Você está na página 1de 66

Space colonization discourse exports anthropocentrism to new worlds and reifies terrestrial exploitation the alternative is to imagine the

e global suicide of humanity which shatters their humanist ideology Kochi & Ordan 2008 (Tarik, Lecturer in Law and International Security at the University of Sussex, Noam, Bar Ilan University, An Argument for the Global
Suicide of Humanity, Borderlands, Volume 7, Number 3) In 2006 on an Internet forum called Yahoo! Answers a question was posted which read: In a world that is in chaos politically, socially and environmentally, how can the human race sustain another 100 years? The question was asked by prominent physicist Stephen Hawking (Hawking, 2007a). While

1NC Exploration (1:50)

Hawking claimed not to know the solution he did suggest something of an answer (Hawking, 2007b). For Hawking the only way for the human race to survive in the future is to develop the technologies that would allow humans to colonise other planets in space beyond our own solar system. While Hawkings claim walks a path often trodden by science fiction, his suggestion is not untypical of the way humans have historically responded to social, material and environmental pressures and crises. By coupling an imagination of a new world or a better place with the production and harnessing of new technologies, humans have for a long time left old habitats and have created a home in others. The history of our species, homo sapiens, is marked by
population movement aided by technological innovation: when life becomes too precarious in one habitat, members of the species take a risk and move to a new one. Along with his call for us to go forward and colonise other planets, Hawking does list a number of the human actions which have made this seem necessary. [1] What

is at issue, however, is his failure to reflect upon the relationship between environmental destruction, scientific faith in the powers of technology and the attitude of speciesism. That is, it must be asked whether population movement really is the answer. After all, Hawkings suggestion to colonise other planets does little to address the central problem of human action which has destroyed, and continues to destroy, our habitat on the earth. While the notion of cosmic colonisation places faith in the saviour of humanity by technology as a solution, it lacks a crucial moment of reflection upon the manner in which human action and human technology has been and continues to be profoundly destructive. Indeed, the colonisation of other planets would in no way solve the problem of environmental destruction; rather, it would merely introduce this problem into a new habitat. The destruction of one planetary habitat is enough we should not naively endorse the future
destruction of others. Hawkings approach to environmental catastrophe is an example of a certain modern faith in technological and social progress. One version of such an approach goes as follows: As our knowledge of the world and ourselves increases humans are able to create forms of technology and social organisation that act upon the world and change it for our benefit. However, just as there are many theories of progress [2] there are also many modes of reflection upon the role of human action and its relationship to negative or destructive consequences. The version of progress enunciated in Hawkings

story of cosmic colonisation presents a view whereby the solution to the negative consequences of technological action is to create new forms of technology, new forms of action. New action and innovation solve the dilemmas and consequences of previous action. Indeed, the very act of moving away, or rather evacuating, an ecologically devastated Earth is an example at hand. Such an approach involves a
variety of negative consequences of human action, moments of destruction, moments of suffering, which may not be redeemable or ever made better. Conversely there

moment of reflection previous errors and consequences are examined and taken into account and efforts are made to make things better. The idea of a better future informs reflection, technological innovation and action. However, is the form of reflection offered by Hawking broad or critical enough? Does his mode of reflection pay enough attention to the irredeemable moments of destruction, harm, pain and suffering inflicted historically by human action upon the non-human world? There are, after all, a

are a number of conceptions of the good in which humans do not take centre stage at the expense of others. What
we try to do in this paper is to draw out some of the consequences of reflecting more broadly upon the negative costs of human activity in the context of environmental catastrophe. This

involves re-thinking a general idea of progress through the historical and conceptual lenses of speciesism, colonialism, survival and complicity. Our proposed conclusion is that the only appropriate moral response to a history of human destructive action is to give up our claims to biological supremacy and to sacrifice our form of life so as to give an eternal gift to others. From the outset it is important to make clear that the argument for the global suicide of humanity is presented as a thought experiment. The purpose of such a proposal in response to Hawking is to help show how a certain conception of modernity, of which his approach is representative, is problematic. Taking seriously the idea of global suicide is one way of throwing into question an ideology or dominant discourse of modernist-humanist action. [3] By imagining an alternative to the existing state of affairs, absurd as it may seem to some readers by its nihilistic and radical solution, we wish to open up a ground for a critical discussion of modernity and its negative impacts on both human and non-human animals, as well as on the environment. [4] In this respect, by giving voice to the idea of a human-free world, we attempt to draw attention to some of the asymmetries of environmental
reality and to give cause to question why attempts to build bridges from the human to the non-human have, so far, been unavailing.

and, the impact is an unending political genocide which captures the apparatus of life and death Kochi & Ordan 2008 (Tarik, Lecturer in Law and International Security at the University of Sussex, Noam, Bar Ilan University, An Argument for the Global
Suicide of Humanity, Borderlands, Volume 7, Number 3)

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of 'evil', a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty
(cf. the differing accounts of 'evil' given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity might comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was 'evil', then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if

we are to think of the content of the 'human heritage', then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the 'West' generally consider to be the content of a human

heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nationstates which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples' land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of 'race war' that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by
arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially 'inferior' and in some instances that they were closer to 'apes' than to humans (Diamond, 2006).

Such violence justified by an erroneous view of 'race' is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human 'races') and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer's comment that whereas humans consider themselves "the crown of creation", for animals "all people are Nazis" and animal life is "an eternal Treblinka"
(Singer, 1968, p.750).

Human centrism allows us to exploit nature, eventually causing extermination of all life. Ahkin, 10 (Melanie Ahkin, Monash University, 2010, Human Centrism, Animist Materialism, and the Critique of Rationalism in Val Plumwoods Critical Ecological Feminism, Emergent Australian Philosophers, a peer reviewed journal of philosophy, http://www.eap.philosophy-australia.com/archives.html DH) These five features provide the basis for hegemonic centrism insofar as they promote certain conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality which universalise and naturalise the standpoint of the superior relata as primary or centre, and deny and subordinate the standpoints of inferiorised others as secondary or derivative. Using standpoint theory analysis, Plumwood's reconceptualisation of human chauvinist frameworks locates and dissects these logical characteristics of dualism, and the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality common to centric structures, as follows. Radical exclusion is found in the rationalist emphasis on differences between humans and non-human nature, its valourisation of a human rationality conceived as exclusionary of nature, and its minimisation of similarities
between the two realms. Homogenisation and stereotyping occur especially in the rationalist denial of consciousness to nature, and its denial of the diversity of mental characteristics found within its many different constituents, facilitating a perception of nature as homogeneous

and of its members as interchangeable and replaceable resources. This definition of nature in terms of its lack of human rationality and consciousness means that its identity remains relative to that of the dominant human group, and its difference is marked as deficiency, permitting its inferiorisation. Backgrounding and denial may be observed in the conception of nature as extraneous and inessential background to the foreground of human culture, in the human denial of dependency on the natural environment, and denial of the ethical and political constraints which the unrecognised ends and needs of non-human nature might otherwise place on human behaviour. These features together create an ethical discontinuity between humans and non-human nature which denies nature's value and agency, and thereby promote its instrumentalisation and exploitation for the benefit of humans.11 This dualistic logic helps to universalise the human centric standpoint, making invisible and seemingly inevitable the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality and oppression of
non-human nature it enjoins. The alternative standpoints and perspectives of members of the inferiorised class of nature are denied legitimacy and subordinated to that of the class of humans, ultimately becoming invisible once this master standpoint becomes part of the very structure of thought.12 Such an anthropocentric framework creates a variety of serious injustices and prudential risks, making it highly ecologically irrational.13 The

hierarchical value prescriptions and epistemic distortions responsible for its biased, reductive conceptualisation of nature strips the non-human natural realm of non-instrumental value, and impedes the fair and
impartial treatment of its members. Similarly, anthropocentrism creates distributive injustices by restricting ethical concern to humans, admitting partisan distributive relationships with non-human nature in the forms of commodification and instrumentalisation. The prudential risks and

blindspots created by anthropocentrism are problematic for nature and humans alike and are of especial concern within our current context of radical human dependence on an irreplaceable and increasingly degraded natural environment. These prudential risks are in large part consequences of the centric structure's promotion of illusory human
disembeddedness, self-enclosure and insensitivity to the significance and survival needs of non-human nature: The logic of centrism naturalises an illusory order in which the centre appears to itself to be disembedded, and this is especially dangerous in contexts where there is real and radical dependency on an Other who is simultaneously weakened by the application of that logic.14 Within the context of human-nature

relationships, such a logic must inevitably lead to failure, either through the catastrophic extinction of our natural environment and the consequent collapse of our species, or more hopefully by the abandonment and transformation of
the human centric framework.15

Consequentialism is impossible in a non-speciest frameworkinstead of satisfying a desire for good consequences, you should affirm a value system beyond humanism. Eric Katz, Director of Science, Technology, and Society Program at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, 1997

[Nature as Subject p. 9-10] Utilitarianism might be salvaged for use in the environmental debate if it is stripped of its bias towards the satisfaction of human needs and preferences. Bentham, it should be remembered, considered the pains and pleasures of the animal kingdom to be of important to a
utilitarian calculation. According to this kind of position, the wants and desires of the wildlife in a given area would have to be considered prior to any development or destruction for the purpose of human betterment. Unfortunately, the problems with this kind of broad utilitarianism appear insurmountable, How

does the

satisfaction of animal needs compare in utility with the satisfaction of human needs ? Can we bring plant life into the calculation? What about nonliving entities , such as rock formations (e.g., the Grand Canyon) or entire ecological areas ? Does a marsh have an interest in not being drained and turned into a golf course, a need or desire to continue a natural existence? It is clear that difficult-if not impossible-problems arise when we begin to consider utility for non humanand nonsentient entities. (2) A second alternative, highly tentative, is a movement away from a "want-oriented perspective" in ethical theory.2 Rather than evaluating the moral worth of an action by the consequences which satisfy needs and desires in the human (or even nonhuman) world, we can look at the intrinsic qualities of the action, and determine what kind of values this action manifests. The question which the debate over environmental presentation raises is not "Does preservation of this particular natural object lead to a better world?" but rather "Do we want a world in which the preservation of natural objects is considered an important value?" The question is not whether the preservation of a certain entity increases the amount of satisfaction and pleasure in the world, but rather, whether these pleasures, satisfactions, and needs ought to be pursued. The question, in short, is about what kind of moral universe ought to be created.2' Only when the preservation of natural objects is seen to be an intrinsically good policy of action , rather than a means to some kind of satisfaction, will a policy of environmental protection be explained and justified. The development of an ethical theory which can accomplish this task will be a difficult
undertaking, but it is the only choice open to preservationists who wish to avoid the easy, self-defeating trap of utilitarianism

The juridical war language of their impact claims mask the species war at the foundation of the law. Kochi 9 [tarik, lecturer in law and international security @ U of Sussex, Doctorate in Law from Griffith, species war: law, violence, and animals, law, culture, and the humanities, 353-359] In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called war rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and understand war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in which specific terms (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm of human action. In this paper I argue that the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation species war. That is, at the foundation of the Law of war resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals. At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war. In contemporary public debates the laws of war are typically understood as referring to the rules set out by the conventions and customs that define the legality of a states right to go to war under international law. However, such a perspective is only a narrow and limited view of what constitutes the Law of war and of the relationship between law and war more generally. Here the Law of the Law of war needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term Recht
denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of Gesetz which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws. 1 To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific (positive law) formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war

1NC Argablarg (2:40)

contains at its heart arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence. The question of what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationship between war and law,
and, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out (positing) a particular answer to this question. In this respect

the Law of war (and thus its particular laws of war) involves a practice of normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to such questions as: what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of war, who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? When we
consider the relationship between war and law in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at the foundation of the Law of war resides species war. At present, the Law of war is dominated by two cultural-conceptual formulations or discourses. The Westphalian

system of interstate relations and the system of international human rights law are held to be modern foundations of the Law of war. In the West, most peoples conceptions of what constitutes war and of what constitutes a legitimate act of war are shaped by these two historical traditions. That is to say, these traditions have ordered how we understand the legitimate use of violence. 2 These discourses, however, have been heavily criticized. By building upon a particular line of criticism I develop my argument for
the foundational significance of species war. Two critiques of sovereignty and humanitarian law are of particular interest: Michel Foucaults notion of race war and Carl Schmitts notion of friend and enemy. Foucault in Society Must Be Defended set out a particular critique of the Westphalian juridical conception of state sovereignty and state power. 3 Within the Westphalian juridical conception, it is commonly argued

that sovereign power and legitimacy are grounded upon the ability of an institution to bring an end to internal civil war and create a sphere of domestic peace. Against this Foucault claimed that war is never brought to an end within the domestic sphere, rather, it continues and develops in the form of race war. Connected to his account of bio-power, Foucault suggests a historical discourse of constant and perpetual race war that underlies legal and political institutions within modernity. 4 In The Concept of the Political, Carl Schmitt offered a critique of the liberal conception of the state grounded
upon the notion of the social contract and criticized legal and political conceptions of the state in which legitimacy (and the legitimacy of war) was seen to be grounded upon the notion of humanity. 5 For Schmitt the juridical notion of the state (and international human rights law)

presupposes and continually re-instates through violence the distinction and relation between friend and enemy. Schmitt claimed that the political emerges from the threatening and warlike struggle between friends and enemies and that all political and
legal institutions, and the decisions made therein, are built upon and are guided by this distinction. 6 In relation to the issue of war/law these two insights can be taken further. I think Foucaults notion of race war can be developed by putting at its heart the differing

historical and genealogical relationships between human and non-human animals. Thus, beyond race war what should be considered as a primary category within legal and political theory is that of species war. Further, the fundamental political distinction is not as Schmitt would have it, that of friends and enemies, but rather, the violent conflict between human and non-human animals. Race war is an extension of an earlier form of war, species war. The friend-enemy distinction is an extension of a more primary distinction between human and nonhuman animals. In this respect, what can be seen to lay at the foundation of the Law of war is not the Westphalian notion of civil peace, or the notion of human rights. Neither race war nor the friend-enemy distinction resides at the bottom of the Law of war. Rather, what sits at the foundation of the Law of war is a discourse of species war that over time has become so naturalised within Western legal and political theory that we have almost forgotten about it. Although species war remains largely

hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a
Western variant. This variant, however, is one that may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes

legitimate violence fall back upon the hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements
about differential life-value and that these judgements are an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how

contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I
develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting upon the nature of law more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the good). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these

functions of law resides a practice of making judgements about the life-value of particular objects. These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the state, community, etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative life- value of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes legitimate violence. Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision it points to a moment at the heart of the law where distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or
positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law,

at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor. 7 In J.M. Coetzees The Lives of Animals 8 the protagonist Elizabeth Costello draws
a comparison between the everyday slaughter of non-human animals and the genocide of the Jews of Europe during the twentieth century. In addressing you on the subject of animals, she continues, I will pay you the honour of skipping a recital of the horrors of their lives and deaths. Though I have no reason to believe that you have at the forefront of your minds what is being done to animals at this moment in production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, in laboratories, all over the world, I will take it that you concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force, and leave it at that, reminding you only that the horrors I here omit are nevertheless at the center of this lecture. 9 A little while later she states: Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation,

cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them. And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical
enterprise dedicated to nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the comfort of our own homes) is as little consolation to those victims as it would have been pardon the tastelessness of the following to ask the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body fat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses with. 10 Similar comparisons have been made before. 11 Yet, when most of us think about the term war very seldom do we bother to think about non-human animals. The term war commonly evokes images of states, armies, grand weapons, battle lines, tactical stand-offs, and maybe even sometimes guerrilla or partisan violence. Surely the

keeping of cattle behind barbed wire fences and butchering them in abattoirs does not count as war? Surely not? Why not? What can be seen to be at stake within Elizabeth Costellos act of posing the modern project of highly efficient breeding and factory
slaughtering of non-human animals beside the Holocaust is a concern with the way in which we order or arrange conceptually and socially the legitimacy of violence and killing. In a Western philosophical tradition stretching at least from Augustine and Aquinas, through to Descartes and Kant, the ordering of the relationship between violence and legitimacy is such that, predominantly, non-human animals are considered to be without souls, without reason and without a value that is typically ascribed to humans. For example, for Augustine, animals, together with plants, are exempted from the religious injunction Thou shalt not kill. When considering the question of what forms of killing and violence are legitimate, Augustine placed the killing of non-human animals well inside the framework of religious and moral legitimacy. 12 Of relevance is the practice by which the

question of legitimate violence is ordered that is, the manner in which it is organised by philosophical, moral and cultural justifications in a way that sets out how particular acts of violence are to be understood within social-material life. Within a Western tradition the killing of animals is typically not considered a form of war because violence against animals is placed far within the accepted framework of legitimate killing. The meanings
attached to the words we use are significant here. Many of our linguistic categories have been formulated along the distinction between human and nonhuman and offer different meanings based upon what object within this distinction a word denotes. Words like killing and slaughter

evoke different meanings and different responses when applied to humans as opposed to chickens or cattle or insects. While most people would react in horror to the brutal killing of a child, they accept the daily slaughter of thousands of calves. Although there
exists a bureaucratic language of regulation governing issues of efficiency, property rights, hygiene and cruelty, the breeding of animals for killing is widely accepted as a legitimate act. Such that, the killing of one animal is not considered murder and the killing of a geographical group of animals is not considered an act of genocide or species war.

and, the impact is an unending political genocide which captures the apparatus of life and death Kochi & Ordan 2008 (Tarik, Lecturer in Law and International Security at the University of Sussex, Noam, Bar Ilan University, An Argument for the Global
Suicide of Humanity, Borderlands, Volume 7, Number 3)

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of 'evil', a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty
(cf. the differing accounts of 'evil' given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity might comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was 'evil', then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if

we are to think of the content of the 'human heritage', then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the 'West' generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nationstates which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples' land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of 'race war' that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by
arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially 'inferior' and in some instances that they were closer to 'apes' than to humans (Diamond, 2006).

Such violence justified by an erroneous view of 'race' is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human 'races') and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer's comment that whereas humans consider themselves "the crown of creation", for animals "all people are Nazis" and animal life is "an eternal Treblinka"
(Singer, 1968, p.750).

Human centrism allows us to exploit nature, eventually causing extermination of all life. Ahkin, 10 (Melanie Ahkin, Monash University, 2010, Human Centrism, Animist Materialism, and the Critique of Rationalism in Val Plumwoods Critical Ecological Feminism, Emergent Australian Philosophers, a peer reviewed journal of philosophy, http://www.eap.philosophy-australia.com/archives.html DH) These five features provide the basis for hegemonic centrism insofar as they promote certain conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality which universalise and naturalise the standpoint of the superior relata as primary or centre, and deny and subordinate the standpoints of inferiorised others as secondary or derivative. Using standpoint theory analysis, Plumwood's reconceptualisation of human chauvinist frameworks locates and dissects these logical characteristics of dualism, and the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality common to centric structures, as follows. Radical exclusion is found in the rationalist emphasis on differences between humans and non-human nature, its valourisation of a human rationality conceived as exclusionary of nature, and its minimisation of similarities
between the two realms. Homogenisation and stereotyping occur especially in the rationalist denial of consciousness to nature, and its denial of the diversity of mental characteristics found within its many different constituents, facilitating a perception of nature as homogeneous

and of its members as interchangeable and replaceable resources. This definition of nature in terms of its lack of human rationality and consciousness means that its identity remains relative to that of the dominant human group, and its difference is marked as deficiency, permitting its inferiorisation. Backgrounding and denial may be observed in the conception of nature as extraneous and inessential background to the foreground of human culture, in the human denial of dependency on the natural environment, and denial of the ethical and political constraints which the unrecognised ends and needs of non-human nature might otherwise place on human behaviour. These features together create an ethical discontinuity between humans and non-human nature which denies nature's value and agency, and thereby promote its instrumentalisation and exploitation for the benefit of humans.11 This dualistic logic helps to universalise the human centric standpoint, making invisible and seemingly inevitable the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality and oppression of
non-human nature it enjoins. The alternative standpoints and perspectives of members of the inferiorised class of nature are denied legitimacy and subordinated to that of the class of humans, ultimately becoming invisible once this master standpoint becomes part of the very structure of thought.12 Such an anthropocentric framework creates a variety of serious injustices and prudential risks, making it highly ecologically irrational.13 The

hierarchical value prescriptions and epistemic distortions responsible for its biased, reductive conceptualisation of nature strips the non-human natural realm of non-instrumental value, and impedes the fair and
impartial treatment of its members. Similarly, anthropocentrism creates distributive injustices by restricting ethical concern to humans, admitting partisan distributive relationships with non-human nature in the forms of commodification and instrumentalisation. The prudential risks and

blindspots created by anthropocentrism are problematic for nature and humans alike and are of especial concern within our current context of radical human dependence on an irreplaceable and increasingly degraded natural environment. These prudential risks are in large part consequences of the centric structure's promotion of illusory human
disembeddedness, self-enclosure and insensitivity to the significance and survival needs of non-human nature: The logic of centrism naturalises an illusory order in which the centre appears to itself to be disembedded, and this is especially dangerous in contexts where there is real and radical dependency on an Other who is simultaneously weakened by the application of that logic.14 Within the context of human-nature

relationships, such a logic must inevitably lead to failure, either through the catastrophic extinction of our natural environment and the consequent collapse of our species, or more hopefully by the abandonment and transformation of
the human centric framework.15

Consequentialism is impossible in a non-speciest frameworkinstead of satisfying a desire for good consequences, you should affirm a value system beyond humanism. Eric Katz, Director of Science, Technology, and Society Program at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, 1997 [Nature as Subject p. 9-10] Utilitarianism might be salvaged for use in the environmental debate if it is stripped of its bias towards the satisfaction of human needs and preferences. Bentham, it should be remembered, considered the pains and pleasures of the animal kingdom to be of important to a
utilitarian calculation. According to this kind of position, the wants and desires of the wildlife in a given area would have to be considered prior to any development or destruction for the purpose of human betterment. Unfortunately, the problems with this kind of broad utilitarianism appear insurmountable, How

does the satisfaction of animal needs compare in utility with the satisfaction of human needs ? Can we bring plant life into the calculation? What about nonliving entities , such as rock formations (e.g., the Grand Canyon) or entire ecological areas ? Does a marsh have an interest in not being drained and turned into a golf course, a need or desire to continue a natural existence? It is clear that difficult-if not impossible-problems arise when we begin to consider utility for non humanand nonsentient entities. (2) A second alternative, highly tentative, is a movement away from a "want-oriented perspective" in ethical theory.2 Rather than evaluating the moral worth of an action by the consequences which satisfy needs and desires in the human (or even nonhuman) world, we can look at the intrinsic qualities of the action, and determine what kind of values this action manifests. The question which the debate over environmental presentation raises is not "Does preservation of this particular natural object lead to a better world?" but rather "Do we want a world in which the preservation of natural objects is considered an important value?" The question is not whether the preservation of a certain entity increases the amount of satisfaction and pleasure in the world, but rather, whether these pleasures, satisfactions, and needs ought to be pursued. The question, in short, is about what kind of moral universe ought to be created.2' Only when the preservation of natural objects is seen to be an intrinsically good policy of action , rather than a means to some kind of satisfaction, will a policy of environmental protection be explained and justified. The development of an ethical theory which can accomplish this task will be a difficult
undertaking, but it is the only choice open to preservationists who wish to avoid the easy, self-defeating trap of utilitarianism

Rejection enables an understanding of the species-being that solves the ethical exceptionalism of their survival politics Hudson 4 Laura, graduate student in Cultural Studies at the University of California, Davis, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, meditations journal, Vol. 23, Issue 2, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/articles/the-political-animal In his discussion of religion, Marx argues that the recognition of religion as the alienated self-consciousness of human beings allows humans to know themselves: I therefore know my own self, the self-consciousness that belongs to its very nature, confirmed not in religion but rather in annihilated and superseded religion.35 Marx argues that Hegels negation of the negation, which is to lead in a positive progression toward the Absolute, is actually the negation of pseudo-essence, not true essence: A peculiar role, therefore, is played by the act of superseding in which denial and preservation denial and affirmation are bound together.36 Religion is the misrecognized, abstract, and alienated form of human self-consciousness. In recognizing this, and in superseding it, a better understanding of human self-consciousness and potentiality is revealed. Rather than waiting for reward in the next life, we must change our lives in the material world. Religion is a human construct, not a force from outside. Humanism appears as the annulment of religion, but it, too, remains an abstraction until brought into relation with the natural world. Extrapolating from Marx here, we might say that the concept of the human occupies the same space in our conceptual framework as religion does: The supersession of the concept of the human as an
essence based in a political identity, or even an anti-naturalism, requires that we recognize that the concept is the result of the alienation of human beings from their sensual, living selves: the concept of the human is not the thing-in-itself. Nature as presented in Hegel was only the alienated form of the Absolute and, as such, remained an abstraction of thought. Marx argues that we must come to recognize the sensual reality of nature and the supersession of the abstract thought-entity. As elements of nature ourselves, we must move beyond the abstract forms

through which we recognize ourselves and come to terms with the fact that we are natural, sensual beings, animals who may be captivated, who may also be processed, objectified, reified things as well as transcendent beings. In bare life, perhaps, we find the first moment of this supersession: Under modern capitalist sovereignty, we are all equally abandoned by the
law we have created to free us from nature. We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or humanity as a species, may require this recognition to move beyond the

pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call the human is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of ones location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of

organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the
development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of humanity through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between

human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being
depends on a sort of reconciliation between our human and animal selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call the human in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the

false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agambens invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the
decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the states promise of the good life (or the good death) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

