AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC. vs ANTONIO BAUTISTA G.R. No.

156367, 16 May 2005 Antonio Bautista was employed by Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. in May 1995. He was assigned to the Isabela-Manila route and he was paid by commission (7% of gross income per travel for twice a month). In January 2000, while he was driving his bus he bumped another bus owned by Auto Bus. He claimed that he bumped the he accidentally bumped the bus as he was so tired and that he has not slept for more than 24 hours because Auto Bus required him to return to Isabela immediately after arriving at Manila. Damages were computed and 30% or P75,551.50 of it was being charged to Bautista. Bautista refused payment. Auto Bus terminated Bautista after due hearing as part of Auto Bus management prerogative. Bautista sued Auto Bus for Illegal Dismissal. The Labor Arbiter Monroe Tabingan dismissed Bautistas petition but ruled that Bautista is entitled to P78,1117.87 13th month pay payments and P13,788.05 for his unpaid service incentive leave pay. The case was appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission. NLRC modified the LAs ruling. It deleted the award for 13th Month pay. The court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC. Auto Bus averred that Bautista is a commissioned employee and if that is not reason enough that Bautista is also a field personnel hence he is not entitled to a service incentive leave. They invoke: ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. If he is, Whether or not the three (3)-year prescriptive period provided under Article 291 of the Labor Code, as amended, is applicable to respondent's claim of service incentive leave pay. HELD: Yes, Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. The Supreme Court emphasized that it does not mean that just because an employee is paid on commission basis he is already barred to receive service incentive leave pay. The question actually boils down to whether or not Bautista is a field employee.

According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, 'field personnel shall refer to nonagricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. As a general rule, field personnel are those whose performance of their job/service is not supervised by the employer or his representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places at specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal office of the employee. Certainly, Bautista is not a field employee. He has a specific route to traverse as a bus driver and that is a specific place that he needs to be at work. There are inspectors hired by Auto Bus to constantly check him. There are inspectors in bus stops who inspects the passengers, the punched tickets, and the driver. Therefore he is definitely supervised though he is away from the Auto Bus main office. On the other hand, the 3 year prescriptive period ran but Bautista was able to file his suit in time before the prescriptive period expired. It was only upon his filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, one month from the time of his dismissal, that Bautista demanded from his former employer commutation of his accumulated leave credits. His cause of action to claim the payment of his accumulated service incentive leave thus accrued from the time when his employer dismissed him and failed to pay his accumulated leave credits. Therefore, the prescriptive period with respect to his claim for service incentive leave pay only commenced from the time the employer failed to compensate his accumulated service incentive leave pay at the time of his dismissal. Since Bautista had filed his money claim after only one month from the time of his dismissal, necessarily, his money claim was filed within the prescriptive period provided for by Article 291 of the Labor Code.

CALAMBA MEDICAL CENTER, INC. vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RONALDO LANZANAS AND MERCEDTHA LANZANAS G.R. No. 176484, 25 November 2008 FACTS: Ronaldo and Merceditha are doctors employed by Calamba Medical Center, Inc. They are given a retainers fee by the hospital as well as shares from fees obtained from patients. One time, Ronaldo was overheard by Dr. Trinidad talking to another doctor about how low the admission rate to the hospital is. That conversation was reported to Dr. Desipeda who was then the Medical Director of the hospital. Eventually Ronaldo was suspended. Ronaldo filed a case for Illegal Suspension in March 1998. In the same month, the rank and file employees organized a strike against the hospital for unfair labor practices. Desipeda eventually fired Ronaldo for his alleged participation in the strike, which is not allowed under the Labor Code for he is a managerial employee. Desipeda also fired Merceditha on the ground that she is the wife of Ronaldo who naturally sympathizes with him. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no Illegal Suspension for there was no employer-employee relationship because the hospital has no control over Ronaldo as he is a doctor who even gets shares rom the hospitals earnings. The National Labor Relations Commission as well as the Court of Appeals reversed the LA. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship? HELD: Yes. Under the control test, an employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital if the hospital controls both the means and the details of the process by which the physician is to accomplish his task. There is control in this case because of the fact that Desipeda schedules the hours of work for Ronaldo and his wife. The doctors are also registered by the hospital under the SSS which is premised on an employer-employee relationship.

