North Korea Nuclear Crisis

03/15/05 Jimyong Moon

1. Intro North Koreas nuclear crisis, an event that has brought a serious tension in the Korean peninsula for several decades, has reached their climax on February 10, 2005 when North Korea declared possession of nuclear weapons. However, despite this significant outbreak, international situation is facing rather paradoxical atmosphere with calmness. The Bush Administration, who did not believe the North Koreas denial of possessing nuclear weapons and heavily blamed the North Korea for already having them or admitting them, is at the pains of ignoring the situation, whereas the North Korea blusters out a threat of already having nuclear weapons, which is suppose to be hidden. To understand this paradoxical on-going situation, the meaning of a nuclear development requires consideration. The meaning of a nuclear development includes both development of nuclear energy and development of nuclear weapons. Of course it is true that the development of nuclear energy has an affinity with the development of nuclear weapons, but different aspects lie between a peaceful development of nuclear energy and the development of nuclear weapons. An amicable use of nuclear energy (without developing nuclear weapons) practiced by Japan is a good example which fully exists in the international society. Therefore, without this kind of understanding of nuclear development, a mere ideological analysis of developing nuclear energy is the same thing of developing nuclear weapons should be refrained.

2. Posturing of U.S., North Korea and Crisis Development The basic position of U.S. toward nuke is to maintain previous NPT. The Clinton Administration as well as the Bush Administration has this basic stand, however the difference, as seen in the agreement of The 1994 Agreed Framework, is that the Clinton Administration allowed the North Koreas nuclear development within certain conditions (e.g. periodical inspection) in the

North Korea Nuclear Crisis

03/15/05 Jimyong Moon

aspect of developing nuclear energy, while the Bush Administration thought even this nuclear energy development of North Korea was unreliable. The Bush Administration, after inauguration, constantly showed discontent with the agreement of The 1994 Agreed Framework and tried to revise it.1 Of course, suspicious actions of North Korea (e.g. suspicions of Kumchangri Unerground Complex and test-firing of missiles) played a great role in making the Bush Administration judge in this way, but an inveterate distrust in North Korea and Kim Jong-il also had a significant role in it.2 Especially after the 9.11 terror, U.S. called North Korea by axis of evil, showing extreme hostility. In deed, many Bush officials believed that diplomacy may help, but that the real value of the engagement is simply to expose North Koreas malevolent intentions that include not only the development of weapons of mass destruction but also the reunification of the Korean peninsula under communist rule.3 Along with these reasons, another reason why North Koreas nuclear development is considered negatively is that the conservative parties, the basis of the Bush Administration, traditionally do not welcome a hostile country, outside of U.S. power of influence, to develop an enormous energy and use it.4 In other words, there is an intention to control the use of uranium regarded as the most important strategic material with oil after World War II.5 As it can be seen through resent oppression of U.S. toward Iran, U.S. worries that the world order led by U.S. would be affected by the countries like North Korea and Iran where they could produce a great volume of uranium by themselves which would make possible for those nations to develop rapidly if nuclear energy development is accelerated within them. In fact, it is known that more than 90% of technology is shared between a peaceful use of nuclear energy and a use of a nuclear weapon. Even
1

Manyin, Mark E., North Korea : A chronology of events October 2002-December 2004, CRS issue brief for congress (2003), p.1. 2 Niksch, Larry A., North Koreas Nuclear Weapons Program, CRS issue brief for congress (2003), p.3. 3 Cha, Victor D., Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula, International Security, 27,1 (2002), pp.42-43 4 Kim, Gi-Dea, The problem of North Korea nuclear, Issue and Criticism (2005), <http://www.apress.or.kr/> 5 About the time of World War I, gum was regarded as strategic material and was controlled.

