Africa Confidential Editors Choice

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Selected stories from

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D
ear R
ead
er

M
an
y th
an
ks fo
r d
o
w
n
lo
ad
in
g
th
is selectio
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o
f th
e very b
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m

A
frica C
o
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o
p
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n
d
it in
terestin
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read
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A
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o
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as lau
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50 years ag
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a p
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accu
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P
atrick S
m
ith
Ed
ito
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A f r i c a C o n f i d e n t i a l T h e E d i t o r s C h o i c e
Ghana: A new economic team emerges (AC Vol 50 No 17)35
Zimbabwe: Faint heart never won (AC Vol 50 No 24) 36
Zimbabwe: Didymus Mutasa dithers (AC Vol 51 No 24) 36
Africa/Arms trade: Smugglers (AC Vol 50 No 23) 37
Congo-Kinshasa: Mines and dams (AC Vol 50 No 20) 38
Congo-Kinshasa: Dam intrigues (AC Vol 50 No 19) 39
Uganda: A king takes on the President (AC Vol 50 No 19) 40
Uganda: Leaders in waiting (AC Vol 50 No 19) 41
Zimbabwe: Greed, gold and grit (AC Vol 50 No 17) 42
Zimbabwe: After Msika (AC Vol 50 No 17) 42
Zimbabwe: Shiri salutes, sort of (AC Vol 50 No 17) 43
South Africa: So far, so Zuma (AC Vol 50 No 17) 44
South Africa: Suing the messenger (AC Vol 50 No 17) 44
South Africa: Township protests (AC Vol 50 No 16) 45
Congo-Brazzaville: A stolen election (AC Vol 50 No 16) 47
Congo-Brazzaville: General in waiting (AC Vol 50 No 16) 47
Gambia: 15 years of one-man rule (AC Vol 50 No 15) 48
Angola: Sonangol goes international (AC Vol 50 No 14) 49
Africa/Oil: How to win in a recession (AC Vol 50 No 12) 50
Africa/Oil: Inside the four big traders (AC Vol 50 No 12) 51
Nigeria: The ght gets more serious (AC Vol 50 No 11) 52
Nigeria: The hunt for Tompolo (AC Vol 50 No 12) 53
Algeria: Victory in a vacuum (AC Vol 50 No 8) 54
Algeria: The contenders (AC Vol 50 No 8) 55
Ethiopia: A change is going to come (AC Vol 50 No 10) 56
Togo: Brothers and enemies (AC Vol 50 No 9) 57
Togo: Clan trouble (AC Vol 50 No 9) 57
South Africa: BEE & the credit crunch (AC Vol 50 No 6) 58
Zimbabwe: Worthless cash (AC Vol 50 No 5) 59
Zimbabwe: Next, the mines (AC Vol 50 No 5) 60
Zimbabwe: Now blood gold (AC Vol 50 No 5) 60
Somalia: The Sheik Sharif show (AC Vol 50 No 4) 61
Somalia: Where is Al Shabaab now? (AC Vol 50 No 4) 62
Whos Who (AC Vol 50 No 13) 63
About the Publishers 66
Subscription Information 66
Rwanda: The assassins hand (AC Vol 51 No 14) 4
Kenya: Mungikis new man (AC Vol 51 No 14) 5
Kenya: Criminal business (AC Vol 51 No 14) 6
South Africa: In a league of his own (AC Vol 51 No 8) 6
Guinea: A popular putsch, so far (AC Vol 50 No 2) 8
Guinea: The new men under re (AC Vol 50 No 2) 9
Congo-Kinshasa: Le scandale ptrolier (AC Vol 51 No 8) 10
Congo-Kinshasa: Contenders (AC Vol 51 No 8) 10
Congo-Kinshasa: Contractual confusion (AC Vol 51 No 8)12
Congo-Kinshasa: Muddles (AC Vol 51 No 11) 13
Congo-Kinshasa: Fight for cellphones (AC Vol 51 No 11) 14
Nigeria: Into the unknown (AC Vol 51 No 11) 14
Nigeria: Reformers and generals (AC Vol 51 No 11) 15
Guinea: Votes and the mining houses (AC Vol 51 No 11) 16
Guinea: Promising contracts (AC Vol 51 No 11) 16
Liberia: The born-again Bong mines (AC Vol 51 No 11) 17
Nigeria: Jonathan and the securocrats (AC Vol 51 No 7) 18
Zimbabwe: The diamond mine drama (AC Vol 51 No 7) 19
Sudan: The opposition shuns Omer (AC Vol 51 No 7) 20
Sudan: The most complex elections (AC Vol 51 No 7) 20
Sudan: The many ways to win (AC Vol 51 No 7) 22
Africa/USA: US military calls (AC Vol 51 No 6) 23
Africa/USA: Military money (AC Vol 51 No 6) 23
Somalia: More troops for Mogadishu (AC Vol 51 No 6) 24
Somalia: Whitehall strengthens Sharif (AC Vol 51 No 6) 25
Subscriber Testimonials 26
Sudan: Doubts over Darfur (AC Vol 51 No 5) 28
Guinea: The junta explains (AC Vol 51 No 4) 29
Zimbabwe: Platinum lining (AC Vol 51 No 3) 29
Angola: Dos Santos prepares (AC Vol 51 No 4) 31
Angola: The bid to clean up MPLA Inc. (AC Vol 51 No 4) 31
Nigeria: The elite scrambles for cover (AC Vol 51 No 1) 32
Nigeria: A khaki option on the table (AC Vol 51 No 1) 32
Egypt: Generational change (AC Vol 51 No 1) 33
Egypt: Succession is a family business (AC Vol 51 No 1) 33
Nigeria: Rogues and rackets on trial (AC Vol 50 No 24) 34
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RWANDA
The assassins hand
Violence and intrigue at home and abroad overshadow the impending
elections
S
omeone is trying to kill the
opponents of General Paul Kagame
ahead of the presidential election
on 9 August. A group of armed men
bungled an attack against an exiled
Rwandan dissident, Lieutenant-General
Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, on
19 June in Tshwane/Pretoria, South
Africa. Kayumba escaped with a wound
in his stomach (AC Vol 51 No 13). On
24 June in Kigali, two unidentied men
shot dead Jean-Lonard Rugambage,
assistant editor of the banned Umuvugizi
newspaper, which still publishes
online.
Oppositionists say the crimes seem
linked. Rugambages editor, Jean-Bosco
Gasasira, exiled in Uganda, claims
that senior ofcials in Kigali had been
telephoning some of the suspects in
South Africa. Another Rwandan report
speaks of telephone calls from Kigali to
Major Francis Gakwerere, who was
released after questioning by the South
African police.
The Daily Monitor, a Kampala
newspaper, quoted police sources in
reporting that an attempt had been
made on Gasasiras life one week before
Rugambages murder. In February
2007, men with iron bars badly injured
Gasasira in Kigali.
The Rwandan authorities promptly
said they had nothing to do with the
recent attacks. After Rugambages
death the police swiftly arrested two
suspects. The minister of internal
security, Moussa Fazil Harelimana,
said they wanted revenge against the
journalist, who had murdered one of
the two suspects brother during the
genocide against the Tutsis.
Human Rights Watch and Reporters
sans frontires remain unconvinced.
One of the dead journalists colleagues
pointed out that there have been very
few revenge killings by genocide
survivors.
Nyamwasas wife, Rosette, rejects
the ofcial Rwandan denials of
involvement in the attempt to kill him.
So does the wounded mans friend,
Colonel Patrick Karegeya (AC Vol 51
No 13), a former director of Rwandas
external intelligence service.
Ayanda Ntsaluba, the director
general of international relations
and cooperation at South Africas
Department of Foreign Affairs, has said
the assassination attempt involves a
state with which his country has good
and solid diplomatic relationsIf the
attack on the Lieutenant General is
a political act, we will treat it as one
of great seriousness, and will treat it
accordingly.
So far Pretoria has not named
Kigali but the affair is bound to have
diplomatic repercussions. On 1 July
four suspects holding asylum papers
were brought before a South African
court: Juma Huseni and Shari
Bakari of Tanzania, George Francis
of Mozambique, and Ahmed Ali of
Somalia. They will appear again on
14 July, when further evidence should
emerge.
Several other friends of Kigali will
be angry if the government is judged
responsible. So far their statements are
cautious, for lack of strong evidence.
The attack on Nyamwasa resembles
one in Nairobi, Kenya, against Seth
Sendashonga, interior minister in the
rst post-genocide government (then
led by Alexis Kanyarengwe), who fell
out with the regime. Kenyan police
identied a pistol used in the attack
in 1996 as belonging to a Rwandan
diplomat living near the scene of the
crime.
ABSCONDING OFFICERS
Nine days before the attempt on
Kayumbas life, the Rwanda Defence
Forces announced the arrest of Brigadier-
General Jean-Bosco Kazura, president
of the Fdration rwandaise de football
(Ferwafa), on his return from the World
Cup in South Africa. He was formally
accused of absconding from duty and
travelling without permission.
The website Igihe.com claims that
Kazura had been sent to organise the
attack on Kayumba, and was arrested
on his return home once the team of
killers was in place. His arrest might
bolster the Rwandan governments
denial of involvement.
Evidently, Kagame has trouble
with his senior ofcers. Apart from
the open dissent of Kayumba and
Karegeya, and the arrest of Kazura,
two generals were arrested in April
Karake Karenzi, formerly second in
command of the United Nations/African
Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur,
and Charles Muhire, formerly chief of
staff of the air force. With the election
only weeks away, Kagame is taking no
chances.
Other candidates allowed to stand
are from parties in the Forum des
organisations politiques, which includes
only allies of Kagames own Front
patriotique rwandais. So the election
will be less open than the last one
in 2003, for which the former prime
minister, Faustin Twagiramungu, was
allowed to return home and campaign.
This time the alternative candidates
seem only there to make up the numbers.
They are Prosper Higiro, vice-president
of the Senate, for the Parti libral; Jean
Damascne Ntawukuriryayo, deputy
speaker, representing the Parti social-
dmocrate; and Alvera Mukabaramba
for the Parti du progrs et de la
concorde.
Others have been disqualied.
Victoire Ingabire of the Forces
dmocratiques unies-Inkingi was
shown by a UN report in late 2009 to
have links with the military chiefs of
the rebel Forces dmocratiques pour la
libration du Rwanda. Charged by the
chief prosecutor, Martin Ngoga, with
promoting genocidal ideology, her case
was not processed in time and she was
out of the race.
Several members of Ingabires party
have been notied of pending charges,
and on 24 June the police arrested
several dozen troublemakers in Kigali.
Among them was Bernard Ntaganda,
would-be presidential candidate for the
Parti social Imberakuri. The police later
said he faced prosecution for, amongst
other things, ethnic divisionism, illegal
assembly and unauthorised recruitment
of criminal suspects. Ofcials also claim
he tried to kill a dissident from his own
party, Christine Mukabunani.
Frank Habineza, head of the Green
Democratic Party of Rwanda, was also
banned from standing. As a former Tutsi
refugee in Uganda, and former member
of the RPF and the government, he can
hardly be accused of siding with the
gnocidaires, but the authorities said
his party had not qualied by holding
the obligatory four general meetings.
He was arrested on 24 June while
demonstrating outside the US embassy
demanding freedom for Ntaganda;
he accuses the regime of torturing its
opponents.
Amid the furore over the
assassinations, both successful and
attempted, there have been no more
grenade attacks in Kigali since a spate
of them in February and March. Those
were blamed by the chief prosecutor on
Nyamwasa and another Tutsi dissident,
Deo Mushayidi, who is in a Kigali
prison, although nothing has been
proven against him yet.
KENYA
Mungikis new man
Maina Njengas evolution from gang leader to born-again Christian to
aspiring candidate highlights the breakdown of Kenyan politics
T
he once unthinkable has happened:
Maina Njenga, the much-feared
leader of Kenyas Mungiki militia, is
carving out a new career as a mainstream
politician. After his release from gaol in
October 2009, Nkenga renounced violence,
became a born-again Christian and is now
a stalwart campaigner for Kenyans to vote
in favour of the proposed new constitution
in the referendum on 4 August.
One of Njengas declared political
heroes is Fidel Castro Odinga, the son of
Prime Minister Raila Odinga, on whom
Njenga showers praise. He claims to now
be friends with Raila and visited him with
Fidel during the premiers recent stint in
hospital.
Njenga wants to run as a member
of parliament or as a governor of one
of Kenyas 47 new counties in the 2012
elections. Meanwhile, he is mobilising
Mungikis National Youth Movement
for the Yes campaign in support of the
new constitution. He shares ofces in
Lavington with the largely dormant
Labour Party, once headed by former MP
Julia Odhiambo and ripe for a takeover.