There is Illegal Dismissal committed against Rolando for there was no notice and hearing held. It was never shown that Rolando joined the strike. But even if he did, he has the right to do so for he is not a part of the managerial or supervisory employees. As a doctor, their decisions are still subject to revocation or revision by Desipeda. There is Illegal Dismissal committed against Merceditha for the ground therefore was not mentioned in Article 282 of the Labor Code.

G.R. No. 146989: MELENCIO GABRIEL represented by Flordeliza Gabriel vs NELSON BILON, ANGEL BRAZIL, & ERNESTO PAGAYGAY G. R. No. 146989, 7 February 2007 FACTS: Bilon, Brazil and Pagaygay are jeepney drivers driving jeepneys owned by Melencio Gabriel. They are paying P400/day for their boundary. Later, the drivers were required to pay an additional P50.00 to cover police protection, car wash, deposit fee, and garage fees. The three drivers refused to pay the additional P50.00. On April 30, 1995, when the drivers reported to work, they were not given any jeepney to drive. Eventually, they were dismissed. The three drivers sued Gabriel for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the drivers and ordered Gabriel to pay the drivers their backwages and their separation pay amounting to about a total of P1.03M. On April 18, 1997, the LA promulgated its decision and on the same day sent a copy thereof to Gabriel but Flordeliza (wife of Gabriel) refused to receive the copy. Apparently, Gabriel died on April 4, 1997. The copy was resent via registered mail on May 28, 1997. Flordeliza appealed to the LA on June 5, 1997. The LA dismissed the appeal; it ruled that the appeal was not on time because the promulgation was made on April 18, 1997 and that the appeal on June 5, 1997 was already beyond the ten day period required for appeal. The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the LA. It ruled that there was no employee-employer relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC but it ruled that the separation pay should not be awarded but rather, the employees should be reinstated. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal before the LA was made on time. Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. Whether or not there was a strained relation between Gabriel and the drivers. HELD: The appeal was made on time because when the promulgation was made Gabriel is already dead. The ten day requirement to make an appeal is not applicable in this situation because Gabriel was not yet properly substituted by the wife. The counting of

the period should be made starting from the date when the copy was sent via registered mail. Therefore, the appeal filed on June 5 was made on time. There exists an employer-employee relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called boundary [that] they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. The award of the separation pay is not proper. It was not shown that there was a strained relationship between Gabriel and the drivers so as to cause animosity if they are reinstated. The Strained Relations Principle is only applied if it is shown that reinstatement would only cause antagonism between the employer and the employee; and that the only solution is separation and the payment of separation pay.

WILHELMINA S. OROZCO vs THE FIFTH DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, AND LETICIA JIMENEZ MAGSANOC G.R. No. 155207, 29 April 2005 FACTS: Orozco was hired as a writer by the Philippine Daily Inquirer in 1990. She was the columnist of Feminist Reflections under the Lifestyle section of the publication. She writes on a weekly basis and on a per article basis (P250-300/article). In 1991, Magsanoc as the editor-in-chief sought to improve the Lifestyle section of the paper. She said there were too many Lifestyle writers and that it was time to reduce the number of writers. Orozcos column was eventually dropped. Orozco filed for a case for Illegal Dismissal against PDI and Magsanoc. Orozco won in the Labor Arbiter. The LA ruled that there exists an employer-employee relationship between PDI and Orozco hence Orozco is entitled to receive backwages, reinstatement, and 13th month pay. PDI appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC denied the appeal because of the failure of PDI to post a surety bond as required by Article 223 of the Labor Code. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC. ISSUE: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between PDI and Orozco. Whether or not PDIs appeal will prosper. HELD: Under Article 223 of the Labor Code: ART. 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable

bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect its/his appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employers appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees just and lawful claims. But in this case, this principle is relaxed by the Supreme Court considering the fact that the Labor Arbiter, in ruling that the Orozco is entitled to backwages, did not provide any computation. The case is then remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the computation. This necessarily pended the resolution of the other issue of whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between PDI and Orozco.

