. M. McLeod, and became fully operational by 6 April).[6] The operation was split into four sections, relating to different divisions of the Fourth Army: Skye I; Fourth Army headquarters Skye II; British II Corps Skye III; American XV Corps (a genuine division, but with fictional units added to its order of battle) Skye IV; British VII Corps.

In his 2000 book, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign, Roger Hesketh concluded that "No evidence has so far been found to show that wireless deception or visual misdirection made any contribution to Fortitude North".It is thought that the Germans were not in fact monitoring the radio traffic being simulated.[7]

Operation Graffham
To lend further weight to the deception political and economic pressure was levelled at neutral Sweden. British diplomats began negotiations to obtain concessions useful in the event of any invasion of Norway, such as the right to fly reconnaissance missions over Sweden or to refuel planes that made emergency landings. Economic pressure, such as threats of black listing Swedish business, was also placed on the country. The Allies intended that news of the pressure would be passed to the Germans, with whom the Swedes maintained economic links.[3][8]

Operation Fortitude However, Operation Graffham had the additional purpose of trying to stop German ties to Sweden, especially the supply of ball bearings to the German war effort. Ball bearing production in Germany, vital to war production, was very low and the military relied on imports from Scandinavia. Stanton Griffis, an executive at Paramount Pictures and later an American Ambassador, was sent to the country. Posing as a talent scout he approached ball bearing manufacturers and attempted to purchase their supply. The combination of political and economic pressure eventually lead Swedish government to restrict German military traffic through the country and halt the supply of bearings.[8]

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Fortitude South
Fortitude South was conducted with the intention of convincing the Germans that an invasion would come to the Pas de Calaisa logical strategic choice for an invasion since it was the closest part of France to England and its beaches were not easily defended. While it was hoped that this would reduce the number of troops in the Normandy area at the time of the invasion, even more important was to dissuade the Germans from reinforcing the Normandy battleground in the days immediately after the invasion. To this end the Allies hoped to convince the Germans that the Normandy invasion, when it occurred, was a diversion, and that the main invasion was still to come near Calais.

Dummy RAF bomber, October 1943

Operation Quicksilver
The key element of Fortitude South was Operation Quicksilver. It entailed the creation of the belief in German minds that the Allied force consisted of two army groups, 21st Army Group under Montgomery (the genuine Normandy invasion force), and 1st U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) (a fictitious force under General George Patton), positioned in southeastern England for a crossing at the Pas de Calais. At no point were the Germans fed false documents describing the invasion plans. Instead they were allowed to construct a misleading order of battle for the Allied forces. To mount a massive invasion of Europe from England, military planners had little choice but to stage Symbol of the fictional 1st U.S. Army Group units around the country with those that would land first nearest to the embarkation point. As a result of FUSAG's having been placed in the south-east, German intelligence would (and did) deduce that the center of the invasion force was opposite Calais, the point on the French coast closest to England and therefore a likely landing point. To facilitate this deception, additional buildings were constructed; dummy vehicles and landing craft were placed around possible embarkation points. Furthermore, Patton was often photographed visiting these locations. It was originally intended to make many such fakes, but the extremely low level of German aerial reconnaissance and the belief that most German spies were under British control meant that such effort were reduced to a minimum. A huge amount of false radio traffic was transmitted, commensurate with a force of that size. A deception of such a size required input from many organisations, including MI5, MI6, SHAEF via Ops B, and the armed services. Information from the various deception agencies was organized by and channeled through the London Controlling Section under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel John Bevan.

Operation Fortitude

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Results
The Allies were able to judge how well Fortitude was working thanks to Ultra, signals intelligence obtained by breaking German codes and ciphers. On June 1 a decrypted transmission by Hiroshi shima (the Japanese ambassador) to his government recounting a recent conversation with Hitler confirmed the effectiveness of Fortitude. When asked for his thoughts on the Allied battle plan Hitler had said; "I think that diversionary actions will take place in a number of places - against Norway, Denmark, the southern part of western France, and the French Mediterranean coast".[9] Adding that he expected the Allies to subsequently attack in force across the Straits of Dover.[9] They maintained the pretense of FUSAG and other forces threatening Pas de Calais for some considerable time after D-Day, possibly even as late as September 1944. This was vital to the success of the Allied plan, since it forced the Germans to keep most of their reserves bottled up waiting for an attack on Calais which never came, thereby allowing the Allies to maintain and build upon their marginal foothold in Normandy.

Reasons for success


Some of the key reasons why this operation was so successful: The long term view taken by British Intelligence to cultivate these agents as channels of disinformation to the enemy. The use of Ultra decrypts to read Enigma-coded messages between Abwehr and the German High Command, which quickly told them the effectiveness of the deception tactics. This is one of the early uses of a closed-loop deception system. R V Jones, the Assistant Director Intelligence (Science) at the British Air Ministry insisted for reasons of tactical deception that for every radar station attacked within the real invasion area, two were to be attacked outside it. The extensive nature of the German Intelligence machinery, and the rivalry amongst the various elements.

In fiction
Eye of the Needle is a novel (and subsequent movie) about a Nazi spy figuring out the Allied deception and racing to let the German leadership know. Another book, The Unlikely Spy, is a novel that focuses on Allied attempts to carry out Fortitude, as well as a German agent's race to discover the true plans. Blackout, as well as its sequel All Clear, is a novel about time-travelling historians who are studying the events of the Battle of Britain. One of the historians, posing as a contemporary British soldier, has been assigned to assist with Operation Fortitude.

References
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] Jablonsky 1991 Brown 1975, pg. 1-10 Sexton 1983, pg. 112 Holt 2004, pg. 486 Cave Brown 1975 Cave Brown 1975, pg. 464 - 466 Hesketh, p167 Cave Brown 1975, pg. 468 - 469 Holt 2004, pg. 565 - 566

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Bibliography
Cave Brown, Anthony (1975). Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary True Story Behind D-Day. Howard, Sir Michael, Strategic Deception (British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 5) (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990) Holt, Thaddeus, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (Scribner, New York, 2004) Harris, Tomas, GARBO, The Spy Who Saved D-Day, Richmond, Surrey, England: Public Record Office, 2000, ISBN 1-873162-81-2 Hesketh, Roger (2000). Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press. ISBN1585670758. Latimer, Jon, Deception in War, Overlook Press, New York, 2001 ISBN 978-1585673810 Sexton, Donal J. (1983). "Phantoms of the North: British Deceptions in Scandinavia, 1941-1944". Military Affairs (Society for Military Histor) 47 (3): pp. 109-114. ISSN00263931.

External links
Royal Engineers Museum (http://www.remuseum.org.uk/campaign/rem_campaign_overlord.htm) Royal Engineers and Operation Overlord/Fortitude Masters thesis of Whitney Talley Bendeck (http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses_1/submitted/etd-11122004-104647/ unrestricted/BendeckWThesis.pdf)

Fourth Army (United Kingdom)

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Fourth Army (United Kingdom)


Fourth Army
Active Country Branch Type Engagements First World War 19141918 United Kingdom British Army Army First World War

Commanders
Notable commanders Sir Henry Rawlinson

The Fourth Army was a field army that formed part of the British Expeditionary Force during the First World War. The Fourth Army was formed on 5 February 1916 under the command of General Sir Henry Rawlinson to carry out the main British contribution to the Battle of the Somme.

First World War


History
The Fourth Army was formed in France on 5 February 1916, under the command of Sir Henry Rawlinson.[1] On the first day on the Somme, eleven Fourth Army divisions (including XIII Corps, XV Corps, III Corps, X Corps, and VIII Corps) attacked astride the Albert-Bapaume road. The attack was completely defeated on the northern sector so subsequent Fourth Army operations concentrated on the southern sector, handing control of the northern sector to the Reserve Army. The plan for the Fourth Army during the 1917 Flanders offensive (that became the Third Battle of Ypres) was to mount an amphibious invasion of the Belgian coast once a breakthrough had been achieved. As the Ypres fighting became bogged down, the Fourth Army divisions were drawn off as reinforcements until the army was effectively disbanded. The Fourth Army was reformed in early 1918 once again under Rawlinson following the virtual destruction and subsequent disbanding of the Fifth Army during the German offensive known as Operation Michael. The Fourth Army spearheaded the British Hundred Days offensive that began with the Battle of Amiens and ended with the Armistice in November, 1918.

Composition
The 4th Army BEF was the only British force with major American (AEF) units subordinate to it: II Corps, American Expeditionary Force 27th Infantry Division AEF 30th Infantry Division AEF The 27th Infantry Division was a unit of the United States Army in World War I and World War II. The Division traces its history from the 6th Division, made up of New York units and formed in May 1917. The 6th Division designation was changed to the 27th Division in July 1917.[2] Designated: July 20, 1917 as the 27th Division of the New York National Guard.

Fourth Army (United Kingdom) Deployed designation: 27th Division, American Expeditionary Force Activated: July 1917 (National Guard Division from New York). Initial strength: 991 officers and 27,114 enlisted men. Shipped out: April 20, 1918. Casualties: Total 8,334 (KIA: 1,442; WIA: 6,892). Inactivated: April 1919.

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Major operations: Meuse-Argonne, Ypres-Lys, Somme offensive. Initially stationed in the East Poperinghe Line. Battle of Dickebusche Lake, Summer 1918 Battle of Vierstratt Ridge, Summer 1918 German defensive Hindenburg Line, September 1918. Somme Offensive, September 25, 1918 Le Selle River, Winter 1918 The 27th did break the Hindenburg line during the Battle of the Somme, initiating a German retreat from their defensive line and forcing the Germans to a final confrontation at the Le Selle River before Armistice was signed in February 1919.

Commanders
Feb 1916Nov 1916 General Sir Henry Rawlinson Jul 1918Nov 1918 General Sir Henry Rawlinson

Second World War


In World War II, no British Fourth Army actually took the field, but as part of the deception plans Operation Cockade and the later Operation Fortitude North, the Germans were encouraged to believe that a Fourth Army had been established with its headquarters in Edinburgh Castle, and was preparing to invade Norway. This successfully drew and kept German units away from the real invasion zone in Normandy. In the subsequent 'Fortitude South' the Fourth Army with different units was presented as part of the fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG) in its threat to the Pas de Calais.[3]

Fictional composition of the British Fourth Army


Fortitude North HQ at Edinburgh British II Corps (fictional - HQ Stirling) British 55th Infantry Division (Northern Ireland) British 58th Infantry Division (fictional, Aberlour) British 113th Independent Infantry Brigade (garrison for Orkney and Shetland Islands) British VII Corps (fictional - HQ Dundee) British 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division (Dundee) US 55th Infantry Division (fictional, Iceland) 7th, 9th & 10th US Ranger battalions (fictional, Iceland)[4] United States XV Corps (Northern Ireland) US 2nd Infantry Division US 5th Infantry Division US 8th Infantry Division

Fourth Army (United Kingdom) Fortitude South HQ at Hathfield British 2nd Airborne Division (fictional, Bulford) British II Corps (fictional - HQ Tunbridge Wells) British 35th Armoured Brigade (Maresfield) British 55th Infantry Division (Three Bridges) British 58th Infantry Division (fictional, Gravesend) British VII Corps (fictional - HQ Folkstone) British 61st Infantry Division - (Wye) British 80th Infantry Division - (fictional, Canterbury) British 5th Armoured Division - (fictional, Newmarket)

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Notes and references


[1] The British Armies of 1914-1918 (http:/ / www. 1914-1918. net/ armies. htm) [2] Wilson, John B.. Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (http:/ / www. history. army. mil/ books/ Lineage/ M-F/ index. htm). United States Army Center for Military History. CMH Pub 60-14-1. . [3] Roger Hesketh. Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. St Ermins Press. 1999. ISBN 0316851728 [4] Thaddeus Holt. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Phoenix. 2005. ISBN 0753819171

Ghost Army
The Ghost Army was a United States Army tactical deception unit during World War II officially known as the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops. The 1,100-man unit was given a unique mission within the Army to impersonate other U.S. Army units to deceive the enemy. From a few weeks after D-Day, when they landed in France, until the end of the war, they put on a traveling road show, using inflatable tanks, sound trucks, phony radio transmissions and playacting. They staged more than 20 battlefield deceptions, often operating very close to the front lines. Their mission was kept secret until 1996, and elements of it remain classified.

History and deployment


Inspiration for the unit came from the British who had used similar techniques on a smaller scale at the battle of El Alamein. The unit had its beginnings at Camp Forrest, Mississippi, and was fully formed at Pine Camp (now Fort Drum), NY before sailing for England in early May 1944. In England they were based near Stratford, and some troops participated in Operation Fortitude, the British simulation of a landing force designated for the Pas-de-Calais. Some troops went to Normandy two weeks after D-Day, where they simulated a fake Mulberry harbor at night with lights to draw German fire away from the real ones. Next the full force assisted in bottling up the German defenders of Brest by simulating a larger force that was actually encircling them. As the Allied armies moved east, so did the 23rd, and it eventually was mostly based out of Luxembourg, where it engaged in deceptions of crossings of the Rur river, positions along the Maginot Line, Hrtgen Forest, and finally a major crossing of the Rhine to draw German troops away from the actual sites.

Ghost Army

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Recruiting
Ghost soldiers were encouraged to use their brains and talent to mislead, deceive and befuddle the German Army. Many were recruited from art schools, advertising agencies and other venues that encourage creative thinking. In civilian life, ghost soldiers had been artists, actors, set designers and engineers. Although the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops consisted of only 1,100 soldiers, the contingent used inflatable tanks and artillery, fake aircraft and giant speakers broadcasting the sounds of men and artillery to make the Germans think it was upwards of a two division 30,000 man force. The unit's elaborate ruses helped deflect German units from the locations of larger allied combat units. The unit consisted of the 406th Combat Engineers (which handled security), the 603rd Camouflage Engineers, the 3132 Signal Service Company Special and the Signal Company Special.

Tactics
Visual deception
The visual deception arm of the Ghost Army was the 603rd Camouflage Engineers. It was equipped with inflatable tanks, cannons, jeeps, trucks, and airplanes that the men would inflate with air compressors, and then camouflage imperfectly so that enemy air reconnaissance could see them. They could create dummy airfields, troop bivouacs (complete with fake laundry hanging out on clotheslines), motor pools, artillery batteries, and tank formations in a few hours. Many of the men in this unit were artists, recruited from New York and Philadelphia art schools. Their unit became an incubator for young artists who sketched and painted their way through Europe. Several of these soldier-artists went on to have a major impact on art in post-war America. Bill Blass, Ellsworth Kelly, wildlife artist Arthur Singer and Art Kane were among the many artists who served in the 603rd.

Sonic deception
The 3132 Signal Service Company Special handled sonic deception. The unit coalesced under the direction of Colonel Hilton Railey, a colorful figure who, before the war, had discovered Amelia Earhart and sent her on her road to fame. Aided by engineers from Bell Labs, a team from the 3132 went to Fort Knox to record sounds of armored and infantry units onto a series of sound effects records that they brought to Europe. For each deception, sounds could be mixed to match the scenario they wanted the enemy to believe. This program was recorded on state-of-the-art wire recorders (the predecessor to the tape recorder), and then played back with powerful amplifiers and speakers mounted on halftracks. The sounds they played could be heard 15 miles (24km) away.

Radio deception
"Spoof radio", as it was called, was handled by the Signal Company Special. Operators created phony traffic nets, impersonating the radio operators from real units. They learned the art of mimicking a departing operators method of sending Morse Code so that the enemy would never detect that the real unit and its radio operator were long gone.

Atmosphere
To add to the mix of techniques, the unit often employed theatrical effects to supplement the other deceptions. Collectively called "atmosphere", this included simulating actual units deployed elsewhere by sewing on their divisional patches, painting appropriate unit designators on vehicles and having the companies deployed as if they were regimental headquarters units. Trucks would be driven in looping convoys with just two troops in the seats near the tailgate, to simulate a truck full of infantry under the canvas cover. "MP's" would be deployed at cross roads wearing appropriate divisional insignia and some officers would simulate divisional generals and staff officers

Ghost Army visiting towns where enemy agents were likely to see them. A few actual tanks and artillery pieces were occasionally assigned to the unit to make the dummies in the distance seem more realistic.

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References
Holley, Joe. (2006, July 8). Louis Dalton Porter; Used Artistic Skills to Trick German Army. The Washington Post, p. B6 [1] NPR: Artists of Battlefield Deception: Soldiers of the 23rd [2] National Army Security Agency Association [3] Ghosts of the ETO by John Gawne Bare Blass by Bill Blass edited by Cathy Horyn Secret Soldiers by Philip Gerard. Ghost Army of World War II by Jack Kneece

External links
Official website of The Ghost Army documentary [4]

References
[1] [2] [3] [4] http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-dyn/ content/ article/ 2006/ 07/ 07/ AR2006070701341. html http:/ / www. npr. org/ templates/ story/ story. php?storyId=14672840 http:/ / www. nasaa-home. org/ 23rdhqs. htm http:/ / www. ghostarmy. org

Gleiwitz incident
The Gleiwitz incident was a staged attack by Nazi forces posing as Poles on 31 August 1939, against the German radio station Sender Gleiwitz in Gleiwitz, Upper Silesia, Germany (since 1945: Gliwice, Poland) on the eve of World War II in Europe. This provocation was the best-known of several actions in Operation Himmler, a series of unconventional operations undertaken by the SS in order to serve specific propaganda goals of Nazi Germany at the outbreak of the war. It was intended to create the appearance of Polish aggression against Germany in order to justify the subsequent invasion of Poland.

