Tutorial Essay on Nietzsche II, 18 May 2008 Mahbub Gani (mahbub.gani@kcl.ac.

uk)

Is the Ascetic Ideal inimical to life enhancement?

Nietzsches merciless albeit lyrical critique of traditional morality reaches its apogee in the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morality. There the centre stage is given to eviscerating what Nietzsche calls the ascetic ideal. Eventually this comes to stand for a limiting form of asceticism, a form which requires this sensual world of becoming to be opposed and overcome in order to reach an utterly separate domain that is invested with higher value. In trying to make sense of Nietzsches critique it is helpful to bear in mind his dual role as philosopher and cultural critique. Nietzsche is not merely

interested in informing but bringing about a revolutionary transformation in his reader, shocking them out of their torpor. We would do well to be reminded, Nietzsche might counsel, of the disconcerting opening lines of the On the Genealogy of Morality, We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers, and later, that we remain strange to ourselves out of necessity, we do not understand ourselves [GM I, 3]. There is a disturbing, almost subversive, undertone in the work that occasionally surfaces probably intended to mirror the opposite unearthing motion the reader should apply to break through the years of moral philosophy that have ossified into an outer crust of comforting clichs. We believe ourselves to be the moderns, Nietzsche might tease importunely, but actually we are no wiser than the atheists who look upon with mocking surprise at the madman proclaiming that God is dead. These are some of the complex forces at work in the background in Nietzsches discussion of the ascetic ideal. Ultimately he will oppose the ideal, on the 1

Tutorial Essay on Nietzsche II, 18 May 2008 Mahbub Gani (mahbub.gani@kcl.ac.uk) basis that it leads to the denigration of life, but not before he has disclosed its hitherto unrecognised power and scope. It is my intention in this essay to explain how it is that Nietzsche thinks the ascetic ideal is opposed to life. I will first attempt to piece together the broad structure of Nietzsches argument before considering in detail the reasons for his opposition. Nietzsche presents seven types of persons affected by the ascetic ideal artists, philosophers, scholars and, of course, priests, to name a few. The priest will unavoidably feature prominently in my discussion, but I will also concentrate on the meaning of the ideal for the philosopher, especially in relation to the philosophers unassailable faith in truth. The essay will close with a final assessment of whether the ascetic ideal is necessarily inimical to life enhancement. Nietzsche objects to the ascetic ideal on the basis that it requires a denial of life in its entirety. His perspectivism, however, prevents him from raising his objections motivated solely from a belief that life in fact is intrinsically of value. Nor can he complain on absolute moral grounds or because he has an alternative ideal that is nearer to the truth (in a metaphysical sense). Instead Nietzsche offers something like a transcendental argument: what are the conditions for life-enhancement, or more specifically, what are the values that make it possible for certain types of life to flourish? Crucially what is presupposed are widely agreed empirical relations between certain values and practices and the success or failure of certain types of life. Nietzsche does not suggest that such a question should actually be answered in a 2

Tutorial Essay on Nietzsche II, 18 May 2008 Mahbub Gani (mahbub.gani@kcl.ac.uk) positive manner. Far from it: for one thing, the unfathomable complexity of the underlying history leading to any action makes such analysis a practically impossible task. If at all, such questions should be answered in a negative manner, to purify values of their life-denying features. Applying this argument, then, the ascetic ideal must be opposed if it can be shown to be averse to life-enhancement. To assess whether the argument works, clearly we must know what it is for something to be life enhancing. Even though Nietzsche does not provide explicit criteria for lifeenhancement, according to May1, one or more of the following appear to be crucially involved: power, sublimation (of power) and such form-creation that leads to the love of life. Values for Nietzsche possess both subjective and objective aspects. On the one hand they represent perspectival ways of seeing the world, carving out of it only the fragment of interest to the viewer. On the other hand, values are correlated empirically with the success or failure of certain character types. This leads to the possibility that different, perhaps contradictory, constellations of values are required for the success of different kinds of life. Values also reflect the will to power of individuals over life, a way of interpreting the ceaseless flux of the world in order to get a foothold on life, survive and flourish. In this way, values, consciously posited or otherwise, are inescapable.

