Normandy 60 years on - Myths and Legends

To those interested in military history that have read seriously on the D Day landings and the subsequent Normandy campaign, will be quite aware of the controversies surrounding the campaign. Were the British and Canadians supposed to break out on the east flank? How important was Caen to be taken early? "Did Dempsey fail Caen?" (1) Did Montgomery change his plans? Did the British and Canadians really have a go? And was all the work really done by the Americans? These questions have come about by somewhat contentious accusations by some veterans and historians. Writers such as Chester Wilmont (2), Nigel Hamilton (3) and Robin Neilands (4) have explored and responded to the accusations and questions in some substantial works. Unfortunately their works have not been the basis for a more profound and focused analysis of the Normandy campaign in film and contemporary writings. Some veterans and historians have put a distinctly American bias on their interpretations of the Normandy battles. General George Patton and prominent U.S historian Stephen Ambrose are two of those. Patton in his diaries and communications with headquarters, Ambrose in his writings and in his capacity as advisor with the film industry. Others such as General Eisenhower have also contributed to the development of controversy over the direction of the Normandy campaign. It is the issues arising from these controversies, which have grown into myths, and it is Stephen Ambrose (5) who is I feel, central to the perpetuation of some of these myths. Why, you may ask, would one focus on Stephen Ambrose? As some may be aware Stephen Ambrose was the military history consultant on the landmark movie 'Saving Private Ryan', it was this movie that reached millions of people worldwide and that influenced the average persons perception of the events in Normandy. It is interesting to scan the web sights attributed to the movie Saving Private Ryan and read the comments of those who have viewed the movie. Of the thirty reviews 1 read, only one questioned the movie, and it mostly addressed technical issues. Whilst many praise it's technical feats, nowhere in the reviews did anyone question the focus of the historical content and facts. Saving Private Ryan is a technically superior war movie; it explored the realities of war and many controversial issues such as the killing of prisoners of war. It is historically very accurate with the equipment, uniforms and hardware. However, it is questionable in its implications concerning the direction of the Normandy campaign. Two aspects of the movie which seem to help perpetuate Normandy myths and which require analysis are firstly the discussion between the main character of Captain Miller, played by Tom Hanks and the character of Captain Hamill, played by Ted Danson. The dialogue between them is as follows: Miller: "Monty's taking his time taking Caen we can't pull out till he's ready, so" Hamill: "that guy is overrated". Miller: "No argument here". Hamill: "Gotta take Caen so we can take St Lo". Miller: "Gotta take St Lo so we can take Boulogne". Hamill: "Boulogne u got Cherbourg".

Miller: "Cherbourg you got Paris". Hamill: "Paris u got Berlin". These eight lines uttered by two junior officers encompass many of the issues, which are mentioned in the introduction. The implication being that the British are being slow, that Caen should have been taken by now and it is this which is preventing the Americans from taking St Lo. They are holding us [the US] up from winning the war for them [the British]. This was quite the opposite of the facts. As it was necessary to hold the panzers at Caen, while the US forces took Cherbourg. Bradley was not prepared to move on St Lo until Cherbourg was secured. He considered the battle for St Lo could not begin until four days after that. This coupled with the late June channel gales, which destroyed the American "Mulberry", (6) slowed the build up for the US break out. And secondly the issue of whether Tiger Tanks and the SS were committed at this stage to this area in front of the U.S beaches, as shown in the movie. It is this use of world war two legends: the formidable SS, the supposably ubiquitous 88 and the Tiger Tank that totally questions the need for an historical advisor on this film. The irony being, it is an historical opposite, these issues, and the actual facts. It was the British and Canadians who were fighting the SS [eventually 5 divisions] and the Tiger tanks. They were drawing the bulk of the German armour onto them, to allow a US breakout in the west. For Stephen Ambrose to condone the words uttered by Miller and Hamill and to imply the SS and Tigers were engaged with the Americans at this early time in the invasion makes one question his understanding of the Normandy campaign, or his motivation for a significantly biased view. It is the perpetuation of the myths, as listed above, in this movie, which has turned them into perceived fact by many millions of people around the world. The capture of Caen had been listed as an actual D Day objective. This was an obvious target as it was a centre for road and rail on