Events at Gleiwitz
Much of what is known about the Gleiwitz incident comes from the sworn affidavit of Alfred Naujocks at the Nuremberg Trials. In his testimony, he states that he organized the incident under orders from Reinhard Heydrich and Heinrich Mller, the chief of the Gestapo.[1]

Gliwice Radio Tower today. It is the highest wooden structure in Europe.

On the night of 31 August 1939, a small group of German operatives, dressed in Polish uniforms and led by Naujocks,[2] seized the Gleiwitz station and broadcast a short anti-German message in Polish (sources vary on the content of the message). The Germans' goal was to make the attack and the broadcast look like the work of anti-German Polish saboteurs.[2][3]

Gleiwitz incident To make the attack seem more convincing, the Germans brought in Franciszek Honiok, a German Silesian known for sympathizing with the Poles, who had been arrested the previous day by the Gestapo. Honiok was dressed to look like a saboteur; then killed by lethal injection, given gunshot wounds, and left dead at the scene, so that he appeared to have been killed while attacking the station. His corpse was subsequently presented as proof of the attack to the police and press.[4] In addition to Honiok, several other prisoners from the Dachau concentration camp[2] were kept available for this purpose.[3] The Germans referred to them by the code phrase "Konserve" ("canned goods"). For this reason, some sources incorrectly refer to the incident as "Operation Canned Goods."[5]

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Context
The Gleiwitz incident was a part of a larger operation, carried out by Abwehr and SS forces.[3] At the same time as the Gleiwitz attack, there were other incidents orchestrated by Germany along the Polish-German border, such as house torching in the Polish Corridor and spurious propaganda output. The entire project, dubbed Operation Himmler and comprising 21 incidents in all,[6] was intended to give the appearance of Polish aggression against Germany.[5] For months prior to the 1939 invasion, German newspapers and politicians like Adolf Hitler accused Polish authorities of organizing or tolerating violent ethnic cleansing of ethnic Germans living in Poland.[6][7] On the day following the Gleiwitz attack, 1 September 1939, Germany launched the Fall Weiss operation the invasion of Poland initiating World War II in Europe. On the same day, in a speech in the Reichstag, Adolf Hitler cited the 21 border incidents, with three of them called very serious, as justification for Germany's "defensive" action against Poland.[6] Just a few days earlier, on 22 August, he had told his generals, "I will provide a propagandistic casus belli. Its credibility doesn't matter. The victor will not be asked whether he told the truth."[3][5]

International reactions
American correspondents were summoned to the scene the next day[3] but no neutral parties were allowed to investigate the incident in detail and the international public was skeptical of the German version of the incident.[8]

Treatment in film
There have been several adaptations of the incident in cinema. Der Fall Gleiwitz, direction: Gerhard Klein (1961), DEFA studios (The Gleiwitz Case; English subtitles), is an East German film that reconstructs the events. It was pronounced in West Germany to be the best DEFA film. Operacja Himmler is a Polish film that covers the events. Both Hitler's SS: A Portrait In Evil, direction: Jim Goddard (1985); and Die Blechtrommel briefly include the incident. It was also featured in a video game; Codename Panzers, which stirred up controversy in Poland because uninformed players interpreted authentic German propaganda about the incident reproduced in the game as a statement of historical truth.

Gleiwitz incident

39

References
[1] "20 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 4; Thursday, 20 December 1945" (http:/ / avalon. law. yale. edu/ imt/ 12-20-45. asp). Avalon Project. . Retrieved 2009-10-12. [2] Christopher J. Ailsby, The Third Reich Day by Day, Zenith Imprint, 2001, ISBN 0760311676, Google Print, p.112 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=TMdZSJGWaIYC& pg=PA112& dq=Gleiwitz+ incident& as_brr=3& sig=WzKCJ2wdK-HI3d_BbZR49ofZspg#PPA112,M1) [3] James J. Wirtz, Roy Godson, Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge, Transaction Publishers, 2002, ISBN 0765808986, Google Print, p.100 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=PzfQSlTJTXkC& pg=PA100& ots=ouNc9JPz4y& dq=Gleiwitz+ incident& as_brr=3& sig=WZF91Hk_0WybC1nqbS8Ghw7nTzw) [4] Museum in Gliwice: What happened here? (http:/ / www. muzeum. gliwice. pl/ en/ radiostacja/ ) [5] Bradley Lightbody, The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis, Routledge, 2004, ISBN 0415224055, Google Print, p.39 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=wyfgwYOiZasC& pg=PA39& ots=xYud8FdZWZ& dq=Gleiwitz+ incident& as_brr=3& sig=7caKSyB2wnUFa7AjKU9rljRfDzk) [6] Address by Adolf Hitler - September 1, 1939 (http:/ / www. fcit. usf. edu/ HOLOCAUST/ resource/ document/ HITLER1. htm); retrieved from the archives of the Avalon Project at the Yale Law School. [7] Holocaust Educational Resource (Nizkor) (http:/ / www. nizkor. org/ ftp. cgi/ imt/ nca/ ftp. py?imt/ nca/ nca-06/ nca-06-3469-ps-04) [8] Steven J. Zaloga, Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg, Google Print, p.39 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=oQeAKAjlEwMC& pg=PA39& ots=p_29yUfOTD& dq="Operation+ Himmler"& as_brr=3& sig=ztSquH7JvUE-9t4p3ndbIO-dkOo), Osprey Publishing, 2002, ISBN 1841764086

Further reading
John Toland, Adolf Hitler : The Definitive Biography, ISBN 0-385-42053-6. Dennis Whitehead, "The Gleiwitz Incident", After the Battle Magazine Number 142 (March 2009) Stanley S. Seidner, Marshal Edward migy-Rydz Rydz and the Defense of Poland, New York, 1978.

External links
Part I Blitzkrieg September 1, 1939: a new kind of warfare engulfs Poland (http://www.time.com/time/ magazine/article/0,9171,958453-1,00.html), TIME, Monday, August 28, 1989 Radio Tower Museum in Gliwice: Gliwice provocation. Broadcasting station. (http://www.radiostacjagliwicka. republika.pl/foldery/FoldeRAng.htm) (Russian) @Mail.Ru - (http://ww2.boom.ru/Polish/gleiwitz.html) (German) Museum der Rundfunkgeschichte und der Medienkunst Rundfunksender Gliwice (http://www. muzeum.gliwice.pl/de/news_fullpage.php?nid=719&ret_top=/de/index.php) (Polish) 65 lat temu wybucha wojna (http://www.kopnet.gliwice.pl/?id=819):

Operation Hambone

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Operation Hambone
Operation Copperhead (originally called "Operation Telescope") was a small British-run deception operation run during World War II. It was one of many deceptions run prior to the invasion of Normandy (Operation Overlord). For instance, General Patton was supposedly in command of a fictitious army massing for a crossing to Calais. This was one aspect of a deception called Operation Fortitude. An Australian actor, M. E. Clifton-James, depicted Field Marshal Montgomery on a well-publicised visit to Gibraltar and North Africa. This was to suggest to the Germans that the Allies were planning to invade Southern France. On 25 May 1944 Clifton-James flew from Northolt to Gibraltar on Churchill's private aircraft. At a reception at the governor-general's house, hints were made about Plan 303, a plan to invade southern France. German intelligence picked this up and ordered agents to find out what they could about Plan 303. Clifton-James then flew to Algiers where over the next few days he made a round of public appearances with General Henry Wilson, the Allied commander in the Mediterranean theatre. Clifton-James was then secretly flown to Cairo where he stayed until the invasion in Normandy was well underway. He then returned to his job after an absence of five weeks. This operation was the subject of the book and movie I Was Montys Double. In the movie Clifton-James appeared both as himself and as Montgomery. Some sources wrongly refer to this operation as Operation Hambone, the name used in the book for the operation.

References
Howard, Sir Michael, Strategic Deception (British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 5) (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990), p. 126 Holt, Thaddeus, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (Scribner, New York, 2004), pp. 561-62, 815 British National Archives, "A" Force Permanent Record File, Narrative War Diary, CAB 154/4 pp. 85-90

Operation Hardboiled

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Operation Hardboiled
Operation Hardboiled was a deception operation during world War II designed to trick the Germans into believing that the Allies intended to attack occupied Norway.

Background
In October 1941, the Joint Planning Staff of the British War Ministry decided that a special organisation should be set up to plan and execute deception operations. They considered that such a body should operate as part of the existing operational planning staffs. The controlling officer of this organisation would be responsible for both planning and executing these operations using existing machinery. Intelligence authorities, security authorities and the armed forces themselves would be available to implement these actions. The Chiefs of Staff approved of this plan, and chose Colonel Oliver Stanley, MC, as Controlling Officer for Deception Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[1]

Operation
Operation Hardboiled was the first plan submitted by Colonel Stanley. He had been appointed in the darkest day of the war for Britain. With the British offensive in the Western Desert being checked and the Japanese assault in the Far East, it was hard to make the enemy believe that a serious offensive was being planned.[2] Operation Hardboiled was one of the many feints planned by Stanley and his office over the next 3 years. Troops were allocated and trained, plans were drawn up with Stavanger as the objective and Norwegian currency was stockpiled. The operation was freely gossipped about in London, and double agents reported some of the gossip to the Abwehr. Although Hardboiled was never intended to go ahead, it was planned as meticulously as if it was real, and had real troops assigned to it. It gave the Stanley's office some useful experience in planning deception operations, and allowed the double agents to build up some credibility with the Abwehr. Although the Germans appeared to take the bait and reinforced their Norwegian garrisons, Hardboiled died a quiet death as the troops trained for it were used in an amphibious operation against Madagascar in July 1942.[3]

References
[1] Howard, Michael Eliot and Hinsley, Francis Harry. British Intelligence in the Second World War . Cambridge University Press, 1990. ISBN 9780521401456, p. 22 [2] Howard, Michael Eliot and Hinsley, Francis Harry. British Intelligence in the Second World War . Cambridge University Press, 1990. ISBN 9780521401456, p. 23 [3] Crowdy, Terry. Deceiving Hitler: Double-Cross and Deceptions in World War II. Osprey Publishing, 2008. ISBN 9781846031359

Operation Haifisch

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Operation Haifisch
Operation Haifisch (Shark) was a German codename for the cover operation against Great Britain in World War II, intended (like Operation Harpune) to conceal preparations for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. Elaborated by Wilhelm Keitel and designated to begin in April 1941, the aim was to strike at England's southern coast in four different places between Folkestone and Worthing. The Kriegsmarine's main task was to ferry the invasion forces after loading them at major ports between Cherbourg and Rotterdam.

References
[[Alan F. Wilt [1]] "Shark" and `Harpoon": German Cover Operations Against Great Britain in 1941]

References
[1] http:/ / links. jstor. org/ sici?sici=0026-3931%28197402%2938%3A1%3C1%3A%22A%60GCO%3E2. 0. CO%3B2-8& size=LARGE& origin=JSTOR-enlargePage

Operation Harpune
In World War II, Operation Harpune was the major German deception plan of 1941. This operation (like Operation Haifisch) portrayed the so-called Operation Seelowe ("Sealion") as inevitable, to conceal preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union, called Operation Barbarossa. Harpune had two parts, Harpune Sd (Harpoon South) operated from Norway, Denmark, and France, while Harpune Nord (Harpoon North) did the same in Norway.[1]

References
[1] AOK Norwegen, Ia, Nr. 6/41, Operationsbefehl Nr. 1 fr die Vorbereitung der Unternehmung 'Harpune,' in Ttigkeitsberichte fr Monat Mai. AOK 20 12564/7 in Ziemke, Earl F., The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945, Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1959, 138

Operation Herbstreise

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Operation Herbstreise
During World War II, Operation Herbstreise (Autumn Journey in German) was a planned series of deception operations to support the German invasion of the United Kingdom (Operation Seelwe). It would have involved an empty convoy of large transports threatening the east coast of England while the actual invasion force in small barges hit the southern coast. Two days prior to the actual landings, the light cruisers Emden (Kapitn zur See Hans Mirow), Nrnberg (Kapitn zur See Leo Kreisch with Vizeadmiral Hubert Schmundt, the Commander of Cruisers, aboard) and Kln (Kapitn zur See Ernst Kratzenberg), the gunnery training ship Bremse and other light naval forces would escort the liners Europa, Bremen, Gneisenau and Potsdam, with 11 transport steamers, on Operation "Herbstreise" (Autumn Journey), a feint simulating a landing against the English east coast between Aberdeen and Newcastle.*** After turning about, the force would attempt the diversion again on the next day if necessary. (Most of the troops allocated to the diversion would actually board the ships, but disembark before the naval force sortied.) Shortly before the commencement of "Sea Lion", the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper (Kapitn zur See Wilhelm Meisel), on standby at Kiel from 13 September 1940, would carry out a diversionary sortie in the vicinity of Iceland and the Faroes. The heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer (Kapitn zur See Theodor Krancke) would carry out another diversionary mission by raiding merchant shipping in the Atlantic. (It is doubtful this ship would have been available in time for the operation as she was undergoing extensive trials and crew training in the Baltic Sea following a major shipyard refit.)[1]

References
[1] Schenk, Peter (1987), Landung in England. Das geplante Unternehmen "Seelwe": Der Beginn amphibischer Grounternehmen. Oberbaum: Berlin.

Operation Ironside

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Operation Ironside
During World War II, Operation Ironside was a deception carried out by the Allies in 1944 in support of the invasion of Normandy. Ironside falsely threatened an Allied invasion of France along the Bay of Biscay, near Bordeaux during the summer of 1944. Ironside was part of the deception of Operation Fortitude.

References
Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (Overlook, 2000, New York) details the plans for Ironside and Ironside II

Operation Kremlin
Operation Kremlin (Fall Kreml in German) was a successful German deception operation against Soviet forces in May-June 1942. After German troops captured the city of Kharkov in October 1941, the German High Command planned an offensive to destroy the Soviet forces toward the southern sector of the Eastern Front. To divert the attention of the Soviets from that thrust (which would lead to the Battle of Stalingrad), on May 29, 1942, the High Command ordered "the earliest possible resumption of the attack on Moscow" by Army Group Centre. Two factors made Operation Kremlin plausible to the Soviet High Command: first, it coincided with Soviet thinking which the Germans did not know; second, its premise to simulate a repeat of the late 1941 drive to Moscow had a firm foundation. In fact, it arguably made more strategic sense than the actual offensive (Operation Blau), which was directed at the oil fields in southern Russia. The directive given to the Army Group, which assigned two panzer divisions the identical missions that they had received in the previous autumn, could have been taken for the real thing, even those German officers who were in the know, and most of them were kept in the dark, which even made it more believable. As part of Operation Kremlin, the Luftwaffe increased reconnaissance flights over and around Moscow, officers in charge of prisoner-of-war interrogations were given lists of questions to ask regarding Moscow's defenses, and sealed packets of Moscow maps were distributed down to regimental level. A readiness date of August 1 was planned. Although postwar Soviet accounts insisted Operation Kremlin had failed, the Soviet High Command and the General Staff were in fact misled by the deception; Joseph Stalin and top Soviet generals had no doubt that the Germans would launch another offensive on Moscow in mid-1942. On June 28, Operation Blau began.

References
Ziemke, Earl F. and Magna E. Bauer. Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987.

London Controlling Section

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London Controlling Section


The London Controlling Section (LCS) was established in June 1942 within the Joint Planning Staff at the offices of the War Cabinet, which was presided over by Winston Churchill as Prime Minister.[1] The purpose of the LCS was to devise and coordinate strategic military deception and cover plans. The plans were then executed by other organizations.[2] The organization was publicly revealed by Sir Ronald Wingate in 1969.[3]

Charter
The sweeping LCS charter, in part, authorized them to prepare cover and deception plans on a world-wide basis, co-ordinate deception plans prepared by Commands world-wide, and watch over the execution of deception plans. Additionally, and more sweeping, they were not limited to strategic deception, but had authority to include any matter for a military advantage.[4] Cover and deception are intended to either create or reinforce a The LCS kept a dancing faun on its conference table in London, symbolic of the ruses de guerre that the belief in ones opponent which influences the opponents behavior organization played. (Anthony Cave Brown, along certain lines. Cover induces belief that something true is Bodyguard of Lies, p. 11) something false. Deception induces belief that something false is true. Cover conceals truth; deception conveys falsehood. Cover induces nonaction; deception induces action.[5] Since behavior is that which is to be influenced, the enemy does not have to actually believe what is being projected. It is only necessary that the enemy is so concerned that he must provide for it.[6] To influence behavior, the target of deception is the enemy commander, and the consumer of the deception is the commanders intelligence organization.[7] For example, for strategic deception in Europe, the target of deception was Adolf Hitler himself through the Supreme Command of the Defense Forces, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). The consumer was a branch of the intelligence staff of the High Command of the Army, Oberkommando Des Heeres (OKH), the Foreign Armies West, Fremde Heere West (FHW).[8] Three essential elements of deception are a firm plan, adequate security, and time.[9] For an operation to be successful, there must be a clear statement of the true situation along with the objective and a road map of how to bring a certain belief into the mind of the enemy. Clearly, there can be no deception if security fails and the enemy knows the true situation. Finally, the higher the target, the more time is required to build up the mosaic presented to the target. John Bevan, the first Controlling Officer of the LCS, added two additional elements to strategic deception: codebreaking and double agents.[10] Codebreaking in the European Theater was done at Bletchley Park, and the intelligence from this activity was codenamed Ultra. Generally, the information was used to ferret out enemy intentions. However, in the arena of deception operations, the information was used to assess the effectiveness of the cover and deception operation. Double agents were in the purview of the Double Cross System, also known as the Twenty Committee, run by John Cecil Masterman. Double agents were generally used to collect intelligence and to build the mosaic of cover and deception operations.

