Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
27 September 2006
Arthur D. Little Limited Science Park, Milton Road Cambridge CB4 0XL United Kingdom Telephone +44 (0)870 336 6700 Fax +44 (0)870 336 6701 www.adlittle.uk.com Reference 21184
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
Notice This report was commissioned by Technip Italy on terms specifically limiting the liability of Arthur D. Little Limited. Our conclusions are the results of the exercise of our best professional judgement, based in part upon materials and information provided to us by Technip Italy and others. Use of this report by any third party for whatever purpose should not, and does not, absolve such third party from using due diligence in verifying the reports contents. Any use which a third party makes of this document, or any reliance on it, or decisions to be made based on it, are the responsibility of such third party. Arthur D. Little Limited accepts no duty of care or liability of any kind whatsoever to any such third party, and no responsibility for damages, if any, suffered by any third party as a result of decisions made, or not made, or actions taken, or not taken, based on this document.
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
Contents
1. 2. 3.
Executive Summary HAZOP Approach Appendices I. II. III. IV. V. VI. FEED HAZOP procedure Attendance Node List HAZOP Recommendations HAZOP Worksheets HAZOP Master P&IDs
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
Arthur D. Little has completed the FEED HAZOP review for Technips OK LNG Project Utility units
The HAZOP was based on 65 Process & Instrumentation Diagrams: Unit 003 Well Water Pumping Unit 017 Hot Oil System Unit 031 Jetty Unit 041/42 Instrument Plant Air Unit 043 Nitrogen System Unit 051 Raw Water Treatment System Unit 052 Service Water System Unit 053 Potable Water System Unit 054 Demin. Water System Unit 055 Fire Water System Unit 056 Oily Water System Unit 057 Effluent Treatment Unit 059 Sewage/Waste Water Treatment Cause & Effects Diagrams and other relevant reference documents were also considered The HAZOP team members, detailed discussions and any identified recommendations are recorded on the daily record sheets and summarised in Appendices I V
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
Significant recommendations fall into six main categories: Review of Vendor Packages. The Contractor is to review the various vendor packages during the detailed design phase of the project Review of equipment and pipework design. The Contractor is to review aspects of equipment and pipework design including design temperatures, materials selection, requirement for individual furnace fuel gas KO drums, and additional check valves to prevent utility header de-pressurisation Review of PSV sizing and design basis. The Contractor is to review requirements for additional PSV protection, and aspects of the design of various existing PSVs Utilities area equipment specification. The Contractor will need to undertake a review of utilities area equipment specifications and provision of flammable gas detection in light of the results of the QRA and location hazard area classification. Review of flare area oily water system design. The Contractor is to review the requirement for connection of lifting pumps to emergency power supply and pump capacity/basin volume upon receipt of site specific rainfall data Provision of additional local instrumentation and DCS process control instrumentation and alarms. The Contractor is to review provision of additional instrumentation to facilitate operation and local maintenance/sampling activities Detailed recommendations are included in Appendix IV
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
Contents
1. 2. 3.
Executive Summary HAZOP Approach Appendices I. II. III. IV. V. VI. FEED HAZOP procedure Attendance Node List HAZOP Recommendations HAZOP Worksheets HAZOP Master P&IDs
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
Study Approach
Arthur D. Little conducted a HAZOP review as part of Technips FEED phase for the OK LNG Project
The HAZOP followed the relevant Technip Italy procedure Document code PP202, Rev. B (see Appendix I) The study was completed during the period 11 to 18 September 2006, and was based on the current revision of the Process & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) The study focussed on process design and operational control arrangements Review of the associated ESD trip function reliability/redundancy was to be completed separately during the related SIL review
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Team Composition
The HAZOP team comprised representatives from the independent consultant, project owner and design contractor
The independent HAZOP Leader and Scribe were from Arthur D. Little Limited Team members represented the following project stakeholders: Company/Operator: OK LNG Project Team Subcontractor: Snamprogetti SpA
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List of P&IDs
The Gas Treatment Units review studied 65 Process & Instrumentation Diagrams
Unit Unit 3 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-003-P ID-00-31-01 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-017-P ID-00-31-01 2252-017-P ID-00-31-02 2252-017-P ID-00-31-03 2252-017-P ID-00-31-04 2252-017-P ID-00-31-05 2252-017-P ID-00-31-06 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-031-P ID-00-31-01 2252-031-P ID-00-31-02 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-041-P ID-00-31-01 2252-041-P ID-00-31-02 2252-041-P ID-00-31-04 2252-041-P ID-00-31-04 2252-041-P ID-00-31-05 2252-041-P ID-00-31-06 2252-041-P ID-00-31-07 Revision A Date Sheet Description
Revision A A A A A A
Date
Sheet Description
25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Furna ce (017-H-101 A) 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Furna ce (017-H-101 B) 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Furna ce (017-H-101 C) 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Dis tribution 25-Aug-06 Expa ns ion Drum & Circula tion P umps 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Dra ina ge S ys te m
Revision A A
Revision A A A A A A A
Date
Sheet Description
23-Ma y-06 Air Compre s s ors P a cka ge 23-Ma y-06 Air Drying P a cka ge 23-Ma y-06 Air Compre s s ors P a cka ge 24-Ma y-06 Eme rge ncy Compre s s or a nd P la nt Air Re ce ive r 24-Ma y-06 Ins trume nt Air Re ce ive rs 24-Ma y-06 Ins trume nt Air Re ce ive rs 24-Ma y-06 Ins trume nt Air Re ce ive rs
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List of P&IDs
The Gas Treatment Units review studied 65 Process & Instrumentation Diagrams (continued)
Unit Unit 43 Unit 43 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-043-P ID-00-31-01 2252-043-P ID-00-31-02 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-046-P ID-00-31-01 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-051-P ID-00-31-01 2252-051-P ID-00-31-02 2252-051-P ID-00-31-03 2252-051-P ID-00-31-04 2252-051-P ID-00-31-05 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-052-P ID-00-31-01 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-053-P ID-00-31-01 2252-053-P ID-00-31-02 2252-053-P ID-00-31-03 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-054-P ID-00-31-03 2252-054-P ID-00-31-05 Revision A A Date Sheet Description
23-Ma y-06 Nitroge n Ge ne ra tion P a cka ge 23-Ma y-06 Nitroge n S tora ge a nd Va poris a tion
Unit Unit 46
Revision A
Sheet Description
Revision A A A A A
Date
Sheet Description
23-Ma y-06 Ra w Wa te r Filtra tion S ys te m 24-Ma y-06 Filte re d a nd Fire Wa te r S tora ge 24-Ma y-06 Filte re d a nd Fire Wa te r S tora ge 23-Ma y-06 Re ve rs e Os mos is S ys te m 24-Ma y-06 De s a lina te d Wa te r S tora ge a nd P umping
Unit Unit 52
Revision A
Date
Sheet Description
Revision A A A
Date
Sheet Description
24-Ma y-06 De s a lina te d Wa te r P ota bilis a tion 24-Ma y-06 P ota ble Wa te r S tora ge a nd P umping 24-Ma y-06 P ota ble Wa te r A.C. Filte rs S e ction
Revision A A
Date
Sheet Description
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List of P&IDs
The Gas Treatment Units review studied 65 Process & Instrumentation Diagrams (continued)
Unit Unit 55 Unit 55 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-055-P ID-00-31-01 2252-055-P ID-00-31-02 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-056-P ID-00-31-01 2252-056-P ID-00-31-02 2252-056-P ID-00-31-03 2252-056-P ID-00-31-04 2252-056-P ID-00-31-05 2252-056-P ID-00-31-06 2252-056-P ID-00-31-07 2252-056-P ID-00-31-08 2252-056-P ID-00-31-09 2252-056-P ID-00-31-10 2252-056-P ID-00-31-11 2252-056-P ID-00-31-12 2252-056-P ID-00-31-13 2252-056-P ID-00-31-14 2252-056-P ID-00-31-15 2252-056-P ID-00-31-16 2252-056-P ID-00-31-17 2252-056-P ID-00-31-18 2252-056-P ID-00-31-19 2252-056-P ID-00-31-20 2252-056-P ID-00-31-21 2252-056-P ID-00-31-22 2252-056-P ID-00-31-23 Revision A A Date 14-J ul-06 14-J ul-06 Fire Wa te r S ys te m Fire Wa te r S ys te m Sheet Description
Unit Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56
Revision A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Sheet Description
12-S e p-06 Oily Wa te r Equa lis a tion a nd P umping 12-S e p-06 Oily Wa tte r Tre a tme nt 12-S e p-06 Tre a te d Oily Wa te r Dis cha rge 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Inle t Fa cilitie s Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Inle t Fa cilitie s Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Fla re Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in
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List of P&IDs
The Gas Treatment Units review studied 65 Process & Instrumentation Diagrams (continued)
Unit Unit 57 Unit 57 Unit 57 Unit 57 Unit 57 Drawing Number (PID) 2252-057-P ID-00-31-03 2252-057-P ID-00-31-05 2252-057-P ID-00-31-06 2252-057-P ID-00-31-07 2252-057-P ID-00-31-08 Revision A A A A A Date Sheet Description
12-S e p-06 LNG Tra in 1 & 2 Boile rs Blow Down Colle ction Ba s ins 12-S e p-06 La bora tory a nd Che mica l S e we r Re ce iving P it 12-S e p-06 Che mica l Wa te r Ne utra lis a tion 12-S e p-06 Nue tra lis a tion Dos ing S ys te m 12-S e p-06 LNG Tra in 3 & 4 Boile rs Blow Down Colle ction Ba s ins
Drawing Number (PID) 2252-059-P ID-00-31-01 2252-059-P ID-00-31-02 2252-059-P ID-00-31-03 2252-059-P ID-00-31-04 2252-059-P ID-00-31-05
Revision A A A A A
Date
Sheet Description
12-S e p-06 S a nita ry Wa te r Colle ction P its 12-S e p-06 S a nita ry Wa te r Colle ction P its 12-S e p-06 S a nita ry Wa te r Tre a tme nt 12-S e p-06 S a nita ry Wa te r Dis cha rge a nd Drying Be ds 12-S e p-06 S a nita ry Wa te r Colle ction P its
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Reference Documents
Company Statement of Requirements, No. OKLNG-GG-PM-DB-0001 FEED Process Basis of Design, No. OKLNG-GG-PR-DB-0002 Cause and Effects Diagrams Equipment FEED Stage Specifications PSV Sizing Basis Specifications
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HAZOP Record
For each HAZOP node, the record presents the relevant deviations considered, existing mitigation factors and any recommendations arising The record sheet also lists and prioritises the 149 recommendations identified HAZOP record sheets for the Utility Units are included in Appendix V
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Contents
1. 2. 3.
Executive Summary HAZOP Approach Appendices I. II. III. IV. V. VI. FEED HAZOP procedure Attendance Node List HAZOP Recommendations HAZOP Worksheets HAZOP Master P&IDs
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The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or undirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
B A REV.
A.SCALESSE A.SCALESSE
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DOCUMENT REVISIONS
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The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or undirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
OK LNG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FRONT END ENGINEERING DESIGN WP1 HAZOP REVIEW PROCEDURE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. 2. 3.
PURPOSE ................................................................................................................................. 3 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS .................................................................................................... 3 ORGANIZATION....................................................................................................................... 3 3.1. 3.2. Responsabilities .............................................................................................................. 3 Timing............................................................................................................................... 4
4.
5.
6. 7.
SCHEDULE............................................................................................................................. 11 FOLLOW-UP........................................................................................................................... 11
ATTACHMENT A
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The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or undirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
OK LNG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FRONT END ENGINEERING DESIGN WP1 HAZOP REVIEW PROCEDURE
1.
PURPOSE
This procedure defines the requirements and methodology of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study within the Front End Engineering Design (FEED) phase of OK LNG DEVELOPMENT Project. 2. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS HAZOP Study will be based primarily on P&ID issued for FEED. In addition the following documentation will be made available as reference: Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) H&M Balances Project Design Basis Process Philosophies and Narratives Major Equipment Data Sheets Relief Valve applicable Emergency Scenarios Fluid List Material Selection Diagrams Cause&Effect Diagrams Plot Plans
3. 3.1.
ORGANIZATION Responsabilities The HAZOP team will typically comprise the following members:
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The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or undirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
OK LNG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FRONT END ENGINEERING DESIGN WP1 HAZOP REVIEW PROCEDURE
Clients representatives (possible including operations) Particular responsibilities of team members will be as follows: Chairman: an experienced, independent technical person, who is responsible for leading the reviews with appropriate guidewords, establishing the detailed work schedule, ensuring that procedures are followed and that notes and results of the reviews are properly recorded and distributed, resolving any conflict that may arise during the sessions, ensuring that the team works toward a common goal by utilizing expertise of all team members, and checking on progress of sessions. Scribe: is responsible for preparing HAZOP Worksheets, and recording and filing all documents used and generated during the sessions in accordance with instructions of the Chairman; is responsible for distributing HAZOP Worksheets to attendees and specialists concerned. Other Team Members: are responsible for providing comments based on their knowledge and experience to assist the team in resolving issues emerging during the sessions. 3.2. Timing A detailed agenda and logistic organization of HAZOP Study will be transmitted to Company before starting of the sessions. As general approach, due to the intensive nature of the HAZOP technique, the duration of daily sessions should be not excessive. The Chairman will monitor the meeting time, adjusting study progress to meet time targets, without causing reduction in effectiveness. HAZOP meetings will be held in Rome in JV offices. Session will start at 9:00 up to 13:00 and from 14:00 to 18:00 with 15 minutes break in the morning and in the afternoon.
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The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or undirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
OK LNG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FRONT END ENGINEERING DESIGN WP1 HAZOP REVIEW PROCEDURE
4.
METHODOLOGY Present HAZOP methodology is derived from A Guide to Hazard and Operability Studies, Chemical Industries Association, London 1992. The HAZOP technique is a systematic analysis that uses a guide word approach to identify deviations from intended process design. The technique uses a team of reviewers with expertise in several key areas to identify deviations and their causes using a brainstorming approach. Although the primary goal of a HAZOP study is the identification of process hazards, it is also a valuable tool for uncovering operability problems as well. The scope of the HAZOP technique is therefore identifying potential process hazards or operability concerns, not finding solutions to reduce or eliminate them. Attempting to solve problems uncovered by the HAZOP can result in an unduly long and inefficient study process. At the same time, a HAZOP study can not be intended as a review of project design basis and operating philosophies, since these must be considered as resolved when the HAZOP study is carried out. The methodology to be applied to the HAZOP of the project is summarized here below. The Chairman divides the P&IDs into a number of discrete systems for review (nodes). In this way the team can focus close attention on a single circuit and then produce recommendations for each node. At the start of the review sessions scheduled for a complete plant unit, the Process Engineer describes briefly the process to the HAZOP team. Working through the P&IDs, the Chairman reviews a selected node by examining which deviations from normal operation can lead to undesired outcomes. All applicable deviations are examined combining appropriate guidewords to process or others parameters. Deviations will be considered with reference to normal operation and maintenance; where considered critical, the start-up and the shut-down operations will be analyzed in specific nodes. Suitable guidewords and parameters for a continuous process are listed in Table 1. Other parameters may be developed by the HAZOP team as required. Typically the team considers deviations as: High flow, low flow, no flow, reverse flow High temperature, low temperature High pressure, low pressure Contaminants in process materials, etc.
Events, which can cause these deviations to occur, include: Malfunction of process control systems Blockages
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The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or undirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
OK LNG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FRONT END ENGINEERING DESIGN WP1 HAZOP REVIEW PROCEDURE
Operational error (e.g. opening wrong valve) Faulty maintenance activities (e.g. leaving in a slip-plate) Failure of power supply or utilities (instrument air, cooling water etc.)
For each deviation, the team asks, "Can it happen?. If the answer is positive then the team asks "Would it cause a hazard?" (where a 'hazard' could be a fire, explosion, release of flammable or toxic material, production of off-specification material, production stoppage, equipment damage). Where a deviation can occur and can cause a hazard, the team considers what mitigating features may exist, e.g. relief valves, shutdown systems, alarms, etc. When a potential hazard is identified, remedial action may be required depending on the likelihood of the event and its consequence. If a deviation with potential to create hazard is identified, then, after the guidance of the Chairman, the Scribe records on the appropriate columns of HAZOP Worksheet possible Causes, possible Consequences, and definition of the problem in the Recommendation. The recommendation is identified univocally by means of a number shown on worksheet and on P&ID. Discussion of problems during the meeting should be kept to a minimum, and at the discretion of the Chairman. A dedicated software will be used to record the outcome of the review for each node and each deviation. The marked-up P&IDs will be the HAZOP Master P&IDs and will form part of the HAZOP report. The study is basically qualitative and recording of HAZOP findings on Worksheet is done by exception, i.e. the experience of the team was used to judge if a particular risk is: So unlikely (not credible) or of such low consequence (no hazard) that no further action is needed. For such a case, the point is marked on P&ID (by colored pencil) but the details of discussion are not included in the Worksheet. One which could have consequences if failure occurred, and where the probability and severity may engender a significant risk (safety recommendation); in this case relevant item is marked on P&ID (identification number) and on worksheet (identification number, causes, consequences.and recommendation texts). One which would have consequences in term of facility operability (operability recommendation); in this case relevant item is marked on P&ID (identification number) and on worksheet (identification number, causes, consequences.and recommendation texts).
The study continues with the selection by the Chairman of a new node and deviations are then analysed as before to evaluate the new node under review. The approach is repeated until all systems of the project have been examined. Each line and vessel studied is marked with highlighted coloured pencil to ensure no items are missed.
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The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or undirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
OK LNG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FRONT END ENGINEERING DESIGN WP1 HAZOP REVIEW PROCEDURE
If P&ID minor drafting errors are observed during the review, the Chairman may mark the corrections in a different colour to that used for HAZOP comments without recording it on the Worksheet. Each recommendation will be marked on P&ID with a red colour, while minor drafting errors will be corrected with green colour. TABLE 1 TYPICAL HAZOP GUIDEWORDS/PARAMETERS AND RELATED DEVIATIONS FOR CONTINUOS PROCESS
PARAMETERS FLOW GUIDEWORDS More Less None Reverse More Less None More Less As well as More Less None More Less Reverse Part of As well as Other than More As well as Other than Other than DEVIATIONS high flow low flow no flow reverse flow high pressure low pressure vacuum high temperature low temperature cryogenic high level low level no level additional phase loss of phase change of state off-spec composition contaminants corrosive concentration runway reaction side reaction explosion loss of
PRESSURE
TEMPERATURE
LEVEL
STATE/ COMPOSITION
REACTION UTILITY: power, air, steam, nitrogen, cooling water UNSTEADY OPERATION: startup, shutdown, maintenance, sampling, drainage CONTAINMENT DOCUMENTATION
difficult hazardous
4.1.
Risk Ranking
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The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or undirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
OK LNG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FRONT END ENGINEERING DESIGN WP1 HAZOP REVIEW PROCEDURE
In order to prioritise the recommendations for implementation, a risk-ranking scheme will be used to rank failure scenarios according to their estimated severity and likelihood. The following hazard severity and likelihood levels, and corresponding risk grid shall be used: HAZARD SEVERITY LEVELS Level
1. Very High
Severity Multiple employee fatalities Public fatalities and injuries Extensive property damage Major environmental impact Major adverse public reaction Employee fatalities Public injuries Significant property damage Significant environmental impact Adverse public reaction Employee injuries Minor public injuries Moderate property damage Moderate environmental impact Moderately adverse public reaction Minor employee injuries No public injuries Minor property damage Minor environmental impact No adverse public reaction Operational Upset No employee injuries No public injuries No property damage No environmental impact No adverse public reaction
2. High
3. Medium
4. Low
5. Insignificant
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The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or undirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
OK LNG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FRONT END ENGINEERING DESIGN WP1 HAZOP REVIEW PROCEDURE
Likelihood (events / year) Greater than 1E-2 From 1E-2 to 1E-3 From 1E-3 to 1E-4 From 1E-4 to 1E-6 Less than 1E-6
RISK GRID
Likelihood 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 7 8 9 10 5 5 8 9 10 10
2 3 4
5
4 6 7
8
6 7 8
9
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The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or undirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
OK LNG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FRONT END ENGINEERING DESIGN WP1 HAZOP REVIEW PROCEDURE
4.2.
Recommendations A number of recommendations for changes to equipment and procedures or for additional analysis/verifications will be identified during the HAZOP study, which in the team's opinion will improve the safety and operability of the facility; recommendations and party responsible for addressing the action will be recorded by the HAZOP Scribe on relevant fields of HAZOP worksheets.
5. 5.1.
REPORTING HAZOP Worksheets HAZOP Worksheets will be prepared daily to record study findings in accordance with Chairmans instructions. HAZOP Worksheets will be generated using dedicated HAZOP software. The first issue of HAZOP Worksheets will be checked and approved by the Chairman and subsequently distributed to other attendees for their concurrence.
5.2.
HAZOP Report After completion of scheduled HAZOP sessions, a HAZOP Study Report will be prepared. The outline of the HAZOP Study Report is: 1) Main body of report Introduction and Scope of Work Executive Summary Study Approach Study Results Conclusions 2) Attachments HAZOP Attendees HAZOP Node List HAZOP Worksheets HAZOP Master P&IDs
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The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or undirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
OK LNG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FRONT END ENGINEERING DESIGN WP1 HAZOP REVIEW PROCEDURE
6.
SCHEDULE Contractor will provide a written notice about the recommended start and duration of the HAZOP Study. The notice will include the proposed team leader for Company approval. HAZOP meetings will be held daily. Detailed daily schedule and logistic of HAZOP sessions will be provided in advance. At the beginning of each daily session, the HAZOP secretary will distribute to the HAZOP team attendance the HAZOP Worksheet relevant to the previous working day. At the end of each session the HAZOP leader will collect on his own master copy the comments, if any, relevant to the HAZOP worksheet issued at the beginning of the session.
7.
FOLLOW-UP At the end of HAZOP sessions, beside to the HAZOP Report, Action Sheets containing the recommendations listed in the worksheets and assigned to a party for closure, will be produced. Action Sheets will be followed-up by the party responsible for the action. Changes proposed as the result of HAZOP review will be discussed and agreed with Company. On satisfactory resolution of actions, a formal HAZOP Follow-up Report showing resolutions and actions implemented will be issued for information.
Contents
1. 2. 3.
Executive Summary HAZOP Approach Appendices I. II. III. IV. V. VI. FEED HAZOP procedure Attendance Node List HAZOP Recommendations HAZOP Worksheets HAZOP Master P&IDs
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
27
Appendix II Attendance
The following personnel participated in the Utility Unit (Part 2) FEED HAZOP
11/09/2006 Monday Name Mr James Perry Mr Philip Webster Mr Francesco Mussetto Mr Luciano Vanneschi Mrs Lorena Rosa Mr Christian Scala Mr Alfonso Ricciardi Mr Fred Preston Mr Eric Holland Department Arthur D Little - HAZOP Leader Arthur D Little - HAZOP Scribe Snamprogetti SpA Snamprogetti SpA Snamprogetti SpA Technip Snamprogetti SpA OK LNG OK LNG Y Y Y Y Y Y (am) 12/09/2006 Tuesday Y Y Y Y Y 13/09/2006 14/09/2006 15/09/2006 Wednesday Thursday Friday Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 18/09/2006 Monday Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y
Y Y (am)
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
28
Contents
1. 2. 3.
