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Mintz / HOW JOURNAL DO LEADERS ARTICLE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 10.1177/0022002703261056 MAKE DECISIONS?

How Do Leaders Make Decisions?


A POLIHEURISTIC PERSPECTIVE ALEX MINTZ

Department of Political Science Texas A&M University United Nations Studies Yale University

Poliheuristic theory (PH) bridges the gap between cognitive and rational theories of decision making. PH postulates a two-stage decision process. During the first stage, the set of possible options is reduced by applying a noncompensatory principle to eliminate any alternative with an unacceptable return on a critical, typically political, decision dimension. Once the choice set has been reduced to alternatives that are acceptable to the decision maker, the process moves to a second stage, during which the decision maker uses more analytic processing in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits. In this article, the author applies poliheuristic theory to individual, sequential, and interactive decision settings. Subsequent articles in this issue offer theoretical extensions and multiple tests of the theory using multiple methods (formal, statistical, experimental). Keywords: Decision analysis; poliheuristic theory; multimethod approach

How did American presidents, such as George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Dwight Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan, decide to use force or to refrain from using force? The leading decision paradigm in international relations is the rational actor, expected utility theory. According to this theory, nations are led by rational, forward-looking leaders who seek to maximize the expected gains of policy choices in a holistic and compensatory (additive) fashion (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). 1 This special issue offers an alternative to the expected utility (EU) theory of decision and other rational-analytic decision models. Poliheuristic (PH) choice theory postulates a two-stage decision process in which the menu for choice is narrowed initially by a noncompensatory analysis that eliminates options by the use of one or more heuristics (cognitive shortcuts). Remaining alternatives are then evaluated in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits (Mintz 1993). Examples of the noncompensatory heuristic that guides the elimination of options are threats to a leaders political survival and political constraints on the use of force.
1. Other important decision theories are bureaucratic politics, cybernetic theory, and prospect theory.
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, V 48 No. 1, February 2004 3-13 ol. DOI: 10.1177/0022002703261056 2004 Sage Publications

How do foreign leaders, such as Yasser Arafat and Bashir Assad, make decisions?

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION TABLE 1

Types of Decisions Studied by Poliheuristic Theory


Type of Decision Use of force Nonuse of force Diversionary uses of force Tests of nuclear weapons Initial crisis reaction War termination Coalition formation Intraparty rivalry Level of force used in a crisis Learning Influence of advisers War and peace decisions Framing Military uprising Defection and retaliation Decisions by experts and novices Negotiation Conflict resolution Author Mintz (1993) DeRouen (2003) DeRouen (2001) Sathasivam (2003) DeRouen and Sprecher (2004) Mintz and Geva (1998) Mintz (1995) Mintz (1995) Redd (2002) Yang (2003) Redd (2002) Astorino-Courtois and Trusty (2000) Taylor-Robinson and Redd (2003) Mintz and Mishal (2003) Clare (2003) Dacey and Carlson (2004) Eisenband (2003) Astorino-Courtois and Trusty (2000); Mintz and Mishal (2003)

By focusing on a two-stage process, poliheuristic choice theory integrates elements of the cognitive psychology school of decision making with elements of the rational choice school. The first stage of poliheuristic theory involves a noncompensatory, nonholistic search. It uses decision heuristics and primarily corresponds to the cognitive school of decision making. The second stage involves analytic processing of surviving alternatives. It corresponds to rational choice theory. Cognitive heuristics are more important in the first stage of the decision, whereas rational choice calculations are more applicable to the second stage of the poliheuristic decision process. The poliheuristic model is applicable to single decisions, group decisions, sequential decisions, and decisions in strategic settings. Poliheuristic theory focuses on both the process of decision making and the outcome of decisions and explains why and how decisions are made by world leaders. A key premise of poliheuristic theory is that policy makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions, including strategies that are suboptimal (Mintz et al. 1997). Although poliheuristic theory has been in existence only since 1993, the PH research program has already received considerable attention in such leading journals as the American Political Science Review, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and International Studies Quarterly, as well as in book chapters, edited volumes, and numerous conferences, including those sponsored by the American Political Science Association (APSA), International Studies Association (ISA), Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), Peace Science Society International (PSSI), and the International Society for Political Psychology (Redd 2003, 101).

