As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war as one who knows that

t another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight. As we peer into society's future, we you and I, and our government must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for our own ease and convenience the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address, January 1961

Over this long nearly ten years, the United States launched two major wars and engaged in the largest reorganization of its government since the Great Depression. A new weapon, the remotely piloted "drone" aircraft was sent to kill militants in Yemen and Pakistan. More than 2.2 million Americans have gone to war and over a million have returned as veterans. Some who have returned have been honoured, a small number have been tried for war crimes, and too many have committed suicide. Americans debated the costs of civil liberties lost at home and cringed at revelations of torture in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo. U.S. generals have switched strategies several times and most recently decided to emphasize "population protection" because they realized that, in the words of the new counterinsurgency manual, "An operation that kills insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents."1 But it is the wounded and the dead the latter very conservatively estimated at 225,000 and the great majority civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan who most urgently require that we not simply turn the page. It is appropriate as we approach the ten-year mark to recall some of the costs we may have forgotten and to assess what has not been counted, cannot be counted, and the human and economic costs that will come due in the next decades. What have the wars that the U.S. has undertaken since September 2001 cost in blood and treasure, opportunities lost and possibilities foreclosed? What are the ongoing consequences for the people who fought them, for bystanders, for democracy, human rights, and civil liberties, for the American economy, budget, and the deficit? How has the social and political landscape of Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan been altered? What do we know about the likely future costs of the wars? We found that in terms of those values that could be counted in dollars and in numbers, the costs of war have been generally underestimated or uncounted. One reason for our underestimation of the costs and consequences of these wars, and their likely duration, was the fact that most assessments of the wars only examined one or two elements of the wars. Additionally, disagreements about who, what and how to count about how to record the death and injury in war or about whether future interest costs should be included as a war cost has sometimes been the focus of attention, drawing our eyes away from the big picture and into the intricate and complicated details. For example, although the U.S. has been funding Pakistan to fight militants since 2001 and fighting there itself, many of the costs of the U.S. war in Pakistan have not been included in tallies of war costs. This is despite the fact that the death and displacement in Pakistan is as or more severe than the war in Afghanistan.

Thus, while we often think of these wars as discrete efforts, and divide the costs into categories, the budgetary costs and human toll are much larger if we total the costs and think not only of costs to the U.S. and its allies, but to the civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. Further, we found that although the consequences of wars do not end when the fighting stops and the troops go home, many of the future costs and consequences of these wars have not been counted or have been discounted or dismissed. Many bills will become due over the next several decades. Many social and political costs to families and civil liberties could not be quantified. We also found that the more we looked, the more costs of these wars were to be found, only some of which we had the time and resources to investigate and include.

Human Costs The human toll in death, injury and displacement has been underestimated and in some cases undercounted. There are many difficulties in counting those who are killed and wounded in combat, as discussed in the individual reports by Neta Crawford and Catherine Lutz. Thus, an extremely conservative estimate of the toll in direct war dead and wounded is about 225,000 dead and about 365,000 physically wounded in these wars so far. More than 6,000 U.S. soldiers and 2,300 U.S. contractors have already been killed. The deaths of U.S. allies, including Iraqi and Afghan security forces and other coalition partners total more than 20,000. The numbers of Afghan and Pakistani military and police killed are probably higher than the totals given here

Wars cause physical and psychological wounds outside the war zone. The costs at home include the toll on those left behind when active duty armed forces and reservists deploy. The deployments are not only dangerous, but also longer and more frequent than those of previous wars. Zo Wool shows that the increasing pace of military operations has taken a toll at home on both service members and their families. Some handle the pressure, but we cannot minimize the potent homefront mix of tense family relationships, physical and emotional pain, and, increasingly, drug and alcohol abuse and other risky behavior that imperils the safety of both service members and their families. The consequence is to make military communities as a whole more precarious, meaning that service members especially Soldiers and Marines who see the most combat and civilian family members alike are subject to cycles of anxiety and trauma. While American soldiers and their families have demonstrated great resilience, the burdens of these wars that have fallen on veterans and their families include higher rates of suicide and mental illness, increased drug and alcohol dependence, higher rates of violence including homicide and child abuse and neglect (the latter both among the parent left behind and by the returning veteran), high risk behaviors that have resulted in elevated numbers of car crashes and drug overdoses, elevated levels of homelessness and divorce, and clinical levels of stress among the children. There has already been attention to the rising suicide rates among U.S. soldiers and veterans. In 2003, the year of the invasion of Iraq, suicides across the DoD accounted for more deaths than combat. Despite suicide awareness campaigns across the services, across the DoD suicide outnumbered combat deaths again in 2008. Inside the war zone, battle does not only injure and kill with bombs and bullets. As shown by Omar Dawichi, an Iraqi physician, and Norah Niland, the former director of Human Rights of the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, the devastation has been greater than most of us in the West know. Dawichi highlights the enduring displacement in Iraq, showing how it has led to other problems such as unemployment. Although some have returned to their homes, millions have been and remain displaced. Niland's report highlights the frustrations of the attempt to rebuild a society by Afghans and international actors while continuing to destroy it. The effects of war in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan ripple through those societies' basic