Their appeal to political action reinforces humanist politics as we know it Carmen DellAversano 2010 (the love whose name cannot be spoken: queering the human-animal bond journal for critical animal studies, volume III issue 2010) And reciprocally, everything that concerns animals, however well-founded and urgent, by definition cannot make its way into political discourse. If the child is the prop of the secular theology on which our social reality rests: the secular theology that shapes at once the meaning of our collective narratives and our collective narratives of meaning (Edelman 12), the animal, as the prop for the performance of dehumanization, is the locus of the permanent denial of all meaning and relevance. If, as Edelman writes, queerness names the side of those s fighting for the children, the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism. [] [while] queerness, by contrast, figures [] the place of the social orders death drive [] queerness attains its ethical value precisely insofar as it accedes to that place, accepting its figural status as resistance to the viability of the social (Edelman 2004: 3) nothing could be queerer than the love for animals, which, by its very nature, which entails a serious and irrevocable commitment to the dismantling of the performances and devices on which social order as such rests, marks the other side of politics: [] the side outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurisms unquestioned good (Edelman 2004: 7). It is thus no coincidence that the fetish of the Child should be omnipresent in the many-sided polemic

1NC Kritikal (3:10)

against animal rights. In public debates, anti-vivisection activists are routinely asked by experimenters whether they would rather kill a mouse or a child (the answer is, of course, neither); and every time the subject of animal rights is brought up not merely as a topic of academic discussion but in appeals for practical or financial support, the most common form of refusal invariably brings up starving children as the more appropriate recipients of concern and aid. That the people who give this kind of answers do nothing whatsoever to relieve the plight of children in need does not matter rhetorically: what does matter is that the appeal for children is impossible to refuse [] this issue, like an ideological Mbius strip, only permit[s] one side (Edelman 2004 2).. And any animal queer human can, from systematic and bitter personal experience, agree with Edelman that this is oppressively political [] insofar as the fantasy subtending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought (Edelman 2004 2). The

emotions, feelings, thoughts and actions which make up the fabric of life for an animal queer person decentre the human and humanity from their positions as the taken-for granted subjects, and implicitly but powerfully question reproductive futurism. What Edelman calls the ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity, by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of human relations (Edelman 2004: 2) is shattered by an animal queer perspective. In its animal incarnation, more than in any other of its innumerable avatars, [t]he queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance [] to every social structure or form (Edelman 2004 4). And the real reason why liberalism grants a place to the queer in its LGBT incarnation but marginalizes, ridicules, represses and murders animal queer is that the denial and repression of the queerness of resistance to futurism and thus the queerness of the queer (Edelman 2004 27) are perfectly compatible with a civil rights perspective on same-sex love, but utterly incompatible with animal rights. An animal queer perspective is indeed [i]ntent on the end, not the ends, of the social, [...] insists that the drive toward that end, which liberalism refuses to imagine,
can never be excluded from the structuring fantasy of the social order itself. (Edelman 2004: 28) The deliberate[...] severing of us from ourselves that Edelman (5) mentions as the hallmark of queer is implicit in the love for an animal. Animal

queer severs us from ourselves because it decentres our perspective: suddenly, other values, other interests, other feelings, though incommensurable and unimaginable, become equivalent to our own. The queerest expression of this attitude in the animal rights field (or, for that matter, anywhere, at least as far as I know...) is VHEMT, the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, which unwittingly but appropriately takes up Edelmans challenge that Queerness should and must redefine such notions as civil order through a rupturing of our foundational faith in the reproduction of futurity (Edelman 2004
future. (Edelman 2004 31) The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement Motto: May

16-17) and embodies the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead [which] would depend on us taking seriously the place of the death drive [] and insisting [] that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all of those fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the

we live long and die out VHEMT (pronounced vehement) is a movement not an organization. Its a movement advanced by people who care about life on planet Earth. [...] As VHEMT Volunteers know, the hopeful alternative to the extinction of millions of species of plants and animals is the voluntary extinction of one
us going. At

species: Homo sapiens... us.[...] When every human chooses to stop breeding, Earths biosphere will be allowed to return to its former glory, and all remaining creatures will be free to live, die, evolve (if they believe in evolution), and will perhaps pass away, as so many of Natures experiments have done throughout the eons. Its going to take all of

first glance, some people assume that VHEMT Volunteers and Supporters must hate people and that we want everyone to commit suicide or become victims of mass murder. Its easy to forget that another way to bring about a reduction in our numbers is to simply stop making more of us. Making babies seems to be a blind spot in our outlooks on life. (http://www.vhemt.org/) Instead of worshipping the Child as the guarantee of our own eternity in a future where progress will always confirm we were right, VHEMT calls for a voluntary and lucid renunciation of the Child both as a symbol and as a reality,
and for restoring the beauty, glory and holiness of the planet by returning it to its rightful, non-human, owners, the ones who kept it for half a billion years without making a mess of it. The mission of VHEMT actualizes what Edelman wrote about: the death drive names what the queer, in the order of the social, is called forth to figure: the negativity opposed to every form of social viability (Edelman 2004 9). In envisioning a world where no opposition to the social will be necessary, because the social will no longer be a possibility, VHEMT

radically refuses this mandate by which our political institutions compel the collective reproduction of the Child [and therefore] must appear as a threat not only to the organization of a given social order but also, and far more ominously, to social order as such, insofar as it threatens the order of futurism on which meaning always depends. (Edelman 2004: 11) Because of its refusal of any identification both of and with the Child as the pre-eminent emblem of the motivating end, though one endlessly postponed, of every political vision as a vision of futurity, VHEMT is the most coherent and most radical incarnation of a queer oppositional politics (Edelman 2004: 13).

The aff externalizes violence as a problem to be solved by human agency Kochi and Ordan 08 (An argument for the global suicide of humanity borderlands, December) When thinking about whether the human species is worth saving the naive view sees these good and bad aspects as distinct. However, when thinking about 'human nature' as a whole, or even the operation of human reason as a characteristic of the Enlightenment and modernity, it is not so easy to draw clear lines of separation . As suggested by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1997), within what they call the 'dialectic of enlightenment', it is sometimes the very things which we draw upon to escape from evil, poverty and harm (reason, science, technology) which bring about a situation which is infinitely more destructive (for example the atom bomb). Indeed, it has often been precisely those actions motivated by a desire to do 'good' that have created profound degrees of destruction and harm. One
just has to think of all the genocides, massacres and wars within history justified by moral notions such as 'civilisation', 'progress' and 'freedom', and carried out by numerous peoples acting with misguided, but genuine intentions. When

considering whether humanity is worth saving, one cannot turn a blind eye to the violence of human history. This is not to discount the many 'positive' aspects of the human heritage such as art, medicine, the recognition of individual autonomy and the development of forms of social organisation that promote social welfare. Rather, what we are questioning is whether a holistic view of the human heritage considered in its relation to the natural environment merits the continuation of the human species or not. Far too often the 'positive' aspects of the human heritage
and is used as a tool that perpetually redeems the otherwise 'evil' acts of humanity. Humanity de-crowned Within

are viewed in an abstract way, cut off from humanity's destructive relation with the natural environment. Such an abstract or one-sided picture glorifies and reifies human life

the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of 'evil', a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of 'evil' given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity might comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was 'evil', then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the 'human heritage', then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across
the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the 'West' generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again

the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which
2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further,

pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples' land (Schmitt,

the history of colonialism highlights the central function of 'race war' that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially 'inferior' and in some instances that they were closer to 'apes' than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an
by humans. Such

erroneous view of 'race' is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species

a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human 'races') and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer's comment that whereas humans consider themselves "the crown of creation", for animals "all people are Nazis" and animal life is "an eternal Treblinka" (Singer, 1968, p.750). Certainly many organisms use 'force' to survive and thrive at the expense of their others. Humans are not special in this regard. However humans, due a particular form of self-awareness and ability to plan for the future, have the capacity to carry out highly organised forms of violence and destruction (i.e. the Holocaust; the massacre and enslavement of
indigenous peoples by Europeans) and the capacity to develop forms of social organisation and communal life in which harm and violence are organised and regulated. It is perhaps this capacity for reflection upon the merits of harm and violence (the moral reflection upon the good and bad of violence) which gives humans a 'special' place within the food chain. Nonetheless, with these capacities come responsibility and our proposal of global suicide is directed at bringing into full view the issue of human moral responsibility. When

taking a wider view of history, one which focuses on the relationship of humans towards other species, it becomes clear that the human heritage--and the propagation of itself as a thing of value--has occurred on the back of seemingly endless acts of violence, destruction, killing and genocide. While this cannot be verified, perhaps 'human' history and progress begins with the genocide of the Neanderthals and never loses a step thereafter. It only takes a short glimpse at the list of all the sufferings caused by humanity for one to begin to question whether this species deserves to continue into the
future. The list of human-made disasters is ever-growing after all: suffering caused to animals in the name of science or human health, not to mention the cosmetic, food and textile industries; damage to the environment by polluting the earth and its stratosphere; deforesting and overuse of natural resources; and of course, inflicting suffering on fellow human beings all over the globe, from killing to economic exploitation to abusing minorities, individually and collectively. In light of such a list it becomes difficult to hold onto any assumption that the human species possesses any special or higher value over other species. Indeed, if humans at any point did possess such a value, because of higher cognitive powers, or even because of a special status granted by God, then humanity has surely devalued itself through its actions and has forfeited its claim to any special place within the cosmos. In our development from higher predator to semi-conscious destroyer we have perhaps undermined all that is good in ourselves and have left behind a heritage best exemplified by the images of the gas chamber and the incinerator. We draw attention to this darker and pessimistic view of the human heritage not for dramatic reasons but to throw into question the stability of a modern humanism which sees itself as inherently 'good' and which presents the action of cosmic colonisation as a solution to environmental catastrophe. Rather

than presenting a solution it would seem that an ideology of modern humanism is itself a greater part of the problem, and as part of the problem it cannot overcome itself purely with itself. If this is so, what perhaps needs to occur is the attempt to let go of any one-sided and privileged value of the 'human' as it relates to moral activity. That is, perhaps it is modern humanism itself that must be negated and supplemented by a utopian antihumanism and moral action re-conceived through this relational or dialectical standpoint in thought. The banality of evil, the banality of good In order to consider whether any dialectical utopian anti-humanism might be possible, it becomes

necessary to reflect upon the role of moral action which underlies the modern humanist view of the subject as drawn upon by thinkers such as Hawking. Our argument is that the logical end-point of ethically motivated technical action is a certain type of human apoptosis--the global suicide of humanity. In what follows we set out some aspects of the problematisation of the modern humanist view of moral action and the way in which this causes difficulties for not only Hawking's project of cosmic colonisation, but also for many in the environmental movement more generally. Faced

with what seems to be a looming environmental crisis spiralling out of control and an awareness of a history of human action which has caused this crisis, the reaction of many environmentalists is, contra Hawking, not to run away to another habitat but to call for new forms of action. The call for urgent political and social action to change human behaviour in relation to the environment is echoed globally not only

by environmentalists and activists but also by celebrities and politicians. [6] The response is highly modern in the sense that a problem such as global warming is not considered to be something ordained by fate or the outcome of divine providence. Instead it is understood as something caused by human action for which humans bear the responsibility and, further, that disaster may still be averted if we act in such a way to change the course of history. [7] The move towards critical historical reflection, the assuming of responsibility, and action guided by such an attitude, is certainly a better approach than shutting one's eyes to the violence and errors of human history or placing blind faith in technology. Indeed, criticism of these latter views is heard from within eco-ethics circles themselves, either by labelling such endeavours as 'technofix' or 'technocentric' (Smith, 1998), or by criticizing the modes of action of green-politics as 'eco-bureaucracy' and 'men-politics' (Seager, 1993). However, even if we try to avoid falling into the above patterns, maybe it is actually too late to change the course of the events and forces that are of our own making. Perhaps a modern discourse or belief in the possibilities of human action has run aground, hamstrung by its own success. Perhaps the only forms of action available are attempts to revert to a pre-industrial lifestyle, or a new radical form of action, an action that lets go of action itself and the human claim to continued habitation within the world. In this case, the action of cosmic

colonisation envisaged by Hawking would not be enough. It would merely perpetuate a cycle of destructive speciesist violence. Further, general humanist action, guided by some obligation of 'care' for the environment, would also not be enough as it could not overcome an individual's complicity in systematic and institutional speciesist violence. Human centrism allows us to exploit nature, eventually causing extermination of all life. Ahkin, 10 (Melanie Ahkin, Monash University, 2010, Human Centrism, Animist Materialism, and the Critique of Rationalism in Val Plumwoods Critical Ecological Feminism, Emergent Australian Philosophers, a peer reviewed journal of philosophy, http://www.eap.philosophy-australia.com/archives.html DH) These five features provide the basis for hegemonic centrism insofar as they promote certain conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality which universalise and naturalise the standpoint of the superior relata as primary or centre, and deny and subordinate the standpoints of inferiorised others as secondary or derivative. Using standpoint theory analysis, Plumwood's reconceptualisation of human chauvinist frameworks locates and dissects these logical characteristics of dualism, and the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality common to centric structures, as follows. Radical exclusion is found in the rationalist emphasis on differences between humans and non-human nature, its valourisation of a human rationality conceived as exclusionary of nature, and its minimisation of similarities
between the two realms. Homogenisation and stereotyping occur especially in the rationalist denial of consciousness to nature, and its denial of the diversity of mental characteristics found within its many different constituents, facilitating a perception of nature as homogeneous

and of its members as interchangeable and replaceable resources. This definition of nature in terms of its lack of human rationality and consciousness means that its identity remains relative to that of the dominant human group, and its difference is marked as deficiency, permitting its inferiorisation. Backgrounding and denial may be observed in the conception of nature as extraneous and inessential background to the foreground of human culture, in the human denial of dependency on the natural environment, and denial of the ethical and political constraints which the unrecognised ends and needs of non-human nature might otherwise place on human behaviour. These features together create an ethical discontinuity between humans and non-human nature which denies nature's value and agency, and thereby promote its instrumentalisation and exploitation for the benefit of humans.11 This dualistic logic helps to universalise the human centric standpoint, making invisible and seemingly inevitable the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality and oppression of
non-human nature it enjoins. The alternative standpoints and perspectives of members of the inferiorised class of nature are denied legitimacy and subordinated to that of the class of humans, ultimately becoming invisible once this master standpoint becomes part of the very structure of thought.12 Such an anthropocentric framework creates a variety of serious injustices and prudential risks, making it highly ecologically irrational.13 The

hierarchical value prescriptions and epistemic distortions responsible for its biased, reductive conceptualisation of nature strips the non-human natural realm of non-instrumental value, and impedes the fair and

impartial treatment of its members. Similarly, anthropocentrism creates distributive injustices by restricting ethical concern to humans, admitting partisan distributive relationships with non-human nature in the forms of commodification and instrumentalisation. The prudential risks and

blindspots created by anthropocentrism are problematic for nature and humans alike and are of especial concern within our current context of radical human dependence on an irreplaceable and increasingly degraded natural environment. These prudential risks are in large part consequences of the centric structure's promotion of illusory human
disembeddedness, self-enclosure and insensitivity to the significance and survival needs of non-human nature: The logic of centrism naturalises an illusory order in which the centre appears to itself to be disembedded, and this is especially dangerous in contexts where there is real and radical dependency on an Other who is simultaneously weakened by the application of that logic.14 Within the context of human-nature

relationships, such a logic must inevitably lead to failure, either through the catastrophic extinction of our natural environment and the consequent collapse of our species, or more hopefully by the abandonment and transformation of
the human centric framework.15

Anthropocentrism is THE Original HierarchyWe NEED Politics That Can Respect More than Human Life. Their Humanist Politics Dooms Us To a Future That Endlessly Repeats the Oppression of the Status Quo.

Steven Best, Chair of Philosophy at UT-EP, 2007 [JCAS 5.2]

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call animal standpoint theory is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal. In this context, Charles Pattersons recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Pattersons theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its
logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how

humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. Pattersons thesis
stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to dominate nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically dont even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Pattersons

model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust.
As he puts it, the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples. Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In

the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through domestication. In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and
cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous

technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of
animals, such that men began to control womens reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain

introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society,
humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview that came to be known as the Great Chain of Being used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the

crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species, Patterson writes, our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals
the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them. Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates with opprobrious terms such as rats, pigs, swine,

monkeys, beasts, and filthy animals. Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them. Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom. For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the lower races under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality

were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from humanity. The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike
was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy

of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product
of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind.

Rejection enables an understanding of the species-being that solves the ethical exceptionalism of their survival politics Hudson 4 Laura, graduate student in Cultural Studies at the University of California, Davis, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, meditations journal, Vol. 23, Issue 2, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/articles/the-political-animal In his discussion of religion, Marx argues that the recognition of religion as the alienated self-consciousness of human beings allows humans to know themselves: I therefore know my own self, the self-consciousness that belongs to its very nature, confirmed not in religion but rather in annihilated and superseded religion.35 Marx argues that Hegels negation of the negation, which is to lead in a positive progression toward the Absolute, is actually the negation of pseudo-essence, not true essence: A peculiar role, therefore, is played by the act of superseding in which denial and preservation denial and affirmation are bound together.36 Religion is the misrecognized, abstract, and alienated form of human self-consciousness. In recognizing this, and in superseding it, a better understanding of human self-consciousness and potentiality is revealed. Rather than waiting for reward in the next life, we must change our lives in the material world. Religion is a human construct, not a force from outside. Humanism appears as the annulment of religion, but it, too, remains an abstraction until brought into relation with the natural world. Extrapolating from Marx here, we might say that the concept of the human occupies the same space in our conceptual framework as religion does: The supersession of the concept of the human as an
essence based in a political identity, or even an anti-naturalism, requires that we recognize that the concept is the result of the alienation of human beings from their sensual, living selves: the concept of the human is not the thing-in-itself. Nature as presented in Hegel was only the alienated form of the Absolute and, as such, remained an abstraction of thought. Marx argues that we must come to recognize the sensual reality of nature and the supersession of the abstract thought-entity. As elements of nature ourselves, we must move beyond the abstract forms

through which we recognize ourselves and come to terms with the fact that we are natural, sensual beings, animals who may be captivated, who may also be processed, objectified, reified things as well as transcendent beings. In bare life, perhaps, we find the first moment of this supersession: Under modern capitalist sovereignty, we are all equally abandoned by the
law we have created to free us from nature. We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or humanity as a species, may require this recognition to move beyond the

pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call the human is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of ones location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the
development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of humanity through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between

human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being
depends on a sort of reconciliation between our human and animal selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and

in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call the human in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the

false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agambens invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the
decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the states promise of the good life (or the good death) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

Rejection enables an understanding of the species-being that solves the ethical exceptionalism of their survival politics Hudson 4 Laura, graduate student in Cultural Studies at the University of California, Davis, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, meditations journal, Vol. 23, Issue 2, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/articles/the-political-animal In his discussion of religion, Marx argues that the recognition of religion as the alienated self-consciousness of human beings allows humans to know themselves: I therefore know my own self, the self-consciousness that belongs to its very nature, confirmed not in religion but rather in annihilated and superseded religion.35 Marx argues that Hegels negation of the negation, which is to lead in a positive progression toward the Absolute, is actually the negation of pseudo-essence, not true essence: A peculiar role, therefore, is played by the act of superseding in which denial and preservation denial and affirmation are bound together.36 Religion is the misrecognized, abstract, and alienated form of human self-consciousness. In recognizing this, and in superseding it, a better understanding of human self-consciousness and potentiality is revealed. Rather than waiting for reward in the next life, we must change our lives in the material world. Religion is a human construct, not a force from outside. Humanism appears as the annulment of religion, but it, too, remains an abstraction until brought into relation with the natural world. Extrapolating from Marx here, we might say that the concept of the human occupies the same space in our conceptual framework as religion does: The supersession of the concept of the human as an
essence based in a political identity, or even an anti-naturalism, requires that we recognize that the concept is the result of the alienation of human beings from their sensual, living selves: the concept of the human is not the thing-in-itself. Nature as presented in Hegel was only the alienated form of the Absolute and, as such, remained an abstraction of thought. Marx argues that we must come to recognize the sensual reality of nature and the supersession of the abstract thought-entity. As elements of nature ourselves, we must move beyond the abstract forms

1NC Alt Hudson (0:25)

through which we recognize ourselves and come to terms with the fact that we are natural, sensual beings, animals who may be captivated, who may also be processed, objectified, reified things as well as transcendent beings. In bare life, perhaps, we find the first moment of this supersession: Under modern capitalist sovereignty, we are all equally abandoned by the
law we have created to free us from nature. We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or humanity as a species, may require this recognition to move beyond the

pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call the human is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of ones location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the
development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of humanity through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between

human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being
depends on a sort of reconciliation between our human and animal selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call the human in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the

false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agambens invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the
decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the states promise of the good life (or the good death) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

Their inclusion of animal life does not decenter their position of humans as central we need to engage in thoughts of extinction prior Kochi & Ordan 2008 (Tarik, Lecturer in Law and International Security at the University of Sussex, Noam, Bar Ilan University, An Argument for the Global
Suicide of Humanity, Borderlands, Volume 7, Number 3) Generally, the animal rights movement responds to the ongoing colonisation of animal habitats by humans by asking whether the modern Western subject should indeed be the central focus of its ethical discourse. In

AT Permutation (1:15)

saying x harms y, animal rights philosophers wish to incorporate in y nonhuman animals. That is, they enlarge the group of subjects to which ethical relations apply. In this sense such thinking does not greatly depart from any school of modern ethics, but simply extends ethical duties and obligations to non-human animals. In eco-ethics, on the other hand, the role of the subject and its relation to ethics is treated a little differently. The less radical environmentalists talk about future human generations so, according to this approach, y includes a projection into the future to encompass the welfare of hitherto non-existent beings. Such an approach is prevalent in the Green Party in Germany, whose slogan is Now. For tomorrow. For others, such as the deep ecology movement, the subject is expanded so that it may include the environment as a whole. In this instance, according to Naess, life is not to be understood in a biologically narrow sense. Rather he argues that the term life should be used in a comprehensive non-technical way such that it refers also to things biologists may classify as non-living. This would include rivers, landscapes, cultures, and ecosystems, all understood as the living earth (Naess, 1989, p.29). From this perspective the statement x harms y renders y somewhat vague. What occurs is not so much a conflict over the degree of ethical commitment, between shallow and deep ecology or between light and dark greens per se, but rather a broader re-drawing of the content of the subject of Western philosophical discourse and its re-definition as life. Such a position involves differing metaphysical commitments to the notions of being,

intelligence and moral activity. This blurring and re-defining of the subject of moral discourse can be found in other ecocentric writings (e.g. Lovelock, 1979; Eckersley, 1992) and in other philosophical approaches. [5] In part our approach bears some similarity with these holistic approaches in that we share dissatisfaction with the modern, Western view of the subject as purely human-centric. Further, we share some of their criticism of bourgeois green lifestyles. However, our approach is to stay partly within the position of the modern, Western human-centric view of the subject and to question what happens to it in the field of moral action when environmental catastrophe demands the radical extension of ethical obligations to non-human beings. That is, if we stick with the modern humanist subject of moral action, and follow seriously the extension of ethical obligations to non-human beings, then we would suggest that what we find is that the utopian demand of modern humanism turns over into a utopian anti-humanism, with suicide as its outcome. One

way of attempting to re-think the modern subject is thus to throw the issue of suicide right in at the beginning and acknowledge its position in modern ethical thought. This would be to recognise that the question of suicide resides at the center of moral thought, already.

Only the alternative can destroy the human, non-human divide their approach actively normalizes Kochi 9 [tarik, lecturer in law and international security @ U of Sussex, Doctorate in Law from Griffith, species war: law, violence, and animals, law, culture, and the humanities, 353-359] This reflection need not be seen as carried out by every individual on a daily basis but rather as that which is drawn upon from time to time within public life as humans inter-subjectively coordinate their actions in accordance with particular enunciated ends and plan for the future. 21 In this respect, the violence and killing of species war is not simply a question of survival or bare life, instead, it is bound up with a consideration of the good. For most modern humans in the West the good life involves the daily killing of animals for dietary need and for pleasure. At the heart of the question of species war, and all war for that matter, resides a question about the legitimacy of violence linked to a philosophy of value. 22 The question of war-law sits within a wider history of decision making about the relative values of different forms of life. Legitimate violence is under-laid by cultural, religious, moral, political and philosophical conceptions about the relative values of forms of life. Playing out through history are distinctions and hierarchies of life-value that are extensions of the original human-animal distinction. Distinctions that can be thought to follow from the human-animal distinction are those, for example, drawn between: Hellenes and barbarians; Europeans and Orientals; whites and blacks; the civilized and the uncivilized; Nazis and Jews; Israelis and Arabs; colonizers and the colonized. Historically these practices and regimes of violence have been culturally, politically and legally normalized in a manner that replicates the normalization of the violence carried out against non-human animals. Unpacking, criticizing and challenging the forms of violence, which in different historical moments appear as normal, is one of the ongoing tasks of any critic who is concerned with the question of what war does to law and of what law does to war? The critic of war is thus a
critic of wars norm-alization.