There is talk of Njenga chairing a
new party with Fidel Odinga as secretary
and the former defence minister Njenga
Karume as its patron. Njenga also heads
the Amani Sasa Foundation and promotes
savings and credit organisations (known
as SACCOs). Publicly he says Mungiki is
dead and encourages youth to seek the
peaceful resolution of disputes. He is less
forthcoming on the links between his
gangland career and his wealth, power,
land and large new Mercedes.
Njenga associates with several
prominent Kikuyu politicians and
businessmen who contributed heavily to
his murdered wifes funeral recently. They
are drawn to Njenga because of his ability
to mobilise the Kikuyu youth vote in 2012.
They also know that he probably knows
who among them hired foot soldiers to
launch violent attacks before and after the
2007 election.
A few words from Njenga might break
his political clients. Recently, he was
anointed a Kikuyu elder in Thika; after
that he was feted like a visiting dignitary
when he visited Nyeri. This is all the more
remarkable given that Mungiki earned its
fearsome reputation for beheading and
gouging out the eyes of those who would
not cooperate with them. They were
among the pioneers of a slew of extortion
rackets, worthy of Italys Cosa Nostra and
which have terrorized Kenyans for two
decades.
Like most Kenyan politicians, Njenga
has no permanent friends, just permanent
interest. He recently visited former
president Daniel arap Moi at a No rally
in Nakuru in late June 2010 and before
that in Eldoret, though Njenga was quick
to point out that this did not mean he
supported the No movements cause in the
approaching referendum.
MOI MEETS MUNGIKI
In the 2002 election, Mungiki generally
backed Mois Kenya African National Union
(KANU) candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, for
the presidency. Njenga said in Febuary
2010 that he was a lifelong member of
KANU, so his irtation with Moi and his
talk of forming another political party
annoys Kikuyu heavyweight politicians.
This is exactly Njengas point: he does not
necessarily belong to them. He says openly
that he and his Rift Valley supporters
might take a different path from Mount
Kenya and that we do not want for our
brothers in Central Province to tell us
what to do or where to go. We shall chart
our own destiny.
Because Mungiki is strong in Nairobis
slums and housing estates, Njenga also
probably has a good idea how the Orange
Democratic Movement messages were
sent out to its own Luo Taliban gangs to
launch violence in 2007 there as well as in
the Rift Valley, where Mungiki also has a
strong base.
The ease with which Njenga moves
among this rainbow coalition of disparate
politicians may reect his knowledge of
their organisations and links to violence
and criminality. These groupings of odd
bedfellows might also be a pre-emptive,
defensive reaction to the International
Criminal Courts continuing investigation
of the 2007 post-election violence.
The government nally convicted and
gaoled Njenga in Naivasha in June 2007 for
possession of guns and drugs but released
him in 2009. Within months he was back
in gaol, detained after Mungikis murder
of 29 people in the Mount Kenya area of
Mathira. Despite the seriousness of the
case, Njenga was treated like royalty and
shared the same chef as a gaoled British
aristocrat, Thomas Cholmondeley, the
owner of the Soysambu ranch, who was
convicted for shooting dead a man he
claimed to be a poacher.
While Njenga was still in gaol in April
2009, a group slit the throats of his wife
Virginia Nyakio, her driver, and two
other Mungiki ofcials in a gruesome, still
unsolved murder. Some claimed Virginia
was killed because she was siphoning off
Mungiki funds for herself; others claimed
she was punished for having an affair with
her driver. Still others think she knew
too much and may have helped mobilise
Mungiki in the 2007 post-election violence,
and was perhaps silenced because of that
and as a warning to her husband.
After his wifes murder, while Njenga
was still in gaol, Mungiki organised mass
protests in Nairobi, ooding the city with
their supporters, and called for a transport
strike which paralysed the city.
In late October 2009, Attorney General
Amos Wako issued a nolle prosequi
order, claiming insufcient evidence to
prosecute Njenga, and released him. Just
before that, one of Njengas ve lawyers,
former MP Paul Muite, announced Njenga
had assembled an afdavit which they
were preparing to le, accusing some
ministers and MPs of close involvement
with Mungiki. His lawyers suggested
that he had evidence from 1997 onwards
including tapes, videos, cell phone
messages and photographs to prove the
connection.
Days after Njenga was released from
Nyeres maximum security prison, Mungiki
spokesman Njuguna Gitau, who had a list
of Mungiki victims of police killings with
him, was murdered on Lithuli Avenue in
central Nairobi. It may also have been a
reminder to Njenga that the same could
happen to him.
Njenga then renounced violence and
with some of his followers became a born-
again Christian in a public ceremony
presided over by Bishop Margaret
Wanjiru, Starehe MP and head of the
Jesus is Alive Ministries. Njenga wore a
tee-shirt saying Jesus is my nal answer.
Finding religion seems to be a
family tradition. Njengas cousin, Ndura
Waruinge, was also a Mungiki leader who
became religious after he was released
from gaol in 2008. In an April 2010 report
for the Kenya National Dialogue and
Reconciliation Monitoring Project, South
Consulting said that it viewed the sudden
conversion of members of illegal groups
into Christianity a strategy of legitimising
groups ahead of 2012.
KARUME SHELLS OUT
Shortly after his release, Njenga also
began fundraising for his wifes funeral,
which 20,000 attended. Among the
contributors was Njenga Karume, who
has been part of the Kikuyu inner circle
since Jomo Kenyattas era and has served
as Kikuyu MP from Kiambaa, defence
minister and head of the Gikuyu, Embu
and Meru Association. He also was listed
in the Kenya National Commission of
Human Rights (KNCHR) report on the
post-election violence as an alleged
perpetrator.
The KNCHR accuses Karume of
providing money to aid in the eviction of
non-Kikuyus from Central Province. They
also say he was at meetings in Nairobi along
with Uhuru Kenyatta and others where the
funding and organisation of the violence
took place. Others who contributed to
Njengas fund were his lawyer Paul Muite,
Embakasi MP Ferdinand Waititu, Imenti
Central MP Gitobu Imanyara, Bishop
Margaret Wanjiru, and unnamed Nakuru
businessmen and Mungiki coordinators.
Whatever Njengas political aims, his
former colleagues in crime are thriving.
According to a study by Professor Walter
Odhiambo of the University of Nairobi,
crime is rising in central Nairobi and
in formerly safe suburbs such as Karen,
Kilimani, and Hurlingham.
Ofcial gures show the prevalence
of crime increased by 6% from 2008 to
2009. In the countryside, violent gangs
with new names, such as the Masombe
gang in Meru North and a group called
Unnished in Central Province, appear
almost daily. So do new groups of cattle
rustlers in the Rift Valley.
Since October 2009, South Consulting
has identied 45 new armed groups
across the country, including one called
Ocampo in Nyanza and another named
The Hague in Central Province. For the
time being, they just terrorise and extort
money but they could easily be hired for
political attacks in 2012.
CRIMINAL BUSINESS IS BIG BUSINESS
Mungiki started as a Kikuyu quasi-revivalist religious cult in the Rift Valleys Laikipia
District in the late 1980s. Many Mungiki members lost their land in the 1990s when
President Daniel arap Mois government presided over state-orchestrated electoral
violence there. Munigiki migrated to Nairobis slums, where they provided services
and protection, developing an extortion racket that still controls the matatu transport
routes in the towns and the countryside, particularly in Central Province.
Government started to clamp down on Mungiki in the early 2000s, using special
police units such as the Kwekwe squad. Yet given the powerful networks that have
worked with Mungiki the politicians who have hired them and the police who
get kickbacks from them the militia continues to grow and operate fairly freely.
Mungikis nancial success has encouraged other similar but less well-known
gangs across the country using the same combination of extortion and political
networking. Indeed, some claim the newcomers have usurped the Mungiki brand,
as violent politically-backed gangs proliferate in Kenyas villages and cities.
In a vicious circle, new vigilante gangs form to protect communities against the
Mungiki predator gangs, but over time the vigilantes use increasingly aggressive
tactics until it is hard to differentiate them from the militias they are supposed to
ght.
For ordinary citizens this means a growing threat of violence from one camp or
another. It also means the growing intrusion of the gang leaders and organisers into
local communities. Their grip on the economy tightens: the gangs inltrate primary
and secondary schools for recruits; they extort money from traders, charging them
licence fees to set up their stalls; they control land allocation and building licences;
and they compel school buses to pay tolls.
The gangs have become better equipped and increasingly ruthless. Former
soldiers and police ofcers, with easy access to weaponry, are forming gangs and
using their contacts to negotiate a kind of immunity. The new generation of gangs,
like their counterparts in South America and Nigeria, have started targeting wealthy
families for kidnapping. Sometimes the victims are children.
Claiming that he made Jacob Zuma President, Julius Malema now faces
a challenge to his own power base
AFRICA
In a league of his own
business dealings in his home province of
Limpopo. Media obsession with Malema
has made him stand out in national
politics, although ANC insiders claim
that his real support, even within the
Youth League, is narrow. Alternatively,
Zuma could make a backroom deal under
which Malema promises to tone down his
public utterances in return for immunity
from prosecution. We hear that Zuma
telephoned him last week after he was
televised abusing British Broadcasting
Corporation journalist Jonah Fisher at
an ANCYL press conference.
Aides to Zuma say the President told
Malema he was bringing the ANC into
disrepute. Zuma and ANC leaders were
also fuming about Malemas support
for President Robert Mugabe and his
Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front, backing their disastrous
land reform and indigenisation policies,
and denigrating ZANU-PFs coalition
partner, the Movement for Democratic
Change, calling it a popcorn party.
When Malema visited Zimbabwe
last week, he was ostensibly a guest of
the ZANU-PF youth wing but he was
feted by Mugabe as if he were making
an ofcial visit (AC Vol 51 No 7). MDC
leader Morgan Tsvangirai has formally
raised his concern with Zuma about
Malemas bias towards ZANU-PF. At a
hastily organised ANC press conference,
Zuma insisted: We [the ANC] cannot and
will not side with any one of the parties
to the exclusion of the others. Malema
insists that he went to Zimbabwe and
met Mugabe, ZANU-PF and its youth
wing, with Zumas blessing.
Zuma seems to see Malema as a threat
to the successful hosting of the FIFA
2010 World Cup, which starts on 11 June
in South Africa, and to the Presidents
Arms are widely available, as shown
in the December 2009 arrest of Munir
Ahmed, in possession of 100,000 bullets
and assorted rearms taken from the
Eldoret Ordinance Factory to his house
and ofce in Narok and in Parklands,
Nairobi. City people now fear a new
crime wave in the countryside. None
of this squares with the Kenya 2030
vision of the country as a developing
middle-income nation. Neither do many
Kenyans take seriously President Mwai
Kibakis promise last year to arrest the
militia and gangs that attack Kenyans.
T
his week, President Jacob Zuma
has hard choices to make about
Julius Malema, the vociferous
leader of the African National Congress
Youth League. Malema has several times
publicly contradicted the government
on local and foreign policy matters and
has now publicly fallen out with Zuma
and the party leadership. Yet Zumas
ambition to secure a second term as
ANC President is premised on strong
support from ANCYL. Now he may have
to face down Malema publicly and oust
him from the leadership, probably with
support from other party structures and
the wider electorate.
Such efforts could be helped by the
tax authorities investigation of Malemas
efforts to mediate a deal within the
unity government of ZANU-PF and the
MDC. South Africa has had a bad press
internationally, whether because money
is short or there are fears about safety,
and ticket sales have been slow.
Pretoria has been desperately trying
to project a good news story. Yet the
week in which Malema backed Mugabe,
sang Kill the Boer and evicted the
British journalist coincided with South
Africa securing a World Bank loan for
its energy utility, Eskom. The loan was
on stringent terms and Western powers
such as the United States and Britain
objected that it would be used for coal-
red power-stations and that the ANC
had a stake in a private company, Hitachi
Power Africa, a business partner of
Eskom (which anyway suffers from poor
corporate governance).
ANC GRANDEES
We understand that senior ANC leaders,
such as Deputy President Kgalema
Motlanthe, ANC Treasurer Mathews
Phosa and General Secretary Gwede
Mantashe, along with Zwelinzima Vavi
of the Congress of South Africa Trade
Unions (Cosatu) and Blade Nzimande of
the SA Communist Party (SACP), asked
Zuma to reprimand Malema publicly.
At his press conference on 10 April,
Zuma called Malemas behaviour alien
and Malema seemed genuinely taken
aback. He said angrily that Zuma should
have raised his concerns within party
structures and uttered the ultimate
insult, calling Zuma worse than Thabo
Mbeki.
