A Study on Marketing Channel Power, Channel Climate, Partnership and Cooperation Performance: An Empirical Investigation of the Digital Camera

Industry
SHAO-YU CHUANG Graduate Institute of Industrial and Business Management, National Taipei University of Technology No. 1, Section 3, Chung-Hsiao East Road, Taipei , Taiwan 106, R.O.C. and Department of Information Managemen, Diwan College of Management Tainan , Taiwan 721, R.O.C alicechuang@dwu.edu.tw Tung-Lai Hu Department of Industrial Engineering and Engineering, National Taipei University of Technology No. 1, Section 3, Chung-Hsiao East Road, Taipei , Taiwan 106, R.O.C. jameshu@ntut.edu.tw Wen-Chueh Hsieh Department of International Business , Soochow University Taipei , Taiwan 100, R.O.C. Kobe ,657-8501 Japan wshieh@scu.edu.tw ABSTRACT Over the past few years, a considerable number of studies have been made on channel power, partnership, and cooperation performance in marketing channels. However, there is a lack of published research to better understand the linkages between channel climate and channel power, as well as partnership and channel performance. The purpose of this study is to develop a model based on transaction cost showing the linkages among these dimensions of channel relationships. Using linear structural relations (LISREL), a model of the digital camera (DC) industry is developed to illustrate these relationships. The questionnaire is primarily used in conducting this study. The results indicate that partnership is a mediator, connected the channel power, channel climate and cooperation performance. Channel power and channel climate have significant influence on partnership. The most likely explanation is that channel members who are in symmetrical power and better climate, has more significant influence on partnership. Channel power and channel climate have significant and Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University

influence on cooperation performance. Cooperation performance will be better if channel members are in better trust and relationship continuity in channel climate and symmetrical power. Interaction effect does exit between channel power and channel climate. Keywords Channel Power, Partnership, Channel Climate, Cooperation Performance INTRODUCTION
In the face of recent dramatic changes in the business landscape because of technology, markets have become more complex and changeable. If manufacturer make profit efficiently, it might enhance its position of retailers within the distribution channel (Dukes, Gal-Or

Srinivasan 2006). Therefore, the issues of relationships in distribution channels, e.g., channel relation formation, and its corresponding effects and applications have drawn considerable attention in the field of marketing recently (Mohr & Sohi,1995). Reven & Stern (1986) indicated that if channel members experience more trust and support from channel system, their channel performance should be increased. Despite considerable pioneering work that has been made in early literature on channel relationship management, there is still a need to develop a comprehensive conceptual framework coupled with empirical studies developed to characterize interrelationships of the critical factors such as channel power, channel climate, partnership and cooperation performance, for channel relationship management. Our study is motivated by the rapid growth of channel partnerships. Thus, the objective of this paper is to examine the way of channel members used channel power and climate to influence partnerships of distribution channels. Accordingly, here, a comprehensive conceptual model is proposed to investigate the interrelationships of the aforementioned critical factors of channel relationship management in the following three aspects. (1) The effect of channel partnership on cooperation performance. (2) The effect of channel power and climate on partnership. (3) The interaction between channel power and channel climate. The reminder of the paper is organized as follows, (1) literature review; (2) conceptual framework and hypothesis; (3) method; (4) analysis and results; (5) conclusion and implementation. LITERATURE REVIEW Power and power source Power is defined as the ability of one channel member to control decision variables in the marketing strategy of another member in the channel operating at another level (Stern,El-Ansary,& Coughlan,1996), e.g., a manufacturers ability to get a distributor
: :