London Controlling Section

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Personnel
Eventually, not including those who were attached, there were 7 primary members of the LCS:[11] Lieutenant-Colonel (later Colonel) John Henry Bevan, MC (April 5, 1894-December 1978)[12][13] Controlling Officer. Major (later Colonel) Ronald Evelyn Leslie Wingate, CIE (1889-August 31, 1978),[14][15] Deputy Controlling Officer Flight Lieutenant (later Wing Commander) Dennis Wheatley, RAFVR.[16] (January 8, 1897November 10, 1977) Major (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Harold Peteval. Commander James Gordon Arbuthnott [17], RN.[18] Major Neil Gordon Clark Major Derrick Morley One American, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) William H. Baumer (c.1909-1989), assigned to the US War Plans Division, was seconded to the LCS and served there for Fortitude and subsequent operations.[19][20] As head of the LCS, John Bevan would clearly rank as one of the four preeminent deception planners in World War II along with Dudley Clarke, Peter Fleming, and Newman Smith. Along with Bevans talents, he was aided by his friendships with General Lord Ismay, who acted as Military Deputy Secretary of the War Cabinet and was Chief of the Chiefs of Staff Committee within the War Cabinet, Sir Stewart Menzies, who was Chief of MI6, and Sir Alan Brooke, who was Chief of the Imperial General Staff - Bevan dined with him 2 or 3 times a month. Bevan also had direct contact with Churchill and indirect contact through Churchills Chief of Staff, Ismay.[21] Wingate, the Deputy Controlling Officer, became a member of the LCS through the efforts of Ismay. Wingate and Ismay previously had lengthy associations with each other in service of the Crown in India. The LCS had considerable clout with Churchill, as he had direct interest in deception, and through both Bevan and Wingate being friends with Ismay, Churchills Chief of Staff. Lord Charles Wilson Moran, said Ismay was the Pepys at Churchills court, the perfect oil-can.[22] Dennis Wheatley, in his forties, was a prolific, well-known, best-selling author. While initially only a Flight Lieutenant, he often put his notoriety and skill with words to use in dealing with high-ranking officers. Additionally, his writing skills were put to good use in writing up cover and deception plans.

Operations
The most significant operation with which LCS was associated was Operation Fortitude, the cover and deception for the Normandy invasion in 1944. The strategic plan for Allied deception in 1944, Operation Bodyguard, was drawn up by LCS, which set down the general story of Fortitude. Fortitude was however implemented by the "Ops (B)" section of SHAEF, under General Eisenhower. Ops (B) was composed of two sections, one dealing with physical deception and the other dealing with Special Means,[23] that is, controlled leakage. Initially, the TWIST Committee of the LCS selected the channels for dissemination of controlled leakage. Ultimately, the TWIST committee was abolished and Ops (B) was allowed to deal directly with Section B1A of MI5, which managed controlled agents.[24]

An inflatable dummy tank, modeled after the M4 Sherman and used as part of Operation Fortitude.

London Controlling Section

47

Cold War
Bevan stepped down from the LCS after mid-1945. The LCS continued on into the Cold War period much changed in composition and size.

References
Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (Bantam Books, second printing, 1976) ISBN 0-553-01311-4. Roger Fleetwood-Hesketh, FORTITUDE: The D-Day Deception Campaign (The Overlook Press, 2000) ISBN 1-58567-075-8. Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (A Lisa Drew Book/Scribners, 2004) ISBN 0-7432-5042-7. This 1148-page book is a well-written, comprehensive, and extensively documented account of Allied deception operations during World War II. It has three large appendixes: I Allied Deception Operations, II Special Means Channels, and III The Phantom Armies. Dennis Wheatley, The Deception Planners (Hutchinson & Co., 1980) ISBN 0-09-141830-5.

Notes and Citations


[1] The American counterpart of the LCS was the Joint Security Control, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [2] Holt, p. 167. [3] Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, Harper and Row, 1975. p. 383 [4] Holt, p. 189. [5] Holt, p. 53. [6] Holt, p. 55. [7] Holt, p. 56. [8] Holt, p. 99. [9] Holt, p. 61. [10] Holt, p. 125. [11] Wheatley, pp. 16 and 89. [12] Colonel John Henry Bevan (http:/ / thepeerage. com/ p5446. htm#i54460) [13] "Col. J.H. Bevan." Daily Telegraph (London). December 5, 1978. p. 16 [14] Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire. [15] "Sir Ronald Wingate." Daily Telegraph (London). September 2, 1978. [16] Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve [17] http:/ / www. kittybrewster. com/ members/ e_2. htm [18] Royal Navy [19] Fowler, Glenn. "W.H. Baumer, 79, Industrialist; Helped Plan Normandy Invasion." New York Times. February 17, 1989 (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 1989/ 02/ 17/ obituaries/ w-h-baumer-79-industrialist-helped-plan-normandy-invasion. html?scp=2& sq="william h. baumer"& st=cse) [20] "William Henry Baumer; Key Eisenhower Aide." Los Angeles Times.February 20, 1989. p. 34 [21] Holt, p. 167. [22] Brown, p. 274. [23] Major Roger Fleetwood-Hesketh commanded the Special Means sub-sections of Ops (B), and, immediately after the conclusion of WW II, he wrote the official history of Operation FORTITUDE, which was eventually published in 2000. [24] Hesketh, p. xvi.

London Controlling Section

48

Bibliography
Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War: British Intelligence Operations Against the German High Command (W. W. Norton & Co., published by arrangement with HMSO, 1995) ISBN 0-393-31293-3. Jon Latimer, Deception in War (John Murray, 2001) ISBN 978-0719556050

Operation Mincemeat
Operation Mincemeat was a successful British deception plan during World War II. As part of the widespread deception plan Operation Barclay to cover the intended invasion of Italy from North Africa, Mincemeat helped to convince the German high command that the Allies planned to invade Greece and Sardinia in 1943 instead of Sicily, the actual objective. This was accomplished by persuading the Germans that they had, by accident, intercepted "top secret" documents giving details of Allied war plans. The documents were attached to a corpse deliberately left to wash up on a beach in Punta Umbra in Spain. The story was used as the plot in Duff Cooper's 1950 novel Operation Heartbreak, but revealed as a true story in the 1953 book The Man Who Never Was.

Background
In late 1942, Operation Torch to invade French North Africa was imminent, and victory in the North African Campaign was expected. Allied planners considered the next step in the war and decided to continue attacks in the Mediterranean. From North Africa, attacks could be made either into Italy or through the Balkans trapping the German forces there between the Western Allies and the Soviets. Control of Sicily would open the Mediterranean to Allied shipping and allow invasion of continental Europe, making Sicily an obvious strategic objective. German planners saw this as well; Winston Churchill commented "Everyone but a bloody fool would know that it's Sicily." The massive Allied buildup of resources for the invasion (code-named Operation Husky) would be detected. The Germans would know that some large attack was coming. However, if the Allies could deceive the Germans about where that attack was going, the Germans might disperse or divert some significant part of their forces, which would help the invasion succeed. This had already been practiced by the British in the fighting in North Africa and the British had established a competent system for deception of the enemy, able to give the appearance of fake formations and to feed misinformation through double agents and diplomatic rumour. Several months before, Flight Lt. Charles Cholmondeley RAF of Section B1(a) of MI5,[1] suggested dropping a dead man attached to a badly-opened parachute in France with a radio set for the Germans to find. The idea was for the Germans to think that the Allies did not know the set was captured, and pretend to be Allied agents operating it, thus allowing the Allies to feed them misinformation. This was dismissed as unworkable; however the idea was taken up later by the Twenty Committee, the small inter-service, inter-departmental intelligence team in charge of double agents. Cholmondeley was on the Twenty Committee, as was Lt. Cmdr. Ewen Montagu, a Royal Navy intelligence officer. According to historian Ben Macintyre, Cholmondeley got the idea from a 1939 memo written by Ian Fleming, later author of the James Bond novels. Fleming himself reportedly got the idea from a 1930s detective novel by Basil Thomson.[2] Montagu and Cholmondeley developed Cholmondeley's idea into a workable plan, using documents instead of a radio. The Committee thought of planting the documents on a body with a defective parachute. However, the Germans knew that it was Allied policy never to send sensitive documents over enemy territory, so they decided to make the man a victim of a plane crash at sea. That would explain how the man would be several days dead and how

Operation Mincemeat he could be carrying secret documents. The body would be floated ashore in Spain, where the nominally neutral government was known to cooperate with the Abwehr (German intelligence). The British were sure the Spanish authorities would search the body and allow German agents to examine anything found. Montagu gave the operation the code name of Mincemeat, just restored to the list of available names after its use for another successful mission.[3] The deliberate planting of fake documents on the enemy was not new. Known as the "Haversack Ruse", it had been practiced by the British in the First World War. Also, in August 1942 in North Africa, before the Battle of Alam Halfa a corpse was placed in a blown-up scout car, in a minefield facing the German 90th Light Division just south of Qaret el Abd. With the corpse was a map showing the locations of non-existent British minefields. The Germans fell for the ruse, and Rommel's panzers were routed to areas of soft sand where they bogged down.[4][5][4] In September 1942, a PBY Catalina crashed off Cadiz carrying Paymaster-Lt. James Hadden Turner, a courier. He was carrying a letter from General Mark Clark to the Governor of Gibraltar, which named French agents in North Africa and gave the date of the Torch landings as November 4 (although the actual date was November 8). Turner's body washed up on the beach near Tarifa and was recovered by the Spanish authorities. When the body was returned to the British, the letter was still on it, and technicians determined that the letter was never opened. The Germans had the means to read the letter without opening the envelope, but if they did, they apparently decided the letter was "planted" and the information was bogus, and so ignored it.[4]

49

Major William Martin, Royal Marines


With the help of the renowned pathologist Sir Bernard Spilsbury, Montagu and his team determined what kind of body they needed: a man who appeared to have died at sea by hypothermia and drowning, and then floated ashore after several days. However, finding a usable body seemed almost impossible, as indiscreet inquiries would cause talk, and it was impossible to tell a dead man's next of kin what the body was wanted for. Under quiet pressure, Bentley Purchase, coroner of St. Pancras District in London, obtained the body of a 34-year old Welsh man named Glyndwr Michael, on the condition that the man's real identity would never be revealed. The man had died after ingesting rat poison which contained phosphorus. After being ingested, the phosphide reacts with hydrochloric acid in the human stomach, generating phosphine, a highly toxic gas. Coroner Purchase explained, This dose was not sufficient to kill him outright, and its only effect was so to impair the functioning of the liver that he died a little time afterwards, leaving few clues to the cause of death. Montagu later claimed the man died from pneumonia, and that the family had been contacted and permission obtained, but none of this was true. The dead man's parents had died and no known relatives were found.[6] The next step was creating a "legend": a synthetic identity for the dead man. He became "Captain (Acting Major) William "Bill" Martin, Royal Marines",[6] born 1907, in Cardiff, Wales, and assigned to Headquarters, Combined Operations. As a Royal Marine, Major Martin came under Admiralty authority, and it would be easy to ensure that all official inquiries and messages about his death would be routed to the Naval Intelligence Division. The Army's arrangements were different and much harder to control. Also, he could wear battledress rather than a naval uniform (uniforms were tailor-made by Gieves of Savile Row, and they couldn't have Gieves's tailor measure a corpse.) The rank of acting Major made him senior enough to be entrusted with sensitive documents, but not so prominent that anyone would expect to know him. The name "Martin" was chosen because there were several Martins of about that rank in the Royal Marines.[3] To build up the legend, they provided a fiance named "Pam". Major Martin carried a snapshot of "Pam" (actually a clerk named Jean Leslie from MI5),[6] two love letters, and a jeweller's bill, dated 19th April 1943, from the exclusive S J Phillips Ltd of 113 New Bond Street, for a diamond engagement ring costing 53, 10s 6d, a ring that would cost 13,000 in 2010. The ring was described on the invoice as being a single diamond ring, small diamond shoulders with an engraving to Pam from WM 14.4.43. The author of the love letters has been reported as Hester Leggett, the head of Leslies department at MI5,[6] and not Victoire Evelyn Patricia 'Paddy' Bennett, later Lady

Operation Mincemeat Evelyn Ridsdale,[7] the only woman working in Room 39 under the command of Admiral John Henry Godfrey. Ian Fleming also worked in Room 39; he later modeled the characters of Miss Moneypenny and M on Bennett and Admiral Godfrey, respectively.[7] In keeping with his rank, he was given some good quality underwear, at the time extremely difficult to obtain due to rationing. Items of woollen underwear owned by the late Herbert Fisher, the Master of New College Oxford, having been run over and killed by a lorry, were secured and used to underpin the verisimilitude of the body.[6] He also had a pompous letter from his father, a letter from the family solicitor, and a letter from Ernest Whitley Jones, joint general manager of Lloyds Bank,[6] demanding payment of an overdraft of 79 19s 2d (79.96). There were a book of stamps, a silver cross and St Christophers medallion, a pencil stub, keys, a used twopenny bus ticket,[6] ticket stubs from a London theatre, a bill for four nights' lodging at the Naval and Military Club, and a receipt from Gieves & Hawkes for a new shirt (this last was an error: it was for cash, and officers never paid cash at Gieves; but the Germans did not catch it). All these documents were on authentic stationery or billheads. The dates of the ticket stubs and lodging bill indicated that Major Martin had left London on April 24. If his body washed ashore on 30 April, presumably after several days at sea, then he must have flown from Britain and crashed at sea. To make the Major even more believable, Montagu and his team decided to suggest that he was a bit careless. His ID card was marked as a replacement for one that had been lost, and his pass to Combined Operations HQ had expired a few weeks before his departure and not been renewed. This last touch carried an element of risk, as the Abwehr might be suspicious of a careless man having been entrusted with sensitive documents.

50

The deceptive documents


While the cover identity was created by Montagu and his team, the false documents were also being created. Montagu and his team insisted that these must be at the very highest level, so that there would be no question of the supposed senders being misinformed. The main document was a personal letter from "Archie Nye" (Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald Nye, Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff) to "My dear Alex" (General Sir Harold Alexander, commander of 18th Army Group in Algeria and Tunisia). The letter covered several "sensitive" subjects, such as the (unwanted) award of Purple Heart medals by U.S. forces to British servicemen serving with them, and the appointment of a new commander of the Guards Brigade. This explained its being hand-carried rather than sent through regular channels. On the specific topic of Allied plans in the Mediterranean, the letter referred to Operation Husky as the invasion of Greece by troops from Egypt and Libya under General Henry Maitland Wilson (Commander-in-Chief, Middle East). Two assault beaches and some of the assigned troops were named. (Husky was actually the invasion of Sicily.) The letter also mentioned a second planned attack, Operation Brimstone, for which the cover target was Sicily. This implied that Alexander's forces in Tunisia would invade Sardinia, that being the only other plausible target. Nye added that "we stand a very good chance of making [the Germans] think we are going for Sicily." The letter was composed by Sir Archibald himself and addressed by Patricia Trehearne (later Davies) in Room 13 of the Admiralty. There was also a letter of introduction for Major Martin from his putative commanding officer, Admiral Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Fleet and Allied naval commander in the Mediterranean. This letter included a clumsy joke about "sardines", which Montagu inserted in hopes the Germans would see it as a reference to a planned invasion of Sardinia. The Germans (and their Spanish friends) had apparently missed the letter in Paymaster-Lt. Turner's pocket, so Montagu's team decided to put the documents in a briefcase which could not be overlooked. To justify carrying documents in a briefcase, "Major Martin" was given two copies of the official pamphlet on Combined Operations by Hilary Saunders, and a letter from Mountbatten to General Eisenhower, asking him to write a brief foreword for the pamphlet's U.S. edition.

Operation Mincemeat It was also necessary to ensure that the body and the briefcase with the documents would be recovered together. The team first thought of having the handle clutched in the corpse's hand, held in place by rigor mortis. But the rigor would probably wear off and the briefcase would drift away. The team therefore equipped Major Martin with a leather-covered chain, such as was used by bank and jewellery couriers to secure their cases against snatching. The chain unobtrusively runs down a sleeve to the case. British officer couriers didn't use such chains, but the Germans might not know that, nor be certain that a real "Major Martin" wouldn't use one for this special job. It seemed unlikely that the Major would keep the bag at his wrist during the long flight from Britain, so the chain was looped around the belt of his trench coat.

