VI: PERSONS LIABLE A. THE TORTFEASOR B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY 1. PARENTS 2. GUARDIANS 3. TEACHERS & HEAD OF INSTITUTIONS 4.

OWNERS & MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENT 5. EMPLOYERS 6. STATE C. OTHERS

Art. 1723, CC. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)

2. EMPLOYEES
ARANETA v JOYA 57 SCRA 59 CASTRO J.: May 24, 1974 FACTS: -An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING Company was sent to the States to pursue studies in television. When asked about the expenses of the trip, respondent answered that these were not shouldered by the company and instead by other parties -while abroad, he continued to receive his salaries in the form of vouchers ordered and signed by respondent Joya. The petitioner signed three of these checks. The others were signed by either the respondent, or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in the United States. The Ace Advertising disbursed P5,043.20, all told, on account of Taylor's travel and studies -the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip was made without its knowledge, authority or ratification. The respondent, in his answer, denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the company's board of directors, and that in any event under the by-laws he had the discretion, as general manager, to authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit -Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against the two Aranetas proving that they were involved in sending Taylor abroad -trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5,043.20 with interest at the legal rate from August 23, 1954 until full payment. 3rd party complaint dismissed -CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd party complaint was reversed stating that Taylor's trip had been neither authorized nor ratified by the company -CA noted that based on the facts, both petitioners knew and through their acts showed that they approved of the trip. were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant; what had happened was in truth and in fact a venture by them given their stamp of approval; and as it was an unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds, and it was these three without whose acts the same could not have happened, the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation, for which solidary liability should have been imposed upon all in the first place ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict HELD: Yes - The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated, he in particular not having testified or offered testimony to prove such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite of his being a vicepresident and director of the Ace Advertising, the petitioner remained passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad, concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. This plus the fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary, demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. -The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no moment. The existence of a contract between the parties, as has been repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages

1. PROPRIETORS OF BUILDINGS
Art. 2190, CC. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907) Art. 2191, CC. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; (2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908) Art. 2192, CC. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)

3. ENGINEERS/ARCHITECT

D. NATURE OF LIABILITY: JOINT OR SOLIDARY

FELIX LANUZO vs. SY BON PING and SALVADOR MENDOZA 09/25/80 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: FACTS: On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and operator of a freight truck and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, He rammed into the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred that by reason thereof he became destitute as he lost his means of livelihood from the store which used to give him a monthly income of P300.00. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action, Criminal Case for Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal Court of Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same parties for the same cause. Plaintiff opposed the dismissal stressing that he had made an express reservation in the criminal case to institute a civil action for damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit.. The lower Court denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.. On August 13, 1970, the trial Court rendered a default judgment in plaintiff's favor, ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the damages, attorney's fees plus the costs of this suit. ISSUES: 1. W/N the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. 2. W/N the defendants be jointly and severally liable. HELD: 1. NO. As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim for damages on quasi-delict, he is not barred from proceeding with this independent civil suit. The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on quasi-delict. And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and regardless of the result of the criminal case, except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or commission of the defendant. 2. YES. For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the same Code, which explicitly provides: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, he is likewise responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee

(driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary.