Mintz / HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS? TABLE 2

The Poliheuristic Decision Calculus in American Foreign Policy


President Eisenhower Eisenhower Reagan Bush Sr. Clinton Crisis Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam (1954) Guatemala (1954) Grenada (1983) Iraq (1991) Kosovo (1998) Author DeRouen (2003) Taylor-Robinson and Redd (2003) DeRouen (2001) Mintz (1993) Redd (2000)

Poliheuristic theory has been applied to a rich menu of decisions in international relations: decisions on the use of force, nonuse of force, initial reaction to crisis, crisis escalation, crisis termination, framing, learning, negotiation, peace, rivalry termination, and conflict resolution (see Table 1 and articles in this issue). Table 2 lists cases of poliheuristic decision making by American presidents (Eisenhower, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton) previously analyzed by DeRouen (2001, 2003), Mintz (1993), Redd (2000), and Taylor-Robinson and Redd (2003). There is evidence for the use of the noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic theory in all of these cases. Goertz (2004) provides additional examples of noncompensatory, poliheuristic decision making by American presidents:
1. The U.S. political establishment wanted to return the Panama Canal to Panama. The treaty was negotiated under Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford and supported by the Carter administration. However, public opinion polls showed little support for this move. As a result, there was much hesitation in the Senate regarding ratification (Goertz 2004, 20-21). 2. Realists, such as Eisenhower, Nixon, and Kissinger, considered using nuclear weapons in war but were constrained by public opinion (Goertz 2004, 27).

Several scholars have applied poliheuristic theory to decisions by leaders in the Middle East: the late President Hafez al-Assad of Syria (see Astorino-Courtois and Trusty 2000), former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan (see Sathasivam 2003), former President Saddam Hussein of Iraq (see Mintz 2000), and Chairman Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian Authority (see Clare 2003; Mintz and Mishal 2003). Clare (2003), Mintz (1995), and Mintz and Mishal (2003) have also applied elements of the theory to cases involving Israeli prime ministers (Shamir, Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu, and Sharon). These case studies are listed in Table 3. Obviously, noncompensatory political constraints in nondemocratic societies are different from those imposed on democratic leaders. Poliheuristic theory has also been used to explain other theories of international relations. For example, DeRouen (2001, 70) claimed that diversionary theory is consistent with the noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic choice theory for the president is unlikely to select any alternative in which the political dimension is not

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION TABLE 3

Poliheuristic Studies of Decisions by Leaders in the Middle East


Leader Hafez al-Assad Yasser Arafat Country/Entity Syria Palestinian Authority Palestinian Authority Iraq Israel Israel Pakistan Israel Decision Syrias peace and war decisions vis--vis Israel Patterns of conflictual and cooperative interactions with Israel Decisions during the Palestinian Intifada of 2000-2002 Gulf War of 1991 Decisions before and after the Oslo Accord of 1993 Decisions on coalition formation in 1992, 1994 Pakistans decision to test the bomb in 1998 Decisions during the Intifada Author Astorino-Courtois and Trusty (2000) Clare (2003)

Yasser Arafat Saddam Hussein Netanyahu, Peres, Rabin Yitzchak Shamir Nawaz Sharif Ariel Sharon

Mintz and Mishal (2003) Mintz (2000) Clare (2003) Mintz (1995) Sathasivam (2003) Mintz and Mishal (2003)

satisfied for fear of political repercussions. Mintz and Geva (1993) showed that the noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic theory helps explain the democratic peace phenomenon because leaders of democracies refrain from attacking another democracy because it is politically too costly. However, no such constraint is placed on democratic leaders when the opponent is nondemocratic (Mintz and Geva 1993). The authors also showed that the noncompensatory principle played a role in President Bushs 1991 war termination decision not to pursue Saddam Hussein in Baghdad when then-president Bush was enjoying very high levels of public approval (Mintz and Geva 1998). Studies of poliheuristic theory have thus far only used case studies and experimental analysis. The contributors to this special issue offer multiple tests of poliheuristic theory with multiple methods (formal, statistical, and experimental). WHAT IS POLIHEURISTIC DECISION MAKING? The term poliheuristic can be broken down into the roots poly (many) and heuristic (shortcuts), which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by decision makers to simplify complex foreign policy decisions (Mintz et al. 1997, 554). Poli also refers to the notion that political leaders measure gains and losses in political terms. Poliheuristic theory postulates that when making decisions, policy makers employ a two-stage decision process consisting of (a) rejecting alternatives that are unacceptable to the policy maker on a critical dimension or dimensions and (b) selecting an alternative from the subset of remaining alternatives while maximizing benefits and