ONLY THE ALT ALONE CAN SOLVE - REFORMISM FAILS. Best 6 (Steven, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas El Paso, Revolutionary Environmentalism: An Emerging New Struggle for Total Liberation, http://www.drstevebest.org/RevolutionaryEnvironmentalism.htm, 2006) George W. Bushs feel-good talk of progress and democracy, given an endless and uncritical airing by mainstream corporate media, masks the fact that we live in an unprecedented era of social and ecological crisis. Predatory transnational corporations
such as ExxonMobil and Maxxam are pillaging the planet, destroying ecosystems, pushing species into extinction, and annihilating indigenous peoples

***Mutual Blocks

and traditional ways of life. War,

globalization, and destruction of peoples, species, and ecosystems march in lockstep: militarization supports the worldwide imposition of the "free market" system, and its growth and profit imperatives thrive though the exploitation of humans, animals, and the earth (see Kovel 2002; Tokar 1997; Bannon and
Collier 2003). Against the mindless optimism of technophiles, the denials of skeptics, and complacency of the general public, we depart from the premise that there is a global environmental crisis which is the most urgent issue facing us today. If humanity does not address ecological

problems immediately and with radical measures that target causes not symptoms, severe, world-altering consequences will play out over a long-term period and will plague future generations. Signs of major stress of the
worlds eco-systems are everywhere, from shrinking forests and depleted fisheries to vanishing wilderness and global climate change. Ours is an era of global warming, rainforest destruction, species extinction, and chronic resource shortages that provoke wars and conflicts such as in Iraq. While five great extinction crises have already transpired on this planet, the last one occurring 65 million years ago in the age of the dinosaurs, we are now living amidst the sixth extinction crisis, this time caused by human not natural causes. Human populations have always devastated their environment and thereby their societies, but they have never intervened in the planets ecosystem to the extent they have altered climate. We now confront the

end of nature where no natural force, no breeze or ripple of water, has not been affected by the human presence (McKribben 2006). This is especially true with nanotechnology and biotechnology. Rather than confronting this
crisis and scaling back human presence and aggravating actions, humans are making it worse. Human population rates continue to swell, as awakening giants such as India and China move toward western consumer lifestyles, exchanging rice bowls for burgers and bicycles for SUVs. The human presence on this planet is like a meteor plummeting to the earth, but it has already struck and the reverberations are rippling everywhere. Despite the proliferating amount of solid, internationally assembled scientific data supporting the reality of global climate change and ecological crisis, there are still so-called environmental skeptics, realists, and optimists who deny the problems, often compiling or citing data paid for by ExxonMobil. Senator James Inhofe has declared global warming to be a myth that is damaging to the US economy. He and others revile environmentalists as alarmists, extremists, and eco-terrorists who threaten the American way of life. There is a direct and profound relationship between global capitalism and ecological destruction. The capitalist economy lives or dies on constant growth, accumulation, and consumption of resources. The environmental crisis is inseparable from the social crisis, whereby centuries ago a market economy disengaged from society and ruled over it with its alien and destructive imperatives. The crisis in ecology is ultimately a crisis in democracy, as transnational corporations arise and thrive through the destruction of popular sovereignty. The western environment movement has advanced its cause for over three decades now, but we are nonetheless losing ground in the battle to preserve species, ecosystems, and wilderness (Dowie 1995; Speth 2004). Increasingly, calls for moderation, compromise, and the

slow march through institutions can be seen as treacherous and grotesquely inadequate. In the midst of predatory global capitalism and biological meltdown, reasonableness and moderation seem to be entirely unreasonable and immoderate, as extreme and radical actions appear simply as necessary and appropriate. As eco-primitivist Derrick Jensen observes, We must eliminate false hopes, which blind us to real possibilities. The current world system is inherently destructive and unsustainable; if it cannot be reformed, it must be transcended through revolution at all levelseconomic, political, legal, cultural, technological, and, most fundamentally, conceptual. The struggles and changes must be as deep, varied, and far-reaching as the root of the problems.

We should give moral consideration to the whole cosmos Roderick Nash, Professor of History and Environmental Studies at UC-SB, 1989 [The Rights of Nature p. 157-159]

Rocks Matter (0:20/1:10/1:35)

On the other hand some philosophers and scientists were prepared to entertain precisely this possibility. Although the roots of the idea that the earth is a living being are very old in Western thought, james Lovelock, an English atmospheric chemist, made the most dramatic modern statement of the idea in the mid-19705 with his Gaia hypothesis. The ancient Greeks used the term Gaia to refer to the nurturing earth goddess. Lovelock removed the theology and dressed this concept in the clothing of biochemistry. The planet, he believed, gradually created and presently maintains a self-regulating environment which not only sustains the life of its components but is itself alive. From this perspective individual

beings and species such as Homo sapiens were to the earth as cells and organs were to their own bodies-parts of indivisible wholes. It followed that just as it made no sense to value or respect a brain cell or a liver apart from the entire organism on which it depended for life, so a proper environ- mental ethic demanded assigning value to the whole earth. Since humans were the only morally conscious members of this community, the brain cells of Gaia, they had the unique capability of restraining themselves in a manner consistent with the continuing welfare of the earth-being to which they belonged. All this implied that the planet possessed the traditional requirements for ethical considerability: consciousness, the ability to feel pain, and an interest or capacity for what might be termed happiness. The earth, in short, was regarded as a super-being with rights primary to those of the
lesser beings, and the most far-reaching of the biocentric environmentalists called upon humankind to acknowledge and act upon this reality. Theodore Roszak, for example, wrote in 1978 about the rights Of the planet," which he understood as deriving from the personhood of the Earth." According to Roszak, meaningful

environmental reform would not occur without "a sense of ethical respect, if not reverence, that can only exist between persons." The point, then, was to view the earth as a person-Mother Gaia-and to expand ethics to include her. "Nature," Roszak concluded, must also have
its natural rights." "" Michael Cohen wrote a Guidebook the Liberation of Self and Planet. The director of several education programs aimed at integrating humankind and nature, Cohen believed that if

the planet and, indeed, the universe were alive, then so were all their components: "rocks and mountains, sand, clouds, wind, and rain . , . nothing is dead." As part of the same cosmic being nothing was beyond ethical

consideration. Cohen understood environmental ethics to be an expression of the planet trying to protect itself and, in turn, myself Holmes Rolston contributed the idea that

nature or the earth was the originating matrix" or parental environment" of all matter whether organized into what we call life or displayed as crystals rivers. . . mesas, canyons. Everything was created by nature and, for Rolston, there is value wherever there is positive creativity." Using this principle, he found no reason to limit ethics to earth. Was not the universe the originating matrix" of the planet we occupied? Should it not be included as the ultimate ethical circle? "" In 1986 Rolston, along with other
philosophers. theologians, and scientists, contributed the papers that the Sierra Club published under the title Beyond Spaceship Earth: Environmental Ethics and the Solar System. The collection explicitly addressed the nonanthropocentric dimension," asking whether it was moral to conduct an experimental nuclear meltdown on the moon or to strip-mine a neighboring planet. If the answers to such questions were still sketchy, here were thinkers at least willing to inquire whether a

moral philosophy that ended with the boundaries of the planet was a manifestation of terra centrism" or Earth chauvinism." ""The
implication of all biocentric and, literally, universal ethical philosophy from Aldo Leopold onwards is that the whole is more important than any of the parts. As Stephen- R. L. Clark put it in 1983. What

matters is the maintenance of Gaia and her constituent ecosystems, not the preservation at all costs of any single line (even our own)." '"" Indeed the Gaia hypothesis connoted for many thinkers the capacity of the earth organism to purge itself of disruptive elements just as a simpler organism removed potentially poisonous liquid and solid wastes and tried to destroy cancers and infections. The point of this line of reasoning was to imply that humankind, as the most formidable contemporary poison on the planet, might be excreted if the species did not clean up its technological act. Perhaps, some suggested, Gaia might choose to let Homo sapiens self-destruct with nuclear weapons. In
1986 British television featured a three-part special on a revolutionary environmental action group, called Gaia, whose members believed that human beings were an unhealthy force in the ecosystem and must be eliminated from the earth-organism. There can be no more graphic example of the ability of environmental ethics to transcend human self-interest. But as biocentric philosophers were quick to explain, individual self-interest was indistinguishable, to the Gaian perspective, from the interest of the whole because the self like the cell, has no being at all outside the environmental context.

The distinction between organic life and dead matter is anthropocentric because it separates us from our larger ecological matrix Rowe 1996 Stan, Professor Emeritus at the University of Saskatchewan, From Shallow To Deep Ecological Philosophy, Trumpeter, 13.1

Open most ecology textbooks and the fields of study judged legitimate are exposed. Usually first attention is paid to individual organisms (autecology), then to species and groups of similar individuals (population ecology), then all organisms found occupying the same milieu (community ecology) and finally at the end of the book the ecosystem as community plus abiotic resources or community plus environment. In parentheses, the textbooks of Eugene Odum are an exception. As early as 1953 he defined ecology as the study of the structure and function of nature and accorded first place to the discussion of ecosystems: the largest functional units in ecology. Despite his statement that the entire biosphere may be one vast ecosystem, few ecologists accepted the logic of whole systems. The

fact of complexity in the subject matter, plus the academic necessity of focusing on simple problems that bring quick dividends to the individual in the form of papers judged publishable by peers, has ruled against it. Hence whole journals of ecological research are devoted to articles on communities and populations, the latter justified and enhanced by redefining function as Darwinian adaptation. The prevalent concept of ecosystem continues to be community plus environment with research focused on the utilitarian aspects of organisms, or the effects of organisms on such resources as soil and water: Do the bombs radio-nuclides end up in the food chain and in people? How much
photosynthate (net primary production) can be harvested from land and water? What is the sediment load and water yield from forested versus non-forested watersheds and how can water yield be increased by manipulating vegetation? Both Hagen (1992) and Golley (1993) have traced the development since Darwins time of the idea of ecosystem as a unit of nature characterized by energy flow, nutrient cycling, successional stages and productivity, noting how the practical concerns of the military and various other branches of government spurred the funding of ecosystem research. That

ecosystems might be more than serviceable functional entities consisting of organisms (important) plus an energy-providing and nutrient-providing environment (relatively unimportant) has never been seriously considered in ecological science. When arrived at by summation, the ecosystem concept can be anything, everything or, to some academics, nothing. The error is in the additive approach, building from individual to population to community and, finally, to ecosystem which

emerges as last in order of importance, a so-called convenient artifice or heuristic device vaguely complementing and extending the
biotic community compared to which it is less real. On a more sophisticated level, Lovelock (1988) and Margulis (1995) have attempted to build the living world out of bacteria, rather than bacteria out of a living world. Again the . priori biological, organism-centered bias is evident. The planet and its sectoral parts whose air, land and water comprise every creatures evolutionary source and outer supportive matrix (matrix-mater-womb-mother) gets short shrift. Earth-Sector Ecosystems Suppose that the importance of Earth relative to organisms had been earlier recognized. Then four hundred years of science might have been devoted to understanding the grandest system with which humans are in direct contact: the planetary ecosphere. Examination from the physiological viewpoint, asking How does it function; how does it work? would have required a mental anatomizing of Earth in order to honor its magnificent complexity and to understand its structure-composition, because anatomy is the clue to function. As the word per-form-ance suggests, function is what form does over time; function is literally read from things happening. Scientists have today arrived at the global question of Earths performance, prodded by the Gaia hypothesis and such research programs as the International Geophysical-Biological Program. But the question remains: At

the sub-global level, what mental anatomizing, what divisions of the ecosphere are relevant to such air-breathing, water-drinking, food-eating and land-dwelling creatures as we? The logical answer is sectors of the ecosphere at any chosen scale: air above
land-water with organisms clustered where the gas, liquid and solid phases interface (Rowe 1992). This, in the words of Leopold (1949) with the addition of air-atmosphere that neither he nor the Bibles genesis story recognizesis the land community to which humans belong. The more inclusive term is terrestrial ecosystem and the key to its logical definition and mapping lies in Earths landforms and water forms (Bailey in press). By this route an explicit and tangible concept of ecosystem is derived by division of the ecosphere from the top down, as compared to the diffuse and variable concept obtained by addition from the bottom up. Top

down division yields Earth-centered units of nature, surmounting the conventional organism-centered biocentricity of the bottom up approach. It engenders geoecosystems that are substantial as well as functional, rather than inexplicit bioecosystems (Rowe & Barnes 1994). It gives substance and real-world meaning to terms such as ecodiversity and ecocentrism. A second line of logic also leads to the
way that it metabolizes and thus maintains itself (by autopoiesis, literally self-making). The

idea of ecosystems as variable size-scaled sectors of the ecosphere. Suppose the reality of the world is conceived as systems within systems in a hierarchy of containment, like fitted Chinese boxes or Russian dolls within dolls. One starts at some low level, say a functional cell, observing that its inner structural parts are joined or articulated in such a

cells enclosing functional system is the metabolizing tissue, in turn enclosed in the metabolizing organ and this in turn in the metabolizing organism. Note that each autopoietic level of integration is composed of lower levels and is itself a part of higher levels ; each level has a physiology that refers to its constituent levels below and an ecology that relates it to the levels above.
Now ask, what is the entity above the organism that analogously shows articulated structure, that functions metabolically and exhibits autopoiesis? Logic points to volumetric place-specific ecosystems. Why not community or population? Because neither is a fully functional (metabolic) entity; neither exhibits articulated structure nor autopoiesis. As aggregates, communities and populations can be counted, classified and to some extent studied as interbreeding individualswhich is their practical usebut they are more abstract than organisms and geographic ecosystems; they are taxonomic categories based, respectively, on juxtaposition in space and membership in a particular species or sub-species. The population of a particular species or sub-species trading genetic material can be a center of interest to evolutionary biologists but it can never be a center of understanding when bereft of its sustaining ecosystem. Therefore, the

level of integration

above organism is the Earth space that surrounds and includes it (singly or with its shared population and community members); i.e. the
sector of the ecosphere that includes and supports organisms, the internally articulated air-soil-water-organism geo-ecosystem that miraculously generates and maintains life. To summarize thus far: the

most real or least abstract fields-of-study that logic reveals, are the organism (within its

surrounding ecosystem) and the ecosystem (within its larger surrounding ecosystem), each of the latter a complete piece of dynamic Earth at some geographic place. Ecosystems so conceived can be esteemed and studied from the seven scientific viewpoints previously listed. Not so for populations and communities. They lack the internal articulation and hence the structural-functional attributes of metabolizing autopoietic beings. Communities

of creatures, including humans, are brought to life only by including with them the sustaining Earth-matrix of air, landform, soil and water; i.e. by conceiving them as organic parts of the holistic realities that are ecosystems. Implicit here is a devastating criticism of
togetherthe traditional communitycannot make it alone. The

sociology and communitarian politics that will improve the human condition by sole attention to populations, societies and social ills. Alarmed by the fact that the barbarians are not hammering on the frontier walls but are already here governing us, Macintyre (1981) called for new forms of community to sustain the moral life and survive the coming ages of barbarism and darkness. Such fervent hopes seemed realizable before the Age of Ecology. But now we know that groups of like-minded people banded

community with survival value can never again be conceived as a people-only free-standing entity, able to weather the storms generated by humanistic arrogance. Only Earth ecosystems in which humans are cooperating, serving parts can achieve long-term health and sustainability.
Where Does Life Reside? The hierarchical series organ-organism-ecosystem-ecosphere represents a scale of increasing complexity and creativity. The last member, the ecosphere, is the leading candidate for embodiment of the organizing principle called life. What

gives life to the cell? The living organ that is its surrounding environment. What give life to the organ? The living organism within which it is embodied. What gives life to the organism? The surrounding living ecosystem and the global ecosphere. The October 94 issue of Scientific

American, titled Life in the Universe, presented a state-of-the-art account of how planet Earth and organic earthlingscreaturely relatives and ourselvescame to be. Throughout the text the words organisms and life were used as synonyms. Two contributors made a stab at clarifying what the second concept might or might not mean. Robert Kates suggested that life is simply organic matter capable of reproducing itself, or the mix of living things that fill the places we are familiar with. More circumspect, Carl Sagan was content to falsify current definitions, implying that a satisfactory meaning for life has yet to be found. Organisms can be alive one moment and dead the next with no quantitative difference. The recently deceased organism has lost none of its physical parts yet it lacks lifean unknown quality of organization (perhaps that mystery called energy?) but not the organization itself. A still stronger reason exists for not equating life and organisms. The latter only exhibit aliveness in the context of life-supporting systems, though curiously the vitality of the latter has mostly been denied. By

analogy, it is as if all agreed that only a tree trunks cambial layer is alive while its support systemthe trees bole and roots of bark and wood that envelops and supports the cambiumis dead. Instead we perceive the whole tree as alive. The separation of living organisms from their supportive but dead environments is a reductionist convention that ecology disproves. Both organic and inorganic are functional parts of enveloping ecosystems, of which the largest one accessible to direct experience is the global ecosphere. To
attribute the organizing principle life to Earthto the ecosphere and its sectoral aquatic and terrestrial ecosystemsmakes more sense than attempting to locate it in organisms per se, divorced from their requisite milieus. The aquatic ecologist Lindeman (1942) who pioneered examination of lakes as energetic systems adopted the ecosystem concept because of the blurred distinction between living and dead in the components of the Minnesota lakes he studied. The Biological Fallacy, equating organisms with life, is the result of a faulty inside-the-system view (Rowe 1991). Pictures of the blue-and-white planet Earth taken from the outside are intuitively recognized as images of a living cell. Inside that cell, cheated by sight, people perceive a particulate world separable into important and unimportant parts: the organic and the inorganic, biotic and abiotic, animate and inanimate, living and dead. Religions, philosophies and sciences have been constructed around these ignorant taxonomies, perpetuating the departmentalization of a global ecosystem whose aliveness is as much expressed in its improbable atmosphere, crustal rocks, seas, soils and sediments as in organisms. When did life begin? When did any kind of creative organization begin? Perhaps when the ecosphere came into existence. Perhaps earlier at time zero and the Big Bang. Important human attitudes hinge on the idea of life and where it resides. If only organisms are imbued with life, then things like us are important and all else is relatively unimportant. The

biocentric preoccupation with organisms subtly supports anthropocentrism, for are we not first in neural complexity among all organisms? Earth has traditionally been thought to consist of consequential entitiesorganisms, living beingsand their relatively inconsequential dead environments. What should be attended to, cared for, worried about? The usual

answer today is life in its limited sense of organisms, of biodiversity. Meanwhile sea, land and air classified as dead environmentcan be freely exploited. In the reigning ideology as long as large organisms are safeguarded, anything goes. We
demean Earth by equating life and organisms, then proving by text-book definition that Earth is dead because not-an-organism. In this way mental doors are barred against the idea of liveliness everywhere. Certainly Earth is not an organism, nor is it a super organism as Lovelock has proposed, any more than organisms are Earth or miniEarth. The

planetary ecosphere and its sectoral volumetric ecosystems are SUPRA-organismic, higher levels of integration than mere organisms. Essential to the ecocentric idea is assignment of highest value to the ecosphere and to the ecosystems that it comprises. Note the use of ecosphere rather than biosphere, the latter usually defined as a life-filled (read organism-filled) thin shell at Earths surface. The meaning of ecosphere goes deeper; it is Earth to the core, comprising the totality of gravity and electro-magnetic fields, the molten radioactive magma that shifts the crustal plates, vulcanism and earthquakes and mountain building that renew nutrients at the surface, the whole dynamic evolving stage where

organisms play out their many roles under the guidance of the larger whole, shaped at least in part by the morphic fields of the living Gaia (Sheldrake 1991:162). In different times and places the source of life has been attributed to the air, to soil, to water, to fire, as well as to organisms. As with the blind men touching the elephant, each separate part has been the imagined essential component of the whole Earth. Now that the planet has been conceptualized as one integrated entity, can we not logically attribute the creative synthesizing quintessence called life to it, rather than to any one class of its various parts? When life is conceived as a function of the ecosphere and its sectoral ecosystem the subject matter of Biology is cast in a bright new light. The pejorative concept of environment vanishes. The focus of vital interest broadens to encompass the world. Anthropocentrism and biocentrism receive the jolting shock they deserve. The answer as to where our preservation emphasis should center is answered: Earth spaces (and all that is in them) first, Earth species second. This priority guarantees no loss of vital parts. The

implications of locating animation where it belongs, of denying the naive Life = Organisms equation, are many. Perhaps most important is a broadening of the Schweizerian reverence for life to embrace the whole Earth. Reverence for life means reverence for ecosystems. We should feel the same pain when the atmosphere and the seas are poisoned as when people are poisoned. We should feel more pain at the destruction of wild ecosystems, such as the temperate rain forest of the West Coast, than at the demise of any organism, no matter how sad the latter occasion, because the destruction of ecosystems severs the very roots of evolutionary creativity. All of existence expresses consciousness Bloom no date Frank, What is the Tango?, http://www.howardbloom.net/bigbangtango/website/tango.htm In Frankfurt, Germany, a Russian physicist thinks that hes spotted a sociology of basic particles. Now he wants to talk to photons. In Tel Aviv, Israel, a physicist/microbiologist has been studying bacterial colonies and thinks he sees a linguistic patterna Chomskyite deep structure, a languagein the communication between single-celled beasts. In a paper published in the leading journal of physics, Physica A, the same Israeli physicist has made an even more shocking claimthat bacterial colonies have consciousness. In Moscow, a mathematician/physicist at the Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics of the Russian Academy of Sciences has been pondering quantum mechanics and has concluded that electrons and photons have to make decisions, they have to make up their minds. And in New York City, the founder of a field called paleopsychology thinks that there are common threads between the Germans sociology of quantum mechanics, the Russians emperor electrons, the Israelis sentences spoken chemically by bacteria, the Israelis bacterial mass mind, and the mass passions aroused by superstars of human culture and of history, from Michael Jackson and Prince to Hitler and Osama bin Laden. In modern science all of this should be viewed as blasphemy. Its anthropomorphism, clear and simple. Humans make decisions. Photons and electrons dont. Humans have language. Bacteria have no such thing. They cant. They dont
have tongues. They dont have that critical churner of words and paragraphsa brain. The time may have arrived to remove this taboo. Those whove labored hard to purge anthropomorphism from their vocabulary may have been the real sinners. They may have been anthropo-chauvinists in disguise. When we apply words like attraction and repulsion--words that come from human physical and emotional experience--to quarks, protons, and electrons, we may simply be playing on a basic fact of nature.

Evolution--and I mean the full sweep of evolution from the big bang to today--is iterative and fractal. The same simple principles show up over and over again. Principles like attraction and repulsion are the tools with which the self-construction of the universe began. They ruled over quarks, photons, and electrons 13.5 billion years ago. They were the master forces of the big bang. The human high plateau of
consciousness, emotion, language, culture, and immersion in the opinions of others is unique. But it's just another form of quark-dance, one it took quarks 13.5 billion years to invent. The practical consequence? Sometimes bio-patterns can help solve puzzles in physics. Sometimes clues from human psychology can help solve problems in microbiology. Im the New Yorker mentioned above, the founder of paleopsychology. I call the social dance-steps of the inanimate and living cosmos The Big Bang Tango. And the concept of the Big Bang Tango is beginning to catch fire. When the Tel Aviv physicist studying bacteria, Eshel Ben-Jacobhead of the Physics Department at the Raymond & Beverly Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences at Tel-Aviv University--sent a draft of his upcoming article, Reflections on Biochemical Linguistics of Bacteria, I scribbled the usual notations in the margins. One note pointed out that the papers facts hint that bacteria have something that strongly resembles human culture. Then I gave the reasons. Ben-Jacob and his co-writers felt the comparison was accurate, and included it in their text. When the Moscow mathematician, Pavel Kurakin, at the Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, sent his paper on Toy Quantum Mechanics with Hidden Variables, it bristled with forbidden words.