51

Churchill briefed
Colonel Johnnie Bevan, in overall command of wartime deception, was charged with explaining the operation to the Prime Minister. On April 15, 1943, he was ushered into Winston Churchill's bedroom in the annex where he found Churchill in bed smoking a cigar.[6] Churchill showed considerable interest in the plan, and Bevan felt it necessary to point out that the operation could go very badly. The Prime Minister responded in a characteristically pithy manner: In that case, we shall have to get the body back and give it another swim.[6]

Execution
Major Martin, in his Royal Marines battledress and coat, was placed in a steel canister designed by Charles Fraser-Smith. The canister was filled with dry ice and sealed up. When the dry ice sublimated, it filled the canister with carbon dioxide and drove out any oxygen, thus preserving the body without refrigeration. Cholmondeley and Montagu delivered it to Holy Loch, Scotland where it was taken on board the British submarine HMS Seraph. Seraph's commander (Lt. Bill Jewell) and crew had previous special operations experience. Jewell told his men that the canister contained a top secret meteorological device to be deployed near Spain. On 19 April, Seraph set sail. On 30 April, Seraph arrived at a point about a mile off the coast of Spain, near the town of Huelva. The British knew that there was an Abwehr agent in Huelva who was friendly with the Spanish officials there. At 0430 on 30 April, Seraph surfaced. Lt. Jewell had the canister brought up on deck, then sent all his crew below except the officers. He briefed them on the details of the secret operation. They opened the canister, fitted Major Martin with a life jacket, and attached his briefcase with the papers. Jewell read the 39th Psalm, although the burial service was not specified in the orders, and the body was gently pushed into the sea where the tide would bring it ashore. Jewell afterwards sent a message to the Committee: "MINCEMEAT completed". The canister was shot through so that it would sink, it stubbornly refused to sink and was eventually rigged with a small plastic explosive charge to destroy it. The body was found at around 9:30 a.m. by a local fisherman, Jos Antonio Rey Maria.

"Mincemeat swallowed whole"


When the body was found, it was reported to the Abwehr agent in Huelva, Adolf Clauss. He was the son of the German consul, and operated under the cover of an agriculture technician.[8] Three days later, the British Naval Attach in Spain reported the body's discovery, and the Committee was notified. The body was handed over to the British Vice-Consul F. K. Hazeldene, and Major Martin was buried in Huelva with full military honours on 4 May. The Vice Consul arranged for a pathologist, Eduardo Del Torno, to perform a post-mortem examination. Del Torno reported that the man had fallen into the sea while still alive and had no bruises, death was due to drowning, and the body had been in the sea between 3 and 5 days.[8] A more comprehensive examination was not made because the pathologist took him for a Roman Catholic. Martin wore a silver crucifix and had a St. Christopher plaque[6] in his wallet and his identity tags were marked RC.

Operation Mincemeat Montagu had Major Martin included in the published list of British casualties which appeared in The Times on 4 June, in case the Germans checked up there. By coincidence, the names of two other officers who had died when their plane was lost at sea were also published that day, giving credence to the Major Martin story. The issue of the Times that recorded Major William Martin's "demise" was also the same that announced that of film star Leslie Howard, shot down by Luftwaffe aircraft on the Bay of Biscay. To further the ruse, the Admiralty sent several messages to the Naval Attach about the papers which Major Martin had been carrying. The Attach was urgently directed to locate the papers, and if they were in Spanish hands to recover them at all costs, but also to avoid alerting the Spanish to their importance. The briefcase and papers had been taken up by the Spanish Navy, who had turned over the documents to the Alto Estado Mayor, the Supreme General Staff.[6] From there, they apparently disappeared, and even the German Gestapo could not locate them.[6] Major Karl-Erich Kuhlenthal, the German's most senior Abwehr agent in Spain, took a keen interest in finding the papers. He stirred up so much attention among the Spanish that Colonel Jos Lpez Barrn Cerruti, Spains most senior secret policeman and a keen fascist, took up finding the briefcase. Word of the find reached Abwehr headquarters in Germany. Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, was asked by Kuhlenthal to personally intervene and persuade the Spanish to surrender the documents.[6] Lieutenant-Colonel Ramn Pardo Surez located the documents and arranged to make them available to the Germans. The Spanish removed the still-damp paper by tightly winding it around a probe into a cylindrical shape, and then pulling it out between the envelope flap, still closed by a wax seal, and the envelope body. Pardo took the dried contents to the German Embassy and gave Wilhelm Leissner, the Abwehr chief in Madrid, one hour to make copies.[6] The embassy immediately radioed the text to Berlin, with the paper copies of the photos following a few days later. The documents were re-inserted into their original envelopes, reversing the process by which they were removed, and returned to the British Attach by the Chief of Staff of the Navy on 13 May, with the assurance that "everything was there". When the papers were examined after their return, the British analyzed the documents and confirmed they had been opened.[6] Further confirmation from Ultra prompted a message to Churchill, then in the United States: "Mincemeat Swallowed Whole." The effort Montagu and his team made to build up Martin's identity paid off. The Germans noted and accepted all the personal details. They noted the date on the ticket stubs, and deduced that Martin must have been flying from Britain to Gibraltar. Ironically, their report gave a wrong date (27 April instead of 22 April), and they concluded that the crash had occurred on 28 April, even though the medical evidence "showed" that Martin had been dead in the water for several days by 30 April. But the Germans missed the contradiction, canceling their own error. As a result Adolf Hitler was so convinced of the veracity of the bogus documents that he disagreed with Benito Mussolini that Sicily would be the most likely invasion point, insisting that any incursion against the island should be regarded as a feint. German defensive efforts were substantially redirected: reinforcements were sent to Greece, Sardinia and Corsica instead of Sicily. British commando activities had also been carried out in Greece. The renowned general Erwin Rommel was sent to Greece to assume overall command. A group of "R boats" was transferred from Sicily, and three additional minefields were laid off the Greek coast. Three panzer divisions were moved to Greece one from France, and two from the Eastern Front. The latter was perhaps the most critical move reducing German combat strength against the Russians in the Kursk salient.[9] (Influencing events on the Eastern Front was apparently neither intended nor foreseen by the British originators of the plan, who were preoccupied with their own part of the war.) On 9 July, the Allies invaded Sicily in Operation Husky. The Germans remained convinced for two more weeks that the main attacks would be in Sardinia and Greece, and kept forces out of action there till it was too late. Only on 12 July did the Germans have the 3rd Regiment of 1st Fallschirmjger Division parachute onto the island ahead of the advancing British 8th Army. Ewen Montagu received the OBE for his part in Operation Mincemeat. Charles Cholmondeley received the MBE for masterminding the plan.

52

Operation Mincemeat

53

Impact on later operations


The success of Operation Mincemeat caused the Germans to disregard later genuine document finds. Examples include: Two days after the D-Day landings, the Germans discovered an abandoned landing craft washed up on the Vire estuary in Normandy, containing top secret documents detailing future military targets in the region. Hitler, believing this was a deception similar to Operation Mincemeat, ignored the documents, having already been convinced by numerous deceptions that the main invasion was still to come through the Pas de Calais.[10] During Operation Market-Garden, the drive into the Netherlands in September 1944, a complete operations order with maps and graphics for the airborne phase of the invasion, which was not supposed to be brought with the invading troops, was inadvertently left behind on a transport glider. The operations order fell into German hands, but the Germans, convinced that this was another attempt at Mincemeat-style deception, actually deployed their forces contrary to the information before them.[11]

The Man Who Never Was


Duff Cooper was a diplomat who had held several top level posts during the war. In 1950, he published a spy novel, Operation Heartbreak. The key plot device was floating a corpse into Spain with false documents to deceive the Germans. Cooper had come up with the idea on his own, but naturally many of those concerned with Mincemeat (including Germans and Spaniards) became concerned and started talking. The 'flap' attracted the attention of the British press, and wild rumours began to circulate. At this point the British security services decided that the best response was to publish the story. Ewen Montagu took a week-end off from his busy legal practice, and wrote the book The Man Who Never Was.[12] It was an immediate best-seller and was made into a movie of the same name two years later. The movie added some fictitious elements for drama, such as a German agent in London verifying "Major Martin"'s background, with Montagu and his colleagues one step ahead of him. The submarine used in the film wore pennant number P219, that of HMS Seraph, and she was indeed still in commission in 1954/55. In 1977, Montagu published a second book, Beyond Top Secret ULTRA, in which he recounted his secret war work. It could not be revealed earlier, as it involved both Ultra and the Double Cross System. In Chapter 13 he gives a short version of the Mincemeat story, including some details not in The Man Who Never Was.

Major Martin
There is no doubt about the identity of the man shown on the Identity Card of "Major Martin". This was MI5 Officer Ronnie Reed, who was also Case Officer for Agent Zigzag. According to Montagu, he "might have been the twin brother of the corpse". But the body of the man known as Major Martin was buried in the Cemetery of Solitude in Huelva. As Mincemeat became legend, the question persisted about the identity of the person buried there.

The first corpse


In 1996 Roger Morgan, an amateur historian, uncovered evidence that "Martin" was in reality Glyndwr Michael, a Welsh alcoholic vagrant, allegedly from Aberbargoed, whose name is mentioned on the War Memorial of that village and who died of ingesting rat poison, although how this happened is unknown.[3][13] Ben McIntyre confirmed in his book, titled Operation Mincemeat, that the dead man was Glyndwr Michael. He was found on 26 January 1943 in an abandoned warehouse near King's Cross Station in London and was taken to St Pancras hospital suffering from "acute chemical poisoning." It is thought that rat poison, known as 'Battle's Vermin Killer' was used. This was a paste that was laced with highly toxic white phosphorus. The assumption was made that Michael had intended to take his own life. His own father had committed suicide when Michael was 15 years old. His mother died in 1940 and Michael was alone in the world slowly falling into a deeply depressive state. He drifted, as many did, towards London, and was utterly destitute and homeless, his life gradually falling apart. It is also possible that the poisoning

Operation Mincemeat was accidental due to a starving Michael having been so hungry that he ate scraps of bread coated with poison to kill rats. Phosphoric poisoning is a horrific way to die, usually taking three days, as the phosphorus reacts with the stomach's own hydrochloric acid to create phosphine gas. Death is due to the breakdown of the central nervous system, jaundice, coma, kidney, liver and heart failure, before death. It took Michael two days to die. He was able to inform his nurses who he was and what he had eaten. He died on 28 January 1943, and when his body reached the hospital's morgue, district coroner Bentley Purchase informed Ewen Montagu that he had found the ideal candidate for his project. McIntyre reported that the corpse was kept refrigerated in the morgue until the mission was ready. Once aboard the Seraph, the body was preserved by placing it in a sealed canister containing dry ice, which prevented oxygen from causing decomposition.[6] In 1996 The Daily Telegraph published a story based on information released by the Public Record Office and identified the corpse as Glyndwr Michael. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission in January 1998 added an inscription to the gravestone of "Major Martin" in the Catholic cemetery of Huelva that reads, "Glyndwr Michael served as Major William Martin."[14] The historian Christopher Andrew reaches the same conclusion as to the identity of "Major Martin" in the authorised history of the Security Service, The Defence of the Realm.[15]

54

HMS Dasher connection


In The Secrets of HMS Dasher, authors John and Noreen Steele suggest a different identity for the body. On 27 March 1943 there was an explosion on HMS Dasher (a US-built escort carrier), which was then in the Firth of Clyde, which they ascribe to an accidental torpedoing by a British submarine. Dasher sank, and 379 men were killed. The British authorities tried to keep the story quiet, rather than have the public get upset over alleged defective American shipbuilding. The dead were originally buried in an unmarked mass grave. The Steeles claim that the Mincemeat body was John "Jack" Melville, 37, one of the dead sailors. They assert that Michael's corpse was acquired in January 1943, and would have suffered excessive decomposition by April 30, even if refrigerated. They claim that freezing was not an option as it would have produced observable changes to the body, which contradicts Montagu's account. (Montagu mentions having to thaw the body's feet so that boots could be put on it.) According to the Steeles, HMS Seraph was berthed at Blyth, Northumberland, but she was moved all the way around Scotland to Holy Loch, a major submarine base, on the west coast, and much further from London, just before Montagu delivered the canister. The Steeles argue that this makes no sense unless the body originally designated to be "Major Martin" had decomposed and become unusable, and that a "fresh" body from the Dasher disaster was to be substituted. They say Montagu brought the canister from London, but it was empty. On 8 October 2004, a memorial service was held in Melville's honour aboard the current HMS Dasher, a patrol boat, in which Melville's role as "Major Martin" was officially recognised by the Royal Navy. At the service, Lt. Cmdr. Mark Hill, CO of the naval squadron in Cyprus, said: "In his incarnation as Major Martin, John Melvilles memory lives on in the film, "The Man Who Never Was". But we are gathered here today to remember John Melville as a man who most certainly was".[16] The Dasher theory, however, has been denied by the Naval Historical Branch who responded to a Freedom of Information request (D/NHB/25/56 of 22 Jan 2010) as follows: "As far as both the Royal Navy and the Ministry of Defence are concerned, the body used in Operation Mincemeat was that of Glyndwr Michael as described in the files now in The National Archive at Kew. With regard to the memorial service held on board the current HMS DASHER in October 2004, it should be stressed that, despite media emphasis on a possible 'Man Who Never Was' connection, this was a perfectly proper memorial for those lost in the previous ship of that name. It had been cleared through both HQ British Force Cyprus and the Permanent Joint Head Quarters at Northwood. The statements... as accurately reported in The Scotsman, arose through information that they had been given locally, and which they believed in good faith. Unfortunately, the statements had not been referred to this office for an opinion." [17]

Operation Mincemeat

55

In popular culture
An episode of the Goon Show was entitled "The Man who Never Was" and was set during the Second World War, referred to a microfilm in the uniform of someone dressed up as a naval officer (though this was about a secret weapon.)[18] Operation Mincemeat inspired a similar plan in Cryptonomicon by Neal Stephenson, in Red Rabbit by Tom Clancy, in Body of Lies by David Ignatius, in the film version of You Only Live Twice, and in the science fiction series Space: Above and Beyond. A play of the same name, written by Adrian Jackson and Farhana Sheikh, was first staged by Cardboard Citizens in 2001 in the old Hartley's Jam factory in Southwark. It was staged once again as a site-specific, promenade performance in Cordy House, Shoreditch, in JuneJuly 2009. Cardboard Citizens deals with issues surrounding homelessness, and the play examined identity, together with Major Martin's quest to find out who he was. In 2008 Simon Corble launched his play, also called Operation: Mincemeat with a script-in-hand run performed by the Found Theatre Company.[19] This play saw its world premiere in the 2010 Adelaide Fringe Festival, performed by the Adelaide University Fringe Club to critical acclaim.[20] In his book, The Double Agents, W.E.B Griffin depicts operation Mincemeat. Fictional characters are blended with Ian Fleming, the actors David Niven and Peter Ustinov, and other historical figures as members of Montagu's "committee" to plan and execute Operation Mincemeat.

References
Explanatory notes
[1] Not Sir Archibald Cholmondeley as in The About.com account of Operation Mincemeat (http:/ / militaryhistory. about. com/ od/ navalwarfare/ a/ mincemeat. htm) by Robert W. Martin. [2] "Dead Man Floating: World War II's Oddest Operation" (http:/ / www. npr. org/ templates/ transcript/ transcript. php?storyId=127742365). 2010-06-12. . Retrieved 2010-07-13. [3] "Operation Mincemeat The Man Who Never Was in BBC's h2g2" (http:/ / www. bbc. co. uk/ dna/ h2g2/ A3031949). . Retrieved 2006-12-01. [4] Morgan, Roger (May 1988). "Operation MINCEMEAT". After the Battle: 4. [5] Smith, Capt. Kevin D. (JulyAugust 2002). "Coming Into its Own: The Contribution of Intelligence at the Battle of Alam Halfa". Military Review: 7477. [6] Macintyre, Ben (January 14, 2010). "Operation Mincemeat: full story of how corpse tricked the Nazis" (http:/ / entertainment. timesonline. co. uk/ tol/ arts_and_entertainment/ books/ book_extracts/ article6986802. ece). The Times. . [7] "Lady Ridsdale" (http:/ / www. telegraph. co. uk/ news/ obituaries/ military-obituaries/ special-forces-obituaries/ 6835071/ Lady-Ridsdale. html). London Telegraph. 2009-12-17. . Retrieved 2010-01-04. [8] "Archer Class Auxiliary Carrier, HMS Dasher Destroyed by Explosion on the 27th of March 1943. 379 Dead, an account of the HMS Dasher disaster" (http:/ / ahoy. tk-jk. net/ macslog/ ArcherClassAuxiliaryCarie. html). . Retrieved 2006-12-11. [9] David T. Zabecki, "Operation Mincemeat", in World War II Magazine, November 1995 (http:/ / www. militaryphotos. net/ forums/ archive/ index. php/ t-14966. html). [10] Dead Men's Secrets Documentary, D-Day Deception Episode [11] Ryan, Cornelius. A Bridge Too Far. [12] Montagu, Ewen (1977). Beyond Top Secret ULTRA. Coward McGann and Geoghegan. pp.1213. ISBN0-698-10882-3. [13] Morgan found Michael's name in the Public Record Office in Kew, west London. [14] "Operation Mincemeat" (http:/ / yourarchives. nationalarchives. gov. uk/ index. php?title=Operation_Mincemeat). The National Archives. February 1993. . [15] Andrew, Christopher (2010). The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5. Penguin Books. pp.285287. ISBN9780141023304. [16] "The Scotsman Tribute to the man who never was" (http:/ / thescotsman. scotsman. com/ world/ Tribute-to-man-who-never. 2571668. jp). . Retrieved 2007-04-12. [17] "Freedom of Information request D/NHB/25/56 of 22 Jan 2010" (http:/ / www. arrse. co. uk/ military-history-militaria/ 126596-op-mincemeat--aka-man-who-never---new-identity-claim-3. html#post3034781). . Retrieved 2010-01-27. [18] http:/ / www. thegoonshow. net/ scripts_show. asp?title=s06e27_the_man_who_never_was [19] Simon Corble This is the Man Operation Mincemeat (http:/ / www. corble. co. uk/ page_1212407826828. html). Retrieved on 2009-12-04 [20] Adelaide Theatre Guide Operation Mincemeat (http:/ / www. theatreguide. com. au/ current_site/ reviews/ reviews_detail. php?ShowID=mincemeat& ShowYear=2010) Retrieved on 2010-02-27

Citations

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Further reading
Holt, Thaddeus (2004). The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. New York: Scribner. ISBN0-743-25042-7. Latimer, Jon (2001). Deception in War. London: John Murray. ISBN0-743-25042-7. Macintyre, Ben (2010). Operation Mincemeat. The True Spy Story that Changed the Course of World War II. London: Bloomsbury. ISBN9780747598688. Montagu, Ewen (1977). Beyond Top Secret ULTRA. Coward McGann and Geoghegan. ISBN0-698-10882-3. Montagu, Ewen (1953). The Man Who Never Was. London: Evans. Reed, Nicholas (2011). My Father, The Man Who Never Was: Ronnie Reed, The Life and Times of an MI5 Officer. Folkestone: Lilburne Press. Smyth, Denis (2010). Deathly Deception: The Real Story of Operation Mincemeat. New York: Oxford. ISBN978-0-19-923398-4. Steele, John and Noreen (2002). The Secrets of HMS Dasher. Argyll Publishers. ISBN1-902831-51-9.