North Korea Nuclear Crisis

03/15/05 Jimyong Moon

if the nuclear energy is used peacefully, the potentiality will be recognized which will give an effect of a rise in military position in a certain degree, so the Bush Administration raises a question about the nuclear development itself in North Korea. North Korea, as well known to the world, has been going through a severe insufficiency of energy. It is the insufficient supply of energy that impeded the industrialization after the 1970s, which was once in a great progress after the Korean War. Along with this difficulty in energy supply, economic crisis, followed by the collapse of a communist market in the 1990s, concurred with political crisis (collapse of the Soviet Union, a relation of strategic cooperation between U.S and China) that threatened the existence of North Korea itself.6 Sustaining the regime was desperate particularly in the situation of economical and political crisis after Kim Il-sungs death in 1994. Nuclear development also can be understood in this kind of context. In other words, North Korea is trying to secure the deterrent potential force of military for conservation of itself based on nuclear development, and at the same time, by using this feature as a bargaining chip in foreign negotiation, to obtain a promise of economic recovery and conservation of its regime. As a matter of fact, North Korea revealed this intention during the decision-making process in The 1994 Agreed Framework. That is, North Korea concentrated its efforts to solve the problems in economy and energy through nuclear development during the process of the Agreed Framework. The 1994 Agreed Framework was achieved because the understandings between U.S. and North Korea were in accord with each other. U.S. never wanted North Korea to have nuclear weapons. However, U.S. had a grasp of North Koreas energy problem, so they thought nuclear energy development was a separate thing from developing nuclear weapons. Finally, U.S. approved North Koreas development of nuclear energy, but not allowing nuclear weapon development by controlling it with methods such as periodic inspections. Also, nuclear energy development, rather

Chung, Seung-Min, The study on North Koreas nuclear policy, (Seoul :Sogang University 2003), p. 12.

North Korea Nuclear Crisis

03/15/05 Jimyong Moon

than developing nuclear weapons, was the top priority for North Korea, so it was satisfied with the fact that it could have a stable development of nuclear energy by accepting demands of U.S. in a certain degree. However, this agreement started to break down when North Korea, who was discontented with the delay of heavy fuel oil support and light water nuclear reactor construction that U.S. had promised, took suspicious actions as if it was developing nuclear weapons. In other words, the crisis between U.S. and North Korea began when a commitment problem occurred. This situation was aggravated with the appearance of the Bush Administration, and got really serious after James Kellys report on October, 2002. After Kellys report, U.S enforced on official discontinuance of fuel oil supply and light water nuclear reactor construction, and carried out an indirect pressure through IAEA. In a retaliatory measure, North Korea expelled nuclear inspectors for the IAEA, withdrew from the NPT and reopened its Youngbyon nuclear plant that had been frozen since 1994.7 There was an effort to solve this elevated crisis by dialogues like 3-party talks and 6-party talks after the U.S. attacking on Iraq, but there were not much to gain, and then the crisis is facing a new situation because of North Koreas declaration of possessing nuclear weapons on February 10, 2005. Fundamentally, this was resulted as a combination of an ardent policy by the Bush Administration, a policy that did not allow any nuclear development including nuclear energy development of North Korea, and a dogged obstinacy of North Korea who thought the nuclear development was the last resort of conserving its regime. This means both parties had commitment problem which gave them inflexibility to each other. First of all, U.S. has mistaken the intention of North Korea. The basic goal of North Koreas nuclear development is to maintain its regime, not to communize the Korean Peninsula with the

Hwang, Jihwan, The second nuclear crisis and U.S. foreign policy, Pacific Focus (2003). pp.33-34.

North Korea Nuclear Crisis

03/15/05 Jimyong Moon

power of nuclear weapons. But, the Bush Administration overestimated North Koreas intention, and kept its hard-line policy after Kellys report. Especially after 9.11 Terror, a new security plan called the National Security Strategy of the United States of America emphasized the necessity of preventive counter-proliferation and preemptive strike for the preparation of threats from rogue states and terrorists, pointing out North Korea as one of them.8 In fact, there are many practical problems for U.S. to attack North Korea, but considering the security strategy as an official statement of U.S., it would be enough to make North Korea feel threat to its structure. That means, in the situation of having an information problem because of an absence of direct communication channels since the Bush Administration, U.S. have given no choice for North Korea but to react unyieldingly by signaling it with a bluff of attacking even though U.S. did not really intend to attack.9 Moreover, this resolute attitude of U.S. made North Korea feel a need of a new agreement that could replace the 1994 Agreed Framework, which led North Korea to take a firm action of possessing nuke as a means to draw a fresh agreement. Actually, on the background of North Koreas decision like this lies a strong desire of nuclear development, as well as a judgment that it was practically impossible for U.S. to have a war in the Korean Peninsula. In other words, North Korea thought that if U.S. had wanted to have a war in Korea, it should have pulled in South Korea, which seemed impossible, and China also did not want a war in Korea, which would definitely make U.S. incapable of having a war.10 On the other hand, North Korea has constantly showed actions that could arouse international suspicion since the 1994 Agreed Framework. Thad is, it made U.S. think that it did not give up the development of nuclear weapons by suggesting suspicions about Kumchangri

8 9

ibid, p.37. During the Clinton Administration, it grasped the other partys intention continuously through New York Channel (e.g. reciprocal visit of Jo Myong-lok and Albright) 10 In recent survey from South Korea, the result showed that South Korean have more amicability toward North Korea than toward U.S.