General Secretary Mantashe has
recommended that the ANCs National
Executive Committee charge Malema
with bringing the party into disrepute; a
hearing is expected shortly, with Malema
mobilising allies on the NEC such as
former National Intelligence Agency head
Billy Masetlha, Winnie Madikizela-
Mandela, Deputy Police Minister Fikile
Mbalula and Tony Yengeni. One youth
leader told us that ANCYL leaders want
a formal meeting with Zuma to raise
their objections to his criticisms.
Meanwhile the South African
Revenue Service is quietly conducting a
lifestyle audit, closed to public access,
to investigate the sources of Malemas
wealth. Cosatu has been calling for
such audits of senior politicians and
civil servants, to explain how some live
the high life on public service salaries.
Zuma is understandably cautious about
lifestyle audits and has told Africa
Condential that there are already
plenty of ways to hold politicians to
account. Finance Minister Pravin
Gordhan, answering a parliamentary
question from the opposition Democratic
Alliance last week, said that lifestyle
audits were a long-standing best practice
and that the Revenue Service used many
sources of information to help to identify
discrepancies between taxpayers
declared income and their apparent
wealth.
Malemas friends insist that such
a move would indeed be politically
motivated, while the SACP and Cosatu
support a lifestyle audit of Malema, one of
their biggest detractors. Malemas allies
in the ANCYL want Zuma to protect their
leader from investigation as a payback
for their electoral support. Malema co-
owns SGL Engineering Projects with
Lesiba Gwangwa, a company that
won more than 20 road and sanitation
contracts worth between 500,000
rand (US$69,000) and R39 million in
Limpopo Province in 2007-08. Malema
is a director of at least three other
companies.
After he played a leading role in
ousting Sello Moloto as Premier of
Limpopo, Malemas inuence in the
province rocketed. He is close friends with
most of the municipal commissioners
(who make the contract decisions) and
most of all with the new Premier Cassel
Mathale, who is himself a formidable
businessman with directorships of more
than 20 companies. Their friendship
dates back to 2001, when Malema was
President of the Congress of South
African Students.
Malema owns luxury houses in
Johannesburgs Sandton suburb and his
eet of cars includes an Aston Martin,
a Mercedes-Benz and a Range Rover.
His lawyers are scrambling to ring-
fence his activities from the Limpopo
companies now under scrutiny by the
tax authorities: they are being helped
by poor record keeping in the Limpopo
government and the fear among ofcials
that the investigators might bring down
both Malema and Premier Mathale.
When it comes to investigations,
Zuma faces his own ghosts although
the courts threw out the National
Prosecuting Authoritys corruption
charges against him in April 2009. If
Zuma goes for Malema, ANCYL and its
supporters may try to topple him from
the ANC presidency, just as they did
Mbeki. Some of Malemas then nancial
backers say they did not anticipate that
his ambitions would reach far beyond the
ANCYL; many of them now want to oust
Malema and his allies from the League
leadership in its coming elections. His
attacks on whites and their companies
look like attempts to reinforce his radical
credentials.
ANCYL branches in the North West,
Western and Eastern Cape provinces
have supported Zumas criticism
of Malema. North West provincial
Secretary Boy-Boy Makgetla said the
national leadership may have gone too
far this time. We were very emotional,
we may have went [sic] overboard.
Malema is running a erce campaign to
have his allies elected to key positions in
ANCYLs provincial elections this year
and won a major scalp when his ally
Frans Moswane ousted Lehlohonolo
Masoga as Chairman of the Limpopo
Youth League; Malema personally ran
Moswanes campaign and his opponents
talk of dirty tricks, claiming that some
of them were forcibly removed from the
conference hall during elections. There
were st-ghts and Moswane claims
that Malema told local police to remove
opponents for trespassing. Bystanders
say he threw chairs at delegates who
sang songs denouncing his leadership
style.
The Youth League shenanigans are
not all that divides the ANC now. The
party has been quarrelling with its
alliance partners, Cosatu and the SACP;
General Secretary Mantashe has accused
Cosatu of wanting to break the alliance.
Mantashe, who is also SACP Secretary
General (a much criticised dual role),
sides with Zuma to shore up the centre:
Zuma, in exchange, has publicly endorsed
Mantashe.
The ANC will elect a new leadership
at its conference in 2012. Many of the
rows over policy and ideology are really
about the inuence of individuals and
factions. This increase of personal
politics helps to explain the appeal to
activists of old-school politicians such as
Deputy President Motlanthe, although
he lacks the charisma of Zuma and
Malema. The ANCYL and the nationalist
and business wings of the party want to
replace Mantashe as General Secretary
with Fikile Mbalula. Serious competitors
for the ANC presidency, such as Tokyo
Sexwale and Mathews Phosa, seem
ready to support ANCYL if it backs their
bids to replace Zuma.
Cosatu and the SACP want to keep
Mantashe but have not decided whether
to push either Vavi or Nzimande for the
party presidency. The ANCYL is hedging
its bets, and Sexwale and Phosa are keen.
If the ANCYL dropped both Malema
and Zuma, Sexwale could be the main
beneciary and he has the funds for a
serious party presidential campaign.
The other ANC star-in-waiting, Cyril
Ramaphosa, has kept clear of the
inghting. His previous position was
that he would not run for the presidency
unless the party asked him. Many like
the idea of a Ramaphosa presidency but
there are also still plenty of supporters
for the modest Motlanthe, whose backers
are also lobbying ANCYL, SACP and
Cosatu. His would be the safest pair of
hands in the fractious climate which the
ANC now inhabits.
GUINEA
A popular putsch, so far
The junta is purging the army, reviewing mining contracts and has been
given just six months to organise elections
G
uineas new leader, Captain Moussa
Dadis Camara, faces formidable
difculties in holding together the
junta as rival military factions circle in
search of largesse and political inuence.
Camaras junta seized power within hours
of the death of President Lansana Cont
on 22 December. He must also deal with
strong opposition from the international
organisations which insist that he should
return the country to constitutional rule
immediately.
After speaking to delegations from
the African Union and the European
Union, Camara agreed to hold elections
within six months and hand over power
although he initially said he would need
at least a year to prepare for this. The
regional Economic Community of West
African States has added its weight to this
demand. Meanwhile, the AU and Ecowas
have suspended Guinea as a full member.
Some African leaders, notably
Senegals Abdoulaye Wade and Libyas
Colonel Moammar el Gadaf, are
backing the putschists and have called for
them to be given more time.
Camaras coup was popular across the
military ranks junior ofcers, infantry
and armoured cops who were alienated
by the clique of generals and brigadiers
that dominated the regimes patronage
system in the nal years of President
Lansana Conts rule. For now, the
generational divide in the army is more
important than the ethnic one. Long-time
oppositionist Alpha Cond has spoken
with Camara and urges a more exible
attitude towards the junta. Civic activists
and opposition parties say the putsch
may have prevented the sparking of new
tensions in West Africa.
The junta calls itself Le Comit National
pour le Dveloppement et la Dmocratie
(CNDD) and says it has two priorities: the
neutralisation of any opposition among old
guard ofcers and politicians around the
late President, and the winning of broad
support among the younger generation
of soldiers as well as credible opposition
politicians and civic society activists.
Intially, Camaras putsch was opposed
by activists backing Prime Minister Ahmed
Tidiane Souar (appointed by the late
Cont) as interim head of the government
and demanding that the Speaker of the
National Assembly, Aboubacar Sompar,
should become president as stipulated in
the constitution. It also stipulates that
elections should be held within 60 days.
Others thought this impractical
because there wouldnt be enough time
to organise elections and because other
military groups, some linked to South
American drug cartels, would intervene
to halt the polls. Within four days of the
putsch, Camara had persuaded Souar
and Sompar to drop their opposition and
endorse the junta.
So far, the lack of any response
armed or rhetorical from senior ofcers,
Conts presidential guard or special
units, such as the red berets, suggests
support for the junta. Such loyalty has
its price. Camara has promised to reform
the militarys salary, conditions and
promotion structure. The military is
perhaps Guineas last national institution
with a dened structure, albeit one that
has now been dented by a junior ofcers
coup.
AWKWARD COALITION
The ruling CNDD is an awkward coalition
of competing interests between reformers
and old-style military politicians. Some
of its leaders are regarded as committed
reformers, such as General Mamadouba
Toto Camara, who took up the cause of
the trades unionists and civic activists
whose strikes brought the country to a
halt in January and February 2007 (AC
Vol 48 No 3). They were demanding
lower prices for essential commodities;
less corruption, crookery and nepotism;
higher pay and punishment of the guilty.
Other key gures in the junta, like Second
Lieutenant Claude Pivi, inspire more fear
than condence.
One of the new juntas rst decisions
was to set up audits of the main state
and private businesses, especially those
involved in bauxite, of which Guinea is
the worlds fourth largest exporter and
has about 28% of the worlds reserves.
One of the rst contracts likely to come
under scrutiny will be Victor Dahdalehs
Dadco and its joint holding with Alcoa and
Alcan of a 51% stake in the Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guine; the remaining 49% is
held by the Guinean state.
A Canadian of Jordanian origin,
Dahdaleh is at the centre of a legal case
in the United States in which the Gulf
state of Bahrain accuses him and the US
company Alcoa of running a conspiracy
involving overcharging, fraud and bribery
to the tune of more than US$1 billion (AC
Vol 49 No 6). The state-owned Aluminium
Bahrain started the action in Pittsburgh
Federal Court on 28 February, claiming it
has been overcharged for alumina imports
over the last 15 years; much of the bauxite
was sourced from Guinea.
Three other international mining
companies Anglo American (gold), BHP
Billiton (bauxite) and Rio Tinto (iron ore)
are watching developments closely. They
have billions of dollars tied up in Guineas
mining sector as world prices for minerals
except for gold go into steep decline.
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On 28 December, the junta
annnounced two key appointments: Lt.
Colonel Skouba Konat as Minister
of Defence, with the rank of Brigadier
General; and Mamadouba Toto Camara as
Minister of Security and Civil Protection,
also promoted to Major General. Military
sources say Konat is the most inuential
gure in the CNDD, alongside Pivi.
Captain Klti Faro is now Secretary
General to the Presidency, a key post.
He will keep watch for the new leader,
with access to all information reaching
the Presidents Ofce and the power to
say which has priority. On 30 December,
Camara named banker Kabin Komara
as Prime Minister, with authority over
civilian appointments.
Camara has promised to oppose ethnic
favouritism but his appointments have
been critcised on these grounds. Within
hours of seizing power, Capt. Camara
sacked Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen.
Diarra Camara. His replacement, Col.
Oumar Sano, comes from Camaras home
town of Nzrkor. The Gendarmerie Chief
of Staff, Ibrahima Bald, is Fulani from
the north and a close friend of Camara,
but he knows Guine Forestire (south-
east Guinea) well and speaks the local
language, Guerze. His deputy, Franois
Bavogui, is also from that region.
A senior ofcer commented that
one cannot at the same time deplore
favouritism and show it; he added that some
of Camaras relatives have been speedily
promoted. When one of his relations came
to see him in his ofce at headquarters,
he said it was wrong to speak to him in
Guerze in front of everybody. The ofcial
language of Guinea is French, so speak to
me in French, he said.
Both Camara and Konat move around
under heavy escort, with machine guns on
show. The junta has promised the sacked
generals and ofcials that they will be left
in peace. Yet on 1 January, former Premier
Cellou Dalein Diallo was visited at his
home in Dixinn Port by heavily armed
soldiers, under the command of Capt.
Aidor Bah, who said they were looking
for weapons intended for mercenaries.
The CNDD voiced strong disapproval of
the raid but Bah is well known to them
and some say he is a CNDD member.
On 3 January, several gures from
the Cont regime such as Gen. Camara,
Kandet Oumar Tour and Admiral Aly
Daff, former Naval Chief of Staff, were
arrested. They were later freed, but the
arrest prompted some to doubt the juntas
commitment to hold elections and hand
over power.
At a meeting with the Forces Vives de la
Nation civic organisation, Camara strongly
criticised the Cont regimes commercial
dealings. Later, he promised to set up a
commission to review mining contracts.
Contracts that were in the national
interest would continue but dubious
deals would be revised or, if necessary,
cancelled outright, said a CNDD member.
So far, there are no details.
The rst step in an anti-corruption
drive was taken on 9 January, with the
arrest for embezzlement of former Deputy
Customs Director Aboubacar Bruno
Bangoura. Two days later came the
arrest of Mohamed Dioubat, who was
described as a drugs baron. Both are held
at the armys Camp Alpha Yaya Diallo,
which makes the judicial process suspect.
The Independent National Electoral
Commission, headed by Ben Skou Sylla,
says that of a probable total of 6 million
only about 1.5 mn. electors are registered.