External links
Excerpts from the official Top Secret Ultra report on Operation Mincement (http://www.psywar.org/forum/ index.php/topic,477.msgl) PsyWar.Org, 3 January 2010. The dead tramp who won World War II (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1243379/ The-dead-tramp-won-war-A-new-book-reveals-astonishing-story-Man-Who-Never-Was.html) Daily Mail 15 January 2010. "Major Martin's" Grave in Spain (http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=11237449) The Age article The Man Who Never Was (http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/01/27/ 1043534001763.html) Captain Bill Jewell obituary (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1470038/Captain-Bill-Jewell. html) Mincemeat and the Imaginary Man Damn Interesting article (http://www.damninteresting.com/index. php?s=Mincemeat) Spanish language article (http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://us.geocities.com/manwhoneverwas/ hom090.html&date=2009-10-25+04:36:26) "The Man Who Never Was" movie at the Internet Movie Database (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0049471/)* BBC article on Operation Mincemeat (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-11887115) "Operation Mincemeat" 2010 Walker George Films Documentary for the BBC (http://walkergeorgefilms.co.uk/ filmography/documentaries/operation-mincemeat-2010/)*

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National redoubt
A national redoubt is a general term for an area to which the (remnant) forces of a nation can be withdrawn if the main battle has been lostor even beforehand if defeat is considered inevitable. Typically a region is chosen with a geography favouring defence, such as a mountainous area or a peninsula, in order to function as a final hold-out to preserve national independence for the duration of the conflict.

France and the Low Countries


From the middle of the 19th century until 1914 the fortress city of Antwerp was the official National Redoubt of Antwerp in Belgium, and until 1940, the "Fortress Holland" was that of the Netherlands, although in neither case did the "redoubt" prove defensible even though the same area of Holland proper did manage to stop the advances of the French troops in the Rampjaar 1672, providing the Dutch with much-needed time to eventually gain the upper hand. In 1940 Brittany was briefly considered as such in the last stages of the Fall of France, but again proved impractical.

China
During the Second Sino-Japanese War in World War II, the city of Kunming was prepared as a national redoubt in case the temporary capital in Chongqing fell, an elaborate system of underground caves to serve as offices, barracks and factories was prepared but never utilized.
Major Dutch defence lines in 1940

Kunming was again to have served in this role in the renewed Chinese civil war, but the Nationalist garrison changed sides and joined the Communists. Instead, Taiwan became the last redoubt and home of the Nationalist government, a role which continues to this day.[1]

Nazi Germany
The Alpine Fortress (German: Alpenfestung) was the World War II national redoubt planned by Heinrich Himmler in November/December 1943[2] for Nazi Germany's retreat to an area from "southern Bavaria across western Austria to northern Italy".[3] The plan was never fully endorsed by Hitler and no serious attempt was made to put the plan into operation. In the six months following the D-Day landings in Normandy in June 1944, the American and British armies advanced to the Rhine and seemed poised to strike into the heart of Germany, while the Soviet Army, advancing from the east through Poland, reached the Oder. It seemed likely that Berlin would soon fall and Germany be cut in half. In these circumstances, it occurred both to some leading figures in the German regime and to the Allies that the logical thing for the Germans to do would be to move the government to the mountainous areas of southern Germany and Austria, where a relatively small number of determined troops could hold out for some time. A number of intelligence reports to the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) identified the area held stores of foodstuffs and military supplies built up over the preceding six months, and could even be harbouring armaments production facilities. Within this fortified terrain, they said, Hitler would be able to evade the Allies and cause tremendous difficulties for the occupying Allied forces throughout Germany.

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The Nazi Germany minister for propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, set up a special unit to invent and spread rumours about an Alpenfestung. Goebbels also sent out rumours to neutral governments, thus keeping the Redoubt myth alive and its state of readiness unclear. He enlisted the assistance of the intelligence service of the SS, the SD, to produce faked blueprints and reports on construction supplies, armament production and troop transfers to the Redoubt. For Germans, the Redoubt became part fantasy and part official deception plan. Although Adolf Hitler never endorsed the The final operations of the Western Allied armies in Germany between 19 April plan, he issued an order on April 24 for the and 7 May 1945 evacuation of remaining government personnel from Berlin to the Redoubt; he made it clear that he would not leave Berlin himself, even if it fell to the Soviets, as it did on May 2. When the American armies penetrated Bavaria and western Austria at the end of April, they met little serious resistance, and the National Redoubt was shown to have been a myth. Nevertheless the National Redoubt had serious military and political consequences. Once the Anglo-American armies had crossed the Rhine and advanced into western Germany, they had to decide whether to advance on a narrow front towards Berlin, or on a broad front, with a view to securing both the North Sea coast and southern Germany before advancing further. The American commander, General George S. Patton, had consistently advocated a narrow front ever since D-Day, and did so again at this point. But the Allied commander in chief, U.S. General Dwight Eisenhower, took a more cautious view, and the broad front strategy prevailed. Goebbels' deception plan over the Redoubt was one of the great successes of German intelligence during World War II, albeit one that came too late to alter the outcome of the war. The Allied intelligence services were completely fooled by Goebbels' false trail of rumours. The Alpine Fortress was one of three reasons associated with SHAEF's movement of forces towards southern Germany rather than towards Berlin (cf. Berlin was planned to be in the Soviet Zone of Occupation and the Battle of Berlin would entail unacceptably high Western Allied casualties).

Evacuations to the Alpine Fortress


February/early March 1945, SHAEF received reports that German military, government and Nazi Party offices and their staffs were leaving Berlin for the area around Berchtesgaden, the site of Hitler's retreat in the Bavarian Alps. In February 1945, the SS evacuated V-2 rocket scientists from the Peenemnde Army Research Center to the Alpine Fortress. SS Generalleutnant Gottlob Berger claimed Hitler had signed a 22 April 1945 order to evacuate 35,000 prisoners to the Alpine Fortress as hostages, but Berger did not carry out the order[4] (many evacuated locations also failed to obey Hitler's order requiring Demolitions on Reich Territory, e.g., Mittelwerk).

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Post-war claims
Post-war claims regarding the Alpine Fortress include: The Alpine Fortress "grew into so exaggerated a scheme that I am astonished we could have believed it as innocently as we did. But while it persisted, this legend of the Redoubt was too ominous a threat to be ignored." (General Omar Bradley) Allied assessments of the Alpine Fortress were "the worst intelligence reports of all time, but no one knew that in March of 1945, and few even suspected it." (author Stephen E. Ambrose)

Yugoslavia
According to the "Total National Resistance" defense doctrine of the second Yugoslavia, a rugged highland area roughly encompassing Bosnia was to function as a redoubt to which the Yugoslav People's Army would retreat in case of a Soviet or NATO invasion. Defense of the rest of the country was to be left to the guerrilla-warfare efforts of the Territorial Defense forces. A network of fortified bases was developed in anticipation, including an underground air force base at eljava and a command bunker complex intended for the use of Marshal Josip Broz Tito.

Switzerland
Swiss National Redoubt (Schweizer Alpenfestung or Rduit suisse) was a defensive plan developed by the Swiss government during World War II to respond to a possible German invasion, which had been planned but was never carried out. The plan was three staged, first to hold an invading army on the border, if that failed to launch a delaying war that would allow the bulk of Swiss forces to withdraw to a defensible perimeter in the Swiss Alps, and three to defend that mountain stronghold.[5]
Plan of the Defence lines of the Swiss National Redoubt

Austria
During the Cold War, Austria developed a similar plan called Raumverteidigung (area defense). The plan was primarily directed against Hungary and Czechoslovakia (and later the Warsaw Pact) but it also included plans against an attack by NATO forces. The Austrian Armed Forces would retreat into key zones situated in the alpine region and defend it. They would also employ guerilla warfare behind enemy lines and delay the enemy advance in the area's security zones.[6][7]

Fictional
The concept of a "last stand" national stronghold also appears in fictional works, perhaps most famously in J.R.R. Tolkien's The Two Towers. In that book the people of Rohan, fearing an attack of superior numbers by the armies of Isengard, leave their capital city of Edoras to take refuge in the fortress of Helm's Deep. Tolkien also uses the concept in The Return of the King, where during the Siege of Minas Tirith most of the civilian populace retreats to the vales of the White Mountains, while the majority of the military gathers in Minas Tirith.

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Notes
[1] "Last Stand" (http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171,855050,00. html?iid=chix-sphere). Time magazine. December 19, 1949. . Retrieved 2007-12-03. [2] Gallagher, Wes (Associated Press Correspondent) (Dec. 13, 1944). "Nazis Prepared for Five Years Underground Warfare" (http:/ / news. google. com/ newspapers?id=EKYLAAAAIBAJ& sjid=F1UDAAAAIBAJ& pg=3767,1446383). The Evening Independent (St. Petersburg, Florida). . Retrieved 2010-12-22. "Himmler started laying the plans for underground warfare in the last two months of 1943.... The plans are threefold, embracing (1) Open warfare directed from Hitler's mountain headquarters; (2) Sabotage and guerrilla activity conducted by partisan bands organized by districts, and (3) Propaganda warfare to be carried on by some 200,000 Nazi followers in Europe and elsewhere. Strongholds Established Already picked S.S. (elite) troops have been established in underground strongholds and hospitals in the Austrian, Bavarian and Italian Alpine area and it is the plan of Nazi leaders to flee to that region when the German military collapse comes." [3] Time. February 12, 1945. http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171,852130-4,00. html. & #32;"But what of the top Nazis who cannot hide? With a compact army of young SS and Hitler Youth fanatics, they will retreat, behind a loyal rearguard cover of Volksgrenadiere and Volksstrmer, to the Alpine massif which reaches from southern Bavaria across western Austria to northern Italy. There immense stores of food and munitions are being laid down in prepared fortifications. If the retreat is a success, such an army might hold out for years." [4] The Last Escape - John Nichol, Tony Rennell - 2002 Penguin UK (http:/ / www. penguin. co. uk/ nf/ Book/ BookDisplay/ 0,,9780141003887,00. html) [5] http:/ / strangemaps. wordpress. com/ 2007/ 05/ 07/ 109-the-schweizer-reduit-hard-core-switzerland/ Strange Maps [6] http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ military/ world/ europe/ at. htm [7] http:/ / www. bmlv. gv. at/ omz/ ausgaben/ artikel. php?id=302

Operation Scherhorn
Operation Scherhorn (in English sources) or Operation Berezino (original Russian codename), Operation Beresino (in East German sources) was a secret deception operation performed by the NKVD against the Nazi secret services in August 1944 May 1945. It was proposed by Joseph Stalin, drafted by Mikhail Maklyarsky and executed by Pavel Sudoplatov and his NKVD subordinates assisted by ethnic German antifascists and communists.[1] The main objective of Operation Berezino was to create an illusion of a large German armed group operating behind the front line, and to deplete Nazi intelligence resources through capture and extermination of their field operatives sent to assist these nonexistent troops. The NKVD set up a fake German "resistance pocket" under "command" of lieutenant-colonel Heinrich Scherhorn, a real German prisoner of war forced to cooperate with the Soviets. The German response, Otto Skorzeny's Operation Freischtz (Operation Poacher in post-war English sources[2]) developed according to Soviet expectations. The German Pavel Sudoplatov, the Intelligence Services official commandos sent by Skorzeny were routinely arrested and forced who executed the operation. to take part in the Soviet funkspiel. German support gradually faded, but the German command maintained radio contact with "Group Scherhorn" until May 1945.

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Background
According to Pavel Sudoplatov, Operation Berezino was conceived by the NKVD officers Victor Ilyin and Mikhail Maklyarsky as an extension of Operation Monastyr (1941-1944). In 1941 NKVD operative Alexander Demyanov (Soviet codename Heyne, German codename Max), wearing a persona of a disgruntled bohemian socialite, established contact with the German resident in Moscow. The NKVD used this opportunity to expose the undercover network of the Abwehr in the Soviet Union. In December 1941 Demyanov "defected" to the German side and showed up at the Abwehr field office in Smolensk. Three months later he returned to Moscow as a trusted German agent. His apartment became a death trap for scores of genuine German agents but he retained the trust of his German superiors. In the middle of 1942 Demyanov's control officer Willie Fischer expanded the operation into a strategic level disinformation campaign. For more than two years Demyanov supplied Reinhard Gehlen with carefully scripted "military plans". According to Sudoplatov, the German success in repealing the Soviet Rzhev offensive were, in part, influenced by correct information fed to Gehlen through Demyanov.[3] According to Sudoplatov, Joseph Stalin personally monitored the progress of Operation Monastyr. The NKVD men engaged in it were highly rewarded but Stalin himself was dissatisfied with the limited scope of the operation. Shortly before the beginning of Operation Bagration he summonned Victor Abakumov, Vsevolod Merkulov, Fyodor Kuznetsov and Sudoplatov[4] and issued a direct written order to launch a new disinformation campaign. Stalin's instructions, recorded by Sergei Shtemenko, shifted the objective towards methodical physical destruction of German special forces and their intelligence capacity. Sudoplatov had to set up a believable "German camp" behind the advancing Soviet troops and call the German command for help. Stalin reasoned that the Germans would expend their best commandos in futile rescue missions. As a side benefit, the fake "camp" would divert German airlift resources from supporting the real pockets of resistance.[3]

Planning
The new operation, codenamed Berezino, was drafted by colonel Mikhail Maklyarsky and approved by Stalin, Lavrenty Beria and Vyacheslav Molotov. NKVD officers Nahum Eitingon, Willie Fischer, Mikhail Maklyarsky, Alexander Demyanov, Yakov Serebryansky departed to Belarus with a group of ethnic German antifascists. More pro-Soviet Germans, earlier engaged in mopping up Polish and Lithuanian forest brothers, joined them at the base camp some 100 kilometers east of Minsk.[5] The NKVD men screened groups of German prisoners of war captured during Operation Bagration and picked lieutenant-colonel Heinrich Scherhorn as the "front" for their operation. Scherhorn, former commander of the guards' regiment of the 286th Security Division was taken prisoner in June 1944. According to NKVD veteran Igor Schors, the choice was sealed by the connection between the Scherhorn family and Hitler: in the early 1930s Scherhorn's father made substantial donations to the Nazi Party.[6] Scherhorn and his radio operator agreed to play the Soviet game.[7] German communist Gustav Rebele assumed the role of Scherhorn's aide, watching his "commander" day and night.[5] The active phase of Berezino began on August 18, 1944[8] with a wireless message from Max to German command. Max reported that Scherhorn's detachment of 2,500 men was encircled by the Soviets in the swamps near the Berezina River. According to German sources, colonel Hans-Heinrich Worgitzky[9] of OKH Counterintelligence suspected a Soviet funkspiel and refused to commit his men to rescue "Scherhorn". Gehlen intervened and demanded full support to "Scherhorn" which he thought would ideally fit Otto Skorzeny's plan of guerilla action behind the front line.[10] OKW Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl instructed Skorzeny to begin the rescue operation.[11]

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First casualties
According to German communist Karl Kleinjung, in the beginning of September Eitingon announced the first success: the German command confirmed departure of a group of four or five commandos. The Soviets mustered a "welcome party" dressed in battered Nazi field uniforms. Some, like Kleinjung, were ethnic Germans, others were NKVD men who did not speak the language. Between 01:00 and 02:00 September 16[12] a Heinkel He 111 made two runs over the designated drop zone, releasing supply containers and paratroopers. According to the official site of the SVR there were three radio operators;[12] according to Kleinjung there were two SS commandos, one of them a radio operator, and two agents of Baltic descent.[13] The latter two were quietly subdued by NKVD, while the two SS men were cordially welcomed and escorted to Scherhorn's tent. After the meeting the guests were arrested by the NKVD and forced to cooperate in the funkspiel. They reported their safe landing over their own wireless set, persuading the German command that the operation proceeded as planned. They were followed by three more commando teams; according to Kleinjung, the NKVD intercepted all three without arousing suspicion.[5] Otto Skorzeny, too, wrote about four airborne SS teams. All were dressed in Soviet field uniforms, armed with Soviet handguns and stripped of any personal items that could give away their identities. The first one (Einsatz P) disappeared before the commandos or the aircraft crew could confirm landing. The second one (Einsatz S) made radio contact with Skorzeny after four days of silence. They reported that they safely reached their objective; Scherhorn himself spoke to German command over the wireless. The third team (Einsatz M) disappeared without trace. The fourth one (Einsatz P) reported that they landed far off the drop zone and had to reach it on foot, wandering through the forests infested with NKVD and Soviet deserters. The contact was soon lost. Three weeks later Einsatz P safely crossed the front line in Lithuania, reporting horrors of Soviet atrocities on their way.[14]