to do what he would not have done otherwise. Power is derived from various power sources or bases such as coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, expert power, and information power (French & Raven,1959Raven & Kruglanski,1970). Other researchers have partitioned or dichotomized the set of power sources into two groups. Hunt and Nevin (1974) used a coercive-noncoercive distinction, with the latter including reward, expert, referent, and legitimate power sources. Etgar (1978) was the first to apply an economic/non-economic dichotomy, grouping reward and coercive sources in the economic category. Recent empirical investigations of interdependence within channel dyads have incorporated both firms dependence, either from one partners perspective (e.g., Anderson and Narus 1990; Buchanan 1992; Frazier and Rody 1991; Heide 1994; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990) or by querying each partner about its respective dependence (Ganesan 1994). Anderson and Weitz (1989) provide empirical evidence supporting Stern and Reves (1980) proposition that channel relationships that are asymmetric in dependence and power are more dysfunctional, less stable, and less trusting than symmetric relationships. Channel climate and partnership From the perspectives of marketing researchers toward the entity investigated, e.g., an organization or a distribution channel (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Anderson, Lodish, & Weitz, 1987; Churchill, Ford, & Walker, 1976; Falcione & Herden, 1987; Falcione & Kaplan, 1984; Hammond, Brown, & Harmon, 1996; Mohr & Nevin, 1990; Moran & Volkwein, 1992; Verbeke, Volgering, & Hessels, 1998; Williamson,1981), it is generally agreed that a comprehensive definition of channel climate refers to the channel members perceptions of the existing operational conditions of distribution channels, including both intraorganization characteristics and interrelationships with other corresponding members of distribution channels. Channel climate can be viewed as an extension aiming at the interorganizational scope, i.e., a distribution channel, and thus may indicate the atmosphere of working partnerships between dyadic channel members in such aspects as the degrees of mutual trust, conflicts, and supportiveness between channel members (Anderson et al., 1987; Schul et al., 1985). Accordingly, channel climate may also provide some implications in terms of the continuity of partnerships of channel members (Hammond et al., 1996). According to Anderson and Narus (1990), such a channel partnership indicator is further investigated in several aspects, including relative dependence of channel members, coordinating effects, and sustaining satisfaction in working partnerships.
: propostion

In addition to reducing mistrust-induced transaction costs (Williamson, 1981) and conflicts (Lusch & Brown, 1982), Mohr and Nevin (1990) further point out that given the existing interdependence between two channel members, communication with high frequency in mutually supportive and trusting climates may help improve the performance of distribution channels to a certain extent. Cooperation performance Cooperation refers to situations in which parties work together to achieve mutual goals (Anderson and Narus, 1990). Coordination, which implies cooperation, has been known to be essential in such areas as channels of distribution for decades. EI-Ansary (1975) divided channel performance into two type measurements which are quantitative analysis such as distribution cost and qualitative analysis such as level of cooperation, commitment and so on. From social and managerial perspective, El-Ansary and Stern (1996) suggest that Channel performance should be included three factors: effectiveness, fair and efficient. Transaction cost A transaction is a process by which a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface (Williamson, 1979, 1985). In the classical economic theory it is not only argued that the price mechanism to be able to coordinate the behavior of transaction, but also assumed that consumer information is symmetric in the market. Since both buyers and sellers have the same amount of information; the transaction can be executed without cost. In reality markets are often inefficient (e.g., information asymmetry) and uncertain (e.g., product and process uncertainty). In order to process a transaction, customers must conduct activities such as searching for information, negotiating terms, and monitoring the on-going process to ensure a favorable deal (Coase, 1937).The transaction cost can also be affected by product uncertainty and process uncertainty. Product uncertainty refers to possible unexpected outcomes of product use or the inability of the product to meet customer expectations. Process uncertainty refers to the customer not having a complete confidence in the transaction process and a higher level of uncertainty generally implies a higher transaction cost (Liang & Huang, 1998). CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS Building on advances in the prior literature (Hu & Sheu, 2003; Hu, Sheu, & Huang, 2002; Hu, Sheu, & Hsieh, 2002), a comprehensive framework is proposed, as presented in Fig. 1, to characterize the interrelationships of the aforementioned four critical factors, i.e., channel power, , climate, partnership and corporation performance,
: : Cooperation performance is a key marketing and organizational issue, given the potential and actual impact in the accomplishment of organizational goals (Coelho & Easingwood 2003). El-Ansary (1975) indicates that the cooperation performance can be general defined as a consequence of interaction among channel members. : 76