health and health care infrastructure and cause death indirectly. People suffer and die from lack of access to clean drinking war, medicine, and from diseases that they would not have gotten if their economic and health care infrastructure had not been destroyed or disrupted by war, or if millions had not been internally displaced or become refugees in neighboring countries. Crawford argues that this indirect war-related death is a significant problem that will continue to kill after the fighting stops. We have not made an estimate for the number killed and harmed by malnutrition and diseases they were exposed to because of the wars. The mental health consequences of war in Afghanistan and Iraq include anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Budgeted and Long Term Economic Costs We calculate that the U.S. federal government has already spent between $2.3 and 2.6 trillion in constant 2011 dollars. This number is greater than the trillion dollars that the President and others say the U.S. has already spent on war since 2001. Our estimate is larger because we include more than the direct Pentagon appropriation for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the larger global war on terror; wars always cost more than what the Pentagon spends for the duration of the combat operation. But the wars will certainly cost more than has already been spent. Including the amounts that the U.S.5 is obligated to spend for veterans, and the likely costs of future fighting as well as the social costs that the veterans and their families will pay, we calculate that the wars will cost between $3.7 and 4.4 trillion dollars. These wars were financed almost entirely by borrowing adding more than $1.3 trillion dollars to the national debt. Ryan Edwards shows that while the wars did stimulate economic growth to about .9 percent, the increased debt had several macro-economic effects including raising U.S. interest rates by perhaps about .3 percent. The interest on the war debt, from 2001-2011 can be calculated using various assumptions. Our estimate, again conservative because it uses the March 2011 CRS figure for spending on the wars through 2011, is that the financing of the debt attributable to the war has already cost about $177 billion in current dollars (more than $185 billion in constant dollars). It may seem as if these interest payments are a small amount, compared to the total costs of the war, but they exceed the Department of Defense's budgeted costs of war in Afghanistan and Iraq for the current fiscal year. Assuming that the United States continues to spend more on the war and other operations after formal withdrawal, we estimate that by 2020, interest payments alone could exceed $1,000 billion. But of course the precise amount of interest paid on the war debt will depend on both political choices and the economic conditions that prevail over the next decade. The large increase in military spending and debt has other effects on interest rates, jobs, and investment. While Heidi Garrett-Peltier shows that U.S. military spending has undoubtedly increased employment in sectors related to the military, that spending in other sectors would have produced many more jobs directly and indirectly. Similarly, while spending on military infrastructure has grown, overall spending on U.S. public infrastructure and assets has not kept pace with the needs for repair and investment, which some call the "infrastructure deficit," over the last decade. James Heintz argues that spending on public assets would have increased private productivity. William Hartung underscores the benefits to one major military contractor, Lockheed. The war has also affected the economies of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Specifically, Bassam Yousif found a bifurcated Iraqi economy. Enormous oil revenue has been generated since 2003, and GDP per capita has risen. However rebuilding has been slow for several reasons. Political instability and violence create a climate of uncertainty. Many of the killed professionals, who left the country during the early years of the war have not returned. Thus, unemployment remains high and the benefits of increased oil revenue (mostly due to higher oil prices) have not been spread throughout the population.

Social and Political Costs Civil liberties have been curtailed in the war on terror. In the U.S. American citizens have been subjected to increased electronic surveillance, while some Muslims and people of South Asian descent have been questioned at airports, fingerprinted or deported for visa problems. Few have been accused of terrorism. In Afghanistan, former warlords were put into positions of power and many have come to see elections as a shallow form of sham democracy. The United States has detained hundreds of thousands of individuals in Afghanistan and Iraq, and elsewhere in the world. Many of those detained as suspected militants are innocent according to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Some in U.S. run prisons have been tortured in Afghanistan, Iraq, and at Guantanamo Bay. Environmental Damage and Human Health The natural environments of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been harmed by war, including radical destruction of forest cover and an increase in carbon emissions. In addition, the water supply has been contaminated by oil from military vehicles and depleted uranium from ammunition. Along with the degradation of the natural resources in these countries, the animal and bird populations have also been adversely affected. In peacetime, the Department of Defense has been the countrys single largest consumer of fuel, using about 4.6 billion gallons of fuel each year. War accelerates fuel use. By one estimate, the U.S. military used 1.2 million barrels of oil in Iraq in just one month of 2008. This high rate of fuel use over non-wartime conditions has to do in part with the fact that fuel must be delivered to vehicles in the field by other vehicles, using fuel. One military estimate in 2003 was that two-thirds of the Armys fuel consumption occurring in vehicles that were delivering fuel to the battlefield. The military vehicles used in both Iraq and Afghanistan produced many hundreds of thousands of tons of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and sulfur dioxide in addition to CO2. In addition, the allied bombing campaign of a variety of toxics-releasing sites such as ammunition depots, and the intentional setting of oil fires by Saddam Hussein, during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to air, soil, and water pollution. While destruction of military base garbage in burn pits and toxic dust from military operations have added to air pollution, heavy military vehicles have also disturbed the earth, particularly in Iraq and Kuwait. Combined with drought as a result of deforestation and global climate change, dust has become a major problem exacerbated by the major new movements of military vehicles across the landscape. The U.S. military has focused on the health effects of dust for military personnel serving in Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan. Microbiologists have found heavy metals in that dust, including arsenic, lead, cobalt, barium, and aluminum, which can cause respiratory distress, and other health problems. Since 2001, there has been a 251 percent rise in the rate of neurological disorders, a 47 percent increase in the rate of respiratory problems, and a 34 percent rise in rates of cardio-vascular disease in military service members that is likely related to this problem. The people of Afghanistan, Iraq and Kuwait will obviously be exposed to this dust for much longer periods. The wars have also damaged forests, wetlands and marshlands in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. The degraded environment itself may contribute in turn to further conflict.21 Water near military bases and battles is often contaminated by the chemical residue of weapons and military operations, such as depleted uranium from shells and benzene and trichloroethylene from air base operations. Perchlorate, a toxic ingredient in rocket propellant, is one of a number of contaminants commonly found in groundwater around munitions storage sites around the world, with research needed on the extent of such pollution in all three war zones. War related pollution has clearly already affected the health of Iraqis and Afghans. A household survey in Fallujah, Iraq in early 2010 obtained responses to a questionnaire on cancer, birth defects, and infant mortality. Significantly higher rates of cancer in 2005-2009 compared to rates in Egypt and Jordan were found. The infant mortality rate in Fallujah was 80 deaths per 1000 live births, significantly higher than rates of 20 in Egypt, 17 in Jordan and 10 in Kuwait.