Executive Summary HAZOP Approach Appendices I. II. III. IV. V. VI. FEED HAZOP procedure Attendance Node List HAZOP Recommendations HAZOP Worksheets HAZOP Master P&IDs
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
29
Drawing Number (PID) 2252-041-P ID-00-31-01 2252-041-P ID-00-31-02 2252-041-P ID-00-31-04 2252-041-P ID-00-31-02 2252-041-P ID-00-31-05 2252-041-P ID-00-31-06 2252-041-P ID-00-31-07
Revision A A A A A A A
Date
Sheet Description
23-Ma y-06 Air Compre s s ors P a cka ge 23-Ma y-06 Air Drying P a cka ge Eme rge ncy Compre s s or a nd P la nt 24-Ma y-06 Air Re ce ive r 23-Ma y-06 Air Drying P a cka ge 24-Ma y-06 Ins trume nt Air Re ce ive rs 24-Ma y-06 Ins trume nt Air Re ce ive rs 24-Ma y-06 Ins trume nt Air Re ce ive rs
Node (FEED) 1
Equipment
Day 1
Revision A A
Date
Sheet Description
23-Ma y-06 Nitroge n Ge ne ra tion P a cka ge 23-Ma y-06 Nitroge n S tora ge a nd Va poris a tion
Node (FEED) 1
Equipment
Day 1
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
30
Unit Unit 3 Unit 51 Unit 51 Unit 51 Unit 51 Unit 51 Unit 51 Unit 51 Unit 51 Unit 51 Unit 53 Unit 51 Unit 51 Unit 52
Drawing Number (PID) 2252-003-P ID-00-31-01 2252-051-P ID-00-31-01 2252-051-P ID-00-31-02 2252-051-P ID-00-31-03 2252-051-P ID-00-31-01 2252-051-P ID-00-31-02 2252-051-P ID-00-31-02 2252-051-P ID-00-31-03 2252-051-P ID-00-31-04 2252-051-P ID-00-31-05 2252-053-P ID-00-31-02 2252-051-P ID-00-31-02 2252-051-P ID-00-31-03 2252-052-P ID-00-31-01
Revision A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Date
Sheet Description
Node (FEED) 1
Node Description
Equipment
Day 2
23-Ma y-06 We ll Wa te r P umping 23-Ma y-06 Ra w Wa te r Filtra tion S ys te m 24-Ma y-06 Filte re d a nd Fire Wa te r S tora ge 24-Ma y-06 Filte re d a nd Fire Wa te r S tora ge 23-Ma y-06 Ra w Wa te r Filtra tion S ys te m 24-Ma y-06 Filte re d a nd Fire Wa te r S tora ge 24-Ma y-06 Filte re d a nd Fire Wa te r S tora ge 24-Ma y-06 Filte re d a nd Fire Wa te r S tora ge 23-Ma y-06 Re ve rs e Os mos is S ys te m De s a lina te d Wa te r S tora ge a nd P umping 3 2
Well Water Pumps and Raw 003-P-101A-C Water Filtration 051-U-101 051-T-101A/B
051-U-102
24-Ma y-06
24-Ma y-06 P ota ble Wa te r S tora ge a nd P umping 24-Ma y-06 Filte re d a nd Fire Wa te r S tora ge 24-Ma y-06 Filte re d a nd Fire Wa te r S tora ge 23-Ma y-06 S e rvice Wa te r P umping 4 S e rvice wa te r s ys te m 051-T-101A/B 052-P -130A/B 052-P -131A/B 3
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
31
D ra win g N u m b e r ( P ID ) 2252-053-P ID-00-31-01 2252-053-P ID-00-31-02 2252-053-P ID-00-31-03 2252-053-P ID-00-31-02 2252-053-P ID-00-31-03
R e v is io n A A A A A
D a te
S h e e t D e s c rip t io n
N o de (F EED ) 1
E q u ip m e n t
Day 3
24-M a y-06 P o ta ble Wa te r A.C . F ilte rs S e c tio n 24-M a y-06 P o ta ble Wa te r S to ra ge a nd P um ping 2 P o ta ble wa te r c hilling unit, 053-T-120 053-P -120A/B s to ra ge ta nk a nd 053-U-123 dis tributio n 3
Drawing Number (PID) 2252-051-P ID-00-31-05 2252-054-P ID-00-31-03 2252-054-P ID-00-31-05 2252-054-P ID-00-31-03 2252-054-P ID-00-31-05 2252-054-P ID-00-31-05
Revision A A A A A A
Date
Sheet Description
De s a lina te d Wa te r S tora ge a nd 24-Ma y-06 P umping 24-Ma y-06 De min. Wa te r P a cka ge 24-Ma y-06 De min. Wa te r S tora ge a nd P umping 24-Ma y-06 De min. Wa te r P a cka ge 24-Ma y-06 De min. Wa te r S tora ge a nd P umping 24-Ma y-06 De min. Wa te r S tora ge a nd P umping
Node (FEED) 1
Node Description
Equipment
Day 3
P roduction of de mine ra lis e d 051-T-102 wa te r 051-P -101A/B 054-U-110 054-T-110 Wa te r de mine ra lis a tion unit 054-U-110 pa cka ge re ge ne ra tion 054-T-111 054-P -111A/B 054 T 110 De mine ra lis e d wa te r pumps 054-T-110 a nd he a de r 054-P -110A/B
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
32
Appendix III Node List Hot Oil System and Diesel Oil
Unit Unit 17 Unit 17 Unit 17 Unit 17 Unit 17 Unit 17 Unit 17 Unit 17 Unit 17 Unit 17
Drawing Number (PID) 2252-017-P ID-00-31-01 2252-017-P ID-00-31-02 2252-017-P ID-00-31-03 2252-017-P ID-00-31-04 2252-017-P ID-00-31-05 2252-017-P ID-00-31-01 2252-017-P ID-00-31-02 2252-017-P ID-00-31-03 2252-017-P ID-00-31-04 2252-017-P ID-00-31-06
Revision A A A A A A A A A A
Date
Sheet Description
25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Furna ce (017-H-101 A) 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Furna ce (017-H-101 B) 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Furna ce (017-H-101 C) 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Dis tribution Expa ns ion Drum & Circula tion P umps 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Furna ce (017-H-101 A) 25-Aug-06 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Furna ce (017-H-101 B) 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Furna ce (017-H-101 C) 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Dis tribution 25-Aug-06 Hot Oil Dra ina ge S ys te m
Node (FEED) 1
Day 4
017-H-101A/B/C
017-V-102/3 017-P-103/4
Unit
Revision
Date
Sheet Description
Node (FEED) 1
Day 4
Unit 46
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
33
Revision A A
Sheet Description J e tty Air S ys te m a nd Nitroge n Re ce ive r J e tty Air S ys te m a nd Nitroge n Re ce ive r
Node (FEED) 1 2
Equipment
Day 4 4
Drawing Number (PID) 2252-051-P ID-00-31-02 2252-051-P ID-00-31-03 2252-055-P ID-00-31-01 2252-055-P ID-00-31-02 2252-031-P ID-00-31-02 2252-052-P ID-00-31-01
Revision A A A A A A
Date
Sheet Description
24-Ma y-06 Filte re d a nd Fire Wa te r S tora ge 24-Ma y-06 Filte re d a nd Fire Wa te r S tora ge 14-J ul-06 14-J ul-06 14-J ul-06 Fire Wa te r S ys te m Fire Wa te r S ys te m J e tty Fire Fighting S ys te m
Node (FEED) 1
Day 5
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
34
Unit Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56 Unit 56
Revision A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Date
Sheet Description
Day 6
12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Oily Wa te r Equa lis a tion a nd P umping 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Oily Wa te r Equa lis a tion a nd P umping 12-S e p-06 Inle t Fa cilitie s Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Inle t Fa cilitie s Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Fla re Colle ction Ba s in 12-S e p-06 Oily Wa te r Equa lis a tion a nd P umping
Type 3 (fla re a re a ) colle ction 056-BA-512 ba s in 056-P -512A/B 056-BA-513 056-P -513A/B Oily wa te r tre a tme nt 056-TK-120 056-Z-101 056-BA-121 056-P -121A/B 056-P -150A/B 056-U-101 056-BA-122 056-BA-123 056-P -122A/B 056-P -123A/B
4 Unit 56 Unit 56 2252-056-P ID-00-31-02 2252-056-P ID-00-31-03 A A 12-S e p-06 Oily Wa te r Equa lis a tion a nd P umping 12-S e p-06 Oily Wa te r Tre a tme nt
Unit 56
2252-056-P ID-00-31-04
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
35
Drawing Number (PID) 2252-057-P ID-00-31-03 2252-057-P ID-00-31-05 2252-057-P ID-00-31-06 2252-057-P ID-00-31-07
Revision A A A A
Date
Sheet Description
LNG Tra in 1 & 2 Boile rs Blow Down 12-S e p-06 Colle ction Ba s ins La bora tory a nd Che mica l S e we r 12-S e p-06 Re ce iving P it 12-S e p-06 Che mica l Wa te r Ne utra lis a tion 12-S e p-06 Ne utra lis a tion Dos ing S ys te m
Node (FEED) 1
Equipment 057-BA-110 057-BA-111 057-BA-112 057-BA-113 057-P -110A/B 057-P -111A/B 057-P -112A/B 057-P -113A/B 075-BA-120 057-BA-126 057-BA-121A/B 057-P -121A/B 057-U-102 057-U-103
Day 5
Unit 57
2252-057-P ID-00-31-08
12-S e p-06
Revision A A
Date
Sheet Description
12-S e p-06 S a nita ry Wa te r Colle ction P its 12-S e p-06 S a nita ry Wa te r Colle ction P its
Node (FEED) 1
Node Description
Equipment
Day 6
Unit 59
2252-059-P ID-00-31-05
S a nita ry wa te r colle ction pits 059-BA-101 059-P -101-A/B 059-BA-102 059-P -102A/B 059-BA-103 059-P -103A/B 059-BA-104 059-P -104A/B 059-BA-105 059-P -105A/B 059-BA-106 059-P -106A/B 059-BA-107 S a nita ry wa te r tre a tme nt S a nita ry wa te r colle ction ba s in 059-BA107 S a nita ry wa te r fe e ding pumps 059-P 107 S a nita ry wa te r tre a tme nt pa cka ge 059U-101 S a nita ry wa te r dis cha rge ba s in 059-BA108 S a nita ry wa te r dis cha rge pumps 059-P 108A/B Drying be ds 059-BA-111A-E Re cove ry wa te r pit 059-BA-112 Re cove ry wa te r pump 059-P -112
Unit 59
2252-059-P ID-00-31-03
Unit 59
2252-059-P ID-00-31-04
12-S e p-06
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
36
Contents
1. 2. 3.
Executive Summary HAZOP Approach Appendices I. II. III. IV. V. VI. FEED HAZOP procedure Attendance Node List HAZOP Recommendations HAZOP Worksheets HAZOP Master P&IDs
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
37
Recommendations R759.1 Consider requirement for vendor package HAZOP during detailed design R761.1 Consider requirements for redundancy in electrical feeders to the air compressor packages, to enable distribution of air compressors over multiple electrical feeders. R761.2 Consider requirements for dP indication and PDAH alarm on interstage and discharge filters on the air compressor packages R761.3 Review control system for air compressor packages to determine whether possible to continue operation of air compressor packages at full flow rate in manual mode in the event of malfunction 041-PIC-0005 and operator intervention R763.1 Confirm requirements for check valves and configuration of air compressor package and start-up compressor and drier with vendor R764.1 Update P&ID to show internal baffle plate on wet air vessel R765.1 Consider vapourisation of water collected in wet air vessel in sizing basis for 041-PSV-0001 R769.1 Discuss with vendor requirements for air compressor package temperature indication and alarms (e.g. discharge of interstage cooler) R769.2 Provide AAH on 041-AI-0001A/B to warn operator of water breakthrough to instrument air system R778.1 Consider requirements for flammable gas detection in vicinity of the air compressor package as located downwind of the LNG process area R784.1 Provide DCS pressure indication and low pressure alarm on each individual instrument receiver R787.1 See R784.1 for provision of DCS PI and PAL indication on individual instrument air receivers R788.1 Consider and confirm requirements for PSV on each air drying package vessel R791.1 Ensure operating manual highlights moisture breakthrough alarm has no trip and/or sequence action R798.1 Consider requirements for dP indication on air drier filter elements in discussion with vendor R798.2 Ensure operating manual requires operator check and draining of free water from the compressor casing before start-up R801.1 Consider requirement for flammable gas detection on start-up compressor inlet R804.1 P&ID will be updated to remove instrument air header to jetty given dedicated jetty air compressor
Action by: TS TS
Action resolution
S 3 2
L 3 4
R 7 7
761 761
Node 1 Node 1
TS TS
3 3
3 2
7 6
TS TS TS TS TS TS
3 2 3 3 3 2
3 2 4 3 3 4
7 4 8 7 7 7
TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS
4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2
4 4 3 3 3 3 4 2
9 9 7 7 7 7 7 4
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
38
Recommendations R805.1 Consider requirement for vendor package HAZOP during detailed design R806.1 Operating manual should clearly state requirement to start vapouriser package before using significant volumes of nitrogen for purging and maintainance activities to protect nitrogen header pressure and minimise potential for reverse flow of flammable mixtures into the nitrogen header R806.2 Operating manual should clearly state requirement for operator to initiate LIN & GAN operating mode R806.3 Consider configuration of trip of LIN production in the event of high level in both downstream liquid nitrogen storage tanks in consultation with vendor R806.4 Consider updates of nitrogen generation plant P&ID to show HS selector for either GAN or GAN & LIN production modes in consultation with vendor R807.1 Ensure atmospheric vent for nitrogen is at safe location R814.1 Investigate whether additional requirement for oxygen analyser on liquid nitrogen production to prevent contamination of liquid nitrogen storage R816.1 Discuss during vendor package HAZOP protections against exceedance of vapouriser gaseous discharge pipework specification R818.1 Discuss during vendor package HAZOP protections against overfilling and overpressurising storage R818.2 See Recommendation R806.3 for configuration of trip of LIN production in the event of high level in both downstream liquid nitrogen storage tanks R819.1 Consider configuration of LAL at higher level in the tank (e.g. 60-80% full) if no requirement to have LAL at low level in the tank, e.g. for protection of pump and/or gas breakthrough from storage
Action by: TS TS
Action resolution
S 3 3
L 3 3
R 7 7
806 806
Node 1 Node 1
TS TS
3 3
3 3
7 7
806
Node 1
TS
807 814
Node 1 Node 1
TS TS
3 3
3 3
7 7
TS TS TS
3 3 3
3 3 3
7 7 7
819
Node 1
TS
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
39
HAZOP Node Item No. 828 Node 1 828 Node 1 829 829 Node 1 Node 1
Recommendations R828.1 Consider HAZOP of vendor package during detailed design R828.2 Review all utility water storage tanks and provide maintenance blinds and/or spacers to enable isolation of tanks for maintenance R829.1 Update P&ID to show correct relative location of 051-LALL-0005A/B vs non firewater nozzles R829.2 Consider whether DCS panel alarms 051-LAH-0006A/B and 051-LAH0004A/B are required as these will be nuisance alarms during normal operating conditions and tank levels R829.3 During detailed design, following selection of well water pump type and filter capacity, consider requirement for minimum flow protection on well pumps R830.1 Consider during detailed design whether permissive of well water pump operating is required to commence the backwash cleaning sequence R830.2 Provision of pressure indication on suction of raw water filtration package, requested by client as permissive for on/off control of raw water sterilisation package R831.1 Consider LO and/or CSO of the firewater supply line and minimum flow return on the filtered and firewater storage tank to prevent closure in error by operator R832.1 Consider during detailed design, provision of syphon breaker on top entry to filtered and firewater storage tanks to prevent reverse flow and/or additional check valve on tank inlet in the event of bottom filling R833.1 Detailed design to consider requirement for external protection of water tanks floors via CP or coating R833.2 Review of raw water, filtered water and service water pipework will be completed during detailed design following conformation of well water composition (salt and solids content) R834.1 Review requirement for pressure relief provision on filters in revised design (not yet issued) to prevent overpressure of filters and tank inlet pipework as well water pump discharge presure rating increased to class 600, but filters and downstream pipework remain class 150 R834.2 Review requirement for thermal relief on raw water pipework from well during detailed design R835.1 Review sizing basis for the vent on filtered and firewater storage tanks to ensure sufficient for combined maximum flow rate out of tank R842.1 In new revision of P&ID (not issued) assumption that three independent wells will be used for provision of well water for site with individual low low level trip of single well water pump R844.1 Consider during detailed design and reciept of raw water composition implications on proposed filtration package configuration and design
Action by: TS TS TS TS
Action resolution
S 3 2 2 3
L 3 2 2 3
R 7 4 4 7
829
Node 1
TS
830
Node 1
TS
830
Node 1
TS
831
Node 1
TS
832
Node 1
TS
833 833
Node 1 Node 1
TS TS
4 4
3 3
8 8
834
Node 1
TS
TS TS TS
3 2 2
3 4 2
7 7 4
844
Node 1
TS
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
40
Recommendations R844.2 Consider during detailed design and reciept of raw water composition implications on anticipated solids production from the backwash filters and discharge to off-site receiving waters R847.1 See Recommendation R833.2 for review of materials following reciept of well water composition during detailed design R847.2 Review reverse osmosis package design for removal of dissolved solids during detailed design following reciept of well water composition R847.3 Consider during detailed design and reciept of raw water composition implications on salt concentration of concentrate discharged to off-site receiving waters (more significant issue if creek is freshwater rather than brackish or saline) R851.1 Consider HAZOP of vendor package during detailed design R853.1 Consider provision raw water sterilisation package sodium hypochlorite storage DCS level indication R855.1 Next revision of P&IDs will show manual isolation valve at chemical injection tie-in. Consider requirement for check valve given increase in well water pump discharge pressure R856.1 Undertake HAZOP of injection package during detailed design. At present, preference is to use iso tank as means of storage of sodium hypochlorite chemical, removing requirements for additional vessel and/or handling requirements R861.1 Recommend provision of shelter for raw water sterilisation package (shade, not enclosed building) R874.1 Consider HAZOP of vendor package during detailed design R875.1 Review proposed on/off level set points in desalinated water and potable water storage tanks to ensure it is possible to refill tanks, taking into account with single and combined filling rates R878.1 Consider requirement for tank inlet check valve in the event bottom filling R890.1 Consider requirements for DCS dP indication and PDAH on the reverse osmosis package inlet filters R900.1 Consider provision of LO manual isolation valve at tie-in to jetty firewater ring main to enable maintainance of check valve and interconnecting header (from booster pump to jetty) as approximately 9 km long without compromising firewater provision at jetty R902.1 See R833.2 for review of filtered water specification during detailed design upon confirmation of well water composition
Action by: TS
Action resolution
S 3
L 3
R 7
TS TS TS
3 3 3
3 3 3
7 7 7
TS TS TS
3 2 2
3 2 2
7 4 4
856
Node 2
TS
TS TS TS
4 3 3
2 3 3
7 7 7
TS TS TS
2 3 2
2 3 2
4 7 4
902
Node 4
TS
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
41
HAZOP Node Item No. 920 Node 1 922 923 Node 1 Node 1
Recommendations R920.1 Undertake HAZOP of potable water vendor packages during detailed design R922.1 Review water potablisation and biocide packages to consider what DCS alarms, etc. are required to notify operator of malfunction R923.1 Ensure water potabilisation package control logic inhibits continued injection of sodium hydroxide (normally controlled by 053-AIC-0001) to prevent overinjection of sodium hydroxide during no-flow conditions (via 053-FIC0001) R924.1 Consider provision of check valve on inlet to potable water storage tank and desalinated water storage tank R934.1 Consider provision of DCS level indication using 053-LALL-0003 instrument R934.2 See R922.1 for provision of appropriate DCS indication and alarms R939.1 Ensure during detailed design that potable water sample point enables collection of representative potable water sample R944.1 Consider relocation of potable water tie-in for CWT make-up, upstream of the activated carbon filter package, given flow rate limitation on activated carbon filter package R946.1 Review during detailed design the design of chilling unit package and protections against ice formation in the event of loss of potable water flow through the chilling unit package R946.2 Consider inclusion of chilling unit package trip in Cause and Effect in the event of 053-LALL-0003 on the potable water tank in consulation with vendor R949.1 Review design pressure of chilling unit package and activated carbon filters R949.2 Review proposed potable water system distribution and design pressure, as it appears high compared with allowable user pressures R954.1 See R946.1 for review of chilling unit package design during detailed design R957.1 See R934.1 for configuration of level indication on 053-LALL-0003 instrument
Action by: TS TS TS
Action resolution
S 3 2 2
L 3 2 2
R 7 4 4
TS TS TS TS TS
2 2 2 3 2
2 2 2 3 2
4 4 4 7 4
946
Node 2
TS
946
Node 2
TS
TS TS TS TS
2 2 3 2
2 2 3 2
4 4 7 4
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
42
HAZOP Node Item No. 966 Node 1 969 969 Node 1 Node 1
Recommendations R966.1 Undertake HAZOP of water demineralisation package during detailed design R969.1 Consider provision of level indication on 054-LALL-0003 instrument on DCS R969.2 Consider in consultation with downstream users (Steam and Acid Gas Removal Units) whether trip of demineralised water pumps needs to initate action on downstream unit e.g. 102-P-107A/B Demin water make up metering pump. Update Cause and Effect Diagram as necessary R972.1 Nitrogen purge connection will be removed in subsequent version of P&ID. Boiler feed water is dosed with oxygen scavenger and tank is stainless steel R992.1 Vendor package logic sequences will be finalised during detailed design, including action in the event of common trouble alarm, e.g. continuation of sequence, stop of sequence or restart of sequence (general recommendation for all utility vendor packages) R992.2 Consider provision of conductivity meter in regeneration wash of the neutralisation basin R1002.1 Review proposed design and consider configuration of alarm (e.g. LAH on the neutralisation basin and/or regeneration complete alarm) to notify operator to empty neutralisation basin R1003.1 If level indication and alarm provided (see R1002.1), consider provision of low level stop of neutralisation pumps R1008.1 Review requirement for sequence valve on plant air mixing sparger as neutralisation in the basin is normally part of the automatic regeneration sequence R1008.2 Review during detailed design of vendor package HAZOP specific protections for contamination of duty mineralisation discharge during regeneration, e.g. double valving, limit switches on sequence panels, conductivity analyser on discharge of each resin bed R1011.1 Water demineralisation package sizing basis will be reviewed during detailed design following reciept of raw water composition R1014.1 Configure PAL on 054-PI-0002 on demineralised water header R1015.1 Consider requirement for check valve on common demineralised water header to prevent depressurisation to tank
Action by: TS TS TS
Action resolution
S 3 2 2
L 3 2 2
R 7 4 4
972
Node 1
TS
992
Node 2
TS
992 1002
Node 2 Node 2
TS TS
3 2
3 2
7 4
1003 1008
Node 2 Node 2
TS TS
3 3
3 3
7 7
1008
Node 2
TS
TS TS TS
3 2 2
3 2 2
7 4 4
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
43
Recommendations R1035.1 HAZOP of fired furnace vendor package to be undertaken during detailed design R1036.1 Undertake complete review of furnace vendor package control, trip functions, cause & effect and flow control configuration to individual passes during detailed design R1036.2 Consider configuration of FI and FQI to enable operator monitoring of flow to individual condensate stabilisers and gas heaters R1036.3 Consider provision of manual globe valve to enable operator regulation of flow through filter, especially when clean R1037.1 Review during vendor package HAZOP furnace protections for low and/or no flow on individual passes R1037.2 See Reccomendation R1036.3 for provision of flow control element in slipstream R1037.3 Review with furnace vendor whether 017-FV-0001 is required given master flow controller of individual inlet flow controllers. R1040.1 Configure LAL on 017-LI-0004 to act as pre-alarm before circulating pump trip R1040.2 See R1040.1 for configuration of LAL R1040.3 Ensure piping layout enables draining of hot oil to drum for maintenance activities R1041.1 Confirm against code requirements whether dedicated PSV required for filter vessel sized for fire, or CSO manual isolation valve to ensure protection via expansion drum pressure relief R1042.1 Consider handwheel, if not already provided, on 017-PV-0015 to enable continued operation with manual control R1045.1 Review design temperature of hot oil exchangers to match hot oil unit design temperature R1045.2 Review design temperature of hot oil expansion drum R1063.1 Confirm during vendor package HAZOP provision of firebox venting and purge requirements prior to ignition R1063.2 Confirm with vendor proposed simultaneous isolation of both fuel gas to the furnace and flow of hot oil through the furnace tubes. Ensure tube design temperature sufficient for residual heat in the firebox and no flow condition
Action by: TS TS
Action resolution
S 3 3
L 3 3
R 7 7
TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS
5 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3
5 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3
10 9 7 9 7 7 7 9 7
TS TS TS TS TS
3 2 2 3 3
3 2 2 3 3
7 4 4 7 7
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
44
HAZOP Node Item No. 1064 Node 2 1065 1068 1074 Node 2 Node 2 Node 2
Recommendations R1064.1 Review during detailed vendor package HAZOP flame protection and flame-out protection, including trip actions R1065.1 See R1064.1 R1068.1 Detailed furnace design to confirm potential for flame impingment and protection against over-firing in furnace R1074.1 Evaluate the need for KO drum provision on common fuel gas to Unit 17 furnaces to minimise potential for furnace upset (general recommendation) R1087.1 Consider relocation of manual globe valve to inlet of hot oil sump to control purging flow R1087.2 Add note to P&ID to state that pressure gauge should be visible from nitrogen purge manual globe valve R1088.1 Ensure nitrogen purge sizing basis and local indication is sufficient to prevent formation of vacuum in sump during pump out conditions
Action by: TS TS TS TS
Action resolution
S 3 3 3 3
L 3 3 3 3
R 7 7 7 7
TS TS TS
4 4 4
4 4 4
9 9 9
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
45
HAZOP Node Item No. 1104 Node 1 1105 Node 1 1108 1109 Node 1 Node 1
Recommendations R1104.1 Undertake vendor package HAZOP during detailed design R1105.1 Consider provision of pump to enable filling of diesel truck for onsite distribution R1108.1 Consider provision of check valve at harbour to prevent reverse flow R1109.1 Evaluate requirement for overflow on diesel oil storage tank, given potential environmental aspects associated with the overflow of diesel oil to bunded area
Action by: TS TS TS TS
Action resolution
S 3 2 2 2
L 3 2 2 2
R 7 4 4 4
Recommendations R1150.1 Undertake vendor air compressor package HAZOP during detailed design
Action by: TS
Action resolution
S 3
L 3
R 7
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46
Recommendations R1180.1 Review configuration of firewater system. Consider provision of check valve to prevent depressurisation of ring main through main firefighting pump minimum flow to tank R1181.2 Next revision of P&IDs will remove 051-LALL-007A/B stop of main firewater pumps R1200.1 Next revision of P&ID will show double check valve arrangement on service water tie-in to jetty firewater ring main R1201.1 OK LNG to review proposed design of jetty firewater pump discharge headers and minimum flow lines. Consider requirements for upgrade of proposed materials as draining of seawater from system not really appropriate due to weekly fire pump test and jetty availability issues. R1202.1 Next revision of P&ID will show discharge of 031-PSV-0003B downstream of minimum flow control valve R1212.1 Next revision of P&ID will show biocide dosing connection to pump firewater basin screen R1215.1 Detailed HAZOP of vendor package during detailed design will consider alarms to notify operator of malfunction and low level biocide dosing to jetty firewater ring main
Action by: TS
Action resolution
S 2
L 2
R 4
TS TS OK LNG
2 2 2
2 2 2
4 4 4
TS TS TS
2 2 3
2 2 3
4 4 7
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
47
Recommendations R1220.1 Consider whether switch in chemical sewer neutralisation basin logic should wait until high alarm in duty basin before opening inlet valve on standby basin to ensure the two basins operate in sequence R1220.2 Consider benefits for automatic start of boiler blowdown lifting pumps based on high level in collection basin, given blowdown flow rate is continous at approximately 12 m3/hr R1221.1 In the event that R1220.2 is implemented, autostart of standby pump will occur if level does not start to decrease in the basin once start signal initiated. In the event of pump trip during pumpout, high level in basin will initiate additional pump start signal R1221.2 HAZOP of chemical dosing packages will be undertaken during detailed design R1222.1 Review with instrumentation group whether provision of sequence failure alarm is possible and/or necessary for the chemical sewer neutralisation basin R1235.1 Consider provision of hard pipework connection for removal of solids from bottom of blowdown collection basins using vacuum truck R1238.1 Provide sample connection on discharge of chemical sewer neutralisation pumps for sampling purposes
Action by: TS
Action resolution
S 5
L 1
R 5
1220
Node 1
TS
1221
Node 1
TS
1221 1222
Node 1 Node 1
TS TS
3 4
3 3
7 8
1235 1238
Node 1 Node 1
TS TS
5 4
2 1
8 4
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
48
Recommendations R1243.1 Operating procedures to recommend notification and communication with utilities area personel before starting pumpout of oily water collection basins to prevent overwhelming oily water tank and oily water treatment packages following heavy rainfall R1251.1 Ensure appropriate flammable gas detection is provided in process area, including in vicinity of collection basins, in the event that non-ExD pumps provided. Emergency scenarios should also consider what action to take in the event of large release simultaneous with pump operation R1258.1 Consider provision of hard piping to each collection basin to facilitate cleaning and removal of solids by vacuum truck R1261.1 Ensure operating procedures clearly state requirements for treatment of washing waters from amine process areas following large amine spillage offsite. Neutralisation and release to oily water system is inappropriate due to high COD of effluent and no downstream biological treatment process R1262.1 Detailed design phase will consider requirements for corrosion protection on base of tank, e.g. CP, etc. R1278.1 Review proposed design of oily water system to consider and develop operating procedure for management of oil collected on surface of each collection basin over time R1290.1 Review whether flare lifting pumps need to be connected to emergency power supply and/or provision of one electric and one diesel pump, given location and function R1290.2 During detailed design, review proposed design following reciept of further rainfall information specific to site location. It may be necessary to consider increasing flare lifting basin size and/or revise pump configuration (three 50% pumps) R1301.1 Consider requirements for independent level indication, high level alarm and high high level alarm, given potential impact on other flare area related equipment, i.e. flare KO drum condensate pump, incinerators, etc. R1302.1 See Recommendation R1301.1, and consider provision of independent low low level pump trip to prevent pump damage
Action by: TS
Action resolution
S 5
L 3
R 9
1251
Node 1
TS
1258 1261
Node 1 Node 1
TS TS
5 4
2 3
8 8
1262 1278
Node 1 Node 2
TS TS
3 4
3 3
7 8
1290
Node 3
TS
1290
Node 3
TS
1301
Node 3
TS
1302
Node 3
TS
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Recommendations R1313.1 Consider deletion of pump discharge flow control, if not removed, ensure 056-FV-0001 is FO R1313.2 Update P&ID to show on-off control signal from 056-LI-0004 to control panel on oily water treatment package to control injection of oily water treatment package chemicals R1316.1 Consider provision of skimming nozzles in tank at normal operating level for use in event of failure of floating skimmer device (see acid gas removal process HAZOP) R1317.1 Consider requirement for PSV protection on sludge pump discharge since this is a positive displacement type pump R1318.1 Consider configuration of low alarm on air pressure on oily water treatment package R1318.2 Undertake HAZOP of vendor package during detailed design R1325.1 Ensure suitable level device is provided since dirty service
Action by: TS TS
Action resolution
S 5 4
L 3 3
R 9 8
1316
Node 4
TS
10
TS TS TS TS
4 3 3 5
3 3 3 2
8 7 7 8
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
50
Recommendations R1353.1 During detailed design, review sizing basis for sanitary water pits (especially inlet facilities pit), taking into account anticipated manning levels for each area R1376.1 Confirm with process department potential and maximum concentration of benzene, toluene and xylene in LNG process effluent. Determine in consultation with vendor potential impact on sanitary water treatment package R1376.2 Undertake HAZOP of vendor sanitary water treatment package during detailed design
Action by: TS
Action resolution
S 3
L 3
R 7
1376
Node 2
TS
1376
Node 2
TS
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51
Contents
1. 2. 3.
