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The South Atlantic Quarterly (ISSN 0038-2876) is published quarterly, at $24.00 for libraries and institutions, and $14.00 for individuals. Photocopies for course or research use that are supplied to the end-user at no cost may be made without need for explicit permission or fee. Registered users may pay for photocopying via the Copyright Clearance Center.
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The South Atlantic Quarterly (ISSN 0038-2876) is pub
lished quarterly, at $24.00 for libraries and institutions
and $14.00 for individuals, by Duke University Press, Box 6697 College Station, Durham, NC 27708. Second class postage paid at Durham, NC. Postmaster: Send address changes to Duke University Press, Box 6697 College Station, Durham, NC 27708. Photocopying. Photocopies for course or research use that are supplied to the end-user at no cost may be made without need for explicit permission or fee. Pho tocopies that are to be provided to their end users for some photocopying fee may not be made without payment of permissions fees to Duke University Press, at 25 cents per copy for each article copied. Registered users may pay for photocopying via the Copyright Clearance Center, using the code and price at the bot tom of each article-opening page. Permissions. Requests for permission to republish copy righted material from this journal should be addressed to Permissions Editor, Duke University Press, Box 6697 College Station, Durham, NC 27708. Library exchanges and orders for them should be sent to Duke University Library, Gift and Exchange Depart ment, Durham, NC 27706. The South Atlantic Quarterly is indexed in Abstracts of English Studies, America: History and Life, American Humanities Index, Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Book Review Index, Current Contents, Humanities Index, and Index to Book Reviews in the Humanities. This journal is a member of the Conference of Editors of Learned Journals. Copyright 1989 by Duke University Press us iSSN 0038-2876 ( The South Atlantic Quarterly Fall 1989 Volume 88 Number 4 REREADINGS IN THE FREUDIAN FIELD EDITED BY A. LEIGH DENEEF Foreword 723 A. LEIGH DENEEF Plato's Symposium and the Lacanian Theory of Transference: Or, What Is Love? 725 ELLIE RAGLAND- SULLIVAN The Death of the Modern: Gender and Desire in Marlowe's "Hero and Leander" 757 DAVID LEE MILLER Reading Desire Backwards: Belatedness and Spenser's Arthur 789 ELIZABETH J. BELLAMY What Did the King Know and When Did He Know It? Shakespearean Discourses and Psychoanalysis 81I HARRY BERGER, JR. Anamorphic Stuff: Shakespeare, Catharsis, Lacan 863 NED LUKACHER Coming to Cressida through Irigaray 899 DEBORAH A. HOOKER Stepping to the Temple 933 GRAHAM HAMMILL 724 A. teiyh DeNeef literary practice. It is precisely this kind of negotiation I had in mind by calling the present essays "rereadings." Each represents a return to a familiar classical text in order to tease out certain themes that assume both shape and meaning only belatedly, in the wake of nearly a century of psychoanalytical inquiry. At the same time, each offers a reinterpre tation of the analytical motifs and structures that attempts to remain sensitive to the idiosyncracies of a particular literary representation. How successful these rereadings are-how convincing and how pro vocative-will depend upon a further critical reading-another re turn to another text through a return to Freud through Lacan. The other half of the title of the collection adopts the phrase under which Lacan described his own "return to Freud." Writing before unique historical turning points in anthropology, sociology, linguistics, literary theory. and philosophy, Freud was unfortunately deprived of important theoretical innovations that could have sup ported his intended models and clarified his methodological choices. The return to Freud, therefore, was to be a bringing back to his think ing the results of works that postdated him. This new constellation, a collective gathering of several related disciplines, Lacan called "the Freudian Field." As the following essays reveal, the present use of psychoanalysis in rereading literary texts is by no means a single-dimension endeavor, for it freely borrows from a wide range of theoretical models-lin guistics, narrative and discourse analysis, genre and gender studies, rhetoric, speech acts, deconstruction, and so on. Amid such diver sity it is not possible to subsume the interpretive strategies under anyone patriarchal-Freud, Lacan-or even matriarchal-lrigaray -name. Indeed, it is perhaps just this refusal to foreclose interpre tive models and a concurrent willingness to interrogate methods and procedures, to test the limits of psychoanalytic insights, that may be the best answer to the charges that Kerrigan raises. At the very least, I trust, the present collection shows that despite the death of its "father," Lacanian thinking is very much alive and well, and that it is making important differences in contemporary literary criticism. If, in the process, it also helps to clarify the difficult ideas of Lacan himself, that, I think, is a major and necessary contribution to the scene of criticism today. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan Plato's SympOSium and the Lacanian Theory of Transference: j Or, What Is Love? In the first ten meetings of his seminar On the Transference Lacan offered an innovative interpretation of Plato's Symposium. l This dialogue from the fifth century B.C. survived throughout the Middle Ages in manuscript form, but was not published in a critical edi tion until 1578 by Henri Estienne, a French humanist. Since that time some of the best thinkers have interpreted the Symposium, or The Banquet, as it is otherwise called. 2 To say something new about Plato's writings on Socrates is, then, no mean feat. In Lacan's compelling reading, Socrates-Plato's master teacher-is shown as exemplary in pointing a way for analysts to use transference dialecti cally, to help analysands distinguish between desire and love. Lacan's own teaching elaborates fine dis tinctions with the express goal of giving ana lysts a theory worthy of a praxis that will help analysands work with the confusions and suffering (usually regarding love and de sire) that bring them to consult an analyst in the first place. But before we look at The South Atlantic Quarterly 88:4. Fall 1989. Copyright 1989 by Duke University Press. CCC 0038'2876/89/$1.5. ns Wlie Ran/and-Sullivan of Socrates and Freud, paradoxically "winning" the thought game by claiming that his word is no more final than any other. Playing on Lacan's insistence that there is no final word, no totality of discourse, no innate "self," no full word, Derrida's skeptical stance says to Lacan that there is also nothing one can call "truth." Put another way, Der rida's final word is the word that says implicitly to Donald Davidson: Don't worry, young man. There is nothing more to know. If language is all there is and it merely frames itself endlessly, building trace upon trace, what does it mean, then, when Freud erases Plato"be hind Socrates' signature?" 6 Characteristically, Derrida then goes into a long series of speculations, examinations of notes, citations, inter pretations, and speculations: all to prove that "the origin is a specu lation. Whence the 'myth' and the hypothesis. If there is no thesis in this book, it is because its proper object cannot be the object of any thesis. It will have been noticed that the concept of hypothesis is the most general 'methodological' category of the book: all the 'method ological' procedures amount to [reviennent d] hypotheses. And when science us in the dark, providing us, for example as concerns the origin of sexuality, 'not so much as a ray of a hypothesis' ... it is again to a 'hypothesis,' of another order certainly, that we must recur."