Benefits: Gender Equality, Democracy The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq both resulted in the eviction of two of the worlds most repressive regimes, that of Saddam Hussein and of the Taliban. While bringing democracy to the two countries was not the initial rationale for either war (v. eliminating safe haven to terrorists and weapons of mass destruction), democracy promotion and gender equality quickly became a stated goal for each as Shiva Belaghi reports. We were unable to systematically investigate the question of gender equality in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is clear however that women in Afghanistan and Iraq still face major barriers to full political and social participation. In both countries, women hold a quarter of the seats in their respective national legislatures. Gender inequality parallels the parlous state of democracy in these two countries. Cynthia Enloe found that in particular, individual women and women's rights organizations faced extreme obstacles. On a widely used evaluation and ranking of the quality of democracy across the worlds states, the Democracy Index, Iraq ranks poorly. Of the 167 countries ranked for 2010, Iraq is classified as a hybrid regime (between a flawed democracy and an authoritarian regime) and comes in at #111.23 According to Transparency International, on a corruption scale from 0 to 10, Iraq ranks 1.5 the worst in the Middle East - in corruption (defined as abuse of entrusted power for private gain) in 2010.24 Freedom House simply says: "Iraq is not an electoral democracy. Although it has conducted meaningful elections, political participation and decisionmaking in the country remain seriously impaired by sectarian and insurgent violence, widespread corruption, and the influence of foreign powers."25 Freedom House also notes that hundreds of professors were killed and many fled the country during the height of the sectarian fighting, a blow to academic freedom; the judiciary's independence is threatened by political pressure, and sectarian violence continues to threaten the religious freedom. On the Democracy Index, Afghanistan is categorized as an authoritarian regime and ranks at 150. Afghanistan ranks 1.4 on the Transparency International corruption scale the worst in South Asia. Of the 178 countries assessed, the only countries they rank ahead of are Myanmar and Somalia.26 Norah Niland writes that democracy promotion in Afghanistan was in trouble from the beginning, in the meeting which resulted in the December 2001 Bonn Agreement. The resuscitation of well-known warlords who had just been installed in their former fiefdoms for the primary purpose of helping the US prosecute the Global War on Terror was of great concern to Afghans. Significantly, Bonn did not include groups concerned about the marginalization of women, human rights advocates, nor representatives of the victims of war and abuse. A significant proportion of the Pashtun community, particularly those associated with the Taliban and rural norms, were not invited to Bonn and were, effectively, relegated to the margins of Afghan politics. Whereas Afghans do want a say in how they are governed, as indicated in the 70 percent turnout in the 2004 elections, a growing number of citizens are less and less interested in the ineffective democracy that has been on offer. By August 2009, impunity and corruption were more entrenched than before and Karzais western backers were still married to the notion that elections, however unconvincing to Afghans, were needed to sustain domestic support in ISAF troop-contributing countries. Elections, and Karzais bid to retain his Presidency, were marred by violence and well-documented, systematic fraud.27 Turnout was low and polling day was the worst single 24-hour period of recorded violent incidents, including the deaths of 57 Afghans, since the overthrow of the Taliban regime.28 The second round of parliamentary elections in 2010 fared no better in terms of being credible or acceptable to Afghan voters. Little effort had been made to correct either the electoral system or the faults that had marred previous rounds of voting. The widespread violence and corruption in Afghanistan has, ironically, boosted the image of the Taliban which the Taliban have been able to exploit because of their reputation and approach to criminality. They ended the mayhem associated with their predecessors many of whom are Karzais allies who have reverted to their predatory practices. The study commissioned by U.S. General Stanley McChrystal in 2009 led to the conclusion that widespread corruption and abuse

of power exacerbate the popular crisis of confidence in the government and reinforce a culture of ombudsmen to investigate abuse of power in its own cadres and remove those found guilty.29 US disregard for international law in Afghanistan has greatly undermined security and efforts to construct a rule of law system that is just and credible. Many Afghans believe they deserve a Bonn II that is free of external interference, embraces the full diversity of Afghan society, and is geared to the identification of genuine power sharing, peace-consolidation, and transparent state-building arrangements.