in channel relationship management. Channel Power Partnership Channel Climate Fig. 1. Conceptual framework of the proposed model. Relation between Partnership and cooperation performance The research question considered is a long-term partnership within a distribution channel promotes effective competition among distribution channels. Of interest are the direction and magnitude of impact that partnership may have on the cooperation performance. The above suggests the following formal research hypothesis: H1: In channel relationships characterized by higher levels of partnership, both manufacturer and retailer will have higher cooperation performance. Relation between channel power and partnership It is important to consider that more dependence of retailer more power of manufacture does. Thus, manufacture-retailer dyad should careful use its own power to control channel members in order to enhance the partnership. The above suggests the following formal research hypothesis: H2: The higher levels of asymmetric power in manufacture-retailer dyad, the higher levels of partnership maintenance. Relation between channel climate and partnership From an organization theory point of view, dyadic trust seems to be a key element in maintaining harmonious channel climate leading to a long-term partnership between dyadic channel members. The above suggests the following formal research hypothesis: H3: The better channel climate the better partnership maintenance. Relation between channel power and cooperation performance Power generally must be used in a marketing channel to gain cooperation and also to improve cooperation performance (Alderson, 1965; Stern, El-Ansary & Coughlan, 1996). From this viewpoint one may say that power will affect cooperation performance. Therefore, the above suggests the following formal research hypothesis: H4The higher levels of asymmetric power in manufacture-retailer dyad, the higher levels of cooperation performance. Relation between channel climate and cooperation performance Channel members with trust and longterm cooperation in the distribution channels will improve cooperation performance and also reduce transaction cost (Dwyer, Cooperation Performance

: Cooperation Performance : Morgan and Hunt (1994) argue that partners that deliver superior benefits will be highly valued, and firms will commit themselves to establishing, developing, and maintaining relationships with such partners. Hence, cooperation is the only outcome posited to be influenced directly by both relationship commitment and trust. A partner committed to the relationship will cooperate with another member because of a desire to make the relationship work. Both theory and empirical evidence indicate that trust also leads to cooperation. ... [1]

: (strategy partnering) : : : : : : : Effective channel power improves levels of satisfaction and cooperation among members and ultimately improves channel efficiency and effectiveness (Dwyer, 1980; Kasulis & Spekman, ... [2] : : : : : : : Herein, dyadic trust refers to the mutual belief held by dyadic channel members in ... [3] : : : : : : : : :

Schurr & Oh, 1987; Mohr & Spekman , 1994; Anderson & Weitz, 1989). The above suggests the following formal research hypothesis: H5The better channel climate in manufacture-retailer dyad, the better cooperation performance. Interaction between channel power and Channel climate A harmonious channel climate can be readily maintained under the condition that channel power asymmetry is significant. The source member may tend to believe that the corresponding target member will not behave opportunistically to damage the existing dyadic trust relationship since; otherwise, the target member would have to pay for it with relatively more unexpected impact. The above suggests the following formal research hypothesis: H6The higher levels of asymmetric power of manufacture in manufacture-retailer dyad, the higher levels of channel climate.