Mintz / HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS?

minimizing risks (see Mintz 1993, 2003; Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 1997; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). 2 Poliheuristic theory sees domestic politics as the essence of decision. High political audience costs are nonadditive. Avoiding major loss is noncompensatory (see also Goertz 2004). Domestic political audience costs are an integral part of foreign policy decision making. Policy makers are political actors whose self-interest in political survival is paramount (Russett and Barzilai 1992; Sathasivam 2003). Consequently, policy makers are likely to reject outright any alternative that poses potentially very high political costs, even if that same alternative also yields potentially high benefits on other dimensions (although military and strategic considerations are also noncompensatory under certain conditions).
TWO-STAGE GAMES

Poliheuristic theory identifies a process by which leaders make decisions by first simplifying complex foreign policy decisions while focusing on the dimensions of the decision. They then evaluate remaining alternatives using analytic processing. The set of alternatives is reduced to a more manageable size by employing a noncompensatory decision analysis. Sathasivam (2003, 57) therefore argued that poliheuristic theory goes beyond previous attempts to predict foreign policy decisions that used rational actor or bureaucratic politics models by looking not only at why decisions were made but also at how these decisions were made (see also Christensen and Redd 2004). Whereas several theories of political decision making originated in economics, PH is a theory of political decision making because it specifically postulates that leaders avoid major political loss and that such a loss is noncompensatory for political decision makers. Poliheuristic theory is compatible with a host of contingency theories of decision and judgment that attribute to the decision maker sufficient flexibility in adapting the decision process to changing problems and conditions (Beach and Mitchell 1978; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Tetlock 1992). The main characteristics of the theory are as follows:
Poliheuristic theory is dimension based, noncompensatory, nonholistic, satisficing, and order sensitive (Mintz, Geva, and DeRouen 1994). This set of characteristics distinguishes it from other theories of decision making (expected utility theory, cybernetic theory, prospect theory). In strategic settings, such as those that characterize many war and peace decisions (see Morrow 1997), the poliheuristic decision maker eliminates, in the first stage, not only his or her noncompensatory alternatives but also alternatives perceived to be politically infeasible for an opponent (for an example, see Astorino-Courtois and Trusty 2000). The reduced choice sets can then be subjected to a standard game-theoretic analysis in the second stage of the decision (Mintz and Astorino-Courtois 2001).
2. Experimental studies have shown that analytic decision models, such as expected utility, are most likely to be employed by decision makers when the number of alternatives available to the leader is small.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

In sequential settings, each decision in the sequence of decisions is a two-stage poliheuristic decision. Thus, Saddam Husseins decisions in fall 2002 and spring 2003 can be viewed as a sequence of poliheuristic decisions on whether to cooperate (minimally) with United Nations inspectors. In sequential and interactive (strategic) situations,3 each decision is part of a sequence of decisions by both players in a strategic interaction, each employing poliheuristic calculations in each decision node in a strategic setting (see Eisenband 2003). According to this thesis, Saddam Hussein and George Bush have engaged in a sequential and interactive poliheuristic game consisting of numerous mini-decisions.