Sylla, a former civil society leader, was
appointed by the previous regime and has
been approved by the new one. The plan
was that these long-promised elections
would reinvigorate parliament and smooth
the way for a presidential election later.
The head of the junta often appears
on state television making impenetrable
speeches. His random style of speaking
causes concern, but his insistence that
all should be equal under the law has
reassured some Guineans.
On 14 January, Camara announced,
as proposed by the Prime Minister,
the appointment of 29 members of the
government. Ten are senior ofcers and
most are technocrats, some of whom
held senior posts under the old regime.
The Finance Minister is Capt. Mamadou
Sand, and the Telecommunications
Minister is Col. Mathurin Bangoura. The
Governor of the Central Bank of Guinea,
Daouda Bangoura, has since been
sacked and replaced by the Banks Auditor
General, Alassane Barry.
THE NEW MEN UNDER FIRE
Some of the Comit National pour le Dveloppement et la Dmocratie juntas
appointments have been heavily criticised. Chief among these is military leader
Moussa Dadis Camaras old friend, Boubacar Barry, an architect, as provisional
Minister for Construction, Public Works and Public Buildings. Barry was told of
the impending coup as soon as President Lansana Conts death became known.
He has also worked as an architect for the controversial Mamadou Sylla, the late
Conts close friend, who has been linked to fraudulent transactions worth some
US$22 million (AC Vol 48 No 3).
Another controversial appointment was that of Mohamed Diop as Governor of
Conakry, Guineas capital. Diops competence is questioned, but he is popular with
the youth in Conakry and a friend of new Defence Minister Sekouba Konat, as
well as of Camara. The Deputy Director of Customs, Aboubacar Bruno Bangoura,
was dismissed and arrested. His provisional replacement is the former Inspector of
Customs, Alpha Yaya Diallo, another friend of Conts.
Most criticised was the promotion of Claude Pivi, a close friend of Captain
Ousmane Cont, the late Presidents son, who has often been linked to the drugs
trade, as Minister in charge of Presidential Security. His critics said he could have
done the job without being given a ministry and a seat in cabinet. His appointment
was not conrmed until 17 January, after Camara had rejected objections from
some of his colleagues. Pivi complained that his promotion was delayed compared
to those of his fellow soldiers, whose fathers are senior ofcers.
Pivi, a second lieutenant at 48, is a paratrooper of limited education. He came to
prominence in March 2008 during a mutiny, when soldiers demanded pay arrears.
In May 2008, Pivi ordered the hostage-taking of several senior ofcers, including
the Deputy Chief of Staff, Mamadou Sampil Camara (who is still detained in Camp
Alpha Yaya Diallo). A few days later, he arrived for a meeting with the then Chief
of Staff, Gen. Diarra Camara. His hair wild and wearing cowrie-shell amulets, he
apparently made a rude gesture.
In June 2008, Pivi tried to mediate when the army was called in to put down
another mutiny, this time by police. However, some policemen red at his soldiers
and, to get even, he sent his men to attack the base of the police anti-riot unit, the
Compagnie Mobile dIntervention et de Scurit. The result was the death of more
than 25 police and at least 6 soldiers. Troops then pursued police ofcers, even
breaking into and breaking up their homes. Police sources say that Pivis soldiers
smashed up the headquarters of the anti-drug unit and took away large amounts of
drugs which have not been recovered.
The weekly La Lance reported on 26 November 2008 that Pivi had savagely
tortured some Cameroonians he suspected of stealing his rear-view mirror. They
turned out to be innocent students, who happened to be wandering around a
restaurant where Pivi was eating. The Guinean Organisation for Human Rights
has threatened to bring charges against him. He attracted attention again on 17
December. Les Echos de Guine reported that he had spoiled his chance of taking
power by his conduct during last years mutiny. He had copies of the paper destroyed
and witnesses say street-sellers were beaten up.
ANALYSIS
CONGO-KINSHASA
Le scandale ptrolier
The country now produces a paltry 25,000 barrels a
day but the big international oil companies are lining
up to buy their way into Congo-Kinshasa. Smaller
companies have been locked in wrangles with each other
and successive Kinshasa ofcials for several years.
New blocks are likely to be offered in a licensing round
that will open up new parts of Congo to exploration;
competition for disputed blocks is heating up. But will
the oil boom boost economic development or just repeat
the confusion and corruption of the mining sector?
WAITING FOR KABILA
P
resident Joseph Kabila is blocking exploration contracts
that were granted several years ago and the lack of his ap-
proval has left several companies hanging on in Kinshasa,
hoping he will sign soon. He may be getting ready to. A new
oil code, which is being debated in the National Assembly,
would open up blocks freshly apportioned in Lake Tanganyika
and gas blocks in Lake Kivu for bids in a new licensing round
expected this month. Congo has lagged behind its neighbour
Uganda, with which it shares Lake Albert, and that is one rea-
son why it is preparing to take on oil exploration in earnest.
Ugandas side of Lake Albert probably contains two billion
barrels of oil; Irelands fast growing Tullow Oils hard-won
partnership with Frances Total and the China National Offshore
Oil Company Limited (CNOOC, AC Vol 45 No 11) is conducting
advanced exploration there. Total and Tullow are keen to
replicate the deal on the Congo side and to use the same pipeline
infrastructure to take Congos oil out eastwards. Kinshasa ofcials
want the oil to move within their own territory and seek terms
as favourable as those their Ugandan counterparts have won (see
Box II).
There are tensions between Kinshasa
and Kampala over the new oil wealth, with
two shoot-outs on Lake Albert between their
forces. Congos Ministry of Hydrocarbons has
appealed to oil companies to pay for naval
support and vehicles to help patrol the Lake.
Total also faces competition from Italys Eni
(Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi), which signed
a loose strategic agreement in August 2009,
when the Italian giant expressed its interest
in oil countrywide, including Lake Albert.
In April, Congolese Hydrocarbons
Ministry ofcials will visit Paris, France, and
Houston, United States, offering concessions
in nine oil blocks on Lake Tanganyika and six
gas blocks on Lake Kivu, where the Ministry
says there are 60 billion cubic metres of gas;
the gas reserves are growing by 350 mn3 a
year, according to ofcials.
CHANGING THE RULES
T
he Petroleum, Oil and Gas Corporation
of South Africa (PetroSA) is interested
in Lake Kivu and in deep-water offshore
oil; Sasol (originally the Suid Afrikaanse
Steenkool en Olie) is interested in Lake Kivu.
The USAs Chevron, CNOOC and Total are
among those interested in Tanganyika.
Albert is another story.
Mindful that it is running late, the
Ministry has made several recommendations
for changes to the draft oil code which has
been seen by the Senate and is being debated
in the Assembly. One would mean that the
President had just 45 days to sign or reject
any exploration licence; if he did not sign,
it would go ahead automatically. Kabila is
unlikely to accept this but the Hydrocarbons
Ministry wants both to speed things up and
to wrest more power for itself.
Some companies, including Tullow, have
been waiting over three years for presidential
CONTENTION AND CONTENDERS
In the Albertine Graben (Lake Albert, Lake Edward and land in between and around),
the rivalry is international.
Block 1, Albertine Graben, is the one everyone wants. It is under disputed licence
to rival consortia, with all the current competitors willing to join the fray, including
Total, Eni, Perenco (whose blocks out west are already producing), Chevron and
SOCO. First in was Tullow which, along with Heritage Oil and Congolaise des
Hydrocarbures (Cohydro), signed a partnership sharing agreement for Blocks 1 and
2 in July 2006. Tullows Tim OHanlon and Heritage Oils Tony Buckingham (AC Vol
45 No 5 et passim) agreed on a 55-45 split, making Tullow the operator. However,
Congos Hydrocarbons and Finance ministers at the time stopped the deal, saying
the signature bonus of 500,000 (then $0.9 mn.) wrongly covered two blocks and
was signed by a deputy oil minister without the necessary authority.
Next, the Divine Inspiration Group (DIG), a South African black economic
empowerment company, made a deal for 51% of the block in January 2008, with
PetroSA as its technical partner and backing from the SA government. Several
other companies were thrown into the mix, including Spains H Oil Congo with 37%;
Congos Cohydro (7%) and Sud Oil SPRL, run by Pascal Kinduelo, with 2%; and
Congo Petroleum and Gas, run by Jean Bosco and Muaka Khonde, with 3% (AC Vol
49 No 10). Both Tullow and DIG still claim the block but neither has been granted a
presidential decree for an exploration licence. Other interests wait in the wings.
Block 2, Albertine Graben is also claimed by Tullow and Heritage. The government
did not block this licence but it must be renegotiated since it originally came in a
package along with Block 1. Tullow/Heritage will not negotiate, since that might
imply doubts about their claim to Block 1. No decree has been granted.
Block 3, Albertine Graben: land only, 85% of it held since December 2007 by
SacOil Holdings, in a 50-50 partnership with its parent company, DIG, and Encha
Group. Cohydro has the other 15%.
Block 4, Albertine Graben: mostly land, plus the northern tip of Lake Albert; not
yet awarded.
Block 5, Albertine Graben: no dispute. A consortium of Dominion Petroleum
(46.75%) and SOCO International (38.25%) will start drilling onshore later this year,
along with Cohydro (15%). Awaits a presidential decree.
Cuvette Centrale: no disputes yet and no presidential decrees.
Blocks 1,2,3: HRT Petroleum of Brazil has been assigned blocks, along with the
Compagnie Minire Congolaise (CoMiCo), and has evaluated Busira sub-basin
(Block 3) and Lokoro sub-basin (Blocks 1 and 2).
Block 8 (plus Blocks A and B, which cover triangles to the northwest of parts of
Block 1): DIG awaits a presidential decree and has access to 21 blocks.
Block 7: SOCO International, about to start drilling in the west, awaits a presidential
decree, as does Dominion Petroleum in Block 9.
ratication. Their plot is in dispute. Others, including Britains
SOCO International and Bermuda-based Dominion Petroleum,
face no dispute but have no presidential decrees, either. In the
confusion, some companies have considered starting exploration
since the Presidents say-so may not be necessary but have
prudently held their re.
Kabila does not want to be bounced into deals set up by
others and seems to suspect the motives of many of those around
him, such as the recently sacked Hydrocarbons Minister Ren
Isekemanga Nkeka and his colleauges, who want him to sign.
Only with strong presidential backing is the business likely to
gather pace.
The new Hydrocarbons Minister, Clestin Mbuyu Kabango,
was shifted from his senior post as Interior and Security Minister
in Februarys reshufe and is keen for action. Some think the
prospect of a raft of new licences, along with signature bonuses
that range from the mandatory US$500,000 to, in some cases,
$2.5 million a block, may jolt the President into action. The cash
could prove useful before elections, due in September 2011 but
likely to slide into 2012. Kabila did not turn up at a triennial
pan-African oil conference which Congo hosted this month.
Parliament was closed to make room for the gathering, which
drew hundreds of investors and several African oil ministers.
Whatever the Presidents insights into previous bribes,
something is clearly wrong with the payment system. Congo is
trying to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,
an international publish-what-you-pay scheme, by 15 June, after
putting back the already postponed deadline from 9 March. It
thinks EITI membership will help it to attract larger investors,
which are subject to international scrutiny that should show
their shareholders fair play. Congo-Kinshasas rst EITI report,
covering 2007 but produced only this month, was a muddle of
inconsistent, incomplete gures but it hopes to get the 2008 and
2009 reports out in time to qualify for membership before the
June deadline (which coincides with the 50th anniversary of
Independence from Belgium).
The 2007 report covers only ve oil
companies, including the French independent
Perenco, Chevron and Teikoku Oil Co. Ltd., an
afliate of Japans biggest exploration company
Inpex Corporation. It reveals plenty of mayhem.
The auditors PriceWaterhouseCoopers think
that may be due less to corruption than to
incorrectly recorded information. There is
a shortfall of $33 mn. between what the
companies said they paid and the receipts
recorded by the Direction Gnrale des Recettes
Administratives, Judiciaires, Domaniales et de
Participations. That could indicate missing
funds and corruption in DGRAD. Yet the
Direction Gnrale des Impts (DGI) says it
received $42 mn. more than companies said
they had paid, which would be an extraordinary
triumph for a tax authority. In total, everything
more or less evened out at $405 mn. paid and
received.
These companies are all focused on the
Bassin Ctier (Coastal Basin), offshore and
onshore in the south-west. Perenco and Chevron
are paired on four blocks, both onshore and
offshore, with offshore production at fewer
than 10,000 barrels per day. Onshore, EnerGulf
Resources, based in Canada and the USA, has
a 90% stake in Lotshi block (the Congolaise des
Hydrocarbures, Cohydro, has the rest) and is
now exploring, with plans to drill two wells
in late 2010 or next year. British-registered
Surestream Petroleum has three exploration
blocks Yema, Matamba-Makanzi and Ndunda
all signed up in November 2005.
