Whitehead and Relativity Author(s): Francis Seaman Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul.

, 1955), pp. 222-226 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/185317 . Accessed: 03/03/2012 23:38
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WHITEHEAD AND RELATIVITY

FRANCIS SEAMAN

When Whitehead's views of relativity are mentioned, everyone thinks of the views Whitehead published between 1919 and 1924. Concerning these views, C. D. Broad is "depressed"' (1: pp. 143-4) that physicists paid so little attention. And Victor Lowe has written:
There is a bare possibility that Whitehead's theory of relativity may yet affect the history of science. (4: p. 69)

The Northrop and Gross anthology (7) includes selections from this early point of view without ever betraying the fact that Whitehead later changed his mind. Given that this is the present attitude, it is important to point out that Whitehead himself in Process and Reality (13) rejected his early point of view. Instead of an alternative theory of relativity, Whitehead offered an alternative interpretation of the "orthodox" theory. This change was consequent upon Whitehead's new belief that creativity was atomic rather than continuous. It is equally important to notice that there has been some vindication of this speculative result from physics. In CyberneticsNorbert Wiener wrote:
Vitalism has won to the extent that even mechanisms structure of vitalism. (14: p. 56) correspond to the time

And on the basis of work done in quantum mechanics, no less a person than Einstein has suggested as probable that physics will substitute a system of discrete units for continuous functions. (9: p. 686) And not only is Whitehead's novel interpretation of relativity in the winds of science, but his approach to geometry and his method of extensive abstraction, contrary to what some authoritative commentators (5: p. 12, p. 18) would have us believe, are being developed by mathematicians. It is of course true that Whitehead has vigorous objections to parts of modern science, but in determining the relevance of philosophy to other fields, it is important to see where and how philosophical speculation has gone ahead of science and perhaps in part thereby inspired the advance of science. These two paragraphs will be elaborated in the order in which they have occurred. An abiding feature of Whitehead's thought is a belief in the unity of space and time. He presented this belief prior to relativity theory, stating:
Nothing could be more beautiful than the above issue of the classical concept, if only we limit ourselves to considerations of an unchanging world of space. Unfortunately, it is a changing world to which the complete concept must apply.2 (11: p. 479, c.f. also p. 467)

In the theory of relativity Whitehead found confirmation for this point of view which he had already espoused (10: p. 33, c.f. also p. 136). The question to
1 Notice that Broad says he has never coped with the material in Process and Reality.
2

Article received in September, 1905, and so worked out pre-relativity. 222

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which he then addressed himself in his writings published between 1919 and 1924 was the characterization of this "changing" space. He argued that space was an abstraction from events and expressive of the relations between events; that space was uniform; and most important (which he later gave up) that space-in-process is continuous.
The continuity of nature arises from extension. Every event extends over other events, and every event is extended over by other events. Thus in the special case of durations which are now the only events directly under consideration, every duration is part of other durations . . . Accordingly, there are no maximum durations and minimum durations. Thus there is no atomic structure of durations. (10: p. 591)

Since space is, so to speak, continuously and uniformly extending, it must not be affected by such factors as mass and electromagnetism. Whatever exists besides space-time, must react apart from and along side of that extensive continuum. This put Whitehead at odds with the orthodox theory of relativity. The latter considered space as being more or less non-homogeneous in the presence of mass. Because of this difference with the orthodox view, Whitehead undertook to rewrite the equations of relativity so that they might agree with his views. In his equations, the path of a particle is to be described by the sum of two functions: one, a function of purely spatial-temporal factors, the other, a function of various factors such as mass and electromagnetism (12: c.f. pp. 81-5). From these equations Whitehead deduced several consequences which differed from the predictions of orthodox relativity, but by amounts too small to be observed. In Process and Reality, continuity is replaced by atomism. As Hammerschmidt observes:
In the early period, passage is creative but not atomic in itself ... (later) early creativity is superseded by an atomic self-creativity . . . (3: pp. 8-9)
...