According to Kurakins theory, a quantum particle receives queries from particle detectors. Those detectors duel for the particles attention. Some of these pretenders receive only refuse signals. One lucky detector wins the particles favor and is blessed with the particles visit. In other words, there is competition and communicationa basic Darwinian twosomeat work on the
quantum level. How, I asked does a quantum particle make its decision on which signal to accept? Who wins what Kurakin call this lottery? Says Pavel, Query signal intensity is proportional to |psi|2. Detectors win proportionally to their query intensities. In other words, in the quantum world, the strongest thrive. But the weak subordinate or diea rule that shows up in the evolution of stars, galaxies, living beings, minds, emotions, politics, and history. Whats wrong with these conversations? Whats wrong with Kurakins characterization of the rules of the cosmos as natural fascism? Whats wrong with Ben-Jacobs claim that bacteria send messages, use chemical words, have a chemical language, and can conduct a dialogue? Or that bacterial swimmers enter a consultation phase, during which they divide and communicate until a collective decision, is reached? Or worse yet, that bacteria have chemical foreplay, chemical courtship, interpret the state of the colony, reach a majority vote, and, if they have valuable information announce this fact? Whats wrong? Every single word of this is scientific heresy. Plastering human qualities on everything we see is precisely what science has labored mightily to avoid since roughly 1650. Anthropomorphism is the stuff of witches and Church eldersof magic, superstition, and religion. Anthropomorphism carries all the Dark-Age intellectual baggage that folks like Galileo, Hooke, van Leeuwenhoek, Newton, and Voltaire snatched with difficulty from the fists of clerics, alchemists, and potion makers and threw away. There's a claim implicit in the work of the colleagues I've stitched together on the Internet, a claim that in my work is as explicit as hell: many

of the patterns we regard as solely human are not. We share basic rules and

stratagems not just with ants, lizards, and chimps. It's beginning to look as if we

share such basics as communication with quarks, abilities like decision making with quantum particles, and complexities like the deep structure of language with bacteria. Our aversion to anthropomorphism is arrogance in disguise. It's anthropocentrism--a failure to see that we carry in us patterns we've inherited from ten billion years of inanimate evolution, evolution that built the raw

material of your finger tips, your blood, your brain, Bara's, my wifes, Chris Andersons, and mine. We woke up in the 20th Century to something Aristotle once suspected that we are political animals. Are we clever? Yes. But we are clever beasts. Thanks to 20th Century figures like Wolfgang Koehler, Paul MacLean, Neil Miller, William Hamilton, E.O. Wilson, and Franz de Waal, we caved in and finally fessed up to the fact that many of the things we do and feel we share with reptiles, lab rats, apes, and chimps. Science is on the brink of yet another revelation. We share many of our human qualities with more than just our cousins in the clan of DNA. We share these qualities with atoms, stars, and galaxies. Is this airy-fairy, New Age wishful thinking, or is this genuine science? If its valid, science is in for more than just a minor change. It may be on the brink of what many of its practitioners wish for consciously but fear deep in their hearts, a cataclysmic viewpoint-flip, one that could undermine the validity of their lifes worka Thomas Kuhnian paradigm shift. The paradigm shift is coming. I think I hear it rumbling. In fact, as the New Yorker whose been splicing these disparate strands of the Big Bang Tango together, Ive staked my life on it.

This evidence is in the context of IR, not colonization or anthropocentrism prefer the specific of our link and alternative evidence because only it describes the way the plan manifests human-centrism. 2. Focus on inner dimensions is more important than research or policy discussions Zajonc Prof 2006 Arthur, Professor of physics at Amherst College. Contemplative and Transformative Pedagogy, Kosmos Journal 1.1, http://www.arthurzajonc.org/uploads/Contemplative_Pedagogy%20Kosmos.pdf. I approach the question of shaping worldviews as an educator and as one who, like so many, is moved by widespread violence and global economic inequities. What is it about worldviews that results in the identity politics of Iraq where Shiites, Sunnis,
and Kurds all act along ethnic and religious lines, or in Darfur where issues of identity cut deeper, leading to Arabs perpetrating mass killing and rape against their Muslim brothers and sisters who are 'black Africans' from non-Arab tribes? What is it about worldviews that leads to a large and growing divide between the rich and the poor? In the face of increasing per capita GDP, the global median income is decreasing, and 100 million more are in poverty today than ten years ago.1 What can I as an educator offer in the face of these tragic realities of today's world? To offer an alternative or 'better' worldview is to no avail. In fact, efforts to promote that better viewpoint may initiate or aggravate conflict. In this article I advance a view of the human being in which the individual develops the capacity to move among worldviews, transcending particular identities while simultaneously honoring each of them. Even more, we can learn to live the complexity of diverse identities that are in truth everpresent in us as well as in the world. In reality, the interconnectedness of the world has its reflection in the connections among the diverse aspects of ourselves. When we find peace among the component parts of our own psyche, then we will possess the inner resources to make peace in a multicultural society. Only in this way will the crises I have mentioned be addressed at their roots. I

AT Owen 2 (1:30)

see educationformal and informalas the sole means of developing this remarkable human capacity for interior harmony, which in the end is the capacity for freedom and love. The Function of Frames The content of education is infinite in extent. Every day more information is available, new research is published, political changes occur, and businesses collapse. All of these demand our attention. Education is largely comprised of acquiring and organizing such information, and for this purpose students are taught the skills needed to assimilate and transmit information through reading, writing, and mathematics. But such simple input-output functions are but one dimension of education. Something more is needed to convert information into meaningful knowledge. Surrounding and supporting the information we receive is the 'form' or structure of our cognitive and emotional life that goes largely unobserved. To understand how information becomes meaningful, we must turn our attention to this hidden container or 'frame of reference,' as Jack Mezirow termed it.2 A frame of reference is a way of knowing or making meaning of the world. Enormous quantities of sensorial and mental data stream into human consciousness, but somehow that stream is brought into a coherent meaningful whole. At first sight it may seem that such meaning-making is an entirely natural and universal process, and to some degree it certainly is. Evolution has incorporated reflexes and drives deep into the human psyche. But the way we make sense of the world is also conditioned profoundly by societal forces, among them education. That is to say, we are socialized into a worldview that operates largely unconsciously and behind the scenes, but which affects the way we understand what we see, hear, and feel. According to the Leo Apostel Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Belgium, "A worldview is a map that people use to orient and explain the world, and
from which they evaluate and act, and put forward prognoses and visions of the future." In the course of a lifetime we may shed one worldview and adopt another. In other words, we can change the structure that makes meaning for us. Thus while

worldviews can be understood as deep cognitive structures, they are not immutable. The solutions to Darfur and economic inequality (among many other problems) will ultimately not be found through more information or better foreign aid programs, but only here at the level where information marries with values to become meaning. Human action flows from this source, not from data alone. An education that would reach beyond information must work deeper; it will need to transform the very container of consciousness, make it more supple and complex. For this, we educators need pedagogical 2 tools other than those optimized for information transfer. At its most

advanced stage, we will need to help our students and ourselves to create a dynamic cognitive framework that can challenge established intellectual boundaries, and even sustain the conflicting values and viewpoints that comprise our planetary human community. Challenging Conventional Divisions In recent years I have spent time with members of the Native American Academy, a group largely comprised of academics who are also Native Americans. In our meetings we have explored the character of Native knowledge systems and research methods in comparison to those of orthodox Western science. From the first, the differences were marked. The place of our meeting was of special consequence, Chaco Canyon. It is the site of an ancient indigenous settlement whose remaining structures are clearly aligned according to a detailed astronomical knowledge. Following a long drive we turned onto the approach road, stopping in the middle of nowhere to make a small offering of bee pollen and tobacco. The first evening included a long ceremony performed by a knowledge-keeper from the local Native population, which concluded with a sensitive presentation of the problems we were likely to encounter in our endeavors. The sacred and the secular so seamlessly blended in the indigenous mind contrasts strongly with the conventional division between science and spirituality in the modern West. In the Western worldview, science is often defined in opposition to spirituality. My work with Native American colleagues challenges that presupposition at its root. Our time is one in which such unreflective assumptions must increasingly be challenged. Last year I was seated among over 10,000 neuroscientists listening to the fourteenth Dalai Lama address them concerning the interaction between Buddhist philosophers and Western scientists. The occasion was the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, and the Dalai Lama was the keynote speaker because of his groundbreaking collaborative work to bridge the traditional cultural divide between science and the contemplative traditions. Because of his openness and that of a growing number of scientists, Buddhist meditative insights have been joined to scientific research in ways that are very fruitful for the fields of cognitive science and psychology.3 This is a second example in which traditional divisions have been challenged with fruitful consequences. Contemplative

Pedagogy One of the most powerful transformative interventions developed by humanity is contemplative practice or meditation. It has been specifically designed to move human cognition from a delusory view of reality to a true one: that is, to one in which the profound interconnectedness of reality is directly perceived. Global conflict has its deep source in the privileging of worldviews, in the reification of our particular understanding and the objectification of the other. Such ways of seeing our world are, at root, dysfunctional and divisive.
Contemplative practice works on the human psyche to shape attention into a far suppler instrument, one that can appreciate a wide range of worldviews and even sustain the paradoxes of life, ultimately drawing life's complexity into a gentle, non-judgmental awareness. The usefulness of secular contemplative practice is being increasingly appreciated by educators at hundreds of North American universities and colleges. For example, in collaboration with The Center for Contemplative Mind in Society, the American Council of Learned Societies has granted 120 Contemplative Practice Fellowships to professors over the last ten years, supporting them in designing courses that include contemplative practice as a pedagogical strategy.4 At conferences and summer schools at Columbia University and Amherst College and elsewhere, professors have gathered to share their experiences in the emerging area of contemplative pedagogy. Their efforts range from simple silence at the start of class to exercises that school attention; and most recently, to innovative contemplative practices that relate directly to course content. The 2005 Columbia Conference focused specifically on the role of

contemplative practices in "Making Peace in Ourselves and Peace in the World." Courses are offered that range from theater to economics, from philosophy to cosmology, in which university teachers are experimenting with a wide range of contemplative exercises, thus creating a new academic pedagogy. I have become convinced that contemplation 3 benefits both students and faculty, and that secular contemplative practices should assume a significant place on our educational agenda.

Contemplative practices fall into two major classes, those that school cognition and those that cultivate compassion. We are well aware that our observation and thinking require training, but we often neglect the cultivation of our capacity for love. In his letters to a young poet, Rainer Maria Rilke wrote, "For one human being to love another, that is perhaps the most difficult of all our tasks, the ultimate, the last
it. With their whole being, with all their forces, gathered close about their lonely, timid, upwardbeating heart, they must learn to love." 5 We

test and proof, the work for which all other work is but a preparation. For this reason young people, who are beginners in everything, cannot yet know love, they have to learn

are well-practiced at educating the mind for critical reasoning, critical writing, and critical speaking as well as for scientific and quantitative analysis. But is this sufficient? In a world beset with conflicts, internal as well as external, isn't it of equal if not greater importance to balance the sharpening of our intellects with the systematic cultivation of our hearts? We must, indeed, learn to love. Educators should join with their students to undertake this most difficult task. Thus true education entails a transformation of the
human being that, as Goethe said, "is so great that I never would have believed it possible." This transformation results in the human capacity to live the worldviews of others, and

even further to sustain in our mind and heart the contradictions that are an inevitable part of engaging the beautiful variety of cultures, religions, and races that populate this planet. We can sustain the complexities of the world because we have learned to honor and embrace the complex, conflicting components of ourselves. Our inner accomplishments, achieved through contemplative education, translate into outer capacities for peace-building. From there it is a short distance to the perception of interconnectedness and the enduring love
for others, especially for those different from us. We are increasingly becoming a world populated by solitudes. When Rilke declares that the highest expression of love is to "stand guard over and protect the solitude of the other," he is expressing his respect for and even devotion to the uniqueness of every person and group. If, however, we are to avoid social atomization or the fundamentalist reaction to this tendency, we will need to learn to love across the chasms that divide us. Only

a profoundly contemplative and transformative education has the power to nurture the vibrant, diverse civilization that should be our global future. As Maria Montessori wrote, "Preventing conflicts is the work of politics; establishing peace is the work of education."6 And, anthropocentrism offers an explanation for international relations and conflict Kochi 9 [tarik, lecturer in law and international security @ U of Sussex, Doctorate in Law from Griffith, species war: law, violence, and animals, law, culture, and the humanities, 353-359] In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called war rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and understand war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in which specific terms (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm of human action. In this paper I argue that the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation species war. That is, at the foundation of the Law of war resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals. At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war. In contemporary public debates the laws of war are typically understood as referring to the rules set out by the conventions and customs that define the legality of a states right to go to war under international law. However, such a perspective is only a narrow and limited view of what constitutes the Law of war and of the relationship between law and war more generally. Here the Law of the Law of war needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term Recht
denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of Gesetz which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws. 1 To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific (positive law) formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war

contains at its heart arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence. The question of what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationship between war and law,
and, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out (positing) a particular answer to this question. In this respect

the Law of war (and thus its particular laws of war) involves a practice of normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to such questions as: what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of war, who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? When we

consider the relationship between war and law in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at the foundation of the Law of war resides species war. At present, the Law of war is dominated by two cultural-conceptual formulations or discourses. The Westphalian

system of interstate relations and the system of international human rights law are held to be modern foundations of the Law of war. In the West, most peoples conceptions of what constitutes war and of what constitutes a legitimate act of war are shaped by these two historical traditions. That is to say, these traditions have ordered how we understand the legitimate use of violence. 2 These discourses, however, have been heavily criticized. By building upon a particular line of criticism I develop my argument for

the foundational significance of species war. Two critiques of sovereignty and humanitarian law are of particular interest: Michel Foucaults notion of race war and Carl Schmitts notion of friend and enemy. Foucault in Society Must Be Defended set out a particular critique of the Westphalian juridical conception of state sovereignty and state power. 3 Within the Westphalian juridical conception, it is commonly argued

that sovereign power and legitimacy are grounded upon the ability of an institution to bring an end to internal

civil war and create a sphere of domestic peace. Against this Foucault claimed that war is never brought to an end within the domestic sphere, rather, it continues and develops in the form of race war. Connected to his account of bio-power, Foucault suggests a historical discourse of constant and perpetual race war that underlies legal and political institutions within modernity. 4 In The Concept of the Political, Carl Schmitt offered a critique of the liberal conception of the state grounded
upon the notion of the social contract and criticized legal and political conceptions of the state in which legitimacy (and the legitimacy of war) was seen to be grounded upon the notion of humanity. 5 For Schmitt the juridical notion of the state (and international human rights law)

presupposes and continually re-instates through violence the distinction and relation between friend and enemy. Schmitt claimed that the political emerges from the threatening and warlike struggle between friends and enemies and that all political and
legal institutions, and the decisions made therein, are built upon and are guided by this distinction. 6 In relation to the issue of war/law these two insights can be taken further. I think Foucaults notion of race war can be developed by putting at its heart the differing

historical and genealogical relationships between human and non-human animals. Thus, beyond race war what should be considered as a primary category within legal and political theory is that of species war. Further, the fundamental political distinction is not as Schmitt would have it, that of friends and enemies, but rather, the violent conflict between human and non-human animals. Race war is an extension of an earlier form of war, species war. The friend-enemy distinction is an extension of a more primary distinction between human and nonhuman animals. In this respect, what can be seen to lay at the foundation of the Law of war is not the Westphalian notion of civil peace, or the notion of human rights. Neither race war nor the friend-enemy distinction resides at the bottom of the Law of war. Rather, what sits at the foundation of the Law of war is a discourse of species war that over time has become so naturalised within Western legal and political theory that we have almost forgotten about it. Although species war remains largely hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a
Western variant. This variant, however, is one that may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes

legitimate violence fall back upon the hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements
about differential life-value and that these judgements are an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how

contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I
develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting upon the nature of law more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the good). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these

functions of law resides a practice of making judgements about the life-value of particular objects. These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the state, community, etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative life- value of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes legitimate violence. Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision it points to a moment at the heart of the law where distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or
positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law,

at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor. 7 In J.M. Coetzees The Lives of Animals 8 the protagonist Elizabeth Costello draws
a comparison between the everyday slaughter of non-human animals and the genocide of the Jews of Europe during the twentieth century. In addressing you on the subject of animals, she continues, I will pay you the honour of skipping a recital of the horrors of their lives and deaths. Though I have no reason to believe that you have at the forefront of your minds what is being done to animals at this moment in production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, in laboratories, all over the world, I will take it that you concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force, and leave it at that, reminding you only that the horrors I here omit are nevertheless at the center of this lecture. 9 A little while later she states: Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation,

cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them. And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical
enterprise dedicated to nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the comfort of our own homes) is as little consolation to those victims as it would have been pardon the tastelessness of the following to ask the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body fat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses with. 10 Similar comparisons have been made before. 11 Yet, when most of us think about the term war very seldom do we bother to think about non-human animals. The term war commonly evokes images of states, armies, grand weapons, battle lines, tactical stand-offs, and maybe even sometimes guerrilla or partisan violence. Surely the

keeping of cattle behind barbed wire fences and butchering them in abattoirs does not count as war? Surely not? Why not? What can be seen to be at stake within Elizabeth Costellos act of posing the modern project of highly efficient breeding and factory
slaughtering of non-human animals beside the Holocaust is a concern with the way in which we order or arrange conceptually and socially the legitimacy of violence and killing. In a Western philosophical tradition stretching at least from Augustine and Aquinas, through to Descartes and Kant, the ordering of the relationship between violence and legitimacy is such that, predominantly, non-human animals are considered to be without souls,

without reason and without a value that is typically ascribed to humans. For example, for Augustine, animals, together with plants, are exempted from the religious injunction Thou shalt not kill. When considering the question of what forms of killing and violence are legitimate, Augustine placed the killing of non-human animals well inside the framework of religious and moral legitimacy. 12 Of relevance is the practice by which the

question of legitimate violence is ordered that is, the manner in which it is organised by philosophical, moral and cultural justifications in a way that sets out how particular acts of violence are to be understood within social-material life. Within a Western tradition the killing of animals is typically not considered a form of war because violence against animals is placed far within the accepted framework of legitimate killing. The meanings
attached to the words we use are significant here. Many of our linguistic categories have been formulated along the distinction between human and nonhuman and offer different meanings based upon what object within this distinction a word denotes. Words like killing and slaughter

evoke different meanings and different responses when applied to humans as opposed to chickens or cattle or insects. While most people would react in horror to the brutal killing of a child, they accept the daily slaughter of thousands of calves. Although there
exists a bureaucratic language of regulation governing issues of efficiency, property rights, hygiene and cruelty, the breeding of animals for killing is widely accepted as a legitimate act. Such that, the killing of one animal is not considered murder and the killing of a geographical group of animals is not considered an act of genocide or species war.

The Roll of the Ballot is to vote for the team whose values best breakdown humanism thats the Katz evidence from the 1NC. We cannot reconcile the desires or utility of humans, nonhuman animals, abiotic existence or things like rocks and larger ecosystems so instead we should endorse openness. Their hierarchies inevitable cards speak to this dead-lock and just blow it off instead we need to embrace the possibility of abiotic and non-human value. This is not a theoretical argument but rather a substance question the affirmative can weigh their 1AC insofar as it represents their approach to alterity.

Framework (0:15)

***Exploration

The agent is the judge voting negative to endorse the global suicide of humanity this thought experiment shatters humanism by forcing us to come to grips with a world absent humans. This competes based on our link arguments our framework arguments and the impacts to the K prove its a valuable decisionmaking question. All debates come down the judge voting so any abuse is inevitable. They foreclose the ability to discuss the effects of the ballot. And, its predictable we have links to the action of the affirmative and its advantages, this is a kritik read often on the topic AND RAHUL WOKE ME UP AT 11 OCLOCK AT NIGHT TO ASK FOR MY CITES. And, its reciprocal the affirmative fiats a change in the entire USfg policy especially an OVERTURN of a previous decisions the resolution is a should not a would question.

Framework AT Agent Stuff

Voting negative affirms the priority of an inhuman ethics the means by which we create or adopt a perspective of species-being which disidentifies with the human which means it solves any internal link to their [impact author] evidence without a risk of a link. AND, refusal of extinction in the name of survival abandons the incommunicable forms of life. the only ethical move is that which refuses to abandon bare life ethics is a pre-requisite to actions how we choose to live logically foregrounds whether a choice is good or bad Dr. Noys 2K7 Benjamin, Professor Literature/Critical Theory at Chichster University, The Culture of Death, 96-97] http://library.nu/docs/OIH2F8BU30/The%20Culture%20of%20Death Agamben is arguing that there is no human essence except in our capacity to be destroyed. What makes us human is what makes us vulnerable to this radical exposure to life that is only death in motion. Therefore the only real basis of ethics lies in this experience of our exposure to power and to being held on the verge of death. Modern
ethics can only be modern if it measures up to the experience of the exposure to death in modern culture. Agambens new ethics tries to do this by insisting that we always carry the shame of bare life and that this shame forces us to witness the impossibility of ever separating off completely bare life, as power would like to do. His ethical subject is the subject who bears witness to the fact that they find themselves

Alt Solvency (1:05)

only in the oblivion of losing their subjectivity. What power constantly strives to do is to break the connection between the living and speaking being by isolating bare life as survival. Agamben returns to this experience of survival and finds in it the possibility of an ethics that can refuse to separate off survival. This new ethics is found in the remnant, and in survival. What we find in Auschwitz, according to Agamben, is the attempt to produce an absolute separation of bare life. We must witness this attempt but refuse it through an act of witnessing that always maintains our connection to bare life. Ethics after Auschwitz will be an ethics that refuses to exclude bare life, and an ethics that bears witness to the irreducible disjunction between the living being and the speaking being. How does such an
ethics help us to answer the problems which biomedicine poses for us today? It seems, unlike bioethics or Badious ethic of truths, to offer no solutions to these pressing problems. However, what it does offer is the insistence that for any ethics to be truly ethical it must not

simply exclude bare life as what is not ethical. It turns existing ethical discourse on its head (or puts it back on its feet)
by locating ethics in the problem of bearing witness to bare life as what founds, and at the same time ruins, any experience of subjectivity. This, then, is an ethics that does not forget or efface bare life, and so does not forget our exposure to death.

3. Fiats reciprocal everyone would adopt the position of species-being if the aff can claim it then so can the alternative. The resolution is a should not a would question. 4. Focus on inner dimensions is more important than research or policy discussions Zajonc Prof 2006 Arthur, Professor of physics at Amherst College. Contemplative and Transformative Pedagogy, Kosmos Journal 1.1, http://www.arthurzajonc.org/uploads/Contemplative_Pedagogy%20Kosmos.pdf. I approach the question of shaping worldviews as an educator and as one who, like so many, is moved by widespread violence and global economic inequities. What is it about worldviews that results in the identity politics of Iraq where Shiites, Sunnis,
and Kurds all act along ethnic and religious lines, or in Darfur where issues of identity cut deeper, leading to Arabs perpetrating mass killing and rape against their Muslim brothers and sisters who are 'black Africans' from non-Arab tribes? What is it about worldviews that leads to a large and growing divide between the rich and the poor? In the face of increasing per capita GDP, the global median income is decreasing, and 100 million more are in poverty today than ten years ago.1 What can I as an educator offer in the face of these tragic realities of today's world? To offer an alternative or 'better' worldview is to no avail. In fact, efforts to promote that better viewpoint may initiate or aggravate conflict. In this article I advance a view of the human being in which the individual develops the capacity to move among worldviews, transcending particular identities while simultaneously honoring each of them. Even more, we can learn to live the complexity of diverse identities that are in truth everpresent in us as well as in the world. In reality, the interconnectedness of the world has its reflection in the connections among the diverse aspects of ourselves. When we find peace among the component parts of our own psyche, then we will possess the inner resources to make peace in a multicultural society. Only in this way will the crises I have mentioned be addressed at their roots. I

see educationformal and informalas the sole means of developing this remarkable human capacity for interior harmony, which in the end is the capacity for freedom and love. The Function of Frames The content of education is infinite in extent. Every day more information is available, new research is published, political changes occur, and businesses collapse. All of these demand our attention. Education is largely comprised of acquiring and organizing such information, and for this purpose students are taught the skills needed to assimilate and transmit information through reading, writing, and mathematics. But such simple input-output functions are but one dimension of education. Something more is needed to convert information into meaningful knowledge. Surrounding and supporting the information we receive is the 'form' or structure of our cognitive and emotional life that goes largely unobserved. To understand how information becomes meaningful, we must turn our attention to this hidden container or 'frame of reference,' as Jack Mezirow termed it.2 A frame of reference is a way of knowing or making meaning of the world. Enormous quantities of sensorial and mental data stream into human consciousness, but somehow that stream is brought into a coherent meaningful whole. At first sight it may seem that such meaning-making is an entirely natural and universal process, and to some degree it certainly is. Evolution has incorporated reflexes and drives deep into the human psyche. But the way we make sense of the world is also conditioned profoundly by societal forces, among them education. That is to say, we are socialized into a worldview that operates largely unconsciously and behind the scenes, but which affects the way we understand what we see,

hear, and feel. According to the Leo Apostel Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Belgium, "A worldview is a map that people use to orient and explain the world, and
from which they evaluate and act, and put forward prognoses and visions of the future." In the course of a lifetime we may shed one worldview and adopt another. In other words, we can change the structure that makes meaning for us. Thus while

worldviews can be understood as deep cognitive structures, they are not immutable. The solutions to Darfur and economic inequality (among many other problems) will ultimately not be found through more information or better foreign aid programs, but only here at the level where information marries with values to become meaning. Human action flows from this source, not from data alone. An education that would reach beyond information must work deeper; it will need to transform the very container of consciousness, make it more supple and complex. For this, we educators need pedagogical 2 tools other than those optimized for information transfer. At its most

advanced stage, we will need to help our students and ourselves to create a dynamic cognitive framework that can challenge established intellectual boundaries, and even sustain the conflicting values and viewpoints that comprise our planetary human community. Challenging Conventional Divisions In recent years I have spent time with members of the Native American Academy, a group largely comprised of academics who are also Native Americans. In our meetings we have explored the character of Native knowledge systems and research methods in comparison to those of orthodox Western science. From the first, the differences were marked. The place of our meeting was of special consequence, Chaco Canyon. It is the site of an ancient indigenous settlement whose remaining structures are clearly aligned according to a detailed astronomical knowledge. Following a long drive we turned onto the approach road, stopping in the middle of nowhere to make a small offering of bee pollen and tobacco. The first evening included a long ceremony performed by a knowledge-keeper from the local Native population, which concluded with a sensitive presentation of the problems we were likely to encounter in our endeavors. The sacred and the secular so seamlessly blended in the indigenous mind contrasts strongly with the conventional division between science and spirituality in the modern West. In the Western worldview, science is often defined in opposition to spirituality. My work with Native American colleagues challenges that presupposition at its root. Our time is one in which such unreflective assumptions must increasingly be challenged. Last year I was seated among over 10,000 neuroscientists listening to the fourteenth Dalai Lama address them concerning the interaction between Buddhist philosophers and Western scientists. The occasion was the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, and the Dalai Lama was the keynote speaker because of his groundbreaking collaborative work to bridge the traditional cultural divide between science and the contemplative traditions. Because of his openness and that of a growing number of scientists, Buddhist meditative insights have been joined to scientific research in ways that are very fruitful for the fields of cognitive science and psychology.3 This is a second example in which traditional divisions have been challenged with fruitful consequences. Contemplative

Pedagogy One of the most powerful transformative interventions developed by humanity is contemplative practice or meditation. It has been specifically designed to move human cognition from a delusory view of reality to a true one: that is, to one in which the profound interconnectedness of reality is directly perceived. Global conflict has its deep source in the privileging of worldviews, in the reification of our particular understanding and the objectification of the other. Such ways of seeing our world are, at root, dysfunctional and divisive.
Contemplative practice works on the human psyche to shape attention into a far suppler instrument, one that can appreciate a wide range of worldviews and even sustain the paradoxes of life, ultimately drawing life's complexity into a gentle, non-judgmental awareness. The usefulness of secular contemplative practice is being increasingly appreciated by educators at hundreds of North American universities and colleges. For example, in collaboration with The Center for Contemplative Mind in Society, the American Council of Learned Societies has granted 120 Contemplative Practice Fellowships to professors over the last ten years, supporting them in designing courses that include contemplative practice as a pedagogical strategy.4 At conferences and summer schools at Columbia University and Amherst College and elsewhere, professors have gathered to share their experiences in the emerging area of contemplative pedagogy. Their efforts range from simple silence at the start of class to exercises that school attention; and most recently, to innovative contemplative practices that relate directly to course content. The 2005 Columbia Conference focused specifically on the role of contemplative practices in "Making Peace in Ourselves and Peace in the World." Courses are offered that range from theater to economics, from philosophy to cosmology, in which university teachers are experimenting with a wide range of contemplative exercises, thus creating a new academic pedagogy. I have become convinced that contemplation 3 benefits both students and faculty, and that secular contemplative practices should assume a significant place on our educational agenda.