ASK ANGOLA
A
lot more is at stake in Congos dispute with
Angola about their maritime borders (AC
Vol 50 No 22). There is certainly a lot of oil
under the deep waters off the shore of Cabinda
and the short coastal strip where the Bas-
Congo Province meets the sea, and in 2006 a
Zone of Common Interest acknowledged an
eleven kilometre-wide corridor for Congo out
to the deep ocean. The agreement has not been
implemented and Congolese ofcials say they
hope to negotiate a new, larger zone. Rumours
of new efforts at negotiation, involving Angola
paying vast sums to Congo, have replaced talk
of international arbitration.
The biggest pipe dream is the Cuvette
Centrale, the Central Basin, with a proposed
$3.5 bn. pipeline to match. This region covers
1.4 mn. square km. of near-inaccessible
rainforest across the heart of the country
and several companies, including Total, are
interested in its 21 blocks, with four others
on its fringe awaiting presidential decrees
on exploration licences. There are ideas but
no details about a 1,500 km. pipeline to
transport the oil to Matadi port, which is also
to be developed as a container terminal. The
Hydrocarbons Ministry also wants to release
extra blocks around the Central Basin, bringing
the total to 80.
CONTRACTUAL CONFUSION
The disputes about Congo-Kinshasas oil concessions, licences, claims and terms
have grown so tangled that, we hear, President Joseph Kabila may ask Uganda for
help with a review. There were armed clashes between the two countries forces
in 2007 over their rival claims to oil-bearing areas of Lake Albert and its islands.
Amid the ensuing rapprochement, the Permanent Secretary of the Ugandan
Ministry of Energy, Fred Kabagambe-Kaliisa, who led negotiations about his own
countrys agreements with investors, suggested to Congolese ofcials that they
could get better terms.
Environmental activists have the usual concerns. Congolese civil society
groups warn of the effects of oil exploration in the restive Ituri Province and
plan to lobby Parliament. Henri Muhiya of the Commission Episcopale pour les
Ressources Naturelles (CERN) says that even if revised contracts raise more
revenue for Kinshasa, the people of eastern Congo may not benet and that it is
doubtful whether Ituri will even get the 40% share that the constitution provides.
Platform, a British lobby group which leaked details of three of Ugandas Lake
Albert contracts in November 2009, says that both the Ugandan and Congolese
terms offer the governments less than their counterparts in Asia and the
Americas. Platforms Mika Minio-Paluello says the deals signed by Kampala with
Tullow and Heritage give the companies excessive prots, endanger Ugandas
sovereign control over the resource and provide few guarantees on human rights
and the environment. Minio argues that Ugandas terms would give Congo-
Kinshasa only slightly more than the present conditions.
The Lake Albert area is believed to hold up to one billion barrels of oil. In July
2006, Kinshasa assigned Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) over Blocks
1 and 2 with Tullow Oil and Heritage. Then, in January 2008, the government
reassigned Block 1 to South Africas Divine Inspiration Group (DIG, see Box I).
After a political and legal wrangle, in March 2009 the Hydrocarbons Minister,
Ren Isekemanda Nkeka, invited Tullow back into Block 1 if it agreed to work with
new partners. A decree is awaited from President Joseph Kabila and both sides
are lobbying as high as they can reach.
Independent legal sources say Tullow has the best contractual case; others
say the South African consortium offers higher revenue to the government. The
South African rms have deployed business operators linked to former President
Thabo Mbeki. Tiego Moseneke founded the Encha Group, which controls SacOil
through the South African Resources Corporation. He is close to Kabilas brother
Zo and to Nozi Mwamba, a Congolese consultant to DIG.
Moseneke may have lost inuence, since Mbeki lost the presidency last year,
so Kabila may see little point in working with him. Moreover, there are allegations
that the former Energy Minister, Lambert Mend, had links to DIG and sought to
elbow out Tullow/Heritage on its behalf.
A further twist is a report to Congos Parliament by its Economic and Financial
Commission (Econ). In November 2009, it concluded that there was an urgent
need to certify oil reserves and to choose credible, well-resourced and well-
equipped companies to exploit the oil around Lake Albert and Lake Tanganyika,
and gas under Lake Kivu. Econs leaders wanted their report debated in January
and February this year but nothing happened. The report is potentially explosive,
since it also points ngers at both the Finance Minister and Prime Minister
Adolphe Muzito himself.
Econ has also urged the government to reclaim the deep-water oil blocks
that are contested with Angola off the Atlantic coast, using the 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea. There is general dissatisfaction in Parliament about the
negotiations led by Mend when oil minister, which led to the signing in July 2007
of a Joint Development Zone agreement by Presidents Kabila and Jos Eduardo
dos Santos of Angola.
Congos Minister for International and Regional Cooperation, Raymond
Tshibanda Ntunga Mulongo, and Angolas Foreign Minister Assuno Afonso
de Sousa dos Anjos, have agreed on a timetable for further talks within the two
countries joint commission.
Another joint commission is supposed to discuss dening the maritime
frontier but nothing has happened beyond an agreement to meet. A Congolese
parliamentarian told Africa Condential that the two countries were preparing to
take the matter to the International Court of Justice, particularly because Mends
2007 agreement had seemed to acknowledge Angolas sovereignty over areas
claimed by Congo. The dispute will not be resolved until the offshore border has
been legally determined.
CONGO-KINSHASA
More muddles in the mines
It seems impossible to keep politicians, and suspect characters, away
from Congos rich mineral resources
T
he review of Congo-Kinshasas
contested mining contracts was
completed months ago but the business
is still clogged in the mire of decision-
making. One victim is Kingamyambo
Musonoi Tailings in Katanga, a project
intended to produce more than 100,000
tonnes of copper and 20,000 tn. of cobalt
from mining residue. KMT was supposed
to start up within a year but is running at
least a year late. First Quantum Minerals
has invested almost US$600 million in
the scheme; FQM, a joint venture listed
in Toronto, Canada, holds 65% of KMT.
Its partners are South Africas Industrial
Development Corporation (10%), the
World Banks International Finance
Corporation (7.5%), local parastatal
Gnrale des Carrires et des Mines
(Gcamines, 12.5%) and the state (5%).
The aim was to build a mineral-
treatment plant on site and to help to
nance the rehabilitation of groups 7
and 8 (178 megawatts each) of the Inga
II hydroelectric power complex. The plan
collapsed when the government decided
last August to close the mining operations
down, after the failure of negotiations to
renew the partnership with Gcamines;
700 people lost their jobs and attempts
at reconciliation failed. FQM called for
arbitration by the International Chamber
of Commerce in Paris and a rst hearing
may take place next month. Not to be
outdone, Gcamines got together in late
February with Congos ofcial mining
registry to demand compensation worth
$12 billion.
One reason why FQM went to the Paris
arbitration tribunal was to deter rivals
eager to persuade Kinshasa to transfer
the concession to them. One result is that
the IFC is holding up any future deals in
Congo-Kinshasa until the dispute is sorted
out. The delays could affect at least nine
separate projects involving investment of
over $100 mn., in banking, textiles and
other sectors. Another lost opportunity to
develop a company and indeed a region
involves Congolese businessman Kalaa
Mpinga, Chief Executive of the South
Africa-registered Mwana Africa, which
had intended to invest some $75 mn. in
Congos main diamond-mining enterprise,
the Socit Minire de Bakwanga (Miba).
In 2006, Mwana Africa bought 20% of
Miba from Sibeka of Belgium and it had
hoped to get a management contract and
a half share in the Congolese giant, which
employs 5,500 people. Although there
was no rival offer, the government turned
down Mwana Africa and in November
2008, Miba ceased production.
We hear that politics lay behind
the governments refusal to play
along. President Joseph Kabilas team
wanted to be sure that Mwana Africa
and Mpinga would not emerge as an
independent nancial power, especially
in Kasa Oriental Province. There, Kabilas
popularity is far outdone by that of the
old and ailing chief of the Union pour la
Dmocratie et le Progrs Social (UDPS),
Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, who
has blamed Mibas troubles on interference
and nancial raids from Kinshasa.
Moreover, the State Enterprises
Minister, Jeannine Mabunda Lioko,
wanted Mwana Africa to pay much more,
saying Mibas diamond resources were
worth more than $10 bn. although
that was described as excessive last
September by the Chairman of the Senate
Commission on Mines, David Mutamba
Dibwe, whose report blamed Mibas
collapse on central governments policies,
or lack of them.
ORIENTALE GOLD RUSH
Another row concerns the gold rush in
Orientale Province. Civil society groups
are criticising AngloGold Ashanti for
publishing the terms of a rental agreement
with the parastatal Ofce des Mines dOr
de Kilo-Moto, concerning the Mongbwalu
concession in Ituri. A British non-
governmental organisation, the Catholic
Agency for Overseas Development, called
on the company at the end of March to
inform the Congolese public about the
terms. It is unclear why the size of the
concession has been reduced and where
its boundaries now fall, said Cafod, which
also wants the company to publish the
agreed revenue payments and its social
obligations. That would involve more
information about its plans for a social
and environmental impact assessment.
Kinshasas daily Le Potentiel reckons the
rm got a deal that fails to match the spirit
of the mining contracts review, speaking
of hidden nancial interests behind it.
The Minister in charge was Mabunda,
who has also been criticised by a member
of Parliament from the Mouvement de
Libration du Congo, Fidle Babala. He
claimed she had circumvented the legal
requirement to tender and to consult the
relevant committee and Parliament. He
claims that, if estimates of gold reserves
of 28 mn. ounces are accurate, the deal
will lose the state 2.7 bn.
Other companies are accused of failing
to obtain calculations by the state Centre
dEvaluation, dExpertise et de Certication
(CEEC) of precious and semiprecious
minerals (gold, silver, rhodium or
germanium) that may be exported, along
with copper and cobalt. These gures
are needed in order to levy the correct
export taxes. Lonide Mupepele, the
CEEC Director, says one such defaulter is
Australias Anvil Mining, which operates
the copper and silver mine at Dikulushi.
He says such companies have a powerful
lobby in Kinshasa, which has tried to
organise a strike to destabilise the CEEC.
One of these lobbyists, says a
Congolese ofcial, is Augustin Katumba
Mwanke, a former Anvil manager, now
an MP and President of Kabilas coalition,
the Alliance pour la Majorit Prsidentielle
(AMP). He is known as AK-47 for his
reputation as an arms dealer. A United
Nations experts report in 2002 criticised
him for pillaging natural resources and a
parliamentary commission identied him
as having, in 2001, instructed Miba to
buy military equipment from the Czech
company Thomas CZ.
A new episode in the legal battle
between FQM and the government
took place on Friday 21 May, when the
Congolese Supreme Court decided to
cancel FQMs title rights to the Frontier
and Lonshi deposits. According to Alexis
Mikandji, chief of staff at the Ministry
of Mines, the decision was justied by
the fact that First Quantum only had a
letter from the Ministry and not a permit
for both mines, whose rights are claimed
by the state-owned company Socit
de Dveloppement Industriel et Minier
du Congo. As a result, FQM shares have
been badly hit, falling from a year-high
of C$100.32 to C$62.79. Since November
2007 FQM has invested US$226 mn. in the
Frontier Mine project. The legal wrangles
occur at a crucial time. Feasibility studies
for underground mining at Lonshi were
near completion and it is likely that in such
a legally unstable environment, FQM will
not go ahead with further investments.
Forecasts by the Mines Ministry of a
doubling of copper output from 410,000
tn. to 851,600 tn. by 2012 are now in
doubt. Besides this row, on 24 May, mining
houses operating in Katanga announced
that they would withhold tax payments
to the provincial government. They are
challenging the decision by the governor
of the province to raise a US$60 tax per
tonne on copper concentrate exports. In
fact, the companies do pay the tax but
they say that they will treat it as a cash
advance and deduct it from end of year
tax payments.
74.89%
99%
3.79%
74.89%
51%
0.13%
5.88%
100%
72.42%
Provides
services
Provides
services
30% 70%
70%
30%
President
& director
40%
40%
60%
31.5%
55%
13.5%
100%
70%
30%
99%
Married
60%
1%
100%
Sources:
Artfield Group filings;
Dayuan International Development filings;
Chatham House, Thirst for African Oil: Asian
National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola;
US-China Economic & Security Review
Commission, The 88 Queensway Group.