Alternatives The United States government immediately framed the 9/11 attacks as an act of war that demanded a military response, and the United States launched a war against Afghanistan. Mathew Evangelista argues that war was not the only or perhaps even the most effective way to confront the threat posed by Al Qaeda. Although some countries have adopted the military approach to terrorist challenges, usually in the context of ongoing wars of secession or national liberation, others have dealt effectively with terrorism over the years without resort to war. France, Algeria, Russia, and Canada used military force to confront terrorism. France used military force when it faced anticolonial opposition in Algeria from 1954 until 1962, the year Algeria achieved its independence. French forces destroyed Algerian villages with napalm bombs and tortured women and men suspected of membership in urban terrorist networks. Ironically, the post-independence Algerian government adopted similar tactics in the early 1990s when it confronted an armed Islamist movement that resorted to terrorist methods. Russia fought a devastating and unsuccessful war against the secessionist republic of Chechnya starting in 1994. It withdrew its forces in defeat in1996, but resumed the war in 1999 in the wake of terrorist bombings of apartment buildings in several Russian cities that killed hundreds of civilians. Continued terrorist violence, including suicide bombings (something previously unknown in Chechnyas centuries-old secessionist struggle) reinforced Russias characterization of the war as an anti-terrorist operation. In fact, as in the Algerian war of independence, much of the terrorist violence constituted a response to rather than a cause of the states military violence, including indiscriminate killing of civilians. In the case of Canada in October 1970 a spate of bombings, kidnappings, and murder by the Front de Liberation du Qubec led Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau to invoke the War Measures Act, bring tanks into the streets of Montral, and arrest nearly 500 suspected terrorists and sympathizers. Although much criticized by peaceful proponents of Qubecs independence from Canada, the action put an end to the violent secession movement. Henceforth Qubecs status would be decided by peaceful means: negotiations and popular referenda.30 Other countries have dealt with terrorist violence without resorting to military means or the war paradigm. Consider these statistics: In the first six months of a certain year, there were 1400 episodes of political violence, including 925 bombings and shootings. Some 22 terrorist groups organized on a permanent basis were responsible for half of the incidents, but there were more than a hundred groups whose names were known to the authorities during that same period. About a thousand militants had gone underground and were involved in what were called urban guerrilla activities. An estimated 3000-8000 part-time guerrillas lived ordinary legal lives, but participated in some way in the terrorist acts. Sympathizers to those engaged in political violence were estimated to number between two and three hundred thousand. This was not Iraq in 2005, but Italy in 1978.31 Italy still occasionally suffers isolated terrorist bombings and assassinations, but the broad-based terrorist movement on the 1970s and 1980s was eradicated without resort to war. One might argue that the threat posed by home-grown terrorists such as Italys Brigate Rosse is not comparable to that of al Qaeda, that it may be possible to defeat domestic terrorism with police powers, this argument holds, but fighting foreign terrorists requires military means. In

fact, however, the terrorist organizations in Europe and Japan in the 1970s did benefit from international contacts, including training centers and safe havens. In the 1970s members of Germanys Red Army Faction received training in Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) camps that operated under the auspices of the Syrian government in Lebanons Bekaa Valley.32 The communist regime in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) also provided support for West German terrorists: In the 1970s the GDR appears to have been an important transit country for RAF members as they traveled abroad to elude the investigations of the West German police. Japans Red Army also received considerable support from abroad for its terrorist activities. Under close supervision at home, left-wing radicals moved to North Korea or the Middle East. From these foreign locations, the JRA staged daring operations, such as the attacks on the TelAviv airport in 1972, a Singapore oil refinery in 1974, on the French embassy in The Hague in 1974, and on the U.S. and Swedish embassies in Kuala Lumpur in 1975. In the 1980s the JRA had about thirty core cadres operating abroad. Activists who turned to violence had often been victims of state violence and repression themselves. As one observer mentioned in regard to the French war in Algeria and the troubles in Northern Ireland, prisons turn out to be a marvelous recruiting and training centre.36 Many other cases support this generalization. Especially when the prison experience includes torture, friends and family members of the victims often seek revenge by engaging in terrorist activities. How did the urban terrorism of 1970s Europe end? Here the generalization that seems most convincing is that political systems and social and political organizations became more inclusive and more open to the concerns that had earlier found expression only in political violence. By addressing the main grievances that underlay the violence, the authorities could isolate the relatively small number of terrorists from the much larger population of potential sympathizers. Evangelist argues that the point is not that every terrorist is motivated by a legitimate political grievance that should be addressed. Rather for terrorism to persist on any meaningful scale it has to have some at least passive support from a broader group of individuals who themselves might not consider engaging in violence. If those individuals find their concerns addressed by the government and society, they are more likely to withhold their support from the terrorists who remain committed to violence and even endorse state efforts to maintain order.