: the : : :

: Correspondingly, under the condition of high power asymmetry, the target member may pay for greater loss than the source member in the case

METHOD
To examine the validity of the proposed hypotheses, empirical tests were conducted using the linear structural relations (LISREL) analytical tool. There are three major procedures are involved in the tests: (1) specification of operational measures, (2) model formulation, and (3) sampling and data collection. They are detailed below. Specification of operational measures According to the properties of LISREL, two types of variables, including (1) latent variables and (2) manifest variables, should be appropriately identified before system analysis. Table 1 summarizes all the variables. Table 1 Summary of operational measures
Latent Variables X1: Channel Power X2: Channel Climate Corresponding manifest variables X11: Reward power X12: Coercive power X12: Legitimate power X13: Expert power X14: Referent power X15: Information Power X21: Trust X22: Relationship continuity Y11: Commitment Y12: Communication Y13: Cooperation Y21: Satisfaction Y22: Cooperative willingness Y23: Sales quantity ( of the source member) Y24: Sales ability (of the source member)

that their common consensus of trust is broken. Therefore, the source member would believe that the corresponding target member may not willingly conduct any opportunistic behavior to damage the existing harmonious channel climate. In addition, the source member with more power may expect to maintain the predominance over the target member in the interest-induced interaction process. This will lead to continuity of the harmonious channel climate in the interest-induced interaction process. : : : : : : : : :

Y1: Partnership Y2: Cooperation Performance

Model formulation

The main analytical technique used in this study is linear structural relations (LISREL model), which has been extensively used for the analysis of causal hypotheses on the basis of nonexperimental data (Bagozzi, 1981; Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993; Qiu, 1999). Employing LISREL program, the proposed conceptual framework is reformulated as a hypothetical model, as presented in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2. Proposed LISREL-based hypothetical model. Sampling and data collection Data used for this experiment were collected through interview questionnaire surveys aimed at the digital camera (DC) industry of Taiwan. A total of 180 Taiwanese DC retailers were sampled to fill out the questionnaire. Using the returned interview surveys, the final valid sample size is 139 after elimination of 24 out of the 163 returned questionnaires because of either incomplete information or questions not answered. Correspondingly, 139 DC manufacturerretailer distribution channels were investigated in the surveys. Following the measures suggested in Cooper and Emory, the 139 samples were then examined with the Cronbachs a tests to ensure the reliability of these samples to represent the corresponding population for the experiment in this study (Cooper & Emory, 1995; Cronbach, 1951). Results of the preliminary tests indicated the reliability of the collected survey data. According to the numerical results of the Cronbachs a tests, all the Cronbachs a measurements are greater than 0.7 l, implying high reliability of the collected data. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS This section summarizes the numerical results obtained from the LISREL analytical tool, and corresponding discussions are provided below. Assessment of overall model fit Using LISREL 8.3, the present model yielded a not significant x2 (p = 0.18) is greater than the corresponding critical value 0.05, suggesting a statistical consistency between
:

: : : : 2

the hypothetical structure and the data. Table 2 shows that the entire structure of the proposed conceptual framework is appropriate to characterize the interrelationships of these latent variables. According to the assessment criteria suggested by Anderson and Gerbing (1988), the estimates of both GFI (GFI=0.92) and AGFI (AGFI=0.84) are greater than the corresponding critical value 0.90and 0.80; similarly, RMR (RMR=0.04) are less than the corresponding critical value 0.05. Correspondingly, all the assessment measures indicate that the proposed conceptual framework exhibits a very good fit to collected data. Table 2 Results of goodness-of-fit tests
Assessment measure (1) x2 (2) Goodness-of-fit index (GFI) (3) Adjusted goodness-of-fit index(AGFI) (4) Root-mean-square (RMR) Estimate P = 0.18 0.92 0.84 0.04 Critical vale >0.05 >0.90 >0.80 >0.05 Indication Good fit Good fit Good fit Good fit
: : : , : : : : , : : : :

Influence analysis of manifest variables This test scenario investigates the capability of a given manifest variable to characterize the corresponding latent variable with the influence index () provided by LISREL. According to the numerical results summarized in Table 3, it can be inferred that overall, the influences of the manifest variables on the corresponding latent variables are significant. Particularly, the specified manifest variables, including reward power, trust, commitment, and satisfaction seem to be highly suitable to characterize the corresponding latent variables since their values are 1.0. As we have seen in Fig3 and Table 4, the estimate of the corresponding aggregate effect of channel power is 0.21, however its corresponding direct effect is merely 0.09. Such numerical results imply that channel power does not seem to facilitate cooperation performance. Therefore, there is no reason strong enough to accept Hypothesis 4, implying that the effect of channel power asymmetry on cooperation is not significant. The result suggest that channel power is not the only factor should be considered to achieve cooperation performance in the distribution channels. For convenience, the corresponding analytical results of these hypotheses tests are summarized in Table 6.

