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Army and Marine Corps vehicle modernization plans are at a critical junction
Planners need to take a long view, given long development times and service lives of ground vehicles, a dynamic security environment and increasingly scarce resources We have identified seven trends that suggest that the future operating environment will be more lethal, and also less permissive to the deployment, operation and sustainment of ground expeditionary forces U.S. ground forces (especially the Army) appear likely to face serious challenges to the way they deploy, fight, and sustain themselves that vehicle modernization by itself cannot solve Given the need to think through these challenges, the absence of ready technological solutions to them, and prospective constraints on modernization funding, the ground forces should pursue a less ambitious approach to modernization, while maximizing the ability to adapt to future surprises and preserving key sectors of the industrial base
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1. Two central challenges to current modernization planning a) Uncertainty b) Austerity

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Dealing with Uncertainty a) Seven important trends affecting the future of land warfare b) Their implications for ground vehicles Dealing with Austerity a) Conserving scarce resources b) Maximizing adaptability c) Exploring crucial technologies d) Protecting the industrial base

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Army and Marine Corps vehicle modernization efforts currently at a critical junction Modernization driven by aging of systems procured in the 1980s and additional wear and tear and lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan A number of ambitious programs are in their relatively early, uncertain stages: Army: M2/M3 Bradley to be replaced with new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) M113 family of vehicles to be replaced with new Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) Marine Corps AAV-7 to be replaced with new Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) LAV-25 to replaced with new Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) Both HMMWVs, MRAPs to be replaced with new Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) DEFUNDED HMMWV to be recapitalized as Medium Enhanced Capability Vehicle (MECV) None of these programs have reached Milestone B, (the point at which a design is selected for production), so all plans are relatively flexible at this point All are planned to be funded more or less simultaneously
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Uncertainty Given the long development times and service lives typical of ground vehicles, planners need to think long-term20 to 30 years out Easier said than done, of course, as the world is undergoing rapid demographic, political, economic, technological change
Austerity Budget cuts are certain; their full extent is not Defense cuts may not be fairly divided among the Services Diminished resources make it more important than ever that we get it right (at least not wrong)

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Predicting the future is a fools errand BUT it is possible to reduce the risk of surprise and hedge against the surprise that will still (inevitably) occur Careful analysis of trends can help identify potential discontinuities in the future security environment that could have significant implications for the ground forces and their vehicles Seven key trends stand out:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. The evolution of the armor/anti-armor competition The emphasis of force protection The growing importance of partners The proliferation of precision-guided weaponry The prevalence of non-linear operations The urbanization of warfare The proliferation of nuclear weapons

Pessimism is intended, pleasant surprises are less of an issue

Need to be wary of overly optimistic forecasts

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Armor/anti-armor competition has always been dynamic, in that the advantage fluctuates between anti-vehicle weapons and vehicle protection measures
Silver bullets and invulnerability have both proved ephemeral

History and recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that anti-armor weapons will be cheaper and faster to field than the countermeasures that protect against them
Even non-state actors have been able to keep pace with new protection measures, as demonstrated by IED development

Active protection measures may provide a new form of protection, but can likely be countered relatively quickly and cheaply Bottom Line: Looking forward, no level of armor protection (or other form of protection) is likely to provide lasting invulnerability, the race will remain a close one
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Force protection has become an increasingly dominant priority for the ground forces in operations and procurement
Especially true and particularly evident in Iraq and Afghanistan, where $43.5B spent on MRAPs, $20.8B spent on JIEDDO This appears trend appears unlikely to be reversed Moral imperative Maintain combat power and operational Protect the dollars and cents value of U.S. military personnel Preserve the affordability of the all-volunteer force by Bottom Line: It appears unlikely that U.S. ground forces will be able to dial back force protectionbut maintaining the desired level will likely grow more difficult and expensive (perhaps prohibitively so)

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Owing to the growing cost of projecting land power, building partner capacity is a central element of our national security strategy No More Iraqs and No More Afghanistans Resource constraints and the high cost of expeditionary operations Play to U.S. competitive advantages Partners will have varying levels of sophistication/resources

Bottom Line: The United States may be challenged to provide vehicles that meet the needs and desires of partners
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The United States is losing its near-monopoly in precisionguided weaponry Next decade or two will likely see the proliferation of GRAMMguided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles Two forms appear likely to emerge: Battlefield G-RAMManti-tank guided missiles, mortars, shoulder-mounted surface-to-air missiles, all with ranges of roughly 20 miles or less