North Korea Nuclear Crisis

03/15/05 Jimyong Moon

Underground Complex and a test-firing of missiles. In particular, the actions North Korea showed after the discontinuance of fuel oil supply by U.S. was good enough for U.S. to think that it still had something going on with the development of nuclear weapons. From the standpoint of the Bush Administration, the contents of the 1994 Agreed Framework1994 were not even close to a satisfactory level, and continuously ongoing suspicious actions of North Korea were considered to be a serious threat to the National Security Strategy and NPT that U.S. has pursued, so a hard-line action was the only choice. Nevertheless, the fact that U.S. is too silent on the matter of North Koreas declaration of possessing nuclear weapons reveals U.S. has fallen into a dilemma of having no other option but only one choice, a war, since it has showed all hard-line policies. Despite the collapse of NPT at a stretch, a primary goal of U.S. to restrain nuclear proliferation, an advertent reaction of U.S shows that it knows North Korea is not likely to have a strategic value of nuclear weapons even if it has them, as well as a war is practically impossible. After all, after the declaration of possessing nuke by North Korea, it can be recognized that recent reaction U.S. showed was extremely normal when compared to the former one which was rather an overreaction.

3. Prospects on the Solution If a war is the worst scenario of preference to all the parties concerned, there is a great possibility of reaching a common assent between both parties of U.S. and the North Korea (Pearson, 1995). But, since there is information problem on both sides due to the absence of precise communication and there were too many commitments (not clear whether it was a kind of negotiation strategies) inside each country before they came to the negotiation, it is hard to see a mutual consent in present stage. For the time being, U.S. is seeking for a appropriate solution through 6-party talks that it carries forward. However, this option will buy some time for U.S but not draw out a fundamental settlement because North Korea already has a doubt on its validness

North Korea Nuclear Crisis

03/15/05 Jimyong Moon

and wants to have a bilateral with U.S. The most needed thing in current situation is to form an atmosphere that makes each partys position flexible so as to let each one take a step back. Mutual trust is an imperative element to accomplish this retreat. Also, to form a mutual trust, a great emphasis should be placed on the mediator who can exchange the exact intention of each partys leader. The Bush Administration should dispatch an important personnel like a former president Carter as a special envoy. Through this kind of method, both parties will be able to solve information problem with establishing a good rapport. Once the relationship of mutual trust is formed, they need to go back to the 1994 Agreed Framework, as a way of saving costs and solving the problem effectively. They may review the agreement, but revise the content. What is concerned to this matter can be found in the fact that Putin made an agreement with Iran about nuclear energy despite the pressure of U.S. President Putin brought nuclear waste used to make nuclear weapons back to Russia so that he could dissolve U.S.s suspicions completely.11 Because of this, now Iran can use nuclear energy legally and peacefully. If U.S. tries to have a bilateral with North Korea by complementing the 1994 Agreed Framework in this way, then North Korea will be able to solve its fundamental problem of energy insufficiency because it will have a stable way of using nuclear energy, which will eventually lead to dissolve the confronted crisis.

11

Ohmynews, (2/28/2005), < http://www.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=239851>

North Korea Nuclear Crisis

03/15/05 Jimyong Moon

References
Cha, Victor D., Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula, International Security, 27,1 (2002). Chung, Seung-Min, The study on North Koreas nuclear policy, (Seoul: Sogang University 2003) Hwang, Jihwan, The second nuclear crisis and U.S. foreign policy, Pacific Focus (2003) Kim, Gi-Dea, The problem of North Korea nuclear, Issue and Criticism (2005), <http://www.apress.or.kr/>. Manyin, Mark E., North Korea : A chronology of events October 2002-December 2004, CRS issue brief for congress (2003). Niksch, Larry A., North Koreas Nuclear Weapons Program, CRS issue brief for congress (2003).

Ohmynews, < http://www.ohmynews.com> Pressian, <http://www.pressian.com>