Executive Summary HAZOP Approach Appendices I. II. III. IV. V. VI. FEED HAZOP procedure Attendance Node List HAZOP Recommendations HAZOP Worksheets HAZOP Master P&IDs
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Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-041-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/23-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-041-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/23-05-06 2252-041-PID-00-31-04/Rev A/24-05-06 Design intent Compression of wet air in 3 normally operating air compression package units to feed downstream nitrogen generation, plant and instrument air systems. Water from the compression is removed in the compressor discharge KO drums and wet air vessel 041-V-101. Node Equipment Air compression package 041-U-101 Wet air vessel 041-V-101 759 Node 1 Air compression package Overview 1. HAZOP of air compressor and drier packages R759.1 Consider requirement for vendor package HAZOP during detailed design 1. Gradual decrease in pressure in downstream discharge of air compressor 2. Increased flow of instrument air and demand on air drying package 3. Potential for higher dP over the air drying package 1. 041-FI/FAH-0002 on flow to plant air, 041-FI-0001on flow to nitrogen generation and 041-FI0003 on flow to instrument air 2. 041-PIC/PAL-0005 controls the air compression, increasing output from air compression packages 3. 041-PIC-0008 controls pressure to downstream instrument air receivers and upstream wet air supply to nitrogen package by closing 041-PV-0008 air supply to utility plant air system 4. 041-PAL-0006 closes 041-SDV0001 to plant air. 041-PALL-0006 closes 043-SDV-0001 on nitrogen air generation package inlet. 041PALL-0007 activates unit 41 alarm only, manual operator hand switch trip of air compressor package 041U-101 and start of 041-U-103 startup compressor and drier. 5. Dedicated plant area instrument air receivers each sized for 15 mins hold up volume of instrument air 6. 2 x 100% air drying packages with one normally in standby. Online air drying package has two towers, one in regeneration, one in operation with timed regeneration switchover sequence. 1. Discussion is taking place with process to confirm 15 mins hold up of instrument air is sufficient for safe shutdown of downstream process units. 2. SDV, ESDV have dedicated air supply buffers sized for 20 mins and 3 valve strokes. TS
760
Flow - High
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Deviation
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks 1. Plant air is a maintenance utility service and air supply to instrument air and nitrogen generation service takes precedence
Action by:
Action resolution
1. Increase in demand of dried air 1. 041-FI/FAH-0002 on flow to for plant utility service plant air, 041-FI-0001on flow to 2. Potential for gradual decrease in nitrogen generation and 041-FIpressure in instrument air system 0003 on flow to instrument air 2. 041-PIC/PAL-0005 controls the air compression, increasing output from air compression packages 3. 041-PIC-0008 controls pressure to downstream instrument air receivers and upstream wet air supply to nitrogen package by closing 041-PV-0008 air supply to utility plant air system 4. 041-PAL-0006 closes 041-SDV0001 to plant air. 041-PALL-0006 closes 043-SDV-0001 on nitrogen air generation package inlet. 041PALL-0007 activates unit 41 alarm only, manual operator hand switch trip of air compressor package 041U-101 and start of 041-U-103 startup compressor and drier. 5. Dedicated plant area instrument air receivers each sized for 15 mins hold up volume of instrument air 6. 2 x 100% air drying packages with one normally in standby. Online air drying package has two towers, one in regeneration, one in operation with timed regeneration switchover sequence.
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards 1. Independent 041-PIC-0008 on dried air system downstream 2. 041-XL-0001A/B/C/D running indication on individual air compression packages 3. Individual air compressor package recycle and anti-surge protection, in the event of low actual demand for instrument/plant air 4. 041-PI/PAH-0001A/B/C/D on discharge of individual air compressors 5. Possible for operator to override 041-PIC-0005 and operate air compressors manually 6. Dedicated PSVs on discharge of individual air compressors and 041PSV-0001 on wet air vessel
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
3. Malfunction/incorrect set point of 1. Increase in compressor flow 041-PIC-0005 rate 2. Gradual increase in dried air pressure 3. Potential for equipment overpressure
761
Flow - Low
1. Low demand in downstream 1. Gradual increase in pressure in instrument air, nitrogen generation the discharge of the air and/or plant air compressor packages 2. Potential for overpressure of upstream equipment
1. Design pressure of air compressors and downstream equipment is 10 barg 2. 041-PSV-0001 on wet air vessel discharge to safe location 3. 041-PIC-0005 controls the number of air compressors online (control logic will always maintain single air compressor online) 4. In normal operating mode, constant demand for instrument air and nitrogen generation. Flow rate dependent mainly on number of LNG trains in operation 5. 041-PI/PAH-0001A/B/C/D on discharge of each individual air compressor package 6. 041-XL-0001A/B/C/D running status indication for each air compressor package
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Deviation
Consequences 1. Decrease in production of compressed air 2. Potential for decrease in downstream plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air pressure 3. Potential for downstream process equipment trips due to loss of instrument air and/or nitrogen
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
R761.1 Consider requirements for 1. 041-PIC-0005 controls the redundancy in electrical feeders to number of duty air compressors the air compressor packages, to (start of stand-by compressor) 2. 041-PAL-0006 closes 041-SDV- enable distribution of air 0001 to plant air. 041-PALL-0006 compressors over multiple closes 043-SDV-0001 on nitrogen electrical feeders. air generation package inlet. 041PALL-0007 activates unit 41 alarm only, manual operator hand switch trip of air compressor package 041U-101 and start of 041-U-103 startup compressor and drier.
3. Blockage of air compressor package inlet filters (one per compressor package)
1. Reduction in flow of air to individual air compressor packages 2. Decrease in discharge flow rate from individual air compressor 3. Potential for decrease in pressure in downstream instrument air/nitrogen generation systems
1. 041-PIC-0005 controls the R761.2 Consider requirements for number of duty air compressors dP indication and PDAH alarm on (start stand-by compressor) interstage and discharge filters on 2. 041-PAL-0006 closes 041-SDV- the air compressor packages 0001 to plant air. 041-PALL-0006 closes 043-SDV-0001 on nitrogen air generation package inlet. 041PALL-0007 activates unit 41 alarm only, manual operator hand switch trip of air compressor package 041U-101 and start of 041-U-103 startup compressor and drier.
TS
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards 1. Independent 041-PIC-0008 controls feed to plant air system 2. 041-XL-0001A/B/C/D running indication on individual air compression packages 3. 041-PAL-0006 on feed to instrument air system 4. Possible for operator to override 041-PIC-0005 and start air compressors manually 5. Dedicated plant area instrument air storage receivers with inlet check valves sized for 15 mins normal operation
Recommendations R761.3 Review control system for air compressor packages to determine whether possible to continue operation of air compressor packages at full flow rate in manual mode in the event of malfunction 041-PIC-0005 and operator intervention
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
4. Malfunction or incorrect set point 1. 041-PIC-0005 staged shutdown of 041-PIC-0005 of online air compressors 2. Gradual decrease in dried air pressure 3. Potential for loss of instrument air supply to process
1. Requirements for 2 oo 3 TS voting on 041-PIC-0005 not considered necessary by HAZOP team (reference course HAZOP recommendation 2.1.1.1)
762 763
Flow - No Flow - Reverse 1. Standby air compressor 1. Potential for reverse flow through stand-by air compressor and/or start-up compressor equipment 2. Potential for compressor damage 1. Potential for reverse flow from instrument air recievers with damage to air drying package 2. Potential for loss of buffer air pressure in instrument air receivers 1. Common check valve on inlet to plant air receiver 041-V-103 2. Check valve on inlet to each individual instrument air receiver
No new issues R763.1 Confirm requirements for check valves and configuration of air compressor package and startup compressor and drier with vendor TS
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Safeguards 1. 041-PI/PAL-001A/B/C/D on individual air compressor discharge 2. Periodic operator inspection of equipment 3. 041-PIC-0005 start of stand-by compressor
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1. Potential for release of compressed air to atmosphere 2. Potential for increased duty on air compressors
1. Wet air system is carbon steel R764.1 Update P&ID to show with 3mm corrosion allowance internal baffle plate on wet air (pipework and wet air vessel) vessel 2. Demister pad in wet air vessel is stainless steel, minimising potential for corrosion and blockage 3. Inlet baffle on wet air vessel, minimises potential for entrainment of solids and blockage of the wet air vessel demister pad
1. HAZOP team does not TS consider requirement for dP indication over demister necessary given provision of inlet baffle
765
1. 041-PSV-0001 sized for fire on R765.1 Consider vapourisation of wet air vessel water collected in wet air vessel in sizing basis for 041-PSV-0001 1. 041-UUA-003A/B common trouble alarm on air drying package 2. Individual surge control on each air compressor 3. Individual compressor discharge PSV sized for full design capacity of compressor
TS
1. Blocked discharge of air compressor package resulting in increase in discharge pressure 2. Loss of flow of dried air to instrument air and plant air distribution network 3. Gradual decrease in pressure downstream of plant air receiver 4. 041-PIC-0005 would tend to modulate inlet vane position on air compressors to increase flow rate further
766
Pressure - Low
No new issues
767
Vacuum
No new issues
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Deviation
Causes
Consequences 1. Increased generation of water in discharge from air compressor package 2. Potential for increased load on air drying package 3. Potential for damage to desiccant due to ingress of free water
Safeguards 1. Air compressor package will be provided with interstage and final stage cooler and K/O drums 2. Wet air vessel with 041-LAH001 and operator manual draining prevents free water ingress into air drying package (no normal level)
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
769
Temperature High
1. Malfunction in air compressor 1. Increase in discharge package (e.g. loss of interstage or temperature from air compressor afterstage cooling) package 2. Increased duty on downstream air drying package
1. 041-TI/TAH-003/A/B/C/D on discharge of each air compressor package 2. 041-AI-0001A/B moisture indication on downstream air drying package 3. Dedicated drier package on inlet to nitrogen generation package unit
R769.1 Discuss with vendor requirements for air compressor package temperature indication and alarms (e.g. discharge of interstage cooler) R769.2 Provide AAH on 041-AI0001A/B to warn operator of water breakthrough to instrument air system
TS
770
Temperature Low
771
Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High 1. Malfunction in upstream compressor discharge K/O drum level control 1. Potential for carryover of water into wet air vessel 2. Potential for free water ingress into nitrogen generation and air drying packages 1. Wet air vessel with 041-LAH0001 requires manual operator draining 2. Dehydration package within nitrogen generation package
No new issues
772
773
Level - Low
1. Normal condition in wet air vessel No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Safeguards
Recommendations R778.1 Consider requirements for flammable gas detection in vicinity of the air compressor package as located downwind of the LNG process area
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
779
No new issues
780 781
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-041-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/23-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-041-PID-00-31-04/Rev A/24-05-06 2252-041-PID-00-31-05/Rev A/24-05-06 2252-041-PID-00-31-06/Rev A/24-05-06 2252-041-PID-00-31-07/Rev A/24-05-06 Design intent The air drying package is provided to reduce the humidity of the instrument air and prevent condensation in downstream pipework and possible instrument damage. Design dew point for the drier is -20 degrees C at normal operating pressure. The air drying package is a desiccant type with non-heated regeneration sequence. Two 100% air drying packages are provided, each with two drying columns which alternate regeneration and absorbtion operating modes (timed sequence). Each of the dedicated downstream instrument air receivers have a capacity of 10 mins hold up. Node Equipment 041-U-102 Air drying package 041-U-103 Startup compressor and drier 041-V-103 Plant air reciever 041-V-104 Instrument air receiver (utilities area) 041-V-102A Instrument air receiver (LNG train 1) 041-V-102B Instrument air receiver (LNG train 2) 041-V-102C Instrument air receiver (LNG train 3) 041-V-102D Instrument air receiver (LNG train 4) 041-V-105 Instrument air receiver (storage area) 041-V-106 Instrument air receiver (receiver area) 782 Node 2 Compressed air drier package and downstream instrument air receivers Overview
783
Flow - High
See Node 1
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations R784.1 Provide DCS pressure indication and low pressure alarm on each individual instrument receiver
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
1. Potential for loss of flow to downstream instrument and plant air systems 2. Potential to overpressure air drier package and wet air vessel
1. Individual air drier package common trouble alarm 041-UUA0003A/B, drier status 041-XL0002A/B indication, and step indication 041-XL-0003A/B (local panel) 2. Each individual instrument air receiver has 15 mins holdup capacity 3. Individual compressor antisurge control and discharge PSV prevent overpressure of upstream systems 4. 100% spare air drier package provided, requiring operator action to bring online
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
3. Blockage of the plant air drier 1. Reduced throughput in air drying 1. Individual air drier package desiccant packings with corrosion package common trouble alarm 041-UUAscale 2. Potential for decrease in 0003A/B would be initiated in the pressure in downstream plant and event of high differential pressure instrument air systems due to over the packing reduced drying capacity 2. Each individual instrument air receiver has 15 mins holdup capacity 3. 041-PAL-0006 isolates plant air, 041-PALL-006 isolates wet air feed to nitrogen generation package to protect feed of dried, compressed air to the instrument air headers 4. Individual compressor antisurge control and discharge PSV prevent overpressure of upstream systems 5. 100% spare air drier package provided, requiring operator action to bring online 6. Requirement for complete charge of desiccant for individual air drying package to be stored in warehouse
4. Startup of LNG liquifaction plant 1. Reduced requirement for instrument air and nitrogen generation
1. Provision of dedicated startup compressor and drier (2320 Standard m3/hour) 2. Startup compressor is connected to single electrical feeder and emergency power generator to enable commissioning of plant and power generation unit 3. Main air compressor package will be commissioned to supply feed required for single train LNG operation 1. All control sequence valves are pneumatic 2. Electrical supply for control panel is connected to emergency power supply
785
Flow - No
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Causes 1. Reverse flow of dry air during air drying package regeneration
Consequences
Safeguards 1. Normal operating condition during regeneration 2. Check valves provided in the regeneration pipework to prevent flow of high moisture content air into the downstream instrument air system
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
787
Loss of Containment
1. Use of dried air to regenerate the package desiccant 2. Potential for impact on downstream instrument air network pressure 1. Potential for leakage of instrument air to atmosphere
1. Sizing basis for air compressor packages takes into account the regeneration flow rate
1. Dry instrument air network R787.1 See R784.1 for provision (downstream of air drying package of DCS PI and PAL indication on 041-U-102) is galvanized steel, individual instrument air receivers minimising potential for scale formation 2. Instrument air receivers are carbon steel and epoxy lined 3. Corrosion and leakage flow rate would be small in comparison with capacity of the network 4. Each instrument air receiver is provided with manual isolation valve and check valve on the inlet to enable manual isolation and prevent depressurisation in the event of failure of pipework in upstream system
TS
788
1. PSV fire protection on each individual instrument air receiver and upstream plant air receiver
R788.1 Consider and confirm requirements for PSV on each air drying package vessel
TS
789
Pressure - Low
No new issues
790
Vacuum
No new issues
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards 1. 041-AI-0001A/B on each drying air package 2. Manual sample collection points in the discharge of the air drying package 041-U-102 and startup compressor and drier 041-U-103
Recommendations R791.1 Ensure operating manual highlights moisture breakthrough alarm has no trip and/or sequence action
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
Partial Pressure 1. Incorrect sequence timing on air 1. Potential for insufficient drying package regeneration time and/or exceedance of drying capacity within the desiccant, resulting in moisture breakthrough
792
Temperature High
1. Increase in discharge temperature from air compressor package 2. Increased duty on downstream startup air drying package
1. 041-TI/TAH-0006 on discharge of the startup air compressor package 2. 041-AI/AAH-0002 moisture indication on downstream startup air drying package No new issues
793
Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High 1. Malfunction of main air drying package and/or startup drier 1. Increase in moisture content of instrument air 2. Potential for formation of condensate, corrosion and instrumentation damage downstream 1. 041-AI-0001A/B on discharge of main air drier package 2. 0041-AI/AAH-0002 on discharge of startup drier 3. Drain valve on plant air receiver and each individual instrument air receiver which could be used to check for liquid formation 4. Dry air pipework is galvanized and air receivers are epoxy lined
794
No new issues
795
796 797
Air compression and feed to plant air, nitrogen generation and instrument air systems
Wet air is compressed in the air compression package 041-U-101. In normal operation, 3 x 33% compressors in operation with 4th compressor on standby. Normal discharge pressure is 9 bar with total rated capacity of 18990 Standard m3/hr. Compressed air is used to feed the nitrogen generation system (5000 Normal m3/hr), plant air 600 Normal m3/hr and instrument air 12000 Normal m3/hr. Wet air for the plant and instrument air is dried in the air drying package 041-U-102 (Desiccant heated type drier using dried air for regeneration with heating). Each of the downstream instrument air receivers (one for each plant area) is sized for 15 mins hold up.
Causes 1. Entrainment of solids (desiccant) from the main air drying package and/or start up drier 2. Free water ingress into startup compressor
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
1. Integral filter element will be R798.1 Consider requirements for provided in the air drier packages dP indication on air drier filter elements in discussion with vendor 1. Location of compressor and drier package under shelter 2. Local start of startup air compressor R798.2 Ensure operating manual requires operator check and draining of free water from the compressor casing before start-up
1. Potential for damage of positive displacement type compressor (piston type and/or screw type compressor)
TS
799 800
801
1. Contamination of instrument air with hydrocarbon from the air compressor packages 2. Ingress of flammable gas into 1. Potential for explosion startup compressor
1. Requirement for vendor supply of oil free instrument air 1. Compressor only used during start-up R801.1 Consider requirement for flammable gas detection on startup compressor inlet No new issues TS
802
Corrosive (As well as) Explosive Wrong Material (Other than) 1. Provision of jetty instrument air from main plant air system
803 804
R804.1 P&ID will be updated to remove instrument air header to jetty given dedicated jetty air compressor
TS
Nitrogen system
Nitrogen is generated by cryogenic separation of nitrogen from atmospheric air. The nitrogen generation package has two operating modes (gaseous nitrogen - GAN and gaseous and liquid nitrogen production - GAN & LIN). Liquid nitrogen (sufficient for four days normal consumption or purge in one LNG train) is stored in two 50% vessels, which take approximately four weeks to fill in GAN & LIN operating mode. In the event of a decrease in gaseous nitrogen header pressure, liquid nitrogen is vapourised to supplement gaseous nitrogen production. The liquid nitrogen vapourisers are sized for purge flow rate requirements which is significantly larger than the normal continuous nitrogen consumption. Consequences Safeguards Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-043-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/23-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-043-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/23-05-06 Design intent See section description
Node Equipment 043-V-101 Nitrogen generation package 043-V-102 Nitrogen storage and vapourising package 805 Node 1 Nitrogen Overview System 1. HAZOP of nitrogen generation, nitrogen liquid storage and vapouriser package unit R805.1 Consider requirement for vendor package HAZOP during detailed design TS
806
Flow - High
1. Increase in requirement for GAN 1. 043-PI/PAL-0002 on common 2. Potential for decrease in gaseous nitrogen header nitrogen header pressure 2. 043-FI-0005 on common gaseous nitrogen header 3. Independent 043-FI-0006A/B from nitrogen generation unit 4. In the event of 043-PAL-002, gaseous nitrogen is produced from the vapourisation of liquid nitrogen to maintain header pressure 5. 043-FI-0004A/B gaseous nitrogen flow rate from each vapouriser
2. Maintenance/purging of single 1. Significant increase in gaseous LNG train with continued operation nitrogen requirement on remaining three LNG trains 2. Decrease in nitrogen header pressure
1. Nitrogen storage and vapourising package is designed to enable both vapourisers to operate simultaneously and combine with normal nitrogen generation package GAN to maintain nitrogen header pressure 2. 043-PI/PAL-0002 on common gaseous nitrogen header initiates vapourisation of liquid nitrogen to maintain header pressure
R806.1 Operating manual should clearly state requirement to start vapouriser package before using significant volumes of nitrogen for purging and maintainance activities to protect nitrogen header pressure and minimise potential for reverse flow of flammable mixtures into the nitrogen header
TS
Nitrogen system
Nitrogen is generated by cryogenic separation of nitrogen from atmospheric air. The nitrogen generation package has two operating modes (gaseous nitrogen - GAN and gaseous and liquid nitrogen production - GAN & LIN). Liquid nitrogen (sufficient for four days normal consumption or purge in one LNG train) is stored in two 50% vessels, which take approximately four weeks to fill in GAN & LIN operating mode. In the event of a decrease in gaseous nitrogen header pressure, liquid nitrogen is vapourised to supplement gaseous nitrogen production. The liquid nitrogen vapourisers are sized for purge flow rate requirements which is significantly larger than the normal continuous nitrogen consumption. Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards 1. Nitrogen generation package designed to enable continued production of normal consumption GAN and design flowrate LIN concurrently 2. LIN production design flow rate enables filling of nitrogen storage within a period of 4 weeks 3. 043-LI/LAH-0001A/B nitrogen storage liquid level feedback to nitrogen generation control panel Recommendations R806.2 Operating manual should clearly state requirement for operator to initiate LIN & GAN operating mode R806.3 Consider configuration of trip of LIN production in the event of high level in both downstream liquid nitrogen storage tanks in consultation with vendor R806.4 Consider updates of nitrogen generation plant P&ID to show HS selector for either GAN or GAN & LIN production modes in consultation with vendor Remarks Action by: TS Action resolution S L R
3. Requirement for LIN production 1. Potential decrease in GAN (storage not full) production
807
Flow - Low
1. Reduction in gaseous nitrogen 1. Gradual increase in gaseous requirement, e.g. 1 or 2 LNG trains nitrogen header pressure offline 2. Potential to overpressure the nitrogen generation package
1. Internal nitrogen generation R807.1 Ensure atmospheric vent package control. For single train for nitrogen is at safe location operation, requirement to vent nitrogen. However, for 2 and 3 train operation, possible to regulate nitrogen generation package at turndown conditions 2. 043-PI-002 on gaseous nitrogen header 3. 043-FI-0005 on gaseous nitrogen header
TS
808
Flow - No
1. Plant shutdown
1. Loss of gaseous nitrogen usage 1. Internal nitrogen generation 2. Potential to overpressure the package control will control nitrogen generation package pressure by release of nitrogen to atmosphere under pressure control 2. On total plant shutdown, wet air feed to nitrogen package will be isolated and liquid nitrogen storage isolated for use during startup
Nitrogen system
Nitrogen is generated by cryogenic separation of nitrogen from atmospheric air. The nitrogen generation package has two operating modes (gaseous nitrogen - GAN and gaseous and liquid nitrogen production - GAN & LIN). Liquid nitrogen (sufficient for four days normal consumption or purge in one LNG train) is stored in two 50% vessels, which take approximately four weeks to fill in GAN & LIN operating mode. In the event of a decrease in gaseous nitrogen header pressure, liquid nitrogen is vapourised to supplement gaseous nitrogen production. The liquid nitrogen vapourisers are sized for purge flow rate requirements which is significantly larger than the normal continuous nitrogen consumption. Deviation Causes 2. High level in liquid nitrogen storage tanks Consequences 1. No requirement for LIN production Safeguards 1. Possible to operate nitrogen generation package in gaseous nitrogen mode only with reduced total nitrogen production Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
809
Flow - Reverse
1. Malfunction of pressure control 1. Potential for production of 1. Internal vapouriser package on nitrogen vapourisation package nitrogen at higher pressure than pressure control to ensure feed nitrogen generation package production of GAN at same pressure as nitrogen generation package 1. Valve and/or equipment failure 1. Potential for release of nitrogen 1. Equipment design to atmosphere with the production of nitrogen rich atmosphere
810
Loss of Containment
811
Pressure - High 1. Thermal expansion and vapourisation of liquid nitrogen in isolated pipework 2. Fire in vicinity of liquid nitrogen package units Pressure - Low 1. Upstream air compressor trip and/or isolation of nitrogen generation package due to Low Low instrument air pressure
1. Overpressure of pipework and equipment 1. Potential for overpressure of pipework and equipment 1. Loss of wet air feed to nitrogen generation package and production of GAN
1. Equipment design and/or pressure relief 1. Equipment design and/or pressure relief 1. 043-PI/PAL-002 on GAN header initiates vapourisation of stored liquid nitrogen to maintain header pressure 2. 041-PALL-006 from upstream instrument air system initiates trip of nitrogen generation package but enables continued operation and vapourisation of liquid nitrogen 3. Liquid nitrogen storage for 4 days normal consumption or purge in one LNG train
812
813
Vacuum
No new issues
Nitrogen system
Nitrogen is generated by cryogenic separation of nitrogen from atmospheric air. The nitrogen generation package has two operating modes (gaseous nitrogen - GAN and gaseous and liquid nitrogen production - GAN & LIN). Liquid nitrogen (sufficient for four days normal consumption or purge in one LNG train) is stored in two 50% vessels, which take approximately four weeks to fill in GAN & LIN operating mode. In the event of a decrease in gaseous nitrogen header pressure, liquid nitrogen is vapourised to supplement gaseous nitrogen production. The liquid nitrogen vapourisers are sized for purge flow rate requirements which is significantly larger than the normal continuous nitrogen consumption. Deviation Causes Consequences 1. Increase in oxygen concentration in nitrogen produced 2. Potential for ingress of oxygen into downstream systems containing flammable fluids Safeguards 1. 043-AI-0005 oxygen analyser on GAN distribution header 2. 043-AI-0001A/B oxygen analyser on nitrogen generation control panel Recommendations R814.1 Investigate whether additional requirement for oxygen analyser on liquid nitrogen production to prevent contamination of liquid nitrogen storage Remarks Action by: TS Action resolution S L R
1. Potential for ice formation in nitrogen generation package and liquid nitrogen systems
815
Temperature High
816
Temperature Low
1. Potential for exceedence of 1. All liquid nitrogen pipework is material design specifications and stainless steel and designed for brittle fracture low temperature service 1. Liquid ingress into nitrogen header 2. Potential to exceed material specification of gaseous nitrogen pipework leaving nitrogen vapourisers 3. Potential for pipework brittle fracture R816.1 Discuss during vendor package HAZOP protections against exceedance of vapouriser gaseous discharge pipework specification TS
817
Cryogenic (Sub - 1. Normal condition for nitrogen Zero) generation, liquid storage and vapourisers Level - High 1. Flow of liquid nitrogen to liquid nitrogen storage tanks 1. Potential to liquid fill storage tanks 2. Potential to overpressure liquid nitrogen storage tanks 1. 043-LI/LAH0001A/B on liquid nitrogen storage tanks R818.1 Discuss during vendor package HAZOP protections against overfilling and overpressurising storage R818.2 See Recommendation R806.3 for configuration of trip of LIN production in the event of high level in both downstream liquid nitrogen storage tanks TS
818
Nitrogen system
Nitrogen is generated by cryogenic separation of nitrogen from atmospheric air. The nitrogen generation package has two operating modes (gaseous nitrogen - GAN and gaseous and liquid nitrogen production - GAN & LIN). Liquid nitrogen (sufficient for four days normal consumption or purge in one LNG train) is stored in two 50% vessels, which take approximately four weeks to fill in GAN & LIN operating mode. In the event of a decrease in gaseous nitrogen header pressure, liquid nitrogen is vapourised to supplement gaseous nitrogen production. The liquid nitrogen vapourisers are sized for purge flow rate requirements which is significantly larger than the normal continuous nitrogen consumption. Deviation Level - Low Causes 1. Periodic requirement for vapourisation of liquid nitrogen to maintain GAN header pressure Consequences 1. Gradual decrease in level of liquid nitrogen in the storage tanks 2. Potential for insufficient liquid nitrogen availability for one LNG train purge (largest requirement) Safeguards Recommendations Remarks Action by: TS Action resolution S L R
1. During normal GAN production R819.1 Consider configuration of mode, the nitrogen generation LAL at higher level in the tank (e.g. package produces greater than 60-80% full) if no requirement to 100% normal nitrogen have LAL at low level in the tank, consumption requirement e.g. for protection of pump and/or 2. Requirement for operator to gas breakthrough from storage manually switch nitrogen generation package from GAN to GAN & LIN operation mode. This is normally manual to prevent continual upset to air separation column reflux and operation 3. 043-LI/LAL-001A/B on liquid nitrogen storage
824
1. Upset in the nitrogen generation 1. Increase in carbon dioxide package concentration in nitrogen product 2. Potential for formation of solid carbon dioxide in liquid nitrogen system
825
No new issues
826 827
Plant Deviation Causes HAZOP Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-003-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/23-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-051-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/23-05-06 2252-051-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/24-05-06 2252-051-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/24-05-06
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent Raw water is extracted from a brackish well (1600ppm salts) via the well water unit 003, pumped through inlet filtration equipment and stored in two filter and firewater storage tanks (15300 m3 individual storage tank; 4500 m3 required in each tank for firewater based upon two hours largest fire scenario, 10800 m3 in each tank for 2.5 days normal consumption of filtered water). During normal operation, two well pumps are used to maintain level in the filtered and firewater storage tanks and five filters operate in parallel, with the sixth filter in backwash operating mode, or in standby.
