Saint Petersburg Institute Atomenergoproekt

NPP-2006 with reactor VVER-1200/491

Reporter: Chief Engineer for the Branch of NPP with New Generation Reactor VVER 1 A. Altshuller

Basic principles and approaches:

Maximum use of approaches taken in developing already existing
designs of nuclear power plants with VVER reactors; Minimizing risks and improving system characteristics by adopting proven technical approaches and by using equipment similar or identical to that used at existing plants; Improving system and equipment characteristics by abandoning excessive conservatism and by optimizing design margins; Ensuring required level of safety, also in case of a beyond-designbasis accident, by selecting reasonable configuration of safety systems including active and passive elements to make possible more extensive use of diversity and functional redundancy principles and to reduce the influence of human error according to the principle of reasonable adequacy; Reducing capital and operating expenditures; Reducing NPP construction expenses and construction period by using available stock of working documentation.
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Designing continuity
VVER-1000 RP -320 Serial design VVER-1000 RP -428 (NPP91) Updated design providing for enhanced safety and improved cost/performanc e ratio Used for Tianwan NPP, China VVER-1000 RP -466 (NPP91/99) Design developed taking into account new European and international requirements (EUR and YVL) Tender bid for NPP FIN 5, Shanmen NPP and Yangjang NPP in China NPP-2006 with RP -491 Design developed taking into account new European and international requirements

Used for nuclear power plants in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Czechia

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE VVER-1200/491 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

3200 3212 Nominal electric power at cooling oC water temperature + 18+18oC 1160 33.7 NPP service life
year

50 8400 6400 7.0

0.2 0.12

298.6 329.7 16.2

Improved cost/performance ratio

- Thermal power increased to 3200 MW; - Electrical unit power increased to 1160 MW (at generator terminals): Gross power unit efficiency increased to 36.2%, net efficiency increased to 33.7 %; Improved heat flow diagram of steam turbine plant; Steam pressure at steam generator outlet increased to 7.0 P Pressure loss in steam lines reduced to 2.0 Bar. Power of NOS diesel generator decreased by abandoning automatic connection to NOS diesel generator in case of external power loss in certain systems
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The system of technical and organizational measures consists of five protection levels: First level: conservative design based on use of the latest norms, rules and standards quality assurance at all stages of the NPP construction (design, equipment design and manufacture, installation, civil construction and operation) control of the condition of all safety barriers during operation safety culture Second level: control at anticipated occurrences and revealed failures This level is intended to ensure the continuous integrity of the first three barriers. Third level: safety systems to avoid transition of equipment malfunctions and operator errors to DBA or DBA to BDBA, as well as for maintaining the radioactive materials inside the localizing systems. Fourth level: accident management, including the localizing functions protection. Fifth level: accident management measures outside the NPP site that are intended to reduce the consequences from releases of radioactive materials into the environment.
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Target probabilistic safety indices for new designs of nuclear power plants with VVER reactors

Design NPP-2006 is developed to ensure the following target probabilistic safety indices: indices summarized frequency of severe core damage less than 10-6 (1/year); frequency of limiting accident release less than 10-7 (1/year).

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Structure and parameters of safety systems

Configuration and capacity of safety systems, safety-important
systems and auxiliary systems used in this design have been selected to meet the target deterministic and probabilistic criteria based on the safety system structure used for the reference project; Configuration and capacity of some of the safety systems have undergone certain changes as compared to the reference project; The changes have been made to enhance safety and to make the project more economically attractive.

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Structure and parameters of safety systems

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Schematic diagram of safety systems

1 reactor, 2 steam generator, 3 RCP, 4 pressurizer, 5 ECCS , 6 containment, 7 outer containment, 8 tank-pit (low concentration borated water storage), 9 heat exchanders, 10 low pressure safety injection pump, 11 High pressure safety injection pump, 12 high concentration borated water storage tank, 13 safety boron injection pump, 14 chemical feed tank, 15 chemical feed pump, 16 core spray header, 17 passive hydrogen recombiner, 18 bubbler, 19 Core melt localizing facility , 20 Alkali emergency storage tank, 21 Main Steam Valve Unit , 22 ventilation unit for emergency underpressure in annulus 23 filter, 24 ventilation stack , 25 Demineralized water storage tank, 26 Emergency feedwater pump, 27 Containment PHRS condenser, 28 PHRS tank, 30 SG PHRS heat exchanger, 32 hydraulic seal, 33 Pump for PHRS tanks makeup, 34 Level controller in PHRS tanks (passive action), 35 valve for makeup of PHRS tanks (for BDBA under de-energizing conditions) .