THELMA DUMPIT-MURILLO vs COURT OF APPEALS, ASSOCIATED BROADCASTING COMPANY, JOSE JAVIER AND EDWARD TAN G.R. No. 164652, 8 June 2007 FACTS: Dumpit was hired by ABC as a newscaster in 1995. Her contract with the TV station was repeatedly renewed until 1999. She then wrote Jose Javier (VP for News and Public Affairs of ABC) advising him of her intention to renew the contract. Javier did not respond. Dumpit then demanded reinstatement as well as her backwages, service incentive leave pays and other monetary benefits. ABC said they could only pay her backwages but her other claims had no basis as she was not entitled thereto because she is considered as a talent and not a regular employee. Dumpit sued ABC. The Labor Arbiter ruled against Dumpit. The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the LA. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and ruled that as per the contract between ABC and Dumpit, Dumpit is a fixed term employee. ISSUE: Whether or not Dumpit is a regular employee. HELD: Yes. Dumpit was a regular employee under contemplation of law. The practice of having fixed-term contracts in the industry does not automatically make all talent contracts valid and compliant with labor law. The assertion that a talent contract exists does not necessarily prevent a regular employment status. The duties of Dumpit as enumerated in her employment contract indicate that ABC had control over the work of Dumpit. Aside from control, ABC also dictated the work assignments and payment of petitioners wages. ABC also had power to dismiss her. All these being present, clearly, there existed an employment relationship between Dumpit and ABC.

In addition, her work was continuous for a period of four years. This repeated engagement under contract of hire is indicative of the necessity and desirability of the Dumpits work in ABCs business.

TELEVISION AND PRODUCTION EXPONENTS, INC. and/or ANTONIO P. TUVIERA vs ROBERTO C. SERVAA G.R. No. 167648, 28 January 2008 FACTS: Servaa started out as a security for the Agro-Commercial Security Agency (ACSA) since 1987. The agency had a contract with TV network RPN 9. On the other hand, Television and Production Exponents, Inc (TAPE). is a company in charge of TV programming and was handling shows like Eat Bulaga! Eat Bulaga! was then with RPN 9. In 1995, RPN 9 severed its relations with ACSA. TAPE retained the services of Servaa as a security guard and absorbed him. In 2000, TAPE contracted the services of Sun Shield Security Agency. It then notified Servaa that he is being terminated because he is now a redundant employee. Servaa then filed a case for illegal Dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Servaas dismissal is valid on the ground of redundancy but though he was not illegally dismissed he is still entitled to be paid a separation pay which is amounting to one month pay for every year of service which totals to P78,000.00. TAPE appealed and argued that Servaa is not entitled to receive separation pay for he is considered as a talent and not as a regular employee; that as such, there is no employee-employer relationship between TAPE and Servaa. The National Labor Relations Commission ruled in favor of TAPE. It ruled that Servaa is a program employee. Servaa appealed before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and affirmed the LA. The CA further ruled that TAPE and its president Tuviera should pay for nominal damages amounting to P10,000.00. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an employee-employer relationship existing between TAPE and Servaa. HELD: Yes. Servaa is a regular employee.