Soon after the end of the George W. Bush presidency, many longtime observers in India and Washington charged his successor with abandoning the cause of elevating U.S.India relations to the pinnacle of American foreign policy priorities. Veteran Indian diplomat Kanwal Sibal lamented, Th e confi dence of the Indian establishment that IndiaU.S. relations were set on a steep upward trajectory has eroded noticeably with President Obama replacing President Bush. Daniel Twining, a former Bush administration offi cial, reported in the Weekly Standard that Indians frequently say, We miss Bush. Indias strategic community, he notes, is concerned about (and in some cases, alarmed by) the presidents approach to Pakistan; his strategy for Afghanistan; his willingness to pursue a more robust Asia policy that raises the costs of Chinese assertiveness; the absence of American leadership on trade; and his commitment to treating India as a key power and partner in world aff airs in a way consistent with Indians own sense of their countrys rising stature and capabilities.1 Th e Indian-born American scholar Sumit Ganguly wrote in Newsweek this April that Barack Obama is in danger of reversing all the progress his predecessors, including George W. Bush, made in forging closer U.S. ties with India. Preoccupied with China and the Middle East, the Obama administration has allotted little room on its schedule for India, and failed to get much done in the short time it did make.2 Like a Rorschach test, commentary as President Obama prepares to go to India tells us as much about the authors as it does about the president, his policies, or India. Much of the commentary is negative, but this in part refl ects the tendency of people to speak up only when they have something negative to say. More interesting is the proclivity of critical Indian pundits to yearn for the friendly presence of George W. Bush. For their part, many American commentators see Chinese and Pakistani monsters sneaking up behind Obamas thin, unsuspecting frame and wonder why he is not standing closer to Indias Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Nostalgia often colors perceptions and mixes fact with wishful projections. Former Bush administration offi cial Evan Feigenbaum notes in Foreign Aff airs, Many in India believe that the Obama administration has tilted its policy toward Beijing in a way that undermines Indian interests. Yet, Feigenbaum rightly goes on to say, Obamas China policy is broadly consistent with that of every U.S. president since Richard Nixon. Obama has been tougher on Pakistan than Bush ever was (which is not saying much). Even stalwart Republicans acknowledge that Obamas Afghanistan policy is struggling to clean up the damage caused by the neglect and mismanagement of his predecessor. Putting aside wishful or partisan thinking about the results of Bush administration policy, one can easily see why some Indian elites long for the exceptional favor the former president bestowed on their country. Bush did more for India than he did for any NATO ally, including the United Kingdom, notwithstanding Tony Blairs lonely, reputation destroying support for the war in Iraq. Blair urged the Bush administration to try to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, revive negotiations on a climate change treaty, and expend political capital to revive the Middle East peace process. He was rebuffed on all counts. India, on the other hand, spurned Bushs pleas to join the military coalition in Iraq and blocked his efforts to restart world trade liberalization and isolate Iran. Bush responded by giving India a global nuclear deal so lopsided that one of its architects called it a gift

horse. Th e Bush administration offered more and asked less of India than it did of any other country, save perhaps Israel.

Th e United States would be wise to continue such a tilted relationship only if American national interests coincided closely with Indias preferences across most of the important bilateral, regional, and global issues now facing policy makers. Careful analysis of U.S. and Indian interests does not show such a close convergence. Th erefore, a sound and sustainable U.S. policy toward India should more accurately refl ect multiple American, Indian, and global interests. Th e United States should continue to emphatically support Indias eff orts to prosper, secure itself, and gain international infl uence. Democratic Indias success will be an achievement of unprecedented scale and complexity, and it will benefi t not only Indians but the entire world. Yet a U.S.Indian partnership should not be conceptualized as a means to contain or contest Chinaa notion that many self-proclaimed realists in America and India wish to project onto the relationship. Th e United States should appreciate Indias intrinsic importance more fully. To conceive of India as a balance against China instrumentalizes it. India is nobodys tool, and as a large, developing country it shares many interests with China. Sometimes India and China will stand together in opposition to the United States, as with climate change and World Trade Organization negotiations. More often than not, New Delhi will pursue a more cooperative approach with Beijing than China-balancers in the United States would wish. India knows it will always live next to China and does not have the luxury to pursue ideologically and rhetorically heated policies toward it. Rather than maintaining the pretense of partnership, a truly proIndia policy would acknowledge that India has diff erent near-term needs and interests as a developing country than does the United States, even as it recognizes that each will benefi t in the long run from the success of the other. Most of what the U.S. government can do for India lies in the broader global arena, and most of what India needs at home it must do for itself. As Columbia University economist Arvind Panagariya writes, Commentators who deplore the US for failing to match its words with action and exhort it to move beyond symbolism do not off er a concrete set of actions they would like the latter to take. Th e United States should be more willing than it has been to accommodate Indias interests when doing so would not undermine the evolution of a more cooperative global order. Th e most daunting needs today are enhancing stable economic growth, producing and using energy in new ways that limit dangerous climate disruption and weapons proliferation, turning disaff ected states and populations away from violent extremism, stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and integrating rising regional powers such as India, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa into global leadership. Military balancing, which is the preoccupation of the so-called realists, is not unnecessary, but it is relatively

easy. It can be done through procurement, operational cooperation, and training. Th e greater challenge is building confi dence that big global problems can be managed eff ectively. Th is requires sustained political and diplomatic mobilization and cooperation among diverse states that are not typically inclined to make trade-off s to achieve a greater good.