Table 3 Summary of the influence indexes () for influence analysis

Dependent variables Manifest variables Commitment Communication Cooperation Satisfaction Cooperative willingness Sales quantity Sales ability Independent variables Manifest variables Reward power Coercive power Legitimate power Expert power Referent power Information Power Trust Relationship continuity Latent variables Partnership 1.000 0.810** 0.870** ******* ******* ******* ******* Latent variables Channel Power 1.000 0.920** 0.880** 0.750** 0.790** 0.640** ******* *******
: : : , : : : : : : : , : : : : : : : , : : : : : : : , :

Cooperation performance ******* ******* ******* 1.000 0.820** 0.930** 0.790**

Channel Climate ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* 1.000 0.910**

: : : : : : , : : : : : : : : : : , : : : :

significant

not significant

: : :

Fig. 3. Illustration of direct relationships among latent variables.

Table 4 Corresponding effects to cooperation performance

Effect-Source Type of effect Indirect effect 0.12 0.03 0 Aggregate effect 0.21 0.27 0.31 Direct effect Target variable: cooperation performance 0.09 Channel power 0.24 Channel climate 0.31 Partnership

: : : : : : : In a channel relationship, partnership has positive effect on cooperation performance (e.g., H1). Once retailers have more communication,

Table 6 Analytical results of hypotheses tests

Hypothesis H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Statement In channel relationships characterized by higher levels of partnership, both manufacturer and retailer will have higher cooperation performance The higher levels of asymmetric power in manufacture-retailer dyad, the higher levels of partnership maintenance. The better channel climate the better partnership maintenance. The higher levels of asymmetric power in manufacture-retailer dyad, the higher levels of cooperation performance. Better channel climate in manufacture-retailer dyad, better cooperation performance. The higher levels of asymmetric power of manufacture in manufacture-retailer dyad, the higher levels of channel climate. Result significant significant significant Not significant significant significant

commitment, and cooperation with their manufactures, their satisfaction will be increase and also will prefer to continuously work with the manufactures. In a distribution channel (see Table 6), responds agreed that the use of the asymmetric power enhances the partnership (e.g., H2); however, the use of asymmetric channel

CONCLUSION AND IMPLEMENTATION This paper has presented a comprehensive conceptual framework to investigate the interrelationships among channel power asymmetry, channel climate, partnership, and cooperation performance, which is regarded as the relationship management. Managerial implications In marketing channels management, channel power, climate, performance, and relationship are important factors to be considered. Using partnership as a mediator, manufactures can gain a better trust from their retailers. The study suggests that in DC industry, manufactures should build a harmonies channel climate with symmetric channel power in order to maintain a solid and long-term partnership with their retailer. Therefore, with solider and longer partnership both manufacturer and retailer can reduce their transaction cost and prevent opportunistic behavior. Further research Our finding should be viewed as valuable insight toward a better understanding of channel relationships. Here, our study suggest several directions for further research. (1) The effects of channel climate on both short-term and long-term partnership warrant more investigations. (2) Evaluation of the corresponding effects on partnership under various conditions of

power has no directly effect on cooperation performance (e.g., H4). In addition, retailers acknowledged that if they have less trust and communication with their manufacture, the use of the channel power is considered to distract the manufacture from achieving better cooperation performance within the manufacture-retailer dyad. It would be better to provide trust and relationship continuity to retailer rather than the use of channel power. From the hypothesis 3 and hypothesis4, it is clear that ... [4] : , : because they