the east flank; it was also on the northern edge of a plain that made it suitable for the development of a large airfield complex. This plain was also suitable for the development of armoured exploitation south toward Falaise. As much of the enemy armour lay west and southwest of Caen it was an area of concentration, this meant that the movement of these forces to by pass it left their flank exposed to British armoured counter attack. Also, an attack against Caen by the German armour left them open to allied air attack in the open country around this area. Caen's capture or the threat of its capture meant that one way or the other it would be hotly contested by both sides. What Montgomery came to understand more so than anyone else, was the importance of Caen, as a magnet for the German armour. It was not that important, contrary to some historians, that Caen be taken on D Day, or even within several weeks. But, that the area [Caen] occupied by the second army engage the bulk of the German forces to allow the Americans to capture the major objective of Cherbourg. The capture of Cherbourg occurred on the 27th of June and Caen had still not fallen. It wasn't necessary for it to fall until the Americans had Cherbourg and were ready to break out. Bradly stated, "That if the [British] second army kept panzer divisions at Caen, that was as good as possessing it". (7) Caen was the main objective of the original Overlord plan developed by General Morgan the Chief of staff to the Supreme Allied Commander [Designate], i.e. the senior staff

officer at headquarters set up to plan the allied invasion of France before Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander, [COSSAC]. Similar reasons for the capture of Caen were both obvious to Montgomery and COSSAC, but it was not clear in the COSSAC plan how the capture of a port [significant for supply] would eventuate and what the significance of the battle for Caen would be. To Montgomery it was clear what part Caen would play in the D Day assault and the subsequent Normandy campaign. That of drawing the German armour there to be gradually eliminated and their not to be replaced at anywhere near the rate of its destruction. This was evident from the impact the allied air superiority had on German units, forcing them to travel mostly at night. Montgomery had promised the Air Force the capture of Caen and its airfield, but then later realized that the actual ground was not important. However he had sown the seeds with Tedder (8) and Conningham (9) and gave them the ammunition to constantly complain at SHAEF that Monty was not achieving what he had promised. Lt-Colonel Dawnay Monty's Military Attache later stated: I think he had given the RAF a totally false impression, at St Paul's and elsewhere, as to when he was going to get those airfields, south of Caen-a totally false impression. Because when we got there [to Normandy] we realized quiet clearly that he didn't care a damn about those airfields, as long as he could draw all the German armour on to that [eastern] side and give a chance for his right swing to break out! (10) In light of his clear understanding of the issues it was certainly a mistake on Montgomery's part to suggest that Cean could be taken on D Day. General West of the COSSAC staff said, "I told Monty he couldn't take Caen the first day. He [Monty] was very optimistic. After all it is 12 miles from some of the beaches. It would take troops a day to move that far. Only large airborne forces could have taken [Caen]". (11) Montgomery was only optimistic and had not stated to West that Caen must be taken. While the time frame Montgomery expected [D plus 8] was too optimistic, [Bradley did not believe it could be done before D plus 15] however the direction was clear as only Montgomery could be. Montgomery was obviously disappointed over the failure before Caen but it was achieving his objective that of "Writing down the enemy". Not only was Montgomery criticised for slowness in the capture of Caen, but also Dempsey, the commander of second army, tasked with its capture was severely pilloried. Nigel Hamilton summed up Dempsey so well, I felt compelled to quote his comments. It says much for Dempsey that he performed his role so selflessly, and it was a selflessness that Bradley admired, even if lesser American commanders scorned it. One distinguished American historian would even blame the failure of the Allies to finish the war in 1944 on the decision to place Dempsey on the left flank, with Bradley on the west; yet it is frankly inconceivable that the 'piss and vinegar' (12) American generals would have accepted a role so self-effacing and lacking in 'glory gains' as that which Dempsey unhesitatingly took on, under Montgomery. Dempsey afterwards declined to write his memoirs, which would explain his thankless role in Normandy, and received insults and decades of self perpetuating American mythology with quiet equanimity, and even ordered his diaries be burned rather than stir up inter-allied bickering. (13) The issues were bathed in a murkiness that had not only been stirred up by members of SHEAF but also by Montgomery himself. Montgomery did not have a good relationship with some members of Eisenhower's staff, ironically most of them being British. He had alienated General Morgan over his criticism of the COSSAC plan and had upset both Tedder who was the deputy supreme commander and Conningham