CHINA INTERNATIONAL FUNDS WEB OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BACKERS
Lev Leviev Wang
Xiangfei
Lo Fong Hung Veronica Fung
Yuen Kwan
Wu Yang Helder Bataglia
Africa Israel
Investments Ltd.
Pierson
Asia
New Bright Intl
Development Ltd.
Sonangol EP Espirito Santo
Commerce, SA
Memorand
Management
(1998) Ltd.
Africa Israel
Financial Assets
and Strategies Ltd.
China Sonangol
Intl Ltd.
(CSIL)
Sinopec Dayuan Intl
Development Ltd.
(formerly Beiya
Development Ltd.)
Ascent Goal
Investments
Ltd.
China Sonangol
Intl (S) Pte. Ltd.
Sonangol Sinopec
Intl Ltd. (SSI)
China Intl Fund
Ltd. (CIF)
China Beiya
Escom Intl Ltd.
(holding co.)
LGC
China Sonangol
Resources Enterprise
Ltd. (CSRE, formerly
Artfield Group Ltd.)
Endiama Group
Holding Ltd. Co.
No. 20 China
Railways Bureau
Sonangol
Asia Ltd.
Sodiam Endiama E&P
Sodiam Intl
Ltd. (Israel)
Ascorp Endiama China
Intl Holding Ltd.
Independent
shareholders
Omega Diamonds
CONGO-KINSHASA
The ght for cellphones
Amid local trade wars, Vodacom-Congo is feeling the pinch and
contemplating pulling out of the DRC
V
odacom-Congo may be Congo-
Kinshasas largest mobile telephone
concern, with more than 4 million
subscribers, although its rival Zain claims
to have more. Vodacoms internal battles
are bigger still. Vodacom International
owns 51% of the shares; Congo Wireless
Network, based in Johannesburg, South
Africa, owns 49%. They agree on little.
Other conicts divide CWNs shareholders.
Vodacom-Congo is feeling the pinch, and
in mid-May the employment authority,
the Inspection Gnrale du Travail, gave
it leave to dismiss 11% of its workforce; it
employs 500 people directly and perhaps
ten times as many indirectly. That prospect
upsets Labour Minister Franois-Joseph
Nzanga Mobutu Ngbangawe (son of the
late Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko) while the
trades unions complain that the company
has failed to produce the nancial
statements needed to justify the cuts.
The root of the problem is that, at a
rowdy meeting in Johannesburg in April,
a CWN representative called for Vodacom
to be dissolved. Vodacom International,
which had proposed to inject more than
US$480 mn. into the company, called for
arbitration under International Chamber
of Commerce rules at a Brussels tribunal.
One of CWNs shareholders accused
Vodacom International of fraud, forgery,
usury, use of false documents and abuse
of trust, and demanded payment of $1.5
billion. He is a United States citizen of
Guinean origin born in Gambia, Alieu
Badara Conteh, who hopes to extract
himself and his money from the company.
Conteh has been schooled in Britain
and the USA. A rival shareholder, Feruzi
Kalume Nyembwe (who owns 40% of
CWN through the Resotel company), said
Contehs claim is unjustied.
This is where politics come in.
Feruzi Kalumes father is Didier Kazadi
Nyembwe, a member of Parliament
who has long, close connections to the
presidential family since they all lived in
Tanzania. Kazadi is like a second father
to President Joseph Kabila. He was head
of the National Security Council (1997-
2003), then of the national oil company,
the Congolaise des Hydrocarbures, and the
intelligence agency, the Agence Nationale
des Renseignements. A United Nations
expert panel accused him of illegally
exploiting Congos natural resources
during the civil wars. It is widely believed
that, when CWN was formed in 1998,
Kazadi joined to represent the interests
of then President Laurent-Dsir Kabila,
whose part-ownership (like the rest of the
familys business affairs) is controlled by
presidential sister Janet Kabila.
Given their long history together
in Tanzania and Congo, it is likely that
Kazadis relationship with Laurent Kabila
helped CWN land the licence in the rst
place. Now the Vodacom Group claims
that to the best of its knowledge Kazadi is
a business associate but not a shareholder
of CWN. Yet Vodacom-Congo can also
be described as a Kazadi family affair:
in 2006 a third Kazadi, Laurent, was
Vodacom-Congos Commercial Director;
in 2009 Dsir Kazadi Katala was head
of Division Billing Systems; and Franoise
Kazadi is Commercial Supervisor. Besides
that, Kazadi Nyembwes name appears
in the contacts list of a company called
Congotel which sells Vodacom products.
In April 2007, after Vodacom-Congo
had failed to pay CWN a dividend in its
ve years of existence, the shareholders
began to complain. Kazadi had Conteh
arrested. The South African government
calmed things down for a while. Yet a
well-informed consultant tells us that
Vodacom now wants to sell out of CWN,
or even quit Congo altogether, because
both the local partners and the political
climate are unworkable. Potential foreign
investors will be watching.
Over the next six months, Vodacom
must decide whether it continues its
operations in the DRC, said its Chief
Executive Ofcer, Pieter Uys.
NIGERIA
Into the unknown
An exciting election looms next year: no one knows who is going to run
and, more importantly, who is going to win
P
resident Goodluck Jonathan has a
year to make good on his promises
to tackle the electricity crisis, lead a
credible anti-corruption campaign and
implement the electoral and political
reforms proposed by Justice Mohammed
Uwaiss Commission (AC Vol 51 No 8).
National elections are due by June 2011.
By December 2010, it will be clear whether
Jonathans government lives up to its
promises. The combination of a sustained
improvement in electricity supply and
organising free and peaceful elections
would give him something approaching
heroic status. His associates say that he
is serious about reform but complain that
the government is undermined by vested
interests and political deals.
The difculty with pushing through
reforms within six months is that the
governing Peoples Democratic Party
(PDP) is due to hold its national congress
in November to choose a presidential
candidate. If Jonathan wants to run, he
and his colleagues will be distracted by
politics and the resulting deals could
scupper serious reform. It is not clear
how party rules on the candidacies will
work. A careless ofcial in his camp told
journalists that Jonathan had every right
to stand in next years presidential election
and that he would vote for him. He later
returned to insist he was speaking purely
in a personal capacity.
PDP barons talk of a gentlemens
agreement under which the party
leadership, and so the presidential
candidacy, alternate between north and
south. Given that the late President Umaru
Musa YarAdua, from the north-west,
served barely three-quarters of a term, the
logic is that a candidate from the north
should succeed him in 2011. Jonathans
camp is quietly testing the waters.
As his Vice-President, Jonathan chose
the little-known Mohammed Namadi
Sambo, former Governor of Kaduna State.
A day before the announcement, Sambo
had led a group (including Mallam Nasir
el-Rufai, the self-exiled ex-minister and
YarAduas most vocal critic) to offer
condolences at the Presidents residence.
El-Rufai has returned to help push the
reform of the PDP. In Kaduna, the impact
of Sambos promotion is unfolding.
Patrick Yakowa, the new Governor, a
Christian from southern Kaduna, has to
choose a Muslim deputy. Several factions
are competing and their squabbles may
jeopardise security, Sambos most palpable
achievement in the state.
The vice-presidency is a robust launch
pad for a presidential bid and several
ambitious politicians would like to see
Sambo fail. Among them are Gombe
Governor Danjuma Goje; Muktar
REFORMERS, POLITICIANS AND GENERALS
Three groups are emerging within the governing Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).
The aims of the Reform Forum, led by Ken Nnamani and Aminu Bello Masari, are
sound and admirable. Yet some describe their calls for party reform (read, internal
democracy) as cover for realigning patronage, the dening feature of Nigerian
politics. Its a mixed bag: 19 members have been suspended by the National
Working Committee (which, they insist, did not follow due process). Nasir el-Rufai,
Nuhu Ribadu, Nnamani and Bello Masari are members of the Good Governance
Group, set up to woo civil society groups such as the Save Nigeria Group. Wealthy,
retired General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma, Chairman of the Presidential Advisory
Committee, is said to be a sponsor. Nnamani, the former Senate President, and
Masari, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, both opposed ex-President
Olusegun Obasanjos bid to ddle the constitution and run for a third term. Oddly,
Victor Attah and Peter Odili, former Rivers and Akwa Ibom state governors (both
close to Obasanjo), are connected to the group. Odili was among the 19 suspended
by the PDP, accused of grand corruption.
Others include governors, ministers and aides from Obasanjos presidency:
former Aviation Minister Femi Fani-Kayode, former Presidential Advisor Akin
Osuntokun, former Foreign Affairs Minister Ojo Maduekwe, PDP stalwart Professor
Femi Otubanjo, former Attorney General Kanu Agabi, former Transportation
Minister Abiye Sekibo, former Imo State Governor Achike Udenwa, former
Education Minister Chinwe Obaje, Prof. Julius Ihonvbere, and former Senate
President Adolphus Wabara.
The Governors Forum, headed by Kwara State Governor Bukola Saraki, insists
that the PDPs presidential candidate be a northerner. This is echoed by Vincent
Ogbulafor, who has just resigned as party Chairman. He is charged with defrauding
the government of 238 million naira (US$1.6 mn.) while he was Minister of Special
Duties in 2001. He says the charge is politically motivated; his trial resumes on 21
June. South-East PDP governors Sullivan Chime (Enugu), Martins Elechi (Ebonyi)
and Ikedi Ohakim (Imo) called on Ogbulafor to resign after meeting President
Goodluck Jonathan on 4 May.
The governors approved the choice of Mohammed Namadi Sambo, former
Kaduna State Governor, as Vice-President and ditched Ogbulafor, making way
for a new chair from the south-east. The 28 PDP governors control 30% of the
delegates expected to vote at the party primaries this September. Jonathan is not
on good terms with the governors from the southern states of Bayelsa, Rivers,
Akwa Ibom, Edo and Delta. The Reform Forum has demanded the dissolution of
the National Working Committee and might get its way. Mohammed Haliru Bello,
the PDPs acting Chairman, was recently questioned by the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission (EFCC) concerning the Siemens bribery scandal. He was
Communications Minister from 2001 to 2003 and is alleged to have received 70,000
euros ($86,000) from Siemens in two instalments.
Former Vice-President Atiku Abubakars return to the PDP is an attempt to regain
control of the Peoples Democratic Movement, the network set up by the late Shehu
Musa YarAdua which lay the basis for the PDP. Anthony Anenih, political bruiser
and superannuated politician, was a PDM founding member but has no interest in
reform or accountability. Two of his allies are aides to President Jonathan: Chief of
Staff Mike Oghiadomhe was deputy to Anenihs political godson, Lucky Igbinedion,
former Edo Governor. Cairo Ojougboh, who is pushing Jonathans presidential
candidacy next year, is his Special Advisor on National Assembly matters and a
long-time ally of Anenihs.Josephine Anenih, Anenihs estranged wife, is Minister
of Women Affairs in the cabinet. Oghiadomes prior job as Principal Secretary
has been lled by Hassan Tukur (AC Vol 51 No 2), a career diplomat who has held
government posts in the oil and gas industry, the latest as secretary of the National
Energy Commission.
The third group consists of ex-soldiers (and includes Aliyu Mohammed Gusau).
Ex-military heads of state Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida and Muhammadu Buhari
would also like to be president. So would Atiku Abubakar, former Deputy Director
of Customs and Excise, now returned to the PDP. Babangida, one of Nigerias
wealthiest men, would be a strong candidate, but the southern-dominated media
detest him. A poster campaign against him repeats the main charges: that he
organised the murder of journalist Dele Giwa, presided over the theft of some
$12.5 billion in oil surplus during the 1990 Gulf War and annulled the 1993 elections,
frustrating a democratic transition and ushering in Sani Abachas destructive junta.
He good-humouredly rebuts all this but fails to convince. Some think that, at 68, his
heart isnt in it.
Shagari, Deputy Governor of Sokoto State
and son of ex-President Shehu Shagari;
and Ahmed Makar, a senator and one-
time Governor of Kaduna. In 2007, then
President Olusegun Obasanjo backed
YarAdua rather than Makar, who is
seen by some as a closet Islamist and
whose health is in doubt; he was own
abroad late last year for three months of
treatment.
Given the squabbles within the PDP
and the north, Mahmud Yayale Ahmed,
Secretary of the Federal Government,
would have been the safest choice as Vice-
President. He is a true civil servant, unlikely
to rock the boat but not a card-carrying
member of the party in power. National
Security Advisor Aliyu Mohammed
Gusau is preparing for a presidential bid
in 2011. Michael Are, former Director
General of the State Security Service
under Obasanjo, is Gusaus deputy. The
presidential ambitions of Bukola Saraki,
Chairman of the Governors Forum, are as
strong as ever.
Yet the PDP has been changing, even
in the three weeks since YarAduas death.