Because it uses decision shortcuts and rules of thumb, poliheuristic theory can explain complicated foreign policy decisions. It is unique in its ability to deal with multiple players, multiple alternatives, and multiple dimensions, such as those characterizing N-adic arms races, N-nation alliance decisions, and environmental decisions. It is inherently built on the assumption that policy makers simplify complicated decision problems by first using simple cognitive shortcuts and then applying an analytic decision calculus to arrive at a choice. Poliheuristic theory can be refuted and falsified by finding the decision process to be compensatory, alternative based, holistic, or order insensitive. As the authors of articles in this issue show, however, the theory is quite robust. AN EXAMPLE OF POLIHEURISTIC DECISION MAKING At the core of the poliheuristic theory is the noncompensatory principle of decision making. It serves to eliminate alternatives in the first stage of the decision process. For example, on March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament vetoed the proposed deployment of 62,000 U.S. troops to Turkey as a launching pad for a possible attack against Iraq. This decision was reportedly due to strong public opposition to deployment of U.S. troops on Turkish soil despite promises from the United States for a huge economic aid package, worth $30 billion in grants and loan guarantees, and U.S. pressure on the Europeans to accept Turkey into the European Union. Although the economic and military benefits associated with cooperation with the United States were huge, the political costs for the Turkish parliament were apparently negative and noncompensatory. The move by the Turkish parliament is a good example of the use of the noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic theory in decisions by state leaders and other politicians. Despite a very high score on the economic aid dimension, a low score on the political (public opinion) dimension did not compensate for the expected eco3. In these situations, the poliheuristic (PH) model resembles the logic of the iterated dominanceelimination procedure in game theory, yet the PH model specifically predicts that the political dimension is noncompensatory, assumes a two-stage process rather than an iterated elimination process consisting of several steps, uses decision weights, and is also applicable to very complex decision situations with multiple players with multiple options. In dynamic situations, the PH model often predicts outcomes that are different from those reached using games of strategic interactions that are based on rational choice because in such settings, PH eliminates from the outset unacceptable alternatives (such as doing nothing), and these alternatives do not reappear during the decision process.

Mintz / HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS?

nomic benefits, and the deployment of force alternative was not approved by members of the parliament. In noncompensatory terms, there were no substitution effects or trade-offs between the political and economic dimensions of the decision. 4 Turkey has been torn between widespread public opposition to a war against a fellow Muslim state and intense pressure from Washington. At the time the decision was made, the expectations, according to Reuters (March 1, 2003), were that Ankara would, almost certainly, lose an almost concluded financial aid package amounting to some $6 billion in U.S. grants and up to $24 billion in loan guarantees. The proposal for deployment of U.S. forces was rejected by the Turks, even in face of a massive aid package from the United States and military-strategic commitment to Turkey from the United States and Great Britain. Opposition leader Deniz Baykal welcomed the outcome and said, This has shown again that the whole world now has to give importance to national [public] opinion and show understanding of parliament when approaching Turkey (Reuters, March 1, 2003). Once the option to deploy U.S. forces on Turkish soil had been rejected by parliament, the Turkish government evaluated the remaining alternatives that advanced to the second stage of the decision process and decided, in an attempt to minimize further costs and maximize benefits, to allow air passage over Turkeys airspace to coalition planes. The noncompensatory political loss aversion variable in poliheuristic theory can be operationalized in several ways as follows:
Threat to a leaders survival Significant drop in public support for a policy Significant drop in popularity The prospects of an electoral defeat Domestic opposition Threat to regime survival Intraparty rivalry and competition Internal or external challenge to the regime Potential collapse of the coalition, government, or regime Threat to political power, dignity, honor, or legitimacy of a leader Demonstrations, riots, and so forth The existence of veto players (e.g., pivotal parties in parliamentary government)

NEXT STEPS IN THE POLIHEURISTIC RESEARCH PROGRAM The next steps in the PH research program are as follows:
Apply poliheuristic theory to key issues and puzzles in international relations: decisions on alliance formation and dissolution, deterrence decisions, armament and disarmament
4. A reviewer of this article has pointed out that a much larger amount of economic aid to Turkey might have eventually compensated for domestic opposition to the deployment of U.S. troops.