? In Beyond the Pleasure PrinCiple, Freud says: If, therefore, we are not to abandon the hypothesis of death in stincts, we must suppose them to be associated from the very first with life instincts. But it must be admitted that in that case we shall be working upon an equation with two unknown quan tities. Apart from this, science has so little to tell us about the origin of sexuality that we can liken the problem to a darkness into which not so much as a ray of a hypothesis has penetrated. In quite a different region, it is true, we do meet with such a hypothesis; but it is of so fantastic a kind-a myth rather than a scientific explanation-that I should not venture to produce it here, were it not that it fulfills precisely the one condition whose fulfillment we desire. For it traces the origin of an instinct to a need to restore an earlier state of thinys. What I have in mind is, of course, the theory which Plato put into the mouth of Aris- What l . ~ tow? 729 lophancs in the Symposium, and which deals not only with the orillin of the sexual instinct but also with the most important of its variations in relation to its object .... Shall we follow the hint us by the poet-philosopher [Professor Heinrich Gomperz of Vicnna], and venture upon the hypothesis that living substance at the same time of its coming to life was torn apart into small particles, which have ever since endeavoured to reunite through the sexual instincts? That these instincts, in which the chemical affinity of inanimate matter persisted, gradually succeeded ... ?a Ih'ud continues with a biological speculation on the origin of sexu ,lIity. In the Symposium Plato describes six oratorical addresses given "In Praise of Love," all directed to Socrates for questions and commen tary. The speeches represent various efforts to figure out what love is, what its origins are, and what it means. The tension in the dialogue ('omes from its larger context, however: the jealous rivalry of Alci hiades directed against Socrates and Agatho. Lacan's interpretation of Socrates' handling of this triad sets the tone for his own On the Transference, as well as his departure from Freud regarding the role of the analyst in transference. But before looking at Lacan's seminar, let us glance briefly at Derrida's spoof of Lacan's theories on love and sexuality. Derrida focuses on the problems involved in Plato's writing about Socrates and the imperfect textual renderings that necessarily follow from such accounts, not the least of which is, for him, Lacan's reading of Freud. Derrida demonstrates the obvious. Any repetition turns Rede (speech) into Gerede (rumor or gossip), an imperfect text. Lacan's teaching about love, love letters, becomes in the Derridean skeptic's mill a postcard. Derrida finds Lacanguilty of "full speech," a term Lacan dropped in the 1950S, although he never used it to mean something fully present or whole, but rather a fragment or fiction he called a piece of "truth." Lacan's greater error, in Derrida's account, lies in his being such a dupe as to base a seminar on a fragment in the already written. Lacan did indeed take up the hypothesis or myth that someone called Socrates commanded enough interest in a pupil called Plato to keep him from falling into his favorite trap of philosophical clo 730 ElJie Ran/and-Sullivan sure (ideal forms) when Socrates was his subject of focus. Moreover, Lacan took seriously the idea that the Symposium was not merely an occasion for discrete discourses of mythical opinion (doXQ). More like the salons of courtly love, the symposium was a moment when what was said was "overdetermined" by the mingling of desires and love that frames Plato's account of the speeches, adding something (a jouissance effect) to the written frame, something that cannot be recorded but which "materializes" the word-"words in their flesh, in their material aspect"-especially when the subject matter con cerns Eros. 9 Apollodorus, a new and ardent follower of Socrates, be gins the evening by running in to announce the eventual arrival of his teacher. As host, Agatho eagerly awaits the arrival of Socrates. At the end of the evening, after the speeches, a drunken AIcibia des arrives and insists on revealing to those present that Socrates is both the most precious (aBalma) and most treacherous of humans. In Lacan's account, Socrates' response to AIcibiades and then to Agatho explains much about the differing natures of desire and love, opening up many questions about the source of Socrates' wisdom (or indeed the idea of "wisdom" per se): questions perhaps not adequately re considered until Lacan's interpretation of the Symposium. In 1966 at an international colloquium supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation and sponsored by the Johns Hopkins Humani ties Center ("The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man"), Lacan advanced some of his most difficult ideas, ideas we are still trying to make sense of. For instance, he presented his view of myth as something which operates from structure. The Symposium is made of myths. That is, Lacan does not stop his discussion of The Banquet in Seminar 8, but refers to it throughout his teaching. For ex ample, in the seminar on The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho Analysis he expressly creates a myth of his own to explain his dis covery (in the clinic) that the "truth" of structure is the Real (not mythical) of effect that speaks to and from the body and whose cause is desire.IO Derrida's insistence that everything is myth or hypothe sis is far from Lacanian. There is no metalanguage, Lacan teaches, no one discourse or explanation or method. But there is a truth of the body that speaks a language of the Real, a language of symptoms (objet a) and love (ideals). What, Is I.ovcl 731 (... I haw never said that the unconscious was an assemblage of words, JUII that the unconscious is precisely structured). I don't I hink I here is such an English word but it is necessary to have the h'l'Ill, as we are talking about structure and the unconscious is SI rll('t tired as a language. What does this mean? Properly speaking this is a redundancy because 'structured' and 'as a language' for 1IIl' 1 I 1 ( . ~ a n exactly the same thing. Structured means my speech, Illy kxicon, etc., which is exactly the same as a language. And I h,11. is not all. Which language? Rather than myself it was my pupils that took a great deal of trouble to give that question a different meaning, and to search for the formula of a reduced language. What are the minimum conditions ... ? There were also some philosophers ... who have found since then that it was lint a question of an 'under' language or of 'another' language, Ilot myth for instance or phonemes, but language. It is extraordi nary the pains that each took to change the place of the question. Myths, for instance, do not take place in our consideration pre dsely because they are also structured as a language .... There is only one sort of language; concrete language ... that people talkY To describe a palpable effect made by speech that materializes itself Ilot only in the body, but in writing, thinking, desiring, and loving as well, Lacan first used the word ecrit. Later he developed his con cept of the objet Q as that which "drives," materializes language, and smashes all totalities. Elsewhere I have attempted to reconstruct Lacan's later picture of discourse as a social link between speaking beings whose cause is the objet aY The analytic discourse, in particu lar, gives rise to his notion of the variations of desiring structures that appear in the clinic. More particularly, the analytic discourse teaches that there is a limit to discourse that delineates a person as a sub ject of desire, despite the infinity of possible combinations of words, images, phonemes, states of being, (im) possible worlds, and so on. ~ And that limit has a universal aspect: it is whatever presents itself as 'an intervention in our lives. around the formula "sexual being." Inso far as being sexed involves our jouissance (pleasure or suffering), we are always "sexually" involved.I; Yet, paradoxically, in Lacan's view, 732 EWe RaaJand-SulJivan there is no sexual relation, no representation for gender identity, no innate signifier for the difference between male and female "written" clearly in the unconscious (founding memory). This lack of a tive mark of sexual difference does not mean, however, that there is no mark for difference. The Imaginary seeks to symbolize difference, the difference itself becoming its own mark, a tautology repeated at every level of the personal and social. In this sense, every person has a relation to a third term-the phallus or mark of lack inscribed as the first countable signifier for difference and as the first disappear ing signifier-that he or she depends on as the "at least one" signifier for opposition that permits signifiers to account for other differences. That is, the phallus is the first imposition of cultural meaning on biology. Moreover, if this first mark is not made, no other metaphori cal substitution of one term, one element, one identificatory trait for another can occur. Knowledge is linked to love and because this mark for dif ference is based on one law: the incest taboo which forbids ongOing oneness with the mother in the name(s) of some father. Such a turn ing toward! around cultural differentials propagates sexual identities as ideologies. But without this organizing structure, an infant never learns to mark itself as other, never learns to say"!," never experi ences the pure signifier as nothing more than that which allows a representing of a subject for another si8nifier. In this drama of the Real and Symbolic, the function of metaphor-that which substitutes one thing for another-lies at the heart of the human ability to know, to love, to move, to copulate, to reproduce anything new or creative. Metaphor also continually gives birth to the fading that Lacan acterized as metonymy or desire. In its simplest, and perhaps most complex, sense, Lacanian discourse theory teaches that all discourse organizes itself around the sexual difference that is quickly mytholo 8 ized (essentialized) by any culture and made particular in the case of each