channel power coupled with different channel climate pursues further investigation. It should also be noted that different combinations of channel power asymmetry conditions and channel climate may have diverse effects on partnership. (3) Further case studies aimed at other industries may be useful. Extensions for managing transnational distribution channel relationships also warrant
: :

investigation. In conclusion, this study has contributed to theory by clarifying the relationship between the partnership and cooperation performance, along with the relationship between channel power, channel climate and partnership. These are important issues addressed, and an understanding of them is likely to lead more effective channel performance and channel management. Finally, this study has provided directions for future research regarding multiple channel strategies.
: this study have

Reference
Alderson, W. 1965. Dynamic Marketing Behavior. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. Andersen, P. H. & Kumar, R. 2006. Emotions, trust and relationship development in business relationships: A conceptual model for buyerseller dyads. Industrial Marketing Management. 35: 522-535. Anderson, E. & Narus, J. A. 1990. A Model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturer Firm Working Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 54: 42-58. Anderson, E. & Weitz, B. A. 1989. Determinants of Continuity in Coventional Industrial Channel Dyads. Marketing Science, 8: 310-323 Anderson, E. & Weitz, B. A. 1992. The Use of Pledges to Build and Sustain Commitment in Distribution Channels. Journal of Marketing Research, 29: 18-34. Anderson, E., Lodish, L. and Weitz, B. A. 1987. Resource Allocation Behavior in Conventional Channels. Journal of Marketing. 22: 365-376. Buchanan, L. 1992. Vertical Trade Relationships: The Role of Dependence and Symmetry in Attaining Organizational Goals. Journal of Marketing Research. 20: 65-75. Buklin, L. P. & Sengupta S. 1993. Organizing Successful Co-Marketing Alliance. Journal of Marketing. 57: 32-46. Churchill, G. A., Jr., Ford, N. M. & Walker, O. C. Jr. 1976. Organizational Climate and Job Satisfaction in the Sales force. Journal of Marketing Research, 13: 323-332. Dukes, A. J., Gal-Or, E. & Srinivasan, K. 2006. Channel Bargaining with Retailer
: : Anderson, E. & Narus, J. A. 1984. A Model of the Distributors Perspective of Distributor-Manufacturer Working Relationships. Journal of Marketing.48: 62-74. : Andaleeb, S. S. 1996. An Experimental Investigation of Satisfaction and Commitment in Marketing Channels: The Role of Trust and Dependence. Journal of Retailing, 72: 77-93. : e

Asymmetry. Journal of Marketing Research, 43: 84-97. Dwyer, F. R., Schurr, P. & Oh, S. 1987. Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 51: 11-27. El-Ansary, A. I. & Stern, L. W. 1972. Power Measurement in the Distribution Channel. Journal of Marketing Research, 9: 47-52. Etgar, M. 1978. Intrachannel Conflict and Use of Power: A Reply. Journal of Marketing Research, 15: 275-276. Frazier, G. L. & Rody, R. C. 1991. The Use of Influence Strategies in Interfirm Relationships in Industrial Product Channels. Journal of Marketing, 55: 52-69. Ganesan, S. 1994. Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer0Seller Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 58: 1-19. Hunt, S. D. &Nevin, J. R. 1974. Power in a Channel of Distribution: Source and Consequences. Journal of Marketing Research, 11: 186-93. Liang, T. P., & Huang, J. S. 1998. An empirical study on consumer acceptance of products in electronic markets: A transaction cost model. Decision Support Systems. 24: 29 31. Lusch, R. F. & Brown, J. R. 1982. A Modified Model of Power in the Marketing Channel. Journal of Marketing Research, 19: 312-23. Mohr, J. & Nevin, J. 1990. Communication Strategies in Marketing Channels: A Theoretical Perspective. Journal of Marketing, 50: 36-51. Mohr, J. & Sohi, R. S. 1995. Communication flows in distribution Channels: Impact on Assessments of Communication Quality and Satisfaction. Journal of Retailing, 71: 393-416. Mohr, J. & Spekman, R. 1994. Characteristics of Partnership Success: Partnership Attributes, Communication Behavior, and Conflict Resolution Techniques. Strategic Management Journal, 5: 135-152. Morgan, R. M. & Hunt, S. D. 1994. The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing. Journal of Marketing, 58: 20-38. Noordewier, T. G., John, G. & Nevin, J. R. 1990. Performance Outcomes of Purchasing Agents in Industrial Buyer-Vendor Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 54: 80-93. Smith, J. B. & Barclay D. W. 1997. The Effect of Organizational Differences and Trust on the Effectiveness of Selling Partner Relationship. Marketing. 61: 3-21. Stern, L. W. and Reve, T. 1980. Distribution Channels as political Economies: A Framework for Comparative Analysis. Journal of Marketing, 44: 52-64. Ulaga, W. & Eggert , A. 2006. Value-Based Differentiation in Business Relationships: Gaining and Sustaining Key Supplier Status. Journal of Marketing, 70:119-136. Journal of