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decisions, diversionary uses of force, counterterrorism, enduring rivalry, and so on. Apply PH to other important domains in international relationse.g., International Political Economy (IPE)while analyzing economic aid and trade decisions, environmental decisions, financial decisions, and so on. Apply PH decision making to the coalition formation process and to bargaining. Develop empirical criteria to identify (a) key decision dimensions, (b) the cutoff point for when the noncompensatory (avoid major loss) principle applies, and (c) the conditions under which decision makers switch from the first stage of decision making to the second stage in the PH decision calculus. Automate poliheuristic theory and PH decision rules. This will make it easier for scholars to apply and test the theory using different data sets on a variety of geographical and historical contexts. Identify poliheuristic equilibria, that is, spell out the conditions under which players in a strategic setting reach an equilibrium in an interactive two-stage poliheuristic process. Compare PH conceptually and empirically to cybernetic and expected utility models of the use of force. For example, compare PH findings to Ostrom and Jobs (1986) and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalmans (1992) findings. Assess whether bureaucratic/organizational political constraints or domestic political constraints are more salient and influential as noncompensatory domestic dimensions of decision making. Examine the impact of framing and marketing on poliheuristic choice. In contrast to expected utility, PH is order sensitive. Is it also affected by the way alternatives, dimensions, and implications are framed? Examine the link between affect and PH decision making. Extend the PH model to group decision making and sequential decision making, which characterize many foreign policy situations. The simplest representation of PH is as a single individual making choices based on the noncompensatory decision principle. However, political choices in bureaucratic or democratic settings are often the product of group and societal processes in which an individual leader must interact with others to make and implement choices.

MULTIMETHOD TESTS OF THE THEORY As pointed out above, most studies of poliheuristic theory have thus far employed case studies and experiments in studying leaders decisions. The contributors to this special issue go beyond the case study method and process-tracing analysis in presenting multiple tests of poliheuristic theory with multiple methods (statistical, formal, experimental).5 Stoll (forthcoming) points out that research that relies on any one methodology is usually inferior to research that makes use of several methods. It is a rare situation in which one method is so superior that the others can safely be ignored. The use of a multimethod approach in international relations is rare (but see Maoz et al., forthcoming, for a multimethod analysis of conflict management and conflict resolution, as well as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalmans 1992 work applying multiple methods to decisions to initiate wars).
5. Consistent with the policy of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, articles in this issue were reviewed by at least two anonymous referees.

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A multimethod approach to foreign policy analysis can


1. cross-validate results based on different methods of inquiry, 2. help generalize results beyond a specific case, 3. contribute to theory development because different methods (e.g., formal, case study) may uncover unexpected findings that may be reincorporated into a refined theory and retested, 4. enhance confidence in results and substantiate or refute theory, 5. identify differences and similarities in results based on methods used, 6. lead to robust and standardized results, thus contributing to scientific advancement in international relations (Mintz 2003).

Specifically, in this special issue, Goertz (2004) uses formal theory and spatial analysis to formalize and extend poliheuristic theory. Dacey and Carlson (2004) use a formal model to compare decision making of experts and nonexperts in foreign policy. DeRouen and Sprecher (2004) use probit analysis on a data set of N-nations initial reaction to international crisis. Christensen and Redd (2004) and Mintz (2004) use experimental tests of the theory, and Stern (2004) provides a qualitative overview of poliheuristic theory relating it to other emerging theories of foreign policy decision making: problem representation, decision units, and cognitive constructivism. REFERENCES
Astorino-Courtois, Allison, and Brittani Trusty. 2000. Degrees of difficulty: The effect of Israeli policy shifts on Syrian peace decisions. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (3): 359-77. Beach, L. R., and T. R. Mitchell. 1978. A contingency model for the selection of decision strategies. Academy of Management Review 3: 439-49. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. 1992. War and reason. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Christensen, Eben J., and Steven B. Redd. 2004. Bureaucrats vs. the ballot box in foreign policy decision making: An experimental analysis of the bureaucratic politics model and the poliheuristic theory. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (1): 69-90. Clare, Joseph. 2003. Loss aversion and patterns of Israeli-Palestinian interactions: A noncompensatory perspective. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, February, Portland, OR. Dacey, Raymond, and Lisa J. Carlson. 2004. Traditional decision analysis and the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (1): 38-55. DeRouen, Karl. 2001. Politics, economics, and presidential use of force decision making. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen. . 2003. The decision not to use force at Dien Bien Phu. In Integrating cognitive and rational theories of foreign policy decision making, edited by Alex Mintz, 11-28. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. DeRouen, Karl, and Christopher Sprecher. 2004. Initial crisis reaction and polihueristic theory. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (1): 56-68. Eisenband, Dori. 2003. Application of the poliheuristic theory of decision to the political negotiation process. Paper presented at the conference on the Nexus Between Domestic and International Relations, March, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX. Goertz, Gary. 2004. Constraints, compromises, and decision making. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (1): 14-37.