person. Yet, if, as Lacan maintains, structure usually pre dominates over chaos and rote repetition, if, indeed, the raison d'etre of myth is to interpret (Oedipal) structuring, then it is not so sur prising that one will find myth at the origin of all explanations where problems of ordering meaning around minimal enigmas have maxi mum repercussions. What it means to be "me" comes back to what it What Is tovel 733 IIIt',lIIH 10 Ill' male or female, to be (or not to be) gendered in this way III I h.lI. ()nlv extreme cases pose the problem of the foreclosure of a for difference (autism and psychosis). But what texts that never quit speaking about love? Do they not !ipt'.lk .IS if trying to account for something missing? We do not account !'Ol' I h,11 hy deconstructing their language, for the sexual myths (desire 1)(,11I!: inlerpretation, in Lacan's view) that evolve as Imaginary, Sym holk. Real, and Symptomatic orderings place love, death, and power ,IS SI.lkes at the heart of all quests and questi6ns. III the Symposium the first speaker, Phaedrus, is both candid and lIIodest. He argues that Love is all-powerful for both mortals and v,otis. He attributes the power and superiority of Love to his having no p.m'nts at all, suggesting (to me) that the urge to enshroud questions 1'C'!:,mling human origins in mystery and enigma is far from new. Love W.IS not begotten in a traditional way, says Phaedrus. He was gen C'I'.lled from the ineffable principle of all things. Indeed, after Chaos !!.IVC birth to Earth, Earth gave birth to Love, the eldest and most worthy of the gods. Love, then, is the author of human virtue and happiness. To prove his point, Phaedrus tells of two mortals who sac rificed their lives for love-Alcestis and Achilles-and in so doing pleased the gods to the utmost, even regaining life as a paradoxical reward. The second speaker suggests that the idea of a general discourse to be made upon Love poses the problem incorrectly. There are, says he, two Loves, not one. Arguing in a diffuse but interesting style that Love attends two Aphrodites or Venuses, Pausanias explains that the celestial one leads to love of the mind or philosophy, and the vul gar one stimulates love of the body (sexuality). The superiority of mind over affairs of the body can be traced to the origins of the two Venuses, the celestial one born of man alone. Her father was Uranus (the god of rain) or Heaven itself. The vulgar or popular Venus was born of Zeus and Dione. Pausanias goes on to denigrate the kind of love practiced in other Greek states (Sparta, etc.) where boys are en joined by law to gratify men as sexual lovers, thus placing monetary value on "love." Where the arts of speaking do not flourish, as they do in Athens, says he, virtue and wisdom cannot be attained through the love begotten by friendship. Thus the celestial Venus "partakes 734 Ellie RaaJand-Sullivan not of the female, but of the male only; whence she is the parent of friendship-a stranger to brutal lust."14 While Pausanias is speak ing, Aristophanes, the comic playwright, goes into fits of hiccoughs and begins to make jokes. Centuries later in his interpretation of the Symposium, Lacan says that no one will understand Plato's dialogue if they do not know why Aristophanes acted in this manner during Pausanias's speech. Since the hiccoughing Aristophanes is in no shape to speak next, the medical doctor Eryximachus recommends that he tickle his throat with a feather in order to sneeze and relieve his hiccoughs. Eryximachus speaks next, providing the safety of rhetoric and nar rative until we can return to Aristophanes. Indeed, what did Lacan mean by pointing to jokes and hiccoughs as crucial to understand ing the Symposium? If one follows the logic of analysis put forth by Lacan, there is a "truth" to his interpretation of The Banquet that validates not only his theory that truth has the structure of fiction, but pushes our understanding of aesthetics beyond its many formal istic explications by showing that fiction's roots lie in the Real of the body. Indeed, at the simplest level, Aristophanes' laughter and hiccoughs show that the body gets in the way of smooth and elo quent rhetoric, that the body can be an obstacle, a stumbling block to meaning. By contrast, Eryximachus invokes a universal principle in Nature that attracts harmony and stands behind physical health and happy love. He argues that love as a passion corrupts and blights. But both gods and mortals, says he, try together for the riaht love, one which will cure whatever is wrong. Divination is just that: to cherish the right in order to cure the wrong. The goal of love, then, aims at good things such as temperance and justice. In these com bined efforts of Heaven and Earth, Eryximachus finds the social good as welL Then Aristophanes is ready to speak. In 1960 Lacan wondered why Plato brought Aristophanes into the Symposium. In historical reality, not only did Aristophanes mock Socrates in The Clouds, he helped kill him by introducing the diocism: a punitive rupture of the politi cal unity of the city. Moreover, although he is a comic playwright, Aristophanes' speech on love is not particularly comic, although it appears to be at first glance. Aristophanes is in no doubt about the What Is Love? 735 IlIlWI'r of love. He says the god of love should be the one most honored humans, but he is not because the human race has Changed from wh,11 it originally was when there were three species: males, females, ,IIH\ hermaphrodites. In this time humans were like their animal ('ClllIllnparts; they walked on all fours. But, reminding us of the Bib Ik,l\ myth of fallen angels in the Judaic tradition, Aristophanes says t h.1I Jupiter punished humans for trying to invade Heaven by cutting I h(,111 in half and forcing them to walk upright. The true punishment, was that having been bisected, each half was doomed to IOllg for its other half. In compensation for this loss, Jupiter gave hlllllans sex. The hermaphrodites became heterosexuals; females be I '.1111(' lesbians in some cases; and males found the best kind of love in I ht' combination of sex and friendship: "Greek love." In his eighth seminar Lacan teaches us that Plato put profound words in Aristophanes' mouth, something he will reiterate in The /"ollr Fundamental Concepts where he speaks of this irony: the un ml1scious (sexuality) finds itself on the opposite side to love. Why is t his ironic? Humans are characterized by lack and loss, Lacan teaches .Igain and again. In nothing are we total, neither in our speech, our bodies, our fictions, or our gender "identity." Individuals try to com pensate for a niggling sense of something missing through sex and love. But the major catch-22 is that sex and love do not fit like a glove Lacan's observation that "c;a ne va pas entre les hommes et les femmes" was intuited centuries ago by Socrates via Plato. Moreover, Aristophanes' bisection of the sexes suggests the lack to which his myth gives the lie. Poking fun at himself and taking his injunction seriously at the same time, Lacan says: Children, there is treasure buried here. I have given them [my listeners] the plough share [sic] and the plough, namely that the unconscious was made out of language, and at one point in time ... three very good pieces of work have resulted from it. But we must now say-You can only find the treasure in the way I tell you. There is something comical about this way. This is abo solutely essential in understanding any of Plato's dialogues, and especially when one is dealing with the Symposium. This dia logue is even, one might say, a practical joke. The starting-point 736 lillie l{ayland-SllJlivan ... [of the joke] is Aristophanes' fable. This fable is a defiance to the centuries, for it traverses them without anyone trying to do better. I shall try.... Aristophanes' myth pictures the pur suit of the complement for us in a moving, and misleading way, by articulating that it is the other, one's sexual other half, that the living being seeks in love. To this mythical representation of the mystery of love, analytic experience substitutes the search by the subject, not of the sexual complement, but of the part of himself, lost forever, that is constituted by the fact that he is only a sexed living being, and that he is no longer immortalY In his seminar on transference Lacan had commented that Aris tophanes' laughter pokes fun at Pausanias, on one level. Aristophanes points to the hypocrisy of the moralist Pausanias who coldly divorced love from desire; dealing in goods and not passions (the power of a given city state being the good), while seeming to praise "Greek love" as pure and intellectual. But this suggestion alone hardly merits Lacan's claims to do better in interpreting Aristophanes' fable than has been done for centuries. So Lacan invents his own myth in an effort to delineate the distinction between love and desire he finds implicit in Aristophanes' fable. The lamella is an organ, "something extra-flat, which moves like the amoeba. It is just a little more com plicated. But it goes everywhere. And as