: Dwyer, F. R. & Walker, O. 1981. Bargaining in an Asymmetrical Power Structure. Journal of Marketing, 45: 104-115. Dwyer, F. R. 1980. Channel member satisfaction: : Frazier, G. L. & Summers, J. D. 1986. Perceptions of Interfirm Power and Its Use Within a Franchise Channel of Distribution. Journal of Marketing Research, ... [6] : Gaski, J. F. 1984. The Theory of Power and Conflict in Channels of Distribution. Journal of Marketing, 48: 9-29. Goodman, L. E. & Dion, P. A. ... [7] : Kasulis, J. J. & Spekman, R.t E. 1980. A Framework for the Use of Power. European Journal Marketing Research, 14:180-91. Kumar, N., Scheer, L.K. , and ... [8] : Moorman, C., Deshpande, R. & Zaltman G. 1992. Relationships Between Providers and Users of Marketing Research: The Dynamics of Trust Within and ... [9] : Wilson, D. T. 1995. An Integrated Model of Buyer-Seller Relationships. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 23: ... [10] ... [5]

 5 : [1]

2007/3/27 5:35:00 PM

Morgan and Hunt (1994) argue that partners that deliver superior benefits will be highly valued, and firms will commit themselves to establishing, developing, and maintaining relationships with such partners. Hence, cooperation is the only outcome posited to be influenced directly by both relationship commitment and trust. A partner committed to the relationship will cooperate with another member because of a desire to make the relationship work. Both theory and empirical evidence indicate that trust also leads to cooperation.
5 : [2] 2007/3/27 5:50:00 PM

Effective channel power improves levels of satisfaction and cooperation among members and ultimately improves channel efficiency and effectiveness (Dwyer, 1980; Kasulis & Spekman, 1980; Frazier & Summers, 1986). One of the effective alliances is power imbalance or dependence (Smith & Barclay, 1997; Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993). Symmetric relative dependence exists when both partners are equally dependent on each other. Channel relationships that are asymmetric in relative dependence are more dysfunctional, less stable, and less trusting than symmetric relationships (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Stern and Reve, 1980). Thus, the greater the interdependence, the stronger is the motivation to form a long-term, strategic partnership.
5 : [3] 2007/3/27 5:56:00 PM

Herein, dyadic trust refers to the mutual belief held by dyadic channel members in which the corresponding partner is reliable to fulfill its obligations in the interest-induced exchange process. According to previous literature (Andersonet al., 1987; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Schul et al., 1985), dyadic trust may help to alleviate the fear of opportunistic behavior inherent in both the source member and the target member and also enhance mutual confidence in a distribution channel.
10 : [4] 2007/3/27 6:17:00 PM