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Maoz, Zeev, Alex Mintz, T. Clifton Morgan, Glenn Palmer, and Richard Stoll, eds. Forthcoming. Multiple paths to knowledge: Methodology in international relations. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Mintz, Alex. 1993. The decision to attack Iraq: A noncompensatory theory of decision making. Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (4): 595-618. . 1995. The noncompensatory principle of coalition formation. Journal of Theoretical Politics 7 (3): 335-49. . 2000. The poliheuristic theory of decision. Mimeo. . 2003. The method-of-analysis problem in international relations. Photocopy, United Nations Studies, Yale University. . 2004. Foreign policy decision making in familiar and unfamiliar settings: An experimental study of high-ranking military officers. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (1): 91-104. Mintz, Alex, and Allison Astorino-Courtois. 2001. Simulating decision processes: Expanding the poliheuristic theory to model n-person strategic interactions in international relations. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, February, Chicago. Mintz, Alex, and Nehemia Geva. 1993. Why dont democracies fight each other? An experimental study. Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:484-503. . 1997. The poliheuristic theory of decision. In Decision making on war and peace: The cognitiverational debate, edited by N. Geva and A. Mintz, 81-101. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. . 1998. A prospect based analysis of war termination. In New directions in the study of international conflict, crisis, and war, edited by F. Harvey and B. Mor. New York: Macmillan. Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, and Karl DeRouen. 1994. Mathematical models of foreign policy decision making: Compensatory vs. noncompensatory. Synthese 100:441-60. Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, Steven Redd, and Amy Carnes. 1997. The effect of dynamic and static choice sets on political decision making: An analysis using the decision board platform. American Political Science Review 91 (3): 553-66. Mintz, Alex, and Shaul Mishal. 2003. Decision matrixes and outcomes: Explaining Arafat and Sharons policy alternatives and dimensions during the intifada. Paper presented at the Gilman Conference on New Directions in International Relations, February, Yale University, New Haven, CT. Morrow, James. 1997. A rational choice approach to international conflict. In Decision making on war and peace: The cognitive-rational debate, edited by N. Geva and A. Mintz, 11-32. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Ostrom, Charles, and Brian Job. 1986. The president and the political use of force. American Political Science Review 80 (2): 541-66. Payne, John W., James R. Bettman, and Eric J. Johnson. 1993. The adaptive decision maker. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Redd, Steven B. 2000. The effect of advisors on strategy and choice in foreign policy decision making. Ph.D. diss., Political Science, Texas A&M University. . 2003. The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making: Experimental evidence. In Integrating cognitive and rational theories of foreign policy decision making, edited by Alex Mintz, 101-26. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Russett, Bruce M., and Gad Barzilai. 1992. The political economy of military action: The U.S. and Israel. In The political economy of military spending in the United States, edited by A. Mintz. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. Sathasivam, Kanishkan. 2003. No other choice: Pakistans decision to test the bomb. In Integrating cognitive and rational theories of foreign policy decision making, edited by A. Mintz, 55-76. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Stern, Eric. 2004. Contextualizing and critiquing the poliheuristic theory. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (1): 105-26. Stoll, Richard. Forthcoming. Conclusion. In Multiple paths to knowledge: Methodology in international relations, edited by Z. Maoz, A. Mintz, T. C. Morgan, G. Palmer, and R. Stoll. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

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Taylor-Robinson, Michelle, and Steven B. Redd. 2003. Framing and the poliheuristic theory of decision. In Integrating cognitive and rational theories of foreign policy decision making, edited by A. Mintz, 77100. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Tetlock, Philip E. 1992. The impact of accountability on judgment and choice: Toward a social contingency model. In Advances in experimental social psychology, edited by M. P. Zanna, 331-76. San Diego: Academic Press. Yang, Yi. 2003. Learning in N-adic strategic interactions: The U.S.-China-India case. Paper presented at the regional graduate student conference, Program in Foreign Policy Decision Making, March, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX.

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