it is something ... that is related to what the sexed being loses in sexuality, it is, like the amoeba in relation to sexed beings, immortal-because it survives any division, any scissiparous And it can run around. ... This lamella, this organ, whos1 characteristic is not to exist, but which is nevertheless an organ ... is the libido . . . qua pure life instinct ... , life that has need of no organ.... It is precisely what is subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of sexed reproduction."16 That something is subtracted means, for Lacan, that loss cum jouissance is the symp tom of an emergent Real that marks us as creatures of One-minus. Humans have been punished, according to Aristophanes. They have been given the "gift" of incompleteness. To make sure the punish ment be felt as such, they were made sexual (desiring), but doomed to search for a proper sexual partner through the straits of love. What Is Love? 737 1..11',111 is spelling it out for his listeners, a, b. c: "The sexual relation 11,111<11'<1 over to the hazards of the field of the Other. It is handed IIVN 10 I he explanations that are given of it." The subject hl'gins in the locus of the Other ... is born in so far as the signi fier ('merges in the field of the Other. But by this very fact, this sllbject-which was previously nothing if not a subject coming illto heing-solidifies into a signifier. The relation to the Other is pn'cisely that which. for us. brings out what is represented by the 1,lIlldla-not sexed polarity. the relation between masculine and f('minine, but the relation between the living subject and that which he loses by having to pass. for his reproduction. through the sexual cycle. In this way I explain the essential affinity of every drive with the zone of death. and reconcile the two sides of the drive-which. at one and the same time. makes present sexu ality in the unconscious and represents. in its essence, deathY There is no totalized masculine or feminine. There is no ideal love, ollly the love of ideals in their painful affinity to narcissism and cleat h. What one loves concerns what one has lost. the mark of loss I"Onstituting the Real as an excess, a beyond or limit that Lacan named jouissance. Its forms are the objet a which return from a place of trauma to create affect. and place jouissance and death (archaic <lead "letters") in our desires (drives) and discourses. Lacan's point about the "drives" that emanate from the Other is that they do not necessarily have the good of the subject in mind. We can, however, <Juestion the "drives" from the side of jouissance or la chose (the objet a). Indeed. the subject is a headless robot, spoken by repetitions and drives that try to reduce differences to some alien sense of the same. What, then, is funny about Aristophanes' discourse. what is so re vealing? In this case funny points to the tragicomic. We give all to love. die for love, kill for love. In this strange masquerade where we dance around each other. accommodating ourselves to others through monumental farces, intense contradictions. outrageous comedies, the strangest of bedfellows. we keep the Other at arm's length and blame others instead. Lacan says what we love in an other is what we lack (desire) in the Other of our own repressed fables. Still. love is our only hope. Love for an other (transference) tries to reach beyond the 738 Ellie Raoland-Sullivan death barrier erected by alien Otherness, only to stumble up against the desire inscribed in signifying chains that each subject supposes as his savoir. One name Lacan gave this meconnaissance was sublima tion. Indeed, he equated "Greek love" to sublimation. But Lacanian sublimation is not Freudian sublimation. That is, it is not pathologi cal. Rather, sublimation concerns creative efforts to know something of the enigmatic, sometimes painful silence felt "as if from within" that informs our quests to validate (know) who and what we are. What do we seek in an other through love? Most people say friendship and sex, as if they were of a piece. Not for Lacan. Friendship concerns love, narcissism, identificatory familiarity, similarities in jouissance. Sex addresses itself, rather, to the Other whose object each subject is, albeit unawares. Sex waltzes in the lane of the "drives": voices, gazes, gifts (fecal generosity), consump tions (oral affinities), aiming not at reproduction, but at being in the circuit of the drives. 1s Sex and love accommodate themselves to each other awkwardly and in shifting patterns, often more like two Mack trucks dancing than Shelley'S Epipsychidion. Seemingly cyni cal by comparison to Shelley's conviction that love was a quest for a soul mate, Lacan suggests that not only do we not seek the other for beauty, the "object" sought in love is not the other qua person either. There is, instead, a Schadenfreude produced by the objet a that Lacan characterizes as an "extreme barrier forbidding access to a fundamental horror." 19 What we seek in an other in love, then, is distance from the objet a that constitutes the knots composing our own unsymbolized traumas, which, tInetheless, leave their mark. An other becomes a protective barrier\between our fantasies and the strange Real whose subjects we are, a Real of losses evolving from a prespecular lining of the subject (the primordially repressed objects that cause desire-the breast, the feces, the urinary flow, the gaze, the voice, the phoneme, the void-) attaching body to language, and desire to demand. 20 Every demand becomes a demand (request) for love, for the recognition that feeds the ontological illusion of exis tence. That the "beauty" to which individuals cling is narcissistic illusion, alienated desire, mechanistically repeating symptoms, the fables of the Other's signi1)ring chains, and the chaotic void around which these fables weave themselves, makes each human "subject" a What: Is [,ovel 739 S.Ylllptolll (rewritten by Lacan as sin thorne in order to express the par I k"I.lrily specific to this order) of her or his life encounters with love ,1IIe! Ilt'sire, told in the names of the father and mediated by desires of I he Illot her. Whell Lacan opines that the most hidden and radical articulation of loY(' in kinship is between father and son, I wonder if he is hinting ,II Ilw sublimated power of the paternal metaphor where love is the IIIV(' of a name or a lineage: the love of self reflected in the tauto mirror of naming. Love is for a name, Lacan taught. Desire is .111 organ. If the immortality of a name (soul translated by Lacan .IS (llller/aimer) comes from the generation of a child as the desired ohjt('\ by which a family tries to pin down whatever remains unas sllIIilated (the Real) in each member, I wonder if each child is not .111 olJjet a in a family; the all too familiar, yet uncannily different 01 It' (s). It seems to me, then, that all this discourse in the Sympo , ~ i l l l l l on the birth of Love is family talk, a philosophical effort to give h to a child that would symbolize the forces in play in this group where philosophy was not a thing apart, but a way of life. I would .l<ld, further, that classical scholars have described "Greek love" as llirlation or erotic petting, but not as a love that excluded sexual rela tions with, or love for, a wife. Lacan called it an amour d'ecoJe that veiled the problematic of Woman, something we will return to later. Por now, let's go on to Agatho's speech; the one preceding Socrates' .lIlswers. Agatho was a second-rate tragedian, and a Sophist, or master of rhetoric as well. His discourse is witty, rambling, and beautifully spo ken, but apparently superficial. Love is the youngest of the gods, he says, and the most tender. Love seeks beauty, but must also deal with I he varied effects it produces on the lover and the beloved. In his answers, Socrates first gently admonishes all the speakers, remind ing them that the point of the symposium is not for each one to say what is "true," but to frame the best from all the materials (remind ing us of the coherence theory of truth). Then he replies to Agatho, leading him step by step in his famous elentic method of teaching by questioning and refutation, the remembrance of which (in Lacan's view) kept Plato from embracing altogether the systematic method of establishing essential truths he strove for. Having praised Agatho's 740 Ellie Raaland-Sullivan elegant words and good diction, Socrates begins what Plato renders as a magical dance. He asks if love is love of something, or of nothing. "Every being which feels any desire should desire only that which it is in want of."21 Lacan will hear in these words a reminiscence of his idea that we love in an other what we lack in the Other; what is lost in memory and symbolization returns transformed as variations of the objet a. In other words, Socrates debunks Agatho's claim that Love desires Beauty alone. He will explain what kind of being Love is, Socrates says, and after ward show what effects he produces. "Now I think the easiest way that I can take, in executing this plan, will be to lay before you the whole of this doctrine in the very manner and order in which I myself was examined and lectured on the subject by Diotima." 