the

What appears to be a continuous change, for example, the motion of a particle, is in reality a series of occasions, or an "historic route". The achievement of the creativity of each occasion is bequeathed to future occasions and helps determine the region and structure of these successive occasions. The relevant consequence of this new position is Whitehead's acceptance of the mathematics of relativity and consequently his rejection of his earlier views. Although he accepts the mathematical description of the world as given by relativity, Whitehead reinterprets the orthodox views in a most novel and exciting manner. It is this view of the world which is, to my mind, Whitehead's lasting contribution to the philosophy of science. It is of course true that for Whitehead space is uniform while the space of general relativity is not uniform. But as one reads the mathematical development of relativity, say in G. Y. Rainich's Mathematics of Relativity (8: c.f. p. 114 et seq.), it appears at once that the complex space of relativity is constructed in terms of tangent flat (Euclidean) spaces. These tangent flats are said to be essential in order that coordinates can be established (re-measurement made possible). An analogous procedure is used

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by Einstein who considers regions of the complex space that are sufficiently small so as to be considered flat (2: c.f. p. 62). Using either procedure, it is evident that a uniform space is required to give coordinates to the more complex space. In either case the resulting equations are continuous. What Whitehead asserts is that the path, say of a particle, in this complex space is to be considered as an historic route of occasions. The physical factors interact after each pulse of experience and determine the region for the next concrescence or next occasion, the sum of these occasions being what we call the path of the particle:
The concrescence presupposes its basic region and not the region its concrescence. (13: p. 434)

Thus Whitehead will have no objection to the mathematics of relativity since he now asserts that space and physical things interact. And this Whitehead states explicitly. If one remembers that for Whitehead, it is better not to speak of distance along a path, but only of an "impetus"; and if one knows that in Process and Reality, the phrase "systematic geometry" means a geometry of uniform space, then it is easy to see that Whitehead rejected his older views:
It is to be noted, however, that the conclusions of this discussion involve no objection to the modern treatment of ultimate physical laws in the guise of a problem in differential geometry. The integral impetus is an extensive quantity, a 'length'. The differential element of impetus is a differential element of systematic length weighted with the individual peculiarities of its relevant environment. The whole theory of the physical field is the interweaving of the individual peculiarities of actual occasions against the background of systematic geometry. (13: p. 507)

It is worth emphasizing that there is "no objection to the modern treatment of ultimate physical laws in the guise of a problem in differential geometry", and that "The differential element of impetus is a differential element of systematic length weighted with the individual peculiarities of its relevant environment." By making creativity atomic, Whitehead has found that he too must weight space with physical factors. What is novel in this view is that instead of incorporating physics and uniform geometry into continuous equations, the incorporation, says Whitehead, goes on in atomic units. What is so exciting and interesting in this suggestion of Whitehead's is that this stepwise process of reacting is just the way the new mathematical brains work, and perhaps, it is just the way in which our brains work. The more the laws of physics become computing machine type laws, the more physics becomes Whiteheadian. Further, as will be indicated below, quantum mechanics may push physics into a notion of change by discrete units, and this is suggested by no less than Einstein himself. The important thing to recall about Whitehead doctrine of relativity is that modern science seems to be going in that direction. It is of course true that Whitehead objects vigorously to the procedures of modern physicists whom he charges have no adequate theory of space (13: e.g. p. 507). This difference arises because the modern physicist considers the flats in terms of which the complex space of relativity is constructed to be merely scaffolding while Whitehead considers these flats to be real. It is this difference