c

PRIMA MALIPOL vs. LILY LIM TAN and ERNESTO LABSAN 55 SCRA 202 ZALDIVAR, J 01/21/74 FACTS: In the evening of February 6, 1965, Pantaleon Malijan, who was walking with his companion Leonardo Amante on the shoulder of the road in Barrio San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was hit by a gasoline tanker and was thrown to the ground. While he was sprawling on the ground Malijan was run over by the tanker's right wheel that got detached from its axle. Malijan's companion, with the aid of the barrio captain, brought Malijan to the San Pablo City Hospital where he died that same night, the cause of death being "possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicular accident." The gasoline tanker driven at the time of the accident by herein appellant Ernesto Labsan, was being used in connection with the gasoline business of the owner, the herein appellant Lily Lim Tan. Representations and demands for payment of damage having been ignored by appellants, appellees filed complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying that appellants be condemned to pay, jointly and severally, the damages as specified in said complaint. The appellees are the mother and the minor brothers and sisters of the deceased Pantaleon Malijan. A judgment by default was rendered in favor of Malipol ordering the driver Labsan to pay actual and moral damages, attorneys fee plus cost of litigation. Tan, being the operator of the tanker is subsidiarily liable. Tan filed a verified motion to lift order of default and for a new trial claiming that on June 10, 1966 Atty. Chavez endorsed the complaint to Atty. de Castro, and told the latter that the summons and complaint were received by the appellants on May 30, 1966. While in fact, it was May 30 when Tan through a long distance telephone conversation informed Atty Chavez that she received the summons on May 16. That the mistake according to Tan was because Atty Chavez was already in an abnormal condition which later resulted in his committing suicide on June 17. ISSUE: W/N the court erred in erred in making Tan subsidiarily liable. HELD: YES. The action in the instant case was brought not to demand civil liability arising from a crime. The complaint makes no mention of a crime having been committed, much less of the driver Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of a crime. But there is an allegation in the complaint that Ernesto Labsan was the authorized driver of the truck that figured in the accident, which truck was operated by appellant Lily Lim Tan in connection with her gasoline business. The prayer in the complaint, furthermore, sought to hold appellants jointly and solidarily liable for damages. The instant action, therefore, was based, as the complaint shows, on quasi delict. Under Article 218 of the Civil Code, which treats of quasi delicts, the liability of the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary. The employer, however, can demand from his employee reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his liability. The employer, appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the decision of the lower court.

FRANCISCA VILUAN VS CA (PATRICIO & GREGORIO HUFANA) 16 SCRA 742 REGALA J Apr 29 1966 FACTS: Seven persons were killed and thirteen others were injured in Bangar, La Union, on February 16, 1958, when a passenger bus on which they were riding caught fire after hitting a post and crashing against a tree. The bus, owned by petitioner and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino. It appears that, as the bus neared the gate of the Gabaldon school building in the municipality of Bangar, another passenger bus owned by Patricio Hufana and driven by Gregorio Hufana tried to overtake it but that instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of his bus and raced with the overtaking bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a result of which it hit a post, crashed against a tree and then burst into flames. Heirs of the 4 among those who perished, sued petitioner and the latter's driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, for damages for breach of contract of carriage. Carolina Sabado, one of those injured, also sued petitioner and the driver for damages. In their answer, petitioner and her driver blamed respondent Gregorio Hufana for the accident. With leave of court, they filed third party complaints against Hufana and the latter's employer, Patricio Hufana. The court found that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the two buses and held both, together with their respective employers, jointly and severally liable for damages. The case was elevated to CA where the decision was modified ordering only Vinluan as liable for breach of contract of carriage. ISSUE: W/N the Hufanas should have been held equally liable with Vinluan to the plaintiffs in the damage suit. HELD: YES. The fact that the respondents were not sued as principal defendants but were brought into the cases as third party defendants should not preclude a finding of their liability. Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner springs from contract while that of respondents arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
FA

(5) Freedom of suffrage; (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; (7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; (10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same; (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; (12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law; (13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances; (14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form; (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail; (16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf; (17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness; (18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and (19) Freedom of access to the courts. In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

1 Sangco 228-255 (1993)

Code Commission: The creation of an absolutely separate and independent civil action for the violation of civil liverties is essential to the effective maintenance of democracy,for these reasons: o In most case, the threat to freedom originates from abuse of power by government officials and peace officers. o The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt often prevented the appropriate punishment. o Direct and open violations of the Penal code trampling upon the freedoms named are not so frequent as those subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not come within the pale of penal law. A violation of any of the individual rights and liberties enumerated in Art. 32 may or may not constitute a criminal offense. If act constitutes a criminal offense, the victim may opt between a civil action under Art. 100 of the RPC and an independent civil action under Art. 32. If act is not a criminal offense, the civil action to enforce liability for damages is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code according to Art. 1162 thereof, and the Rules on Civil Procedure.

VII: TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION A. VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Art. 32, CC. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (1) Freedom of religion; (2) Freedom of speech; (3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

The right to institute an independent civil action under Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is a substantive right intended as an exception to and held as an amendment of the general rule in Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the 1940 Rules of Court ( Sec. 1 Rule 111 of the 1964 Revised rules of Court) These independent actions should not be deemed instituted with the criminal action and the right to institute them should not be made subject to their prior reservation.

2. YES. Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows: "ART. 32.Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. xxx "(9)The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. xxx "The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated." "ART. 2219.Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: xxx "(6)Illegal search; xxx "(1)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 36." - Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in addition, P750.00 for attorney's fees.