Contemplative practices fall into two major classes, those that school cognition and those that cultivate compassion. We are well aware that our observation and thinking require training, but we often neglect the cultivation of our capacity for love. In his letters to a young poet, Rainer Maria Rilke wrote, "For one human being to love another, that is perhaps the most difficult of all our tasks, the ultimate, the last
it. With their whole being, with all their forces, gathered close about their lonely, timid, upwardbeating heart, they must learn to love." 5 We

test and proof, the work for which all other work is but a preparation. For this reason young people, who are beginners in everything, cannot yet know love, they have to learn

are well-practiced at educating the mind for critical reasoning, critical writing, and critical speaking as well as for scientific and quantitative analysis. But is this sufficient? In a world beset with conflicts, internal as well as external, isn't it of equal if not greater importance to balance the sharpening of our intellects with the systematic cultivation of our hearts? We must, indeed, learn to love. Educators should join with their students to undertake this most difficult task. Thus true education entails a transformation of the
human being that, as Goethe said, "is so great that I never would have believed it possible." This transformation results in the human capacity to live the worldviews of others, and

even further to sustain in our mind and heart the contradictions that are an inevitable part of engaging the beautiful variety of cultures, religions, and races that populate this planet. We can sustain the complexities of the world because we have learned to honor and embrace the complex, conflicting components of ourselves. Our inner accomplishments, achieved through contemplative education, translate into outer capacities for peace-building. From there it is a short distance to the perception of interconnectedness and the enduring love
for others, especially for those different from us. We are increasingly becoming a world populated by solitudes. When Rilke declares that the highest expression of love is to "stand guard over and protect the solitude of the other," he is expressing his respect for and even devotion to the uniqueness of every person and group. If, however, we are to avoid social atomization or the fundamentalist reaction to this tendency, we will need to learn to love across the chasms that divide us. Only

a profoundly contemplative and transformative education has the power to nurture the vibrant, diverse civilization that should be our global future. As Maria Montessori wrote, "Preventing conflicts is the work of politics; establishing peace is the work of education."6

Their Thomas evidence says The next president should declare a rebirth of the U.S. space program with clear goals, such as a U.S. moon colony and a trip to Mars, And they still attempt to exploit extraterrestrial objects for use by humans it converts mars into a fancy chemistry set. And, the new humans are more important than animals cards in the 2AC probably give us a link even if the 1AC didnt.

AT Not Colonization

Kritik outweighs and turns the case a. root cause of environmental destruction human-centrism is the only way to subordinate the environment and justify exploitation strip mining and pollution may be tied in some way to the [affs harms] but the underlying justification is anthropocentric this makes it try or die for the alternative otherwise the earth as we know it will no longer exist thats _____. b. anthropocentric hierarchies are the root cause of human exploitation the tactics of oppression like chains and whips, pens and cages, splitting up families and humiliation were all perfected on non-human animals. The superior/inferior binary is founded on our ability to place humanity on a pedestal. Black people described as bestial or animalistic, women degraded like domesticated animals, the list goes on the founding divide is the anthropocentric one thats our Best 7 evidence. This is a reason the alternative solves the case and why the aff can never solve because they cant overcome the fundamental division and instead reinforce it through a new, more inclusive humanism. c. this is particularly true of the 1ACs impacts [analysis]

2NC/1NR Overview (0:50)

***Kritikal

Voting negative affirms the priority of an inhuman ethics the means by which we create or adopt a perspective of species-being which disidentifies with the human which means it solves any internal link to their [impact author] evidence without a risk of a link. AND, refusal of extinction in the name of survival abandons the incommunicable forms of life. the only ethical move is that which refuses to abandon bare life Dr. Noys 2K7 Benjamin, Professor Literature/Critical Theory at Chichster University, The Culture of Death, 96-97] http://library.nu/docs/OIH2F8BU30/The%20Culture%20of%20Death Agamben is arguing that there is no human essence except in our capacity to be destroyed. What makes us human is what makes us vulnerable to this radical exposure to life that is only death in motion. Therefore the only real basis of ethics lies in this experience of our exposure to power and to being held on the verge of death. Modern
ethics can only be modern if it measures up to the experience of the exposure to death in modern culture. Agambens new ethics tries to do this by insisting that we always carry the shame of bare life and that this shame forces us to witness the impossibility of ever separating off completely bare life, as power would like to do. His ethical subject is the subject who bears witness to the fact that they find themselves

Alt Solvency (0:30)

only in the oblivion of losing their subjectivity. What power constantly strives to do is to break the connection between the living and speaking being by isolating bare life as survival. Agamben returns to this experience of survival and finds in it the possibility of an ethics that can refuse to separate off survival. This new ethics is found in the remnant, and in survival. What we find in Auschwitz, according to Agamben, is the attempt to produce an absolute separation of bare life. We must witness this attempt but refuse it through an act of witnessing that always maintains our connection to bare life. Ethics after Auschwitz will be an ethics that refuses to exclude bare life, and an ethics that bears witness to the irreducible disjunction between the living being and the speaking being. How does such an
ethics help us to answer the problems which biomedicine poses for us today? It seems, unlike bioethics or Badious ethic of truths, to offer no solutions to these pressing problems. However, what it does offer is the insistence that for any ethics to be truly ethical it must not

simply exclude bare life as what is not ethical. It turns existing ethical discourse on its head (or puts it back on its feet)
by locating ethics in the problem of bearing witness to bare life as what founds, and at the same time ruins, any experience of subjectivity. This, then, is an ethics that does not forget or efface bare life, and so does not forget our exposure to death.

3. Fiats reciprocal everyone would adopt the position of species-being if the aff can claim it then so can the alternative. The resolution is a should not a would question. 4. Focus on inner dimensions is more important than research or policy discussions Zajonc Prof 2006 Arthur, Professor of physics at Amherst College. Contemplative and Transformative Pedagogy, Kosmos Journal 1.1, http://www.arthurzajonc.org/uploads/Contemplative_Pedagogy%20Kosmos.pdf. I approach the question of shaping worldviews as an educator and as one who, like so many, is moved by widespread violence and global economic inequities. What is it about worldviews that results in the identity politics of Iraq where Shiites, Sunnis,
and Kurds all act along ethnic and religious lines, or in Darfur where issues of identity cut deeper, leading to Arabs perpetrating mass killing and rape against their Muslim brothers and sisters who are 'black Africans' from non-Arab tribes? What is it about worldviews that leads to a large and growing divide between the rich and the poor? In the face of increasing per capita GDP, the global median income is decreasing, and 100 million more are in poverty today than ten years ago.1 What can I as an educator offer in the face of these tragic realities of today's world? To offer an alternative or 'better' worldview is to no avail. In fact, efforts to promote that better viewpoint may initiate or aggravate conflict. In this article I advance a view of the human being in which the individual develops the capacity to move among worldviews, transcending particular identities while simultaneously honoring each of them. Even more, we can learn to live the complexity of diverse identities that are in truth everpresent in us as well as in the world. In reality, the interconnectedness of the world has its reflection in the connections among the diverse aspects of ourselves. When we find peace among the component parts of our own psyche, then we will possess the inner resources to make peace in a multicultural society. Only in this way will the crises I have mentioned be addressed at their roots. I

see educationformal and informalas the sole means of developing this remarkable human capacity for interior harmony, which in the end is the capacity for freedom and love. The Function of Frames The content of education is infinite in extent. Every day more information is available, new research is published, political changes occur, and businesses collapse. All of these demand our attention. Education is largely comprised of acquiring and organizing such information, and for this purpose students are taught the skills needed to assimilate and transmit information through reading, writing, and mathematics. But such simple input-output functions are but one dimension of education. Something more is needed to convert information into meaningful knowledge. Surrounding and supporting the information we receive is the 'form' or structure of our cognitive and emotional life that goes largely unobserved. To understand how information becomes meaningful, we must turn our attention to this hidden container or 'frame of reference,' as Jack Mezirow termed it.2 A frame of reference is a way of knowing or making meaning of the world. Enormous quantities of sensorial and mental data stream into human consciousness, but somehow that stream is brought into a coherent meaningful whole. At first sight it may seem that such meaning-making is an entirely natural and universal process, and to some degree it certainly is. Evolution has incorporated reflexes and drives deep into the human psyche. But the way we make sense of the world is also conditioned profoundly by societal forces, among them education. That is to say, we are socialized into a worldview that operates largely unconsciously and behind the scenes, but which affects the way we understand what we see, hear, and feel. According to the Leo Apostel Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Belgium, "A worldview is a map that people use to orient and explain the world, and

from which they evaluate and act, and put forward prognoses and visions of the future." In the course of a lifetime we may shed one worldview and adopt another. In other words, we can change the structure that makes meaning for us. Thus while

worldviews can be understood as deep cognitive structures, they are not immutable. The solutions to Darfur and economic inequality (among many other problems) will ultimately not be found through more information or better foreign aid programs, but only here at the level where information marries with values to become meaning. Human action flows from this source, not from data alone. An education that would reach beyond information must work deeper; it will need to transform the very container of consciousness, make it more supple and complex. For this, we educators need pedagogical 2 tools other than those optimized for information transfer. At its most

advanced stage, we will need to help our students and ourselves to create a dynamic cognitive framework that can challenge established intellectual boundaries, and even sustain the conflicting values and viewpoints that comprise our planetary human community. Challenging Conventional Divisions In recent years I have spent time with members of the Native American Academy, a group largely comprised of academics who are also Native Americans. In our meetings we have explored the character of Native knowledge systems and research methods in comparison to those of orthodox Western science. From the first, the differences were marked. The place of our meeting was of special consequence, Chaco Canyon. It is the site of an ancient indigenous settlement whose remaining structures are clearly aligned according to a detailed astronomical knowledge. Following a long drive we turned onto the approach road, stopping in the middle of nowhere to make a small offering of bee pollen and tobacco. The first evening included a long ceremony performed by a knowledge-keeper from the local Native population, which concluded with a sensitive presentation of the problems we were likely to encounter in our endeavors. The sacred and the secular so seamlessly blended in the indigenous mind contrasts strongly with the conventional division between science and spirituality in the modern West. In the Western worldview, science is often defined in opposition to spirituality. My work with Native American colleagues challenges that presupposition at its root. Our time is one in which such unreflective assumptions must increasingly be challenged. Last year I was seated among over 10,000 neuroscientists listening to the fourteenth Dalai Lama address them concerning the interaction between Buddhist philosophers and Western scientists. The occasion was the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, and the Dalai Lama was the keynote speaker because of his groundbreaking collaborative work to bridge the traditional cultural divide between science and the contemplative traditions. Because of his openness and that of a growing number of scientists, Buddhist meditative insights have been joined to scientific research in ways that are very fruitful for the fields of cognitive science and psychology.3 This is a second example in which traditional divisions have been challenged with fruitful consequences. Contemplative

Pedagogy One of the most powerful transformative interventions developed by humanity is contemplative practice or meditation. It has been specifically designed to move human cognition from a delusory view of reality to a true one: that is, to one in which the profound interconnectedness of reality is directly perceived. Global conflict has its deep source in the privileging of worldviews, in the reification of our particular understanding and the objectification of the other. Such ways of seeing our world are, at root, dysfunctional and divisive.
Contemplative practice works on the human psyche to shape attention into a far suppler instrument, one that can appreciate a wide range of worldviews and even sustain the paradoxes of life, ultimately drawing life's complexity into a gentle, non-judgmental awareness. The usefulness of secular contemplative practice is being increasingly appreciated by educators at hundreds of North American universities and colleges. For example, in collaboration with The Center for Contemplative Mind in Society, the American Council of Learned Societies has granted 120 Contemplative Practice Fellowships to professors over the last ten years, supporting them in designing courses that include contemplative practice as a pedagogical strategy.4 At conferences and summer schools at Columbia University and Amherst College and elsewhere, professors have gathered to share their experiences in the emerging area of contemplative pedagogy. Their efforts range from simple silence at the start of class to exercises that school attention; and most recently, to innovative contemplative practices that relate directly to course content. The 2005 Columbia Conference focused specifically on the role of contemplative practices in "Making Peace in Ourselves and Peace in the World." Courses are offered that range from theater to economics, from philosophy to cosmology, in which university teachers are experimenting with a wide range of contemplative exercises, thus creating a new academic pedagogy. I have become convinced that contemplation 3 benefits both students and faculty, and that secular contemplative practices should assume a significant place on our educational agenda.

Contemplative practices fall into two major classes, those that school cognition and those that cultivate compassion. We are well aware that our observation and thinking require training, but we often neglect the cultivation of our capacity for love. In his letters to a young poet, Rainer Maria Rilke wrote, "For one human being to love another, that is perhaps the most difficult of all our tasks, the ultimate, the last
it. With their whole being, with all their forces, gathered close about their lonely, timid, upwardbeating heart, they must learn to love." 5 We

test and proof, the work for which all other work is but a preparation. For this reason young people, who are beginners in everything, cannot yet know love, they have to learn

are well-practiced at educating the mind for critical reasoning, critical writing, and critical speaking as well as for scientific and quantitative analysis. But is this sufficient? In a world beset with conflicts, internal as well as external, isn't it of equal if not greater importance to balance the sharpening of our intellects with the systematic cultivation of our hearts? We must, indeed, learn to love. Educators should join with their students to undertake this most difficult task. Thus true education entails a transformation of the
human being that, as Goethe said, "is so great that I never would have believed it possible." This transformation results in the human capacity to live the worldviews of others, and

even further to sustain in our mind and heart the contradictions that are an inevitable part of engaging the beautiful variety of cultures, religions, and races that populate this planet. We can sustain the complexities of the world because we have learned to honor and embrace the complex, conflicting components of ourselves. Our inner accomplishments, achieved through contemplative education, translate into outer capacities for peace-building. From there it is a short distance to the perception of interconnectedness and the enduring love
for others, especially for those different from us. We are increasingly becoming a world populated by solitudes. When Rilke declares that the highest expression of love is to "stand guard over and protect the solitude of the other," he is expressing his respect for and even devotion to the uniqueness of every person and group. If, however, we are to avoid social atomization or the fundamentalist reaction to this tendency, we will need to learn to love across the chasms that divide us. Only

a profoundly contemplative and transformative education has the power to nurture the vibrant, diverse civilization that should be our global future. As Maria Montessori wrote, "Preventing conflicts is the work of politics; establishing peace is the work of education."6 5. Consequentialism is impossible in a non-speciest frameworkinstead of satisfying a desire for good consequences, you should affirm a value system beyond humanism. Eric Katz, Director of Science, Technology, and Society Program at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, 1997 [Nature as Subject p. 9-10] Utilitarianism might be salvaged for use in the environmental debate if it is stripped of its bias towards the satisfaction of human needs and preferences. Bentham, it should be remembered, considered the pains and pleasures of the animal kingdom to be of important to a
utilitarian calculation. According to this kind of position, the wants and desires of the wildlife in a given area would have to be considered prior to any development or destruction for the purpose of human betterment. Unfortunately, the problems with this kind of broad utilitarianism appear insurmountable, How

does the satisfaction of animal needs compare in utility with the satisfaction of human needs ? Can we bring plant life into the calculation? What about nonliving entities , such as rock formations (e.g., the Grand Canyon) or entire ecological areas ? Does a marsh have an interest in not being drained and turned into a golf course, a need or desire to continue a natural

existence? It is clear that difficult-if not impossible-problems arise when we begin to consider utility for non humanand nonsentient entities. (2) A

second alternative, highly tentative, is a movement away from a "want-oriented perspective" in ethical theory.2 Rather than evaluating the moral worth of an action by the consequences which satisfy needs and desires in the human (or even nonhuman) world, we can look at the intrinsic qualities of the action, and determine what kind of values this action manifests. The question which the debate over environmental presentation raises is not "Does preservation of this particular natural object lead to a better world?" but rather "Do we want a world in which the preservation of natural objects is considered an important value?" The question is not whether the preservation of a certain entity increases the amount of satisfaction and pleasure in the world, but rather, whether these pleasures, satisfactions, and needs ought to be pursued. The question, in short, is about what kind of moral universe ought to be created.2' Only when the preservation of natural objects is seen to be an intrinsically good policy of action , rather than a means to some kind of satisfaction, will a policy of environmental protection be explained and justified. The development of an ethical theory which can accomplish this task will be a difficult
undertaking, but it is the only choice open to preservationists who wish to avoid the easy, self-defeating trap of utilitarianism

6. We should give moral consideration to the whole cosmos Roderick Nash, Professor of History and Environmental Studies at UC-SB, 1989 [The Rights of Nature p. 157-159]

On the other hand some philosophers and scientists were prepared to entertain precisely this possibility. Although the roots of the idea that the earth is a living being are very old in Western thought, james Lovelock, an English atmospheric chemist, made the most dramatic modern statement of the idea in the mid-19705 with his Gaia hypothesis. The ancient Greeks used the term Gaia to refer to the nurturing earth goddess. Lovelock removed the theology and dressed this concept in the clothing of biochemistry. The planet, he believed, gradually created and presently maintains a self-regulating environment which not only sustains the life of its components but is itself alive. From this perspective individual

beings and species such as Homo sapiens were to the earth as cells and organs were to their own bodies-parts of indivisible wholes. It followed that just as it made no sense to value or respect a brain cell or a liver apart from the entire organism on which it depended for life, so a proper environ- mental ethic demanded assigning value to the whole earth. Since humans were the only morally conscious members of this community, the brain cells of Gaia, they had the unique capability of restraining themselves in a manner consistent with the continuing welfare of the earth-being to which they belonged. All this implied that the planet possessed the traditional requirements for ethical considerability: consciousness, the ability to feel pain, and an interest or capacity for what might be termed happiness. The earth, in short, was regarded as a super-being with rights primary to those of the
lesser beings, and the most far-reaching of the biocentric environmentalists called upon humankind to acknowledge and act upon this reality. Theodore Roszak, for example, wrote in 1978 about the rights Of the planet," which he understood as deriving from the personhood of the Earth." According to Roszak, meaningful

environmental reform would not occur without "a sense of ethical respect, if not reverence, that can only exist between persons." The point, then, was to view the earth as a person-Mother Gaia-and to expand ethics to include her. "Nature," Roszak concluded, must also have
its natural rights." "" Michael Cohen wrote a Guidebook the Liberation of Self and Planet. The director of several education programs aimed at integrating humankind and nature, Cohen believed that if

the planet and, indeed, the universe were alive, then so were all their components: "rocks and mountains, sand, clouds, wind, and rain . , . nothing is dead." As part of the same cosmic being nothing was beyond ethical

consideration. Cohen understood environmental ethics to be an expression of the planet trying to protect itself and, in turn, myself Holmes Rolston contributed the idea that

nature or the earth was the originating matrix" or parental environment" of all matter whether organized into what we call life or displayed as crystals rivers. . . mesas, canyons. Everything was created by nature and, for Rolston, there is value wherever there is positive creativity." Using this principle, he found no reason to limit ethics to earth. Was not the universe the originating matrix" of the planet we occupied? Should it not be included as the ultimate ethical circle? "" In 1986 Rolston, along with other
philosophers. theologians, and scientists, contributed the papers that the Sierra Club published under the title Beyond Spaceship Earth: Environmental Ethics and the Solar System. The collection explicitly addressed the nonanthropocentric dimension," asking whether it was moral to conduct an experimental nuclear meltdown on the moon or to strip-mine a neighboring planet. If the answers to such questions were still sketchy, here were thinkers at least willing to inquire whether a

moral philosophy that ended with the boundaries of the planet was a manifestation of terra centrism" or Earth chauvinism." ""The
implication of all biocentric and, literally, universal ethical philosophy from Aldo Leopold onwards is that the whole is more important than any of the parts. As Stephen- R. L. Clark put it in 1983. What

matters is the maintenance of Gaia and her constituent ecosystems, not the preservation at all costs of any single line (even our own)." '"" Indeed the Gaia hypothesis connoted for many thinkers the capacity of the earth organism to purge itself of disruptive elements just as a simpler organism removed potentially poisonous liquid and solid wastes and tried to destroy cancers and infections. The point of this line of reasoning was to imply that humankind, as the most formidable contemporary poison on the planet, might be excreted if the species did not clean up its technological act. Perhaps, some suggested, Gaia might choose to let Homo sapiens self-destruct with nuclear weapons. In
1986 British television featured a three-part special on a revolutionary environmental action group, called Gaia, whose members believed that human beings were an unhealthy force in the ecosystem and must be eliminated from the earth-organism. There can be no more graphic example of the ability of environmental ethics to transcend human self-interest. But as biocentric philosophers were quick to explain, individual self-interest was indistinguishable, to the Gaian perspective, from the interest of the whole because the self like the cell, has no being at all outside the environmental context.

Were impact turning the focus on policymaking and politics the figure of the animal-queer is continually excluded from politics because it is inconsistent with the humanist ethic inclusion of the aff within the system guarantees cooption as it will be manipulated to reinforce the trope of preserving the Child thats DellAversano. This is particularly true given their dehumanization impacts which posits a new more inclusive humanism that just expands the community to which futurism applies.

AT: Must Act/Do Stuff with Gov (0:15)

You should prefer our internal links to his argument for two reasons 1. genealogical exposition were doing the intellectual work tracing the sources of these practices your evidence ahistoricizes violence and actually mutes the discourse of the alternative by presuming the immutable nature of the human/non-human divide. 2. perspectivism only our telling of the link story steps outside of the narrative of humanism you have a sound reason to be skeptical of their claims because we indict the origin of their axiological positing of values

Empirics/Historicism Important (0:20)

Anthropocentrism outweighs and turns the case a. environmental destruction the human/non-human animal divide enables the inferioritization of nature and subordinates it to humanity, stripping it to mere instrumental value anthropocentrism acts as perceptual blinders letting us run ourselves off the edge and into extinction its try or die for the alternative. b. root cause of war the non-human register is a pre-requisite to conflict and escalation even if competition occurs, we can only justify killing by placing them in a category below human or the animal category only the alternatives rejection of anthropocentrism in favor of the species-being can solve. Their description of human motivations for conflict covers over the species-war that produces racialized and nationalist conflict. c. Even if they win utilitarianism The kritik outweighs were killing billions of farm animals a year in the worst conditions thats only the U.S. Deckha in 2k10 Maneesha, associate professor of law at the University of Victoria, The Subhuman as a Cultural Agent of Violence, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 3, http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/09/JCAS-Special-Issue-Women-of-Color-November-3-FINAL-2010.pdf One of the most violent places imaginable is the modern day slaughterhouse. The rate of killing inside is swift and of unprecedented proportions. In the United States alone, around 9.5 billion animals are killed per year. To put that in perspective, that amounts to 250 cows per hour and 266 chickens per second (Isaacs-Blundin, 2007). This figure does not account for all slaughter of animals for food in the United States, merely the extent of killing of land farm animals (Finelli, 2006). The overwhelming number are born, raised, and killed for consumption making the violence against farm animals the most pervasive form of institutionalized violence against animals (Isaacs-Blundin, 2007). These statistics also fail to capture the suffering animals endure while in the slaughterhouse, where they are raised for slaughter (Finelli, 2006; Marcus, 2005; Pollan, 2002; Scholsser, 2001). All of this infliction on animal bodies is perceived as legitimate violence because of the nonhuman status of the species involved. The law buttresses this cultural acceptance. Animals are the property of corporate and human
owners; theirs is a near universal status in western legal systems, which facilitates their instrumental use and exploitation for human ends.