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which accounts for Whitehead's criticism of the usual theories of measurement. But this is another problem. There are two further remarks worth making concerning this topic. First, I recall that when Professor Rainich was setting up the complex space of relativity in the classroom, he remarked: "We cannot imagine (or 'diagram') this space, for Euclid is in the blackboard." It is just this phenomena which Whitehead's views explain most elegantly. For according to Whitehead, after each occasion has concresed (reacted), and the subject of the occasion perceives, the perception is always in terms of a uniform space. Second, it is true that in one sense Whitehead did not give up his early view, for in Process and Reality, the physical factors concrese in independence of the spatial-temporal (13: pp. 445-7). Articles such as that of V. Lowe's "Whitehead's Philosophy of Science" give the misleading impression that nothing has been done by mathematicians and physicists with Whitehead's notion of space (5: p. 12, p. 18), and moreover it gives the impression that unless operationalism and its relatives are abandoned, Whitehead has been in vain (5: pp. 10-11, 14, 15, 19). In point of fact, the essential thing about Whitehead's approach is not his objection to operationalism, but the fact that Whitehead bases his discourse upon regions or "lumps" of space, and in terms thereof defines points and lines. And just this approach has been developed in mathematics. Consider the following remarks from Menger's "Topology Without Points":
Such a topology of lumps seems to me to be closer to the physicist's concept of space than is the point set theoretical concept. For naturally all the physicist can measure and observe are pieces of space, and the individual points are merely given as the result of approximations. (6: p. 85) At any rate, there have been various attempts in the topological literature essentially towards the same end, namely, that of eliminating points as basic concepts, and yet so far these attempts have been quite unrelated. For some time it has seemed desirable to me to coordinate these ideas. The present lecture is intended to carry out this synthesis.3 (6: pp. 106-7)

In a later discussion, under the title "Theory of Relativity and Geometry", Menger writes concerning the impact of quantum mechanics:
I venture the conjecture that, for geometrication of physics, especially the physics of the microcosm, idealizations very different from those of Euclid might prove more adequate than his. One alternative is a geometry where points are not primary entities. What is here contemplated is a geometry of lumps-that is, a theory in which lumps are undefined concepts whereas points appear as the results of limiting of intersectional processes applied to these lumps. (9: p. 472)

And commenting upon this, where "(1)" refers to the assumption of continuity, Einstein wrote:
The more radical effort of surrendering (1) with (2) appears to me-and I believe to Dr. Menger also-to lie more closely at hand. So long as no one has new concepts, which appear to have sufficient constructive power, mere doubt remains; that is,
3Also, anyone who reads part of this tract (p. 85 et seq.) will be struck by the similarity to Whitehead's Process and Reality procedures for characterizing space.

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unfortunately, my own situation. Adhereing to the continuum originates with me not in a prejudice, but arises out of the fact that I have been unable to think up anything organic to take its place. (9: p. 686)

There seems therefore good reason to believe that physics may go the way of Whitehead. This is a most exciting conclusion. And it would seem that those who would praise Whitehead could do so best by pointing up the areas of agreement between his work and that of science, rather than by pointing to his differences with scientists and philosophers of science. University of Idaho
BIBLIOGRAPHY (1) BROAD, C. D., "Alfred North Whitehead." Mind (April, 1948). (2) EINSTEIN, ALBERT, The Meaning of Relativity. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1946. W., Whitehead'sPhilosophy of Time. King's Crown Press, WILLIAM (3) HAMMERSCHMIDT, 1947. (4) LOWE, VICTOR,"Whitehead's Philosophical Development," The Philosophy of Alfred

North Whitehead.Evanston, Illinois: Library of Living Philosophers, 1941.

(5) LOWE, V., HARTSCHORNE, C., AND JOHNSON, A. H., Whiteheadand the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1950. (6) MENGER, KARL, "Topology Without Points." Houston, Texas: Rice Institute Pamphlet, XXVII (January, 1940). (7) NORTHROP, F. S. C., AND GROSS, M. W., eds., A. N. Whitehead;An Anthology. New

(8)

RAINICH, (9) SCHILPP,

York: Macmillan Co., 1953. G. Y., Mathematicsof Relativity. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1950. P. A., ed., Albert Einstein; Philosopher-Scientist. Evanston, Illinois: Library

of Living Philosophers, 1949. (10) WHITEHEAD, A. N., The Conceptof Nature. London: Cambridge University Press, 1920. (11) WHITEHEAD, A. N., "On the Mathematical Concepts of the Material World." Philo-

sophical Transactions, CCV (London, 1906).

(12) WHITEHEAD, A. N., The Principle of Relativity. London: Cambridge University Press,

1922. (13)
WHITEHEAD,

A. N., Process and Reality. New York: Macmillan Co., 1936.

(14) WIENER, N., Cybernetics.New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1948.