22 This sibyl line woman had done for him what he is doing for Agatho. Certainly Socrates spares Agatho's "self love" by this indirect method of speak ing. But much more is going on. Plato puts in Socrates' mouth words supposedly bestowed on him by Diotima, who showed him that his account of love gave the lie to itself. Love was neither beautiful nor good, she said. Love lies between what is human and ignorant, and what is wise and divine, and thus transmits and interprets the gods. We remember that for Lacan the gods are of the field of the Real, that which has left a trace, an effect, but is not symbolized in knowledge, and so performs maddeningly just out of one's grasp. And we remem ber Lacan's idea that myth is what works from structure (a principle of ordering). Yet Lacan uses myth to shpw how structure works, thus reversing his theory that myth works f,om structure in the service of teaching. Socrates' story of how love was generated, taken from Diotima, is the following: Love was the son of the gods Poverty and Plenty. Poverty, the woman, copulated with Plenty, then took her son Love from Plenty as he lay asleep in a state of drunkenness. Thus, Love is always poor, rough, hard, dry, barefoot, homeless, groveling, and in perpetual want. But he is also brave, active, devising traps, and powerful in magic. The child then, like the mother. She desires something the man has. According to Diotima, what is particularly good in love is its object: that is, the generation of love seeks to link the mortal and immorta1. 23 Socrates via Diotima tells us that Love What Is Love? 741 concerns the gods. Lacan stresses that the gods are of the Real something more obscured (or repressed) from our knowledge today I han from Greek knowledge when the gods were plural and powerful in multiple ways. Yet for Socrates love is not itself a good object. It is a demon. It is, Lacan will later stress, Socrates' demon. For the Illoment, I suggest that the love Plato describes through Diotima as Socrates' mouthpiece is the structure of hysteria delineated by Lacan (after Freud). When Socrates goes on to discuss the role of Love in t he sciences and arts, Alcibiades enters the room in a drunken state. Alcibiades was a nobleman, known then and now for his military for his debauchery and greed for power, and for his physical heauty. He insists on interrupting in order to speak the truth about Socrates whom he calls a Satyr and a Silenus, ugly on the outside hut beautiful inside. Alcibiades then tells the story that stands at I he origin of the symposium on love insofar as Lacan calls Alcibiades Socrates' first love. The story is roughly this. Alcibiades loved Socrates and thought Socrates loved him for his beauty. Alcibiades thought of Socrates as a treasure, a precious and undefinable object. But because he confused desire with love, says Lacan, Alcibiades thought he could possess t his treasure by sexual seduction. Since he did not receive a specific from Socrates as to his romantic feelings for him, Alcibiades devised ways to make his teacher speak his love as sexual desire. I it' plotted to be alone with him. That led to nothing. He plotted to wrestle with him in gymnastics. That led to nothing sexual. He plotted to sup alone with him, and to keep Socrates by his side during t he night. But Socrates resisted the relationship of lover and beloved, .1llowing Alcibiades to hold him in his arms all night "merely as a her or brother." Alcibiades has returned to Athens to accuse him hdbre his companions of being a Silenus and a Satyr. Socrates' crime is that he is haughty because he is best in everything, even military .1rts. Moreover, he does not tell his feelings. Naming other young lIIen, Alcibiades says: "He has deceived these, as if he had been their lover. when at the same time he rather became the beloved object himself."7.1 Then he turns to Agatho and warns him to watch out. Socrates gives a surprising answer. He immediately speaks to Aga and warns that Alcibiades is trying to separate them. Alcibiades 742 Ellie Ra8/and-Sullivan has one goal: to have both Socrates and Agatho love him since he wants to be made better (be cured) by being a "beauty who surpasses all others." Socrates hears Alcibiades at the level of desire according to Lacan's rendering of the scene. Put another way, the only organ that never closes or locks up is the ear whose answer in the body responds to the voice. 25 Lacan has called silence the voice's purified form.26 Lacan says Alcibiades praised Socrates, but the words were really spoken for/to Agatho. "He has 'undressed' in public, telling of his failed seduction, telling the slaves to stop up their ears, in order to make Socrates his slave." Put another way, if Alcibiades cannot seduce Socrates, he will seduce the new young man who loves him. But Socrates refuses the position of slave or dupe. He tells Alcibiades that in his mistaken love for him (Socrates), he wants to exchange the deception of beauty for the truth, copper for gold. Lacan's interpretation of the Symposium gives a picture of Socra tes as one who pretends to know nothing except that he can recog nize what love is: where the lover is located and the beloved. Now this is a curious twist. We know that Socrates has long been seen as the master of irony, the one who claims' he knows nothing, the Greek word eironeia meaning "not knowing." The same device is used rhetorically-not knowing-to create drama. So the drama of the Symposium turns around not knowing; or, as Lacan would have it, around who knows what. Socrates knows something: who loves and who is beloved, a crucial kind of knowledge if knowledge itself is empty (as true dogma) and arbitrary, truth reveals whose knowledge exercises power based on who II\anipulates desire. In his exegesis of Freud's various writings on love, Lacan views Freud as saying we can only think of love by referring to another sort of struc ture, the "drive" which Freud divided into three levels: the real, the economic, and the biological. To these three levels three oppositions correspond: interestlindifference, pleasure/displeasure, biological ac tivity/passivityY Lacan picks up on the active/passive distinction, but substitutes the terms loving/being loved. Michel Foucault's docu mentation of the suspicion of homosexuality as a distaste for sexual passivity (the position of the beloved), seen, for example, in ancient Athens, as a position lacking authority, is picked up by Leo Bersani who argues that the hygienics of social power concerns the fear of a What Is Love? 743 h'H.11 .llld moral incompatibility between sexual passivity and civic rllil hority.lH By directing Freud's distinction between the active and \hl,'lSiVl' away from the idea of literal sexual position, Lacan once 11",1111 ohviates a binary opposition to demonstrate, in my view, that hiliolry conceptions (right vs. wrong, top vs. bottom, master vs. slave, I'll'.) .Ire always Imaginary positionings (ideologies) that emanate 1'1'11111 .1 given person's desiring structure rather than from any correct ,wxlI.1I politics of pleasure to be found in shadow form on the walls of !'I.llo's cave. Vil'wing Socrates' and Freud's recognition of active/passive posi IlclIIs as a knowledge, Lacan compares them as men who chose to llI'I'VC' love in order to use it in the order of knowledge. But Freud discovered something more in love than he meant to. He discovered Iht' death drive there. In Lacan's view, Freud discovered that de ,'lir<' is not a vital function, nor is psychoanalysis a positive science, .IS ('volutionary theory would have us believe. Yet Freud also dis ('overed transference and thought it occurred spontaneously, but did 110\ know what this meant. We know the path some analysts have since Freud's day, believing transference love (or hate) to be a of childhood engagement with the parents. But Lacan saw sOlllething different here. He thought Plato also sensed something of t he distinction of love from desire by the mere fact of putting a deri sive discourse on love in the mouth of Agatho, the person speaking just before Socrates who does know what love is (and is not). Lacan thus disagrees with classical scholars by not discounting Agatho's discourse. Agatho describes love in poetic lines: "It is peace among humans I The calm on the seas I Rest of winds put to bed." Lacan says that any Greek would know that "calm seas" mean nothing is work ing. or nothing is happening. Love, on the contrary, is a singular thing that carries us along. To portray it as a tranquil sleep is, in Lacan's words, "a comic romance." For Love is the end of peace! That Socrates in his day would have resisted Alcibiades is amazing to Lacan, who reads it to mean that Socrates' knowledge about love has a special relationship to transference. As Socrates interrogates Agatho-his current protege-he brings out one term: the function of lack. The dialogue the two unfolds around the distinc tion between Eros as love and Eros as desire: desire which Lacan has 744 Ellie Raaland-Sullivan described as caught up in a dialectic because it is suspended to a signi fying chain which is constitutive ofthe subject, but under the form of metonymy_ In The Four Fundamental Concepts, Lacan describes the reality of the unconscious as sexual reality-an untenable truth. And why? "We know that sexual division, in so far as it reigns over most living beings, is that which ensures the survival of a species. Whether, with Plato, we place the species among the Ideas, or whether we say, with Aristotle, that it is to be found nowhere but in the individuals that support it, hardly matters here. Let us say that the species sur vives in the form of its individuals." 