John Lewiston

Swedens failed colonisation of the Delaware, 1638 to 1655

Under Gustav II Adolf Sweden seemed to acquire a keen taste for conquest, an integral part of what historian Sven A. Nilsson refers to as Swedens policy of aggrandisement.1 Adhering to this general policy Sweden sought to increase her standing in Europe and indeed the world. Therefore, one could view Swedens attempt to found a colony in North America as a symptom of a national policy designed to increase Swedish prestige. However, the short history of New Sweden, as Swedens colony on the Delaware came to be known, is ultimately one of frustration and failure. With a few exceptions, Swedens efforts to establish global trading posts under the General Trading Company, the Old South Company and then the United South Ship Company, had been met with disappointment. However, despite this the idea was revived under Gustav Adolf during a lull in the wars, and amid the economic fears of costly wars and a sharply declining Baltic trade.2 In 1632, with Sweden under the six year old Queen Christina, Axel Oxenstierna assumed the brunt of power in policy-making in the country. By 1635 Oxenstierna, along with Dutchman Samuel Blommaert, had resolved to found a colony to be guided by another Dutchman, one Peter Minuit, the former director of the New Netherland Company. In 1638, with the arrival of the Key of Calmar and the Griffin in the Delaware, the men realised their dream of founding both a colony and a rival company under Swedish protection.3 Only seventeen years later this dream was destroyed by a Dutch invasion and the conquest of New Sweden. Ultimately it was the Dutch, who had long looked upon the Swedes as interlopers, and their use of direct military action which ended Swedish control of the Delaware.4 However, though the Dutch bear this ultimate responsibility, and there were some difficulties with the English to the north and south, the failure of New Sweden was in many ways selfinflicted. As historian Hans Norman points out, before the Dutch invasion the colony was already in a state of decay, in large part due to the general neglect it had suffered at the

S.A. Nilsson, Imperial Sweden: Nation-Building, War and Social Change, quoted in The Age of New Sweden by (ed.) A. Losman, A. Lundstrom & M. Revera (The Royal Armoury, Stockholm, 1988) p.9 2 th th G.D. Peterson, Warrior Kings of Sweden: The Rise of an Empire in the 16 and 17 centuries (McFarland & Company Inc., North Carolina, 2007) p.214/ J. de Vries, The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 16001750 (Cambridge University Press. New York, 1976) p.17 3 S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, The Rise and Fall of New Sweden: Governor Johan Risinghs Journal 1654-55 in its historical context (Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm, 1988) p.47 4 Ibid, p.45

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hands of the mother country.5 Though there was generally a wish to preserve New Sweden, internal disputes, the prioritisation of domestic issues, and the overshadowing dictates of military policy and war-financing resulted in failures to provide the colony with the resources, supplies, finances, leadership, and people it needed.6 Therefore, I shall analyse the demise of New Sweden by examining internal factors, such as Swedens inability to adequately populate the colony, alongside external factors, such as the actions of the English and Dutch in New Sweden, or the military offensives against Sweden from Russia and Denmark. Furthermore, I shall separately examine New Sweden and Sweden, analysing the extent to which problems in the colony can be attributed to the home country. The first factor to consider in the failure of New Sweden is the role of the Swedens domestic leadership. The leadership must in many ways accept much of the blame for the myriad of problems New Sweden had to endure before the Dutch invasion; after all it was they who were responsible for overarching policy and strategy, upon which the colonys survival depended. As previously mentioned, much of the original initiative, capital, knowledge and experience which drove the New Sweden venture came from Dutchmen.7 Therefore in 1642, after nationalism and lower than expected profits galvanised a Dutch withdrawal, policy underwent a dramatic shift as the enterprise became wholly Swedish, and the government was brought into direct involvement.8 Historian Stellan Dahlgren describes this phenomenon as a shift from the English-Dutch colonial model, which prioritised merchant interests, to the French-continental colonial model, which relied upon royal intervention.9 The crucial outcome of this shift to complete Swedish responsibility was that the fate of New Sweden came to rest on a few significant individuals. Even the previous losses of influential men such as Peter Minuit, whose death on the return voyage to Europe in 1638 was considered a severe blow to the New Sweden project, had been better endured as the hunt for profits gave impetus to searches for able leaders, regardless of their nationality.10 Furthermore, Oxenstierna had strongly favoured a system that left trading to private enterprise, using Dutch short-term profit motives to help strengthen and consolidate the