In determining Servaas nature of employment, the Supreme Court employed the Four Fold Test: 1. Whether or not employer conducted the selection and engagement of the employee. Servaa was selected and engaged by TAPE when he was absorbed as a talent in 1995. He is not really a talent, as termed by TAPE, because he performs an activity which is necessary and desirable to TAPEs business and that is being a security guard. Further, the primary evidence of him being engaged as an employee is his employee identification card. An identification card is usually provided not just as a security measure but to mainly identify the holder thereof as a bona fide employee of the firm who issues it. 2. Whether or not there is payment of wages to the employee by the employer. Servaa is definitely receiving a fixed amount as monthly compensation. Hes receiving P6,000.00 a month. 3. Whether or not employer has the power to dismiss employee. The Memorandum of Discontinuance issued to Servaa to notify him that he is a redundant employee evidenced TAPEs power to dismiss Servaa. 4. Whether or not the employer has the power of control over the employee. The bundy cards which showed that Servaa was required to report to work at fixed hours of the day manifested the fact that TAPE does have control over him. Otherwise, Servaa could have reported at any time during the day as he may wish. Therefore, Servaa is entitled to receive a separation pay. On the other hand, the Supreme Court ruled that Tuviera, as president of TAPE, should not be held liable for nominal damages as there was no showing he acted in bad faith in terminating Servaa.

FAR EAST AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY, INC. and/or ALEXANDER UY vs JIMMY LEBATIQUE and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 162813, 12 February 2007 FACTS: In March 1996, Lebatique was hired as a driver by FAR EAST AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY, INC. with a daily wage of P223.50. His job as a driver includes the delivery of animal feeds to the clients of the company. He must report either in the morning or in the afternoon to make the deliveries. On January 24, 2000, Lebatique was suspended by Manuel Uy (brother of FEASIs General Manager Alexander Uy) for allegedly using the company vehicle illegally. On the same day, Lebatique filed a complaint for nonpayment of overtime pay against Alexander Uy. Uy summoned Lebatique and asked why he was claiming overtime pay. Lebatique said since he started working with the company he has never been paid OT pay. Uy consulted with his brother. On January 29, 2000, Uy told Lebatique to look for another job. Lebatique then filed an Illegal Dismissal case against the company. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Lebatique. Uy was ordered to reinstate Lebatique and at the same time to pay Lebatique his 13th month pay, back wages (time when case was pending), service incentive leave pay and OT pay all amounting to P196,659.72. Uy argued that Lebatique was not dismissed and that he was merely suspended; that he abandoned his job; and that Lebatique was a field personnel not entitled to overtime pay and service incentive leave. ISSUE: Whether or not Lebatique is a field personnel. HELD: No. Lebatique is a regular employee.

Uy illegally dismissed Lebatique when he told him to look for another job. Judging at the sequence of event, Lebatique earned the ire of Uy when he filed a complaint for nonpayment of OT pay on the day Lebatique was suspended by Manuel Uy. Such is not a valid reason for dismissing Lebatique. Uy cannot therefore claim that he merely suspended Lebatique. Further, Lebatique did not abandon his job. His filing of this case is proof enough that he had no intention to abandon his job. To constitute abandonment as a just cause for dismissal, there must be: (a) absence without justifiable reason; and (b) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employeremployee relationship. None of the above was proven by Uy. Also, Lebatique is not a field personnel as defined above for the following reasons: (1) company drivers, including Lebatique, are directed to deliver the goods at a specified time and place; (2) they are not given the discretion to solicit, select and contact prospective clients; and (3) Far East issued a directive that company drivers should stay at the clients premises during truck-ban hours which is from 5:00 to 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 to 9:00 p.m. As a regular employee, Lebatique is entitled to service incentive leave and OT pay. The Supreme Court affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision but remanded the case for properly computing Lebatiques OT pay taking in to consideration the companys time keeping records