Overview (0:45)

***Security

Voting negative affirms the priority of an inhuman ethics the means by which we create or adopt a perspective of species-being which disidentifies with the human which means it solves any internal link to their [impact author] evidence without a risk of a link. AND, refusal of extinction in the name of survival abandons the incommunicable forms of life. the only ethical move is that which refuses to abandon bare life ethics is a pre-requisite to actions how we choose to live logically foregrounds whether a choice is good or bad Dr. Noys 2K7 Benjamin, Professor Literature/Critical Theory at Chichster University, The Culture of Death, 96-97] http://library.nu/docs/OIH2F8BU30/The%20Culture%20of%20Death Agamben is arguing that there is no human essence except in our capacity to be destroyed. What makes us human is what makes us vulnerable to this radical exposure to life that is only death in motion. Therefore the only real basis of ethics lies in this experience of our exposure to power and to being held on the verge of death. Modern
ethics can only be modern if it measures up to the experience of the exposure to death in modern culture. Agambens new ethics tries to do this by insisting that we always carry the shame of bare life and that this shame forces us to witness the impossibility of ever separating off completely bare life, as power would like to do. His ethical subject is the subject who bears witness to the fact that they find themselves

Alt Solvency (1:05)

only in the oblivion of losing their subjectivity. What power constantly strives to do is to break the connection between the living and speaking being by isolating bare life as survival. Agamben returns to this experience of survival and finds in it the possibility of an ethics that can refuse to separate off survival. This new ethics is found in the remnant, and in survival. What we find in Auschwitz, according to Agamben, is the attempt to produce an absolute separation of bare life. We must witness this attempt but refuse it through an act of witnessing that always maintains our connection to bare life. Ethics after Auschwitz will be an ethics that refuses to exclude bare life, and an ethics that bears witness to the irreducible disjunction between the living being and the speaking being. How does such an
ethics help us to answer the problems which biomedicine poses for us today? It seems, unlike bioethics or Badious ethic of truths, to offer no solutions to these pressing problems. However, what it does offer is the insistence that for any ethics to be truly ethical it must not

simply exclude bare life as what is not ethical. It turns existing ethical discourse on its head (or puts it back on its feet)
by locating ethics in the problem of bearing witness to bare life as what founds, and at the same time ruins, any experience of subjectivity. This, then, is an ethics that does not forget or efface bare life, and so does not forget our exposure to death.

3. Fiats reciprocal everyone would adopt the position of species-being if the aff can claim it then so can the alternative. The resolution is a should not a would question. 4. Focus on inner dimensions is more important than research or policy discussions Zajonc Prof 2006 Arthur, Professor of physics at Amherst College. Contemplative and Transformative Pedagogy, Kosmos Journal 1.1, http://www.arthurzajonc.org/uploads/Contemplative_Pedagogy%20Kosmos.pdf. I approach the question of shaping worldviews as an educator and as one who, like so many, is moved by widespread violence and global economic inequities. What is it about worldviews that results in the identity politics of Iraq where Shiites, Sunnis,
and Kurds all act along ethnic and religious lines, or in Darfur where issues of identity cut deeper, leading to Arabs perpetrating mass killing and rape against their Muslim brothers and sisters who are 'black Africans' from non-Arab tribes? What is it about worldviews that leads to a large and growing divide between the rich and the poor? In the face of increasing per capita GDP, the global median income is decreasing, and 100 million more are in poverty today than ten years ago.1 What can I as an educator offer in the face of these tragic realities of today's world? To offer an alternative or 'better' worldview is to no avail. In fact, efforts to promote that better viewpoint may initiate or aggravate conflict. In this article I advance a view of the human being in which the individual develops the capacity to move among worldviews, transcending particular identities while simultaneously honoring each of them. Even more, we can learn to live the complexity of diverse identities that are in truth everpresent in us as well as in the world. In reality, the interconnectedness of the world has its reflection in the connections among the diverse aspects of ourselves. When we find peace among the component parts of our own psyche, then we will possess the inner resources to make peace in a multicultural society. Only in this way will the crises I have mentioned be addressed at their roots. I

see educationformal and informalas the sole means of developing this remarkable human capacity for interior harmony, which in the end is the capacity for freedom and love. The Function of Frames The content of education is infinite in extent. Every day more information is available, new research is published, political changes occur, and businesses collapse. All of these demand our attention. Education is largely comprised of acquiring and organizing such information, and for this purpose students are taught the skills needed to assimilate and transmit information through reading, writing, and mathematics. But such simple input-output functions are but one dimension of education. Something more is needed to convert information into meaningful knowledge. Surrounding and supporting the information we receive is the 'form' or structure of our cognitive and emotional life that goes largely unobserved. To understand how information becomes meaningful, we must turn our attention to this hidden container or 'frame of reference,' as Jack Mezirow termed it.2 A frame of reference is a way of knowing or making meaning of the world. Enormous quantities of sensorial and mental data stream into human consciousness, but somehow that stream is brought into a coherent meaningful whole. At first sight it may seem that such meaning-making is an entirely natural and universal process, and to some degree it certainly is. Evolution has incorporated reflexes and drives deep into the human psyche. But the way we make sense of the world is also conditioned profoundly by societal forces, among them education. That is to say, we are socialized into a worldview that operates largely unconsciously and behind the scenes, but which affects the way we understand what we see,

hear, and feel. According to the Leo Apostel Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Belgium, "A worldview is a map that people use to orient and explain the world, and
from which they evaluate and act, and put forward prognoses and visions of the future." In the course of a lifetime we may shed one worldview and adopt another. In other words, we can change the structure that makes meaning for us. Thus while

worldviews can be understood as deep cognitive structures, they are not immutable. The solutions to Darfur and economic inequality (among many other problems) will ultimately not be found through more information or better foreign aid programs, but only here at the level where information marries with values to become meaning. Human action flows from this source, not from data alone. An education that would reach beyond information must work deeper; it will need to transform the very container of consciousness, make it more supple and complex. For this, we educators need pedagogical 2 tools other than those optimized for information transfer. At its most

advanced stage, we will need to help our students and ourselves to create a dynamic cognitive framework that can challenge established intellectual boundaries, and even sustain the conflicting values and viewpoints that comprise our planetary human community. Challenging Conventional Divisions In recent years I have spent time with members of the Native American Academy, a group largely comprised of academics who are also Native Americans. In our meetings we have explored the character of Native knowledge systems and research methods in comparison to those of orthodox Western science. From the first, the differences were marked. The place of our meeting was of special consequence, Chaco Canyon. It is the site of an ancient indigenous settlement whose remaining structures are clearly aligned according to a detailed astronomical knowledge. Following a long drive we turned onto the approach road, stopping in the middle of nowhere to make a small offering of bee pollen and tobacco. The first evening included a long ceremony performed by a knowledge-keeper from the local Native population, which concluded with a sensitive presentation of the problems we were likely to encounter in our endeavors. The sacred and the secular so seamlessly blended in the indigenous mind contrasts strongly with the conventional division between science and spirituality in the modern West. In the Western worldview, science is often defined in opposition to spirituality. My work with Native American colleagues challenges that presupposition at its root. Our time is one in which such unreflective assumptions must increasingly be challenged. Last year I was seated among over 10,000 neuroscientists listening to the fourteenth Dalai Lama address them concerning the interaction between Buddhist philosophers and Western scientists. The occasion was the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, and the Dalai Lama was the keynote speaker because of his groundbreaking collaborative work to bridge the traditional cultural divide between science and the contemplative traditions. Because of his openness and that of a growing number of scientists, Buddhist meditative insights have been joined to scientific research in ways that are very fruitful for the fields of cognitive science and psychology.3 This is a second example in which traditional divisions have been challenged with fruitful consequences. Contemplative

Pedagogy One of the most powerful transformative interventions developed by humanity is contemplative practice or meditation. It has been specifically designed to move human cognition from a delusory view of reality to a true one: that is, to one in which the profound interconnectedness of reality is directly perceived. Global conflict has its deep source in the privileging of worldviews, in the reification of our particular understanding and the objectification of the other. Such ways of seeing our world are, at root, dysfunctional and divisive.
Contemplative practice works on the human psyche to shape attention into a far suppler instrument, one that can appreciate a wide range of worldviews and even sustain the paradoxes of life, ultimately drawing life's complexity into a gentle, non-judgmental awareness. The usefulness of secular contemplative practice is being increasingly appreciated by educators at hundreds of North American universities and colleges. For example, in collaboration with The Center for Contemplative Mind in Society, the American Council of Learned Societies has granted 120 Contemplative Practice Fellowships to professors over the last ten years, supporting them in designing courses that include contemplative practice as a pedagogical strategy.4 At conferences and summer schools at Columbia University and Amherst College and elsewhere, professors have gathered to share their experiences in the emerging area of contemplative pedagogy. Their efforts range from simple silence at the start of class to exercises that school attention; and most recently, to innovative contemplative practices that relate directly to course content. The 2005 Columbia Conference focused specifically on the role of contemplative practices in "Making Peace in Ourselves and Peace in the World." Courses are offered that range from theater to economics, from philosophy to cosmology, in which university teachers are experimenting with a wide range of contemplative exercises, thus creating a new academic pedagogy. I have become convinced that contemplation 3 benefits both students and faculty, and that secular contemplative practices should assume a significant place on our educational agenda.

Contemplative practices fall into two major classes, those that school cognition and those that cultivate compassion. We are well aware that our observation and thinking require training, but we often neglect the cultivation of our capacity for love. In his letters to a young poet, Rainer Maria Rilke wrote, "For one human being to love another, that is perhaps the most difficult of all our tasks, the ultimate, the last
it. With their whole being, with all their forces, gathered close about their lonely, timid, upwardbeating heart, they must learn to love." 5 We

test and proof, the work for which all other work is but a preparation. For this reason young people, who are beginners in everything, cannot yet know love, they have to learn

are well-practiced at educating the mind for critical reasoning, critical writing, and critical speaking as well as for scientific and quantitative analysis. But is this sufficient? In a world beset with conflicts, internal as well as external, isn't it of equal if not greater importance to balance the sharpening of our intellects with the systematic cultivation of our hearts? We must, indeed, learn to love. Educators should join with their students to undertake this most difficult task. Thus true education entails a transformation of the
human being that, as Goethe said, "is so great that I never would have believed it possible." This transformation results in the human capacity to live the worldviews of others, and

even further to sustain in our mind and heart the contradictions that are an inevitable part of engaging the beautiful variety of cultures, religions, and races that populate this planet. We can sustain the complexities of the world because we have learned to honor and embrace the complex, conflicting components of ourselves. Our inner accomplishments, achieved through contemplative education, translate into outer capacities for peace-building. From there it is a short distance to the perception of interconnectedness and the enduring love
for others, especially for those different from us. We are increasingly becoming a world populated by solitudes. When Rilke declares that the highest expression of love is to "stand guard over and protect the solitude of the other," he is expressing his respect for and even devotion to the uniqueness of every person and group. If, however, we are to avoid social atomization or the fundamentalist reaction to this tendency, we will need to learn to love across the chasms that divide us. Only

a profoundly contemplative and transformative education has the power to nurture the vibrant, diverse civilization that should be our global future. As Maria Montessori wrote, "Preventing conflicts is the work of politics; establishing peace is the work of education."6

Must abandon species level thinking dehumanization impacts --> non-human devaluation reject speciesm camps/extinction Deckha in 2k10 Maneesha, associate professor of law at the University of Victoria, The Subhuman as a Cultural Agent of Violence, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 3, http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/09/JCAS-Special-Issue-Women-of-Color-November-3-FINAL-2010.pdf Conclusion A New Discourse That the human/subhuman binary continues to inhabit so much of western experience raises the question of the continuing relevance of anthropocentric concepts (such as human rights and human dignity) for effective theories of justice, policy and social movements. Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, a better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary altogether. Discourses of anti-violence and dignity must shift from anthropocentric and hierarchical concepts to nonexclusive conceptual anchors. This will ensure a more stable foundation for antiviolence and justice-seeking projects. The human specialness claim is a hierarchical one and relies on the figure of an Other - the subhuman and nonhuman - to be intelligible. The latter groups are beings, by definition, who do not qualify as human and thus are denied the benefits that being human is meant to compel. More to the point, however, a dignity claim staked on species difference, and reliant on dehumanizing Others to establish the moral worth of human beings, will always be vulnerable to the subhuman figure it creates. This figure is easily deployed in inter-human violent conflict implicating race, gender and cultural identities as we have seen in the context of military and police camps, contemporary slavery and slavery-like practices, and the laws of war - used in these situations to promote violence against marginalized human groups. A new discourse of cultural and legal protections is required to address violence against vulnerable humans in a manner that does not privilege humanity or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of inferior beings on whom the perpetration of violence is legitimate. This paper has sought to demonstrate the need to find an alternative discourse to theorize and mobilize around vulnerabilities for subhuman humans. This move, in addressing violence and vulnerabilities, should be productive not only for humans made vulnerable by their dehumanization, but nonhumans as well.

Link Dehumanization (0:30)

***Links

Their _____ evidence says, [relevant quote about dehum]

Ext Link Dehumanization (1:00/2:00)

The idea of the continual figure of the inhuman around which we need to center our analysis is the link to our Deckha 10 evidence. This recuperates racial and gendered perspectives by merely allowing the subhuman to perpetuate itself as a group and analytic object that we can understand in its coherence. The idea that we can reverse ______ by engaging in a more humanist form of politics that recognizes that these subjects are worthy of ethical consideration is the link to our criticism. This focus on the instance of historical suffering minimizes our ability to understand how that history came to be. It is impossible engage in {the affs harms} without first developing the tools to enforce these racialized and gendered distinctions. Our Deckha evidence is an explanation of why you need to foreground this type of explanation. The idea of [x] being central does not address the question of how the juridical criterion of what violence matters along species lines Kochi 9 [tarik, lecturer in law and international security @ U of Sussex, Doctorate in Law from Griffith, species war: law, violence, and animals, law, culture, and the humanities, 353-359] For Schmitt the juridical notion of the state (and international human rights law) presupposes and continually re-instates through violence the distinction and relation between friend and enemy. Schmitt claimed that the political emerges from
the threatening and warlike struggle between friends and enemies and that all political and legal institutions, and the decisions made therein, are built upon and are guided by this distinction. 6 In relation to the issue of war/law these two insights can be taken further. I think Foucaults notion of

race war can be developed by putting at its heart the differing historical and genealogical relationships between human and non-human animals. Thus, beyond race war what should be considered as a primary category within legal and political theory is that of species war. Further, the fundamental political distinction is not as Schmitt would have it, that of friends and enemies, but rather, the violent conflict between human and non-human animals. Race war is an extension of an earlier form of war, species war. The friend-enemy distinction is an extension of a more primary distinction between human and non-human animals. In this respect, what can be seen to lay at the foundation of the Law of war is not the Westphalian notion of civil peace, or the notion of human rights. Neither race war nor the friend-enemy distinction resides at the bottom of the Law of war. Rather, what sits at the foundation of the Law of war is a discourse of species war that over time has become so naturalised within Western legal and political theory that we have almost forgotten about it. Although species war remains largely hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a Western variant. This variant, however, is one that
may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence fall back upon the

hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements about differential life-value and that these judgements are
an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species

war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting
upon the nature of law more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the good). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these functions of law resides a practice of making

judgements about the life-value of particular objects. These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the state, community, etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative life- value of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes legitimate violence. Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision it points to a moment at the heart of the law where
distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the

violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law, at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor. 7
In J.M. Coetzees The Lives of Animals 8 the protagonist Elizabeth Costello draws a comparison between the everyday slaughter of non-human animals and the genocide of the Jews of Europe during the twentieth century. In addressing you on the subject of animals, she continues, I will pay you the honour of skipping a recital of the horrors of their lives and deaths. Though I have no reason to believe that you have at the forefront of your minds what is being done to animals at this moment in production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, in laboratories, all

over the world, I will take it that you concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force, and leave it at that, reminding you only that the horrors I here omit are nevertheless at the center of this lecture. 9 A little while later she states: Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the

Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them. And to split
hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical enterprise dedicated to nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the comfort of our own homes) is as little consolation to those victims as it would have been pardon the tastelessness of the following to ask the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body fat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses with. 10 Similar comparisons have been made before. 11 Yet, when most of us think about the term war very seldom do we bother to think about non-human animals. The term war commonly evokes images of states, armies, grand weapons, battle lines, tactical stand-offs, and maybe even sometimes guerrilla or partisan violence. Surely the keeping of cattle behind barbed wire fences

and butchering them in abattoirs does not count as war? Surely not? Why not? What can be seen to be at stake within Elizabeth
Costellos act of posing the modern project of highly efficient breeding and factory slaughtering of non-human animals beside the Holocaust is a concern with the way in which we order or arrange conceptually and socially the legitimacy of violence and killing. In a Western philosophical tradition stretching at least from Augustine and Aquinas, through to Descartes and Kant, the ordering of the relationship between violence and legitimacy is such that, predominantly, non-human animals are considered to be without souls, without reason and without a value that is typically ascribed to humans. For example, for Augustine, animals, together with plants, are exempted from the religious injunction Thou shalt not kill. When considering the question of what forms of killing and violence are legitimate, Augustine placed the killing of non-human animals well inside the framework of religious and moral legitimacy. 12 Of relevance is the practice by which the question of legitimate violence is ordered that is,

the manner in which it is organised by philosophical, moral and cultural justifications in a way that sets out how particular acts of violence are to be understood within social-material life. Within a Western tradition the killing of animals is typically not considered a form of war because violence against animals is placed far within the accepted framework of legitimate killing. The meanings attached to the words we use are significant here. Many of our linguistic
categories have been formulated along the distinction between human and non-human and offer different meanings based upon what object within this distinction a word denotes. Words like killing and slaughter evoke different meanings and different responses

when applied to humans as opposed to chickens or cattle or insects. While most people would react in horror to the brutal
killing of a child, they accept the daily slaughter of thousands of calves. Although there exists a bureaucratic language of regulation governing issues of efficiency, property rights, hygiene and cruelty, the breeding of animals for killing is widely accepted as a legitimate act. Such that, the killing of one animal is not considered murder and the killing of a geographical group of animals is not considered an act of genocide or species war.

Extending rights or recognition to dehumanized groups fails to reject the category of subhuman this is a pre-requisite for effective action against exploitation Deckha in 2k10 Maneesha, associate professor of law at the University of Victoria, The Subhuman as a Cultural Agent of Violence, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 3, http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/09/JCAS-Special-Issue-Women-of-Color-November-3-FINAL-2010.pdf Part III Doing Away With the Subhuman The first part of this paper has established the importance of the subhuman figure in several contemporary manifestations of violence: militarized and police camps, slavery and slaverylike practices, and the laws of war. If this role played by subhumanization is accurate, a pressing question presents itself: should we continue to rely on anti-violence discourses (i.e., human rights or other human justice campaigns) that entrench the subhuman category? In other words, human rights discourses do not instruct us to purge the subhuman category or the human/nonhuman divide from our critical repertoire. Instead, they seek to convince us that we should see all human beings as definitely human and not subhumanize them. This approach does not effectivly achieve its aims of protecting vulnerable human groups from violence because it leaves the subhuman category intact, a category that humanized humans can always assert should convictions sway about the relative moral worth of a particular human group. The subhuman category is then poised to animalize or
dehumanize the targeted group and generate corresponding justifications as to why the human group does not deserve better than subhuman treatment.

A better strategy would be to eliminate the subhuman category from the onset by impugning the human/nonhuman boundary itself and thus the claim to human superiority. Not everyone agrees with this assessment as a
route to secure anti-violence agendas aimed at protecting vulnerable human groups. Many critics wish to hold onto the elevated cultural status (if not legal) of humans over any other species (Naffine, 2009). Elsewhere I have discussed the potential sources of resistance to such a move in critical theory and political campaigns. 9 Obviously, it can be very unsettling for vulnerable human groups to destabilize this

boundary and the corollary belief in human specialness that is said to be at the root of western knowledge systems (Fox, 2004). This is especially so for vulnerable human groups whose humanity has been historically denied. Yet this might be precisely what is required (if insufficient) to alter the dynamics of violence that amplify vulnerabilities. Still, others may disagree and maintain that these instantiations of subhuman violence only demonstrate the incompleteness of humanism and the corresponding need to promote human rights discourse more robustly so that no human beings are thought of as subhuman. This viewpoint assumes that the impediment to humanism is its incomplete application rather than some defect in the category itself. Postcolonial scholars have pointed to the fallacy of holding this view. Citing western imperial origins and structure, they insist upon the always already exclusive logic that human rights entail (Kapur, 2006). They have argued that the rational and autonomous liberal actor always requires an Other through which to establish himself. In contemporary times, liberalisms Other are subjects whose perceived lifestyles and values are cast as threats to a

Kapur identifies liberalisms contemporary Others as the Islamic, the homosexual, the sex worker and the migrant subject and highlights the spectacular array of laws, primarily relating to antiterrorism and anti-migration, that produce these legal Others. Kapur goes on to note how this Othering actually creates a class of the non-human, delineating some as lesser and some more as super human (Kapur, 2006). I would push this
liberal order. Ratna analysis further to investigate the depths of our reliance on the category of the subhuman. It is not simply the case that liberalism creates Others who then get plugged into a discourse of subhumanity and superhumanity. Rather, the humanist foundations of liberalism ensure that

the liberal paradigmatic actor must always differentiate itself from the non-human, for the good life articulated within liberal theories is a vision of human life that depends on the non-human for its claims to unique value. The sub-human is crucial to the foundations of humanist and liberal theories making their recuperation an implausible task. It is for the same reason that merely extending rights or other legal interests to nonhumans is an insufficient response to their frequently abject legal and cultural condition. While creating a non-property status or affording other rights to nonhumans might better protect them from human exploitation, this approach will not disrupt the subhuman/human boundary zones that enable violence in the first place. As feminists know very well, a mere extension of rights with nothing more does not interrogate the logic of exclusion contained within traditional moral/ethical categories (Nedelsky, 1993;
Adams and Donovan, 1996; Oliver, 2009). Oliver explains the inability of merely extending rights without undoing humanism when she writes:

focusing on rights or equality and extending them to animals does not address more essential issues of conceptions of the animal, man, or human. It does not challenge the presumptions of humanism that makes man the measure of all things, including other animals and the earth. Insofar as it leaves intact traditional concepts of man and animal and the traditional values associated with them, it cannot transform our ways of thinking about either. The consequences of Western conceptions of man, human, and animal are deadly for both animals and various groups of people who have been figured as being like them. Without interrogating the man/animal opposition on the symbolic and imaginary levels, we can only scratch the surface in understanding exploitation and genocide of people and animals (Oliver,
2009). Oliver proceeds from this insight to note its connection to Agambens concern, discussed above, around understanding western concepts of animal and animality in order to, in turn, understand oppression of those humans we cast as subhuman or even nonhuman (Oliver, 2009).

Whether motivated by a focus on human vulnerability, nonhuman vulnerability, or both, pursuing antiviolence projects with the current anthropocentric status quo seriously undercuts those very same projects.