LIM v DE LEON G.R. No. L-22554 MARTIN; August 29, 1975 NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the CFI FACTS - Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him. - After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. - June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch. - Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. Upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. - Plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused. Likewise, Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to plaintiffappellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense. ISSUES 1. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime 2. WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffsappellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful HELD 1.

ABERCA V VER G.R. No. L-69866 YAP; April 15, 1988 NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allegations: That complying with said order of Ver, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

NO. Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a search warrant; that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and without the consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question that without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. And since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.

Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages of P39,030; moral damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M; exemplary damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M; and attorney's fees not less than P200K. Respondents contentions: A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Sol-Gen. Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. ISSUES 1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. 2. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated. 3. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to (dome of the) plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR of the court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to dismiss HELD 1. NO. Ratio: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Reasoning: [a] The purpose Art. 32 CC is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. [b] The invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. It cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times. [c] Art. 32 of CC which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the RPC or other penal statute. [d] Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

2. NO Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case, as contended by respondents, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 32 CC. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party Reasoning: [a] The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. But in this case, Art. 32 governs. [b] By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and acquires a larger dimension. A superior have to answer for the transgressions of his subordinates against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Hence, Art. 32 of CC makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. [c] To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. [d] So, under the above principles, it is difficult to justify the TCs dismissal for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the defendants, except Maj.Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Art. 32 of CC. 3. NO. The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the resolution, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in this case. DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Case remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. SEPARATE OPINION: TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: - The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public officers or employees, or members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of CC. - The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by petitionersplaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondent superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not

abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor.

MHP GARMENTS, INC. vs. CA PUNO; 22 September 1994 Nature: Petition for Certiorari Facts -MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." -Sometime in October 1983, MHP received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. De Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). De Guzman, Peafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. The items were then turned over by Captain Peafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. After a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. He also ordered the return of the seized items which was not immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized items were turned. The other items returned were of inferior quality. Private respondent then filed a Civil Case against the petitioners for sums of money and damages. The trial court ruled for the private respondents. The decision was appealed to the respondent court. It affirmed the decision with modification.MHP filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. Issue/s and Held: WON the search and seizure was legal No. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. De Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. The search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and

prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods. WON MHP Garments is liable Yes. The omission will not exculpate petitioners. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman who did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 already directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law; and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body it orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions which the petitioners miserably failed to do. And thirdly, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not. WON an award for moral damages should be awarded Yes. It is consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by private entities. Disposition IN VIEW WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof. Costs against petitioners.

B. DEFAMATION, FRAUD, PHYSICAL INJURIES

Art. 33,CC. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. RPC Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. Art. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to present such publication for a compensation. The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who threatens another to publish a libel concerning him or the parents, spouse, child, or other members of the family of the latter or upon anyone who shall offer to prevent the publication of such libel for a compensation or money consideration. Art. 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official proceedings. The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine of from 20 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor or manager or a newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall publish facts connected with the private life of another and offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said person, even though said publication be made in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been mentioned. Art. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. Art. 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be

imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not included and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. MARCIA V CA (PAJE) 205 PHIL 147 RELOVA; January 27, 1983 NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS - Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus - His bus collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, causing the latters death and physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap - Paje was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. A civil case was also instituted against him by herein petitioners for reckless imprudence and negligence in driving the passenger bus. - He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC. However, he was acquitted in the CA. The CA ruled that criminal negligence is wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence, for the case was of pure accident. - The defendants presented the copy of said criminal case to the court handling the civil case against them. The civil case was dismissed. ISSUES WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a dismissal in the civil case HELD YES - The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. - Petitioner also relies on Art 33 CC. However, the said article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be nonexistent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability DISPOSITIVE: Decision affirmed