Theater G-RAMMcruise missiles and ballistic missiles with significantly greater ranges (20-1500 miles)
Bottom Line: Different mixes of the two types will likely be employed by different adversaries, but both will pose serious tactical- and operational-level problems for U.S. ground forces
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Trend in warfare is toward non-linear operations G-RAMM could provide adversaries ability to strike rear areas at the tactical level (e.g. inside bases like Camp Victory) and operational level (e.g. APODs and SPODs in theater) Bottom Line: The prevalence of non-linear operations especially when combined with G-RAMMhas significant implications for a range of ground operations, to include the defense of formerly safe rear-area assets (e.g., supply points) and convoy operations

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Demographic trends show a clear movement toward urbanization

Urban environments challenge preferred U.S methods of operation Dilute U.S. advantages in range, mobility, precision, sensing and comms Urban eviction and control operations typically require use of sizable ground forces and involve protracted fights and incurring heavy casualties

Clever adversaries will look to exploit this situation

Bottom Line: The ground forces will not be able to avoid urban combat because it is hard, but rather will be compelled to engage in it because it is hard
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Proliferation of nuclear weapons appears likely to continue Thresholds at which use of nuclear weapons is considered may change To date, U.S. forces have not mounted conventional operations against a nuclear-armed adversary Bottom Line: Looking forward, the ground services need to include operations in a nuclear environment as something for which they should prepare

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As these trends play out, they will almost certainly challenge U.S. Army and Marine Corps power-projection operations
A far more lethal operational environment Anti-armor advantage in the armor/anti-armor competition G-RAMM Nonlinear operations Urban operations Nuclear environment Force protection will likely remain an imperative (for several reasons)
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But deploying and sustaining armored vehicleswhich is already challengingwill likely grow more difficult as environment becomes less permissive The threat from anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities (e.g. battlefield and theater GRAMM) to air and sea ports of debarkation, fixed bases, and depots could significantly increase the costs in blood and treasure of deploying and sustaining large, heavy ground forces Non-linear threats to sustainment operations will make sustaining logistically-demanding vehicles still more difficult

THIS POSES A DILEMMA TO WHICH THERE IS NO READILY APPARENT TECHNOGICAL SOLUTION

The Army and Marine Corps need to develop operational concepts that will inform how they plan to deploy, fight, and sustain themselves in this environment
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Growing resource constraints require careful resource allocation

In the absence of a major breakthrough in vehicle defense technologies, spending large sums on developing new systems seems ill-advised Ground forces should seek to use it up, wear it out, make it do, or do without whenever possible by:

1. Extending the service lives and enhancing the utility of existing vehicles that appear well suited to future challenges and can be affordably recapitalized
2. Procuring off-the-shelf (OTS) solutions when existing vehicles cannot be Reordering modified to meet anticipated needs but OTS (perhaps modified) vehicles can of past 3. Undertaking ambitious developmental efforts only when 1. and 2.
cannot meet needs AND there is a high degree of assurance that a from-scratch design will provide a discontinuous boost in effectiveness
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approach

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Given the uncertainty inherent in the future security environment, need to mitigate its consequences by maximizing the adaptability of new and recapitalized vehicles
M113: 40+ variants in service 50+ years on Several measures could enhance adaptability: Employing an open architecture approach (easily replaceable components, standard interfaces, etc.) that enables plug and play of subcomponents Designing in surplus space, weight, and power (SWaP) in order to facilitate future modifications
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Science and Technology (S&T) funding is the seed corn of future capabilities; needs to be protected Trends suggest several priority areas for S&T investment: Protection Possible to reverse cost imposition equation? Fuel Efficiency Ground vehicles are a major source of fuel demand (roughly 1/3 of wartime demand) High fuel consumption rates increase effects of supply interdiction and expose additional convoys to attack (1/8 of Army casualties related to fuel convoys) Reduce sustainment requirements Policy action needed: decisions need to account for the fully burden cost of fuel Robotics Robotic systems ideal for dull, dirty, and dangerous work Address force protection challenges Free up trade space taken up by protective measures Reduce sustainment requirements
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Whatever modernization strategy is pursued, ground forces need to consider the effects on the industrial base

Age of austerity will likely bring about contraction of the defense industrial base

Some design and manufacturing capability could be lost, and could be difficult and expensive (if not impossible) to recover later

Accordingly, ground services should identify the most critical sectors of the ground vehicle industrial base and make a deliberate effort to sustain them
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