SPENT FUEL STORAGE SYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR A TYPICAL TWO-

LOOP PWR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DURING HYPOTHETICAL

COMPLETE LOSS OF EXTERNAL COOLING
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the
Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
Marko Matkovi, Leon Cizelj, Ljubo Fabjan, Andrej Proek
Joef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Introduction
Study has been performed as a part of the European Stress Tests.
In accordance to Slovenian official requirements specified under 1
st
paragraph
of article 58. Off. Gaz. of RS 60/2011 - Ionizing Radiation Protection and
Nuclear Safety Act, operators of a radiation or nuclear facilities are forced to
consult authorized experts for radiation and nuclear safety issues.
Jozef Stefan Institute as a Technical and Scientific Support Organization (TSO)
has performed independent calculations, which were used for the report
submitted to the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration.
The agreement between results obtained by the NPP in Krsko and
independent calculations carried out by JSI was good.
The added value of the study is to provide a better estimation of the time lags
and possible scenarios before cladding failure of the FAs within the SFP can
appear.
Such assessment helps the operator of the NPP to take prompt decisions with
a minimum negative effect on the people and the environment.
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Configuration 1
Schematic of the SFS cross-section for configuration 1 (C1)
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Geometry and Inventory Configuration
C1 SFP-full, TC-full, CLA-full
C2 SFP-full, TC-empty, CLA-empty
C3 SFP-full, TC-empty, CLA-empty, SSD broken
C4a SFP-full, TC-empty, CLA-empty, SSD broken, water leakage from the TC
C4b SFP-full, TC-empty, CLA-empty, SSD broken, water leakage from the SFP
C4c SFP-full, TC-empty, CLA-empty, SSD broken, water level drop to h
bP1P2
Water elevation before the event is either at the maximum level or it is calculated from the
available initial inventory configuration.
There is no external cooling available.
There is no fresh water intake.
The displacement volume of all FAs within the SFP has been subtracted in proportion to the
relative immersion height.
Similarly, estimated volume of SFP storage racks has been subtracted proportionally to the
FAs relative immersion height within the water contained inside the SFP.

SFS inventory configurations:
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Configuration 2
Schematic of the SFS cross-section for configuration 2 (C2)
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Configuration 1
Schematic of the water level elevation profiles for configuration 1 (C1)
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Configuration 2
Schematic of the water level elevation profiles for configuration 2 (C2)
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Configuration 3
Schematic of the SFS cross-section for configuration 3 (C3)
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Configuration 4
Schematic of the SFS cross-section for configuration 4 (C4)
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Configuration 3
Schematic of the water level elevation profiles for configuration 3 (C3)
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Configuration 4
Schematic of the water level elevation profiles for configuration 4 (C4)
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Characteristic Time Lags
decay heat
[MW]
time to
(reach) [h]
C1 C2 C3 C4a C4b C4c
1.5 8.5 1.5 8.5 1.5 8.5 1.5 8.5 1.5 8.5 1.5 8.5
start boiling 86.4 15.4 61.8 11.0 61.8 11.0 56.0 10.8 56.0 10.8 16.4 3.0
htFA+1m 568.7 100.4 419.1 74.0 338.6 59.8 134.0 47.1 134.0 47.1 / /
htFA 629.9 111.2 472.7 83.4 399.7 70.5 179.8 57.0 163.5 56.1 48.5 8.6
hmidFA 692.3 122.2 535.2 94.4 462.2 81.6 242.3 68.0 197.2 65.7 111.0 19.6
h20%FA 774.9 136.8 617.8 109.0 544.8 96.1 324.9 82.5 278.0 80.1 193.5 34.1
Characteristic time lags for cooling water within the SFP
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
The Decay Heat Power
( ) ( )
2 . 0
2 . 0
0
066 . 0

= t t t
s
P P
where P
0
is the reactor thermal power before shutdown, is the time since reactor start
and
s
is the time of reactor shutdown measured from the time of the start-up (in seconds)
Typical decay heat power load of the spent fuel system during the cycle
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Water Heat-Up
once the sequence of events has led the system to the lack of active
cooling all water in communication was brought to the same
temperature of 35 C,
boiling takes place at ambient pressure,
coolant properties are taken at the mean temperature and do not
change during the heat-up.
Decay heat power is considered constant for the duration of the
event.
( )
( )
P
T - T c V
V P, t
0 sat pL L conf
conf