In the course of meetings between presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama and prime ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, the United States and India have developed a framework for their burgeoning relationship. Th is agenda is now structured in the U.S.India Strategic Dialogue. Th e present essay analyzes the two states interests in several of the most important areas of their engagement, taking the liberty to conceptualize the issues a bit more broadly than they are in the bureaucratic categories of the Strategic Dialogue: Democracy and values Economic development and poverty alleviation Policies toward China and defense cooperation Counterterrorism, Pakistan, and Afghanistan Vital issues of global governance Nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation Trade Climate change UN Security Council

Democracy
American policy makers ritualistically incant that India is the worlds largest democracy and is therefore the natural partner of the greatest democracy, the United States. Democracy clearly is one of Indias outstanding features. Its maintenance by a population of 1.1 billion people who speak hundreds of languages, practice six established religions, and live on per capita GDP of $1,122 marks one of humankinds greatest achievements.5 India is simply an amazing place and polity. Yet, while Indias democratic character is intrinsically of tremendous value, it serves little instrumental purpose for U.S. interests. Th e United States traditionally proselytizes democracy around the world and would very much welcome the credibility that Indian leaders could give it in developing countries if they teamed up. But Indian leaders do not try to convert others to democracy. Promoting democracy is too redolent of the missionary colonialism that Indians still culturally resist, and it is anathema to the state sovereignty that India still prioritizes. Indias admirable long-term struggle to perfect its own democracy is the most important contribution it can make to the larger cause of democracy promotion around the world. Washington should not disappoint itself by

trying to enlist India in larger American projects to reform the world. In fact, the best way for the United States and India to advance their relationship and strengthen their shared infl uence on the world would be to perfect their own unions, to paraphrase the U.S. Constitution. Indias democratic structure provides the means for citizens to organize in parties and NGOs to advance their interests and aspirations for justice. Th is political liberty is inherently valuable and also instrumentally useful as a pressure-relief valve. Indias legal system also has much to recommend it. Nevertheless, Indias size, diversity, and backwardness continue to be overwhelming. Governance and the administration of justice remain spotty. Major examples of problems abound: the Naxalite insurgency in one-third of Indian districts, a surging intifada in the Kashmir Valley, communal violence such as in the Gujarat pogrom of 2002, caste discrimination and violence, and urban near-lawlessness such as one fi nds in Mumbai. Th e marvel is that India has not discarded democracy to meet these challenges.

Development and Poverty Reduction

Indias greatest national challenge is to to turn the historic economic gains of the last twenty years into inclusive growth that lifts millions more out of poverty, that revitalizes rural India, and that creates a future of possibility for more and more Indians.8 These eloquent words were spoken by U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns, but they effectively paraphrase the repeated statements of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Success in political-economic development will determine whether India is strong or weak, secure or vulnerable, an influencer of global trends or influenced by them. There is no reason to think that Indias rise will occur differently, or that intentional policies by the United States would provide a major lift. Indias domestic politics and policies will enable or retard its economic progress. India needs all kinds of infrastructure; American actors will eagerly provide the technology and know-how that will help build it if India adopts the policies that invite this participation. Th \ere is not much for the U.S. government to do here Trade will affect Indias economic development, though not as decisively as internal reforms and mobilization. Global trade rules will be relevant, and they will be discussed in a later section of this report. In terms of bilateral trade, China has recently rocketed past the United States as Indias largest partner, according to the IMF. U.S.India defense sales and cooperation, if they materialize at significant levels, could shift the figures. However, there is little reason to think that SinoIndia trade will stop growing. This is another factor that will complicate Indias overall policy making toward China, and it should also cast doubt on American projections of India as a close partner in containing its economically dynamic neighbor.

Policies Toward China and Defense Cooperation

China is at the crux of much of the American and Indian criticism of Obamas policies toward India. Th e critics focus on competition between China and India and between China and the United States. Th ey assume that these arenas of competition should draw India and the United States closer together than they have been during Obamas term. Yet China and India, despite their rivalry, have more convergent interests than these critics realize. Furthermore, the United States may have more eff ective ways to motivate China to cooperate in peacefully ordering international aff airs than by overtly championing India to contest China, with an emphasis on military power. Th is web of interests and possibilities must be disentangled in order to devise policies that will yield positive results for India, the United States, and the broader international system. At the same time, there is a moral-ideological contest between India and China, which India naturally wins in the eyes of Americans and Indians. Extolling Indias democracy is a polite way of accentuating Chinas non-democracy. As the Indian strategist Brahma Chellaney has stated, the Bush agenda was predicated on the idea of helping a rising India become a democratic bulwark against authoritarian China. Chellaney and American critics argue that Obama sees things through a diff erent prism.14 Yet ideology alone is too plastic to be the basis of U.S.Indian partnership to channel Chinas power. India and China share interests as developing countries, and the American and Indian polities experience friction in values, preferences, and style, despite their both being democracies. Th e bigger strategic questions are whether China will ineluctably challenge the post-World War II international system of economics and security developed largely by the United States and, if so, whether the best way to prevent or mitigate Chinas exertions is to counter them with military power. If military balancing is the foremost strategic imperative, then the next question is whether India is willing and able to be an eff ective U.S. partner in pursuit of this end. Th e United States should make clear its commitment to support Indias territorial integrity under the UN Charter. It should cooperate with India and other Asian states to retain defense capabilities suffi cient to blunt Chinese military power projection against them, especially in the South and East China seas, where sovereignty over some islands has not been resolved. Chinas military capabilities and nationalistic assertiveness are rising, and its neighbors, including India, do increasingly ask, in the words of the Indian defense expert Uday Bhaskar, if the inexorable rise of China is conducive to equitable peace and stability in Asia.24 Bhaskar invites Chinese voices to objectively address the unease from East Asia to South Asia about the mismatch between Beijings self-image and its actions. Rather than talk and act about Chinas impact on South Asian security without engaging directly with it, the United States and India should invite the Chinese to explore the potential of confi dence-building and, some day, arms control to ameliorate Asian security dilemmas. Such eff orts could begin informally