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (SCBEU-NUBE) vs STANDARD CHARTERED BANK and ANNEMARIE DURBIN, in her capacity as Chief Executive Officer, Philippines G.R. No. 161933, 22 April 2008 FACTS: The 1998-2000 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Standard Chartered Bank employees Union and the Standard Chartered Bank expired so the parties tried to renew it but then a deadlock ensued. Under the old CBA, the following are excluded as appropriate bargaining unit: A. All covenanted and assistant officers (now called National Officers) B. One confidential secretary of each of the: 1. Chief Executive, Philippine Branches 2. Deputy Chief Executive/Head, Corporate Banking Group 3. Head, Finance 4. Head, Human Resources 5. Manager, Cebu 6. Manager, Iloilo 7. Covenanted Officers provided said positions shall be filled by new recruits. C. The Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers in Manila, Cebu and Iloilo, and in any other branch that the BANK may establish in the country. D. Personnel of the Telex Department E. All Security Guards F. Probationary employees, without prejudice to Article 277 (c) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, casuals or emergency employees; and G. One (1) HR Staff But then in the renewal sought by SCBEU-NUBE, they only wanted the exclusion to apply only to the following employees from the appropriate bargaining unit all managers who are vested with the right to hire and fire employees, confidential employees, those with access to labor relations materials, Chief Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and one Human Resources (HR) staff. SCBEU-NUBE also averred that employees assigned in an acting capacity for at least a week should be given salary raise.

A notice of strike was given to the Department of Labor due to this deadlock. Then DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued an order dismissing the Unions plea. ISSUE: Whether or not the confidential employees sought to be removed from the exclusion as appropriate bargaining unit by SCBEU-NUBE holds ground. HELD: No. Whether or not the employees sought to be excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit are confidential employees is a question of fact, which is not a proper issue in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. SCBEU-NUBE insists that the foregoing employees are not confidential employees; however, it failed to buttress its claim. Aside from its generalized arguments, and despite the Secretary's finding that there was no evidence to support it, SCBEU-NUBE still failed to substantiate its claim. SCBEU-NUBE did not even bother to state the nature of the duties and functions of these employees, depriving the Court of any basis on which it may be concluded that they are indeed confidential employees. With regards to the salary increase of employees in acting capacities, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that a restrictive provision would curtail management's prerogative, and at the same time, recognized that employees should not be made to work in an acting capacity for long periods of time without adequate compensation. The usual rule that employees in acting capacities for at least a month should be given salary raise is upheld.

LETRAN CALAMBA FACULTY and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 156225, January 29, 2008 Facts: On October 8, 1992, the Letran Calamba Faculty and EmployeesAssociation (petit ioner) filed with Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a Complaint against Colegio de San Juan de Letran, Calamba, Inc. (respondent) for collection of various monetary claims due its members. Petitioner alleged, among others, in its Position Paper that in the computation of the 13th month pay of its academic personnel, respondent does not include as basis their compensation for overloads. It only takes into account the pay the faculty members receive for their teaching loads not exceeding eighteen (18) units. The teaching overloads are rendered within eight (8) hours a day. Prior to the filing of the above-mentioned complaint, petitioner filed a separate complaint against the respondent for money claims with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On the other hand, pending resolution of NLRC respondent filed with Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV of the NLRC a petition to declare as illegal a strike staged by petitioner in January 1994. Subsequently, these three cases were consolidated. On September 28, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) handling the consolidated cases rendered a Decision dismissing the money claims cases for lack of merit as well as the petition to declare strike illegal, but the officers of the Union, particularly its President, Mr. Edmundo F. Marifosque, Sr., are hereby reprimanded and sternly warned that future conduct similar to what was displayed in this case will warrant a more severe sanction from this Office. Both parties appealed to the NLRC; however, both were denied. Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the abovementioned NLRC Decision and Resolution and a Motion for Reconsideration with the CA but both were dismissed. Hence, herein petition for review on Certiorari. Issues: 1. Whether the CA gravely erred in holding that the factual findings of theNLRC cannot be reviewed in certiorari proceedings. 2. Whether the CA gravely erred in refusing to rule squarely on the issue of whether or not the pay of faculty members for teaching overloads should be included as basis in the computation of their 13th month pay