In a channel relationship, partnership has positive effect on cooperation performance (e.g., H1). Once retailers have more communication, commitment, and cooperation with their manufactures, their satisfaction will be increase and also will prefer to continuously work with the manufactures. In a distribution channel (see Table 6), responds agreed that the use of the asymmetric power enhances the partnership (e.g., H2); however, the use of asymmetric channel power has no directly effect on cooperation performance (e.g., H4). In addition, retailers acknowledged that if they have less trust and communication with their

manufacture, the use of the channel power is considered to distract the manufacture from achieving better cooperation performance within the manufacture-retailer dyad. It would be better to provide trust and relationship continuity to retailer rather than the use of channel power. From the hypothesis 3 and hypothesis4, it is clear that harmonious channel climate has positive effect on both partnership and cooperation performance thus can be regarded as a critical factor in forming a long-term channel relationship and higher satisfaction. Acoording to the results of hypothesis tests, which imply that a harmonious channel climate built on mutual trust and relationship continuity is absolutely needed for channel relationship management in the existing competitive and complex marketing environment. Here, the source member can also achieve the goal with the aid of channel power used as a lubricator. In contrast, the dominance of the source member resulting from channel power asymmetry can be utilized only to stimulate the formation of harmonious channel climate (e.g. H6); however, it cannot be used as the major method to achieve better coorporation performance.
12 : [5] 2007/3/27 6:39:00 PM

Dwyer, F. R. & Walker, O. 1981. Bargaining in an Asymmetrical Power Structure. Journal of Marketing, 45: 104-115. Dwyer, F. R. 1980. Channel member satisfaction: laboratory insights. Journal of Retailing. 56: 45-65.
12 : [6] 2007/3/27 6:42:00 PM

Frazier, G. L. & Summers, J. D. 1986. Perceptions of Interfirm Power and Its Use Within a Franchise Channel of Distribution. Journal of Marketing Research, 23: 169-176.
12 : [7] 2007/3/27 2007/3/27 6:42:00 PM

Gaski, J. F. 1984. The Theory of Power and Conflict in Channels of Distribution. Journal of Marketing, 48: 9-29. Goodman, L. E. & Dion, P. A. 2001. The Determinants of Commitment in the Distributor- Manufacturer Relationship. Industrial Marketing Management, 30: 287-300. Gronoos, C. 1990. Relationship Approach to Marketing in Service Context: The marketing and Organizational Behavior interface. Journal of Business Research, 27: 3-11. Gundlach, G. T. & Achrol, R. S. 1993. Governance in Exchange: Contract Law and

Its Alternatives. Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 12: 141-155. Heide, J. B 1994. Interorganizational Governance in Marketing Channels. Journal of Marketing, 58: 71-85. Heide, J. B. & John, G. 1990. Alliances in Industrial Purchasing: The Determinants of Joint Action in Buyer-Supplier Relationships. Journal of marketing Research, 27: 24-36.
12 : [8] 2007/3/27 6:33:00 PM

Kasulis, J. J. & Spekman, R.t E. 1980. A Framework for the Use of Power. European Journal Marketing Research, 14:180-91. Kumar, N., Scheer, L.K. , and Steenkamp, J. E. M. 1995. The Effect of Perceived Interdependence of Dealer Attitudes. Journal of Marketing Research, 32: 348-356.
12 : [9] 2007/3/27 6:28:00 PM

Moorman, C., Deshpande, R. & Zaltman G. 1992. Relationships Between Providers and Users of Marketing Research: The Dynamics of Trust Within and Between Organizations. Journal of Marketing Research, 29: 314-328.
12 : [10] 2007/3/27 6:44:00 PM

Wilson, D. T. 1995. An Integrated Model of Buyer-Seller Relationships. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 23: 335-345. Wortzet, R. 1979. New Life Style Determinants of Womens Food Shopping Behavior. Journal of Marketing, 43, 28-9.