The juridical war language of their impact claims mask the species war at the foundation of the law. Kochi 9 [tarik, lecturer in law and international security @ U of Sussex, Doctorate in Law from Griffith, species war: law, violence, and animals, law, culture, and the humanities, 353-359] In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called war rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and understand war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in which specific terms (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm of human action. In this paper I argue that the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation species war. That is, at the foundation of the Law of war resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals. At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war. In contemporary public debates the laws of war are typically understood as referring to the rules set out by the conventions and customs that define the legality of a states right to go to war under international law. However, such a perspective is only a narrow and limited view of what constitutes the Law of war and of the relationship between law and war more generally. Here the Law of the Law of war needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term Recht
denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of Gesetz which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws. 1 To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific (positive law) formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war

Link War (0:50)

contains at its heart arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence. The question of what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationship between war and law,
and, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out (positing) a particular answer to this question. In this respect

the Law of war (and thus its particular laws of war) involves a practice of normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to such questions as: what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of war, who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? When we
consider the relationship between war and law in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at the foundation of the Law of war resides species war. At present, the Law of war is dominated by two cultural-conceptual formulations or discourses. The Westphalian

system of interstate relations and the system of international human rights law are held to be modern foundations of the Law of war. In the West, most peoples conceptions of what constitutes war and of what constitutes a legitimate act of war are shaped by these two historical traditions. That is to say, these traditions have ordered how we understand the legitimate use of violence. 2 These discourses, however, have been heavily criticized. By building upon a particular line of criticism I develop my argument for
the foundational significance of species war. Two critiques of sovereignty and humanitarian law are of particular interest: Michel Foucaults notion of race war and Carl Schmitts notion of friend and enemy. Foucault in Society Must Be Defended set out a particular critique of the Westphalian juridical conception of state sovereignty and state power. 3 Within the Westphalian juridical conception, it is commonly argued

that sovereign power and legitimacy are grounded upon the ability of an institution to bring an end to internal civil war and create a sphere of domestic peace. Against this Foucault claimed that war is never brought to an end within the domestic sphere, rather, it continues and develops in the form of race war. Connected to his account of bio-power, Foucault suggests a historical discourse of constant and perpetual race war that underlies legal and political institutions within modernity. 4 In The Concept of the Political, Carl Schmitt offered a critique of the liberal conception of the state grounded
upon the notion of the social contract and criticized legal and political conceptions of the state in which legitimacy (and the legitimacy of war) was seen to be grounded upon the notion of humanity. 5 For Schmitt the juridical notion of the state (and international human rights law)

presupposes and continually re-instates through violence the distinction and relation between friend and enemy. Schmitt claimed that the political emerges from the threatening and warlike struggle between friends and enemies and that all political and
legal institutions, and the decisions made therein, are built upon and are guided by this distinction. 6 In relation to the issue of war/law these two insights can be taken further. I think Foucaults notion of race war can be developed by putting at its heart the differing

historical and genealogical relationships between human and non-human animals. Thus, beyond race war what should be considered as a primary category within legal and political theory is that of species war. Further, the fundamental political distinction is not as Schmitt would have it, that of friends and enemies, but rather, the violent conflict between human and non-human animals. Race war is an extension of an earlier form of war, species war. The friend-enemy distinction is an extension of a more primary distinction between human and nonhuman animals. In this respect, what can be seen to lay at the foundation of the Law of war is not the Westphalian notion of civil peace, or the notion of human rights. Neither race war nor the friend-enemy distinction resides at the bottom of the Law of war. Rather, what sits at the foundation of the Law of war is a discourse of species war that over time has become so naturalised within Western legal and political theory that we have almost forgotten about it. Although species war remains largely

hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a
Western variant. This variant, however, is one that may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes

legitimate violence fall back upon the hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements
about differential life-value and that these judgements are an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how

contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I
develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting upon the nature of law more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the good). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these

functions of law resides a practice of making judgements about the life-value of particular objects. These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the state, community, etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative life- value of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes legitimate violence. Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision it points to a moment at the heart of the law where distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or
positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law,

at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor. 7 In J.M. Coetzees The Lives of Animals 8 the protagonist Elizabeth Costello draws
a comparison between the everyday slaughter of non-human animals and the genocide of the Jews of Europe during the twentieth century. In addressing you on the subject of animals, she continues, I will pay you the honour of skipping a recital of the horrors of their lives and deaths. Though I have no reason to believe that you have at the forefront of your minds what is being done to animals at this moment in production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, in laboratories, all over the world, I will take it that you concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force, and leave it at that, reminding you only that the horrors I here omit are nevertheless at the center of this lecture. 9 A little while later she states: Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation,

cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them. And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical
enterprise dedicated to nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the comfort of our own homes) is as little consolation to those victims as it would have been pardon the tastelessness of the following to ask the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body fat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses with. 10 Similar comparisons have been made before. 11 Yet, when most of us think about the term war very seldom do we bother to think about non-human animals. The term war commonly evokes images of states, armies, grand weapons, battle lines, tactical stand-offs, and maybe even sometimes guerrilla or partisan violence. Surely the

keeping of cattle behind barbed wire fences and butchering them in abattoirs does not count as war? Surely not? Why not? What can be seen to be at stake within Elizabeth Costellos act of posing the modern project of highly efficient breeding and factory
slaughtering of non-human animals beside the Holocaust is a concern with the way in which we order or arrange conceptually and socially the legitimacy of violence and killing. In a Western philosophical tradition stretching at least from Augustine and Aquinas, through to Descartes and Kant, the ordering of the relationship between violence and legitimacy is such that, predominantly, non-human animals are considered to be without souls, without reason and without a value that is typically ascribed to humans. For example, for Augustine, animals, together with plants, are exempted from the religious injunction Thou shalt not kill. When considering the question of what forms of killing and violence are legitimate, Augustine placed the killing of non-human animals well inside the framework of religious and moral legitimacy. 12 Of relevance is the practice by which the

question of legitimate violence is ordered that is, the manner in which it is organised by philosophical, moral and cultural justifications in a way that sets out how particular acts of violence are to be understood within social-material life. Within a Western tradition the killing of animals is typically not considered a form of war because violence against animals is placed far within the accepted framework of legitimate killing. The meanings
attached to the words we use are significant here. Many of our linguistic categories have been formulated along the distinction between human and nonhuman and offer different meanings based upon what object within this distinction a word denotes. Words like killing and slaughter

evoke different meanings and different responses when applied to humans as opposed to chickens or cattle or insects. While most people would react in horror to the brutal killing of a child, they accept the daily slaughter of thousands of calves. Although there
exists a bureaucratic language of regulation governing issues of efficiency, property rights, hygiene and cruelty, the breeding of animals for killing is widely accepted as a legitimate act. Such that, the killing of one animal is not considered murder and the killing of a geographical group of animals is not considered an act of genocide or species war.

The notion of a liberal peace, realism, hegemony or any other rule of Law place an absurd value upon the notion of the nation state state-hood must be preserved against collapse because it is just how IR functions. This proves that their politics is not utilitarian in the traditional sense but rather uses ideological tools like the Westphalian lens to ensure its perpetuation underlying that is the species war that perpetuates the internal race wars described by Foucault and the friend-enemy dichotomy that plagues modern liberalism. And, the Justification of the Plan Upon Liberal Peace Theory and Its Civilizational Discourse Ensures the Endless Continuation of Legitimate Violence this is a unique space for reflecting and rejecting this dichotomy KOCHI 2K9 [tarik, lecturer in law and international security @ U of Sussex, Doctorate in Law from Griffith, species war: law, violence, and animals, law, culture, and the humanities, 361-359] This reflection need not be seen as carried out by every individual on a daily basis but rather as that which is drawn upon from time to time within public life as humans inter-subjectively coordinate their actions in accordance with particular enunciated ends and plan for the future. 21 In this respect, the violence and killing of species war is not simply a question of survival or bare life, instead, it is bound up with a consideration of the good. For most modern humans in the West the good life involves the daily killing of animals for dietary need and for pleasure. At the heart of the question of species war, and all war for that matter, resides a question about the legitimacy of violence linked to a philosophy of value. 22 The question of war-law sits within a wider history of decision making about the relative values of different forms of life. Legitimate violence is under-laid by cultural, religious, moral, political and philosophical conceptions about the relative values of forms of life. Playing out through history are distinctions and hierarchies of life-value that are extensions of the original human-animal distinction. Distinctions that can be thought to follow from the human-animal distinction are those, for example, drawn between: Hellenes and barbarians; Europeans and Orientals; whites and blacks; the civilized and the uncivilized; Nazis and Jews; Israelis and Arabs; colonizers and the colonized. Historically these practices and regimes of violence have been culturally, politically and legally normalized in a manner that replicates the normalization of the violence carried out against non-human animals. Unpacking, criticizing and
challenging the forms of violence, which in different historical moments appear as normal, is one of the ongoing tasks of any critic who is concerned with the question of what war does to law and of what law does to war? The critic of war is thus a critic of wars norm-alization.

Ext Link War (0:45)

http://www.ecospherics.net/pages/watson2.htm

Link terrorism / war (to cut)

Critical pedagogy is blatantly ignorant of non-human life and makes domination by humans inevitable the essentialism of resistance makes success impossible. Bell and Russel, 2k (Anne C. Bell, department of education, York University, Canada, and Constance L. Russel, Associate Professor, Faculty
of Education, Lakehead University, Co-Editor, Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 25, 3 (2000):188203, http://www.cssescee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf DH) For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however,

Link critical pedagogy

the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The morethan-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms. Like other educators
influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the

prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of human, animal, and nature? This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences (Harding,
1986, p. 112)

Critical pedagogy is rooted in implicit anthropocentric discussions it assumes power lies wholly within human hands and their discourse this is the speciest inferioritiziation of nonhuman animals that justifies exclusion and placing them within the subregister thats Bell and RUssel 2k.

Ext Link critical pedagogy

Anthropocentrism is THE Original HierarchyWe NEED Politics That Can Respect More than Human Life. Their Humanist Politics Dooms Us To a Future That Endlessly Repeats the Oppression of the Status Quo. Steven Best, Chair of Philosophy at UT-EP, 2007 [JCAS 5.2] While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call animal standpoint theory is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal. In this context, Charles Pattersons recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Pattersons theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its
logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how

Best 07

humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. Pattersons thesis
stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to dominate nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically dont even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Pattersons

model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust.
As he puts it, the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples. Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In

the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through domestication. In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and
cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous

technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of
animals, such that men began to control womens reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain

introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society,
humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview that came to be known as the Great Chain of Being used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the

crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative,

***Impact

for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species, Patterson writes, our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals
the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them. Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates with opprobrious terms such as rats, pigs, swine, monkeys, beasts, and filthy animals. Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them. Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom. For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the lower races under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality

were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from humanity. The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike
was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy

of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product
of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind.

Animals have systems of justice and morality Goodall and Bekoff 8 Jane, world-renowned pioneer of the study of chimpanzee behavior, Marc, Professor Emeritus of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology at the University of Colorado, Boulder, The Emotional Lives of Animals: A Leading Scientist Explores Animal Joy, Sorrow, and Empathy - and Why They Matter, New World Library, pg. 85-88, HC
Ive long been interested in play behavior. This might sound like a frivolous field of study a number of my colleagues certainly told me so when I first started but after years of examining videotapes of playing dogs, coyotes, and wolves and trying to understand

Animals Have Justice/Morality (0:30)

why animals play the way they do, I have been led to ask a series of big and ultimately surprising questions: Do animals play fair? Do they negotiate agreements to play (as opposed to fighting or mating), and do those agreements require cooperating, forgiving, apologizing, and admitting when theyre wrong, as well as trusting others? Are animals
honest? If one breaks their agreement, do they consider that wrong? Are there consequences for doing something wrong? If animals demonstrate a dislike for getting the short end of the stick or being short-changed, does that indicate that animals have a sense of justice, of right and wrong, good and bad does that mean, in other words animals are moral beings? And if animals can be shown to display a sense of justice along

with a wide range of cognitive and emotional capacities, including empathy and reciprocity, does that make the differences between humans and all other animals a matter of degree rather than kind? Finally, if all this is true, then is
morality in fact an evolved trait? Does being fair mean being more fit does being more virtuous improve an individuals reproductive fitness, while being less virtuous harm it? To put it another way, do nice guys, gals, and their genes last longest? Do the nicest survive best? These are indeed big, complicated, difficult questions, but mounting evidence points straight to the conclusion that there is honor among beats. While much of the

research thats been aired widely deals with nonhuman primates, especially the work of Frans de Waal and his colleagues at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, there are also compelling data from studies on social carnivores that support the claim that moral behavior is more widespread among animals than previously thought. In Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, de Waal argues that human morality is on a continuum with animal sociality, though he isnt sure that animals are moral beings. However, he doesnt consider social play behavior. Based on my long-term detailed studies of play in social carnivores including wolves, coyotes, red foxes, and domestic dogs I believe we can make the stronger claim that some animals might be moral beings. Other ethologists (such as Nobel laureate Niko Tinbergen and the well-known field biologist George Schaller) certainly stress that we might learn more about the evolution of human behavior from studies of Social carnivores than from studies of other primates because the social behavior
and social organization of many carnivores resemble that of early hominids in a number of important ways (division of labor, food sharing, care of young, and intrasexual and intersexual dominance hierarchies). Given this, social carnivores may hold the key for unlocking the nuances of animal morality. So how does play figure into discussions of morality? To begin with, when animals play there are rules of engagement that must be

followed, and when these break down, play suffers. Animal play appears to rely on the universal human value of the Golden Rule do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Following this requires empathy (feeling anothers feelings) and implies reciprocity (getting paid back for favors assuming that others follow the same rule). Further, in the social arena, animals who dont play well dont seem to do as well as those who do play. Darwin might very well have been right when he speculated that more sympathetic individuals have more reproductive success they survive better. By the end of this chapter, I propose that this means we should make another paradigm shift in how we understand animals and ourselves. Survival of the fittest has always been used to refer to
the most successful competitor, but in fact cooperation may be of equal or more importance. It is likely that for any species individual requires both to some degree, while for social species (as opposed to asocial species) the balance may shift significantly, with the most cooperative individuals most often winning the evolutionary race. We still need to learn a great deal about the importance of cooperative behavior and its relationship to wild justice.

Indeed, its only in the past decade that discussing morality in animals hasnt automatically been met with a skeptical raised eyebrow and a disdainful laugh. Traditionally, morality has been the exclusive right of humans, even sometimes the very definition of our humanness, and some scientists and other still vehemently resist the idea that we might actually share this quality with other beings. Yet more and more biologists, neuroscientists, philosophers, and ethologists are beginning to think that morality may be a broadly adaptive strategy that has evolved in many species. Im not saying animal moral behavior is the same as human moral behavior. Rather, my proposal is that the phenomenon to which morality refers is a wide-ranging biological necessity for social living. Just as emotions are a gift of our ancestors, so too are the basic
ingredients of morality: namely, cooperation, empathy, fairness, justice and trust.

The kritik outweighs were killing billions of farm animals a year in the worst conditions thats only the U.S. Deckha in 2k10 Maneesha, associate professor of law at the University of Victoria, The Subhuman as a Cultural Agent of Violence, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 3, http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/09/JCAS-Special-Issue-Women-of-Color-November-3-FINAL-2010.pdf One of the most violent places imaginable is the modern day slaughterhouse. The rate of killing inside is swift and of unprecedented proportions. In the United States alone, around 9.5 billion animals are killed per year. To put that in perspective, that amounts to 250 cows per hour and 266 chickens per second (Isaacs-Blundin, 2007). This figure does not account for all slaughter of animals for food in the United States, merely the extent of killing of land farm animals (Finelli, 2006). The overwhelming number are born, raised, and killed for consumption making the violence against farm animals the most pervasive form of institutionalized violence against animals (Isaacs-Blundin, 2007). These statistics also fail to capture the suffering animals endure while in the slaughterhouse, where they are raised for slaughter (Finelli, 2006; Marcus, 2005; Pollan, 2002; Scholsser, 2001). All of this infliction on animal bodies is perceived as legitimate violence because of the nonhuman status of the species involved. The law buttresses this cultural acceptance. Animals are the property of corporate and human
owners; theirs is a near universal status in western legal systems, which facilitates their instrumental use and exploitation for human ends.

Killing Lots of Animals Now

The Us Government Has Been Committing Orchestrated The Annual Annihilation of Millions of Birds and Encourages Private Farmers to Do The Same. CSM 1/20 http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2011/0120/Bye-Bye-Blackbird-USDA-acknowledges-a-hand-in-one-mass-bird-death It's not the "aflockalyptic" fallout from a secret US weapon lab as some have theorized. But the government acknowledged Thursday that it had a hand in one of a string of mysterious mass bird deaths that have spooked
residents in Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama, South Dakota, and Kentucky in the last month. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) took responsibility for hundreds of dead starlings that were found on the ground and frozen in trees in a Yankton, S.D., park on Monday. The USDA's

Wildlife Services Program, which contracts with farmers for bird control, said it used an avicide poison called DRC-1339 to cull a roost of 5,000 birds that were defecating on a farmer's cattle feed across the state line in Nebraska. But officials said
the agency had nothing to do with large and dense recent bird kills in Arkansas and Louisiana. The top 10 weirdest stories of 2010 A Google map of mass animal deaths across the country Nevertheless, the USDA's role in the South Dakota bird deaths puts a focus on a little-known

government bird-control program that began in the 1960s under the name of Bye Bye Blackbird, which eventually became part of the USDA and was housed in the late '60s at a NASA facility. In 2009, USDA agents euthanized more than 4 million red-winged blackbirds, starlings, cowbirds, and grackles, primarily using pesticides that the government says are not harmful to pets or humans. In addition to the USDA program, a so-called depredation order from the US
Fish and Wildlife Service allows blackbirds, grackles, and starlings to be killed by anyone who says they pose health risks or cause economic damage. Though a permit is needed in some instances, the order is largely intended to cut through red tape for farmers, who often

employ private contractors to kill the birds and do not need to report their bird culls to any authority. "Every winter, there's massive and purposeful kills of these blackbirds," says Greg Butcher, the bird conservation director at the National Audubon Society. "These guys are professionals, and they don't want to advertise their work. They like to work fast, efficiently, and out of sight."

Human centrism allows us to exploit nature, eventually causing extermination of all life. Ahkin, 10 (Melanie Ahkin, Monash University, 2010, Human Centrism, Animist Materialism, and the Critique of Rationalism in Val Plumwoods Critical Ecological Feminism, Emergent Australian Philosophers, a peer reviewed journal of philosophy, http://www.eap.philosophy-australia.com/archives.html DH) These five features provide the basis for hegemonic centrism insofar as they promote certain conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality which universalise and naturalise the standpoint of the superior relata as primary or centre, and deny and subordinate the standpoints of inferiorised others as secondary or derivative. Using standpoint theory analysis, Plumwood's reconceptualisation of human chauvinist frameworks locates and dissects these logical characteristics of dualism, and the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality common to centric structures, as follows. Radical exclusion is found in the rationalist emphasis on differences between humans and non-human nature, its valourisation of a human rationality conceived as exclusionary of nature, and its minimisation of similarities
between the two realms. Homogenisation and stereotyping occur especially in the rationalist denial of consciousness to nature, and its denial of the diversity of mental characteristics found within its many different constituents, facilitating a perception of nature as homogeneous

Environment/Extinction

and of its members as interchangeable and replaceable resources. This definition of nature in terms of its lack of human rationality and consciousness means that its identity remains relative to that of the dominant human group, and its difference is marked as deficiency, permitting its inferiorisation. Backgrounding and denial may be observed in the conception of nature as extraneous and inessential background to the foreground of human culture, in the human denial of dependency on the natural environment, and denial of the ethical and political constraints which the unrecognised ends and needs of non-human nature might otherwise place on human behaviour. These features together create an ethical discontinuity between humans and non-human nature which denies nature's value and agency, and thereby promote its instrumentalisation and exploitation for the benefit of humans.11 This dualistic logic helps to universalise the human centric standpoint, making invisible and seemingly inevitable the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality and oppression of
non-human nature it enjoins. The alternative standpoints and perspectives of members of the inferiorised class of nature are denied legitimacy and subordinated to that of the class of humans, ultimately becoming invisible once this master standpoint becomes part of the very structure of thought.12 Such an anthropocentric framework creates a variety of serious injustices and prudential risks, making it highly ecologically irrational.13 The

hierarchical value prescriptions and epistemic distortions responsible for its biased, reductive conceptualisation of nature strips the non-human natural realm of non-instrumental value, and impedes the fair and
impartial treatment of its members. Similarly, anthropocentrism creates distributive injustices by restricting ethical concern to humans, admitting partisan distributive relationships with non-human nature in the forms of commodification and instrumentalisation. The prudential risks and

blindspots created by anthropocentrism are problematic for nature and humans alike and are of especial concern within our current context of radical human dependence on an irreplaceable and increasingly degraded natural environment. These prudential risks are in large part consequences of the centric structure's promotion of illusory human
disembeddedness, self-enclosure and insensitivity to the significance and survival needs of non-human nature: The logic of centrism naturalises an illusory order in which the centre appears to itself to be disembedded, and this is especially dangerous in contexts where there is real and radical dependency on an Other who is simultaneously weakened by the application of that logic.14 Within the context of human-nature

relationships, such a logic must inevitably lead to failure, either through the catastrophic extinction of our natural environment and the consequent collapse of our species, or more hopefully by the abandonment and transformation of
the human centric framework.15

War on Terror
Deckha in 2k10 Maneesha, associate professor of law at the University of Victoria, The Subhuman as a Cultural Agent of Violence, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 3, http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/09/JCAS-Special-Issue-Women-of-Color-November-3-FINAL-2010.pdf While Razack is quick to note that the camps and their logic of justified lawlessness pre-date contemporary wars on terror and the like (Razack, 2007), she asserts that the effect of the war on terror has been to discursively normalize these spaces and the violence they inflict. We as a population know about these camps an the suspension of law and protective civil liberties they entail, facilitating the conditions for torture (Razack, 2007). We also know the overwhelming racialized nature of these spaces in terms of who is detained in these camps. Yet they endure. For Razack, the reason for this resides in the camps reliance on a type of race thinking a structure of thought that divides up the world between the deserving and undeserving- that sustains the legitimacy of indefinite detention, war and violence (Razack, 2007). Although race thinking varies, for Muslims and Arabs, it is underpinned by the idea that modern enlightened, secular peoples must protect themselves from pre-modern, religious peoples whose loyalty to tribe and community reigns over their commitment to the rule of law. The marking of belonging to the realm of culture and religion, as opposed to the realm of law and reason, has devastating consequences.(T)he West has often defined the benefits of modernity to those it considers to be outside of it. Evicted from the universal, and thus from civilization and progress, the non-West occupiers a zone outside the law. Violence may be directed at it with impunity (Razack, 2007). Razack connects this concept of race thinking with respect to the camps dispersed throughout the world to Foucaults argument requiring the presence of racism to justify the states sense of legitimate killing and biopower. The war on terror is another instance of the state seeking to purge from its boundaries those racialized Others whose values are cased as in conflict with our own (Razack, 2007). It is because groups are seen as civilizationally different on one sort of cultural register or another, that we accept the culture of exception that underpins the eviction of increasing numbers of people from political community into lawless zones where they may be treated violently (Razack, 2007). Gender frequently figures into this process of racialization, helping western nations accentuate the purported values on which the west and non-west differ by pointing to the systemic gender violence and oppression as part of the Others culture, and never their own (Razack, 2007). The classic colonial argument of the non-west requiring and benefitting from western imperial invasion to save non-western women from their misogynistic culture and dangerous men has clearly been operative in the war on terror. Women and the threats their Muslim culture/religion pose have been prominently featured, for example, in justifications for the war in Afghanistan and preventing sharia law from entering western legal landscapes (Howe, 1995; Razack, 1998; Abu-Lughod, 2002; Bakht, 2005). While the intersection of race and gender is often acknowledged in understanding the etiology of justificatory narratives for war, the presence of species distinctions and the importance of the subhuman are less appreciated. Yet, the race (and gender) thinking that animates Razacks argument in normalizing violence for detainees (and others) is also centrally sustained by the subhuman figure. As Charles Patterson notes with respect to multiple forms of exploitation: Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species, our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animas and do the same to them. (Patterson, 2002). Paterson emphasizes how the human/animal hierarchy and our ideas about animals and animality are foundational for intra-human hierarchies and the violence they promote. The routinized violence against beings designated subhuman serves as both a justification and blueprint for violence against humans. For example, in discussing the specific dynamics of the Nazi camps, Patterson further notes how techniques to make the killing of detainees resemble the slaughter of animals were deliberately implemented in order to make the killing seem more palatable and benign. That the detainees were made naked and kept crowded in the gas chambers facilitated thei animalization and, in turn, their death at the hands of other humans who were already culturally familiar and comfortable with killing animals in this way (Patterson, 2002). Returning to Razacks exposition of race thinking in contemporary camps, one can see how subhuman thinking is foundational to race thinking. One of her primary arguments for the book is that race thinking, which she defines as the denial of a common bond of humanity between people of European descent and those who are not, is a defining feature of the world order today as in the past (Razack, 2007). In other words, it is the species thinking that helps to create the racial demarcation. As Razack notes with respect to the specific logic infusing the camps, they are not simply contemporary excesses born of the wests current quest for security, but instead represent a more ominous, permanent arrangement of who is and is not a part of the human community (Razack, 2007). 5 Once placed outside the human zone by race thinking,

the detainees may be handled lawlessly and thus with violence that is legitimated at all times. Racialization is not enough and does not complete their Othering experience. Rather, they must be dehumanized for the larger public to accept the violence against them and the increasing culture of exception which sustains these human bodily exclusions. Although nonhumans are not the focus of Razacks work, the centrality of the subhuman to the logic of the camps and racial and sexual violence contained therein is also clearly illustrated in her specific examples. It is the subhuman figure that justifies the absence of the rule of law from the racialized geopolitical space of Abu Ghraib. In discussing the now famous pictures of torture in Abu Ghraib, Razack notes that (t)he photos from Abu Ghraib depict acts of intimacy, acts requiring a psychic closenesthat endangers the barrier between the human and the subhuman even as it creates and affirms it. (Razack, 2007). For the American soldiers, the Iraqis must be contained as the racial Other, as they are constructed through the war on terror discourse surrounding cultural differences. It is the sexualized violence (that) accomplishes the eviction from humanity, and it does so as an eviction from masculinity (Razack, 2007). In the course of her analysis, to determine the import of race thinking in enabling violence, Razack quotes a newspaper story that describes the background mentality of Private Lynndie England, the white female soldier made notorious by images of her holding onto imprisoned and naked Iraqi men with a leash around their necks (Razack, 2007). The story itself quotes a resident from Englands hometown who says the following about the sensibilities of individuals from their town: To the country boys here, if youre a different nationality, a different race, youre sub-human. Thats the way that girls like Lynndie England are raised. Tormenting Iraqis, in her mind, would be no different from shooting a turkey. Every season here youre hunting something. Over there theyre hunting Iraqis. (Razack, 2007). Razack extracts this quote to illustrate how race overdetermined what went on, but it may also be observed that species overdetermined what went on (Razack, 2007). Race has a formative function, to be sure, but it works in conjunction with species difference to enable the violence at Abu Ghraib and other camps. Dehumanization promotes racialization, which further entrenches both identities. It is an intertwined logic of race, sex, culture and species that lays the foundation for the violence.