29 And that form evolves from the objet a, cause of desire. So when Freud's little Anna dreams of tarts, strawberries, and eggs, she is not merely making present the object of a need (food/oral drive), but on account of the sexualization of these objects, she can hallucinate a form that sisnjfjes. "It is from the point at which the subject desires that the connotation of reality is given in the hallucination:'3o When Socrates asks Agatho if love is love of something, or of nothing, he shows that Agatho does not possess the object of his desire, that he desires what is not there, that love articulates itself in desire. Put another way, Socrates questions Agatho about what he lacks, which is something that only seems nothing. He questions him about his desire by questioning the coher ence of the signifier: what signifier represents Agatho (as subject) for another signifier. In doing this, Socrates gets rid of the idea that love is transparent to itself, a simple thing. Neither Agatho who spoke like a song, nor Alcibiades who was drunk, knew exactly what they were saying: speaking about Love, they were covering over something about But Socrates knew, if we are to believe Lacan. He knew that it takes three to love: the lover, the beloved, and the objet a that causes the fantasy of love. And Socrates saw through love fantasies because he could not accept being the beloved, that which is worthy of being loved. This puts him in a different position from Alcibiades whose desire knew no limits, and whose (ideal) ego fantasy of "self" does not leave room for contemplating rejection. Put another way, Socrates' special knowledge is the knowledge the hysteric possesses (whether she knows it or not). Her desire is to support the degradation of an "unworthy" father. 31 In this way, she supplements the lack in the Wlwt is Love? 745 ' ..mlly lIovd. Hy unconsciously identifying with a defective being, she herself into a sign of something Real (an objet a) in which ,h11 ( Ulu-r can believe, and which marks the Other for her as well, KI .. her existence even as nothing. Lacan calls the thing ,,,,I}t./ (/) she identifies with the void, or density of emptiness which 1\('1' into the position of being only for others. Yet she is always It' liNk (,1' learning that she does not constitute this sign of the gift (or Mlv('r) li)r everyone. Since she lives the paradoxical dilemma of being /11111\<'1 hillg and nothing at the same time, she readily understands the 111111'tilwss of desire. To protect herself, she wants to desire from a l'uNiI ion of Noli me tansere. In this way she can remain unfulfilled, Itl lIeurotic pain, but true to the Other by continuing to identify with wh.lt is lacking in her family novel. The difficulty of sustaining this pusilion is not that it does not work well. It does. But it plays at Ilit t'dge of loss itself, near the void where Lacan located death as a 1'.lIpable presence. The dignity Lacan attributes to the neurotic is that (unlike norma tivt' narcissists who by definition cling closely to social law) he or sht- wants to know what there is of the Real in the passion of which hl- or she is the effect of a hidden object, das kern unseres Wesen. 32 But iII place of knowledge subjects have the Symptom, the response given to the question of not knowing what she or he is for the Other. Any subject is the symptom of a loss of das Dins at the level of object. The objet a Lacan designates as the void represents Socrates' central identificatory position, as well as that of female hysterics. Socrates' beauty arises from his position of sustaining himself by nothing. Not "no-thing" as nUllity, but by the nothins that Lacan defines as pure desire: la chose as the objet a. Perhaps one begins to see why Socra tes could represent a possible model for the Lacanian analyst. The analyst seeks to imitate lack itself in order to incite an analysand to work with desire, without the analyst's confusing the transference that comes back from the analysand with love to which he or she must respond, or a desire to be satisfied. If the analyst mimes the hysteric's unsatisfied desire, does this have any relation to Socrates' giving his discourse on love in the guise of a woman? Lacan points out that by making a sibyl speak, Plato was not responsible for all he said as author, but nor was Socrates. Moreover, 746 lillie RaB/and-Sullivan Lacan sees quite clearly that Socrates is making the woman in himself speak (and Plato is listening). By his recourse to myth, Socrates could use the elentic method in his own speech, as well as in questioning others because, says Lacan, myth fills in the gap between desire and jouissance, between what one seeks and what cannot yet be dialec tically constructed, the Real. Still, the Real materializes language by the gaze, the voice. the heterogeneous movements of the objet a bur rowing into the flesh, burying our efforts to neatly delineate inside from outside. Socrates, like the Lacanian analyst, destroyed the fantasies (as sumed realities) of his followers in order to unveil the truth that everything is interpretation (desire, if we are to follow Lacan's train of thought here). If our fantasies embroider our desires overtly or covertly, then we see that fantasies have the structure of fiction. They were created, imposed, and in turn cover a jouis-sens (something felt but not symbolized as knowledge) that returns from the future-past in imaginary traces that give body to the symptoms supporting our illusions of being unified. Within this logic, why does Socrates' myth of Love produce so profound an impact on his listeners? Does this myth tell us anything about the powers of "wisdom" attributed to Socrates? Insofar as Socrates' figure of Love possesses the attributes of her mother (Poverty) -in Diotima's myth-and insofar as her mother took the active role in conceiving Love, the roles of lover and beloved (desirable one) are reversed from traditional expectations of male/ female sexuality. Is this because Socrates spoke as a hysteric? As one who knows what it means to take the active role in desire, lest one face the terror of being desired? I wonder if Lacan would not have told Diotima's tale differently later when he had fotulated a concept of the unconscious in relation to a symbol that is absent in the case of Woman (who is a signifier, a category, a person, but not the essence "Imaginarized" around the masculine symbol for sexual difference as erroneously fantasized).33 In the latter case Socrates would not be questioning the woman in himself, so much as Woman, symbolized in early childhood at the level of the Imaginary (the visible) as lack ing something erroneously attributed to males. Moreover, the incest taboo between mother and son gives special value to her body and being. What Is tovel 747 Woman is man's symptom, the symptom of Man's to link the power of desire to the feminine, while routing the 11111 through philosophical investigation and other formalist U/' ,wj('ntitic uses of language. Lacan depicts Socrates as the hysteric who lakes the discourse of mastery up against the wall, pushes its h.l!'k to the wall and beyond to ask how opinion (myth) becomes knowledge. But he would not have thought of himself as questioning 11)(' principle of desire. Socrates questioned young men, and said he W.I.., Icaching his followers to find answers in themselves. Since he so successful as a teacher, how could he have understood that his IlH'I hod was maddening, not because there are no final answers, but the ordinary narcissism (ego myths) of most people (even lidII iant students) does not easily let itself collapse into the emptiness 111.11 makes of desire a drive whose aim is to circumvent loss and deny I.u'k. At the Yale University Law School in November 1975, Lacan said: "I,'hysterique produit du savoir ... Socrate est celui qui a com Ilwl1ce. II n'etait pas hysterique mais bien pire: un maitre subtil. Cela n'empeche pas qu'il avait des symptomes hysteriques."31 The hysteric is usually a woman who plays the game of love unawares. But she plays for a stake: to make the supposed master of knowing produce. She is also a master, then, for she puts others to work. Socrates knew what he was doing, Lacan says in 1975. He knew how to play the heloved in the guise of the lover, without giving anything except the "truth" that there is nothing to give but giving itself. Love is a con solation, on the side of everyday narcissism; desire a passion, on the side of jouissance. Socrates knew what was in question in the love game, and he played without soiling his hands. In The Banquet he said to Aldbiades: "The eye of thought functions by opening itself, in the measure that the scope of the Real eye works by lowering its gaze.