with a mix of nongovernmental experts and former and current offi cials from the three countries if offi cial wariness in New Delhi and Beijing is too great.

Counterterrorism, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

South Asiaparticularly Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indiais bedeviled by groups who act violently not only against the United States but, more often, against residents of South Asia. Pakistan is the epicenter of extremist violence. Th e strategic challenge for the United States, India, and Afghanistan is to motivate Pakistani authorities to act decisively against violent extremists. Pakistan must be persuaded and helped to end the distinction between good jihadis who fi ght India (and the United States and India in Afghanistan) and bad jihadis who have turned against the Pakistani society and state. Th erefore the United States and India share an interest in devising a mixture of inducements and pressures to persuade the power centers in Pakistan to cooperate in rooting out sources of violent extremism. Th e United States can reasonably ask New Delhi to understand that Washington will seek a lasting positive relationship with Pakistan. Criticizing U.S. leaders for words and deeds that do not always and exclusively favor India over Pakistan is neither realistic nor wise. Th e United States and India would also augment the prospects for IndoPak stability by avoiding military sales that Pakistan could reasonably fi nd provocative. Encouraging IndoPak dialogue on how to stabilize their competition in subconventional, conventional, and nuclear capabilities is necessary. Kashmir is a challenge that the United States can neither avoid nor resolve. India has the power to rebuff unwelcome U.S. involvement. Successive American administrations have recognized this. Washington can do more than it typically has to hold the Pakistani military and the ISI to pledges that they will not abet violent actors in Kashmir. At a minimum, the United States should expose Pakistan publicly whenever it fails to act to prevent infi ltrations across the Line of Control, shut down jihadi training operations, or arrest leaders of organizations that foment attacks on India. But Indian leaders must also do more to correct the misgovernance and human rights abuses that are remobilizing Muslims in the Kashmir Valley. Indians may reasonably expect the United States to heed their demand not to try to mediate the Kashmir issue with Pakistan, but they should not expect it to stay silent about large-scale Indian human rights violations or other policies that undermine confl ict resolution there. Th e United States has legitimate strategic interests in urging both India and Pakistan to explore all prospects for normalizing IndoPak relations and reducing the threat of violent extremism in South Asia and elsewhere.

Pakistani elites are adapting to the reality that Pakistan cannot wrest the valley away from India, and that it must negotiate a formula to recognize the territorial status quo and improve the quality of life of Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control. Many Pakistanis recognize further that Manmohan Singh is the leader best suited to fi nd and deliver a package that Indians, Kashmiris, and Pakistanis could live with. But if Pakistanis perceive that resolving the Kashmir issue will merely make the environment safer for India to bolster its conventional military advantage over Pakistan, they will balk. Th is is another reason that the United States and India must take great care to manage their defense cooperation in ways that reassure Pakistan that Indias aims and capabilities are defensive, not off ensive. Conventional military dialogue and confi dence-building measures deserve greater attention for this purpose. One reason why Pakistanis are turning their attention away from Kashmir is that many see Afghanistan as the hotter front for IndoPak competition. Pakistanis, especially the military, perceive an Indian eff ort to extend infl uence throughout Afghanistan at Pakistans expense. Pakistan has fought this infl uence in many ways, including attacks on the Indian embassy and other targets in Afghanistan. India argues justly that it is for the Afghan state and people to decide whether to welcome Indian involvement in their state (many Afghans plainly do). It is unrealistic and ahistorical to expect that India will not be a presence in Afghanistan if Afghans welcome it. Th e United States is caught in the middle. Pakistan demanTh e United States cannot avoid disappointing either Pakistan or India, or both. Afghanistan therefore demonstrates the limits of U.S. partnership with India and Pakistan. Understanding these limits does not give us an answer to the question of what the United States should do in Afghanistan if the current strategy proves unsuccessful. However, it does clarify that neither Pakistan nor India is going to signifi cantly help the United States out of the quagmire, and that American policy makers will have to repair relations with both India and Pakistan in the aftermath of any unhappy Afghan denouement.ds that Washington use its infl uence on its new best friend India not to use Afghanistan as the western side of a vise to squeeze Pakistan. India demands that the United States fi ght the Pakistani-backed Taliban more robustly and eschew temptations to negotiate with the Taliban. India is particularly emphatic about Pakistans not being granted a seat in any possible negotiations. Pakistan is willing to fi ght until the last Taliban or coalition foot soldier falls in order to pursue its interests in Afghanistan, while India is willing to fi ght to the last American to keep Pakistan from exerting indirect control over a future Afghan government.