MADEJA V CARO ABAD SANTOS, J.: December 21, 1983 NATURE Petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss FACTS - Dr. Eva A. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." - The criminal case still pending, Madeja sued Dr. Japzon for damages in the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court

which reads: "Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.". . . ISSUES 1. WON an independent civil action may be filed during the pendency of the criminal case HELD 1. YES. Ratio Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow: "Sec, 2. Independent civil action. - an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. " - "Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." Obiter - There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely: 1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." Tolentino says: "While the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him." 2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is SET ASIDE

contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist. -RTC: in favor of Arafiles -CA: in favor of Morales, et. al. based on doctrine of fair comment ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages HELD NO. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. Ratio. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. Reasoning. First discussed applicable provisions (A33, 19, 21 NCC): Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom. -then discussed how to determine if a published work is libelous: In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. -then discussed the petitioners allegation that the news item as a malicious sensationalization failed: even though the police blotter only shows 1 count of abduction and rape, respondent was present when Emelita executed her swornstatement where she reported an abduction with rape and an abduction incident (where no rape occurred, but was about to happen) so respondents article was not maliciously sensationalized. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioners complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters. -then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED

ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC CARPIO MORALES, J., March 25, 2004 NATURE: Petition for review of CA DeciSION FACTS (Consti II Case) -Respondent Morales wrote an article for Peoples Journal Tonight based on the sworn statement in the police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig where Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month before then attempted to rape her the night she filed a complaint. Morales attempted to contact Arafiles but since the latters office was still closed at that time (past 12mn he works for NIAS-PAGASA), he was not able to do so. -About a year following the published article, Arafiles filed action for damages based on the alleged grossly malicious and overly sensationalized report by Morales which cast aspersions on his character, being the object of public

1. DEFAMATION
MVRS V ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL G.R. No. 135306 BELLOSILLO; January 28, 2003 NATURE: Petition to review decision of CA FACTS - The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL (IDCP), a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs, and some individual Muslims filed in the RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, et.al. - Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGAR was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam; that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Phil but the entire Muslim world, esp. every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. - MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of belief/opinion and was published without malice. Also, it did not mention respondents as object of the article, hence, were not entitled to damages. RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of Islamic faith. ISSUE 1. WON elements of libel exist 2. WON the cause of action should rise from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress HELD 1. NO. Reasoning Defamation means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. 2. NO. The cause of action is libel. Ratio Action arising from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress cannot be sustained in this case, for such action is personal in nature, and since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article, such cause of action cannot be sustained. Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION An "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. - The purported damage caused by the published article falls under principle of relational harm - which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation;

as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm - which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. The present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation. - To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a) conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiff; (b) conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) causal connection between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) the plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe. - Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, embarrassment, or anger. (AmJur) Disposition Petition granted. Decision reversed. SEPARATE OPINION VITUG [concur] - The present controversy stems from a civil action for damages and not from a criminal complaint. CC recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either pursuant to Art 26, par. 4, to the effect that although it may not constitute a criminal offense, vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs xxx can give rise to a cause of action for damages, or to Art. 33 which provides that in case of defamation, a civil complaint for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal case, may be brought by the injured party. - In the present case, the article relates to the entire Muslim population and not just to the IDCP or to any of the individual respondents. There is no direct reference or allusion to the federation or any of its members, or to any of the individual complainants. Respondents scarcely can claim having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages. CARPIO [dissent] - I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is libelous, but because it constitutes an intentional tortious act causing mental distress to those whom private respondent IDCP represents. - Both RTC and CA found the article insulting and humiliating to Muslims, causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to believers of Islam. This finding of fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private respondents an intentional wrongful act - humiliating persons because of their religious beliefs. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent] - Focal point of claim for damages: insult caused by the article that the Muslims worship the pig as their God which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as Muslims that there is only one God, and, that the greatest sin in Islam is to worship things or persons other than Allah. - The article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the religious beliefs of Muslims. Liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer, but on the fact of defamation.

2. FRAUD
SALTA V DE VEYRA 202 Phil 527 DE CASTRO; September 30, 1982 FACTS - Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by two judges in a manner directly in opposition of each other. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively settle this regrettable conflict of opinion, the two cases have been consolidated for a single decision. - Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos' branch. His duty was to grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the amount of the loan applied for. - In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, Salta indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in manner characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. - PNB filed two civil actions to recover losses the bank suffered (Civil Case No. 79583, Civil Case No. 88343). With this the bank filed a criminal action against Salta, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. - Salta was acquitted in the criminal case, and filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases. It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took diametrically opposing views, the former denying the motion, the latter granting it. ISSUE WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). HELD NO. Ratio The civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter." Acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly, the accused would not be liable. Reasoning ART 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. - The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud, one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. - The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling, a specie of an offense committed by means of fraud, where the civil case may

be filed separately and proceed independently of the criminal case, regardless of the result of the latter. - That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts, which fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned. - JUSTICE JBL REYES: in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions `entirely separate and distinct' from the criminal action. Hence in these cases, I think Rule 107 Sec. 1(d) does not apply. - It is significant to note that under Article 31 [11] of the New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter." DISPOSITION: The decision of Justice De Veyra is affirmed.