3. Whether the CA gravely erred in holding that the decision of the NLRC issupported by substantial evidence and in not granting petitionersmonetary claim. Held: This Court held in Odango v. National Labor Relations Commission 14 that: The appellate courts jurisdiction to review a decision of the NLRC in apetition for certiorari is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. An extraordinary remedy, a petition for certiorari is available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not includecorrection of the NLRCs evaluation of the evidence or of its factual findings. Such findings are generally accorded not only respect but also finality. A party assailing such findings bears the burden of showing that the tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the controversy, in order that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie. Settled is the rule that the findings of the LA, when affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, are binding on the Supreme Court, unless patently erroneous.16 It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.17 In a petition for review on certiorari, this Courts jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law in the absence of any showing that the factual findings complained of are devoid of support in the records or are glaringly erroneous.18 Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. The petitioners claim that the DOLE Order should not be made to apply to the present case because said Order was issued only in 1996, approximately four years after the present case was initiated before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, is not without basis. The general rule is that administrative rulings and circulars shall not be given retroactive effect. Nevertheless, it is a settled rule that when an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. In the same manner that payment for overtime work and work performed during special holidays is considered as additional compensation apart and distinct from an employee's regular wage or basic salary, an overload pay, owing to its very nature

and definition, may not be considered as part of a teacher's regular or basic salary, because it is being paid for additional work performed in excess of the regular teaching load. The peculiarity of an overload lies in the fact that it may be performed within the normal eight-hour working day. This is the only reason why the DOLE, in its explanatory bulletin, finds it proper to include a teacher's overload pay in the determination of his or her 13th-month pay. However, the DOLE loses sight of the fact that even if it is performed within the normal eight-hour working day, an overload is still an additional or extra teaching work which is performed afterthe regular teaching load has been completed. Hence, any pay given as compensation for such additional work should be considered as extra and not deemed as part of the regular or basic salary. Moreover, petitioner failed to refute private respondent's contention that excess teaching load is paid by the hour, while the regular teaching load is being paid on a monthly basis; and that the assignment of overload is subject to the availability of teaching loads. This only goes to show that overload pay is not integrated with a teacher's basic salary for his or her regular teaching load. In addition, overload varies from one semester to another, as it is dependent upon the availability of extra teaching loads. As such, it is not legally feasible to consider payments for such overload as part of a teacher's regular or basic salary. Verily, overload pay may not be included as basis for determining a teacher's 13th-month pay.

MAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT vs ROLANDO ADANA, et al. G.R. No. 157634, May 16, 2005 FACTS: Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant (MHR) hired herein 16 respondents as employees in its business in Legaspi City. Its operation was suspended on March 31, 1997 due to the expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the space it rented. While waiting for the completion of the construction of its new site, MHR continued its operation in another site with 9 of the 16 employees. When the new site constructed and MHR resumed its business operation, none of the 16 employees was recalled to work. MHR alleged business losses as the reason for not reinstating the respondents. On various dates, respondents filed complaints for underpayment of wages, money claims and illegal dismissal. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed by petitioner; 2. Whether or not respondents are entitled to their money claims due to underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of holiday pay, rest day premium, SILP, COLA, overtime pay, and night shift differential pay. HELD: 1. Illegal Dismissal: claim for separation pay Since April 1997 until the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision in July 2000, or more than three (3) years after the supposed temporary lay-off, the employment of all the respondents with petitioner had ceased, notwithstanding that the new premises had been completed and the same resumed its operation. This is clearly dismissal or the permanent severance or complete separation of the worker from the service on the initiative of the employer regardless of the reasons therefor. Article 286 of the Labor Code is clear there is termination of employment when an otherwise bona fide suspension of work exceeds six (6) months. The cessation of employment for more than six months was patent and the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a just or authorized cause. While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, the dismissal of employees must be made

within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of fair play. And in termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal. If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter the employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the formers favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of labor. 2. Money claims The Supreme Court reinstated the award of monetary claims granted by the Labor Arbiter. The cost of meals and snacks purportedly provided to respondents cannot be deducted as part of respondents minimum wage. As stated in the Labor Arbiters decision. Even granting that meals and snacks were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without compliance with certain legal requirements. As stated in Mabeza v. NLRC, the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employees wages without satisfying the following: (a) proof that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of deductible facilities is voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the facilities are charged at fair and reasonable value. The law is clear that mere availment is not sufficient to allow deductions from employees wages. As for petitioners repeated invocation of serious business losses, suffice to say that this is not a defense to payment of labor standard benefits. The employer cannot exempt himself from liability to pay minimum wages because of poor financial condition of the company. The payment of minimum wages is not dependent on the employers ability to pay.