Node Equipment Well water pumps 003-P-101A-C Raw water filtration package 051-U-101 Filtered and firewater storage tank 051-T-101A/B 828 Node 1 Well Water Overview Pumps and Raw Water Filtration HAZOP of Backwash Filter Control System and Configuration R828.1 Consider HAZOP of vendor package during detailed design LALL actions in these units TS are configured as DCS stop/inhibit actions, not hardwired ESD trip actions as no immediate safety impact. No SIL rating of 051-LALL005A/B or 051-LALL-0013 required by project TS
R828.2 Review all utility water storage tanks and provide maintenance blinds and/or spacers to enable isolation of tanks for maintenance
Causes 1. High demand for filter water, e.g. requirement for fire water in LNG plant
Safeguards 1. 051-LAH-0004A starts two well pumps 2. 051-LI/LAL-0004A on filtered storage water tank 3. 051-LALL-0005A/B inhibits both the backwash of the raw water filtration package and the use of filtered water for service and demineralised water production (only firewater usage is permitted) 4. 051-LALL-0005A/B on filtered and firewater storage tank stops non firewater user pumps (service water, reverse osmosis & backwash pumps) to prevent pump cavitation 5. Firewater inventory in the filtered and firewater storage tank is protected by elevated nonfirewater water nozzles on tank 6. 051-LI/LAL-0006A/B starts third standby well pump to increase filling rate to maximum flow rate 7. 051-LALL-0007A/B trips firewater pumps to prevent cavitation (in next revision, LALL0007A/B will only be alarm with no trip action)
Recommendations R829.1 Update P&ID to show correct relative location of 051LALL-0005A/B vs non firewater nozzles
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
1. Loss of stop signal for well water pumps 2. Continued operation of three well water pumps 3. High dP over raw water filtration package and high filling rate for filtered and fire water storage tanks 4. Potential to overfill and damage filtered and firewater storage tanks
1. 051-LI/LAHH-0004A/B stops all operating well water pumps to prevent overfilling 2. Filtered and fire water storage tanks have 12" overflow 3. 051-PDAH-0001 on filter package may anunciate in the event of operation of three well water pumps with five filters online
R829.2 Consider whether DCS panel alarms 051-LAH-0006A/B and 051-LAH-0004A/B are required as these will be nuisance alarms during normal operating conditions and tank levels R829.3 During detailed design, following selection of well water pump type and filter capacity, consider requirement for minimum flow protection on well pumps
TS
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards 1. 051-LI/LAH0004A/B starts two well pumps to maintain operating level in filtered and firewater storage tanks 2. 051-LI/LAHH-0004A/B stops all operating well water pumps to prevent overfilling 3. Filtered and fire water storage tanks have 12" overflow 1. 051-LALL-0005A/B on filter and firewater storage tanks inhibits filter backwash and stops service and reverse osmosis water pumps 2. 051-LIC/LAL-0011 on downstream desalinated water storage tank 3. 053-LI/LAL-0001 on downstream potable water storage tank
Recommendations R830.1 Consider during detailed design whether permissive of well water pump operating is required to commence the backwash cleaning sequence
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
1. Reduction in requirement for 1. Reduced flow rate from service water and/or demin water, filtered/fire water storage tank e.g. two train operation only 2. Reduced duty for well water pumps and/or reduced filling time for filtered and firewater storage tanks 3. Increased frequency and duration of no well pumps operating 2. Malfunction/incorrect setpoint in 1. Loss of start signal for two well 051-LI-0004A/B pumps 2. Continued decrease in level in filtered and firewater storage tanks with loss of firewater hold up volume 3. 051-LALL-0005A/B inhibits filter backwash and stops service and reverse osmosis water pumps 4. Loss of both filling and emptying of the filtered and firewater storage pumps 5. Potential for over-chlorination of raw water from raw water sterilisation package 051-U-102
R830.2 Provision of pressure indication on suction of raw water filtration package, requested by client as permissive for on/off control of raw water sterilisation package
TS
3. Malfunction/incorrect setpoint in 1. Loss of start signal to well water 051-LI-0006A/B pumps during initial commissioning activities 2. Increased duration to fill filtered and firewater storage tanks
1. Malfunction of 051-LI-0006A/B has no major impact on the operation of filtered and firewater storage tanks during normal operation
Deviation
Causes 4. Trip of a well water pump, e.g. local power loss and/or mechanical failure
Consequences 1. Reduction in flow rate of filtered water to the filtered and firewater storage tanks 2. Gradual reduction in level in filtered and firewater storage tanks 3. Potential for reduction in level and usage of firewater for normal operating systems
Safeguards 1. Auto-start of standby well pump on low discharge pressure 2. 051-LI/LAL-0004A/B on filtered and firewater storage tanks 3. 051-LALL-0005A/B on filtered and firewater storage tank stops non firewater user pumps (service water, reverse osmosis & backwash pumps) to prevent pump cavitation 4. Firewater inventory in the filtered and firewater storage tank is protected by elevated nonfirewater water nozzles on tank 5. Filtered and firewater storage tanks combined capacity provides five days normal operation holdup volume
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
831
Flow - No
1. Loss of backwash cleaning of single filter 2. Potential for blockage of single filtration package filter 3. Potential impact on normal operating flow rate to filtered and firewater storage tanks
1. 051-PDAH-0001 common alarm on raw water filter package 2. 051-UUA-0001 common trouble alarm on raw water filtration package 3. Six filters in parallel with one filter in backwash during normal operation 4. 051-LI/LAL-0004A/B on filtered and firewater storage tanks
2. Operator error - closing manual 1. Potential for loss of flow of 1. Normal operating procedures isolation valve on filtered water filtered water to tank and/or supply and firewater storage tank to other service requirements 2. Potential for loss of backwash feed to filter package
R831.1 Consider LO and/or CSO of the firewater supply line and minimum flow return on the filtered and firewater storage tank to prevent closure in error by operator
TS
Deviation
Safeguards 1. Each filter and firewater tank capacity is sized to provide 100% of firewater storage inventory 2. Each tank capacity is sized to provide 50% of filtered water holdup inventory for downstream users (2.5 days) 3. All tank inlet and discharge pipework is designed to enable normal 100% flow rate of filtered water and would therefore enable continued operation of process during maintenance on single storage tank
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
832
Flow - Reverse
1. Potential for reverse flow 1. Check valve on discharge of through raw water filtration each individual well water pump package to wells via syphon and/or hydrostatic head
R832.1 Consider during detailed design, provision of syphon breaker on top entry to filtered and firewater storage tanks to prevent reverse flow and/or additional check valve on tank inlet in the event of bottom filling
TS
833
Loss of Containment
1. Corrosion of carbon steel 1. Potential for leakage of raw pipework and filtered and firewater water to atmosphere storage tanks with brackish well water
1. Filtered and firewater tankage is completely internally epoxy lined 2. Carbon steel pipework with 3mm corrosion allowance 3. Carbon steel filters with 5mm corrosion allowance 4. Firewater underground main is GRP
R833.1 Detailed design to consider requirement for external protection of water tanks floors via CP or coating R833.2 Review of raw water, filtered water and service water pipework will be completed during detailed design following conformation of well water composition (salt and solids content)
TS
Deviation
Causes
Consequences 1. Deadhead well water pumps 2. Potential for damage to well water pumps 3. Potential for overpressure of filtered water pipework and filters
Safeguards 1. Complete blockage of six filter packages not considered credible, as normal inlet and outlet sequence valves are FO 2. Well water pumps, discharge pipework and filters have the same design pressure 3. Operating procedures
Recommendations R834.1 Review requirement for pressure relief provision on filters in revised design (not yet issued) to prevent overpressure of filters and tank inlet pipework as well water pump discharge presure rating increased to class 600, but filters and downstream pipework remain class 150 R834.2 Review requirement for thermal relief on raw water pipework from well during detailed design
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
Pressure - High 1. Blockage of filtered water inlet pipework to the storage tank
2. Thermal expansion of blocked 1. Potential for overpressure of water pipework section and/or fire pipework and/or filters in vicinity of filtration package 3. Filling of filtered and firewater 1. Potential for overpressure of storage tank with three well water atmospheric tank pumps operating, e.g. during initial filling of tanks
1. Filters located in area with no fire potential, therefore no fire protection PSV provided 1. 4 inch vent on each filtered and firewater atmospheric storage tanks sufficient 2. 12 inch overflow protection on tank 1. 4 inch vent on each filtered and firewater atmospheric storage tanks 2. 12 inch overflow protection on tank
TS
835
Pressure - Low
1. Operation of two firewater pumps and normal flow of service water from single tank, i.e. one tank out for maintenance activities
1. Potential for decrease in filtered and firewater storage tank vapour space pressure 2. Potential for filtered and firewater storage tank collapse
R835.1 Review sizing basis for the vent on filtered and firewater storage tanks to ensure sufficient for combined maximum flow rate out of tank No new issues No new issues
TS
836 837
838
Temperature High Temperature Low 1. Low ambient temperatures 1. Minimum design temperature for location is 4 degrees C
No new issues
839
840
No new issues
841
No new issues
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations R842.1 In new revision of P&ID (not issued) assumption that three independent wells will be used for provision of well water for site with individual low low level trip of single well water pump
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
1. Potential for loss of well water 1. 0003-LT-0001 stops well water for LNG liquifaction terminal and/or pumps to prevent pump cavitation damage of water water pumps 2. Five days holdup volume in filtered and firewater storage tanks
843 844
Level - No Phase - More 1. High solids concentration in well 1. High solids loading in the raw water water filtration package 2. Potential for blockage of filters 3. Potential for loss of feed to filtered and firewater storage tanks and/or filter overpressure
No new issues 1. Five days storage of filtered R844.1 Consider during detailed water in filtered and firewater design and reciept of raw water storage tanks composition implications on 2. 051-PDAH-0001 common alarm proposed filtration package on filter package configuration and design 3. High dP over single filter initiates backwash sequence 4. Six filters provided, in normal operation five online with sixth filter in backwash R844.2 Consider during detailed design and reciept of raw water composition implications on anticipated solids production from the backwash filters and discharge to off-site receiving waters TS
2. High solids concentration in the 1. Potential contamination of non filter backwash water contaminated water sewer system and off-site receiving waters with high solids content water
TS
3. Contamination of well water with 1. Contamination of downstream hydrocarbon potable water, demin water etc.
1. Raw water will be obtained from deep water wells with no potential for hydrocarbon contamination 2. Biocide dosing of the raw water on the inlet to the filtration package prevents algal/bacteria growth in the filtered and firewater storage tank.
845 846
Causes 1. Increase in dissolved salts concentration in well water, i.e. highly brackish water
Consequences 1. Potential for accelerated corrosion of carbon steel materials 2. Increased load on reverse osmosis desalination package
Safeguards
Recommendations R847.1 See Recommendation R833.2 for review of materials following reciept of well water composition during detailed design R847.2 Review reverse osmosis package design for removal of dissolved solids during detailed design following reciept of well water composition R847.3 Consider during detailed design and reciept of raw water composition implications on salt concentration of concentrate discharged to off-site receiving waters (more significant issue if creek is freshwater rather than brackish or saline)
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
848
No new issues
849 850
Plant Deviation Causes HAZOP Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-051-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/23-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-051-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/24-05-06
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent Raw water from well borehole is sterilised by the injection of sodium hypochlorite (14% free chlorine) into the inlet to the raw water filtration package
Node Equipment Raw water sterilisation package 051-U-102 851 Node 2 Raw water Overview sterilisation package Flow - High HAZOP of raw water sterilisation package R851.1 Consider HAZOP of vendor package during detailed design 1. Independent 051-LAL-0001 on sterilisation package 2. Independent calibration pot provided on raw water sterilisation package for calibration of metering pumps 3. SCXX on filtered and firewater storage tanks to enable manual sample of filtered water chlorine concentration 4. Bisulphide injection on downstream reverse osmosis package for removal of residual chlorine TS
852
1. Malfunction/incorrect setpoint of 1. Increased usage of sodium 051-AIC-001 chlorine analyser on hypochlorite solution inlet to storage filter tank 2. Decrease in level in sodium hypochlorite storage vessel 3. Potential upset in downstream reverse osmosis package unit
853
Flow - Low
1. Malfunction/incorrect setpoint of 1. Decreased usage of sodium 051-AIC-001 chlorine analyser on hypochlorite solution inlet to storage filter tank 2. Potential for algal and bacterial growth in filtered and firewater storage tanks 3. Potential for impact on downstream water systems
1. Independent calibration pot provided on raw water sterilisation package for calibration of metering pumps 2. SCXX on filtered and firewater storage tanks to enable manual sample of filtered water chlorine concentration 3. Periodic operator inspection of raw water sterilisation package sodium hypochlorite level
R853.1 Consider provision raw water sterilisation package sodium hypochlorite storage DCS level indication
TS
Deviation Flow - No
Consequences 1. Loss of sodium hypochlorite injection 2. Potential for algal and bacterial growth in filtered and firewater storage tanks 3. Potential for impact on downstream water systems
Safeguards 1. Pump status indication from raw water sterilisation package 2. Provision of spare metering pump (no autostart provision) 3. SCXX on filtered and firewater storage tanks to enable manual sample of filtered water chlorine concentration 4. Periodic operator inspection of raw water sterilisation package sodium hypochlorite level
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
855
Flow - Reverse
1. Pump trip
1. Potential for reverse flow of raw 1. Integral check valve in metering R855.1 Next revision of P&IDs will water into sodium hypochlorite pump show manual isolation valve at storage chemical injection tie-in. Consider requirement for check valve given increase in well water pump discharge pressure
TS
856
Loss of Containment
1. Small bore pipework failure 1. Potential for spray release of 1. Operator PPE for use when and/or metering pump piston seal sodium hypochlorite to atmosphere handling chemicals failure 2. Potential for operator hazard 2. Raw water sterilisation package and chemical burns equipment will be contained within a small kerbed area 2. Filling and handling of sodium hypochlorite injection chemical 1. Potential for operator hazard and chemical burns 1. Operator PPE for use when handling chemicals R856.1 Undertake HAZOP of injection package during detailed design. At present, preference is to use iso tank as means of storage of sodium hypochlorite chemical, removing requirements for additional vessel and/or handling requirements TS
857
Pressure - High 1. Operator error isolating discharge on metering pump Pressure - Low
858
859
Vacuum
No new issues
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
861
Temperature High
R861.1 Recommend provision of shelter for raw water sterilisation package (shade, not enclosed building) No new issues
TS
862
Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High Level - Low 1. Injection of sodium hypochlorite 1. Gradual decrease in level in solution sodium hypochlorite tank 1. 051-LAL-0001 sodium hypochlorite storage vessel level alarm
863
No new issues
864 865
No new issues
870
Wrong Concentration (Part of) Corrosive (As well as) Explosive Wrong Material (Other than)
No new issues
871
No new issues
872 873
Plant Deviation Causes HAZOP Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-051-PID-00-31-02/24-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-051-PID-00-31-03/24-05-06 2252-051-PID-00-31-04/23-05-06 2252-051-PID-00-31-05/24-05-06 2252-053-PID-00-31-02/24-05-06
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent Filtered water from the filtered and fire water storage tank is desalinated using a reverse osmosis package to produce desalinated water for feed to the demineralisation unit 054 and potable water unit 053. The reverse osmosis package has a design flow rate of 100m3/hr production of permeate and operates in on/off mode based on the level in the downstream desalinated water storage tank and potable water storage tank. The concentrated effluent from the reverse osmosis package (high in dissolved salts) is disposed in the non-contaminated water sewer.