Nigerias political commentariat believes
that a clean-out of thieves and thugs is
overdue. A deadlock among the northern
candidates could position Jonathan as a
trusted compromise candidate from the
South-South. At a conference on Nigeria
in Washington in late April, Obasanjo
said, Theres no arrangement that
precludes any Nigerian from contesting or
from becoming the President of Nigeria.
In effect, he was supporting Jonathans
right to run, calling for abrogation of the
informal north-south pact and insisting
that politicians of his generation must
allow younger ones their chance.
Jigawa Governor Sule Lamido has
ruled himself out as too old and too
analog. He insists, though, that the next
president be from the north. Muazu
Babaginda Aliyu, Niger Governor and
Chair of the Northern Governors Forum,
says the candidate can come from any part
of Nigeria, as long as hes not riff-raff.
The inuential northern socio-
political Arewa Consultative Forum seeks
a credible, competent northern candidate,
while for now supporting the elderly
respected technocrat, Bamanga Tukur,
a member of the Presidential Advisory
Committee. He could serve as a stopgap.
The ten-year-old Forum might then throw
its weight behind Kano Governor Ibrahim
Shekarau, a 55-year-old civil servant-
turned-politician, who has just been
blessed by the Sultan of Sokoto as the
Sardauna of Kano, a time-honoured but
now honorary title. Shekarau, a two-term
Governor from the All Nigeria Peoples
Party in a supposed PDP stronghold,
ensured that votes counted, a policy which
gave him an unprecedented two terms in
ofce.
GUINEA
Votes and the mining houses
O
f the 20-odd candidates running in
the 27 June presidential election,
two veterans stand out. They are
A heavy crop of parties will contest next months election but the real
contest is about controlling mineral rights
Alpha Cond, the pugnacious leader of the
Rassemblement du Peuple de Guine (RPG),
and Cellou Dalein Diallo, President of
the Union des Forces Dmocratiques de
Guine (UFDG) and Prime Minister under
the late General Lansana Cont. Coming
up on their ank is Sidya Tour of the
Union des Forces Rpublicaines (UFR). This
could be the freest election since Guinea
seized independence from France in
1958, although supporters of the leading
candidates all fear interference from the
junta.
The ofcers who replaced Cont
hours after his death in December 2008
have promised to stay on the sidelines
(AC Vol 50 No 2). The coup leader,
Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, is out
of action after one of his men shot him
last December. Gen. Skouba Konat,
who commands the army and, for now,
the country, has promised to obey
whomsoever the Commission Electorale
Nationale Indpendante (CENI) names as
winner.
Alpha Conds RPG is largely nanced
by Kerfalla Person Camara (known as
KPC), boss of the Guicopress company,
who is both extremely rich and a good
friend of Konat. The partys unpretentious
ofce, in the fashionable district where
the mining companies have their ofces,
teems with ex-ministers and power
brokers from Conts regime, such as Fod
Bangoura (formerly a Minister-Secretary
General to the Presidency) and Kiridi
Bangoura (ex-Minister of Territorial
Administration and Decentralisation).
Also active is Ousmane Dor,
once the International Monetary Fund
representative in Senegal. After the
mutinies in early 2007, the then Premier,
Lansana Kouyat, made him Finance
Minister. Kouyat and Cond now struggle
for control of some mainly Mandingo
villages in Upper Guinea and Kouyat,
who is Mandingo, leads the brand-new
Parti de lEspoir pour le Dveloppement
National, whose main asset is the backing
of Libyas Colonel Moammar el Gadaf.
Some claim that Alpha Conds
support comes from big communications
companies, as well as from Bouygues, the
huge French building contractors. Conds
team includes Cheikh Yaya Kane, who
was in charge of the electoral register
in 1993; Moustapha Nat, Chairman
and Managing Director of Mouna Group
Technology, and Damantang Camara, a
lawyer who helped to produce a United
Nations report on reforming the security
forces. Cond, an old classmate of
Frances Foreign Affairs Minister Bernard
Kouchner, has been active in the Socialist
International, alongside presidents
Laurent Gbagbo of Cte dIvoire, Jos
Eduardo dos Santos of Angola and
Jacob Zuma of South Africa.
In the 1993 elections, Cond got just
over a quarter of the votes cast and would
have pushed Cont into a second round
if his votes had not been jettisoned on
PROMISING CONTRACTS
Guineas interim government has seen through several big developments in the
mineral sector, in spite of an agreement that no new deals be ratied until after
Junes elections. In April, the Israeli billionaire Beny Steinmetz sold 51% of his
Guinean operations to Brazils Vale (AC Vol 51 No 10). Together, they have pledged
to spend US$8 billion on exploiting iron ore concessions, to be exported via a
railway corridor through Liberia.In May, Hyperdynamics, a Houston-based oil
company, conrmed that it had received a production-sharing contract. A few days
later Bellzone, a London mining rm, suddenly announced a promise by China
International Fund (CIF) to spend $2.7 bn. on building a railway to the Guinea coast
in return for access to Bellzones iron ore permits.
CIF, a secretive Hong Kong company with links to the Chinese government, last
year promised to invest $7 bn. in Guinea, in return for access to vast mining and
oil rights. That deal was announced shortly after the junta under Captain Moussa
Dadis Camara killed more than 150 opposition protesters in Conakrys stadium in
September 2009. Some Western diplomats say that deal was steered through by
Dadis and Brigadier General Skouba Konat (now interim head of the junta), who
managed the transfer of large sums from the signature fee into the juntas coffers.
Steinmetz rst came into Guinea in 2006, with an agreement giving him a range
of permits, plus rst rights on concessions that Rio Tinto had given up. In the dying
days of General Lansana Contes regime, Steinmetz took control of half of Rio
Tintos lucrative Simandou concession, which had been revoked.
Dadis appointed the smooth-talking banker Mahmoud Thiam as Minister
of Mines and he has kept the job in spite of Dadiss December departure; he is a
protg of Ibrahima Kassory Fofana, an aspiring presidential candidate who was
Finance Minister under President Conte. Both are close to Ibrahima Sory Tour,
head of public relations in Steinmetzs Guinean subsidiary and Conts brother-in-
law. Thiam has travelled on the private jet of Manuel Vicente, Chairman of Angolas
state oil company, Sonangol, who has corporate links to CIF (AC Vol 51 No 6).
Several diplomats and government ofcials claim that Israels former Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert accompanied Steinmetz to Guinea to smooth things through
with Dadis in July last year. Their trip coincided with the arrival of Israel Ziv, a retired
Israeli Major General with a contract to train an ethnic militia for Dadis. Ziv was
received by Victor Kenan, an Israeli diamond dealer who has lived in Conakry for
nearly 20 years, has tight links with Guineas security services and says he is close
to the Steinmetz family. Kenan was seen in the Presidency on the day Vales deal
with Steinmetz was announced, accompanied by a younger man carrying a suitcase
and a jewel box.
At a press conference in Conakry in April, interim Prime Minister Jean-
Marie Dor was asked whether there was any link between the signing of the
Hyperdynamics agreement and the start of building work on his private house. He
replied that he could afford the works because he earned $18,500 a month at the
United Nations International Labour Ofce in the 1980s. Dor has suggested that
Dadis might be stirring up trouble ahead of the polls; Konat has shut down the
training camp and sidelined his military allies. Papa Koly Korouma, formerly one
of Dadiss biggest public supporters, has since tempered his criticism of Konat.
In April, one of Koroumas right-hand men was spotted in Thiams waiting room.
Thiam, meanwhile, says that Rio Tinto must build part of the massively expensive
Trans-Guinea railway from its remaining section of the Simandou concession to
Bellzones Kalia concession, which CIF is to link to the seaboard under the $2.7 bn.
Chinese deal. He says the cheaper and quicker option of exporting ore through
Liberia will be reserved for Steinmetz.
his home ground, Kankan and Siguiri. In
1998, after a pre-election demonstration,
Cond was arrested, falsely accused of
trying to overthrow the regime by force
of arms. In 2003, he boycotted the polls.
He is now 73 and will have competed
against three presidents: Ahmed Skou
Tour, Cont and Dadis Camara.
DALEIN THE FAVOURITE
Conts former Prime Minister, Dalein
Diallo, is tipped to win on the second round
of voting. He has kept away from open
politics since he was overthrown by Fod
Bangoura in 2006 and sacked for grave
errors (AC Vol 47 No 13). Having failed
to win the leadership of the Union pour
le Progrs et le Renouveau (UPR), he took
over the small UFDG and attracted some
senior supporters, including his friends,
ex-ministers Youssouf Sylla (Fisheries)
and Aliou Cond (Transport). He also
brought into the party Mamadou Saliou
Bella Diallo (now Minister of Technical
Education and Vocational Training) and
Amadou Oury Bah, Minister of National
Reconciliation and Solidarity in the team
of Kouyat, who founded the UFDG.
Dalein argues the case for the largest
ethnic group: there has never been a
Fulani (Peulh) head of state. One of
his key appointments has been the
communications expert Souleymane
Tianguel Bah, who will try to dispel
Daleins reputation for working in Conts
oppressive regime. The UFDG keeps its
distance from the UPR and its leader
Ousmane Bah, who took over from the
late Siradiou Diallo. Bahs party will be
the UFDGs main opponent in central
Guinea, which is mainly Fulani; his UPR
lacks strength nation-wide but can hurt
the UFDG among the Fulani. Dalein has
also attracted some hostility in Guine
Forestire, the southern rain-forest
region, because of harsh remarks about
the wounded Dadis, who comes from the
area. Some friends of Dadis fear Dalein
has made too many inroads into the
Presidency. All this reduces the likelihood
of the rst round of voting producing an
outright winner.
The UFR seems to be gathering
strength under former Premier Sidya
Tour (1996-99). After the 1996 mutiny,
Cont brought him in to straighten out
the shattered economy and he did a
good job, boosting his reputation but
not eliminating his ethnic disadvantage:
his Diakhank people make up than
1% of the nation. Tours party has lost
several leaders: Rougui Barry, the
countrys rst credible female politician;
Ousmane Kaba, an economist who has
founded his own Parti Libral pour lUnit
et la Solidarit and intends to stand for
president; and Makal Traor, law
professor and once Public Administration
Minister.
Outside runners include the UPRs
Ousmane Bah; ex-Premier Franois
Loncny Fall, who leads the Front Uni
pour la Dmocratie et le Changement;
and ex-National Assembly President
Aboubacar Sompar, heading the Parti
de lUnit et du Progrs, once Conts
ruling party.
Fringe candidates include Abe Sylla,
back from the United States; Ibrahima
Kassory Fofana, a former Cont Finance
Minister who helped to build up Dalein;
diamond dealer Bouna Kta; Mamadou
Sylla, boss of Futurelec Holding;
Boubacar Barry, of the Parti National
pour le Renouveau, a friend of Dadis; and
accountant Mamadou Bah Baddiko with
his Union des Forces Dmocratiques.
Under the pre-election agreement,
Premier Jean-Marie Dor cannot stand
and he resents it; he had hoped to delay
polling by calling for a constitutional
referendum. His Union pour le Progrs
de la Guine (UPG), hitherto a minor
presence, has picked as its candidate
Papa Koly Kourouma, friend of Dadis
and former Environment Minister. The
Forum des Forces Vives de Guine, which
allies party leaders, trades unionists and
civil society, strongly criticised Dor for
trying to defend the unauthorised signing
of mining contracts.
Hyperdynamics Corporation, a
Texan company prospecting for oil, has
rmed up its contract after renouncing
its claim to 70% of offshore sites. Mines
Minister Mahmoud Thiam approved
a joint venture between the Brazilian
giant Vale and General Resources, run
by Beny Steinmetz (see Box). The UFDs
Mamadou Bah Baddiko, Spokesman for
the Forces Vives, says all such deals will be
reopened if there is a change of regime.
Missing from the presidential contest
is Ibrahima Fofana, the combative and
inuential head of the Union Syndicale
des Travailleurs de Guine, who died
on 16 April in a road accident with
fellow union leader Magb Bangoura,
General Secretary of the Confdration
des Syndicats Libres de Guine, and two
journalists.
The kingmaker, if Dalein and Alpha
Cond face a second round, could be
Sidya Tour. He was Premier when Cond
was arrested in 1998, so the two are by
no means friends but if he linked up with
Dalein, people might fear the return of
the Cont era. One of the UFDG leaders
close allies told us that Sidya was open to
any alliance that would keep out Dalein.
The new Armed Forces Chief of
Staff, Colonel Nouhou Thiam, has sent
thousands of troops to guard the border.
Konat has put him in charge of a special
election security force, the Force Spciale
de Scurisation du Processus Electoral
(Fossepel), where his deputies are Col.
