HUL252 Introduction to Classical Indian Philosophy

Term Paper On Indian Classical Philosophy and Perception

Submitted By: Shreyas Bhindwale(2009EE10417) Neeraj Sarna(2009ME10598) Deepak Sharma(2009CS10185)

INDEX

Content 1. Introduction to Philosophy 2. Introduction to Indian Classical Philosophy 3. Introduction to Philosophy of Perception

Page No. 1 2 4

4. Scientific Account of Perception 5. Perspectives on Perception 6. Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksha 7. Conclusion

5 6 9 11

Introduction To Philosophy
Philosophy in literal terms means a rational explanation of the truths and principals of being, knowledge or conduct. Philosophy is distinguished from the other ways of addressing such problems by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on rational argument. The word philosophy comes from the greek
, which literally means love of wisdom.

Epistemology: is concerned with the nature and

Metaphysics: the study of the nature of reality,

scope of knowledge, and whether knowledge is possible. Among its central concerns has been the challenge posed by skepticism and the relationships between truth, belief and justification.

including the relationship between mind and body, substance and accident, events and causation. Traditional branches are cosmology and ontology.

Main Branches of Philosophy

Main Braches Of Philosophy

Logic is the study of valid argument forms. Beginning in the late 19th century, mathematician such as Gottlob Fregefocused on a mathematical treatment of logic, and today the subject of logic has two broad divisions: mathematical logic (formal symbolic logic) and what is now called philosophical logic.

Ethics or "moral philosophy", is concerned primarily with the question of the best way to live, and secondarily, concerning the question of whether this question can be answered.

Introduction To Philosophy Of Perception

The philosophy of perception is majorly concerned with the knowledge the world and also to the beliefs about the world. There are basically two accounts when it comes to perception: a. Internalist accounts- these assume that perceptions of objects and knowledge or beliefs about them are aspects of individuals mind

b. Externalist accounts- which state that they constitute real aspects of the world external to the individual.

Realist conceptions include phenomenalism and direct and indirect realism. Anti-realist conceptions include idealism and scepticism. The positions of realism is to some extent contradicted by the occurrence of the perceptual illusions and hallucinations and the relativity of perceptual experience.

Considering the classical Indian philosophy there are two major views with regard to the perceptual experience:

1. Buddhist view- It says that all perception is the perception of the individual as such without any conceptualisation from the mind. 2. Nyaya view-It says that no perception is possible without conceptualisation. Reality is a complex structure of individuals and their property qualifiers and should be perceived as such.

Perspectives on Perception

All the Indian philosophical schools regard perception as the primary source of knowledge. They however have different views on the nature, kinds and objects of perceptual knowledge. Notable difference in opinion is observed between the Buddhist and orthodox Hindu schools.

The orthodox view considers perception as a two stage phenomenon and accept both nonconceptualized (indeterminate) as well as conceptualized (determinate) perceptual states. The Buddhists however have contradicting views stating perceptions as an indeterminate and non-conceptualized awareness.

Buddhist View:
According to Buddhist purist point of view, the object which appears in perceptual cognition is a form at arises within consciousness itself and it need not be an external physical object. The most popular definition for perception according to Buddhists is Perception is a cognition that arises from that object and is devoid of conceptual construction. This definition has two major implications which are major points of arguments between the Buddhist and the Hindu school of philosophy. Firstly, according to the Buddhists, perception is non-conceptual in nature. Reality must be seeing devoid of any mental constructs acting upon it. No seeing is seeing as. The application or intervention of mental constructs contaminates the pristine reality and makes it devoid of the actual truth underlying. Perception is mere awareness of bare particulars without any identification or association with words. Association with words, according to the Buddhists, falsifies the reality. Referents of words are universals according to the Buddhists. Universalism is a concept denied by the Buddhists. The Buddhists regard reality as a collection of momentary, self-characterized, discrete particulars. Perceptual cognition is concept free

awareness of a particular as such i.e. awareness of pure, ineffable, sensory intake of what is given. Secondly, the Buddhist definition only indicates a phenomenological feature of perception. The Buddhists have no reservations about the origin of the cognition and thus imply that cognition does not necessarily require contact of a sense faculty with the object. Therefore, for the Buddhist idealist, the object that appears in perceptual cognition need not be an external physical object, but a form that arises within consciousness itself. Buddhist philosophy is idealist-nominalist in spirit. Therefore they are also considered Buddhists Nominalists.