Spy games
"Scherhorn" reported that a rapid breakthrough was made impossible by a large number of wounded. The German command suggested airlifting the wounded to the German rear, which, according to Kleinjung, would have exposed the Soviet ploy. Skorzeny sent an engineer to manage construction of the runway.[15] The Soviets responded with staging a believable night fight between "Group Scherhorn" and "Soviet troops" at the very same moment when two transport planes arrived over the properly illuminated airfield. One of the pilots attempted landing despite the commotion on the ground, but immediately before the touchdown the NKVD men extinguished the runway lights, forcing both planes to abandon their mission.[5] Skorzeny received reports that the runway was permanently disabled by a Soviet air raid. According to Russian sources, execution of this air raid was indeed planned by colonel Ivan Fyodorov of the 4th Air Army. Before this night attack could materialize, the NKVD changed their minds and decided to use Fyodorov as a pawn in their game with Skorzeny. Fyodorov had to defect to "Scherhorn", fly to Germany with one of Skorzeny's planes, and operate there as a double agent. Fyodorov, one of the few Soviet recipients of the Nazi Iron Cross, was well known to the Luftwaffe and the Abwehr,[16] and could have indeed been a perfect double agent had it not been for his explosive, outspoken personality.[17] Instead of openly approaching Fyodorov, the NKVD set up a mock ambush. NKVD men impersonating Belarussian nationalists and Russian monarchists[18] kidnapped Fyodorov, took him to their camp in the forest and pressed him to change sides. The recruiters soon realized that Fyodorov was not fit for the job. Major Kopirovsky, author of the failed proposal, suggested liquidating Fyodorov, but Demyanov overruled him. Fyodorov was allowed to "flee" from the camp and return to the Air Force.[17]

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Agony
Skorzeny and chief of the FHO[19] Reinhard Gehlen remained confident in the existence and combat-worthiness of the 2,000-strong group. According to Kleinjung, they instructed Scherhorn to split it: one half had to march 250 kilometers north, to the Latvian-Lithuanian border, another to the south. According to Skorzeny, both detachments were to march north, with the smaller SS vanguard clearing the way for Scherhorn's main force. Scherhorn suggested that their march might bring them in contact with Polish population, and Skorzeny sent him his ethnic Polish agents. They also fell into Sudoplatov's hands and exposed the German network in Poland.[20] The Germans continuously supplied "Scherhorn" with necessary food and materiel, drawing down the scarce resources of Kampfgeschwader 200. According to the official site of the SVR, the Germans sent a total of 39 flights and dropped a total of 22 commandos with 13 wireless sets.[12] This, according to Kleinjung, created a logistical problem for the NKVD: their once compact team snowballed into a large formation. All German radio operators remained with the group to maintain radio contact with their German controllers, and the number of their NKVD guards and attending personnel grew accordingly.[5] By January 1945 air supplies dwindled: the front line moved too far west, the Luftwaffe could not afford wasting precious fuel on a remote Army camp. Group Scherhorn increased their radio activity, flooding the German command with pleas for help. To motivate the German command, "Scherhorn" proposed a brisk march towards the Daugavpils area where the ice was thick enough for transport airplanes. Gehlen developed a fixation on the success of the "Scherhorn Raid". On February 20, 1945 he took over the operation from Skorzeny and declared it a matter of prestige that had to be supported at all costs.[21] In March, however, Skorzeny spoke against Gehlen's single-handed management and Gehlen reluctantly backed off.[10] Heinrich Scherhorn remained a national hero and on March 23, 1945 was awarded the colonel's rank and the Knight's Cross.[5][22] According to the official site of the SVR, the German command communicated with "Scherhorn" until May 5, 1945;[12] according to Kleinjung and Skorzeny, "Scherhorn" remained in contact with the command until May 8.[23]

Aftermath
After the end of the war Sudoplatov used Heinrich Scherhorn to recruit captive Admiral Erich Raeder and his wife. The attempt failed: according to Sudoplatov, Scherhorn and Raeder were "incompatible with each other". Scherhorn and his group were held prisoners in a camp near Moscow and were repatriated in the early 1950s. Sudoplatov was arrested in the wake of the execution of Lavrenty Beria, and served 15 years in prison. He was cleared of criminal charges in 1992.[3] Alexander Demyanov (Max) retired from the NKVD after one unsuccessful post-war mission in France. According to Sudoplatov, Gehlen offered Max for sale to the Americans, but by this time the real Alexander Demyanov was out of his reach. He worked as an engineer at the Mosfilm studios and died in Moscow in 1975. Mikhail Maklyarsky also worked for the movie industry as a screenwriter. Neither they, nor any of the NKVD officers engaged in Operation Berezino were ever rewarded for it.[3]

Admiral Raeder

Reinhard Gehlen founded the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the West German secret service, and headed it until 1968. Karl Kleinjung, one of the ethnic Germans attendants at Camp Scherhorn, quickly rose through the East German bureaucracy and became the head of the First Directorate (HA I) of the Stasi. In 1997 he was indicted in the murders of civilians on the Inner German border and was acquitted in court.

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Sources
Footnotes
[1] The official site of the SVR names Pavel Sudoplatov the head of the operation; Nahum Eitingon, Mikhail Maklyarsky and Georgy Mordvinov his deputies in charge of Operation Scherhorn; and Willie Fischer as the chief of wireless communications. [2] Operation Poacher was used, for example, in the original 1950 edition of Skorzeny's memoirs, - Skorzeny, pp. 173 and 182. [3] Sudoplatov. [4] According to Sudoplatov, at this time he was completely unaware of the planned Operation Bagration. [5] Kleinjung. [6] Ovchinnikova, Lyudmila (2002). Podpolnaya yavka v centre Moskvy (in Russian) (http:/ / www. fsb. ru/ fsb/ history/ author/ single. htm!id=10318112@fsbPublication. html). Trud, January 18, 2002 (reproduced on the official site of the Federal Security Service). [7] Kleinjung: "Scherhorn war sichtlich erfreut, Deutsche zu sehen und sich mit ihnen unterhalten zu knnen ... Er und einige andere, darunter auch der Funker, gerieten in Gefangenschaft. In zahlreichen Gesprchen wurden sie zur Zusammenarbeit bewegt und erklrten sich zu einem einzigartigen Funkspiel mit dem deutschen Generalstab bereit." [8] Date stated on the official SVR site. Kleinjung provides a different date, August 19. [9] First Deputy to the President of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Reinhard Gehlen) in 1957-1967. [10] Von Zolling, Hoehne pt. 2. [11] Skorzeny, p. 173. [12] SVR. "" (Operacia Beresino, in Russian) (http:/ / svr. gov. ru/ history/ operation5. htm). Official site of the Foreign Intelligence Service. [13] Kleinjung: "Agenten des deutschen Geheimdienstes, die aus Litauen, Lettland und Estland kamen." - "Agents of the German secret service from Lituania, Latvia and Estonia" (sic). [14] Skorzeny, pp. 175-176. [15] Soviet and East German sources do not mention the arrival of this engineer or his team. Shmorgun, pp. 208-212, names a number of German officers flown to "Scherhorn" to supervise evacuation by air. [16] Fyodorov and Stepan Suprun received their Iron Crosses from Hermann Gring for their performance at an air show held in Berlin in June 1941, two weeks before the outbreak of Operation Barbarossa. [17] Shmorgun, pp. 208-225. [18] The "monarchists" were "loaned" from Operation Prestol, another NKVD operation unfolding in the same area - Shmorgun, pp. 221-223. [19] Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost (Eastern Intelligence Section) of Oberkommando des Heeres. [20] Sudoplatov; Biddiscombe, p. 103. [21] Von Zolling and Hoenhe cite Gehlen's speech: "Mit bernahme der Verantwortung durch Generalstab des Heeres ist es erforderlich, die Aktion auch als Prestigefrage zu betrachten und sie mit allen Mitteln zu beenden." [22] Sevin, Dieter (1989). Operation Scherhorn. Military Review. [23] Kleinjung; Skorzeny, p. 182.

References
,

Bibliography
Biddiscombe, Perry (2006). The SS hunter battalions: the hidden history of the Nazi resistance movement 1944-45 (http://books.google.com/books?id=EeYhAQAAIAAJ). Tempus. ISBN 0752439383. Karl Kleinjung (2003). Nichts gewesen auer Spesen. Operation Beresina (in German) (http://ror98.de/ ?DrafdInfo200804_Beresina). Verband Deutscher in der Rsistance, in den Streitkrften der Antihitlerkoalition und der Bewegung "Freies Deutschland" e.V. Shmorgun, Vladimir (2005). Krasny Sokol (in Russian) (http://militera.lib.ru/bio/shmorgun_vk_fedorov/ index.html). Moscow: Golos Press. ISBN 5711700812. Skorzeny, Otto (1950). Secret missions: war memoirs of the most dangerous man in Europe (http://books. google.com/books?id=Vc8hAQAAIAAJ). Dutton. pp. 173-182. Stephan, Robert W. (2004). Stalin's secret war: Soviet counterintelligence against the Nazis, 1941-1945 (http:// books.google.com/books?id=xhdnAAAAMAAJ). University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0700612793. pp. 175-181. Sudoplatov, Pavel (1995). Special tasks: the memoirs of an unwanted witness, a Soviet spymaster (http://books. google.com/books?id=_uExfHdLb8UC). Little, Brown. ISBN 0316821152.

Operation Scherhorn Von Zolling, Hermann and Hoenhe, Hans (1971). Pullach intern. Die Geschichte des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (in German, pt. 2) (http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43345609.html). Der Spiegel, March 22, 1971.

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External links
Parallel analysis of Kleinjung's and Skorzeny's accounts (http://ror98.de/?DrafdInfo200307_SKOR) (in German). Kessler, Michael B.. "Deception: A Neglected Force Multiplier" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ library/report/1989/KMB.htm). GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved August 16, 2010.

Operation Quicksilver (WWII)


In World War II, Operation Quicksilver (Allies, 1944) was a sub-plan of Operation Fortitude, the 1944 deception plan designed to induce the Germans to hold troops away from Normandy in belief that the Normandy landing was only a feint and that the major invasion would come in the Pas-de-Calais. The key element of Quicksilver was the creation in German minds that "First United States Army Group" (FUSAG) commanded by General George Patton supposedly would land in the Pas-de-Calais for the major invasion of Europe, after the landings in Normandy had lured the German defenders to that front. (FUSAG was a genuine army group headquarters which later became Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group, but was given a fictitious role and many non-existent divisions for purposes of deception.) Joan Pujol Garcia, known by the British code name Garbo and the German code name Arabel, was a double agent loyal to the Allies who played a crucial role in the deception by supplying Germany with detailed information from a network of non-existent sub-agents supporting the idea that the main invasion was to be in the Pas-de-Calais.

Overview
Quicksilver was subdivided into six subplans numbered I through VI: 1. Quicksilver I was the basic "story" for Fortitude: the First United States Army Group, based in the southeast of England, was to land in Pas-de-Calais after German reserves were committed to Normandy.[1] 2. Quicksilver II was the radio deception plan of Quicksilver, involving the apparent movement of units from their true locations to southeastern England.[2] 3. Quicksilver III was the display of dummy landing craft, including associated simulated wireless traffic and signing of roads and special areas.[3] 4. Quicksilver IV was the air plan for Quicksilver, including bombing of the Pas-de-Calais beach area and tactical railway bombing immediately before D-Day.[4] 5. Quicksilver V was increased activity around Dover (giving impression of extra tunneling, additional wireless stations), to suggest embarkation preparations.[5] 6. Quicksilver VI was night lighting to simulate activity at night where dummy landing craft were situated. Quicksilver, like the rest of Fortitude South, was devised by Colonel David Strangeways, Montgomery's deception officer, and carried out under his supervision. Strangeways was very adept at deceiving the Germans. His ideas throughout the war had the Germans duped many times. The operation was carried out by means of false radio signals purporting to show units massing in southeastern England, together with false reports to German intelligence by double agents provided by the Double Cross System. Allowing one of the double agents to claim to have stolen documents describing the closely guarded invasion plans might have aroused suspicion. Instead, agents were allowed to report minutiae such as insignia on soldiers' uniforms and unit markings on vehicles. The observations in the south-central areas largely gave accurate information about

Operation Quicksilver (WWII) the units located there: the actual invasion forces. Reports from southwest England indicated few troop sightings, when in reality many units were housed there. Reports from the southeast depicted the real and the notional Quicksilver forces. Any military planner would know that to mount a massive invasion of Europe from England, Allied units had to be staged around the country, with those that would land first nearest to the invasion point. German intelligence used the agent reports to construct an order of battle for the Allied forces that placed the center of gravity of the invasion force opposite Pas de Calais, the point on the French coast closest to England and therefore a likely invasion site. The deception was so effective that the Germans kept 15 reserve divisions near Calais even after the invasion had begun at Normandy, lest it prove to be a diversion from the "real" invasion at Calais.[6] Contrary to a widespread misconception, the FUSAG deception was not primarily implemented with dummy tanks, airplanes, or other dummy equipment, since at that stage of the war the Germans were unable to fly reconnaissance planes over England and such effort would have been wasted. Dummy landing craft were stationed at ports in eastern and southeastern England where they might be observed by the Germans.[7][8] (The Allies did possess extensive dummy equipment, which was used in North Africa and later in continental Europe.)

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Notes
[1] Deuve, Jean. Histoire secrete des stratagemes de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. pp.231233. ISBN978-83-7495-858-5. [2] Deuve, Jean. Histoire secrete des stratagemes de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. 978-83-7495-858-5. pp.234238. ISBN978-83-7495-858-5. [3] [4] [5] [6] Deuve, Jean. Histoire secrete des stratagemes de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. 978-83-7495-858-5. pp.238239. ISBN978-83-7495-858-5. Deuve, Jean. Histoire secrete des stratagemes de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. 978-83-7495-858-5. pp.239242. ISBN978-83-7495-858-5. Deuve, Jean. Histoire secrete des stratagemes de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. 978-83-7495-858-5. pp.242. ISBN978-83-7495-858-5. Masterman, John C (1972), The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (http:/ / www. amazon. com/ double-cross-system-war-1939-1945/ dp/ 0708104592), Australian National University Press, p.223ff, ISBN978-0708104590, [7] Holt, Thaddeus (2004), The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War, New York: Scribner, p.537, ISBN0-7432-5042-7 [8] Howard, Michael (1990), British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 5: Strategic Deception, New York: Cambridge U. Press, p.120, ISBN0-11-630954-7

External links
"Decoy Army Fooled Nazi Masterminds", February 1946, Popular Mechanics (http://books.google.com/ books?id=2yADAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA126&dq=popular+science+February+1946&hl=en& ei=vOPkTL3jJsnOnAf8toClDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5& ved=0CDMQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=popular science February 1946&f=true)

Shelling of Mainila

67

Shelling of Mainila
The Shelling of Mainila (Finnish: Mainilan laukaukset) was a military incident on November 26, 1939, where the Soviet Union's Red Army shelled the Russian village of Mainila (located near Beloostrov), declared that the fire originated from Finland across a nearby border and claimed losses in personnel. Through that false flag operation the Soviet Union gained a great propaganda boost and a casus belli for launching the Winter War four days later.[1][2]

Background
The Soviet Union had signed international and mutual nonaggression treaties with Finland: the Treaty of Tartu of 1920, the Non-aggression Location of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus (according to the borders prior to the signing of Pact between Finland and the Soviet Union signed in 1932 and again in the Moscow peace treaty). 1934, and further the Charter of the League of Nations.[2] The Soviet government attempted to adhere to a tradition of legalism, and a casus belli was required for war. Earlier in the same year, Nazi Germany had staged the similar Gleiwitz incident to generate an excuse to withdraw from its nonaggression pact with Poland.[1]

The incident
Seven shots were fired, and their fall was detected by three Finnish observation posts. These witnesses estimated that the shells detonated approximately 800 meters inside Soviet territory.[3] Finland proposed a neutral investigation of the incident, but the Soviet Union refused and broke diplomatic relations with Finland on November 29.[4] Materials in the private archives of Soviet party leader Andrei Zhdanov heavily hint that the entire incident was orchestrated in order to paint Finland as an aggressor and launch an offensive.[5] The Finnish side denied responsibility for the attacks and identified Soviet artillery as their source indeed, the war diaries of nearby Finnish artillery batteries show that Mainila was out of range of all of them, as they had been withdrawn previously to prevent such incidents.[6] In the days following the shelling, the Soviet propaganda machine generated much noise about other fictitious acts of Finnish aggression. The Soviet Union then renounced the non-aggression pact with Finland, and on November 30, 1939 launched the first offensives of the Winter War.