the commander of the allied tactical air force by promising the carpiquet airfields at Caen. They also harboured resentment over such issues as the lack of recognition and attention that the RAF received from the press and Monty's celebrity status. The air force commanders wanted the airfields Monty had promised and a campaign of backbiting complaining and backstabbing ensured at SHAEF, when they did not arrive. He had failed to realize what problems his promise to the air force had created for him. So why have so many historians jumped on this issue of the taking of Caen on D Day? The main reasons besides the nationalistic ones, being, the perception that the British and Canadians were going to break out in the East, [left] and the many derogatory comments and attacks on Montgomery which took place. Most emanating from SHAEF and those there who had issues with Montgomery. The statement that alludes to the impression of an intended British breakout was the Eisenhower allegation: "When a week had passed since D Day without the capture of Caen, it became clear to us at SHAEF that the hopes of a rapid breakthrough on the left were now remote". (14) Nigel Hamilton summed it up well, " Eisenhower's unfortunate obfuscation has coloured military accounts ever since, polarizing chroniclers into nationalistic camps". (15) Eisenhower's comment displayed a distinct lack of understanding of the plans of his commander in the field. Not at any time did Montgomery issue any orders that second army would break out in the East. A breakout in the East had been part of the COSSAC plan but had been rejected by both Montgomery and Eisenhower months before D Day. Montgomery stated his intention on May 15th at St Pauls when he spoke in the presence of the King and Prime Minister that in the week after the D Day landings the beachhead should expand northwest, west and south, but not necessarily east or southeast. On the left flank the British were to hold Caen, which was to act as a pivot, and prevent the success of any German counter attacks toward Caen. The U.S. V Corps and the British XXX Corps will attack south toward St Lo-Caumont-Villers-Bocage to give depth to the beachhead and prevent the Mulberry harbours from direct artillery fire. Montgomery was not focused on the left of the bridgehead he was focused on the right or west side. He clearly stated in a note in his diary on the 3rd of January 1944 just after his arrival in London-"the more I examined it the more it became clear that the original plan was thoroughly bad, the front of the assault was too narrow; only one corps HQ was being used to control the whole front; no landing was being made on the East side of the CHERBURG peninsula, though the early capture of the port of CHERBURG was vital; the area of the landing would be very congested." It seemed clear that if the US were to get Cherbourg then the British had to keep the German armour at Caen. The evidence is also clear Montgomery did not change the structure or body of his plans. We can see this by the plans put forward by Montgomery at St Paul's in January 1944. Chester Wilmot the BBC correspondent noted during an interview with DeGuingand Montgomery's chief of staff: "(16) Monty stuck to his original plan and didn't try altering it to any marked degree, despite everyone's natural impatience." However Monty himself helped muddy this issue, when after the war he stated that the whole campaign went totally according to plan. As Lt Col Rankin the C.O. of 2/10 medium Regiment RAA stated many times, "a plan only gets you to the start line" and those with some understanding of military matters will confirm flexibility is a key to successful operations. Montgomery emphasized this on many occasions. He

constantly reiterated flexibility, so it is confusing that he would take such a high moral position, implying that he had foreseen all contingencies and that he had planned all the outcomes of the Normandy campaign. I think that whilst ego and arrogance certainly played a part in the course of action he chose, he also felt that he had been unfairly treated. The myths had begun to supplant the fact. Eisenhower had suggested that Monty had proposed to break out on the left. Patton suggested that he saved the British by taking St Lo and that Montgomery had prevented him from closing the Falaise gap (17). Yet he knew, and we know through the records that these inferences are untrue. Bradley was clear on his position about Caen, and he was also clear about the fact that it was he who stopped Patton [not that he, Patton had any idea of doing it, he was focused on getting to Paris] at Falaise stating, " In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult with Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone." (18) Patton's claim, that he was prevented from closing the gap by British jealousy of the Americans, is stupid. These claims were not only