-But attention: there where you see something, I am noth ing."35 In sharp contrast to Alcibiades, Socrates knew in what his value lay. Alcibiades sees only Imaginarily. Desire is his "good" and joins fantasy in love. No knowledge of loss-castration/real privation -is present for him. Yet when rejected, the Freudo/Lacanian triad of Real privation, Imaginary frustration, Symbolic aggression rears its head. Is it surprising that Alcibiades was one of those who played a 748 Ellie RaBland-Sullivan key role in denouncing Socrates? We have returned to Freud via Lacan to find the SOurce of public aggression in the preconscious lining of Real separations, loss itself. Lacan argues that Socrates does not love. Instead of producing metaphor-a substitution/someone or something else-he produces metonymy/desire as it fades into the Real. But in pushing discourse and knowledge to their limit, he unveils the secret of love: that in love one gives what one does not have to give. The lover is a signifier of lack and thus must look for a response, a sign, from the beloved because love lies beyond demand, beyond transference effects. The lover looks for this response in desire where an other is no longer an equal, but something like an object; there where we as subjects are dismissed, there where the horror of objectification is linked to how we bring about our own depreciation as objects; there where encoun ters are missed encounters. Lacan's description sounds strangely like Alcibiades describing Socrates as a Silenus. Going further, if love is the decoy that somehow enters desire through the "drive," one must ask what "drive" we are talking about? Lacan writes that between love-what we lie on to dream-and desire there is a trauma: the Oedipal one. Because we cannot face the bumbling signifying effects left over (objet a) in our efforts to figure out what it is to be boy Or girl, masculine or feminine, male or female, man or woman, wife or husband, mother or father, we over (or under) -value the loved object and thus save our dignity as subjects. But Socrates paid. He died. I would argue that Socrates committed two crimes against his social order. He did nft follow the universal (local) commandment to ]OUIR, to appetites of the body first and foremost. Nor did he support the democratic ideals of the city. I wonder how Nietzsche could have seen Socrates as a master of reason? Perhaps if Nietzsche had read Lacan, Socrates would have appeared to him as master of another kind of passion, one that ob viates the need for an opposition between the Apollonian and the Dionysiac. Are we to believe (if we believe there was a Socrates) that he really chose to drink the hemlock only because he wanted to con tinue a discourse with immortal souls? Mind without body? Or was he finally (unconsciously) weary of the desire/love/knowledge game? Did he commit a kind of suicide (as hysterics sometimes do) because, What Is Love? 749 beyond politics and philosophical mastery, the only game in town was no longer so titillating, was, for him, without exit? If Socrates' "final" knowledge was that the savoir he loved best required recon stituting himself as a void, his death seems not so much political as inevitable. Fatigue or cynicism? The Symposium interested Lacan because he found Socrates in the same dilemma as the analyst, that of trying to occupy a vacant place. The analyst is created by the analysand as an illusion (semblant) of something cast off, something not said in the analysand's Other, thus cast off by the analysand (a). And so the analyst occupies a place of silence, no matter what is said. What is said matters, and what is not said matters. What matters to Lacan is to make the analy sand aware that love or transference is a signifier, a relationship to knowledge, to what one lacks in one's "self" knowledge and thus loves in the Other. Calling on Socrates to help him in his teaching, Lacan insisted that love (and its more truthful sister, hate) must be taken into account in any knowledge quest. Why? Because love tries to bridge the gap between desire and jouissance by encompassing the objet a that makes the word flesh, and sometimes makes enigmatic (symptomatic) words of our flesh. Lacan describes the partial object as the pivot of human In transference, subjects usually identify their desire with their fanta sies-i (a)-seeking to give desire a consistency that appears and can be designated. Yet things do not actually run so smoothly. Transfer ence fictions are fabricated for the addressee: someone or something "supposed," that Lacan named the Other, or the unconscious signi fying chains from which each person speaks. 37 Put this way, Lacan's claim that transference is not an interhuman situation becomes ten able. In the beginning was the WORD-not of creation-but of forma tion. What is the purpose of the word? To teach others what we lack (in the Other) so they can respond to our lack: love us. But since our lacks are not complimentary-as Aristophanes' myth suggests-how can we save each other? The purpose of using transference becomes a way of teaching, of asking the analysand to learn what he lacks through taking account of love. Lacan talked quite a bit in his reading of the Symposium about the confusion of love with God or the gods. Certainly Greek mythology is 750 Ellie RaBland-Sullivan exemplary in its display of such confusions. Lacan insisted that love is not a god, for the gods belong to the Real. And the Real has to do with suffering, death, and loss. The paradox is that humans cling to jouissance, and idealize and eternalize their being (narcissism or ego) which is a structure of alienation-a second death, the first death being our animal death. In this sense the ego appears tragic, although its very arrogance and blindness can turn it suddenly comic. The space between these two deaths is veiled by beauty and by desire. Yet if desire or truth is what is hidden in a subject who is constituted by what it cannot know, only knows after the fact, then it makes sense that the question would entail a profound dependence on the order of language and others (love). On the one hand, desire is hid den; Simultaneously, it is transgressive, while the raison d'etre of the unconscious is "I do not know." Did Socrates not see the danger in his way of questioning? At first glance, one wants to say no. His method was a science based on his belief in an internal coherence of soul, life, and immortality. Yet his very method defied a belief in unity. Much more interesting to me than how much Socrates has been written over by Plato, or even whether Socrates is an exemplary analyst, is the description of a per son who tried centuries ago to advance knowledge through a power ful mixing of desire and love with words. This structure is the one by which Lacan believes psychoanalysis was born. Breuer ran away when he saw the impact of the talking cure in his patient's false preg nancy. But Freud, whom Lacan called a man of desire, stayed and tried to learn something more about what V/e do know in terms of what we do not know from women he c ~ d hysterics. If Socrates' method hystericized his followers, one can only think he understood something of the sense of devastation and desire he produced. Lacan thinks he knew. His evidence is that Socrates did not involve himself sexually with his students. Although he profited from being loved and desired, he put up a barrier to separate knowing from desiring, a barrier that would, paradoxically, make his "wisdom" even more desirable. Lacan calls him a subtle master, but he does not call him a sadist. Although Socrates was not a Lacanian analyst, he was a forerunner of Lacan's insistence that in pushing a subject to say what he or she wants through the pathways of love, the analyst'S own de- What l . ~ Love? 751 sire (interpretation) must fade. While Freud controlled transference by interpretation, by making the subject remember, Lacan attributed to hysteria the status of an act. For him hysteria is itself a mode of transference and a discourse structure. In other words, hysteria has greater meaning for a Lacanian analyst than just that of a diagnos tic tool. Lacanian teleology regarding the "cure" urges analysts to mime hysteria, with the goal of intervening in the fixity of fantasies in order to produce unconstituted desire. Let me speculate about why Socrates' teaching was not curative. Lacan described "Greek love" as sublimation or meconnaissance. If we think of sublimation in relation to das Dina evoked by Freud as the missed object, that is, missed by the memory trace in its identificatory work ofjudging new perceptions in their most primitive organization in relation to images, we can see the genius of Freud's