Nyaya View:
The most comprehensive definition of perception can be stated as: Perception is a cognition which arises from the contact of the sense organ and object and is not impregnated by words, is unerring, and well-ascertained. This definition has raised a lot of criticism. If perception is a cognition, then it is a state of knowledge, rather than a means of knowing. By saying that the sense organs are in contact means that they are in close vicinity of the object. The latter part of the definition has been the centre of discussion for quite some time. There is some disagreement in the nyayas over the adjectives non-verbal and self-ascerted. Some say that they are a part of the definition; non-verbal to point out that perceptual knowledge is not associated with words and well-ascertained to affirm that perceptual knowledge is only of a definite particular and specifically excludes situations in which the perceiver may be in doubt

whether a perceived object a is an X or a Y. Whereas others say that these adjectives indicate two different forms of perceptual cognition and are not to be considered as defining characteristics. They contend that by the term non-verbal, the definition refutes the Grammarian view and includes non-conceptual perception and, by the term well-ascertained, it refutes the Buddhist view and includes conceptual or judgemental perceptions as valid.

Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Pratyaksha

Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksha refers to the non-structured, structure free reality taken in by our sensory aids and is devoid of any mental constructs on it. Savikalpaka Pratyaksha refers to be concept loaded reality. When mental constructs act on the raw data collected by our sensory aids, we get this form. The Buddhists and Nyayas have contradicting views about the perception of reality and the role played by nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka pratyaksha.

Nyaya View:
The Nyayas say that reality itself a relational complex and is structured. Perceptual experience is always a relational complex and hence it is structured awareness of objects. The structure, whereby the relational complex is tied together involves the cognizing subjects mental

contribution. The object is known as a complex of a property bearer(the particular as such), the property and an ontological relation tying them up. For Nyayas, nirvikalpaka is just inarticulate relational complex. Perceptual cognition requires conceptualization. The causal interaction between sensory faculty and object gives rise to a preliminary awareness of a concept free unstructured whole (nirvikalpaka). This (Stage 1) awareness is invariably followed by structured conceptually loaded awareness as a necessary consequence in the same sequential series.(Stage 2) The Nirvikalpaka pratyaksha, according to Nyayas consists of instances of universalhood. A Nyaya will see a universal cow in a particular cow. The bare particular too has propertied aspect attached to it. This makes it different from the just seeing of the Buddhists. The savikalpaka involves a conceptualization, structuring of the bare minimum in Stage 1, which gives us the actual perception of a given particular. Therefore the Nyayas are very strong in their viewpoint that perceptual cognition consists of two stages, where the second stage is the real characteristic of perception-hood. The mind with its mental constructs developed over time acts as a link between the perceptual cognition and discrete momentary sensory faculty collected data.

Buddhist View:

The Buddhists are purists in their view point. They believe in cognition of the given as it is, in its purest form without any mental intervention. They believe that cognition is for particulars only. Collectivity and totality are just constructs of mind. The concept of universalhood is in coherent with the Buddhists. They believe that reality consists of discrete, self-characterized, momentary particulars. A verbal report of proper perception is strictly impossible, for such a report requires conceptualization, which is not perceptual in character; the objects of conceptual awareness are spontaneous constructions of our mind and are essentially linguistic in character. Buddhists believe that perceptual cognition must be totally devoid of conceptualization. Seeing truly is free from conceptual constructs. The sequential process from Stage1 to Stage2 involves a mistaken transfer of the property of perception-hood from the first awareness to the second. They believe that when the bare content or raw data grasped by our sensory aids is subjected to some mental constructs, then the structuring deforms the reality. The pristine nature is lost. Perception according to the Buddhists must be concept free perception of particulars as such.

Nyaya Objection:
The Nyayas oppose Buddhists view by saying that the second stage demystifies the discrete particulars grasped by the sensory aids. They rebuke the Buddhist view point and question it by stating that perception is always perception of a particular. If it is not particular, the it may not be considered cognition. Particular according to the Buddhists will be unique distinct momentary. A particular logically

brings in the concept of universal because a particular must be somehow distinguished from the rest universal. Nyayas rebuke Buddhists by saying that Buddhists do not have particular recognition as they do not believe in the concept of universal. Every particular cognition requires universal cognition to distinguish it (this) from other(that).

Conclusion
The Buddhist view point on perception seems to be a very purist one. They believe that conceptualization distorts the pristine nature of reality. A flaw in their view point as pointed out by the Nyayas is that they cannot possibly explain the intentional aspect of perceptual cognition. In order to have an awareness of a distinct and unique particular, the cognizer must have the ability to be aware of THIS particular rather than THAT one. Only then the intentional aspect of perception will be accounted for. This implies possessing concepts of THIS and THAT. This is against the Buddhist stand. Hence it is unintelligible how we can have concept free perception of particular as such as distinct and unique. The Nyaya stand on perception seems the more rational one of the two. They regard conceptualization as the vital link between the discrete raw data grasped by the sense organs and the actual perceptual cognition. Concepts serve to link or unify discrete impressions as different perceptions of the same object and thus giving rise to the possibility of recognition. Had there been no concepts, recognition of particulars would not have been possible. Therefore, conceptualization is important for perceptual cognition of particulars.