Aftermath
The Finns conducted an immediate investigation, which concluded that no Finnish artillery or mortars could have reached the village of Mainila. Field Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim had ordered all Finnish guns drawn back out of range.[3] Furthermore, Finnish border guards testified that they had heard the sound of artillery fire from the Soviet side of the border.[2] The Russian historian Pavel Aptekar analyzed declassified Soviet military documents and found that the daily reports from troops located in the area did not report any losses in personnel during the time period in question, leading him to conclude that the shelling of Soviet troops was staged.[7] Years after the incident the leader of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev wrote that the Mainila shellings were set up by Marshal of Artillery Grigory Kulik.[8] In 1994, the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, denounced the Winter War, agreeing that it was a war of aggression.[9]

Shelling of Mainila

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References
Citations
[1] Edwards 2006, p. 105 [2] Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvlinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti. Talvisodan pikkujttilinen. pp.4445. [3] Trotter 2002, p. 21 [4] Heikkonen, Esko - Ojakoski, Matti: Muutosten maailma 4, ISBN 9789510339190, WSOY, 2004 p. 125 [5] Manninen, Ohto: Molotovin cocktail-Hitlerin sateenvarjo, 1995 [6] Leskinen, Jari - Juutilainen, Antti (edit.): Talvisodan pikkujttilinen, ISBN 9789510235362, WSOY, 2006 [7] Pavel Aptekar in article Casus Belli (http:/ / www. rkka. ru/ analys/ mainila/ mainila. htm) using casualty reports as sources ( .10 .1095 .37,42,106.130,142) (Russian) [8] Trotter 2002, p. 22 [9] In a joint press conference with President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari at Kremlin May 18, 1994; Many Karelias (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20090202164646/ http:/ / virtual. finland. fi/ netcomm/ news/ showarticle. asp?intNWSAID=25907) Virtual Finland, November 2001, archived February 2, 2009 from the original (http:/ / virtual. finland. fi/ netcomm/ news/ showarticle. asp?intNWSAID=25907) (Finnish)

Bibliography
Edwards, Robert (2006). White Death: Russia's War on Finland 193940. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN978 0 297 84630 2. Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti, eds (1999) (in Finnish). Talvisodan pikkujttilinen (1st ed.). Werner Sderstrm Osakeyhti. pp.976. ISBN951-0-23536-9. Trotter, William R. (2002, 2006) [1991]. The Winter war: The RussoFinnish War of 193940 (5th ed.). New York (Great Britain: London): Workman Publishing Company (Great Britain: Aurum Press). ISBN1 85410 881 6. "First published in the United States under the title A Frozen Hell: The RussoFinnish Winter War of 193940"

External links
Diplomatic correspondence between Finnish and Russian Governments (http://www.around.spb.ru/finnish/ docs/dir0note.php) (Russian)

Operation Span

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Operation Span
During World War II, Operation Span was an Allied deception operation in support of the 1944 landings in southern France . After the Dragoon landings, landing craft and other amphibious vessels were used to approach likely landing areas elsewhere in southern France coast and along the Italian coast. This tied down German troops and prevented their deployment against the beachhead.[1]

References
[1] Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine (1993; 605 pp., table, maps, illustrations, bibliographical note, index). CMH Pub 7-10, cloth, GPO S/N 008-029-00213-2; CMH Pub 7-10-1, paper, GPO S/N 008-029-00229-9. "A history of combat operations by Sixth Army Group from its landing in southern France to its crossing of the Rhine."

Starfish site
Starfish sites, or bombing decoy sites, were deliberately created simulations of burning towns that were constructed in Britain during World War II. The name came from the code name for one of the sites, "Starfish", itself from the original code, SF, for Special Fire. Starfish sites were used to decoy German night bombers away from bombing real towns. Towns thus successfully protected, according to some, include Bristol, Sheffield, and Derby. 'Starfish' decoy sites were part of Britains war of deception against German attacks, and were designed to protect various targets, including airfields, factories, and even cities. They were established in July 1940 by the National Decoy Authority, as part of a programme of civil defences known as the 'C-series' of civil decoys. They were operated by lighting a series of controlled fires or other pyrotechnics during an air raid, in order to simulate an urban area targeted by bombs. There were various types of smaller decoy sites, including the QL decoy sites, which used lights, and the QF sites, which were dummy fire sites. The 'QL' decoys used a grid of muted lights to resemble factories during a poorly observed blackout.[1]

Black Down
During World War II, a bombing decoy town was constructed on Black Down on the Mendip Hills, which was intended to represent the blazing lights of Bristol. The decoy, known under the code-name "Starfish", derived from the original code, SF (Special Fire), used fires of creosote and water to simulate incendiary bombs exploding. In addition, glow boxes were used to simulate the streets and railways of Bristol; the light bulbs were powered by electrical generators turned by Coventry Climax petrol engines contained in two bunkers.[2][3] The success of this endeavour is questionable, with no ground indications that the hills were used as targets.[4]

World War II bunker on Black Down

A Starfish decoy site existed at Long Wood at grid reference NS 540 524 outside Eaglesham in East Renfrewshire, Scotland. Clusters of impressions where basket fires once stood, bounded by fire-break trenches, covered much of the area in World War II photographs, and a prominent structure near the site may have been the decoy control bunker. Anti-aircraft gun emplacements have been noted at the site.[5] Carrington Moss, near Manchester, was another Starfish site.[6]

Starfish site A relatively intact Starfish control bunker can also be seen at Liddington Hill overlooking Swindon. The bunker is at the edge of the small copse on the eastern summit of the hill, which is a landmark easily visible from the M4 motorway.

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References
[1] Hunt, Bob (2004-09-23). "Surface Sites - 'Q' Decoy Site" (http:/ / www. portsdown-tunnels. org. uk/ surface_sites/ qsite_p1. html). Portsdown Tunnels. . Retrieved 2009-05-14. [2] Davies, Les (March 2009). "Starfish and subterfuge" (http:/ / www. mendiptimes. co. uk/ ). Mendip Times. . Retrieved 2009-02-24. [3] Brown, Donald (1999). Somerset V. Hitler: Secret Operations in the Mendips, 1939-45. Countryside Books. ISBN978-1853065903. [4] "Mendip Hills An Archaeological Survey of the Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty" (http:/ / www1. somerset. gov. uk/ archives/ hes/ downloads/ HES_MendipAONB. pdf). Somerset County Council Archeological Projects. . Retrieved 16 January 2011. [5] "Long Wood, Starfish Decoy Site" (http:/ / canmore. rcahms. gov. uk/ en/ site/ 229135/ details/ long+ wood+ starfish+ decoy+ site/ ). RCAHMS. . Retrieved 2009-11-16. [6] Smith, Peter J. C. Luftwaffe Over Manchester: The Blitz Years 1940-1944, p.14. Neil Richardson 2003. ISBN 1852161515

Further reading
Fields of Deception - Britain's Bombing Decoys of World War II, Colin Dobson, Methuen Publishing, 2000, ISBN 9780413745705. The Bombing of Rolls-Royce at Derby in Two World Wars, 2002, Kirk, Felix & Bartnik, RR Heritage Trust

External links
Read about bombing decoys (http://www.pastscape.org.uk/News.aspx?id=NewsItem14#bd) Decoy Sites Wartime Deception in Norfolk and Suffolk by Huby Fairhead (http://www.aviationmuseum.net/ decoys.htm) Night-Time Fire-Based Decoys by Fred Nash (via Google cache) (http://64.233.183.104/ search?q=cache:QfvfadcQCFwJ:unlockingessex.essexcc.gov.uk/content_page.asp?content_page_id=224& content_parents=48,95,213+"starfish+site"&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=13) Read about the Bristol Civil Bombing Site C1H (http://www.pastscape.org.uk/hob.aspx?hob_id=1467945)

Twelfth Army (United Kingdom)

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Twelfth Army (United Kingdom)


During the Second World War, two formations called the British Twelfth Army were created, the first was formed in the Middle East in early 1943 as part of the Operation Barclay deception plan, the second was created in Burma in May 1945.

The first British Twelfth Army


A British Twelfth Army was initially invented by 'A' Force as part as the deception plan for Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943. The Western Allies attempted to convince the Germans that their main effort during 1943 would be to land the Twelfth Army in Greece and then advance into the eastern Balkans during the early part of the summer of 1943 with the aim of bringing Turkey into the war and then linking up with the Soviet Red Army.[1] The deception plan attempted to convince the Germans that this army had twelve divisions under its control and was located in Egypt.[1][2] The army's formation insignia was a trained seal balancing on its nose a terrestrial globe showing the Eastern Hemisphere, black on a white background. The insignia was supposed to symbolize an amphibious creature treating the whole world as its own.[3]

Subordinate units
Between 1943 and 1945, when it was disbanded to allow the formation of the second British Twelfth Army, its nominal existence was used to create the impression of a standing threat to the Balkans. During this period the units shown under its control varied, depending on the target chosen. The following list includes all units mentioned as forming part of the Twelfth Army or its component corps.[3][4] Corps British III Corps (fictional) British XIV Corps (fictional) British XVI Corps (fictional) Polish III Corps (fictional)

Divisions Polish 2nd Armored Division British 4th Airborne Division (fictional) British 5th Airborne Division (fictional) British 5th Infantry Division Polish 7th Infantry Division British 8th Armored Division (fictional) Polish 8th Infantry Division (fictional) British 15th Motorized Division (fictional) British 33rd Infantry Division (fictional) British 34th Infantry Division (fictional) British 40th Infantry Division (fictional) British 42nd Infantry Division (fictional) British 56th Infantry Division British 57th Infantry Division (fictional)

Twelfth Army (United Kingdom)

72

The second British Twelfth Army


The second British Twelfth Army was formed on 28 May 1945, to take control of operations in Burma from the Fourteenth Army, which was being withdrawn to plan for Operation Zipper, the planned invasion of Malaya by amphibious assault, which was due to take place in August 1945. The army HQ was created by re-designating the HQ of the Indian XXXIII Corps, under Lieutenant-General Sir Montagu Stopford. It took over one of Fourteenth Army's main combat formations, IV Corps which was temporarily commanded by Lieutenant General Francis Tuker, with 5th, 17th and 19th Indian Divisions and 255th Indian Tank Brigade under its command. Twelfth Army assumed direct command of 7th and 20th Indian Divisions, together with 22nd East African Brigade. Static formations under its control included 505 District and South Burma District. There were still Japanese formations in Burma at this time, with IV Corps having the responsibility for driving them out of the remainder of the country. The Japanese tried to break out from the Allied armies closing in on them, and although suffering heavy casualties, did succeed in rescuing many of their formations. After the war, Twelfth Army continued in existence until 1 November, when it was re designated Burma Command. The formation insignia was a Chinthe on a red background, with a superimposed horizontal black stripe on which was written "XII" in white letters.

Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] Howard (1995), p. 86 Donald J. Bacon, Second World War Deception (http:/ / www. au. af. mil/ au/ awc/ awcgate/ wright/ wf05. pdf) Thaddeus Holt. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Phoenix. 2005. ISBN 0753819171 Ben MacIntyre. Operation Mincemeat. Bloomsbury. 2010. ISBN 9781408809211

References
Howard, Michael (1995). Strategic Deception in the Second World War. British Intelligence in the Second World War. New York: Norton. ISBN0393312933.

XIV Corps (United Kingdom)

73

XIV Corps (United Kingdom)


XIV Corps
Active Country Branch Type Partof 1916-18
United Kingdom

British Army Field corps Fourth Army

Engagements World War I[1]

Battle of the Somme 1916 Battle of Delville Wood Battle of Guillemont Battle of Ginchy Battle of Flers-Courcelette Battle of Morval Battle of Le Transloy German retreat to the Hindenburg Line Italian Campaign

XIV Corps was a British infantry corps during World War I.

World War I
XIV Corps was formed in France on 3 January 1916 under Lieutenant-General the Earl of Cavan.[1] It took part in the Battle of the Somme in 1916 and then redeployed to Italy in November 1917.[1]

General Officers Commanding


Commanders included: January 1916 - March 1918 Lieutenant General the Earl of Cavan[2]

World War II
In the Second World War, the XIV corps was notionally reformed in North Africa in late 1943 as part the cover plan for the Anzio landings. Initially assigned to the British Twelfth Army, the corps was later depicted as being under the command of the United States Seventh Army and finally under the 15th Army Group as the theater reserve for the Italian campaign[3]

XIV Corps (United Kingdom)

74

Insignia
The corps insignia in World War II was that of a black wolf's head, with a lolling red tongue superimposed on a white square.

Subordinate units
As with its original parent formation the British Twelfth Army, the units notionally under command of the British XIV Corps varied depending on the nature of the threat being depicted. 1943 (Operation Oakfield) Corps headquarters & supporting troops.[3] British 40th Infantry Division (fictional) British 42nd Division (fictional) British 57th Infantry Division (fictional)

1944 (Operation Zeppelin) Corps headquarters & supporting troops.[3] British 5th Airborne Division (fictional) British 40th Infantry Division (fictional) British 42nd Division (fictional) British 57th Infantry Division (fictional) 1945 (15th Army Group reserve) Corps headquarters & supporting troops.[3] British 42nd Division (fictional) British 57th Infantry Division (fictional)

References
[1] Baker, Chris. "The British Corps of 1914-1918" (http:/ / www. 1914-1918. net/ corps. htm). The Long, Long Trail: The British Army of 1914-1918. . Retrieved 2008-12-30. [2] Heathcote, Anthony pg 198 [3] Holt, Thaddeus. pg 914 & 915

Heathcote, T.A. (1999). The British Field Marshals 17361997. Pen & Sword Books Ltd. ISBN 0-85052-696-5 Holt, T (2005). The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Phoenix. ISBN 0-75381-917-1

Operation Zeppelin (Allies)

75

Operation Zeppelin (Allies)


During World War II, Operation Zeppelin was a deception plan carried out by the Allies designed to depict a potential amphibious landing on Crete, western Greece, or the Romanian Black Sea coast. It was carried out in the time preceding the invasion of Normandy. Zeppelin was a complement to Operation Bodyguard, and was in support of Operation Overlord and Operation Dragoon. Zeppelin followed Operation Cascade.