erroneous but one may even question that Third Army (19) reports were somewhat embellished if not exaggerated. Claims by Patton of having possession of Argentan on the 13th August were misleading, whilst patrols were in the area, it was by no means secure, and it would be a further seven days before it was secure. While Patton cast aspersions on the British and Montgomery, re, that he could have closed the Falaise gap, Bradley was more concerned saying," I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken [American] neck at Falaise." (20) Patton had little chance of closing the gap anyway. Bradley realized this when he stated he wanted a firm shoulder built at Argentan, rather than strung out patrols getting cut off at Falaise. Bradley had commented earlier on Patton's style when issuing orders to one of Patton's corps commander over poor links with the corps next to it. "We can't risk a loose hinge.... Germans hit us with three divisions there and it'll make us look foolish. It would be embarrassing to George. George is used to attacks from a single division. He's buttoned up well enough for that. But he's not used to having three or four German divisions hit him. He doesn't know what it means yet" (21) This observation of Patton's style provides a great insight to the supposed greatest general of all time. Perhaps if General Patton had been up against the number of SS divisions that the British and Canadians were, he might have been seen as a more mediocre general. His drive- ahead style worked well, whilst flank exposure to determined enemy units was light, Bradley alludes to this as a concern of his, as his commander. It would have been interesting to see Patton in Dempsey's shoes. I wonder how many soldiers would have got slapped then? It was these types of wild exaggerations after the war that wore Montgomery down and could have produced a state of mind, which lead to somewhat exaggerated claims about every little detail going according to plan. In Dawnay's view Monty later did himself an injustice by insisting after the war that the battle of Normandy had gone "exactly" according to plan. That he retained the overall framework of the strategy he had laid down as early as January 1944 was indisputable, Dawnay felt, but in suggesting that the battle ran true to his detailed conception Monty was doing his own generalship a discredit. It was the sheer acuity and speed with which he realized Rommel was playing into his hands by disputing possession of Caen that impressed Dawnay. (22) So, were the Americans doing all the work and were the British and Canadians really

having a go? Or as portrayed by many who wish to disparage the British, were they sitting around drinking lots of tea? The perception that the Americans were doing all the work has a basis in the amount of ground captured, and the amount of casualties taken, by the US forces compared to those of the British and Canadians. The issue of ground captured has already been covered in the outline of the strategic strategy that Montgomery had devised and achieved in the Normandy campaign. That the British would hold the Germans on the left allow the US to take Cherbourg and then break out. Obviously they would cover and capture more ground. It was not the role of the British/Canadians for territorial gain; it was to write the Germans down. The British and Canadian forces had the bulk of the German armoured forces against them, with the only engagement by a Panzer Division on D Day being against the British. Between D Day and the 26th June the panzer divisions engaged against the British had lost 232 tanks. In fact it would not be until June 26th that American units would encounter a Panzer Division. The first encounter with the SS was the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division south of Craentan on June 13th. The 17th SS was a motorized infantry division with the support of the 17th SS Panzer Abteilung [Battalion] which was about to undergo its baptism of fire. It consisted of 37 StuGs. (23) The second SS first reported contact with US forces on July the 8th This being contrary to that shown in Saving Private Ryan. Why the need to embellish the story? Stephen Ambrose seems to do this on many occasions not only in Saving Private Ryan but also in his book D Day, for he refers to Tiger tanks being with units that had none. He likes to use the legend to suit his needs concerning US troops, but can be quite disparaging of British troops. The US press in July of 1944 made an issue of who they perceived were doing all the work, and Eisenhower appeared somewhat obsessed with it. Brooke noted in his diary. (24) But now comes the trouble; the Press chip in and we hear that the British are doing nothing and suffering no casualties, whilst the Americans are bearing all the brunt of the war. There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best relations between the British and Americans. But it is equally clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy. Bedell Smith, on the other hand, has brains but no military education in its true sense. He is certainly one of the best American officers, but still falls far