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Double containment

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Schematic diagram of BDBA management systems

1 Containment passive heat removal system; system; 2 SG passive heat removal system; system; 3 emergency water supply tanks of passive heat removal system; system; 4 chemical reagent emergency supply system; system; 5 recombiners of containment hydrogen removal system; system; 6 - sensors of hydrogen concentration monitoring system; system; 7 safety valve of pressurizer; pressurizer; 8 core catcher; catcher; 9 system of water supply from reactor internals inspection shaft and fuel pool; pool; 10 borated water supply tanks of system JNK; JNK; 11 valves in line connecting core catcher and JNK tanks. tanks. 15

Main functions of system JNB:

Residual heat removal and RP cool-down under NPP blackout
conditions; Residual heat-removal and RP cool-down under conditions characterized by total loss of feed water; Prevention of radioactive coolant release into atmosphere through BRU-A or through SG safety valves in case of an accident accompanied by leak of coolant from the primary circuit into the secondary circuit; Minimization of radioactive coolant release in case of an accident accompanied by leak of coolant from the primary circuit into the secondary circuit and by steam line break in the non-isolable part outside the containment; Serving as redundant system for active safety systems in case of their failure; ensuring RP emergency cool-down in case of an accident accompanied by loss of primary coolant.
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Design bases for system JNB:

System capacity is selected based on the single failure
principle for the most probable scenarios of beyond-designbasis accidents; System consists of four completely independent trains with capacity 433.3%; System functioning is based on passive principles; System design ensures completely independent operation without operators intervention for at least 24 hours; For the period from 24 to 72 hours the design provides for mobile equipment and reserve water supplies available on site to ensure system functions.

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Main functions of system JMP

System JMP reduces and maintains within
design limits pressure inside the containment and removes to the ultimate heat sink the heat released into the containment during beyond-design-basis accidents including those accompanied by severe core damage

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Design bases for system JMP:

System capacity is selected based on the single failure
principle for the most probable scenarios of beyond-designbasis accidents; System consists of four completely independent trains with capacity 433.3%; System functioning is based on passive principles; System design ensures completely independent operation without operators intervention for at least 24 hours; For the period from 24 to 72 hours the design provides for mobile equipment and reserve water supplies available on site to ensure system functions.

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Containment of NPP-2006 and systems JNB and JMP

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Seismic Loads
The NPP is designed for an earthquake with maximum horizontal acceleration at a ground level equal to 0.12g The NPP design considers the aspects of aircraft crash. An aircraft is equivalent to a hard missile of 5.7 t in mass, with a speed of 100 m/s.

External Explosion
The NPP safety-related safetycomponents have been designed to withstand the effect of an air shock wave induced by external explosion. Pressure in the shock-wave front is shockaccepted being equal to 30 kPa, compression phase duration 1 s.

The safety-related components have safetybeen designed with taking into account the wind load at a wind velocity of 30 m/s at a height of 10 m. In the course of further design stages, this load can be correct, taking into consideration that site conditions. It should be mentioned, that the determinative wind load is whirlwind effect. The loads, accepted in the design, are loads induced by whirlwind of Class F3 on the Fujita scale.

Peak (extreme) load due to snow is accepted in the design,being equal to 4.9 kPa.

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Layout principles

Adjoining nuclear island buildings to the reactor building or locating them not far from it. Physical division of buildings into safety trains separated by fire-resistant structural barriers. Reducing the number of communication lines and the volume of communication between buildings by locating them in an optimal configuration in relation to one another Enhancing NPP physical protection by locating redundant equipment in various buildings. Ensuring controlled access to nuclear island buildings. Optimizing system layout and system location in buildings to increase process efficiency and reduce construction costs.
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MAIN LAJOUT OF VVER-1200/491 NPP

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MAIN LAYOUT OF VVER-1200/491 NPP

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Axial section: Control building-Transportation lock .

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Computer-Aided Design complex

Quality control 3D modeling for all areas (PDS Intergraph) 2D modeling (MicroStation) MicroStation) Archive system (ARKI-DM) (ARKI-

Process diagrams (2D modeling SmartPlant P&ID) Project database

Reference database

I&C CADS Electrotechnical CADS Project schedules control system (Primavera)

Civil engineering (Speedicon M)

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PLANT 3D MODEL

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PLANT 3D MODEL

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Conclusion
Technical approaches taken in developing design NPP-2006
meet the requirements of applicable Russian, EUR and IAEA codes and standards. One of the advantages of this concept is that most of the solutions are similar to those used in existing designs and operating plants, the cost of feasibility study for new solutions being decreased and project development/implementation period being reduced. Other specific features of the project: Achieving the design economic and safety targets is ensured by: design solutions being similar to those used in existing designs and operating plants licensability proven construction technology using mostly serial and standard equipment

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Thank you!

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