discovery.38 We can also see why Freud dropped his "project" as a set of unresolved problems. Lacan picked up some of these problems to show that par tial drives (invocatory, scopic, oral, etc.) thread through the Other starting as symbols or irreducible units, reappearing as symptoms and returning as objet a: missed or lost objects. Since the Real is not assimilable in the Symbolic or Imaginary in a totalized way, these ob jects have taken a bite out of the ego. They demand sacrifice. Insofar as sublimation seeks to represent the narcissistic object, to elevate it to the level of the drive by placing it somewhere in relation to das Dina, sublimation responds to unconscious "drives." Artistic prod ucts of sublimation were in Lacan's view the greatest achievements of humanity. But sublimation is not repression, the unconscious, or identification. Nor is it cure. Insofar as the sexual "drives" are par tial, seeking in an other something to stand in for what is missing in the Other, we seek to make ourselves heard, to resonate and reflect in those erogenous zones that are empty sets (the mouth, the ear, the eyes, and so on). The "drives" push people to make themselves seen, or to see themselves as seeing. Does one not sense the daily disappointments and pitfalls that mark our lives if this is true? Even desperation to be heard or seen, sometimes at any cost. Not only for individuals, but for groups and nations as well. Lacan taught analysts and analysands alike to let what is missing fall. Such a trajectory goes in the opposite direction of sublimation where the aim is to 752 Ellie Raeland-Sullivan grab, freeze, depict, and reify what is missing, all the while keeping it enigmatic. The meeting of a group of American analysts in southern Cali fornia in January of 1988 whose topic was "What Is Love?" showed none of the theoretical rigor of the Symposium, or of Lacan's reading of it. According to Newsday, some topics discussed by the "shrinks [who] keep eyeing it" (love) ranged from considerations of how pre verbal emotions bring our parents into every adult relationship to how romantic love has failed the human psyche. In the words of the reporter, Jamie Talan: "At the turn of the century Sigmund Freud theorized that people fall in love with their Oedipal parent. Today's therapists have come to recognize something developmentally earlier and far more intense: A time before language when parents were nothing short of God-like, totally committed and nurturing."39 The general consensus of the various analysts and psychiatrists there was that people must grow out of looking for a repetition of this love in order to become healthy; that to be obsessed with love is an infan tile state; that people must not fall in love only to meet each other's needs. In March of 1988 analysts and psychiatrists met again in New Orleans to discuss fear of intimacy, marriage avoidance, romance, and why real men should eat quiche. Although one is glad to hear of American analysts speaking about love, one wonders where they can go with the notion that love is a pleasure-principle infantilism to be outgrown? If maturation is the model for health, where does desire fit in? What new ideal of wholeness is b e i ~ g r?lJresented in a model that makes love an Eryximachian malady t01)e cured by an Aristophean bisection? Lacan knew that love can make us ill, make us but he did not jump to the conclusion that in order to be "well" or "whole" we must (pretend to) give it up. Rather, he taught that love is the pathway along which we can learn to make fine distinctions between love and desire that may give us the freedom to take a position in the Other (our desire), and toward others (our ideals). If we come to understand what Socrates taught-that love is a powerful potion laced with desire-perhaps we will agree with Lacan that desire (not love) is every person's cause. Beyond desire, Lacan placed the objet a. At the first ParisNew York Psychoanalytic Workshop, Jacques-Alain What Is Love? 753 Miller explained that the objet a introduces something else into lan guage-something he called "light."40 How, he asked, does this small a relate to the large A-the Symbolic order? Is it exterior or interior? He offered us the word "extimacy" to try to transcend this exterior! interior opposition. Again, I think of Alcibiades' description of Soc rates as ugly on the outside and beautiful on the inside, the paradox being that extimacy-perhaps what Augustine called God-is at the very center of one's intimacy. Yet it seems lost or unattainable. In this, it is precious, aBa/ma. Is it not this strange connection between something in us both alien and intimate that Plato portrays Socrates as showing his pupils by confronting them with lack, leaving them both empty-handed, and yet with their hands full, both perplexed and trapped in their own fantasies? Lacan taught that the sublime object is not "it," but only a substitute for das DinB. "The thing"-our truth, the Real is what we seek in an other through love articulated in desire. What mystifies us, eludes us, or drives us mad, is that "it" remains just out of grasp. Is "it" in us, or in an other? Where is it? What is it? We are faced with a Wizard of Oz problem. Behind every figure or persona, forms fade. When an analysand implicitly, or directly, asks "Who am 11" in order not to know what constitutes "1," Lacan says the analyst never replies "You are this or that," as long as the analyst knows that at the level of the Other the question articulated is "What am I?" One of Lacan's lessons to his pupils was that an analyst can help an analysand reconstitute an "I" only by getting the analysand to answer the questions: "What do I want?" "What does the I lack?" "What is suffering beyond my desire?" Notes /aC(lues Lacan, Le seminaire, livre VIII: Sur Ie transfert (1960-61), unpublished (ext. ) rile Banauet. in The Works of Plato, ed. Thomas Taylor (New York, 19B,d, 3: IOW-BO. \ ,.I('(llICS Lacan. Freud's Papers on Technique, ed. JacqueS-Alain Miller, trans. John Forrestcr (New York, 1988), 274. -I Donald Davidson, "The Philosophy of Plato," London Review of Books, 1 August IIJM,,, 3-12. 754 Ellie Ragland-Sullivan 5 Ibid., 22 6 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1987). 374. 7 Ibid., 370. 8 Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychologi cal Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London. 1953-'74), 18: 51-52. 9 Jacques Lacan, "Of Structure as an Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever," in The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore, 1970), 187. 10 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, ed. Jacques Alain Miller. trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1978). 205. I I Lacan, "Of Structure," 187-88. 12 Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, "The Limits of Discourse Structure: The Hysteric and the Analyst," Prose Studies. forthcoming 1989. 13 Jacques Lacan, Encore. ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris, 1975), 16; my translation. 14 Plato, Banquet, 46l. 15 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 197.205. 16 Ibid., 197-98. 17 Ibid., 198-99. 18 Ibid., 174-86. 19 Jacques Lacan, "Kant avec Sade," in Ecrits (Paris, 1966), 776; my translation. 20 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, ed. and trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977), 315. 21 Plato, Banquet, 492. 22 Ibid., 495. 23 Ibid .. 507. 24 Ibid., 529. 25 See Jacques Lacan. HLe sinthome: Seminaire du 18 n<Jvembre 1975:' inJoyce avec Lacan, ed. Jacques Aubert (Paris, 1987), 42. -......./ 26 See Jean-Guy Godin, "Du syrnptorne a son epure: Le sinthome," in Aubert, ed., Joyce avec Lacan, 167. 27 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts. 190. 28 Leo Bersani, "Is the Rectum a Grave?" October 43 (1987): 212. 29 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 150. 30 Ibid .. 155. 31 See Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, "Dora and the Name-of-the-Father: The Structure of Hysteria," in Discontented Discourses: Feminine Textual Intervention Psychoanaly sis, ed. Marleen Barr and Richard Feldstein (Urbana, 1989), 208-40. 32 Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire, livre IX: L'identification, 14 March 1962, unpublished text. What Is Love? 755 'n See Ellie Ragland-Sullivan. "Seeking the Third Term: Desire, the Phallus, and the Materiality of Language." in Feminism and Psychoanalysis. ed. Judith Roof and Richard Feldstein (Ithaca, 1989),4 0 - 64. 'H Jacques Lacan, "Kanzer Seminar. Yale University," 24- 2 5 November 1975, in Scili cet 6/7 (1976): 7-31. Vi Plato, Banquet, 34 'S6 Jacques Lacan, L'ethique de la psychanalyse, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris, 1986), 29 37 Ibid., 40. Sigmund Freud. "The Project for a Scientific Psychology," in Standard Edition, vol. 3 8 1. 39 Jamie Talan, "What Is Love?" Newsday, 7 February 19 88 ,8. 40 jacques-Alain Miller, "A and a in Clinical Structures." in Acts of the Paris-New York psychoanalytic Workshop: 1986, ed. Stuart Schneiderman (New York. 19 8 7), 24-2 5.