5 6

Ibid, p.91 M. Revera, The Making of a Civilised Nation, Nation-Building, Aristocratic Culture and Social Change, in The Age of New Sweden by (ed.) A. Losman, A. Lundstrom & M. Revera - p.117 and 103 7 S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, p.57 8 G.D. Peterson, p.223 9 S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, Dahlgrens analysis of Heckschers theory, p.7 10 G.D. Peterson, p.220

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existing Swedish empire.11 Oxenstierna knew that the loss of Dutch colonial experience, safe harbours, navigation skills, and entrepreneurial spirit was a severe setback for the New Sweden colony.12 Now, in 1642, support for the colony in Sweden relied heavily upon Axel Oxenstierna, Peter Spiring and Admiral Klas Fleming, a dependency which was exacerbated as Queen Christina showed little interest in her American possessions, being far more preoccupied with her own lavish spending to create an Athens of the North in Stockholm.13 In 1644, Admiral Fleming was killed in battle against the Danish. Responsibility for the ultimate leadership of the colony now came to rest solely on Axel Oxenstierna, who was sorely pressed by other matters of national interest.14 As a result, support from the mother country waned between 1644 and 1648, with only 2 ships arriving in those years with supplies and trade goods, but few new colonists.15 This is merely one example of a problem which hamstrung the Swedish capacity to maintain New Sweden; domestic issues were always given priority and unfortunately for the colonists in America, Sweden had many domestic issues to consider. Internal disputes were rife throughout Swedish society, though most pronounced when directed at and initiated by the upper echelons of the Swedish hierarchy. Sven A. Nilsson describes the characteristic feature of governance in Sweden as, the presence, sharing or sometimes contesting power with the monarchy by the aristocracy, and this certainly applies to Sweden during the New Sweden era.16 Power and policy-making in Sweden at this time was a complicated business. After all, it must be remembered that the nobleman Axel Oxenstierna was merely supposed to be the regent until Queen Christina reached the age of majority in 1644, and yet he continued to direct much of Swedish policy. Under Gustav Adolf, the king and nobility both sought to create a state strong enough for the requirements of war and great-power politics.17 It was thus that Oxenstierna was able to cement the administrative structure of Sweden, with the agreement of the riksdag and the blessing of the king, so that by 1634 there was no room for the personal rule of the

11 12

M. Revera, p.115 Ibid 13 G.D. Peterson, p.225 14 S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, p.74 15 G.D. Peterson, p.224 16 S.A. Nilsson, in The Age of New Sweden by (ed.) A. Losman, A. Lundstrom & M. Revera p.16 17 Ibid

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monarch.18 Christina found her power hampered by permanent administrative routines, but one should not make the mistake of underestimating her ability to wield influence and disrupt policies she did not favour, such as the New Sweden colony.19 Strong political conflicts, rooted in war, financial mismanagement and the worst harvest in half a century, rose in 1650. In Michael Roberts study of Sweden during the crises of the 17th century, he describes the 1640s and 1650s as an acute phase of chronic disorder.20 Sweden was certainly no exception. During the chaos Christina increasingly began to exert her power, and Oxenstiernas power on behalf of the New Sweden Company diminished.21 This power struggle, despite never issuing into violent upheaval, was certainly a factor in Swedens increasing prioritisation of domestic issues.22 New Sweden was given little consideration as the Swedish council instead spent many perplexed hours debating the news from England and France, with Per Brahe fearing that Sweden was being infected by revolutionary doctrines imported from abroad.23 This fear of a social war was very real in 1650.24 Peasants were plagued by excessive labour services, conscription and poor harvests, whilst the clergy and burghers began to lose power as Christina accorded tax exemptions, titles and to nobles and officers returning from war in 1648.25 These massive alienations of Crown lands doubled noble land in Sweden, and increased it six-fold in Finland, by 1652.26 The Three Commoner Estates demanded a reduktion in this amount of noble land, fearing that the social and political balance of the state was at threat as the aristocracy continued to grow richer at the expense of the rest of society.27 However, Christina considered this be an intolerable infringement on her prerogative.28 Ultimately, Christina was the root of the trouble, as her folly and extravagance, alongside the greed of a rapacious aristocracy, caused a crippling financial crisis.29 Only then, after Christina