short when it comes to strategic outlook. With that Supreme Command set-up it is no wonder that Monty's real high ability is not always realised. Especially so when 'national' spectacles pervert the perspective of the strategic landscape. (25) It is important to point out here that at this time, late July, the British / Canadians had no less than five SS panzer divisions and the two heavy tank battalions of Tiger tanks against them on the left. Dempsey was pinning down with his 14 divisions, 14 German divisions which had a total of 600 tanks; five of these divisions were relatively fresh, having been in the line less than two weeks. Whereas, the US forces, consisting of 15 divisions and 4 in reserve, at this time had only a rough conglomeration of units equivalent to 9 divisions with a total of 110 tanks against them. Only one of these divisions had been in combat less than four weeks and the 5th parachute division was untrained. Second army was fulfilling Montgomery's need by being a magnet for the Germans, especially the armoured divisions. Comparing casualty figures can be a somewhat morbid and stilted view by any observer or historian. We only have to look at and analyse any number of battles with high casualty rates that were total disasters and may not have achieved their objectives, to see that they may only be an indication of poor planning and inept leadership. This type of review seems to have overtones of Vietnam and America's

body count. Ambrose in his book "D Day" alludes to the British being a beaten army with generals and senior officers endowed with the burden of WW1, with visions of high casualty rates haunting them, this curtailing their spirit for offensive action. (26) Ambrose cites what he considers an example of this in a letter that Montgomery wrote to Brooke in Nov 1942 after Alamein. "The trouble with our British lads is they are not killers". This type of use of a quote, is an interesting tactic of the likes of Ambrose using selected parts of quotes to support an argument. It is interesting to read the letter to Brooke in its entirety." If the Boche collects a really strong air force in Sicily and Italy I foresee great difficulties in any invasion of those parts. It may well be that our offensive on land against the Germans would be best developed from England across the channel; this obviates all difficulties of shipping, air support, and so on; we should be developing the offensive from a firm base. It would be costly but it would bring off a fight with the Germans. I am certain that the way to deal with the Germans is to face up to him in battle; it is the only way to deal with him, because then you kill him. The trouble with our lads is that they are not killers by nature; they have got to be so inspired that they want to kill, and that is what I tried to do with this Army of mine. Given the large number of Americans 1 believe the invasion of Western Europe could be brought off successfully next summer, about June when the weather is good. But the Army in England would have to be tuned up, and made battle worthy in no uncertain manner" This letter was not remotely about the quality of the British soldier, it was a reflection on all young men. They are not killers by nature. I don't know if Ambrose has some perception of the youth of America as all being products of the Gangs of New York, but what Montgomery was saying, was about the impending invasion of the Continent and he was reflecting on the whole army that would do it, American and British. He was also reflecting on what he had achieved with the 8th Army at Alamein. The point being the need for training, something he was expert at and had been successful with 8th Army. Ambrose also quoted a conversation with Major John Howard 6th Airborne D Company commander. Montgomery's parting words to Howard were, "Bring back as many chaps as you can." And yet those were strange words to say to the commander of an elite force undertaking an absolutely critical task. One might have thought something like "John whatever else get the job done", would have been more appropriate. (27) Here he questions Montgomery's direction, offensive action and sense of urgency of the tasks he had undertaken. Perhaps insinuating that he was extremely cautious which seems to be the catch cry of many American historians when it suits them. You only have to read his letter to Brooke as quoted above to see that Montgomery wanted to bring the Germans to battle and kill them. This type of comment by Montgomery is what made his men feel he cared about them and that they weren't just a number. That Monty would do all he could to do the job with as few causalities as possible. Monty had great faith in those under him and there was no need worry about getting the job done, these were British paras, he knew they would get the job done. Contrast this with Patton, when on one occasion, he stopped one of Third Armie's tanks and made the crew remove the sand bags they had put on the front as extra protection, claiming it made the tank look untidy. Perhaps that's why the saying about "Old Blood and Guts" got referred to by his men as "yes, his guts our blood".