Node Equipment Filtered and firewater storage tank 051-T-101A/B Reverse osmosis package 051-U-103 Desalinated water storage tank 051-T-102 Potable water storage tank 053-T-120 874 Node 3 Reverse Overview osmosis package and desalinated water storage tank HAZOP of reverse osmosis package R874.1 Consider HAZOP of vendor package during detailed design TS
875
Flow - High
1. High usage of desalinated water 1. Gradual decrease in level in the for production of demineralised desalinated water storage tank water in downstream demineralised water package
1. 051-LIC/LAL-0011 starts reverse osmosis package pumps 2. Reverse osmosis package desalinated water production flow rate is 100m3/hr whilst normal flow rate of desalinated water to demineralised water unit is 80m3/hr 3. 051-FIC-0002 flow rate of desalinated water to demineralisation water unit 4. 051-LAH-0011 closes inlet on/off valve to desalinated water storage tank
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
2. Increased usage of potable 1. Gradual decrease in level in the 1. 053-LIC/LAL-0001 starts reverse water on site, e.g. maintenance or potable water storage tank osmosis package pumps shutdown duration 2. Reverse osmosis package desalinated water production flow rate is 100m3/hr whilst average flow rate of desalinated water to potable water unit is 15m3/hr 3. 053-FAH-0003 flow rate of potable water to distribution 4. 053-LAH-0001 closes inlet on/off valve to potable water storage tank
3. Combined filling of desalinated water storage tank and potable water storage tank (both on/off level control)
1. Reduced filling rate to both potable water and desalinated water storage tanks. Net available capacity in reverse osmosis package is 5 m3/hr given average potable water consumption of 15 m3/hr and desalinated water consumption of 80 m3/hr
R875.1 Review proposed on/off level set points in desalinated water and potable water storage tanks to ensure it is possible to refill tanks, taking into account with single and combined filling rates
TS
876
Flow - Low
1. Low water usage in either demineralisation package and/or potable water network
1. Reduced usage of water 2. Potential for duration when no filling of either desalinated water storage tank or potable water storage tank, as both have on/off control 3. Deadhead of reverse osmosis package pumps 4. Potential for damage to reverse 1. Loss of flow of filtered water through the reverse osmosis package
1. 051-PIC/PAH-0002 on discharge of reverse osmosis package stops reverse osmosis package pumps
877
Flow - No
1. 051-XL-0003 reverse osmsis package pump run status indication 2. 051-UUA-0005 common trouble alarm 3. Standby reverse osmosis pump (no autostart) 4. Desalinated water storage tank has capacity of 1 day normal operation 5. Potable water storage tank has 4 days normal average consumption capacity
Deviation
Consequences 1. Potential for loss of firewater storage inventory in upstream filtered and firewater storage tank 2. Potential for loss of production of desalinated water to refill desalinated water tank and/or potable water storage tank
Safeguards 1. 051-LALL-0005A/B on filtered and firewater storage tank stops non firewater user pumps (service water, reverse osmosis & backwash pumps) to prevent pump cavitation 2. Firewater inventory in the filtered and firewater storage tank is protected by elevated nonfirewater water nozzles on tank 3. Sufficient capacity in desalinated water storage tank and downstream demineralised water storage tank to enable continued normal process production condition 4. Potable water storage tank has sufficient capacity for four days operation
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
878
Flow - Reverse
1. Potential for level equalisation between desalinated water potable water storage tanks during filling and/or in the event of pump trip
1. Anticipated that both tanks will be top filling with syphon breaker to prevent reverse flow between desalinated water and potable water storage tanks
R878.1 Consider requirement for tank inlet check valve in the event bottom filling
TS
879
Loss of Containment
1. Periodic operator inspection of the area 2. In the event of major pump seal failure, 051-FI-0001 on permeate flow rate 3. Desalinated water storage tank has capacity of 1 day normal operation 4. Potable water storage tank has 4 days normal average consumption capacity 1. 051-FI-0001 on permeate flow rate 2. 051-AI/AAH-0002 output conductivity analyser on reverse osmosis package
1. Release of desalinated water into waste concentrate stream 2. Reduced production of desalinated water
Deviation
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1. Release of desalinated water to 1. Potable water tank is carbon atmosphere steel with epoxy lining on all internal surfaces
880
Pressure - High 1. Filling of desalinated water 1. Potential for increase in vapour 1. Two inch vent on vapour space and/or potable water storage tanks space pressure for tank 2. Tanks have overflow protection
881
Pressure - Low
1. Emptying of desalinated water 1. Potential for decrease in vapour 1. Two inch vent on vapour space and/or potable water storage tanks space pressure for tank with no inlet flow (on/off filling)
882 883
884
Temperature High Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High 1. Malfunction of 051-LIC-0011 on 1. Loss of stop signal closing inlet 1. 8 inch overflow on desalinated desalinated water tank isolation on/off valve water storage tank 2. Potential to liquid fill and overpressure storage tank 1. Malfunction of 053-LIC-0001 on 1. Loss of stop signal closing inlet 1. 8 inch overflow on potable water potable water tank isolation on/off valve storage tank 2. Potential to liquid fill and overpressure storage tank
No new issues
885
No new issues
886
No new issues
887
888
Level - Low
1. Malfunction of 051-LIC-0011 on 1. Loss of start signal for opening desalinated water tank inlet isolation on/off valve and starting reverse osmosis package pumps 2. Gradual decrease in level in tank 3. Potential to loose liquid level and cavitate desalinated water pumps
1. Independent LALL-0013 stops desalinated water pumps 2. 054-LI/LAL-0004 on downstream demineralised water storage tank
1. Possible to operate both reverse osmosis package pumps in emergency to refill desalinated water storage tank
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards 1. Independent LALL-0003 stops potable water pumps 2. 053-PI/PAL-0004 on potable water distribution header
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
2. Malfunction of 053-LIC-0001 on 1. Loss of start signal for opening potable water tank inlet isolation on/off valve and starting reverse osmosis package pumps 2. Gradual decrease in level in tank 3. Potential to loose liquid level and cavitate potable water pumps
889 890
Level - No Phase - More 1. Carryover of solids from upstream raw water filtration package
No new issues 1. Potential for blockage of reverse 1. Filter on inlet of reverse osmosis R890.1 Consider requirements for osmosis membrane package DCS dP indication and PDAH on the reverse osmosis package inlet filters TS
891
Phase - Less
No new issues
892
Change of State
No new issues
893
1. Incorrect addition of reverse 1. Reduced performance of osmosis package chemicals (anti- reverse osmosis package scale, sulphuric acid, bisulphite) 2. Potential contamination of desalinated water
1. 051-AI/AAH-0002 outlet conductivity 2. 051-LAL-008/9/10 chemical buffer storage in the event of high addition flowrates
894
1. Discharge pipework from No new issues reverse osmosis package and desalinated water network pipework is stainless steel 2. Downstream of the Potable water sanitisation package the potable water system is galvanised CS No new issues No new issues
895 896
Plant Deviation Causes HAZOP Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-051-PID-00-31-02/24-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-051-PID-00-31-03/24-05-06 2252-052-PID-00-31-01/23-05-06
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent Filtered water from filtered and firewater storage tank is used as service utility water. In the process area, this will be used for cleaning and other maintainance activities and design basis is average flow of 80 m3/hr with potential to increase to 160 m3/hr with both pumps operating depending upon demand Service water is also used to maintain the jetty firewater ring main pressurised and other cleaning activities at jetty (design basis 20m3/hr). Node Equipment Filtered and firewater storage tank 051-T-101A/B Service water pumps 052-P-130A/B Service water booster pumps 052-P-131A/B 897 Node 4 Service water system Overview
898
Flow - High
1. Increased requirement for service water for cleaning activities 2. Gradual decrease in service water header pressure 3. Gradual decrease in jetty firewater main pressure 4. Gradual decrease in level in filtered and firewater storage tank
1. 052-FIC/FAH-0001 will close minimum flow protection of service water pump 2. 052-PIC/PAL will start standby service water pump to maintain service water header pressure and suction pressure to service water booster pump for jetty 3. 051-LI/LAL-0004A/B on filtered and firewater storage tank 4. 051-LALL-0005A/B on filtered and firewater storage tank stops non firewater user pumps (service water, reverse osmosis & backwash pumps) to prevent pump cavitation 5. Firewater inventory in the filtered and firewater storage tank is protected by elevated nonfirewater water nozzles on tank
Deviation
Consequences 1. Increased use of service water at jetty 2. Potential for decrease in pressure in jetty supply pipeline 3. Potential for decrease in firewater main pressure at jetty
Safeguards 1. Design basis for service water supply to jetty is to maintain jetty firewater ring main pressurised and supply water for up to two hoses for maintenance activties 2. 031-PIC-0006 initiates jetty firewater pump start in the event of low jetty firewater ring main pressure 1. 052-PIC/PAL-0001 starts standby service water pump in the event of high demand and low header pressure 2. Service water pump running light indication in DCS 3. 031-PIC-0006 initiates jetty firewater pump start in the event of low jetty firewater ring main pressure 1. 052-FIC/FAL-0001 minimum flow protection for service water pumps 2. 052-RO-0002 minimum flow protection for service water booster pumps (for jetty service) 3. 052-FI/FAL-0003 flow to jetty area
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1. Minimum flow protection on service water pumps will open 2. Reduced flow rate of service water to service water header, with potential for decrease in service water pressure depending on demand
899
Flow - Low
1. Low demand for service water in 1. Gradual pressurisation of process area and/or jetty service water header 2. Potential to dead-head the service water pumps 3. Potential for damage to service water pumps if operated below minimum flow for prolonged period
900
Flow - No
1. Gradual decrease in pressure in service water header 2. Potential cavitation of service water booster pump 3. Potential for reduction in jetty firewater ring main
1. 052-PIC/PAL-0001 autostart of standby service water pump to maintain service water header pressure 2. Check valve at tie in of service water header to the jetty firewatre ring main
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations R900.1 Consider provision of LO manual isolation valve at tie-in to jetty firewater ring main to enable maintainance of check valve and interconnecting header (from booster pump to jetty) as approximately 9 km long without compromising firewater provision at jetty
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
2. Service water booster pump trip 1. Potential for gradual reduction in 1. Autostart of stand-by service jetty firewater ring main pressure, water booster pump depending on service water usage 2. Check valve at tie-in of service at jetty water to jetty firewater ring main 2. Autostart of standby jetty 3. 031-PIC-0006 autostart of jetty firewater pumps firewater pumps 3. Ingress of seawater into firewater ring main
3. Low low level in upstream 1. Stop of service water pumps filtered and firewater storage tank 052-P-130A/B and service water booster pumps 052-P-131A/B upon 051-LALL-0005A/B in upstream tank to prevent cavitation of pumps 2. Loss of jockey pump for jetty firewater ring main and potential depressurisation
1. Check valve at tie-in of service water to jetty firewater ring main 2. 031-PIC-0006 autostart of jetty firewater pumps 3. Filtered and firewater storage tanks have significant inventory of filtered water as use as service water, demineralised water production and potable water usage (5 days holdup capacity total filtered water for services) 4. Firewater inventory is protected as elevated service water suction nozzle in filtered and firewater tank
1. Acceptance by client and project team for potential loss of service water supply to maintain jetty firewater ring main pressure. Jetty firewater ring main supply is not compromised as low pressure in jetty firewater header will automatically start jetty firewater pumps
901 902
Flow - Reverse Loss of Containment 1. Service water pump seal failure 1. Spray release of filtered water to 1. Operator inspection of area atmosphere 2. Spare service water pump with 2. Potential for reduction in autostart on low discharge service pressure in service water header water header pressure 2. Service water booster pump seal failure 1. Spray release of filtered water to 1. Operator inspection of area atmosphere 2. Spare service water booster 2. Potential for reduction in pump with autostart on low pressure in service water header discharge service water header to jetty pressure 3. Autostart of jetty firewater pumps if jetty firewater ring main pressure drops
No new issues
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations R902.1 See R833.2 for review of filtered water specification during detailed design upon confirmation of well water composition
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
3. Corrosion of carbon steel 1. Potential for spray release of pipework due to filtered water salt service water to atmosphere concentration
1. Potential for spray release of service water to atmosphere 2. Potential for decrease in firewater ring main pressure in event of significant release
1. Service water pipework on trestle will be painted and/or provided with alternative anticorrosion protection
5. Corrosion of jetty firewater ring main due to residual salt concentration following use of firewater pumps
1. Jetty facilities for replacement of jetty firewater ring main with filtered water following use of firewatre pumps
903
Pressure - High 1. Malfunction of 052-PIC-0001 on 1. Autostart of standby pump service water pump discharge and/or pressure transmitters on service water booster pump discharge
1. Minimum flow protection on both service water and booster pump discharge (sized for single pump) 2. 052-FIC/FAL-0001 on service water to process area 3. 052-FIC/FAL-0003 on service water to jetty 4. Pump running light indication on DCS No new issues
904
Pressure - Low
905 906
907
Temperature High
908
No new issues
909
No new issues
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
916
Wrong Concentration (Part of) Corrosive (As well as) Explosive Wrong Material (Other than)
No new issues
917
No new issues
918 919
Potable water
Potable water is produced from desalinated water by addition of sodium hydroxide to control pH, calcium chloride to control hardness and sodium hypochlorite as a biocide. Potable water is stored in the potable water tank (hold up volume of 4 days normal consumption) and then pumped through an activated carbon filter to remove excessive free chlorine into the pressurised potable water header. Consequences Safeguards Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-053-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/24-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-053-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/24-05-06 2252-053-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/24-05-06
Design intent Potable water is produced from desalinated water by addition of sodium hydroxide to control pH, calcium chloride to control hardness and sodium hypochlorite as a biocide and then stored in the potable water tank with a hold up volume of 4 days normal consumption Node Equipment Water potabilisation package 053-U-120 Biocide dosing system 053-U-122 Potable water storage tank 053-T-120 920 Node 1 Producti Overview on and storage of Potable Water Flow - High 1. HAZOP of vendor packages for potable water system R920.1 Undertake HAZOP of potable water vendor packages during detailed design TS
921
1. Requirement to refill potable 1. Flow of desalinated water from water storage tank (on/off control) upstream reverse osmosis package discharge to potable water storage tank via treatment packages 2. Potential for insufficient treatment of water in water potabilisation package and biocide dosing sytem
1. 053-FIC-0001 controls injection of calcium chloride in the water potabilisation package and sodium hypochlorite in the biocide dosing system 2. 053-AIC-0001 controls pH of potable water by injection of sodium hydroxide from water potabilisation package 3. Periodic operator sampling of potable water in potable water storage tank 1. Water potabilisation package and biocide dosing metering pumps are on/off type pumps 2. Requirement for operator to calibrate metering pump stroke and injection flow rates using package calibration pot 3. 053-AAH-0002 chlorine detector alarm on discharge of activated carbon filter package 4. Daily sampling of potable water from potable water storage tank
2. Malfunction of 053-FIC-0001 on 1. Potential for over-injection of water potabilisation and biocide chemicals into potable water dosing systems system
Potable water
Potable water is produced from desalinated water by addition of sodium hydroxide to control pH, calcium chloride to control hardness and sodium hypochlorite as a biocide. Potable water is stored in the potable water tank (hold up volume of 4 days normal consumption) and then pumped through an activated carbon filter to remove excessive free chlorine into the pressurised potable water header. Deviation Flow - Low Causes 1. Malfunction of water potabilisation and biocide dosing systems Consequences 1. Potential for insufficient treatment of potable water Safeguards 1. Water potabilisation package and biocide dosing metering pumps are on/off type pumps 2. Requirement for operator to calibrate metering pump stroke and injection flow rates using package calibration pot 3. Daily sampling of potable water from potable water storage tank Recommendations R922.1 Review water potablisation and biocide packages to consider what DCS alarms, etc. are required to notify operator of malfunction Remarks Action by: TS Action resolution S L R
923
Flow - No
1. Sufficient level in potable water storage tank closing flow and treatment of dealinated water (on/off control)
1. 053-LIC-0001 controls potable sotrage tank inlet on/off flow 2. Potential for over injection of calcium chloride, sodium hypochlorite and/or sodium hydroxide
1. 053-FIC-0001 controls injection of calcium chloride in the water potabilisation package and sodium hypochlorite in the biocide dosing system 2. 053-AIC-0001 controls pH of potable water by injection of sodium hydroxide from water potabilisation package
R923.1 Ensure water potabilisation package control logic inhibits continued injection of sodium hydroxide (normally controlled by 053-AIC-0001) to prevent overinjection of sodium hydroxide during no-flow conditions (via 053-FIC-0001)
TS
924
Flow - Reverse
1. Reverse flow between potable water and desalinated water storage tanks
1. Potential for loss of potable water and/or contamination of desalinated water storage tank
1. Opening of inlet 053-LV-0001 on potable water storage tank and/or 051-LV-0001 on desalinated water storage tank initiates start of reverse osmosis package pumps, minimising potential for reverse flow
R924.1 Consider provision of check valve on inlet to potable water storage tank and desalinated water storage tank
TS
925
Loss of Containment
1. Spray release of chemical to atmosphere and potential for operator chemical burns
1. Operator PPE and periodic inspection of area 2. Spare metering dosing pump 3. Chemical dosing pumps and storage tanks located within segregated kerbed areas 4. Each chemical kerbed area has operator manual valve preventing uncontrolled release to drain system
Potable water
Potable water is produced from desalinated water by addition of sodium hydroxide to control pH, calcium chloride to control hardness and sodium hypochlorite as a biocide. Potable water is stored in the potable water tank (hold up volume of 4 days normal consumption) and then pumped through an activated carbon filter to remove excessive free chlorine into the pressurised potable water header. Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards 1. Integral PSV within metering pump No new issues Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
Pressure - High 1. Blocked discharge on metering 1. Potential overpressure pump Pressure - Low
927
928 929
930
Temperature High
1. Vendor package is designed for safe dilution of 40% caustic to 5% caustic required for injection 2. Injection of sodium hydroxide through static mixer with small heat of dilution, given injection flow rate and concentration
931
Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High 1. Malfunction/incorrect setpoint 053-LIC-0001 (LV-0001 FL) 1. Continued flow of potable water into potable water storage tank 2. Potential to overfill and overpressure potable water storage tank 1. Eight inch overflow on potable storage tank to NW sewer 2. Periodic operator inspection in area
No new issues
932
No new issues
933
934
Level - Low
1. Loss of refilling of potable water storage tank 2. Potential to loose level and cavitate potable water pumps 3. Loss of pressure in potable water system 1. Loss of chemical for injection
1. Independent 053-LALL-0003 trips potable water pumps and inhibits auto start of spare pump
TS
R934.2 See R922.1 for provision of appropriate DCS indication and alarms No new issues
TS
935
Level - No
Potable water
Potable water is produced from desalinated water by addition of sodium hydroxide to control pH, calcium chloride to control hardness and sodium hypochlorite as a biocide. Potable water is stored in the potable water tank (hold up volume of 4 days normal consumption) and then pumped through an activated carbon filter to remove excessive free chlorine into the pressurised potable water header. Deviation Phase - More Phase - Less Change of State Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendations No new issues No new issues No new issues Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
939
1. Malfunction in water potabilisation package, biocide dosing system or downstream activated carbon filter package
1. 053-AAH-0002 chlorine detector alarm on discharge of activated carbon filter package 2. 053-AIC-0001 for pH (assuming not malfunctioned) 3. Daily sampling of potable water from potable water storage tank
R939.1 Ensure during detailed design that potable water sample point enables collection of representative potable water sample
TS
940
No new issues
941 942
Potable water
Potable water is produced from desalinated water by addition of sodium hydroxide to control pH, calcium chloride to control hardness and sodium hypochlorite as a biocide. Potable water is stored in the potable water tank (hold up volume of 4 days normal consumption) and then pumped through an activated carbon filter to remove excessive free chlorine into the pressurised potable water header. Consequences Safeguards Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-053-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/24-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-053-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/24-05-06
Design intent Potable water from the potable water storage tank (hold up volume of 4 days normal consumption) is pumped through an activated carbon filter to remove excessive free chlorine and into the pressurised potable water header. Node Equipment Potable water storage tank 053-T-120 Potable water pumps 053-P-120A/B Activated carbon filter package 053-U-123 943 Node 2 Potable Overview water chilling unit, storage tank and distributi on
944
Flow - High
1. High demand for potable water 1. Decrease in level in potable in plant, e.g. peak usage for water storage tank showers, etc. at change of shift 2. Potential for decrease in pressure in potable water header
1. Potable water storage tank is refilled via on/off level control 2. Potable water storage tank has 4 days holdup capacity (LAH to LAL on tank) 3. 053-FI/FAH-003 on flow to potable water distibution network 4. Potable water pumps sized for peak water consumption requirements 1. Potable water pumps sized for peak water consumption requirements and make-up to six LNG trains R944.1 Consider relocation of potable water tie-in for CWT make-up, upstream of the activated carbon filter package, given flow rate limitation on activated carbon filter package TS
2. Requirement for make-up of 1. Small increase in total potable LNG cooling water closed network water flow rate system (refrigeration compressor circuit)
Potable water
Potable water is produced from desalinated water by addition of sodium hydroxide to control pH, calcium chloride to control hardness and sodium hypochlorite as a biocide. Potable water is stored in the potable water tank (hold up volume of 4 days normal consumption) and then pumped through an activated carbon filter to remove excessive free chlorine into the pressurised potable water header. Deviation Flow - Low Causes 1. Low demand for potable water in plant Consequences 1. Increase in potable water header pressure and potential to dead-head potable water pumps 2. Increased flow through chilling unit package 1. Increase in differential pressure across filter bed and reduction in flow to the potable water distribution network Safeguards 1. 053-RO-0002 provides minimum flow protection for potable water pumps 2. 053-TI/TAL-0001 on potable water tank controls duty in chilling water package 1. 053-PDAH-0003 on activated carbon filter package 2. Client request for provision of full flow bypass of activated carbon filter package 1. Auto-start of spare potable water pump to maintain pressure in potable water header and flow through chilling unit package 2. Internal chilling unit package control logic 3. 053-PI/PAL-0004 on potable water distribution network 4. Check valve on discharge of activated carbon filter package prevents depressurisation of potable water distribution header through pump minimum flow to tank R946.1 Review during detailed design the design of chilling unit package and protections against ice formation in the event of loss of potable water flow through the chilling unit package R946.2 Consider inclusion of chilling unit package trip in Cause and Effect in the event of 053LALL-0003 on the potable water tank in consulation with vendor TS Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
946
Flow - No
1. Decrease in potable water header pressure 2. Loss of flow through chilling unit package
947 948
Flow - Reverse Loss of Containment 1. Pump seal failure 1. Release of potable water to atmosphere 1. Spare pump 2. Periodic operator inspection of area
No new issues
949
Pressure - High 1. Filling of potable water storage tank 2. Low demand for potable water on site
1. Potential for high vapour space 1. 2" vent and 8" overflow pressure 1. Increase in potable water 1. Minimum flow protection of network pressure potable water pump 2. Potential overpressure of chilling unit package and activated carbon filter package
R949.1 Review design pressure of chilling unit package and activated carbon filters
TS
3. High design discharge pressure 1. All drinking water has to be of potable water pump provided as direct connection to potable water header
R949.2 Review proposed potable water system distribution and design pressure, as it appears high compared with allowable user pressures
TS
Potable water
Potable water is produced from desalinated water by addition of sodium hydroxide to control pH, calcium chloride to control hardness and sodium hypochlorite as a biocide. Potable water is stored in the potable water tank (hold up volume of 4 days normal consumption) and then pumped through an activated carbon filter to remove excessive free chlorine into the pressurised potable water header. Deviation Pressure - Low Causes Consequences Safeguards 1. 2" vent and 8" overflow Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
1. Peak demand for potable water 1. Potential for low vapour space on site pressure in tank
951 952
953
Temperature High
1. Loss of chilling to potable water 1. Potable water network and and gradual increase in potable storage tank is insulated to water temperature prevent solar radiation heating 2. 053-UUA-0001 common trouble alarm on chilling unit package 1. Excessive chilling of potable water and gradual decrease in potable water temperature 1. 053-UUA-0001 common trouble alarm on chilling unit package 2. Limited chilling duty within chilling unit package R954.1 See R946.1 for review of chilling unit package design during detailed design TS
954
Temperature Low
955
Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High Level - Low 1. Failure of 053-LIC-0001 on potable water tank
No new issues
956 957
No new issues 1. Decrease in level in potable 1. 053-LALL-0003 trips potable R957.1 See R934.1 for water storage tank water pumps to prevent cavitation configuration of level indication on 2. Potential for loss of level and 053-LALL-0003 instrument cavitation of potable water pumps TS
Potable water
Potable water is produced from desalinated water by addition of sodium hydroxide to control pH, calcium chloride to control hardness and sodium hypochlorite as a biocide. Potable water is stored in the potable water tank (hold up volume of 4 days normal consumption) and then pumped through an activated carbon filter to remove excessive free chlorine into the pressurised potable water header. Deviation Wrong Concentration (Part of) Causes 1. Malfunction in upstream sodium hypochlorite injection and/or continued operation Consequences 1. Gradual deactivation of activated carbon within the activated carbon filter 2. Potential for excessive chlorine content of potable water Safeguards 1. 053-AAH-0002 free chlorine analyser on discharge of activated filters 2. Sizing basis for activated carbon filter package sufficient to prevent requirement for change in activated carbon within normal shutdown duration of three years 3. Minimum retention time within activated carbon filter forms part of the package equipment specification Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
963
No new issues
964 965
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-051-PID-00-31-05/Rev A/24-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-054-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/24-05-06 2252-054-PID-00-31-05/Rev A/24-05-06
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent Two 100% demineralisation packages are provided for the production of demineralised water which is used for production of boiler feed water make-up for use in the LNG process plant area. The production of demineralised water is an on/off, steady flow rate operation controlled by the level in the demineralised water storage tank. At present it is assumed that a mixed bed exchanger will be used for the production of demin water. In the event of a large demand for demineralised water (e.g. startup following maintainance activities), it is possible to operate both desalinated water pumps and demineralisation package trains in parallel.