18 19

Ibid, p.17 Ibid 20 th Michael Roberts, Queen Christina and the General Crisis of the 17 century, in Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 by (ed.) Trevor Aston (Anchor Books, New York, 1967) p.206 21 S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, p.75 22 M. Roberts, in Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 by (ed.) Trevor Aston p.206 23 Ibid, p.207 24 Ibid 25 Ibid, p.209 26 Ibid, p.210 27 Ibid, p.215 and p.224 28 M. Roberts, in Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 by (ed.) Trevor Aston p.221 29 Ibid, p.225

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allied herself with the aristocracy, was Oxenstiernas positioned strengthened enough to turn his attention to New Sweden.30 By the time Oxenstierna was able to turn his attention to New Sweden the colony was in a perilous condition which in large part came down to one essential point; New Swedens survival as an independent colony relied upon the mother country providing sufficient resources, in terms of manpower, funds and goods, by sending expeditions to North America. However, New Sweden had long been vulnerable to the economic fluctuations of Sweden. In Sven-Erik strms study of the Swedish economy during Swedens Age of Greatness, he points out that, despite Christinas attempts to give Sweden a splendid appearance, Sweden was financially a poor country due to diminishing mineral resources of copper and silver and incessant warfare on the continent.31 Between 1633 and 1677, Swedens income increased, but expenditure also increased from 2,226,909 riksdaler to 5,248,416 riksdaler, dramatically cutting surplus from 1,036,543 to 70,949.32 This was mostly due to the costs of war, including the loss of 614,000 in tolls from Prussian ports, and the loss of French support which had given Sweden 480,000 from 1641 to 1647, before dropping to 206,555 in 1648, and then ceasing until 1656, too late to save the loss of New Sweden. It seems that the upheaval and financial straits of 1650 may have been destructive but it was merely part of a general decline in royal revenue from around 6.36 million silver dollars in 1644, to 3.79 million in 1653, and the necessary reduktion in noble land exempt from tax would not occur until the aristocracy weakened in 1655.33 A decade of economic and political crises, in conjunction with gross financial mismanagement, dramatically weakened The New Sweden Company.34 Indeed, it was well known that the Swedish financial system was shaky, and historian Jan Glete asserts that it was barely able to handle the great power position Sweden had established in the Baltic and northern Germany.35 As a result, after receiving only two ships between 1644 and 1648, none reached the colony again until The Eagle in 1654. Yet, despite years of neglect, New Sweden was not yet lost, and The Eagle could have marked a potential turning point for the colony. Indeed, with his renewed power, Oxenstierna
30 31

S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, p.79 S-E. strm, The Swedish Economy and Swedens Role as a Great Power, 1632-1697, in Swedens Age of Greatness, 1632-1718 by (ed.) M. Roberts (The MacMillan Press, London, 1973) p.73 32 Ibid 33 M. Roberts, in (ed.) T. Aston, p.212 34 S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, p.79 35 J. Glete, Absolutism or Dynamic Leadership? The rise of large armed forces and the problem of political th interest aggregation from a mid-17 century perspective, extracted from Politics and Culture in the Age of Christina by Marie-Louise Rodn (Suecoromana IV, Stockholm, 1997) p.23