Montgomery though, had more front line service time than all the US generals together having served in every rank from second lieutenant to Field Marshal. Perhaps he just had a greater understanding of the plight of the average soldier, British and US. Casualty statistics for the Normandy campaign would, at first glance, certainly portray that the US had done the lion's share of the work. British and Canadian losses for the Normandy campaign were 24,698 while the US were 37,034. However, there are a number of factors which need to be considered and which may put the figures into some perspective. The US figures are somewhat inflated by the D Day losses at Omaha [3,000cas] and the losses of the two airborne divisions 82nd and 101st D Day total casualties for the US first army were 6,603. The British had only landed one airborne division, so had not generated the losses the two US airborne divisions had encountered. The British and Canadian losses on D Day were under 3,500. These discrepancies were not due to the fact that anyone was fighting harder or not having a better go, but that the US leaders had failed to see the advantages of the support units offered by the British 79th Armoured Division. (28) There was also an exceptionally high rate of casualties amongst US re-enforcements, as many lacked the high standard of training that was evident in the British experience of having been fighting for five years. This lack of training being reflected, when, within days of the landing, Bradley was insisting on more training for his troops within the actual theatre of operations at the time. The US official history states; All during June training is to take place in V Corps zone to perfect tank-infantry tactics which could set the attack rolling once more toward St Lo. (29) By the end of June some US companies had topped 100% casualties, many as a result of poor leadership and poor training of some infantry units. By the 29th of July the US also had almost 240,000 more personnel than the British and Canadians in the theatre of operations, this in itself represented the exposure of a greater number to casualties. Ten panzer divisions took part in the Normandy campaign coincidentally the same number as took part in the German attack in 1940. While some of the German tanks were superior to the allies, over half of each division [they rarely came to full strength] were made up of panzer IV's about the technical equivalent to the allied tanks. The superior Panther was deployed in seven of the ten divisions, but rarely in the theoretical strength of one battalion. The Heavy tank battalions were the only ones to possess the Tiger tank and King Tiger. These usually being allocated at corps level. In Normandy there were only seventy nine Tiger tanks and fourteen King Tigers. None of these were engaged against the US forces and by late August there were only about three Tigers and one King Tiger left in Normandy, with these being abandoned as a result of the lack of fuel in the retreat from Faliaise. Compared to the actual numbers of German tanks deployed in Normandy approximately 700 to 800, the Tigers only represented about 13% of the Total German armoured force. When presented with these facts one must question the preponderance of Tiger tanks represented in American movies such as Saving Private Ryan, especially considering that prior to the Battle of the Bulge the US forces would have rarely encountered such tanks and even then to a small degree. So how did the myth of the Tiger emerge? During the war it started, with the Germans to promoting the invincibility of their Tanks and spreading a wide propaganda campaign. The US forces had a fear of German armour dating back to the

Torch campaign and Kasserine pass (30) where they suffered a dramatic defeat in early 1943. Tiger tanks were used in very small numbers in the defence of Tunis and the legend of their invincibility would probably have started in the US forces about this time. The US press also played a part in the myth development by labelling photos of panzer IV's and Panthers, Tiger Tanks; many tanks became what they weren't through sheer ignorance. The attack at Villers-Bocage in June of 1944 where several Tiger tanks stopped the advance of the British 7th Armoured Division was certainly what legends are made of and cemented the myth of the Tiger tank. It was here that the SS legend Michael Wittman and his crew single handedly destroyed about twenty-five armoured vehicles. This action forced the British from Villers-Bocage and created a problem for the British. That being, a sense of insecurity over the ability of their equipment to defeat the German tanks. Myth it was, as by the end of the Normandy campaign there were fewer than five tigers in the area. That is not to say that they were not formidable vehicles, but they were destroyed by a combination of tactics, training, courage and skill of the British and Canadians. Consequently since world war two the Tiger has grown to be the epitome of the killer all-conquering, unbeatable tank. Stephen Ambrose along with other writers and film makers developed and perpetuated this myth. In Ambrose's book "D Day' he says "In April 1944, the 2nd SS Panzer Division [the Das Reich] moved into town near Toulouse named Montauban. It was refitting after hard service on the East Front, receiving brand new tanks, Tigers, the biggest and best Germany could produce. The tanks were gas guzzlers [Tigers weighed 63 tons and got one-half mile to the gallon]." The reality is that the 2nd SS had no Tiger tanks. (31) Also Ambrose later says" If they reacted actively and energetically, the Germans could counterattack the British at Sword within twenty-four hours with more than 1,000 tanks, many of them brand-new Tigers mounting better guns, they were heavier and better than the Shermans and