SOLGUS CORPORATION v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 157488, February 6, 2007 FACTS: On different dates, complainants Alagos et al., were hired as security guards by Solgus Corp., a duly licensed security and investigation agency, and then assigned to its clients. In 1994, they separately filed complaints for illegal dismissal and underpayment of salaries and related benefits against Solgus and its principals. Among their allegations are: (1) at the time of hiring, there was no stipulation they there were hired as probationary employees; (2) they worked 12 hours daily; (3) they were made to sign blank payrolls; and (4) they were summarily dismissed from employment. For its defense, Solgus alleged that complainants Soriano, Emano and Deseo were probationary employees who, due to unsatisfactory performance, failed to pass the 6month probationary period; and that the other complainants were removed from their posts at the request of Solgus clients and that, thereafter, they abandoned their jobs. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints and affirmed the validity of the Affidavits of Desistance submitted by two of the complainants. The case was appealed to the NLRC who reversed the decision of the LA and ordered reinstatement. Solgus then elevated the case to the CA, who modified the NLRC decision. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiters decision to give effect and validity to the affidavits of desistance was proper HELD: In Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission, the guideposts to determine validity of affidavits of desistance were set, thus: "Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the

consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. x x x. " In the instant case, we agree with both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that the Affidavits of Desistance deserve scant consideration. The NLRC Rules of Procedure particularly Section 3, Rule V, provides:

Section 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, either in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified position papers. These verified position papers shall cover only those claims and causes of action raised in the complaint excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and shall be accompanied by all supporting documents including the affidavits of their respective witnesses which shall take the place of the latters direct testimony. The parties shall thereafter not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred to and any cause or causes of action not included in the complaint or position papers, affidavits and other documents. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) The records clearly indicate that Solgus received the 5 December 1996 Order of the Labor Arbiter on 2 January 1997. However, it inexplicably managed to submit its Memorandum only on 27 August 1997 when it presented for the first time the alleged Affidavits of Desistance executed by complainants Telin and Alagos. We agree with the NLRC that the Labor Arbiter should not have taken undue haste in considering the Affidavits of Desistance of complainants as presented by Solgus on the ground that it made no reference at all in its position paper, reply, and rejoinder to the existence of the said affidavits in patent violation of the aforementioned rule of the NLRC. The belated presentation of the purported Affidavits of Desistance deprived complainants Telin and Alagos of the opportunity to debunk the authenticity of said Affidavits of Desistance before the Labor Arbiter in gross violation of the rules of fair play. Even more, the claim of Solgus that they were already existing as early as the time of their execution but submitted to the Labor Arbiter only in 1997 because they could not be located is specious. Such very important documents as the Affidavits of Desistance which are very material to the case could not have been misplaced or difficult to locate as claimed by Solgus. Pertaining as it does to a waiver of rights, Solgus should have exercised more prudence in the custody of these documents.

The Supreme Court does not countenance the genuineness of the allegedly executed affidavits of desistance since the complainants who allegedly executed them deny doing the same. Such being the case, the rule that when the voluntariness of the execution of the affidavit of desistance or release is put into issue then the claim of the employee may still be given due course, finds application in this case The Affidavits of Desistance do not even bear the prima facie evidence of their due execution accorded to private documents, because even the notaries public before whom they were acknowledged issued a certification that no such affidavit was acknowledged by Telin and Alagos before them. Quitclaims, releases and other waivers of benefits granted by law or contracts in favor of workers should be strictly scrutinized to protect the weak and the disadvantaged. The waivers should be carefully examined, in regard not only to the words and terms used, but also to the factual circumstances under which they have been executed. Under prevailing jurisprudence, a deed of release or quitclaim cannot bar an employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled. It is the employers duty to prove that such quitclaims were voluntary. The mere fact that the respondents were not physically coerced or intimidated does not necessarily imply that they freely or voluntarily consented to the terms thereof. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees pressured into signing the same by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal responsibilities. Settled is the rule that quitclaims are ineffective in barring full recovery of the benefits due the employee.