Hudson 4 Laura, graduate student in Cultural Studies at the University of California, Davis, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, meditations journal, Vol. 23, Issue 2, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/articles/the-political-animal In many ways, Ferrys critique of deep ecology rings true: he points out the same logical inconsistencies in deep ecologys biocentrism, and the same fascist tendencies suggested by its unexplained mechanism of social control, that critics in general recognize. But in exploring the questionable ideological underpinnings of deep ecology, Ferry reveals his own ideological investments. He defends the separation between nature and culture that deep ecology and animal rights both question by asserting the ineffable human quality of freedom. In fact, his defense of liberal humanist democracy and the Enlightenment blurs into a defense of the corresponding economic form of capitalism. Thus, he represents deep ecologys love of nature as hatred of humanity because he regards the human being as the anti-natural being par excellence.7 For Ferry, the humanness of the human being resides in his freedom, in the fact that he is undefined, that his nature is to have no nature but to possess the capacity to distance himself from any code within which one may seek to imprison him.8 If human beings are, by definition, anti-natural, then love of nature becomes opposed to human freedom. Nature is the realm of determinations, while human beings exist in the realm of situations. This distinction causes Ferry some trouble: he is forced to explain why we should care about humans who seem determined by their situation, such as the old, the infirm, the mentally retarded, and, most problematic, the very pre-colonial, preindustrial peoples after which deep ecology models itself.9 The natural codes or instincts that Ferry claims are determinations for animals are the very things from which humanity has triumphantly distanced itself, making room for history and politics. Describing humanness as fluid, essence-less, particularly situated but never universally determined, knowing no boundaries: he might be quoting the passages of Marxs Capital that describe exchange value. Free market capitalism is the backdrop for the kind of freedom he imagines, masked by his attempt to ground philosophically humanitys moral status in some special capacity other than species membership. Human ability to break free from nature pits humanity against nature in a battle for mastery; in order to prove our uniqueness, we must resist natural codes, resist being merely use-values for Natures overarching Subject. Ironically, Ferry suggests that proof of our separation from natural codes lies in our ability to commit suicide: we are so free we can die of our freedom. What might this mean for human society as it enters a period of ecological crisis? Would continuing along a path that seems sure to lead to our destruction as a species be the grandest proof of Ferrys hypothesis, or its ultimate negation? The triumph of capital seems to tend toward achieving universality in death: in death we are all equal. And this is the problem: Ferrys freedom is so ill defined that it is difficult to tell exactly what it entails aside from its reactionary resistance to natural codes how we are to separate natural codes from anti-natural impulses is never explained. So-called human freedom is disconnected from the lived experiences of real human beings for whom exploitation and oppression continue unchecked. Only a select few have the material means to enjoy the full benefits of the system and thus experience full humanity. Basing his understanding of freedom in Kantian philosophy, Ferrys analysis runs into the same problem that plagues Kant. Freedom becomes an abstraction divorced from the unfreedom experienced by human beings through their reification as commodities. He fails to address the actual conditions in which freedom is experienced, avoiding sustained discussion of the material, social, and economic conditions that might limit human freedom in ways analogous to natural codes, as a second nature. If deep ecologists err in attempting to make an idealized Nature the arbiter of morality, Ferry commits a similar error in supposing that the market offers a better model. Deep ecology is problematic for Ferry not just because it challenges human autonomy but because it challenges the market by suggesting that some things are not for sale: the anti-modern impulses of deep ecology are also anti-capitalist. His alternative to the restrictions of radical ecology is reform based not in a revision of values but in the ability of the market to adapt. Reconciled with the State, which gives it its own ministers, with democracy, which offers the possibility of non-violent change, ecology ultimately blends into the market, which naturally adapts to new consumer demands. The forest is threatened by automobile emissions? No problem, well build catalytic converters, which are more expensive but less polluting. clean industry is developing by leaps and bounds, creating competition among companies to obtain the green label.10 Where deep ecology argues for a transformation of morality to include the biosphere as a whole, Ferry argues for the wisdom of capitalism in regulating morality along with other human desires. Democratic values are championed only in order to relinquish them to the market, never mind that the market is responsible for the ecological problems that gave rise to the interventions of deep ecology in the first place. If enough people care about the environment or animals, he seems to argue, then reform will occur naturally through the infallible forces of supply and demand.11 In asking us to place our fate in the invisible hand of democratizing capitalism, Ferry demonstrates a quasi-religious belief in the inherent justice

AT Deep Eco Bad Ferry

of the market that compares to the quasi-religious celebration of Nature he decries among deep ecologists. This seems doubly disingenuous as he himself notes a certain dissatisfaction with the consumerist dynamic: Without getting too religious, one suspects that man is not on this earth to buy higher and higher performance cars and televisions; though our final destination may remain a mystery, this, certainly, is not the ultimate goal.12 The final irony is that his screed against deep ecology and its fascist tendencies, highlighted by the extended comparison with the nature worship and animal welfare protections of the Nazis, is motivated by his opposition to the growth of Green Party politics. According to Ferry, the environment does not need its own political party: the appropriate role for ecological concerns is as a pressure group expressing a sensibility which, though shared by the immense majority, does not have a claim to power in and of itself.13 How democratic!

role of the ballot is to bare witness to bare life - provides a way of rethinking politics that avoids victimization inherent in strategic politicization of differences. victimization causes global genocidal violence and short circuits agency and resistance. Enns 2007, Dianne, McMaster University, Political Life Before Identity, 10:1, muse Recent attention to the notion of ... to other living beings. epistemological and political emphasis on identity and difference equates color blindness with the racism of colonialism. while trying to stress the uniqueness of black experience they ignore what was historically unique about the slave trade - the ability for a dominant group to propagate distinctions between victim and perpetrator Enns 2007, Dianne, McMaster University, Political Life Before Identity, 10:1, muse My argument is premised ... prohibitive or debilitating?"26

AT Social Location?

The warrant for this evidence is that certain beings are more complex but this evidence ignores the complexity of rock formations, electromagnetic phenomena and symbiotic systems all of which are just as if not more incredible than humans also, this is a reason you should give moral consideration to the whole universe humanity is just another cell in the universe Rowe 1996 Stan, Professor Emeritus at the University of Saskatchewan, From Shallow To Deep Ecological Philosophy, Trumpeter, 13.1

AT Hierarchies Inevitable (1:10)

Open most ecology textbooks and the fields of study judged legitimate are exposed. Usually first attention is paid to individual organisms (autecology), then to species and groups of similar individuals (population ecology), then all organisms found occupying the same milieu (community ecology) and finally at the end of the book the ecosystem as community plus abiotic resources or community plus environment. In parentheses, the textbooks of Eugene Odum are an exception. As early as 1953 he defined ecology as the study of the structure and function of nature and accorded first place to the discussion of ecosystems: the largest functional units in ecology. Despite his statement that the entire biosphere may be one vast ecosystem, few ecologists accepted the logic of whole systems. The

fact of complexity in the subject matter, plus the academic necessity of focusing on simple problems that bring quick dividends to the individual in the form of papers judged publishable by peers, has ruled against it. Hence whole journals of ecological research are devoted to articles on communities and populations, the latter justified and enhanced by redefining function as Darwinian adaptation. The prevalent concept of ecosystem continues to be community plus environment with research focused on the utilitarian aspects of organisms, or the effects of organisms on such resources as soil and water: Do the bombs radio-nuclides end up in the food chain and in people? How much
photosynthate (net primary production) can be harvested from land and water? What is the sediment load and water yield from forested versus non-forested watersheds and how can water yield be increased by manipulating vegetation? Both Hagen (1992) and Golley (1993) have traced the development since Darwins time of the idea of ecosystem as a unit of nature characterized by energy flow, nutrient cycling, successional stages and productivity, noting how the practical concerns of the military and various other branches of government spurred the funding of ecosystem research. That

ecosystems might be more than serviceable functional entities consisting of organisms (important) plus an energy-providing and nutrient-providing environment (relatively unimportant) has never been seriously considered in ecological science. When arrived at by summation, the ecosystem concept can be anything, everything or, to some academics, nothing. The error is in the additive approach, building from individual to population to community and, finally, to ecosystem which emerges as last in order of importance, a so-called convenient artifice or heuristic device vaguely complementing and extending the
biotic community compared to which it is less real. On a more sophisticated level, Lovelock (1988) and Margulis (1995) have attempted to build the living world out of bacteria, rather than bacteria out of a living world. Again the . priori biological, organism-centered bias is evident. The planet and its sectoral parts whose air, land and water comprise every creatures evolutionary source and outer supportive matrix (matrix-mater-womb-mother) gets short shrift. Earth-Sector Ecosystems Suppose that the importance of Earth relative to organisms had been earlier recognized. Then four hundred years of science might have been devoted to understanding the grandest system with which humans are in direct contact: the planetary ecosphere. Examination from the physiological viewpoint, asking How does it function; how does it work? would have required a mental anatomizing of Earth in order to honor its magnificent complexity and to understand its structure-composition, because anatomy is the clue to function. As the word per-form-ance suggests, function is what form does over time; function is literally read from things happening. Scientists have today arrived at the global question of Earths performance, prodded by the Gaia hypothesis and such research programs as the International Geophysical-Biological Program. But the question remains: At

the sub-global level, what mental anatomizing, what divisions of the ecosphere are relevant to such air-breathing, water-drinking, food-eating and land-dwelling creatures as we? The logical answer is sectors of the ecosphere at any chosen scale: air above
land-water with organisms clustered where the gas, liquid and solid phases interface (Rowe 1992). This, in the words of Leopold (1949) with the addition of air-atmosphere that neither he nor the Bibles genesis story recognizesis the land community to which humans belong. The more inclusive term is terrestrial ecosystem and the key to its logical definition and mapping lies in Earths landforms and water forms (Bailey in press). By this route an explicit and tangible concept of ecosystem is derived by division of the ecosphere from the top down, as compared to the diffuse and variable concept obtained by addition from the bottom up. Top

down division yields Earth-centered units of nature, surmounting the conventional organism-centered biocentricity of the bottom up approach. It engenders geoecosystems that are substantial as well as functional, rather than inexplicit bioecosystems (Rowe & Barnes 1994). It gives substance and real-world meaning to terms such as ecodiversity and ecocentrism. A second line of logic also leads to the
way that it metabolizes and thus maintains itself (by autopoiesis, literally self-making). The

idea of ecosystems as variable size-scaled sectors of the ecosphere. Suppose the reality of the world is conceived as systems within systems in a hierarchy of containment, like fitted Chinese boxes or Russian dolls within dolls. One starts at some low level, say a functional cell, observing that its inner structural parts are joined or articulated in such a

cells enclosing functional system is the metabolizing tissue, in turn enclosed in the metabolizing organ and this in turn in the metabolizing organism. Note that each autopoietic level of integration is composed of lower levels and is itself a part of higher levels ; each level has a physiology that refers to its constituent levels below and an ecology that relates it to the levels above.
Now ask, what is the entity above the organism that analogously shows articulated structure, that functions metabolically and exhibits autopoiesis? Logic points to volumetric place-specific ecosystems. Why not community or population? Because neither is a fully functional (metabolic) entity; neither exhibits articulated structure nor autopoiesis. As aggregates, communities and populations can be counted, classified and to some extent studied as interbreeding individualswhich is their practical usebut they are more abstract than organisms and geographic ecosystems; they are taxonomic categories based, respectively, on juxtaposition in space and membership in a particular species or sub-species. The population of a particular species or sub-species trading genetic material can be a center of interest to evolutionary biologists but it can never be a center of understanding when bereft of its sustaining ecosystem. Therefore, the

level of integration

above organism is the Earth space that surrounds and includes it (singly or with its shared population and community members); i.e. the
sector of the ecosphere that includes and supports organisms, the internally articulated air-soil-water-organism geo-ecosystem that miraculously generates and maintains life. To summarize thus far: the

most real or least abstract fields-of-study that logic reveals, are the organism (within its

surrounding ecosystem) and the ecosystem (within its larger surrounding ecosystem), each of the latter a complete piece of dynamic Earth at some geographic place. Ecosystems so conceived can be esteemed and studied from the seven scientific viewpoints previously listed. Not so for populations and communities. They lack the internal articulation and hence the structural-functional attributes of metabolizing autopoietic beings. Communities

of creatures, including humans, are brought to life only by including with them the sustaining Earth-matrix of air, landform, soil and water; i.e. by conceiving them as organic parts of the holistic realities that are ecosystems. Implicit here is a devastating criticism of
togetherthe traditional communitycannot make it alone. The

sociology and communitarian politics that will improve the human condition by sole attention to populations, societies and social ills. Alarmed by the fact that the barbarians are not hammering on the frontier walls but are already here governing us, Macintyre (1981) called for new forms of community to sustain the moral life and survive the coming ages of barbarism and darkness. Such fervent hopes seemed realizable before the Age of Ecology. But now we know that groups of like-minded people banded

community with survival value can never again be conceived as a

people-only free-standing entity, able to weather the storms generated by humanistic arrogance. Only Earth ecosystems in which humans are cooperating, serving parts can achieve long-term health and sustainability.
Where Does Life Reside? The hierarchical series organ-organism-ecosystem-ecosphere represents a scale of increasing complexity and creativity. The last member, the ecosphere, is the leading candidate for embodiment of the organizing principle called life. What

gives life to the cell? The living organ that is its surrounding environment. What give life to the organ? The living organism within which it is embodied. What gives life to the organism? The surrounding living ecosystem and the global ecosphere. The October 94 issue of Scientific

American, titled Life in the Universe, presented a state-of-the-art account of how planet Earth and organic earthlingscreaturely relatives and ourselvescame to be. Throughout the text the words organisms and life were used as synonyms. Two contributors made a stab at clarifying what the second concept might or might not mean. Robert Kates suggested that life is simply organic matter capable of reproducing itself, or the mix of living things that fill the places we are familiar with. More circumspect, Carl Sagan was content to falsify current definitions, implying that a satisfactory meaning for life has yet to be found. Organisms can be alive one moment and dead the next with no quantitative difference. The recently deceased organism has lost none of its physical parts yet it lacks lifean unknown quality of organization (perhaps that mystery called energy?) but not the organization itself. A still stronger reason exists for not equating life and organisms. The latter only exhibit aliveness in the context of life-supporting systems, though curiously the vitality of the latter has mostly been denied. By

analogy, it is as if all agreed that only a tree trunks cambial layer is alive while its support systemthe trees bole and roots of bark and wood that envelops and supports the cambiumis dead. Instead we perceive the whole tree as alive. The separation of living organisms from their supportive but dead environments is a reductionist convention that ecology disproves. Both organic and inorganic are functional parts of enveloping ecosystems, of which the largest one accessible to direct experience is the global ecosphere. To
attribute the organizing principle life to Earthto the ecosphere and its sectoral aquatic and terrestrial ecosystemsmakes more sense than attempting to locate it in organisms per se, divorced from their requisite milieus. The aquatic ecologist Lindeman (1942) who pioneered examination of lakes as energetic systems adopted the ecosystem concept because of the blurred distinction between living and dead in the components of the Minnesota lakes he studied. The Biological Fallacy, equating organisms with life, is the result of a faulty inside-the-system view (Rowe 1991). Pictures of the blue-and-white planet Earth taken from the outside are intuitively recognized as images of a living cell. Inside that cell, cheated by sight, people perceive a particulate world separable into important and unimportant parts: the organic and the inorganic, biotic and abiotic, animate and inanimate, living and dead. Religions, philosophies and sciences have been constructed around these ignorant taxonomies, perpetuating the departmentalization of a global ecosystem whose aliveness is as much expressed in its improbable atmosphere, crustal rocks, seas, soils and sediments as in organisms. When did life begin? When did any kind of creative organization begin? Perhaps when the ecosphere came into existence. Perhaps earlier at time zero and the Big Bang. Important human attitudes hinge on the idea of life and where it resides. If only organisms are imbued with life, then things like us are important and all else is relatively unimportant. The

biocentric preoccupation with organisms subtly supports anthropocentrism, for are we not first in neural complexity among all organisms? Earth has traditionally been thought to consist of consequential entitiesorganisms, living beingsand their relatively inconsequential dead environments. What should be attended to, cared for, worried about? The usual answer today is life in its limited sense of organisms, of biodiversity. Meanwhile sea, land and air classified as dead environmentcan be freely exploited. In the reigning ideology as long as large organisms are safeguarded, anything goes. We
demean Earth by equating life and organisms, then proving by text-book definition that Earth is dead because not-an-organism. In this way mental doors are barred against the idea of liveliness everywhere. Certainly Earth is not an organism, nor is it a super organism as Lovelock has proposed, any more than organisms are Earth or miniEarth. The

planetary ecosphere and its sectoral volumetric ecosystems are SUPRA-organismic, higher levels of integration than mere organisms. Essential to the ecocentric idea is assignment of highest value to the ecosphere and to the ecosystems that it comprises. Note the use of ecosphere rather than biosphere, the latter usually defined as a life-filled (read organism-filled) thin shell at Earths surface. The meaning of ecosphere goes deeper; it is Earth to the core, comprising the totality of gravity and electro-magnetic fields, the molten radioactive magma that shifts the crustal plates, vulcanism and earthquakes and mountain building that renew nutrients at the surface, the whole dynamic evolving stage where

organisms play out their many roles under the guidance of the larger whole, shaped at least in part by the morphic fields of the living Gaia (Sheldrake 1991:162). In different times and places the source of life has been attributed to the air, to soil, to water, to fire, as well as to organisms. As with the blind men touching the elephant, each separate part has been the imagined essential component of the whole Earth. Now that the planet has been conceptualized as one integrated entity, can we not logically attribute the creative synthesizing quintessence called life to it, rather than to any one class of its various parts? When life is conceived as a function of the ecosphere and its sectoral ecosystem the subject matter of Biology is cast in a bright new light. The pejorative concept of environment vanishes. The focus of vital interest broadens to encompass the world. Anthropocentrism and biocentrism receive the jolting shock they deserve. The answer as to where our preservation emphasis should center is answered: Earth spaces (and all that is in them) first, Earth species second. This priority guarantees no loss of vital parts. The

implications of locating animation where it belongs, of denying the naive Life = Organisms equation, are many. Perhaps most important is a broadening of the Schweizerian reverence for life to embrace the whole Earth. Reverence for life means reverence for ecosystems. We should feel the same pain when the atmosphere and the seas are poisoned as when people are poisoned. We should feel more pain at the destruction of wild ecosystems, such as the temperate rain forest of the West Coast, than at the demise of any organism, no matter how sad the latter occasion, because the destruction of ecosystems severs the very roots of evolutionary creativity. Their definition of complexity is our capacity for making judgements about other beings complexity weve impact turned this approach to the world because it inevitably produces speciest violence

The concept of expanding or contracting human rights is part and parcel of speciest thinking it relies upon the human/non-human binary to give it meaning this produces the oppression they criticize Deckha in 2k10 Maneesha, associate professor of law at the University of Victoria, The Subhuman as a Cultural Agent of Violence, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 3, http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/09/JCAS-Special-Issue-Women-of-Color-November-3-FINAL-2010.pdf Conclusion A New Discourse That the human/subhuman binary continues to inhabit so much of western experience raises the question of the continuing relevance of anthropocentric concepts (such as human rights and human dignity) for effective theories of justice, policy and social movements. Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, a better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary altogether. Discourses of anti-violence and dignity must shift from anthropocentric and hierarchical concepts to nonexclusive conceptual anchors. This will ensure a more stable foundation for antiviolence and justice-seeking projects. The human specialness claim is a hierarchical one and relies on the figure of an Other - the subhuman and nonhuman - to be intelligible. The latter groups are beings, by definition, who do not qualify as human and thus are denied the benefits that being human is meant to compel. More to the point, however, a dignity claim staked on species difference, and reliant on dehumanizing Others to establish the moral worth of human beings, will always be vulnerable to the subhuman figure it creates. This figure is easily deployed in inter-human violent conflict implicating race, gender and cultural identities as we have seen in the context of military and police camps, contemporary slavery and slavery-like practices, and the laws of war - used in these situations to promote violence against marginalized human groups. A new discourse of cultural and legal protections is required to address violence against vulnerable humans in a manner that does not privilege humanity or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of inferior beings on whom the perpetration of violence is legitimate. This paper has sought to demonstrate the need to find an alternative discourse to theorize and mobilize around vulnerabilities for subhuman humans. This move, in addressing violence and vulnerabilities, should be productive not only for humans made vulnerable by their dehumanization, but nonhumans as well. Experimental evidence proves thinking differently can fundamentally change brain chemistry --- neuroplasticity means nothing is written in stone. Or DNA. Sharon Begley, 2007. Newsweeks science editor. Train Your Mind, Change Your Brain, p. 140-1.
In 1987, Schwartz

AT Animal Rights T/Human Rights (0:50)

launched a group-therapy session in conjunction with an ongoing study of OCDs underlying brain abnormalities. Patients came in for therapy, and scientists tracked their progress using the brain-imaging technique positron-emission tomography (PET). Schwartz began showing patients their PET scans, to emphasize that their symptoms arose from a faulty neurological circuit. One patient got it right away: Its not me, its my OCD! she exclaimed one day. Soon other patients, too, saw that their obsessions and compulsions were not really them but were instead the electronic detritus of brain circuitry. Schwartz wondered, could getting patients to

respond in a new way to the obsessive thoughts characteristic of their OCD actually change their brains? He therefore taught patients to use mindfulness to sharpen awareness of the fact that they do not truly believe that they left the stove on or that their hands need washing. Instead, he said, tell yourself you are just experiencing the arrival of an obsessive thought. Start saying to yourself, this thing that feels like an urge to check is in reality just a brainwiring problem. The week after patients started relabeling their symptoms as manifestations of pathological brain processes, they reported

the disease was no longer controlling them, and that they felt they could do something about it,
says Schwartz. I knew I was on the right track. To find out whether the benefits the patients were reporting were accompanied by brain changes, the

UCLA scientists launched what would be a landmark study in how the mind can shape the fundamental biology of the brain. They performed PET scans on eighteen OCD patients before and after ten weeks of
mindfulness-based therapy. None of the patients took medication for their OCD, and all had moderate to severe symptoms. Twelve improved significantly. In these, PET scans after treatment showed that activity in the orbital frontal cortex, the

core of the OCD circuit, had fallen dramatically compared to what it had been before mindfulnessbased therapy. Therapy had altered the metabolism of the OCD circuit, says Schwartz. This was the first study to show that cognitive-behavior therapy has the power to systematically change faulty brain chemistry in a well-identified brain circuit. The ensuing brain changes, he said, offered strong evidence that willful, mindful effort can alter brain function, and that such selfdirected brain changesneuroplasticityare a genuine reality. Calling it an avenue to self-directed neuroplasticity, he reached a conclusion that Roger Sperry, not to mention the Dalai Lama, would applaud: Mental action can alter the brain chemistry of an OCD patient. The mind can change the brain.

1. Animal life and abiotic existences have value without humanity they have the capacity for emotion, beauty and creativity 2. The warrant is probably humanity is key to space colonization but weve impact turned that above thats Kochi and Ordan that just justifies furthering exploitation even if they preserve life, its just to allow an eternity of exploitation 3. It would take billions of years for a disaster of magnitude sufficient to kill all life on earth, its probably just as likely humanity would kill itself off by that point

AT Life Pre-req to Solve (0:20)

This evidence assumes a perfect anthropocentrism our Ahkin evidence indicates anthro leads to perceptual blinders that prevent subjects from understanding the ramifications of their environmental destruction The aff doesnt lead to this its just more exploration and anthropocentrism thats the link debate if anything this is a reason the alt can solve because theres momentum in the status quo And, rejection of anthropocentrism is key its the only method to adopt a position of species being that overcomes the human/non-human divide thats Hudson.

AT Anthro Good Environment (0:20)

1. Were not vague we say we should imagine the global suicide of humanity and that shatters a humanist ethic

AT Vague Alts

1. This evidence only speaks specifically to human concerns

AT Util Heard

***Util