Article Sources and Contributors

76

Article Sources and Contributors


2nd Airborne Division (United Kingdom) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=470014106 Contributors: Buckshot06, Giraffedata, Graham1973, Hammersoft, Jim Sweeney, Leithp, LilHelpa, Starcheerspeaksnewslostwars 4th Airborne Division (United Kingdom) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=467912454 Contributors: Buckshot06, Canglesea, Graham1973, Jim Sweeney, Klemen Kocjancic, Nick Number 55th Infantry Division (United States) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=469772368 Contributors: Anotherclown, AustralianRupert, Diwas, Graham1973, Khazar, Klemen Kocjancic, Mild Bill Hiccup, Ohconfucius, Wikipelli 58th Infantry Division (United Kingdom) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=468335452 Contributors: Graham1973, PKT, Welsh 59th Infantry Division (United States) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=468984749 Contributors: Djmaschek, Graham1973 5th Airborne Division (United Kingdom) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=447667346 Contributors: Graham1973, Jim Sweeney, Nick Number 6th Airborne Division (United States) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=468906734 Contributors: Graham1973, Jwillbur, Ohconfucius, Welsh, Operation Accumulator Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=445915778 Contributors: Leofric1, Neddyseagoon, Night of the Big Wind, Shimgray, Silverhorse, Skysmith, Sus scrofa, Varlaam, Verne Equinox, Wikited Operation Barclay Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=453010904 Contributors: Bluemoose, Caerwine, Captain Seafort, DJ Clayworth, Folks at 137, Frencheigh, Graham1973, HylgeriaK, JCarriker, JeltLuthor, Joshbaumgartner, Krupo, Stefanomione, The Anome, Thucydides of Thrace, Verne Equinox, Zundark, 9 anonymous edits Operation Blumenpflcken Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=460389194 Contributors: Geschichte, Hugo999, Marrante, RA0808, WikiEditor004 Operation Boardman Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=353456731 Contributors: Caerwine, DO'Neil, Dna-webmaster, Folks at 137, Guanaco, Isaac Rabinovitch, Just Another Dan, N328KF, Oberiko, OldakQuill, PaulinSaudi, Raul654, Verne Equinox, 3 anonymous edits Operation Bodyguard Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=470651711 Contributors: Antwonw, Beland, Cathy Richards, Cmills1493, DJ Clayworth, ErrantX, Evercat, Folks at 137, Fwb44, GalFisk, GeorgeTheCar, GraemeLeggett, J Clear, J04n, JeltLuthor, Med, Morwen, N328KF, Nucleophilic, Oberiko, OldakQuill, Patrick, PaulinSaudi, Puddhe, Racerx11, RashBold, Raul654, Richi, SamuelTheGhost, Secretlondon, The Anome, Valtayr, Verne Equinox, 32 anonymous edits Operation Cascade Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=358365652 Contributors: Antwonw, Ciphergoth, JeltLuthor, MarcoLittel, Verne Equinox, Wknight94 Operation Chettyford Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=353456998 Contributors: Dialectric, Folks at 137, Guanaco, Jonnabuz, N328KF, Oberiko, OldakQuill, PaulinSaudi, Raul654, Verne Equinox Operation Cockade Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=468965178 Contributors: BillFlis, Buckshot06, DexDor, GraemeLeggett, Graham1973, Greenshed, Hue White, Koavf, Leandrod, Maniamin, Ntsimp, Opera hat, Paalappoo, Talldean, Tartarus, The ed17, Verne Equinox, Wkharrisjr, Ww2censor, 4 anonymous edits Operation Copperhead Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=423092578 Contributors: Ashlux, CommonsDelinker, DJ Clayworth, Djdaedalus, Dposse, Enochlau, Folks at 137, Jooler, Kalmbach, MCB, PaulinSaudi, Phil Fish, Pmanderson, Supertouch, Twittenham, Verne Equinox, 3 anonymous edits Operation Ferdinand Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=353457165 Contributors: DJ Clayworth, Evercat, Folks at 137, Jimfbleak, RattleMan, Verne Equinox, 4 anonymous edits First United States Army Group Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=468875496 Contributors: ArnoldReinhold, Before My Ken, Bryan.burgers, Buckshot06, CORNELIUSSEON, CharlotteWebb, DocKrin, DutchDevil, EurekaLott, Graham1973, Ground Zero, JeltLuthor, Jmb285, Kirill Lokshin, Kumioko, LtNOWIS, MartinDK, MrDolomite, Ohconfucius, Pol098, Rjm at sleepers, SOCL, ScreaminEagle, Srich32977, Tonster, Verne Equinox, Wrelwser43, 6 anonymous edits Operation Fortitude Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=469669978 Contributors: 0, Adam Keller, Amikake3, AnonMoos, Antwonw, ArnoldReinhold, Baumman, Brada Vang, Bryan Derksen, Buckshot06, Canglesea, Catsmeat, ChrisHodgesUK, Civil Engineer III, Clarityfiend, Cmdrjameson, Colonies Chris, Conversion script, Cool3, Cybercobra, DJ Clayworth, Danny Yee, Dante Alighieri, DavidA, Deltabeignet, Dna-webmaster, Docu, Donreed, Downsize43, E-Kartoffel, Einbierbitte, El C, Elendil's Heir, ErrantX, Frank Mento, Friginator, GRuban, Gaius Cornelius, Gatoclass, GeeksHaveFeelings, Graham1973, Graham87, Gregstoll, Greudin, HLGallon, Hede2000, Henri Hudson, Hydraton31, Igoldste, IronJohnSr, Itai, Jiang, John Vandenberg, Johnpseudo, Joseph Solis in Australia, Jpatokal, K8 fan, Kchishol1970, KingAlanI, Kntrabssi, Lacrimosus, Laddiebuck, Lambiam, Leonard G., M1ss1ontomars2k4, M3taphysical, Mailer diablo, Mandarax, Matt Crypto, Matthewcgirling, Maury Markowitz, Michael Johnson, Mike7, Mkamat, Monk Bretton, Mstrubell, N328KF, Nandt1, Noclador, Oberiko, Ogre lawless, OldakQuill, Patrick, PaulinSaudi, Pol098, Quadalpha, Raul654, Rcbutcher, Richi, Richwales, RickK, RobNS, RockMFR, Roo72, ShakingSpirit, SimonP, Sjc, Sketchmoose, Stan Shebs, Statalyzer, Superm401, Superpup1414, The Anome, Thud495, TinyMark, Tynknen, Unregistered.coward, Verne Equinox, Veyklevar, WojPob, Ww, Zephyrus67, 112 anonymous edits Fourth Army (United Kingdom) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=468670770 Contributors: Buckshot06, CanisRufus, Dawkeye, Dormskirk, Duffman, GraemeLeggett, Graham1973, Gsl, HLGallon, Im a Socialist! What Are You, Jaraalbe, Jim Sweeney, Leithp, Leutha, Lightmouse, M-le-mot-dit, Mild Bill Hiccup, Pol098, R'n'B, Rcbutcher, Rockybiggs, Sadads, Shimgray, Spellmaster, Tim!, Verne Equinox, Waacstats, YUL89YYZ, 4 anonymous edits Ghost Army Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=465880938 Contributors: Amatulic, AnarchMonarch, Avs5221, Awbeal, Badofold, Bardcan, Binksternet, Bobrayner, Calvados, ChrisEngelsma, Danno uk, Diag03, Earle Martin, Epbr123, GCW50, Ghostofachance, GorillaWarfare, Groyolo, Half Cat, Iridescent, Jonkerz, Ktr101, LorenzoB, M-le-mot-dit, N5iln, Rehalliburton, Rickbeyer, Sadads, Sandstein, Scriberius, The Ghost Army, Velella, Verne Equinox, Vportals, 42 anonymous edits Gleiwitz incident Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=470220551 Contributors: Afabbro, Agathoclea, Alan Liefting, Altenmann, Anas Qtiesh, Appleseed, Arloz, Art LaPella, Astronautics, Babbage, Bad Night, Balcer, Big Brother 1984, Boissire, British-royalty, Brozozo, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Canuck-qw, CommonsDelinker, Cromag, DagosNavy, David Gerard, Decora, Dick Shane, DieBuche, Dismas, Drichter53, Ebelular, Echuck215, EncMstr, Eurocopter, Evil Monkey, Falcon8765, GB fan, GCarty, Gfwesq, Ghostrecon92, GirasoleDE, Good Olfactory, Greudin, Gylgamesh, Halibutt, HanzoHattori, Hmains, Ingolfson, Itai, Izehar, J 1982, Jacurek, Jadger, Jakro64, John, Joolz, Joshua06, Jrkarp, Kierzek, Kmhkmh, KnightLago, LUCPOL, Liftarn, Loosmark, Lotje, Lugnuts, Maestrosync, Magus732, Mathiasrex, Matt Crypto, Mellum, Mgnbar, Michael Hardy, Mieciu K, Molobo, N328KF, NEMT, Nigholith, Oberiko, Offensiveword, Olessi, Owen, Piotrus, ProudIrishAspie, Pseudo-Richard, Qviri, R'n'B, Rheo1905, Rich Farmbrough, Rik G., Sam Spade, Sfan00 IMG, Sherurcij, Shyam, Slgrandson, Smith2006, SoLando, Spanglej, Stefanomione, StephenMacmanus, Taw, Team Poland, The Interior, Theoneintraining, Tigerfibel, Tim!, Timharwoodx, Tweenk, Tymek, UnexpectedBanana, VoX, Volunteer Marek, Vuo, W. B. Wilson, WikiDao, Wikiacc, WikipediaSleeperCell2, Wikipeditor, Wowest, WriterHound, Xenon chile, YellowMonkey, 91 anonymous edits Operation Hambone Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=70849569 Contributors: Ashlux, CommonsDelinker, DJ Clayworth, Djdaedalus, Dposse, Enochlau, Folks at 137, Jooler, Kalmbach, MCB, PaulinSaudi, Phil Fish, Pmanderson, Supertouch, Twittenham, Verne Equinox, 3 anonymous edits Operation Hardboiled Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=407201208 Contributors: Geschichte, Good Olfactory, Hugo999, MarcoLittel, Verne Equinox, Welsh Operation Haifisch Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=451327739 Contributors: Brandmeister (old), Dreamafter, Heatherjana, Hugo999, Marc Kupper Operation Harpune Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=451327821 Contributors: Axeman89, Folks at 137, GraemeLeggett, Hugo999, Kernel Saunters, 3 anonymous edits Operation Herbstreise Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=444803955 Contributors: Adamdaley, Alai, Ary29, Bastin, Bluemoose, Cuchullain, Dreamafter, Guanaco, HighKing, Hugo999, Joshbaumgartner, MidnightBlueMan, N328KF, Oberiko, OldakQuill, PaulinSaudi, Raul654, TharkunColl, Zoicon5, 8 anonymous edits Operation Ironside Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=407617627 Contributors: Bedford, CORNELIUSSEON, DJ Clayworth, Henri Hudson, J04n, Verne Equinox, 1 anonymous edits

Article Sources and Contributors


Operation Kremlin Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=462319970 Contributors: Bryan Derksen, Cplakidas, Dapi89, Docu, Dodo19, Folks at 137, Ground Zero, Grutness, Madmagic, Mix321, Mrg3105, N328KF, Oberiko, PaulinSaudi, Pjpark, RashBold, TheParanoidOne, Tswold, 7 anonymous edits London Controlling Section Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=470128086 Contributors: Bfiene, Bwpach, DJ Clayworth, Dr. Colossus, E-Kartoffel, Folks at 137, Gaius Cornelius, Hmains, J04n, JJJJS, JeltLuthor, Jkeene, Kittybrewster, Ninetyone, Onco p53, Rjwilmsi, Sysilverstein, Tassedethe, Verne Equinox, 1 anonymous edits Operation Mincemeat Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=469041155 Contributors: A bit iffy, A5b, Adam Keller, Ae7flux, Aecharri, Anders.Warga, Attilios, Autonova, Avalyn, Badger151, Bammy52, Battleax86, Beland, Bentogoa, Bevo74, Beyond My Ken, Bilsonius, Blanche of King's Lynn, Bluerasberry, Btphelps, Butwhatdoiknow, CALR, Caltrop, Christopher1968, Cintune, Ciphergoth, Climie.ca, Cmdrjameson, Commander Keane, Critic, Curps, DO'Neil, Davelane, Davidbober, Deathphoenix, Deepred6502, DocendoDiscimus, Dogosaurus, Dougsnow, DragonflySixtyseven, Drbreznjev, Duncan.france, E-Kartoffel, Emgb1, Epbr123, Everyking, Finlay McWalter, Frencheigh, GraemeLeggett, Grant65, Ground Zero, Hacgunner, Hammersfan, IEdML, Ian Dunster, Ian Pitchford, Ianheadland, J. Spencer, JChurchman-Davies, JFD, Jacce, Jakehalf, Jamesontai, Jason Palpatine, Jefph, JeltLuthor, JesseJames150, Jmlk17, John Foxe, Joshbaumgartner, Kansas Bear, Kcranson, Kernow, Ketiltrout, Khazar, Klowndave, KnightLago, KnightRider, Konczewski, Kransky, Krupo, Labyrinth13, Les woodland, Lestermay, Little grape, LtNOWIS, Lumos3, MRSC, Mackgal, Madmagic, Majormartin, Mandarax, Manushand, McDutchie, Mejogid, Mkamat, Nabokov, Nervousenergy, Neutrality, Nicholas J Reed, Nick2491, Ninetyone, Nipisiquit, Oberiko, Ombudswiki, Otto4711, Pedantic of Purley, Pennywisepeter, Petri Krohn, Pjpark, Pol098, QuizzicalBee, Quuxplusone, RandallZ, RashBold, RedSpruce, Reginald Perrin, Resqspc, Retrograd45, Rich Farmbrough, Robertb-dc, Robertgreer, Rogerd, Rossgk, Rrostrom, Sam Blacketer, Savh, ScottMHoward, Ser Amantio di Nicolao, Sewebster, Shai-kun, Simonsevenn, Smiteri, Sneakums, Solaricon, Sophie means wisdom, SpaceFlight89, SparhawkWiki, Stefanomione, Stevertigo, Stoph, Stormie, Supertouch, Surv1v4l1st, T-Dub, TastyCakes, That Guy, From That Show!, The Anome, The Fwanksta, The monkeyhate, Thomas94, Tide rolls, Tnxman307, Tommy Herbert, TotoBaggins, Trainik, TreasuryTag, TypoBoy, Unregistered.coward, Verne Equinox, Vgy7ujm, Wayne Riddock, Wencer, Wyatt Riot, Xlaran, YSSYguy, ZooFari, 191 anonymous edits National redoubt Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=469744809 Contributors: Adam Carr, AnonMoos, Axeman89, Badgerpatrol, Before My Ken, Bvlax2005, DJ Clayworth, DJ Silverfish, Demiurge1000, Eleland, Elendil's Heir, Formeruser-81, Funnyhat, Grant65, Ground Zero, Halibutt, Hibernian, Hmains, Homer slips., IkonicDeath, Itai, ItsZippy, JeffW, Joooeey, Joshbaumgartner, KTo288, Ken Gallager, MWAK, Mikelo.Arbaro, Mkpumphrey, Nazgul02, Nick-D, Ninly, Nono64, Nyttend, Oberiko, Orange Suede Sofa, Philip Baird Shearer, Reyk, Rjwilmsi, Robofish, Rsloch, Semper-Fi 2006, Signalhead, Stan Shebs, Target for Today, Todowd, Victor falk, Whoop whoop pull up, 40 anonymous edits Operation Scherhorn Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=467262351 Contributors: BLM Platinum, Bahavd Gita, East of Borschov, Eumolpo, Firstorm, Ning-ning, Peterven, R'n'B, Sophus Bie, Tec15, 7 anonymous edits Operation Quicksilver (WWII) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=452019420 Contributors: 100110100, Antwonw, ArnoldReinhold, Brianmarx, Closeapple, Cometcaster, DJ Clayworth, Ganfon, General announcement, Geni, Hmains, J04n, Jackehammond, Jonel, LockeShocke, Max rspct, Med, Michael Devore, Mikeofv, N328KF, Oberiko, Ogranut, Patrick, Patstuart, Pol098, Rkgtactical, Sevenless, SimonP, Supertouch, The Anome, The RedBurn, TheGrappler, Tofof, Verne Equinox, Wingman4l7, 24 anonymous edits Shelling of Mainila Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=465805818 Contributors: Altenmann, Awotter, Bender235, Black Falcon, Bryan Derksen, Colchicum, Flyhighplato, Furrykef, GCarty, GRuban, Good Olfactory, Huey45, Illythr, IlyaHaykinson, Izehar, Jniemenmaa, Johan Magnus, Jpatokal, Jpgordon, Kizor, Mahmudss, Manuel Trujillo Berges, Mbinebri, Olegwiki, Peltimikko, Piotrus, Pudeo, RJ CG, Raoulduke47, Richy, Rjwilmsi, Stefanomione, Tec15, Tim!, Varlaam, Vuo, Whiskey, WikiPuppies, Wikiacc, Wikipeditor, 33 anonymous edits Operation Span Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=381074636 Contributors: Angela, Ashley Pomeroy, DJ Clayworth, El C, Evercat, Folks at 137, Gomm, Greudin, Itai, Missmarple, N328KF, Oberiko, OldakQuill, PaulinSaudi, Pearle, Raul654, Sunray, Verne Equinox, 5 anonymous edits Starfish site Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=459812170 Contributors: Art LaPella, Betisuk, Djmckee1, Dreamafter, Drmies, Harumphy, Hmains, Hugo999, Linuxlad, Malleus Fatuorum, Mhockey, Mikeo, Mrg3105, Nowster, Piledhigheranddeeper, Pyrotec, Rich Farmbrough, Rodw, Rogerzilla, Rosser1954, Tagishsimon, TristramBrelstaff, Verne Equinox, Wikiuser100, XLerate, 5 anonymous edits Twelfth Army (United Kingdom) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=431918389 Contributors: AustralianRupert, Coyets, Dancer204, David Newton, EnigmaMcmxc, Graham1973, Gsl, HLGallon, Inbamkumar86, Iohannes Animosus, Jaraalbe, Jim Sweeney, Kumioko, Leithp, Nick-D, Phil Boswell, Philip Baird Shearer, Rosiestep, Shimgray, Tristan benedict, Waacstats XIV Corps (United Kingdom) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=470827921 Contributors: Dormskirk, Graham1973, Keith-264, Khazar, Racerx11 Operation Zeppelin (Allies) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=445855195 Contributors: Antwonw, Archanamiya, CORNELIUSSEON, DJ Clayworth, Koavf, Max rspct, Muchness, Verne Equinox, 4 anonymous edits

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Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

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Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors


File:British Airborne Units.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:British_Airborne_Units.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: British_Airborne_Units.gif: Ignasi derivative work: Amada44 talk to me File:Flag of the United Kingdom.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Anomie, Mifter File:US 55th Infantry Division SVG.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:US_55th_Infantry_Division_SVG.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: US_55th_Infantry_Division.png: Noclador derivative work: Asiela (talk) File:59 INF DIV SSI.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:59_INF_DIV_SSI.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: 59_INF_DIV_SSI.jpg: U.S. Army derivative work: Snubcube (talk) File:Flag of the United States.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_the_United_States.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Anomie File:USA - 6 ABN DIV.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:USA_-_6_ABN_DIV.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: USA_-_6_ABN_DIV.png: United States Army derivative work: Snubcube (talk) File:Teheran conference-1943.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Teheran_conference-1943.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: U.S. Signal Corps photo. File:Operation Bodyguard Memorandum.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Operation_Bodyguard_Memorandum.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: ErrantX File:DummyShermanTank.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:DummyShermanTank.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: United States Army File:Joan pujol garcia.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Joan_pujol_garcia.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Amadalvarez, Leithp, PMG, 1 anonymous edits File:1st Army Group.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:1st_Army_Group.svg License: Copyrighted free use Contributors: User:Vindicator Image:DummyShermanTank.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:DummyShermanTank.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: United States Army File:EdinburghCastle.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:EdinburghCastle.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Contributors: Klaus Hermsen File:Dummy aircraft - Oct. 1943.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Dummy_aircraft_-_Oct._1943.jpg License: Attribution Contributors: User:W.wolny Image:Sender gliwice.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Sender_gliwice.jpg License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: User:Palnatoke File:StatueFaunePompi.JPG Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:StatueFaunePompi.JPG License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Contributors: sabrina roberjot Image:Dutch defense lines - ln-en.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Dutch_defense_lines_-_ln-en.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Contributors: Ain92, KTo288, NielsB, Wimpi File:Final Operations - 19 April-7 Mai 1945.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Final_Operations_-_19_April-7_Mai_1945.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: user:W.wolny Image:ReduitSchweiz.gif Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:ReduitSchweiz.gif License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Contributors: als:Benutzer:Senna File:PA Sudoplatov 02.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:PA_Sudoplatov_02.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: USSR File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1980-128-63, Erich Raeder.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1980-128-63,_Erich_Raeder.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Germany Contributors: A1B2C3D4, FordPrefect42, Janericloebe, Kresspahl, Pibwl, Uaauaa Image:Mainila.png Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Mainila.png License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Jniemenmaa File:Black Down bunker.JPG Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Black_Down_bunker.JPG License: unknown Contributors: Rodw File:Flag of the British Army.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_the_British_Army.svg License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 Contributors: Philip Ronan

License

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License
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