VIOLA CRUZ v NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSSION G.R. No. 11638, February 7, 2000 FACTS: The private respondent Norkis Distributors Inc., is a domestic corporation. It is engaged in the business of selling motorcycles and household appliances. It was operating in Mandaue City, Cebu; it had its branch in Valencia, Bukidnon where the petitioner Cruz was employed. On October 14, 1990, while petitioners and her coemployees were busy working, petitioner collapsed and was brought to the hospital. From then on, she was not able to report for work. On December 28, 1990, she sent a letter to respondent Norkis to verify her status of employment but as an answer, she received a termination letter dated November 2, 1990 citing health reasons for the dismissal. On March 18, 1991, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the private respondent praying for payment of separation pay and other money claims before the NLRC Branch of Cayagan de Oro City. The Labor Arbitration Branch ruled in favor of the petitioner. From the said decision, both parties appealed to the NLRC where the decision was reversed and set aside. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner is legal. HELD: Under Section 8, Rule 1 Book VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, for a disease to be a valid ground for the dismissal of the employee, the continued employment of such employee is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees and there must be a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. There is merit in petitioners submission that the award of moral and exemplary damages in her favor is warranted by her unjustified dismissal. Award of moral and exemplary damages for an illegally dismissed employee is proper where the employee had been harassed and arbitrarily terminated by the employer. The Court has consistently accorded the working class a right to recover damages for unjust dismissals tainted with bad faith, where the motive of the employer in dismissing the employee is far from noble. The petition is granted.

EX-BATAAN VETERANS SECURITY AGENCY V SECRETARY OF LABOR G.R. No. 152396. Nov 20, 2007 FACTS: EBVSAIs employees were assigned to the National Power Corporation at Ambuklao Hydro Electric Plant in Benguet. The Regional Office conducted a complaint inspection at the Ambuklao Plant where violations of labor standard laws were observed. On the same date, the Regional Office issued a notice of hearing. The Regional Director then issued a compliance order. The Secretary of Labor affirmed. ISSUES: 1. Whether of not the regional director acquire jurisdiction considering that notice was served at the plant and not at its main office and that it was addressed to its Vice President. 2. Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives have jurisdiction over the money claims of private respondents which exceed P 5,000.00 3. Whether the case falls under the exception in Art 128(b), that is, the RD should have certified the case to the LA for full-blown hearing HELD: 1. The Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices state that notices and copies of orders shall be served on the parties or their duly authorized representatives at their last known address or, if they are represented by counsel, through the latter. The rules shall be liberally construed and only in the absence of any applicable provision will the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character. In this case, EBVSAI does not deny having received the notices of hearing. EBVSAI can no longer question the jurisdiction of the Regional Director after receiving the notices of hearing and after appearing before the Regional Director. 2. Citing Cirineo Bowling Plaza, Inc. v. Sensing, the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Regional Director to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws can be exercised even where the individual claim exceeds P5,000. 3. If the labor standards case is covered by the exception clause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code In order to divest the Regional Director or his representatives of jurisdiction, the following elements must be present:

(a) that the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon; (b) that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and (c) that such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.The rules also provide that the employer shall raise such objections during the hearing of the case or at any time after receipt of the notice of inspection results. But in this case, EBVSAI did not contest the findings of the labor regulations officer during the hearing or after receipt of the notice of inspection results. It was only in its supplemental motion for reconsideration before the Regional Director that EBVSAI questioned the findings of the labor regulations officer and presented documentary evidence to controvert the claims of private respondents.