See Section 3.1 in Nietzsches Ethics, Simon May

Tutorial Essay on Nietzsche II, 18 May 2008 Mahbub Gani (mahbub.gani@kcl.ac.uk) The ascetic ideal is an instance of asceticism in general, or the ascetic form2, as May calls it. The ascetic form sets up two antithetical domains, not necessarily external to this world, one which is assigned a high value while the other is relegated to a domain of lower value. Ethics, values, the goals and priorities of life are all subsequently structured and organised under the rubric of the ascetic form. Whatever is valued highly is to be sought and pursued, while anything possessing lower value must be opposed and overcome. Nietzsche acknowledges the important function of ascetic practices and attitudes in securing the exacting goals and life-style associated with certain demanding careers. Chastity, poverty and humility all have their role, but such words are evacuated of any moral import for: they are merely required to secure independence and to safeguard ones mission from distractions. The ascetic form has the potential to create the pathos of distance in ones life between opposing drives and needs that can provides the fuel for continual overcoming of oneself. The opportunity for lifeenhancement is made possible by stretching a soul across a gradient of opposing values3. The ascetic ideal is an asymptotic limit of the ascetic form, only now the region of lower value is life itself. Under the ascetic ideal, this world of becoming, sensuality and contingency must be repudiated and fought in order to reach a transcendent world of superior value. The ascetic ideal manages to score along two of Mays criteria for life-enhancement power
2 3

See Section 5.1 in Nietzsches Ethics, Simon May Nietzsches Ethics, Simon May, pg. 86

Tutorial Essay on Nietzsche II, 18 May 2008 Mahbub Gani (mahbub.gani@kcl.ac.uk) and sublimation. Moreover, in the absence of a counter ideal, the ascetic ideal has prevented a full-scale descent into suicidal nihilism, although Nietzsche portends that it will soon cease, or already has ceased, to serve this saving function. The ascetic ideal satisfies the urge to power by providing an interpretation and meaning to be attached to the chaos and instability of life specifically justifying suffering thereby enabling life to become bearable. The ideal also enables destructive tendencies to be spiritualised either principally through internalisation, but also externally through value and form creation. The crippling feeling of helplessness experienced by the weak is redirected toward the hatred involved in blaming others. The blame is universal, targeted as it is against the strong, against the sufferer and against life itself as the site of suffering. Resentiment is steered inwards, encouraged and supervised by the ascetic priest, who suggests that the sufferer is the one to blame, the one responsible for the misfortune. The strong, on the other hand, experience pain for different reasons: they are struck by pity and nausea toward the great majority that appear to be caught in such terrible misery. Crushed by their suffering, the afflicted find release through various means: hibernation, what May refers to as distraction4 and what has the most significant repercussions, the ascetic ideal. There are several functions of the ascetic ideal. First, it justifies the world as an abode of punishment for the guilty, provides a sufficiently powerful
4

Nietzsches Ethics, Simon May, pg. 90

Tutorial Essay on Nietzsche II, 18 May 2008 Mahbub Gani (mahbub.gani@kcl.ac.uk) explanation for suffering and misery. Thus, the suffering find intense release through the excessive arousal of emotion. This is riveted to a myth of heroic redemption of the sinner and promise of penance and bliss in a transcendent world free of the imperfections and disorder of this sensual life. Instrumental to this process is the priest, whose own will to power and preservation stands or falls together with this drama. The priest manages the sublimation of cruder, primitive types of pain to more complex ones that have the capacity for prolonging, and indeed enhancing lives. In the last analysis, however, the priest is merely a comforter, not a physician, nor a healer. Though the ascetic ideal has certainly contributed to the preservation and even enhancement of life, ultimately it is doomed, for it leads to a shattered nervous system, it ruins spiritual health and taste in arts and letters [GM III, 21 22]. In the absence of an alternative, the ascetic ideal served the vital function of saving the will from the sickness that ensues from its listlessness and torpor, even if the will was redirected toward the nothingness of the metaphysical. But the ascetic ideal is no longer fulfilling its function, and therefore must be overcome, clearing the ground for a new life-enhancing counter-ideal. It seems natural to suppose that the overcoming of the ascetic ideal is exemplified by the philosopher, and more recently the scientist, but Nietzsche seems to warning that this is too hasty, comforting and optimistic an assessment5. That the philosopher, like other demanding characters,
5

Nietzsches calculated attempts to mislead and subvert our ordinary views regarding philosophers are amply analysed and explained by Clark in Nietzsche on Truth & Philosophy, Chapter 6, pp. 167 171.

Tutorial Essay on Nietzsche II, 18 May 2008 Mahbub Gani (mahbub.gani@kcl.ac.uk) benefits by regulating her life in an ascetic way is hardly controversial. What is both a surprising and interesting hypothesis is that they are in fact under the influence of the more extreme ascetic ideal, even if unconsciously. Nietzsche wanders what might occur if the ascetic drive is induced to philosophise: it will look for error precisely where the actual instinct of life most unconditionally judges there to be truth [GM III, 12]. In short, under the influence of the ascetic ideal, the spiritualization of internalised cruelty leads to the generation of doctrines and concepts that negate life. The philosopher begins with such notions as rationality, freedom of will, being and so on as matters of fact and confers upon them a higher valuation, while ascribing lower value to their opposing counterparts irrationality,

determinacy, becoming and so on all of which are associated with the empirical world. Since something cannot originate from its opposite, the metaphysician might argue, the objects of high value cannot have anything to do with this world, but must nevertheless be located somewhere. The metaphysical realm of the transcendent, the noumenal or whatever is posited as the domain of all that is valued to be superior. This is not merely a cognitive error, which Nietzsche surely believes to be the case based on his rejection of the thing-in-itself as unnecessary on a naturalist account, if not contradictory. In fact such surmising reflects a valuation and structuring of the world in the image of the philosophers own cherished values, reflecting their own will to power. Their valuation, Nietzsche seems to be claiming, originate in the ascetic ideal, under the penumbra of which the philosopher 7