International Trade
International trade can contribute to Indias growth and development, albeit modestly compared with domestic-driven growth. U.S. policies can help create rules of global trade that could benefi t India. Yet in World Trade Organization negotiations the U.S. and Indian positions have clashed in the two areas most important to India: agriculture and services. American friends who want to help India achieve the economic growth and development necessary to become a great power should accommodate Indias interests in agricultural trade. Roughly two-thirds of Indias population earns its livelihood from agriculture, often of the subsistence type. India does not yet have a market for low-skilled wage labor that could absorb large volumes of agriculturalists who could be displaced as a result of trade rules that too indiscriminately ease imports of foodstuff s. Accordingly, India, along with many other developing countries, demands trade rules that would allow it to protect indigenous farmers by erecting tariff s higher than allowed maximums under prospective new rules in the event of a sudden and potentially pricedestabilizing infl ux of imports.31 A U.S. administration could accede to these demands without undermining the global trade regime, though it would cause backlash in the form of political pressure and lost campaign contributions from an agribusiness sector that employs hundreds of millions fewer people than Indian agriculture. Similarly, Indian negotiators in service sector talks bridle at U.S. resistance to new rules that would grant employees of Indian fi rms more permission to travel to the United States and other countries to perform contracted services. Th is is especially important in the fi elds of information technology, law, accounting, and research and development. India has its own inconsistencies: For example, it blocks foreign lawyers from practicing on Indian territory.32 In general terms, India understands the interests of the United States and other advanced countries in protecting their labor markets, but labor-abundant countries like India fi nd it inequitable that the WTO privileges freer trade in goods to the advantage of rich countries, while resisting liberalization of trade in labor.

ENGAGING AND HEDGING CHINA

The relationship between the United States and China increased significantly after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. With China supporting counter-terrorism, the United States started to look at China as a partner rather than a rivalin other words, a responsible stakeholder.5 In 2005, China accepted the United States requests to participate in a Senior Dialogue to discuss global strategic issues such as nuclear proliferation, human rights violations and the issue of Taiwan. A year after, a Strategic and Economic Dialogue was established to address, among other things, their trade frictions and Chinas currency manipulation. China has also been actively involved in the SPT and has been willing to host a series of negotiations. Against this background, Bush sought a constructive, candid, and cooperative relationship with China.6 Likewise, the Obama administration emphasises a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive US-China relationship for the 21st Century.7 Obama also continues asking China to act as a responsible stakeholder. As stated in the 2008 Democratic National Platform, the Obama administration would encourage China to play a responsible role as a growing power to help lead in addressing the common problems.8 This declaratory policy has since been given more practical substance through, for example, the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and efforts to foster common interests in areas as diverse as nuclear non-proliferation, climate change, energy security, trade friction and currency, human rights and religious freedom, and transparency in military affairs. Both states have agreed to manage their maritime disputes through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement.9 Like Bush, Obamas policy towards China and Taiwan is based on the Three US-China communiqus and the Taiwan Relations Act. 10 During his campaign Obama supported US-Taiwan military relations, and declared that I will do all that I can to support Taiwan's democracy in the years ahead Underpinning this statement is the stable relationship between Beijing and Taipei, where Taiwans interests in improving its relationship with Beijing is greater than the attractions of formal independence.12 Obama has also retained the hedging strategy outlined by the Bush administration in the 2006 National Security Strategy.13 To this end, Obama is maintaining US military capabilities and commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.14 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has indicated that the United States will project its power and help its allies in the Pacific by increasing its ability to strike from over the horizon and employ missile defenses to face Chinas extensive military development.15 Overall, Obama will continue the Bush administrations two-pronged strategy by maintaining US presence in the region to hedge Chinese military power and at the same time seeking more cooperation and a proactive role by China in helping to solve the world problems as a responsible stakeholder.16 Nevertheless, Obama has adopted a more stringent stance in dealing with trade disputes with China. Obama decided to impose punitive tariffs on all car and light truck tyres from China.17 China strongly opposed the decision and responded by raising the issue of grave trade protectionism and accusing the United States of breaking commitments made during the G-20 Summit.18 Furthermore, the US bill imposing new tariffs on the import of solar panels to the United States including from China may exacerbate the tension.19 Additionaly, after initially refusing to meet the Tibetan spiritual leader in October 2009, recently Obama held a closed meeting with the Dalai Lama in Washington, followed by a meeting between Dalai Lama and Secretary Clinton. The meetings prompted serious Chinese concern, with Chinas official statement describing the meetings as an intrusion into Chinas domestic affairs that seriously damaged US-China relations.20 These developments eventually could challenge the US-China growing bilateral relationship.
12