Node Equipment Desalinated water storage tank 051-T-102 Desalined water pumps 051-P-101A/B Water demineralisation package 054-U-110 Demineralised water storage tank 054-T-110 966 Node 1 Producti Overview on of deminera lised water R966.1 Undertake HAZOP of water demineralisation package during detailed design LALL actions in this unit are TS configured as DCS stop/inhibit actions, not hardwired ESD trip actions as no immediate safety impact. No SIL rating of 054-LALL003 required by project
967
Flow - High
1. Initiation of demineralised water production via start of single desalinated water pump 2. Increase in level in demineralised water storage tank
1. 054-LI/LAH-0004 on demineralised water storage tank stops desalinated water pumps and production of demineralised water 2. Pump and water demineralisation package running light indication 1. Overflow of demineralised water storage tank 2. Pump and water demineralisation water package running light indications 3. 051-LALL-0005A/B on filtered and firewater storage tank stops service water and desalinated water pumps 4. Operator inspection of area
2. Malfunction/incorrect setpoint of 1. Start of desalinated water pump 054-LI-0004 on the demineralised and demineralised water water storage tank production 2. Loss of stop signal with potential to overfill and overpressurise demineralised water storage tank 3. Increased demand for production of desalinated water and use of demineralisation chemicals 4. Gradual decrease in level in upstream filtered water and firewater tank
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section
Deviation
Causes 3. Operation of both desalinated water pumps and water demineralisation package trains during startup (manual operation)
Consequences 1. Increased use of desalinated water 2. Decrease in level in desalinated water storage tank 3. Potential for loss of level in desalinated water storage tank and cavitation of desalinated water pumps
Safeguards 1. 051-LALL-0013 stop desalinated water pumps in the event of low low level in the desalinated water storage tank 2. Possible to operate both reverse osmosis packages in parallel to maintain feed to desalinated water storage tank 3. Desalinated water and demineralised water storage tanks both contain 1 day normal operating capacity (2400 m3). System inventory for change of single LNG train boiler water circuit is 300 m3
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
968
Flow - Low
1. 051-FIC/FAL-0002 on the desalinated water pumps minimum flow protection 2. Water demineralisation package design pressure is same as desalinated water pump deadhead design pressure
969
Flow - No
1. Loss of start signal for desalinated water pumps 2. Gradual decrease in level of demineralised water storage tank 3. Potential to cavitate demineralised water pumps
1. 054-LALL-0003 stops demineralised water pumps 2. Demineralised water storage tank has 1 day hold up of demineralised water
R969.1 Consider provision of level indication on 054-LALL-0003 instrument on DCS R969.2 Consider in consultation with downstream users (Steam and Acid Gas Removal Units) whether trip of demineralised water pumps needs to initate action on downstream unit e.g. 102-P107A/B Demin water make up metering pump. Update Cause and Effect Diagram as necessary
TS
970
Flow - Reverse
1. Potential for level equalisation between desalinated water storage tank and demineralised water storage tank via minimum flow
1. Auto start of desalinated water pump on low discharge pressure 2. Demineralised water storage tank will be top-fill in vapour space
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 971
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards 1. Periodic operator inspection of the area 2. Low discharge pressure autostart standby pump 1. Periodic operator inspection of the area 2. Operator PPE 3. Dedicated segregated kerbed areas for unit with appropriate surface protection to prevent acid/caustic attack 1. Periodic operator inspection of the area 2. Operator PPE 3. Dedicated segregated kerbed areas for each chemical storage tank to minimise potential for mixing of released caustic and acid solutions 1. Desalinated water and demineralised water storage tanks are stainless steel 1. 2" atmospheric vent and 8" overflow 1. 2" atmospheric vent and 8" overflow 2. 054-RO-0001 controls maximum flow rate of nitrogen into the vapour space
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
2. Pump seal failure on sodium hydroxide and sulphuric acid dosing pumps
1. Spray release of acid/caustic to atmosphere 2. Potential operator hazard and chemical burns
3. Loss of containment (e.g. 1. Potential operator hazard and corrosion) of concentrated acid or chemical burns caustic chemical storage tanks 2. Potential for significant heat of reaction between caustic and acid solutions
972
Pressure - High 1. Filling of demineralised water 1. Potential for increase in storage tank in two train operation pressure in vapour space 2. Incorrect operator setpoint of manual globe valve on demineralised water storage tank nitrogen blanket 1. Potential for increase in pressure in vapour space
R972.1 Nitrogen purge connection will be removed in subsequent version of P&ID. Boiler feed water is dosed with oxygen scavenger and tank is stainless steel
TS
973
Pressure - Low
1. Pump-out of demin water at high 1. Decreased pressure in vapour flow rate for change of BFW circuit space
974 975
976
Temperature High
No new issues
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 977
Deviation Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High Level - Low Level - No Phase - More
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
978
No new issues
No new issues No new issues No new issues 1. Degradation of water demineralisation exchanger resin 1. Potential production of resin fines 1. Water demineralisation vendor package normally contains discharge filter to prevent contamination of demineralised water storage tank
983 984
985
1. Potential breakthrough of salts into demineralised water storage tank 2. Gradual formation of salts in downstream boiler steam system
1. 054-AI/AAH-0001 conductivity analyser on discharge of water demineralisation package 2. High conductivity of demineralised water initiates automatic regeneration of resin and switch to standby exchanger 3. Periodic operator sampling of demineralised water in demineralised water storage tank
986
No new issues
987 988
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-054-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/24-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-054-PID-00-31-05/Rev A/24-05-06
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent Regeneration of the mixed bed resin exchangers is initiated automatically by high conductivity of the demineralised water discharge. The mixed bed resin is regenerated using 5% sodium hydroxide solution and 3% sulphuric acid solution. The demineralised water from the downstream storage tank is used in the final stage of the regeneration for washing the resin to remove residual acid and caustic contamination. The regeneration liquid is collected in a single demin neutralisation basin, and discharged to the non-contaminated sewer following operator confirmation of liquid pH. The reverse osmosis package removes the majority of the dissolved salts upstream, reducing the salt concentration of the regeneration liquid from the water demineralisation package. Node Equipment Water demineralisation package 054-U-110 Demin. neutralisation basin 054-T-111 Neutralisation pumps 054-P-111A/B Demineralised water storage tank 054-T-110 989 Node 2 Water Overview deminera lisation unit package regenera tion
990
Flow - High
1. Incorrect chemical dosing pump 1. High addition flow rate of stroke volume acid/caustic during regeneration cycle (normally timed) 2. Production of acidic and/or caustic regeneration liquid
1. Individual acid and caustic calibration pots for setting pump stroke during commissioning 2. 054-AIC/AAH-0002 controls the pH of the regeneration liquid automatically upon completion of regeneration sequence 3. Requirement for operator test of pH and manual start of neutralisation pumps for discharge of regeneration liquid to the noncontaminated sewer
1. Some vendors will use venturi rather than metering pumps for addition of acid and caustic during regeneration
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 991
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards 1. Individual acid and caustic calibration pots for setting pump stroke during commissioning 2. 054-AI/AAH-0001 conductivity analyser initiates premature regeneration of resin in the event of previously incomplete regeneration 3. 054-AIC/AAH-0002 controls the pH of the regeneration liquid automatically 4. Requirement for operator test of pH and manual start of neutralisation pumps for discharge of regeneration liquid to the noncontaminated sewer
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1. Incorrect chemical dosing pump 1. Low addition flow rate of stroke volume acid/caustic during regeneration cycle (normally timed) 2. Potential for incomplete regeneration of resin 3. Production of acidic and/or caustic regeneration liquid
992
Flow - No
1. Loss of chemical injection during regeneration cycle 2. Incomplete regeneration of the resin
1. 054-UUA-0002 common trouble R992.1 Vendor package logic sequences will be finalised during alarm on water demineralisation detailed design, including action in package the event of common trouble 2. Spare dosing pump for both caustic and acid injection (not auto- alarm, e.g. continuation of start) sequence, stop of sequence or restart of sequence (general recommendation for all utility vendor packages) 1. 054-UUA-0002 common trouble R992.2 Consider provision of alarm on water demineralisation conductivity meter in regeneration package wash of the neutralisation basin 2. Spare washing water pump (not auto-start) See R992.1
TS
1. Loss of resin washing during regeneration cycle 2. Potential for contamination of demineralised water storage tank
TS
993
Flow - Reverse
994
Loss of Containment
995
1. Potential overpressure
996
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 997 998
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
999
Temperature High
1. Potential for high liquid 1. Vendor to provide safe and temperatures during the dilution of suitable dilution facilities within concentrated acid or caustic package solutions for use during regeneration 1. Potential for high liquid temperatures during the acid and caustic neutralisation in the neutralisation basin 1. Sulphuric acid and caustic solutions are dilute, reducing potential for formation of high temperatures No new issues
1000
Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High 1. Simultaneous regeneration of water demineralisation packages 2. Automatic regeneration of the water demineralisation package, but requirement for manual pump out of the neutralisation basin
1001
No new issues
1002
1. Potential to overfill neutralisation 1. Water demineralisation package basin control logic prevents simultaneous regeneration 1. Potential to overfill neutralisation R1002.1 Review proposed design basin and consider configuration of alarm (e.g. LAH on the neutralisation basin and/or regeneration complete alarm) to notify operator to empty neutralisation basin
TS
1003
Level - Low
1. Operator controlled operation 2. Neutralisation pumps will be self priming pumps 3. Spare neutralisation pump
R1003.1 If level indication and alarm provided (see R1002.1), consider provision of low level stop of neutralisation pumps
TS
1004 1005
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 1006 1007
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1008
1. Incorrect addition of acid or 1. Plant air sparger provided in caustic neutralisation regeneration base of neutralisation basin liquid 2. Potential for discharge of acid or caustic effluent to noncontaminated sewer
R1008.1 Review requirement for sequence valve on plant air mixing sparger as neutralisation in the basin is normally part of the automatic regeneration sequence R1008.2 Review during detailed design of vendor package HAZOP specific protections for contamination of duty mineralisation discharge during regeneration, e.g. double valving, limit switches on sequence panels, conductivity analyser on discharge of each resin bed
TS
1. Leakage and/or valve sequence 1. Potential for leakage of acid failure in water demineralisation and/or caustic from exchanger package at start of regeneration under regeneration into normal flow of demineralised water to the demineralised water storage tank
TS
1009
1. Neutralisation basin will have chemical resistant lining 2. Air sparger and air pipework in neutralisation basin is PVC No further issues
1010 1011
Explosive Wrong Material (Other than) 1. Sizing basis for water demineralisation package
R1011.1 Water demineralisation package sizing basis will be reviewed during detailed design following reciept of raw water composition
TS
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-054-PID-00-31-05/Rev A/24-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent The pressure of the demineralised water distribution header is maintained by the demineralised water pumps. In the event of high demineralised water demand, such as requirement to replace boiler water circuit due to condensate contamination, it is possible to operate two demineralised water pumps to maintain header pressure. Node Equipment Demineralised water storage tank 054-T-110 Demin. Water pumps 054-P-110A/B 1012 Node 3 Deminer Overview alised water pumps and header Flow - High 1. High demand for demineralised 1. Decrease in level in water demineralised water storage tank 2. Potential decrease in demineralised water header pressure 1. Demin water pumps are sized to provide normal continuous flow rate required for make-up of BFW system and acid gas treatment (amine solution make-up) 2. 054-PI-0002 on demineralised water header 3. Operator start of second pump if required by process unit i.e. replacement of boiler feed water in the event of condensate contamination 4. Automatic make-up of upstream demineralised water storage tank based on level on/off control
1013
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 1014
Causes 1. Low demand for demineralised water (e.g. 2 out of 4 LNG trains operating)
Consequences 1. Decrease in usage of demineralised water 2. Gradual increase in header pressure 3. Potential to damage demineralised water pumps 1. Increase in recycle of demineralised water to storage tank 2. Decrease in flow of demineralised water for BFW makeup and acid gas treatment amine makeup 3. Potential for decrease in demineralised water header pressure
Safeguards 1. 054-FIC/FAL-0003 minimum flow protection on pumps 2. Automatic filling of upstream demineralised water storage tank based on level in tank 1. 054-PI-0002 on demineralised water header 2. Low pump discharge pressure autostart standby pump
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
TS
1015
Flow - No
1. Decrease in header pressure 1. Auto-start of standby demin with potential loss of demineralised water pump in event of low water make-up to process discharge pressure 2. Potential for reverse flow and depressurisation of header via pump minimal flow protection
R1015.1 Consider requirement for check valve on common demineralised water header to prevent depressurisation to tank
TS
1016 1017
Flow - Reverse Loss of Containment 1. Pump seal failure 1. Release of demineralised water 1. Periodic operator inspection of to atmosphere area 2. Spare demin water pump 3. Low discharge pressure initates auto start of standby pump
No new issues
1018
Pressure - High
No new issues
1019
Pressure - Low
No new issues
1020 1021
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 1022
Safeguards 1. Pipework thermal expansion loops 2. Thermal relief valves will be considered in detailed design
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1023
Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High Level - Low Level - No Phase - More Phase - Less
No new issues
1024
No new issues
No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues
1030
Change of State
No new issues
1031
Wrong Concentration (Part of) Corrosive (As well as) Explosive Wrong Material (Other than)
No new issues
1032
No new issues
1033 1034
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-017-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/25-08-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-017-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/25-08-06 2252-017-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/25-08-06 2252-017-PID-00-31-04/Rev A/25-08-06 2252-017-PID-00-31-05/Rev A/25-08-06
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent The hot oil system is a closed system using speciality thermal oil for use as a heating medium. Hot oil from the hot oil expansion drum is pumped through three hot oil furnaces during normal operation and then used as a heating medium for the condensate stabiliser reboilers. The heating oil is then cooled in the hot oil trim air cooler for use in the inlet facility gas and anti-hydrate heaters before returning back to the hot oil expansion drum. Node Equipment Hot oil expansion drum 017-V-101 Hot oil circulation pumps 017-P-101 Filter 017-FL-101 Hot oil furnace 017-H-101A/B/C Hot oil trim air cooler 017-A-101 1035 Node 1 Hot oil circuit Overview 1. HAZOP of fired furnace vendor package R1035.1 HAZOP of fired furnace vendor package to be undertaken during detailed design TS
1036
Flow - High
1. Individual heater flow control valves would tend to open due to reset from 017-FY-0001A/B/C 2. Gradual decrease in temperature of hot oil from hot oil furnaces and feed to downstream users 3. Potential for insufficient heat duty in downstream exchangers 4. Gradual decrease in hot oil header distribution pressure
1. Each individual user has temperature controlled TV which controls duty in exchanger 2. Temperature controller on discharge of each furnace 017-TI0008A/B/C 3. 017-TIC-0014 controls temperature and duty in hot oil trim air cooler 4. 017-TI/TAH-0002A/B furnace firebox temperature
Deviation
Consequences 1. Increase in flow rate through individual furnace pass 2. Decrease in flow through remaining passes to that furnace 3. Potential for high radiant section coil temperatures and possible coke formation in remaining furnace passes
Safeguards 1. 017-FY-0001A/B/C total furnace flow ratio controller controls total flow through each furnace 2. 017-FIC/FAL-0003** indication on remaining furnace passes 3. 017-TI/TAH-0005** furnace coil skin thermocouple temperature indication and alarms 4. 017-TI/TAH-0003** individual furnace pass discharge temperature 5. 017-FALL-0004** low low flow on individual pass
Recommendations R1036.1 Undertake complete review of furnace vendor package control, trip functions, cause & effect and flow control configuration to individual passes during detailed design
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
3. Malfunction/incorrect setting of 1. Increase in flow through individual hot oil user temperature individual user control valve 2. Potential for upset on process side due to increased heat duty 3. Potential for upset to other users in network 4. Clean filter following startup
1. Process side indication and alarms 2. 017-FQI-0006/7/8/9 provide indication of total flow to individual user branches
R1036.2 Consider configuration of FI and FQI to enable operator monitoring of flow to individual condensate stabilisers and gas heaters
TS
5 10
1. Reduced dP over filter and high 1. 017-FI-0011 on slipstream flow recirculation flow of hot oil through through filter filter
R1036.3 Consider provision of manual globe valve to enable operator regulation of flow through filter, especially when clean
TS
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards 1. 017-FY-0001A/B/C total furnace flow ratio controller controls total flow through each furnace 2. 017-FIC/FAL-0003** indication on furnace passes 3. 017-TI/TAH-0005** furnace coil skin thermocouple temperature indication and alarms 4. 017-TI/TAH-0003** individual furnace pass discharge temperature 5. 017-TI-0008A/B/C controls firing in individual furnaces 6. 017-FALL-0004** low low flow on individual pass 7. 017-TI-0014 controls bypass of hot oil trim air cooler and temperature to the anti-hydrate heaters 8. 014-TIC/TAL-0015 on shell inlet facility anti-hydrate heater discharge
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1. Malfunction/incorrect setpoint of 1. Reduced total flow through hot heater master flow controller oil furnaces 2. Gradual increase in discharge temperature of furnaces 3. Reduced duty in downstream user exchanges. Potential for insufficient heat duty in antihydrate heaters 4. Potential for low flow conditions in individual passes and coke formation
2. Malfunction/incorrect setpoint of 1. Potential for loss of flow through individual pass flow controller single pass of furnace (independent pass FV are FC) 2. Potential cracking and coke formation in coil 3. Potential hot-spotting and premature tube failure
1. 017-FIC/FAL-0003** on flow control through individual pass (if not cause for scenario) 2. 017-FALL-0004** on individual pass
R1037.1 Review during vendor package HAZOP furnace protections for low and/or no flow on individual passes
TS
Deviation
Causes 3. Low demand for hot oil in network, e.g. one condensate stabiliser or train in maintainance
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1. Reduced heat removal from hot 1. 017-TIC-0014 controls oil system temperature in second stage of hot oil system and heat removal in hot oil trim air cooler 2. Operating manual will contain indications for heaters master flow controller setpoints for various operating conditions in the plant 3. 017-TI-0008A/B/C controls firing in individual furnaces 4. 017-TI-0011 on combined temperature from three furnaces resets firing ratio controller 017-TI0007A/B/C
4. Plant startup
1. Reduced requirement for hot oil 1. Operating manual will provide system duty guidance for number of furances and operating hot oil circulation pumps required for providing necessary hot oil duty in the network 2. Circulating hot oil pump design considers circulation of hot oil at ambient conditions 3. 017-TI-0011 would continue to control on operating furnace as temperature reset 1. Reduced flow through filter 2. Reduced removal of coke particles from hot oil 3. Potential to overpressure filter 1. Filter design pressure same as circulating pump design pressure 2. 017-PDI/PDAH-0021 provides indication of filter performance if flow control element provided in slipstream R1037.2 See Reccomendation R1036.3 for provision of flow control element in slipstream TS
1. Potential for loss of circulation of 1. 017-FV-0001 is FO valve hot oil through the furnaces
R1037.3 Review with furnace vendor whether 017-FV-0001 is required given master flow controller of individual inlet flow controllers.
TS
Deviation
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1. Potential for reduction of hot oil 1. Hot circulation pumps have flow and heat duty availability individual single electrical feeder supplies. Hot oil unit has two independent electrical feeders which prevent loss of all hot oil circulating pumps simultaneously 2. Hot oil circulating pump discharge 017-PI-0017 auto starts standby circulating pump to maintain circulation 3. 017-PIC-0015 would tend to close to maintain hot oil header pressure
Flow - No Flow - Reverse Loss of Containment 1. Pump seal failure on hot oil circulating pump 1. Spray release of oil to atmosphere 2. Gradual decrease in hot oil inventory in system 3. Potential for loss of hot oil inventory and cavitation of circulating pumps 1. Release of hot oil into furnace firebox 2. Potential for fire in base of hot oil furnace 1. Periodic operator inspection of the area 2. 017-LI-0004 on hot oil expansion drum 3. 017-LALL-0001 trip on hot oil circulating pumps 1. Periodic operator inspection of furnace 2. Coil skin thermocouples provide indication of high skin temperatures, e.g. coke formation in tube 3. 017-AI-0001A/B/C excess oxygen indication in stack 4. High soot content of furnace emissions from stack 1. Periodic operator inspection of the area 2. 017-LI-0004 on hot oil expansion drum 3. 017-LALL-0001 trip on hot oil circulating pumps
No new issues No new issues R1040.1 Configure LAL on 017-LI0004 to act as pre-alarm before circulating pump trip TS
3. Pinhole tube leak on hot oil trim 1. Spray release of oil to air cooler atmosphere 2. Gradual decrease in hot oil inventory in system 3. Potential for loss of hot oil inventory and cavitation of circulating pumps
TS
Deviation
Consequences 1. Potential exposure of operator to hot circulating oil (approx 200 degrees C)
Recommendations R1040.3 Ensure piping layout enables draining of hot oil to drum for maintenance activities
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
1041
1. Potential for overpressure of hot 1. 017-PIC/PAH opens PV-0019A oil expansion drum to flare on expansion drum 2. 017-PSV-0002A/B 1. Potential for overpressure of hot 1. Filter is normally open to hot oil oil filter expansion drum. However, single manual isolation valve may prevent depressurising via hot oil expansion drum R1041.1 Confirm against code requirements whether dedicated PSV required for filter vessel sized for fire, or CSO manual isolation valve to ensure protection via expansion drum pressure relief TS
3. Malfunction/incorrect setpoint of 1. Gradual pressurisation of 017-PV-0019B nitrogen blanket on expansion drum expansion drum 4. Tube failure in high pressure inlet facility anti-hydrate and feed gas heaters
1. Potential for high pressure gas 1. Dedicated PSV on exchanger breakthrough and overpressure of hot oil headers prevents hot oil system overpressure of hot oil system
1042
Pressure - Low
1. Decrease in hot oil circulating header pressure 2. Potential for insufficient flow through hot oil exchangers with potential for process upset 1. 017-PV-0019A opens to flare, reducing pressure in the hot oil expansion drum
R1042.1 Consider handwheel, if not already provided, on 017-PV0015 to enable continued operation with manual control
TS
1. Hot oil circulating drum elevation approx 10 m. No anticipated problem with hot oil circulating pump operation 1. Hot oil expansion drum designed for vacuum
1043
Vacuum
1. Operator error during steam-out 1. Potential formation of vacuum of hot oil expansion drum and/or filter
1044
Partial Pressure
No new issues
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards 1. Feed gas heaters and antihydrate heater exchangers have design temperature of 320 degrees C
Recommendations R1045.1 Review design temperature of hot oil exchangers to match hot oil unit design temperature R1045.2 Review design temperature of hot oil expansion drum
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
1. Operator incorrect setpoint 017- 1. Increased flow through hot oil TIC-0014 trim air cooler bypass 2. Increase in temperature of hot oil feed to gas heaters and antihydrate heater exchangers 3. Potential increase in return temperature to hot oil expansion drum and filter 1. Malfuction/incorrect setpoint 017- 1. Increased flow through hot oil TIC-0014 trim air cooler 2. Decrease in temperature of hot oil feed to hot oil exchangers and gas heaters 2. Continued operation of fixed speed hot oil cooler fin fans with no hot oil flow
1046
Temperature Low
1. Process side temperature indication and alarms 2. 017-TI-0017 on hot oil return to expansion drum 1. System and pump hot oil circulating pump design considers pumping of high viscous thermal oil during startup at atmospheric temperatures 2. Potential for operator to stop fin fan motors if considered necessary
1047
Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High Level - Low Level - No Phase - More Phase - Less Change of State
No new issues
No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues
Consequences
Safeguards 1. Requirement for manual purging and replacement of determined volume during maintainance on an annual programme
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1055
No new issues
1056 1057
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-017-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/25-08-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-017-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/25-08-06 2252-017-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/25-08-06 2252-017-PID-00-31-04/Rev A/25-08-06
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent Hot oil is heated in a fuel gas fired natural draft furnace to maintain a normal operating discharge temperature of 280 degrees C. Node Equipment Hot oil furnace 017-H-101A/B/C 1058 Node 2 Furnace Overview firing and firebox
Flow - High Flow - Low Flow - No Flow - Reverse Loss of Containment 1. Leakage of fuel gas into firebox 1. Potential for firebox explosion in standby mode during ignition sequence 1. Burner management and firing control system 2. Double block and bleed isolation of main fuel gas to furnace during shutdown 3. Double block and bleed isolation on pilot fuel gas feed during furnace shutdown
No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues R1063.1 Confirm during vendor package HAZOP provision of firebox venting and purge requirements prior to ignition TS
2. Tube leakage and/or tube failure 1. Potential for pool fire in the bas 1. Temperature indication on the in individual furnace of the furnace firebox furance firebox 2. Oxygen anlyser on the flue gas 3. Increase in soot content of the flue gas from the furnace
R1063.2 Confirm with vendor proposed simultaneous isolation of both fuel gas to the furnace and flow of hot oil through the furnace tubes. Ensure tube design temperature sufficient for residual heat in the firebox and no flow condition
TS
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1. Increase in fuel gas flow to main 1. Flame detectors on main burner tip burners in furnace 2. Potential for flame lift-off 3. Potential for re-ignition on hot refractory lining and potential for explosion 1. Increase in fuel gas flow to pilot burner tip 2. Potential for flame lift-off 3. Potential for loss of pilot 1. Potential for increased firing in furnace firebox 2. Gradual increase in discharge temperature of the fire furnace 1. 017-PIC-0009A/B/C controls fuel gas pressure to main burners 2. 017-TI/TAH-0008A/B/C controls firing in furnace to maintain set discharge temperature R1064.1 Review during detailed vendor package HAZOP flame protection and flame-out protection, including trip actions TS
4. Incorrect setpoint and position of 1. Potential increase in firebox damper pressure with potential for substoichiometric combustion
1. 017-AI-001A/B/C excess oxygen analyser on flue gas 2. 017-PI/PAH-0002A/B/C and017PI/PAH-4A/B/C firebox pressure indication
Consequences 1. Loss of fuel gas flow to pilot burner 2. Loss of pilot in furnace 1. Loss of fuel gas flow to main burners 2. Loss of firing in furnace of main gas burners 3. Gradual decrease in temperature of process side discharge from furnace
Safeguards 1. 017-PALL-0008A/B/C on pilot gas 1. 017-PALL-0010A/B/C on main fuel gas 2. Flame detectors on main fuel gas burners
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
3. Low fuel gas pressure and/or blockage of inlet fuel gas filter
1. Decrease in flow of natural gas 1. 017-PALL-0008A/B/C on pilot to both pilot and main gas burners gas 2. Potential for flameout of furnace 2. 017-PALL-0010A/B/C on main fuel gas 017/PDI/PAH-017A/B/C over inlet gas filters No new issues 1. Burner tip design takes into account anticipated variations in fuel gas composition
1066 1067
Vacuum Partial Pressure 1. Variation in fuel gas composition 1. Potential for variation in burner performance
Consequences 1. Increased firing in the individual fired heater 2. Increase in discharge temperature from furnace 3. Potential for flame impingement on furnace tubes 4. Potential for cracking reactions in coil and coke formation 5. Potential for coil rupture
Safeguards 1. 017-TI-0011 on common hot oil discharge from all three furnaces resets 017-TY-0008A/B/C 2. 017-TI/TAH-0005** coil skin temperature thermocouples 3. 017-TI/TAH-0002 radiant zone firebox temperature 4. 017-TI/TAH-0003** individual discharge temperatures 5. 017-TAHH-0009A/B/C on common furnace discharge
Recommendations R1068.1 Detailed furnace design to confirm potential for flame impingment and protection against over-firing in furnace
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
1. Malfunction/incorrect setpoint of 1. Increased firing in the all fired 017-TI-0011 heaters 2. Increase in discharge temperature from furnace 3. Potential for flame impingement 4. Potential for cracking reactions in coil and coke formation 5. Potential for coil rupture
1. 017-TIC-0014 controls cooling in hot oil trim air cooler 2. 017-TI/TAH-0005** coil skin temperature thermocouples 3. 017-TI/TAH-0002 radiant zone firebox temperature 4. 017-TI/TAH-0003** individual discharge temperatures 5. 017-TAHH-0009A/B/C on common furnace discharge
1069
Temperature Low
1. Decreased firing in the individual fired heater 2. Decrease in discharge temperature from furnace
1. 017-TI-0011 on common hot oil discharge from all three furnaces resets 017-TY-0008A/B/C 2. 017-TI-0002 radiant zone firebox temperature 3. 017-TI-0003** individual discharge temperatures 1. 017-TI-0008A/B/C on common hot oil discharge from all three furnaces resets 017-TY-0008A/B/C 2. 017-TI-0002 radiant zone firebox temperature 3. 017-TI-0003** individual discharge temperatures 4. 017-TI-0004 controls cooling in hot oil trim air cooler
1. Malfunction/incorrect setpoint of 1. Decreased firing in all fired 017-TI-0011 heaters 2. Decrease in discharge temperature from furnace
Deviation Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High Level - Low Level - No Phase - More
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
No new issues No new issues No new issues 1. Potential condensate formation 1. Potential for upset in furnace in fuel gas network during initial startup 1. Central KO drum in fuel gas unit R1074.1 Evaluate the need for KO drum provision on common fuel gas to Unit 17 furnaces to minimise potential for furnace upset (general recommendation) TS
1075 1076
1077
Wrong Concentration (Part of) Corrosive (As well as) Explosive 1. Incorrect ignition sequence for furnace 1. Sequence controlled ignition of furnace
No new issues
1078
No new issues
1079
1080
No new issues
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-017-PID-00-31-06/Rev A/25-08-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-017-PID-00-31-05/Rev A/25-08-06
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent Hot oil sumps (individual for NS and NCB systems) are designed to have sufficient total volume for the hot oil inventory for use during maintainance and startup operations The hot oil sumps can also be used for purging of hot oil inventory from the systems and venting of light ends to flare formed from gradual cracking and decomposition of the thermal oil. Facilities are also provided for the injection and makeup of hot thermal oil inventory from external third party drums, etc.