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launched an offensive commercial policy and established a Board of Commerce to be responsible for colonial affairs.36 This energetic renewal of interest and preparation to send new expeditions in 1653 were initiated as it had become apparent that something radical had to be done about the Dutch advantage on the Delaware if New Sweden was going to survive.37 However, for a number of reasons these measures did not save New Sweden, and in this case this demands an analysis of the situation in North America and the colony itself. It must be remembered that the Swedish attempt at colonisation was late in comparison with other European powers, in this case the Dutch in New Netherland, and the English in New England and Virginia.38 This left Sweden at a crucial disadvantage in resources and crucially manpower. Relatively soon after the arrival of Swedes in the Delaware, around 1640, there were already 24,614 Europeans on the east coast of North America, around 1,930 of which were Dutch and the rest were English.39 In comparison, The Key of Kalmar and Mns Kling left only 40-50 colonists on the edge of an untamed wilderness.40 Even a decade later, there were 185 Swedes in North America, compared to 43,501 Englishmen and 4,116 Dutchmen.41 Considering these facts, it is easy to agree with Hans Normans assertion that these statistics provide a clear picture of how small the chances were that the Swedish colony, with so few inhabitants, could survive in the long run when the Dutch decided to take possession of New Sweden.42 There are many reasons behind Swedens difficulties in acquiring willing colonists. One crucial point to make is that Sweden-Finland already had large areas of semiwilderness of its own to be developed.43 Not only was the country large, but the population was small, probably not numbering more than a million people within the old borders of Sweden-Finland.44 This is in stark contrast to Swedens colonial competitors, England and the Netherlands, where there was a need of an outlet for an overcrowded population.45 Furthermore, in the 1630s and early 1640s, life was generally good in Sweden and people felt little desire to search for better prospects across the Atlantic. Therefore, even as grain, vegetables and livestock were established by 1642, recruits were hard to acquire, and the
36 37

S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, p.79 Ibid 38 S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, p.45 39 Ibid, p.59 40 G.D. Peterson, p.221 41 S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, p.59 42 Ibid 43 G.D. Peterson, p.213 44 S.A. Nilsson, in The Age of New Sweden by (ed.) A. Losman, A. Lundstrom & M. Revera, p.15 45 G.D. Peterson, p.213

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government resorted to using soldiers convicted of minor offences and Finns accused of slash-and-burn agriculture which threatened mineral mining and destroyed oak forests precious for naval manufacture.46 An example of how tenuous New Swedens existence was is that the loss of 26 colonists between 1643 and 1644 caused a sharp decrease in the population. However, a far more persistent problem was the defection of colonists to New Netherland and New England, a problem accentuated by the arrival of the new governor, Johan Printz in 1643. Printz was heralded as being intelligent, resourceful, brave and shrewd, but heavily criticised for being headstrong, overbearing, arrogant and unjust.47 Unfortunately, for the colonists it was not his virtues which are best remembered. Despite extending Swedish territory and constructing many defensive works, colonists fled to escape Printzs authoritarian rule.48 Furthermore, Dutchmen who had either been taken prisoner or were relics of early Dutch-Swedish expeditions were often distrusted and desperate to leave for Netherland, but the need for men was so great they were forbidden. There was even an example of two Swedish men abandoning wives and children to escape to Maryland. It cannot be denied however, that Printz was often forced into harsh methods to prevent mass abandonment of the colony. After all morale plummeted due to severe shortages of beaver pelts, food and a general lack of contact with Sweden, which even lasted six years between 1648 and 1654. The abandonment of New Sweden, and defection to foreign colonies to the north and south, undoubtedly had a hugely detrimental psychological and material impact on the survival of the colony. This shortage of people in the colony was a continual problem, but just as pronounced was the inappropriate composition of the colony.49 For example, there were periodical food shortages in the colony in the 1640s due to the fact that, of 105 males in 1644, approximately 25% were soldiers, and a similar proportion were officers and officials, servants, artisans, blacksmiths and carpenters.50 This left only a relatively small part of the population dedicated to agriculture, so vital in maintaining population growth and weaning New Sweden off its reliance on English merchants and sporadic expeditions from Sweden. In 1647, only 28 people were settled on farms, with the rest huddled around Fort Christina or garrisoned in blockhouses or forts downriver. By 1648, there were 15 farmers, as opposed to