Tutorial Essay on Nietzsche II, 18 May 2008 Mahbub Gani (mahbub.gani@kcl.ac.uk) had to operate in the absence of any other ideal [GM III, 10]. This would explain why philosophers continue to hold on to so many fictions, or so at least Nietzsche judges metaphysical doctrines, despite their clear

problematic character. This brings us to what Nietzsche considers the most terrible [GM III, 23] realisation of the wide range of the ascetic ideals influence, which I agree with Clark6 is revealed later [GM III, 27] to be the unconditional commitment to truth. It is not the existence of truths that are problematic, rather the absolute value with which truth has been crowned. Nietzsche pre-empts our proposal that science overcomes the ascetic ideal with the rejoinder that science merely reflects the latest and most noble expression of the ascetic ideal by its universal privileging of truth. How is it, then, that unquestioned subservience to truth derives from the ascetic ideal? First, commitment to truth must be based solely on prudential or moral considerations. But the loyalty to truth cannot be attributed to prudential concerns, for surely it is an empirical fact that untruth serves pragmatic ends just as well as, if not better then truth. Therefore, the unconditional commitment to truth must be motivated by moral concerns, which in turn originate in the traditional morality structured by the ascetic ideal. It is not that the commitment to truth is a logical necessity for the practice and success of, say, science. It is certainly logically possible to insist in truth within particular fields for reasons that are internal to those human

Nietzsche on Truth & Philosophy, Clark, pg. 180

Tutorial Essay on Nietzsche II, 18 May 2008 Mahbub Gani (mahbub.gani@kcl.ac.uk) endeavours, such as science or social communication. However this still does not require that the commitment to truth be universalised. Whether, though, it is possible psychologically to value truth in only a transcendental manner that is, as limited to the internal consistency and possibility of certain professions is questionable. Nevertheless Nietzsche respects the latest and noblest form of the ascetic ideal, because it will be the weapon of choice in undermining and eventually overcoming the very ideal that cultivated and protected it. Moreover the will to truth will continue to be employed in the service of a new, life-enhancing ideal where it will be used as a tool for continual purification of values, safeguarding them from their life-denying perversions7. In the conclusion, I wish to assess whether the ascetic ideal really does involve a denial of life to the extent that it prevents life-flourishing. Now, we have already seen that the more general ascetic form certainly does not entail a deterioration of life. Indeed the gradient in internal drives enabled by the ascetic form can provide the impetus for overcoming. Moreover, it is crucial to recognise the distinction between the denial of life and its active negation, which distinction even Nietzsche tends to blur. It is quite possible that one objects to life, and yet in spite of the objection, or perhaps even because of it, as an act of defiance works towards its enrichment. Even though a morality structured by the ascetic ideal opposes this life, the belief in a transcendent world or being may be so powerful and empowering as to
7

Simon May in Nietzsches Ethics develops in detail the function of the will to truth at the service of a new ideal May suggests that the strongest candidate for the counter ideal is to become what you are.

Tutorial Essay on Nietzsche II, 18 May 2008 Mahbub Gani (mahbub.gani@kcl.ac.uk) counterbalance the negation leading to great acts of creativity and construction in the world. The belief that this world is in the final analysis one of Gods creation, means that even though it is the realm of corruption and suffering, it must nevertheless be respected, honoured and treated with courtesy. Finally, empirically, it must surely be conceded that the worlds

major religions, the apparent target of much of Nietzsches approbation, have inspired supreme, inimitable works of art, architecture and culture. On the basis of their fruits, they can hardly be charged with denigrating life.

10

Tutorial Essay on Nietzsche II, 18 May 2008 Mahbub Gani (mahbub.gani@kcl.ac.uk) BIBILIOGRAPHY Translations of Nietzsches works [GM] On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), Translated by Carol Diethe, Edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought [GS] The Gay Science (1882), Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random Hous, 1974 [HA] Human, All-Too-Human (1878), Translated by R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press, 1986 [TL] On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense (1873), in The Birth of Tragedy and other writings, edited by Raymond Guess and Ronal Speirs, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, 1999 Other works Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, Maudemarie Clark, Cambridge University Press, 1990 Nietzsches Ethics and his War on Morality, Simon May, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999

11