Node Equipment 017-V-102/3 hot oil sumps 017-P-103/4 sump pumps 1081 Node 3 Hot oil sump Overview
1082
Flow - High
1. Transfer of thermal oil from sump to hot oil circuit expansion drum
1. Gradual increase in level of the 1. Manually operated control thermal expansion drum with procedure potential to overfill 2. 017-LI-0004 on hot oil expansion drum 3. 017-LALL-0005/6 initiates trip of transfer pump No new issues No new issues
Flow - Low Flow - No Flow - Reverse 1. Pump trip and/or normal standby 1. Potential for reverse flow of hot 1. Check valve on discharge of condition oil to sump sump pump 2. Check valve on connections for addition of new thermal oil 3. Hot thermal oil injection connection to expansion drum inlet pipework normally manually closed and isolated from system
1086
Loss of Containment
1. Hot oil sumps are carbon steel and painted to minimise potential for external corrosion
Deviation
Causes
Safeguards
Recommendations R1087.1 Consider relocation of manual globe valve to inlet of hot oil sump to control purging flow R1087.2 Add note to P&ID to state that pressure gauge should be visible from nitrogen purge manual globe valve
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
Pressure - High 1. Operator error closing globe valve on nitrogen purge of hot oil sump
1. Potential to exceed sump design 1. 3" vent to flare on vapour space pressure of hot oil sump considered sufficient for normal nitrogen purge and maximum hot oil draining flow rate
1088
Pressure - Low
1. Pump out of thermal oil from hot 1. Potential for decrease in vapour oil sump to hot oil expansion drum space pressure in hot oil sump 2. Potential for damage to drum
R1088.1 Ensure nitrogen purge sizing basis and local indication is sufficient to prevent formation of vacuum in sump during pump out conditions
TS
1089 1090
Vacuum Partial Pressure 1. Flashing of light ends in hot oil sump 1. Potential for formation of flammable atmospheres in hot oil sump 1. Nitrogen purge of the vapour space of hot oil sump to flare
No new issues
1091
Temperature High Temperature Low 1. Decrease in temperature of hot 1. Potential for problems in oil inventory in sump operating sump pump 1. Pumps designed for pumping both atmospheric temperature and hot thermal oil
No new issues
1092
1093
No new issues
Safeguards 1. Hot oil sumps (NS and NCB) are sized to hold total hot oil inventory in system 2. 017-LI/LAH-0009/0010 level indication on hot oil sumps 3. Local level indication gauges on sumps
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
2. Collection of rainwater in hot oil 1. Potential for drum to float since 1. Hot oil sumps are anchored to pits during rainy season normally no liquid inventory pit 2. 017-LI/LAH-0013/14 level indication on pit 3. Operator action to pump out hot oil sump pits during rainy conditions as necessary 1095 1096 1097 1098 Level - Low Level - No Phase - More Phase - Less No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues
1099
Change of State
No new issues
1100
Wrong Concentration (Part of) Corrosive (As well as) Explosive Wrong Material (Other than) 1. Corrosion of internals of hot oil sumps 1. Potential contamination of hot oil 1. Nitrogen blanket/purge of hot oil with corrosion products sump
No new issues
1101
1102 1103
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-046-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/23-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent Single diesel oil storage tank is provided for import and storage of diesel for use within plant facilities for vehicles, emergency generators, fire pumps, etc. Node Equipment Diesel oil inlet filters 046-F-101A/B Diesel oil storage tank 046-T-101 Diesel oil outlet filters 046-F-102A/B Diesel oil station 046-U-101 1104 Node 1 Diesel oil Overview system 1. HAZOP of diesel oil station R1104.1 Undertake vendor package HAZOP during detailed design 1. 046-LI/LAH-0002 with control signal to harbour loading facility 2. 4" vent sized for maximum filling rate 3. Management of diesel oil purchase and inventory control during import activities 1. 046-LI/LAL-0002 for inventory management in diesel oil tank 2. 4" vent R1105.1 Consider provision of pump to enable filling of diesel truck for onsite distribution TS TS
1105
Flow - High
1. Import of diesel oil from harbour 1. Increase in level in diesel oil storage tank 2. Potential to overflow diesel oil storage tank 3. Increase in vapour space pressure and overpressure of atmospheric storage tank 2. Export of diesel oil to distribution 1. Gradual decrease in level in truck diesel oil storage tank 2. Low pressure in vapour space
1106
Flow - Low
1. Gradual blockage of diesel inlet 1. Increased duration for filling and 1. Manual operation and/or outlet filters transfer of diesel oil No new issues 1. Pump trip during import of diesel 1. Potential for reverse flow of from harbour diesel 1. Loading is a manual operation R1108.1 Consider provision of check valve at harbour to prevent reverse flow R1109.1 Evaluate requirement for overflow on diesel oil storage tank, given potential environmental aspects associated with the overflow of diesel oil to bunded area No new issues TS
1107 1108
1109
Loss of Containment
1. Overfilling of diesel oil storage tank during loading via overfill connection
1. Potential contamination of bund 1. 046-LI/LAH-0002 with control area signal to harbour loading facility 2. Management of diesel oil purchase and inventory control during import activities
TS
1110
Pressure - High
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 1111
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1112 1113
1114
Temperature High Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High Level - Low Level - No Phase - More 1. Contamination of diesel oil with 1. Potential collection of water in water diesel oil storage tank 2. Potential collection of water in site emergency fuel tanks, e.g. diesel firewater pump 1. Sample collection on diesel oil storage tank 2. Water removal drain on diesel oil storage tank 3. Cone-up type bottom diesel oil storage tank 4. Water drain connections on site user diesel systems
No new issues
1115
No new issues
1116
No new issues
1121 1122
1123
Wrong Concentration (Part of) Corrosive (As well as) 1. Corrosion at water interface in base of tank 1. Potential for ground contamination 1. Bund design 2. 3mm corrosion allowance in tank
No new issues
1124
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 1125 1126
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Jetty facilities
A dedicated air compression package is provided at the jetty for provision of instrument and maintainance plant air. A dedicated jetty nitrogen buffer vessel is provided with sufficient holdup volume for single loading purge sequence in the event of loss of nitrogen header from the plant nitrogen generation package unit. Consequences Safeguards Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-031-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/23-06-06 /Rev.Number/Date
Design intent Nitrogen is buffered in a single vessel for use in purging loading arms used for transfer of LNG, LPG and HVP condensate products. Node Equipment Jetty gaseous nitrogen reciever 031-V-101 Nitrogen Overview supply
1127
Node 1
1128
Flow - High
No new issues
1133
No new issues
1134
Pressure - Low
1. Purging of loading arm following 1. Use of nitrogen 1. Connected to site nitrogen loading activities 2. Gradual decrease of pressure in system for recharging in the event nitrogen buffer vessel of decrease in pressure due to high usage flow rates 2. 031-PI/PAL-0004 on jetty nitrogen header 2. Malfunction in nitrogen generation system upstream 1. Potential for temporary loss of nitrogen supply to jetty 1. Nitrogen buffer vessel on jetty 2. Check valve on inlet to nitrogen buffer vessel to protect volume in event of loss of nitrogen supply header pressure 3. Buffer vessel sized for single loading operation purge 4. 031-PI/PAL-0004 on jetty nitrogen header
1135
Vacuum
No new issues
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 1136
Jetty facilities
A dedicated air compression package is provided at the jetty for provision of instrument and maintainance plant air. A dedicated jetty nitrogen buffer vessel is provided with sufficient holdup volume for single loading purge sequence in the event of loss of nitrogen header from the plant nitrogen generation package unit. Deviation Partial Pressure Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendations No new issues Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
1137
Temperature High Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High Level - Low Level - No Phase - More Phase - Less Change of State
No new issues
1138
No new issues
1139
No new issues
No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues
1146
Wrong Concentration (Part of) Corrosive (As well as) 1. External corrosion of nitrogen 1. Potential for loss of integrity of buffer vessel and pipework at jetty nitrogen vessel and pipework location 1. All nitrogen header pipework along trestle, jetty head and vessel will be coated to prevent external corrosion
No new issues
1147
1148 1149
Jetty facilities
A dedicated air compression package is provided at the jetty for provision of instrument and maintainance plant air. A dedicated jetty nitrogen buffer vessel is provided with sufficient holdup volume for single loading purge sequence in the event of loss of nitrogen header from the plant nitrogen generation package unit. S L R
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-031-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/23-06-06 Design intent A dedicated compressed air package will be provided at the jetty for production of compressed air for use as plant and instrument air. The air dryer package will be heated regeneration type (electrical)
Node Equipment Jetty air compression package 031-U-104 Jetty dry air receiver 031-V-103 1150 Node 2 Jetty Overview compres sed air system 1. HAZOP of vendor package R1150.1 Undertake vendor air compressor package HAZOP during detailed design TS
1151
Flow - High
1. High demand for instrument air and/or plant air during maintainance and/or other activites at the jetty
1. Gradual decrease in pressure in jetty drier receiver 2. Potential for loss of instrument air
1. 031-PI/PAL-0005A/B autostart of jetty air compression package 2. 031-PI/PAL-0003 closes jetty plant air header to protect instrument air network
1152
Flow - Low
1. Low usage of instrument and/or 1. Reduced production of plant air compressed air by compressed air package No new issues 1. Completion of air compression operation 1. Potential for depressurisation of 1. Check valve on inlet connection jetty air reciever to atmosphere to jetty air reciever prevents depressurisation No new issues
1153 1154
1155
Loss of Containment Pressure - High 1. Malfunction of compressed air control package, e.g. compressor fails to stop 1. Potential to overpressure jetty air receiver 1. Compressed air package design 2. 031-PSV-0002 on jetty dry air receiver 3. 031-UUA-0001A/B summarised malfunction alarm on compressed air package
1156
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 1157
Jetty facilities
A dedicated air compression package is provided at the jetty for provision of instrument and maintainance plant air. A dedicated jetty nitrogen buffer vessel is provided with sufficient holdup volume for single loading purge sequence in the event of loss of nitrogen header from the plant nitrogen generation package unit. Deviation Pressure - Low Causes 1. Malfunction of compressed air control package, e.g. compressor fails to start Consequences 1. Potential for loss of jetty instrument and plant air Safeguards 1. 031-PI/PAL-0003A/B on jetty air compressor package 2. 031-PI/PAL-0003 on instrument air header automatically closes jetty plant air network to preserve instrument air header pressure Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
1158 1159
1160
Temperature High Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High Level - Low Level - No Phase - More 1. Malfunction in jetty air compression package drier 1. Potential for formation of water in jetty dry air receiver 2. Potential for damage to jetty instrumentation 1. Jetty air drier summarised malfunction alarm 031-UUA0003A/B 2. Air high moisture content alarm 031-AI/AAH-0001A/B
No new issues
1161
No new issues
1162
No new issues
1167 1168
1169
1. Jetty air compression package will be located in safe location in non-hazardous zone
Company Facility HAZOP Date Section ID General Section Description: HAZOP Plant Item No. Section 1170
Jetty facilities
A dedicated air compression package is provided at the jetty for provision of instrument and maintainance plant air. A dedicated jetty nitrogen buffer vessel is provided with sufficient holdup volume for single loading purge sequence in the event of loss of nitrogen header from the plant nitrogen generation package unit. Deviation Corrosive (As well as) Causes 1. External corrosion of jetty dry air receiver and pipework at jetty location Consequences Safeguards Recommendations Remarks Action by: Action resolution S L R
1. Potential for loss of integrity of 1. All dry air pipework along trestle, jetty dry air receiver and pipework jetty head and dry air receiver will be coated to prevent external corrosion No new issues No new issues
1171 1172
Firewater Systems
Firewater for the largest fire scenario in the process area is stored in each of the filtered and firewater storage tanks. The pressure in the process area firewater main is maintained using jockey pumps with minimum flow protection back to the filtered and firewater storage tanks. In the event of decrease in pressure in the firewater ring main the main firewater pumps (three 50% pumps provided: 1 electric and 2 diesel) autostart. In the event the pressure in the main does not increase within 20 seconds a second firewater pump is started. It is only possible to stop the main firewater pumps manually. Service water booster pumps are used for maintaining the jetty firewater ring main pressurised. In the event the pressure in the jetty ring main decreases, the jetty seawater firewater pumps are started automatically (two 100% pumps: 1 electric and 1 diesel). All main process and jetty area firewater pumps will be subject to weekly manually operator performance testing and maintenance.
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-051-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/24-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-051-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/24-05-06 2252-055-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/14-07-06 2252-055-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/14-07-06
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent Firewater for the largest fire scenario in the process area is stored in each of the filtered and firewater storage tanks. The pressure in the process area firewater main is maintained using jockey pumps with minimum flow protection back to the filtered and firewater storage tanks. In the event of decrease in pressure in the firewater ring main the main firewater pumps (1 electric and 2 diesel) autostart.
Node Equipment Filtered and firewater storage tank 051-T-101A/B Firefighting water pumps 055-P-101A/B/C Jockey pumps 055-P-102A/B 1173 Node 1 Process Overview Area Firewater System
1174
Flow - High
No new issues
1175
Flow - Low
1. Requirement for weekly performance testing on main firewater pumps. Dedicated test line provided on each individual pump and local flow indicator 055FI-0001 to confirm pump performance 2. Decrease in firewater ring main pressure would auto start standby jockey and/or firewater pump, e.g. if duty jockey pump suction strainer blocked 3. Duty jockey pump will be switched regularly to ensure availability of spare jockey pump and equal running time
Firewater Systems
Firewater for the largest fire scenario in the process area is stored in each of the filtered and firewater storage tanks. The pressure in the process area firewater main is maintained using jockey pumps with minimum flow protection back to the filtered and firewater storage tanks. In the event of decrease in pressure in the firewater ring main the main firewater pumps (three 50% pumps provided: 1 electric and 2 diesel) autostart. In the event the pressure in the main does not increase within 20 seconds a second firewater pump is started. It is only possible to stop the main firewater pumps manually. Service water booster pumps are used for maintaining the jetty firewater ring main pressurised. In the event the pressure in the jetty ring main decreases, the jetty seawater firewater pumps are started automatically (two 100% pumps: 1 electric and 1 diesel). All main process and jetty area firewater pumps will be subject to weekly manually operator performance testing and maintenance.
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Flow - No Flow - Reverse Loss of Containment 1. Jockey and/or firewater pump seal failure 1. Weekly testing and inspection of main firefighting and jockey water pumps 2. Spare pumps available to enable maintenance 1. Loss of minimum flow protection 1. Minimum flow control valve will be FO 2. Maximum design pressure of ring main 16 barg same as design pressure jockey and firewater pumps 1. Loss of minimum flow protection 1. Minimum flow control valve will be FO 2. Maximum design pressure of ring main 16 barg same as design pressure jockey and firewater pumps 1. Potential to exceed rated design 1. Governor controls maximum discharge pressure and speed of diesel pump overpressure of firewater ring main 2. 055-PSV-0001A/B on diesel pumps back to storage tank
1179
Firewater Systems
Firewater for the largest fire scenario in the process area is stored in each of the filtered and firewater storage tanks. The pressure in the process area firewater main is maintained using jockey pumps with minimum flow protection back to the filtered and firewater storage tanks. In the event of decrease in pressure in the firewater ring main the main firewater pumps (three 50% pumps provided: 1 electric and 2 diesel) autostart. In the event the pressure in the main does not increase within 20 seconds a second firewater pump is started. It is only possible to stop the main firewater pumps manually. Service water booster pumps are used for maintaining the jetty firewater ring main pressurised. In the event the pressure in the jetty ring main decreases, the jetty seawater firewater pumps are started automatically (two 100% pumps: 1 electric and 1 diesel). All main process and jetty area firewater pumps will be subject to weekly manually operator performance testing and maintenance.
Consequences 1. Minimum flow opens recycling firewater to tank 2. Potential decrease of pressure in firewater main
Safeguards 1. 055-PIC-/PAL-0006 on firewater ring main initiates autostart and switch of standby jockey firewater pump 2. 055-PIC/PAL-0003 autostarts electric fire pump if ring main pressure continues to fall 3. 055-FIC/FAL-0003 opens minimum flow protection on firewater pump 4. Pump running light for firewater main pump 055-XL-0001C
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1. Minimum flow opens recycling firewater to tank 2. Potential decrease of pressure in firewater main
1. 055-PIC/PAL-0003 initiates autostart of first electric firewater pump. If minimum firewater ring main pressure not achieved, control system automatically autostarts second pump after 20 seconds
R1180.1 Review configuration of firewater system. Consider provision of check valve to prevent depressurisation of ring main through main firefighting pump minimum flow to tank
TS
1. 055-PIC/PAL-0003 initiates R1181.2 Next revision of P&IDs autostart of first electric firewater will remove 051-LALL-007A/B stop pump. If minimum firewater ring of main firewater pumps main pressure not achieved, control system automatically autostarts second pump after 20 seconds 2. Filtered and firewater tanks hold as minimum 4 hours firefighting water at full capacity (two firewater pumps operating) in each tank, i.e. total firewater holdup is 8 hours
TS
Firewater Systems
Firewater for the largest fire scenario in the process area is stored in each of the filtered and firewater storage tanks. The pressure in the process area firewater main is maintained using jockey pumps with minimum flow protection back to the filtered and firewater storage tanks. In the event of decrease in pressure in the firewater ring main the main firewater pumps (three 50% pumps provided: 1 electric and 2 diesel) autostart. In the event the pressure in the main does not increase within 20 seconds a second firewater pump is started. It is only possible to stop the main firewater pumps manually. Service water booster pumps are used for maintaining the jetty firewater ring main pressurised. In the event the pressure in the jetty ring main decreases, the jetty seawater firewater pumps are started automatically (two 100% pumps: 1 electric and 1 diesel). All main process and jetty area firewater pumps will be subject to weekly manually operator performance testing and maintenance.
Deviation
Consequences Loss of firewater and potential for decrease in firewater ring main pressure
Safeguards 1. 055-PIC-/PAL-0006 on firewater ring main initiates autostart and switch of standby jockey firewater pump 2. 055-PIC/PAL-0003 autostarts electric fire pump if ring main pressure continues to fall 3. Underground sections of firewater system will be noncorrosive GRP, minimising potential for system leakage 4. Firewater ring main is made up of a series of rings so each plant network has two independent supply connections
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1181
Vacuum
1. Potential low pressure in storage 1 See filtered and firewater storage tank tank node No new issues
1182
Partial Pressure
1183
Temperature High Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High Level - Low 1. See filtered and firewater tank node
No new issues
1184
No new issues
1185
No new issues
1186 1187
No new issues
1188
Level - No
No new issues
Firewater Systems
Firewater for the largest fire scenario in the process area is stored in each of the filtered and firewater storage tanks. The pressure in the process area firewater main is maintained using jockey pumps with minimum flow protection back to the filtered and firewater storage tanks. In the event of decrease in pressure in the firewater ring main the main firewater pumps (three 50% pumps provided: 1 electric and 2 diesel) autostart. In the event the pressure in the main does not increase within 20 seconds a second firewater pump is started. It is only possible to stop the main firewater pumps manually. Service water booster pumps are used for maintaining the jetty firewater ring main pressurised. In the event the pressure in the jetty ring main decreases, the jetty seawater firewater pumps are started automatically (two 100% pumps: 1 electric and 1 diesel). All main process and jetty area firewater pumps will be subject to weekly manually operator performance testing and maintenance.
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1. Algal and bacterial growth in 1. Potential for fouling of firewater 1. Raw water is dosed with biocide filtered and firewater storage tanks ring main and pump suction (sodium hypochlorite) upstream of pipework inlet for raw water filtration package No new issues
1190 1191
1192
Wrong Concentration (Part of) Corrosive (As well as) Explosive Wrong Material (Other than)
No new issues
1193
No new issues
1194 1195
Firewater Systems
Firewater for the largest fire scenario in the process area is stored in each of the filtered and firewater storage tanks. The pressure in the process area firewater main is maintained using jockey pumps with minimum flow protection back to the filtered and firewater storage tanks. In the event of decrease in pressure in the firewater ring main the main firewater pumps (three 50% pumps provided: 1 electric and 2 diesel) autostart. In the event the pressure in the main does not increase within 20 seconds a second firewater pump is started. It is only possible to stop the main firewater pumps manually. Service water booster pumps are used for maintaining the jetty firewater ring main pressurised. In the event the pressure in the jetty ring main decreases, the jetty seawater firewater pumps are started automatically (two 100% pumps: 1 electric and 1 diesel). All main process and jetty area firewater pumps will be subject to weekly manually operator performance testing and maintenance.
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendations Remarks Action by: Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-052-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/23-05-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-031-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/14-07-06 Design intent Service water from the Service water booster pumps is used to maintain the pressure in the jetty firewatre ring main and provide flow for up to two utility hose connections. In the event the ring main pressure drops the jetty firewater pumps are started automatically supplying the jetty firewater ring main with seawater
Action resolution
Node Equipment Service water booster pumps 052-P-131A/B Jetty firewater pumps 031-P-103A/B Biocide dosing system 031-U-101 1196 Node 2 Jetty Overview firewater system
Flow - High Flow - Low Flow - No Flow - Reverse 1. Depressurisation of jetty 1. Potential for reverse flow firewater ring main to service water system
No new issues No new issues No new issues R1200.1 Next revision of P&ID will show double check valve arrangement on service water tiein to jetty firewater ring main TS
1201
Loss of Containment
1. Corrosion of jetty firewater ring main, as it uses raw filtered water and/or seawater
1. CS firewater ring main will be painted to minimise external corrosion 2. Jetty firewater main can be washed using service water to remove seawater from system. Maintenance override of 031-PIC0006 autostart of jetty firewater pumps will be permitted
R1201.1 OK LNG to review proposed design of jetty firewater pump discharge headers and minimum flow lines. Consider requirements for upgrade of proposed materials as draining of seawater from system not really appropriate due to weekly fire pump test and jetty availability issues.
OK LNG
Firewater Systems
Firewater for the largest fire scenario in the process area is stored in each of the filtered and firewater storage tanks. The pressure in the process area firewater main is maintained using jockey pumps with minimum flow protection back to the filtered and firewater storage tanks. In the event of decrease in pressure in the firewater ring main the main firewater pumps (three 50% pumps provided: 1 electric and 2 diesel) autostart. In the event the pressure in the main does not increase within 20 seconds a second firewater pump is started. It is only possible to stop the main firewater pumps manually. Service water booster pumps are used for maintaining the jetty firewater ring main pressurised. In the event the pressure in the jetty ring main decreases, the jetty seawater firewater pumps are started automatically (two 100% pumps: 1 electric and 1 diesel). All main process and jetty area firewater pumps will be subject to weekly manually operator performance testing and maintenance.
Deviation
Causes
Safeguards
Recommendations R1202.1 Next revision of P&ID will show discharge of 031-PSV-0003B downstream of minimum flow control valve
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
1203
Pressure - Low
1. Malfunction of upstream service 1. Decrease in jetty firewater water pumps and/or excessive use header pressure of water for maintenance 2. Potential for loss of firewater protection at jetty
1. 031-PIC-0006 autostart of jetty firewater pump 2. If after 20 seconds, ring main pressure is not achieved, control system will autostart standby diesel firewater pump 1. 031-PIC-0006 autostart of jetty firewater pump 2. If after 20 seconds, ring main pressure is not achieved, control system will autostart standby diesel firewater pump 1. 031-PIC-0006 autostart of diesel jetty firewater pump 2. Dedicated diesel supply tank sized for 8 hours supply 3. 031-LAL-0006B low level diesel supply in tank 1. Check valve prevents depressurisation of ring main via minimum flow protection of firewater pumps 2. 031-PIC-0006 autostart of jetty firewater pump 3. If after 20 seconds, ring main pressure is not achieved, control system will autostart standby diesel firewater pump No new issues No new issues 1. Review underway to consider requirement for jetty emergency electrical generator (instrumentation, lighting, etc.)
3. Firewater pump trip and/or loss 1. Loss of pressure in firewater of electrical supply main during fire case
1204 1205
Firewater Systems
Firewater for the largest fire scenario in the process area is stored in each of the filtered and firewater storage tanks. The pressure in the process area firewater main is maintained using jockey pumps with minimum flow protection back to the filtered and firewater storage tanks. In the event of decrease in pressure in the firewater ring main the main firewater pumps (three 50% pumps provided: 1 electric and 2 diesel) autostart. In the event the pressure in the main does not increase within 20 seconds a second firewater pump is started. It is only possible to stop the main firewater pumps manually. Service water booster pumps are used for maintaining the jetty firewater ring main pressurised. In the event the pressure in the jetty ring main decreases, the jetty seawater firewater pumps are started automatically (two 100% pumps: 1 electric and 1 diesel). All main process and jetty area firewater pumps will be subject to weekly manually operator performance testing and maintenance.
Deviation Temperature High Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1207
No new issues
1208
No new issues
1209
1. Marine baseline survey currently being undertaken and will be considered in location of jetty firewater pump
Level - Low Level - No Phase - More 1. Algal and/or marine growth on firewater system 1. Potential for fouling of jetty firewater system 1. Biocide dosing system for jetty firewater system
No new issues No new issues R1212.1 Next revision of P&ID will 1. Dosing of inlet systems TS show biocide dosing connection to not considered a problem pump firewater basin screen during discharge and firewater test to local marine environment
1213 1214
1215
1. Potential for algal and marine growth within jetty firewater ring main and equipment
R1215.1 Detailed HAZOP of vendor package during detailed design will consider alarms to notify operator of malfunction and low level biocide dosing to jetty firewater ring main
TS
Firewater Systems
Firewater for the largest fire scenario in the process area is stored in each of the filtered and firewater storage tanks. The pressure in the process area firewater main is maintained using jockey pumps with minimum flow protection back to the filtered and firewater storage tanks. In the event of decrease in pressure in the firewater ring main the main firewater pumps (three 50% pumps provided: 1 electric and 2 diesel) autostart. In the event the pressure in the main does not increase within 20 seconds a second firewater pump is started. It is only possible to stop the main firewater pumps manually. Service water booster pumps are used for maintaining the jetty firewater ring main pressurised. In the event the pressure in the jetty ring main decreases, the jetty seawater firewater pumps are started automatically (two 100% pumps: 1 electric and 1 diesel). All main process and jetty area firewater pumps will be subject to weekly manually operator performance testing and maintenance.