46 47

G.D. Peterson, p.223 Ibid 48 Ibid 49 S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, p.72 50 Ibid

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10 officials and 24 soldiers, and even these precious few had wasted precious seasons attempting an abortive effort to cultivate tobacco, a market dominated by the English, and requiring specialist knowledge.51 By the time The Eagle arrived, and the population of farmers surged to 61, it was too late to stabilise the population and supply difficulties before the arrival of the Dutch. From this perspective, one comes to realise how the losses of expeditions, such as The Cat in July 1649, a ship lavishly loaded with supplies and over 70 people, was considered a catastrophe for the colony.52 It is merely a testament to just how tenuous the survival of New Sweden truly was. It was thus that need for manpower and supplies by 1654 was desperate, and the arrival of The Eagle, and Risinghs recapture of the Dutch Fort Casimir (renamed Fort Trinity), was heralded as New Swedens salvation from English and Dutch encroachment, as well as the crippling shortage of supplies. The Eagle brought around 200 new colonists, the most ever to arrive in New Sweden, despite the loss of over a hundred passengers who had succumbed to a plague during the voyage. Further cause for optimism came from reports that many more passengers had been left on the wharf in Goteborg as they surpassed capacity on The Eagle and The Golden Shark. Finally, Risingh was instrumental in making peace deals with Lenape and Minqua Indians which gifted the Swedes on the Delaware a a supply line to English merchants to the south, and whole new source of beaver pelts. However, all optimism was lost when news arrived that a navigation error had led The Golden Shark, carrying huge quantities of supplies and trade goods, straight into the Hudson River and the welcoming arms of Peter Stuyvesant, the ruthless governor of New Netherland. It had become clear that the Dutch were determined to remove the Swedish presence on the Delaware. As previously mentioned, it cannot be forgotten that New Swedens existence as an independent colony under the Swedish crown was ended Peter Stuyvesants invasion of the Delaware. In what was a relatively awesome display of military power, Stuyvesant took 7 armed ships and 370 soldiers, more than the population up the Delaware, and swept aside resistance at Fort Trinity, before seizing Fort Christina a day later.53 Yet, despite this direct military action, it must also be remembered that there was never any threat that this would galvanise a war in Europe between Sweden and the Netherlands. This is a stark reminder of where New Sweden stood in terms of the great power politics Sweden had to manoeuvre
51 52

S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, p.122 S. Dahlgren & H. Norman, p.75/ G.D. Peterson, p.225 53 G.D. Peterson, p.226

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through at the time. Sweden was a state dedicated to conflict, temporarily uniting monarchy and noblemen in a cause to preserve their war machine, placing severe burdens on the Swedish people in terms of mass conscription and taxation, to pursue ultimately pointless wars in Poland, Germany, Denmark, and Russia. This preoccupation with warfare, internal conflict and financial mismanagement, ultimately left New Sweden with drastically inadequate support.54 It is hard to disagree with Margaret Reveras conclusion that in light of the countrys circumstances, a whole-hearted and successful commitment to colonisation was hardly to be expected.55 The demands of numerous wars and the subsequent financial hardships made unbearable demands on Swedens ability to commit the resources, manpower, leadership, military, supplies or ships to New Sweden necessary to counteract the Dutch and English advantage in North America. It was impossible to avoid a conflict of interest between the needs of, and for, colonists and domestic considerations.56

54 55

M. Revera, p.114 Ibid, p.117 56 S.A. Nilsson, p.17