3. PHYSICAL INJURIES
CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1965 FACTS - The case arose from a vehicular collision. - Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. - The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. - Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. - While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. - Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act. -In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan. - In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned, they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent; and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action. -The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders. - The parties in the civil case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." - The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case.

- At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. - This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been taken. - The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well taken" were; (1) that the action had already prescribed; and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise. ISSUE WON the action had already prescribed. RULING YES. - There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). - Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code, when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon Elordi. The information therein, it may be recalled, was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. - But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the effect. - And when they commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. - In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which read: ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. - The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. In other words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years. - The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation

was not then necessary; without having made it they could file as in fact they did a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case; and consequently, as held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict." - As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription, the said rule does not apply in the present case. DISPOSTIION The order appealed from was affirmed, without costs. CORPUS V PAJE 28 SCRA 1062 CAPISTRANO; July 31, 1969 NATURE Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal FACTS - December 23, 1956 Felardo Paje was driving a Victory Liner bus. It collided with a jeepney driven by Clemente Marcia in Lubao, Pampanga. As a result of the collision, Marcia died while two other people were physically injured. - An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje. Marcias heirs reserved their right to institute a separate civil action against Paje. Paje was later found guilty on November 7, 1960. - November 21, 1961 Pending Pajes appeal, the window and children of Marcia instituted the separate civil action for damages arising from the accident against Paje and Victory Liner, praying that the defendants be jointly and severally liable. - November 9, 1962 Paje was acquitted by the appellate court, saying that the collision was purely an accident. - December 29, 1962 Paje filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on the ground that his acquittal barred the said action but the motion was denied. Petitioners Claim > The petitioners claim that the Lower Court erred in acquitting Paje and that his acquittal was a bar to the civil action. Quoting Chantangco vs. Abaroai: It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil action. This was obviously of no avail, inasmuch as there resulted a judgment for the defendant, and the plain inference from the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil responsibility. Respondents Comments: > At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months after the collision and that according to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed. ISSUE WON the civil action against Paje can still prosper despite his acquittal

HELD NO Ratio Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. Thearticle mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud, (estafa) and physical injuries. Reasoning - Although in the case of Dyogi vs. Yatco this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, it is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries. - In People vs. Buan, the Court ruled that the offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. - Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved. - With regard to the issue of prescription, the Court ruled that the action had indeed prescribed because the prescription period was pegged at 4 years (A1146, CC) and began to run on the day the quasi-delict was committed. Disposition PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. MADEJA V CARO 211 PHIL 469 ABAD SANTOS; December 21, 1983 NATURE Petition seeking to set aside the order of the CFI dismissing the civil case against Japzon FACTS - DR. EVA A. JAPZON was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. - In the information, the offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages - The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages, alleging that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. - The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the respondent judge granted on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 1 111 of the Rules of Court ISSUE WON a civil action for damages may be instituted pending the resolution of a criminal case HELD YES - Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. A

- Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.) - Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,) Obiter - There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely: 1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." 2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. - The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. - In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. - In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death" **(end of obiter) - Corpus vs. Paje, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result. Disposition Petition is granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside.

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. ...
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DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD, SUPERGUARD) 243 SCRA 220 BIDIN; April 3, 1995 FACTS - Benigno Torzuela, , a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," and Atty. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. Dulay. - Maria Benita Dulay, widow of Dulay, filed an action for damages against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard Security Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Respondent: > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed w/ deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC. > that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by petitioners) cannot lie, since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art 365 of the RPC. > that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. > that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v CA) Petitioner > the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants. Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury. > that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 > that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC. Thus, Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art 2176 > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under 2 3 Art 33 and Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court ISSUE WON civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action HELD YES - Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: "Sec 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence 3 Rule 111.Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently - In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil-action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
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34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused." - It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. - The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co; Carandang v. Santiago). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro). - Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.

C. NEGLECT OF DUTY
Art. 34,CC. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

D. ACTION FOR DAMAGES WHERE NO INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION IS PROVIDED

Art. 35, CC. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.