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1217
1. Location of jetty firewater pumps 1. Potential for source of ignition in 1. Location of firewater pump in event of emergency at jetty non-hazardous area
No new issues
1218
No new issues
HAZOP Plant Deviation Causes Item No. Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-057-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/12-09-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-057-PID-00-31-05/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-057-PID-00-31-06/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-057-PID-00-31-07/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-057-PID-00-31-08/Rev A/12-09-06
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
Design intent See Above Node Equipment Boilers blowdown LNG Train 1 Collection Basin 057-BA-110 Boilers blowdown LNG Train 2 Collection Basin 057-BA-111 Boilers blowdown LNG Train 3 Collection Basin 057-BA-112 Boilers blowdown LNG Train 4 Collection Basin 057-BA-113 Boilers blowdown LNG Train 1 Lifting Pumps 057-P-110A/B Boilers blowdown LNG Train 1 Lifting Pumps 057-P-111A/B Boilers blowdown LNG Train 1 Lifting Pumps 057-P-112A/B Boilers blowdown LNG Train 1 Lifting Pumps 057-P-113A/B Chemical sewer receiving pit 075-BA-120 Laboratory pit 057-BA-126 Chemical sewer neutralisation basins 057-BA-121A/B Chemical sewer neutralisation pumps 057-P-121A/B Sulphuric acid dosing package 057-U-102 Sodium hydroxide dosing package 057-U-103 1219 Node 1 Effluent Overview treatmen t system
Causes 1. Blowdown of LNG train boiler system (continuous and discontinuous steam drum blowdown)
Consequences 1. Continuous flow of steam blowdown effluent into LNG train collection basin 2. Gradual increase in level of LNG collection basin with potential to overfill
Safeguards 1. 057-LI/LAH-0001/2/8/9 notifies operator of requirement to start pump if pump not already operating 2. 057-LI/LAH-0004/5 closes chemical sewer neutralisation basin inlet valve and initiates start of neutralisation and pump-out to offsite 3. Logic controller I-5701 is common between both chemical sewer neutralisation basins
Recommendations R1220.1 Consider whether switch in chemical sewer neutralisation basin logic should wait until high alarm in duty basin before opening inlet valve on standby basin to ensure the two basins operate in sequence R1220.2 Consider benefits for automatic start of boiler blowdown lifting pumps based on high level in collection basin, given blowdown flow rate is continous at approximately 12 m3/hr
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
1. Increase in flow rate of effluent from chemical sewer to chemical sewer receiving pit 2. Potential for excessive flow rates into chemical sewer neutralisation basin
1. Effluent from chemical sewer receiving pit (from LNG blowdown and chemical sewer) flows by gravity into chemical sewer neutralisation basin 2. Discharge of effluent from chemicals area is initiated by operator opening manual valve 3. Chemicals area is sheltered, reducing potential for collection of rainwater in kerbed areas for disposal via the chemical sewer neutralisation basin (noncontaminated rainwater from the shelter roofs is routed directly to non-contaminated sewer)
1. Increase in level in the 1. 057-LI/LAH-0003 on the laboratory pit laboratory pit 2. Potential for release of untreated 2. Requirement for collection by effluent to atmosphere vacuum truck for disposal offsite 3. Laboratory pit has a nominal size of 5 m3
Causes
Consequences
Recommendations R1221.1 In the event that R1220.2 is implemented, autostart of standby pump will occur if level does not start to decrease in the basin once start signal initiated. In the event of pump trip during pumpout, high level in basin will initiate additional pump start signal
Remarks
Action by: TS
Action resolution
1. Pump trip in blowdown collection 1. Loss of pump-out of effluent in basin blowdown collection basin 2. Continued increase in level in collection basin with potential to overpressure
1. Loss of mixing flow in basin 1. Chemical sewer neutralisation 2. Loss of pump-out of neutralised control logic will be configured to effluent offsite autostart standby pump in the event of pump trip during either neutralisation mixing and/or pump out sequence stage 1. Loss on injection and/or increased duration for neutralisation of effluent in basin 2. Potential for loss of neutralisation sequence step in basin 1. Summarised malfunction alarms R1221.2 HAZOP of chemical 057-UUA-0001 and 057-UUA-0003 dosing packages will be on neutralisation dosing packages undertaken during detailed design 2. Spare dosing pump provided in dosing system 3. Stroke volume is calibrated manually using calibration pot during commissioning of package TS
3. Pump trip and/or incorrect flow rate setting on neutralisation dosing package
1222
Flow - No
1. Loss of pump out of chemical 1. 057-AIC-0001/2 indication of sewer neutralisation basin neutral pH in basin 2. Continued filling of standby 2. Sequence valve position chemical sewer neutralisation indication provided in DCS panel basin with potential to liquid fill both basins 3. Release of water from intermediate chemical sewer receiving pit
R1222.1 Review with instrumentation group whether provision of sequence failure alarm is possible and/or necessary for the chemical sewer neutralisation basin
TS
Causes 1. Reverse flow from chemical sewer receiving pit to collection basin
Consequences
Safeguards 1. Check valves on discharge pumps prevent reverse flow 2. Vapour space in chemical sewer receiving pit
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1224
Loss of Containment
1. Potential for spillage of acid and/or caustic 2. Potential for neutralisation of chemical dosing fluids
1. Acid and causic dosing packages will be located in kerbed, segregated areas 1. Periodic operator inspection of the area 2. Operator PPE 3. Dedicated sgregated kerbed areas for each chemical storage tank to minimise potential for mixing of released caustic and acid solutions No new issues
2. Loss of containment (e.g. 1. Potential operator hazard and corrosion) of concentrated acid or chemical burns caustic chemical storage tanks 2. Potential for significant heat of reaction between caustic and acid solutions
1225
Pressure - High
1226
Pressure - Low
No new issues
1227 1228
1229
Temperature High
1. Potential for increase in effluent 1. Continuous blowdown from LNG temperature boiler system is approximately neutral does not require neutralisation 2. No significant heat of neutralisation expected in basin as pumps used for circulation of mixing of effluent during neutralisation sequence
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1231
No new issues
1232
1. Malfunction of 057-LI-0004/5
1. Inlet valve opens in error 2. Potential to liquid fill chemcial sewer neutralisation basin
1233
Level - Low
1. Malfunction of 057-LI-0004/5
1234 1235
Level - No Phase - More 1. Release of solids from BFW system during blowdown to collection basin 1. Gradual increase in scale and mineral solids in collection basin 1. Demineralised water used for BFW production 2. Blowdown collection basin and chemical sewer receiving pit are both enclosed basins, reducing contamination potential with atmospheric solids 3. Possible to remove and clean blowdown collection basins using vacuum truck, sufficient maintenance access is provided (road access and manhole)
No new issues R1235.1 Consider provision of hard pipework connection for removal of solids from bottom of blowdown collection basins using vacuum truck TS
1236 1237
1238
1. Pumping of incorrect pH effluent 1. Operator requirement for offsite for disposal periodic sampling of discharge 2. Potential environmental impact effluent and recalibration of pH meter
R1238.1 Provide sample connection on discharge of chemical sewer neutralisation pumps for sampling purposes
TS
Causes 1. Transfer of acid/caustic liquids to chemical sewer receiving pit in the chemical sewer
Safeguards 1. Appropriate materials for chemical sewer 2. Chemical sewer receiving pit will be concrete with chemical resistant epoxy lining 3 Chemical sewer neutralisation basin will be concrete with chemical resistant epoxy lining
Recommendations
Remarks
Action by:
Action resolution
1240 1241
Explosive Wrong Material (Other than) 1. Construction of underground basins with potential for operator falling hazard 1. Underground collection basins with metal roofing designed to enable operator walking 2. Chemical sewer neutralisation basin will have fencing to prevent operator ingress
No new issues
Plant Deviation Causes Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-056-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/12-09-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-056-PID-00-31-05/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-06/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-07/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-08/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-09/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-10/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-11/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-12/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-13/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-14/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-17/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-18/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-19/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-20/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-21/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-23/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/12-09-06
Design intent Oily contaminated process area surface runoff water is collected in dedicated area collection basins. The collection basins are designed such that initial contaminated surface water enters the inlet chamber and overflows a wier arrangement into the main chamber. As the level increases in the main chamber, water from the inlet chamber overflows into the normally non-contaminated sewer system for disposal without treatment, surface oil is prevented from reverse flow into the inlet chamber and non-contaminated sewer by a baffle type arrangement Node Equipment Process area collection basins and lifting pumps 1242 Node 1 Overview Type 1 (process area) collection basin LALL actions in this unit are configured as DCS stop/inhibit actions, not hardwired ESD trip actions as no immediate safety impact. No SIL rating of 056-LALL003 required by project
Plant Section
Plant Section
1. Increase in level in oily water tank 2. Potential to overfill oily water tank
1. Oily water tank sized to hold the inventory from ten process area collection basins 2. 056-LI/LAH-0004 initiates start of oily water transfer pumps and transfer of oily water to downstream DAF treatment package 3. Design flow rate of oily water transfer pumps and downstream treatment facilities is 60m3/hr, higher than individual collection basin lifting pump capacity of 40m3/hr 4. Operator coordination of pumpout activities from various process areas 5. 056-LI/LAHH-0003 on oily water tank (alarm only) and overflow to oily water sewer
R1243.1 Operating procedures to recommend notification and communication with utilities area personel before starting pumpout of oily water collection basins to prevent overwhelming oily water tank and oily water treatment packages following heavy rainfall
TS
Plant Section
1245
Flow - No
1. Normal condition
1. Loss of flow of contaminated oily water to oily water tank and downstream treatment system
1. Oily water system is contaminated with heavy oils. Therefore, downstream oily water treatment is only DAF with no biological treatment of effluent. Therefore, on/off "slug flow" is not a problem for the treatment process 1. Check valves in discharge of all lifting pumps 2. Top entry into oily water tank in vapour space, prevents reverse flow of oily water back to collection basin 1. Operating procedures and requirement for operator to pump out collection basin to low low level pump stop before undertaking cleaning operations
1246
Flow - Reverse
1. Normal condition with no pumpout and/or lifting pump trip during pumpout operation
1. Potential for reverse flow from oily water header and oily water tank to collection basin
1247
Loss of Containment
1. Incorrect operation of collection 1. Potential for contaminated water basin, initiating cleaning operations to run directly into noncontaminated sewer rather than with level in the collection basin over wier into collection basin
1248
1. Maximum design pressure on lifting pumps is common at 8.5 barg, lower than design pressure of all oily water header pipework 1. 4" vent 2. 12" overflow
2. Simultaneous pump-out of 1. High flow rate of oily water to collection basins to oily water tank oily water tank 2. Gradual increase in vapour space pressure 1249 Pressure - Low 1. Pump-out of oily water tank with 1. Gradual decrease in vapour no inlet flow space pressure
Plant Section
2. Release of flammable materials 1. Potential for utility lifting pumps to atmosphere from process area to act as ignition source
1252
No new issues
1253
No new issues
1254
No new issues
1255
No new issues
Plant Section
1. Loss of pump stop signal 2. Decrease in level with potential to damage pump
1257 1258
Level - No Phase - More 1. Gradual collection of solids in collection basin, e.g. sand and other material 1. Potential for damage to lifting pump 1. Pump type selection 2. Normal maintenance and periodic cleaning of collection basins, DAF, etc. for removal of solids
No new issues TS R1258.1 Consider provision of hard piping to each collection basin to facilitate cleaning and removal of solids by vacuum truck
1259 1260
1261
1. Heavy contamination of acid gas 1. Potential for contamination of oily water treatment system with removal unit process area with caustic amine amine spillage (caustic) 2. Potential for release of high COD amine to non-contaminated sewer
1. Acid gas removal unit process area is kerbed, with normally closed drain valve to oily water sewer 2. Requirement for operator to assess collected water before draining to oily water system 3. In the event of heavy amine contamination of process area water, runoff water will need to be collected and disposed of at offsite facilities as no means of onsite treatment available
R1261.1 Ensure operating procedures clearly state requirements for treatment of washing waters from amine process areas following large amine spillage offsite. Neutralisation and release to oily water system is inappropriate due to high COD of effluent and no downstream biological treatment process
TS
Plant Section
1263 1264
Plant Deviation Causes Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-056-PID-00-31-15/Rev A/12-09-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-056-PID-00-31-16/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/12-09-06
Design intent Oily contaminated process area surface runoff water from the inlet facilities is collected in dedicated area collection basins. In addition to process area runoff water, washing water from the inlet facility condensate stabiliser and condensate MP seperator is also discharged to the collection basin. The collection basins are designed such that initial contaminated surface water enters the inlet chamber and overflows a wier arrangement into the main chamber. As the level increases in the main chamber, water from the inlet chamber overflows into the normally non-contaminated sewer system for disposal without treatment, surface oil is prevented from reverse flow into the inlet chamber and non-contaminated sewer by a baffle type arrangement
Node Equipment Inlet facilities CNL/BG collection basin 056-BA-504 Inlet facilities Shell collection basin 056-BA-506 Inlet facilities CNL/BG lifting pumps 056-P-504A/B Inlet facilities Shell lifting pumps 056-P-506A/B 1265 Node 2 Overview Type 2 (inlet facility) collection basin Flow - High Flow - Low Flow - No Flow - Reverse Loss of Containment 1. Draining of process unit (MP condensate seperator and/or condensate stabiliser) washing fluid to oily sewer with high level in collection basin 1. Potential for flow of contaminated water to noncontaminated sewer without treatment 1. Collection basin baffle prevents reverse flow of contaminated process water to noncontaminated sewer No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues
1271
Pressure - High
No new issues
1272
Pressure - Low
No new issues
Plant Section
1275
Temperature High Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High 1. Low concentration of oil contamination in normal run-off water flow from process area 1. Gradual collection of oil on surface of collection basin water 1. Operator skimming of oil collected in each collection basin 2. Road access to each collection basin to enable vacuum truck collection of skimmed oil from basins
No new issues
1276
No new issues
1277
No new issues
1278
R1278.1 Review proposed design TS of oily water system to consider and develop operating procedure for management of oil collected on surface of each collection basin over time
No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues No new issues
1284
Wrong Concentration (Part of) Corrosive (As well as) Explosive Wrong Material (Other than)
No new issues
1285
No new issues
1286 1287
Plant Deviation Causes Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-056-PID-00-31-22/Rev A/12-09-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-056-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/12-09-06
Design intent Oily contaminated process area surface runoff water from the flare area is collected in a dedicated collection basin. The collection basin is designed such that initial contaminated surface water enters the inlet chamber and overflows a wier arrangement into the main chamber. As the level increases in the main chamber, water from the inlet chamber overflows into the flare lifting basin. The non-contaminated water is then pumped into the noncontaminated sewer for disposal without treatment. Surface oil from the flare collection basin is prevented from reverse flow into the inlet chamber and flare lifting basin by a baffle type arrangement. The flare lifting basin and pumps are required as the flare KO drum process area is located at approximately 3-4m below normal process area grade elevation, preventing gravity flow to the non-contaminated sewer.
Node Equipment Flare collection basin 056-BA-512 Oily water flare lifting pumps 056-P-512A/B Flare lifting basin 056-BA-513 Flare lifting pumps 056-P-513A/B
1288
Node 3
1289 1290
Flow - High Flow - Low 1. Flare lifting pump trip during rainy season 1. Potential for flooding of sunken flare KO drum area 1. 056-LI/LAH/LAHH-0040 on flare lifting basin 2. Autostart of standby flare lifting pump by 056-PT-0041A/B
No new issues TS R1290.1 Review whether flare lifting pumps need to be connected to emergency power supply and/or provision of one electric and one diesel pump, given location and function R1290.2 During detailed design, review proposed design following reciept of further rainfall information specific to site location. It may be necessary to consider increasing flare lifting basin size and/or revise pump configuration (three 50% pumps) TS
1. Decreased flow of rainwater into flare area collection basin and lifting basin 2. Potential for on/off operation of flare lifting pumps as (A) small volume of flare lifting basin, and (B) sizing of flare lifting pumps for maximum rainfall flow rate
1291
Flow - No
No new issues
Plant Section
1294
No new issues
1295
Pressure - Low
1. Location of flare collection basin 1. Requirement to pump oily water from flare collection basin to oily at low surface elevation, 3-4 m below normal process area grade water tank elevation
1. All oily water lifting pumps are identical and designed for maximum head required for pumping of water from (A). furthest location, and (B). maximum differential elevation No new issues No new issues
1296 1297
1298
No new issues
1299
No new issues
1300
No new issues
Plant Section
1. Requirement for manual start of 1. Potential exposure of operator pump out flare collection basin to high radiation levels 2. High seasonal rainfall 1. High flow rate of surface run-off water from flare and sunken flare KO drum process areas 2. Potential for overflow of flare collection basin and flare lifting basin
TS R1301.1 Consider requirements for independent level indication, high level alarm and high high level alarm, given potential impact on other flare area related equipment, i.e. flare KO drum condensate pump, incinerators, etc.
1302
Level - Low
1. Loss of pump stop 2. Potential for loss of level and pump damage
TS R1302.1 See Recommendation R1301.1, and consider provision of independent low low level pump trip to prevent pump damage
Plant Section
1307
Wrong Concentration (Part of) Corrosive (As well as) Explosive Wrong Material (Other than)
No new issues
1308
No new issues
1309 1310
Plant Deviation Causes Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-056-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/12-09-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-056-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-056-PID-00-31-04/Rev A/12-09-06
Design intent Oily water in the oily water tank is pumped under level on/off control at a constant flow rate to the oily water treatment package (DAF type). Treated water from the DAF package flows under gravity to the final control basin from where it is pumped under on/off level control to the sea. Node Equipment Oily water tank 056-TK-120 Floating skimmer 056-Z-101 Oil pit 056-BA-121 Oily recovery pumps 056-P-121A/B Oily water transfer pumps 056-P-150A/B Oily water treatment package 056-U-101 Final control basin 056-BA-122 Sludge pit 056-BA-123 Final control pumps 056-P-122A/B Sludge pumps 056-P-123A/B 1311 Node 4 Oily water Overview treatment
1312
Flow - High
1. Transfer of oily water from 1. Gradual increase in level in oily collection basins to oily water tank water tank 2. Potential to overfill oily water tank
1. 056-LI/LAH-0004 controls transfer of oily water to DAF oily water treatment package 2. Gravity flow of treated water from DAF into final control basin 3. 056-LI/LAH-0008 controls transfer of treated water to sea 1. Oily water transfer pumps, oily water treatment package and final control pumps all have same design flow rate capacity 2. Daily operator sampling of final control basin effluent
1. High transfer flow rate of oily water to DAF treatment package 2. Potential for reduced residence times in oily water treatment package 3. Potential for off spec treated water release to sea
Plant Section
1. 056-LI/LAL-0004 stops oily water transfer pumps 2. 056-LI/LAL-0008 stops final control pumps
R1313.2 Update P&ID to show on- TS off control signal from 056-LI-0004 to control panel on oily water treatment package to control injection of oily water treatment package chemicals
1. 056-PT-0005A/B autostart of standby pump 1. 056-PT-0007A/B autostart of standby pump No new issues
1314 1315
Flow - No Flow - Reverse 1. Trip of final control pumps during recycle of off-spec treated water to oily water tank 1. Potential for reverse flow, flooding final control basin 1. 056-PT-0007A/B autostart of standby pump 2. Off-spec treated water recycle to oily water storage tank enters in top vapour space
1316
Loss of Containment
1. Pump seal failure on oily water transfer pumps 2. Loss of oily water floating skimmer and/or failure of internal hose connection
1. Spray release of water to 1. Spare pump atmosphere 2. Operator inspection of area 1. Potential for loss of oil skimming inside oily water tank 2. Gradual increase in oil interface level in tank
TS R1316.1 Consider provision of skimming nozzles in tank at normal operating level for use in event of failure of floating skimmer device (see acid gas removal process HAZOP)
4 10
Plant Section
1318
Pressure - Low
1. Loss of plant air and/or oily water treatment package air compressor
1. Reduced DAF performance with 1. 056-PI-0006 air drum pressure potential for exceedance of discharge composition (high dissolved oil content)
R1318.1 Consider configuration of TS low alarm on air pressure on oily water treatment package R1318.2 Undertake HAZOP of vendor package during detailed design
1319 1320
1321
Temperature High Temperature Low Cryogenic (Sub Zero) Level - High 1. Malfunction of 056-LI-0004 on oily water tank 1. Loss of start signal to oily water 1. Independent 056-LI/LAHH-0003 on oily water tank transfer pumps 2. Gradual increase in level in oily 2. 12" overflow on the tank water tank 1. Periodic operator inspection of 1. Loss of start signal to treated the area water final control pumps 2. Potential flooding of final control basin
No new issues
1322
No new issues
1323
No new issues
1324
Plant Section
1325
Level - Low
1. Loss of stop signal to oily water 1. Independent 056-LI/LALL-0003 on oily water tank stops transfer transfer pumps 2. Gradual decrease in level in oily pump water tank 1. Loss of stop signal to treated water final control pumps 2. Potential loss of level in final control basin 3. Potential pump damage 1. Loss of stop signal to oil recovery pumps 2. Potential loss of level 3. Potential pump damage 1. Loss of stop signal to sludge pumps 2. Potential loss of level in sludge pit 3. Potential pump damage 1. Periodic operator inspection of the area 2. Spare final control pump 3. Pump DCS running light
1. Periodic operator inspection of the area 2. Spare oil recovery pump 3. Pump DCS running light 1. Periodic operator inspection of the area 2. Spare sludge pump 3. Pump DCS running light R1325.1 Ensure suitable level device is provided since dirty service TS
1326 1327
Level - No Phase - More 1. Production of sludge in oily water treatment package 1. Sludge from oily water treatment package is skimmed and stored in sludge pit for disposal offsite 1. Potential for prolonged periods with no sludge pumping 2. Potential for pump blockage and damage 1. Utility connections provided on sludge pump suction and discharge to enable flushing following use
No new issues
Plant Section
1330
1. Malfunction in injection of oily water treatment package chemicals and/or poor package performance
1. Summarised malfunction alarm 056-UUA-0001 on oily water treatment package 2. Final control basin 3. Operator sample and inspection of final control basin every shift 4. Possible to recycle off-spec treated water from final control basin back to oily water tank
1331
Corrosive (As well as) Explosive 1. Formation of flammable atmospheres on oil pit 1. Potential ignition via oil recovery 1. Hydrocarbon contamination is pumps heavy oil with very low vapour pressure 2. Appropriate selection of oily recovery pump
No new issues
1332
1333
No new issues
Plant Deviation Causes Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-059-PID-00-31-01/Rev A/12-09-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-059-PID-00-31-02/Rev A/12-09-06 2252-059-PID-00-31-05/Rev A/12-09-06
Design intent Sanitary waste water from the various areas in the plant is collected in sanitary water pits (each working volume 1.2m3). In addition, oily water from the LNG trains (2.5 m3/hr continuous flow) is also collected in the LNG train sanitary water collection pits. Sanitary water is pumped from each pit under level on/off control to the sanitary water collection basin.
Node Equipment Sanitary water inlet facilities pit 059-BA-101 Sanitary water inlet facilities lifting pumps 059-P-101-A/B Sanitary water LNG train 1 pit 059-BA-102 Sanitary water LNG train 1 lifting pumps 059-P-102A/B Sanitary water LNG train 2 pit 059-BA-103 Sanitary water LNG train 2 lifting pumps 059-P-103A/B Sanitary water LNG train 3 pit 059-BA-104 Sanitary water LNG train 3 lifting pumps 059-P-104A/B Sanitary water LNG train 4 pit 059-BA-105 Sanitary water LNG train 4 lifting pumps 059-P-105A/B Sanitary water utilities pit 059-BA-106 Sanitary water utilities lifting pumps 059-P-106A/B Sanitary water collection basin 059-BA-107
1334
Node 1
LALL/LAHH actions in this unit are configured as DCS stop/inhibit and start actions, not hardwired ESD trip actions as no immediate safety impact. No SIL rating of 059-LALL**** or 059-LAHH-**** functions required by project
Plant Section
1. Increase in level in sanitary water collection basin 2. Potential to overflow collection basin
Plant Section
1. DCS indication of standby pump running 2. Independent LT in each sanitary water pit will stop pump in event of low low level 1. 059-LT/LAL-0003/4 (1/2, 5/6, 7/8, 15/16 or 17/18) stops sanitary water lifting pump 2. 059-LT/LAL-0009/10 stops sanitary water feeding pump from main sanitary water collection basin
1336
Flow - Low
1. Low production of sanitary waste on site (low demand periods within the day)
1. 059-LT/LAHH autostart standby sanitary water lifting pump 2. DCS indication of standby pump running
Plant Section
1337 1338
Flow - No Flow - Reverse 1. Pump trip and/or no pump operating 1. Potential reverse flow from collection basin to pit 1. Check valve on discharge from individual sanitary water lifting pump 2. Sanitary water header enters vapour space on sanitary water collection basin 1. Autostart of standby pump in event of high high liquid level in pit 2. Submerged pumps preventing release of sewage to atmosphere
No new issues
1339
Loss of Containment
1341
Pressure - Low
No new issues
1342 1343
Vacuum Partial Pressure 1. Collection of light hydrocarbon in 1. Potential for formation of LNG lifting pits flammable atmospheres 1. Hydrocarbon concentration in process rundown from LNG trains is very low with no potential for formation of flammable atmospheres
No new issues
1344
No new issues
1345
No new issues
Plant Section
1351 1352
1353
TS 1. Appropriate design and sizing of R1353.1 During detailed design, pit (short residence time) review sizing basis for sanitary water pits (especially inlet facilities pit), taking into account anticipated manning levels for each area
1354
1. Underground pipework is GRP 2. Sanitary waste pits are concrete 3. Short residence time in pit minimises potential for formation of corrosive compounds
1355 1356
Plant Deviation Causes Section Drawing Number/Sheet Number 2252-059-PID-00-31-03/Rev A/12-09-06 /Rev.Number/Date 2252-059-PID-00-31-04/Rev A/12-09-06
Design intent Sanitary water collected in sanitary water collection basin is pumped to the extended aeration sanitary water biotreatment package. The treated water for the sanitary water package flows under gravity to the sanitary water discharge basin, from where it is pumped under on/off level control offsite. Sludge from the sanitary water treatment package is transferred to the drying beds for recovery of water and separation of solids. Solids will then be disposed of offsite and recovered water transferred back to the sanitary water treatment package Node Equipment Sanitary water collection basin 059-BA-107 Sanitary water feeding pumps 059-P-107 Sanitary water treatment package 059-U-101 Sanitary water discharge basin 059-BA-108 Sanitary water discharge pumps 059-P-108A/B Drying beds 059-BA-111A-E Recovery water pit 059-BA-112 Recovery water pump 059-P-112 1357 Node 2 Sanitary Overview water treatment
1358
Flow - High
1. Transfer of sanitary water to sanitary water treatment package (maximum flow, two pump operation during peak demands, e.g. shift changes and/or canteen meal times)
1. Increased flow rate of sewage to 1. Extended type sanitary water sanitary water treatment package treatment package (minimum residence time 20 hrs) 2. Peak flow rate from two pumps is transitory and short duration 3. Daily operator sampling of effluent from sanitary water treatment package and sanitary water discharge basin
1359
Flow - Low
1. Low production of sanitary water 1. Reduced transfer of sewage to (off peak durations) sanitary water treatment package
Plant Section
1. Potential impact on sanitary 1. Possible to "feed" sanitary water water treatment package due to no treatment package to maintain flow for prolonged periods biological system 2. Once plant is operational, shutdown maintenance periods will typically result in demand on sanitary water system, i.e. maintenance use of facilities 1. Auto-start of standby pump on low discharge pressure 1. Check valve on discharge of each individual sanitary water feeding pump, discharge pump and recovery pump 2. Discharge of all pumps to atmospheric vapour space 1. Standby pump 2. Submerged pump type prevents release to atmosphere
2. Pump trip on sanitary discharge 2. Loss of pump out of treated basin water offsite 1361 Flow - Reverse 1. Pump trip and/or no flow durations 1. Potential for reverse flow
1362
Loss of Containment
1363
Pressure - High
1. Low head pumps selected, have lower design pressure than pipework No new issues
1364
Pressure - Low
1365 1366
1367
Temperature High
1368
No new issues
1369
No new issues
Plant Section
1. Loss of start signal to pump 2. Increase in level in pit 3. Reduced performance in drying bed 1. Loss of start signal to pump 2. Increase in level in basin
1371
Level - Low
1. Loss of stop signal to pump 2. Decrease in level in basin 3. Potential to damage pump 1. Loss of stop signal to pump 2. Decrease in level in pit 3. Potential to damage pump 1. Loss of stop signal to pump 2. Decrease in level in basin 3. Potential to damage pump
1. 059-LT/LALL stops sanitary water feeding pumps 2. DCS indication of pump running 1. Operator inspection of area 2. Limited potential to damage pump due to pump design and minimum head requirement 1. 059-LT/LALL stops sanitary water discharge pumps 2. DCS indication of pump running
1372 1373
Level - No Phase - More 1. Production of sludge in sanitary water treatment package 1. Transfer of sludge from sanitary water treatment package to drying beds for dewatering 2. Selected type of sanitary water treatment package (extended aeration) produces low volume of sludge 3. Recovery water pit start/stop on level control 1. High dissolved solids content in treated water 1. Operator inspection and sampling of sanitary water treatment package and discharge basin, once per day
No new issues
Plant Section
1376
1. High concentration of benzene, 1. Extended aeration type sanitary toluene and/or xylene components water treatment package residence 2. Potential poisoning of sanitary duration is in excess of 20 hours water treatment package
TS R1376.1 Confirm with process department potential and maximum concentration of benzene, toluene and xylene in LNG process effluent. Determine in consultation with vendor potential impact on sanitary water treatment package
1. Potential exceedance of BOD, COD and/or other discharge parameters of treated water
1. Daily operator sampling of treated water effluent 2. Summarised malfunction alarm 059-UUA-0001
R1376.2 Undertake HAZOP of vendor sanitary water treatment package during detailed design
TS
1377
No new issues
1378 1379
Contents
1. 2. 3.
Executive Summary HAZOP Approach Appendices I. II. III. IV. V. VI. FEED HAZOP procedure Attendance Node List HAZOP Recommendations HAZOP Worksheets HAZOP Master P&IDs
TechnipItaly/21184/023rep
178