=

pL L it
it
c V
P
t
T

=
A
A

heating-up rate of the water content in the

system
time to boil (without leakage)
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Water Evaporation
The decay heat power P is considered constant for the
duration of the event. However, when FAs in the SFP
start to emerge from the cooling water, not all of the
residual heat power is assigned to evaporation process.
the evaporation rate
heat power is considered as a variable of the relative
immersion depth
if h > h
tFA
( )
LV L
ev
r
P(h)
P V

res
bFA tFA
bFA
P
h - h
h - h

res
P
P(h)
if h < h
tFA
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Water Leakage
Outlet velocity can be calculated by assuming reversible process of fluid
flow through orifice i.e. without friction, local pressure losses and
viscose dissipation and by assumption that all potential energy has
been converted into the kinetic energy of the fluid flow.
leakage volume flow rate
( ) h g 2 A h A, V A = A
leak

minimum theoretical
corresponding crack size
L
A
=
h g 2 r
P
A
LV
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0
Decay Heat Power [MW]
M
i
n
.

C
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g

C
r
a
c
k

S
i
z
e

[
c
m
2
]
hcrack...107.18
hcrack...106.00
hcrack...105.00
hcrack...102.88
P(1.0 cm
2
)
P(2.5 cm
2
)
0.68 MW
1.69 MW
Minimum corresponding crack size versus decay
heat power for four different crack elevations
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Water Leakage
Based on the initial waterlevel recording or leakage rate recording,
the spent fuel system shell integrity can be characterized (rupture
cross-section and elevation). Water level elevation can be predicted
for the period after the initial observation.
Ongoing Work on Characterization of Rupture
SFP spent fuel pit,
TC transfer channel,
CLA cask loading area,
h
0
initial height [m],
h(t) actual height [m],
h
00
crack elevation [m],
A crack mean cross-section [m
2
],
S free water surface in
communication with the SFP [m
2
].
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Water Leakage
Ongoing Work on Characterization of Rupture

= A 2
00

00
= (
2
)

1
2
(
1
) 1

1
2
1

t =
S

2
00

+
0

C
0
=

2
0

00

Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Emergency Water Spraying
Emergency water spray comes into account as an alternative way to maintain
coolability, at least on a temporary basis.
Not all of the sprayed water can be used in the cooling process as specified
above, efficiency of 70% is included in the equation.
Terminal velocity of 1 mm diameter water drops in stagnant air is expected to
be around 4 m/s [3], which is way beyond the vapour velocity at the top of FAs
array.
vapour flow at the top of FA array is expected to generate smaller shear as
compared to a denser and more viscous airflow at comparable velocity

the minimum required water spray
( )
sub pL LV
water
T c r
P
V
A +
=
L
q

[3] Gunn, R. and Kinzer, G.D. (1949) The terminal velocity of fall for water drops in stagnant air. Journal of Meteorology. 6, 243-248.
Decay Heat Emergency Spraying Rate
[MW] [m
3
/h] [l/s]
1.5 2.9 0.8
8.5 16.6 4.6
Minimum required water spraying rate to
maintain coolability of the system
Jozef Stefan Institute, Reactor Engineering Division, R4
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
IAEA, Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
Conclusion Remarks
Coolant water level should be kept high most of the time in the
two supporting inventory structures.
Good predictive capability for most of configurations is expected
for heat-up time and time to reach certain water level elevation
down to the top of the FAs.
Since any residual water (beneath 20% of the FA height) may have
a negative effect on passive cooling capability [2] a more profound
study of SFS cooling capability is needed for the limiting case
characterized by a nearly complete loss of coolant in the SFP.
Efficient remote emergency water Spraying solutions should be
proposed.
Eventual ruptures in the SFS shell can be characterized by simply
following the water level elevation rates or the leakage rates.
[2] A.S.Benjamin, D.J.McCloskey, D.A.Powers and S.A.Dupree, Spent Fuel Heatup Fallowing Loss of Water During Storage, NUREG/CR-
0649 SAND77-1371, Sandia Laboratories.
Thank you for your attention!