Churchills." (32) As noted previously the statistics show otherwise, with nowhere near "many" as stated by Ambrose being part of that number. And in movies such as Saving Private Ryan what do we encounter to demonstrate the ability, drive and fortitude of the US soldier, but the Tiger tank. This is not the issue, as all soldiers who fought in the Normandy campaign fought for an Allied cause and the vast majority fought hard for that cause. I think that any tank, Tiger or not, was certainly a monster to the average infantry soldier. It is the generals and historians that appear to wish to prove points and manipulate the circumstances and facts for their own nationalistic end. I wonder about this agenda of Ambrose's to discredit British generals, the British military, especially Montgomery, but also the British soldier. Again in his book D Day he says, "The ordinary infantry divisions of the British army were another matter. They had been in barracks since the British Expeditionary Force retreated from the Continent in June 1940. The ordinary soldier was not as well educated or as physically fit as his American counterpart. Superficial discipline-dress, saluting, etc. -was much better than among the GIs but real discipline, taking and executing orders, was slack. The British War Office had been afraid to impose discipline too strictly in a democratic army on the odd notion that it might dampen the fighting sprit of the men in the ranks. Those British soldiers who were veterans had been badly beaten by the Wehrmacht in 1940; their overseas mates had surrendered to an inferior Japanese army in Singapore in February 1941, to an inferior German army in Tobruk, Libya, in

June 1942, and again to an inferior German force on the Greek island of Leros in November 1943." (33) The same inferior Japanese and German forces that inflicted substantial defeats on US forces in the Philippines, Pearl Harbour, Kasserine Pass Tunisia and presented bloody noses in New Guinea, Battle of the Bulge and Anzio. This type of Ambrose rhetoric can be dredged up about any army. What was the need to insert snide comments as that in the banter between Miller and Hamill, and why vilify the British soldier? Is it some feeling of national insecurity that has deep roots in the War of independence and perhaps resentment for the British burning of Washington in 1812? The American contribution to the winning of World War two is indisputable. Montgomery acknowledged this on many occasions and frequently spoke [and wrote in his diary] highly of the US generals Eisenhower, Bradley and Patton. He was realistic about the US contribution, even suggesting serving under Eisenhower and Bradley to expedite the running of the campaign. I wonder why, as the US contribution was so great, the need to denigrate the others leadership. It just speaks for itself. Stephen Ambrose would have been better to have focused, as he did, in Band of Brothers, on the fine qualities of the US soldier. Perhaps nationalistic sentiments just took over. After all, do some individuals just have something to prove?
(1) Chester Wilmont. The Struggle for Europe. Dempesy was commander of the British Second Army. (2) Ibid. (3) Nigel Hamilton. Monty: the Making of a General 1887-1942. Monty: Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Monty: Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944-1976 (4) Robin Neilands. Normandy. (5) American historian and writer of Band of Brothers, D Day and other books. Died in 2003. (6) Mulberry was the portable harbour, which was pre-fabricated in England and towed across the channel to allow supply of the invasion force without the capture of a port. It's loss put great pressure on the proposed attacks. (7) Omar Bradly US General and commander of US 1st Army. (8) Deputy Supreme Commander SHAEF. Air Marshal Tedder. (9) Air Officer Commanding Allied Tactical Air force. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Conningham (10) Interview with Lt Col Dawnay on 1.2.83 by Nigel Hamilton. (11) Maj-General C.A. West, interview of 19.2.47 by F.C.Pogue. (12) Comment made by Bradley about his own American Generals. (13) Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield. Monty's war years 1942-1944. 1983. (14) D.D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower's own story of the war 1946. (15) Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield. Monty's war years 1942-1944. 1983. (16) Wilmont notes. DeGuingand to Wilmont August 1944. (17) Falaise Gap. Bottle neck created by trapping much of the German army in Normandy between the US, British and Canadian forces at Falaise 20 miles south of Caen. Many Germans managed to escape the trap. (18) Omar N. Bradly. (19) Third Army was commanded by General Patton (20) Omar N Bradley. (21) Diary of Chester B Hansen. Major. ADC to Bradley. Master of the Battlefield Monty's War Years 1942 1944, Nigel Hamilton. (22) Interview by Nigel Hamilton 1.2.83. Monty Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. P662. (23) StuGs are self-propelled assault guns. Not tanks. (24) Field Marshall Sir Allan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff. CIGS. (25) Sir Arthur Bryant. Triumph in the West. (26) Read pages 48 to 53 Stephen Ambrose, D Day. (27) Page 50 D Day Observation by Stephen Ambrose of Montgomery's words and their meaning. (28) General Percy Hobart commander of British 79th Armoured Div. developed the so-called funnies. Tanks that could swim, clear minefields, cross soft ground etc. Offered to Bradley who was luke warm to their USES. (29) US official history (30) Torch, US invasion of French North Africa and a substantial defeat of US forces in Tunis by the Africa Korps at Kasserine Pass 20th Feb 1943. (31) Refer to Panzers in Normandy then and now. Eric Lefevre (32) Page 567 D Day Stephen Ambrose. (33) Page 49 D Day Stephen Ambrose.