Ibrahima Bald, Gendarmerie Chief of
Staff, and Lieutenant Col. Skou Mara,
Deputy Police Director.
Thiam insists the army will stay
neutral during the campaign and obey
the winner. If trouble arises, he says,
We will crack down. The Colonel could
emerge as a new strongman.
LIBERIA: THE BORN-AGAIN BONG MINES
The US$2.68 billion Bong Mines deal hands the Chinese consortium led by Yin
Fuyou and China Union a 25-year concession for the formerly German-owned
Bong Mines in Bong Country, north-east of Liberias capital, Monrovia. It covers
352 square kilometers and has been only partially explored: it is reckoned to hold at
least 300 million tonnes of low-grade (35-45%) iron ore.
Monrovias Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee met at length in January
to discuss the deal as local communities lobbied government to include their pet
projects in its demands. International experts from the Governance Economic
Management Assistance Program (which monitors Liberian government
operations and nances on behalf of Western states and the World Bank) advised
the government throughout the Bong concession negotiations.
Apart from the mining deal, China Union Mining Company (Hong Kong) and
China Union Investment (Liberia) Bong Mines Company have agreed to rehabilitate
the Bong Mines-Monrovia rail link, improve the Monrovia port, rehabilitate the
Kakata-Heindi highway and build a 130 megawatt hydroelectric dam on the St. Paul
River to supply the mine and Monrovia. The project should create at least 3,000
jobs. Investment Commissioner Richard Tolbert says the mine will be ready within
18 months and that a million-tonne-a-year renery will be completed in twelve.
China Unions Yin says two processing plants will be built.
The committee that approved the bid said China Unions promised social
investments won the day: it will pay $3.5 million for community developments in
the three counties closest to Bong Mines. Labour Minister Samuel Ko Woods says
China Union promised to build a hospital, schools and agricultural projects. Because
of the Liberian governments own credit crunch, China Union announced that the
$40 mn. signature bonus would be paid in two $20 mn. tranches, one immediately
after ratication by the House and Senate, and the other later.
With a new cabinet in place, the acting President wants to push through
some economic and political reforms
T
he next stage of the political plan
mapped out by Acting President
Goodluck Jonathan and his advisors
is taking shape, following the Senates
conrmation of the list of 38 ministerial
nominees they submitted a week ago. By
most measures, the list is an improvement
on the cabinet appointed by President
Umaru Musa YarAdua, who remains
medically incapacitated (AC Vol 51 No 5).
The still unresolved power play
between the Jonathan and YarAdua
camps, the threats of unrest in the Middle
Belt states and attacks on oil installations
in the Niger Delta mean that security
dominates Jonathans concerns. That
explains his reliance on three veteran
generals: Lieutenant General Theophilus
Report to
Report to
Reports to
Reports to
Report to
Reports to
NIGERIAS ARMED FORCES AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
MILITARY HIGH COMMAND
CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF
Air Chief Marshall Paul Dike
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF
Lieutenant General
Abdulrahman Dambazzau
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF
Air Marshall
Oluseyi Petirin
CHIEF OF NAVY STAFF
Vice Admiral
Ishaya Iko Ibrahim
DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS
Major General Kamaldeen Role
GOC 1st Division, Kaduna (formerly
Commander, Army Headquarters Garrison,
Abuja). He replaced Major-General Moses Obi
(now Chief of Operations at Army
Headquarters).
Major General Lawrence Ngubane
GOC 2nd Division, Ibadan (formerly Deputy
Commandant, National Defence College).
Major General Saleh Maina
GOC 3rd Division, Jos (formerly Commandant,
Armoured Corps and School, Bauchi). He
replaced Major General O. Akinyemi (now
Director, Peace-keeping at Defence
Headquarters).
Major General Emeka C.G. Nwanguma
GOC 81st Division, Lagos (formerly of the
Defence Headquarters).
Major General Mohammed Isah
GOC 82nd Division, Enugu (formerly the
Military Secretary Army).
Afakriya Gadzama
Director-General of the State Security
Service (SSS).
Mohammed Yusuf Tilde
Chief Security Officer to President Umaru
YarAdua.
Brigadier General A.T. Umaru
Director of Military Intelligence (formerly
Director of Operations at the Defence
Intelligence Agency).
Brigadier General Gramme Bauka
Director, Defence Intelligence Agency,
Foreign Liaison (formerly Commander 1st
Brigade, Sokoto).
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR (NSA)
General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
PRESIDENT UMARU YARADUA
(duties currently being taken on by Acting President Goodluck Jonathan)
NIGERIA
Jonathan and the securocrats
Danjuma, former Chief of Defence Staff
Gen. Owoye Andrew Azazi and former
Director of Military Intelligence Gen.
Aliyu Mohammed Gusau.
There have been some security
improvements under new Inspector
General of Police Ogbonna Onovo. Several
protest rallies have been held peacefully;
investigations into the murder of journalist
Bayo Ohu and the assassination of Dipo
Dina, an Action Congress candidate
from Ogun State, have made headway.
Hundreds of suspects linked to recent
massacres in Jos have been arrested and
arraigned.
Onovo has enemies, such as the
former Police Affairs Minister, Ibrahim
Lame. Some barons in the governing
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) suspect
that Onovos better policing in Anambra,
Edo and Jigawa states has led to the
partys recent electoral defeats there.
In consulting the 36 state governors on
the choice of ministers, Jonathan seems
to have improved relations somewhat
between his camp in Abuja and the
states. There are some residual tensions:
Timipre Sylva, the Governor of Bayelsa
(Jonathans own state), greatly resents
facing an investigation into his affairs
by the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission. Some expect the return of
its former Chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, to
Nigeria to take up an ombudsman role;
others suggest he might be appointed as
an interim Vice-President.
On the cabinet list there is an
embarrassment of ministerial talent
in some areas: in nance for example,
Goldman Sachs banker Olusegun Aganga
is on the list, as is former Finance Minister
Shamsudeen Usman and former Deputy
Finance Minister Remi Babalola.
It is likely that former Deputy Oil
Minister Henry Odein Ajumogobia
will be given the full portfolio and lead
the effort to steer the much-criticised
Petroleum Industry Bill through the
National Assembly. Godsday Orubebe is
tipped to replace his former Minister in
the Niger Delta portfolio.
Once Jonathan has named all the
ministers, he has to decide how to
consolidate power. Providing he can count
on the loyalty of his new appointees,
he could ask the cabinet to rule that
YarAdua is medically unt to govern. If
two-thirds of the cabinet supported the
motion, Jonathan would become the
constitutionally legitimate President. He
might then run for the partys presidential
nomination in next years election.
Jonathans new and highly inuential
National Security Advisor, Gen. Gusau,
might advise against such a move: some
of the northern barons in the PDP (of
whom Gusau is one) might see the move
as disrespectful to YarAdua, who comes
from the far-northern state of Katsina.
Gusau, whom many believe wants to run
for the presidency next year, might also see
it as a personal complication. If Jonathan
becomes full President, that would leave
a vacancy for a new Vice-President, who
would have to come from the north and
who would also be a front-runner for the
presidential nomination next year. The
most likely candidates include Kwara
State Governor Abubakar Bukola Saraki
(who has cleverly distanced himself
from YarAdua), Jigawa State Governor
Suleu Lamido, Bauchi State Governor
Isa Yuguda and Ribadu as a long shot.
How Jonathan moves in the next few
weeks will determine the survival of his
presidency and perhaps the success of
next years elections.
ZIMBABWE
The diamond mine drama
H
ot Springs, some 100 kilometres
south of Mutare, once aspired to be
a spa resort but the gouty planters in
its colonial-style hotel have been replaced
by Lebanese dealers from West Africa.
The towns featureless hinterland seems
to contain the largest alluvial diamond
eld uncovered in the last half century. Or
so some say.
Diamonds were rst identied in
the area almost ten years ago. The giant
De Beers corporation deemed them
commercially unviable, though, and let
its exclusive prospecting order lapse. It
was succeeded by African Consolidated
Resources (ACR), a London-registered
company with strong Zimbabwe
connections, which registered claims
in the Manicaland provincial mining
commissioners ofce over some 4,000
hectares and began small-scale mining in
what is now called the Chiadzwa Marange
diamond eld.
Word got out that the nd was richer
and more extensive than had been thought
and up to 30,000 small-scale illicit panners
moved in. They were followed by the army,
ostensibly to keep order, who sealed off
the area and, according to human rights
groups, treated the panners brutally.
Rumours spread that Chiadzwa
was a laundry for blood diamonds from
elsewhere on the continent. Sales from
Zimbabwe were suspended while the
Kimberley Process Certication Scheme
decided whether its rules had been
complied with. The KPCSs rst appointed
monitor was British, so Zimbabwe vetoed
him. After a hiatus, the Kimberley Process
founding Chairman, South Africas Abbey
Chikane, was given the job.
ACRs rights had been arbitrarily
reallocated to two small South African
companies Mbada Diamond Mining
and Canadile in joint ventures with the
parastatal Zimbabwe Mining Development
Corporation. ACRs Chief Executive,
Andrew Cranswick, a Zimbabwean, says
ZMDC has entered into strange, lopsided
agreements with non-transparent operators
of no technical standing. Pursuing a
campaign to regain ACRs concessions
at Chiadzwa, Cranswick complained
that Mbada and Canadile were the
beneciaries of decisions that suggested
political patronage and corruption; some
members of parliament agree.
In evidence to a parliamentary
committee this month, Mines Minister
Obert Mpofu (Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front, AC Vol
51 No 6) admitted that his Ministry had
no diamond expertise, that in his opinion
everyone in the diamond business was
crooked and that, desperate for foreign
currency, there was no option but to go
along with the ones who seemed least
crooked. Mpofu thought diamonds could
earn the country between US$1.2 and $1.8
billion a year, a huge sum which would
take Zimbabwe into the same league as
Botswana the worlds second producer
after Russia with 15 million carats. He
did not speculate on how such an inux
might affect international prices.
The two mystery companies initially
refused to appear before the committee;
some reports suggested that the Ministry
of Mines had advised them to stay
away. Then Attorney General Johannes
Tomana pointed out that they could
be held in contempt of Parliament and
detained until they did. However, the
companies testimony did little to clarify
production or values.
Mbadas David Kassel claimed to
have recovered 2.5 mn. carats already,
with throughput of 90,000 tonnes
yielding between 5 and 25 carats
per tonne. Canadiles Adrien Taylor
estimated throughput at 800 tn. a day,
with an average daily recovery of 2,000
carats. They claimed that values could
not be revealed, under the joint venture
agreement with ZMDC. Together, these
statements could imply an annual recovery
of 1.5-2.0 mn. carats a year substantial
but well short of Mpofus claim. Mbada
claimed that at current production rates,
its 2,000 hectare concession would be
mined out by the end of the year but it
hoped it would be extended into the as yet
unallocated surrounding 40,000 ha.
Meanwhile, south of Chiadzwa,
there are reports that the Development
Trust of Zimbabwe-Ozego is recovering
diamonds with army protection on the
Charleswood Estate, formerly the property
of Roy Bennett. The DTZ is Zimbabwean
and Ozego is the Harare-registered
subsidiary of Russias state-owned All
Russian Foreign Economic Association
on Geological Prospecting, said ZW News.
Although Bennett was named as Deputy
Minister of Agriculture by the Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC), he has
been barred by President Robert Mugabe
from assuming ministerial duties on
the grounds that state prosecutors have
launched a case against him for trying to
overthrow the regime (AC Vol 50 No 21).
Further south, there are reports of
another large nd near Chipinge, where
for political reasons there is already a
strong army presence. The world price
of diamonds stays high largely because
the producers, coordinated by De Beers,
rigorously match market supply to
expected demand and back the Kimberley
Process to keep uncertied stones off
the market. Zimbabwes threat to bypass
Kimberley and sell all it can nd will not
please other African producers.
When facing credible allegations of
grand corruption, ZANU-PFs barons start
investigations, lock up a few suspects
and generally the furore dies down.
Mugabe, Mpofu and the Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe Governor, Gideon Gono, have
all claimed there was massive pilfering of
diamonds, rst by De Beers from the mid-
1990s, then by ACR, whose mining rights
(they said) had been dubiously awarded
by a junior ofcial at the provincial
mining commissioners. ACR was accused
of illicit diamond dealing and its ofcers
threatened with arrest if they visited
Zimbabwe. Yet the courts had found in
ACRs favour and its rights were awarded
by the mining commissioner himself.
Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku
issued a court order for nearly 130,000
carats in disputed ownership to be lodged
under seal with the Reserve Bank for
safe keeping; their speculative value has
been put at an improbable US$18 mn. In
deance of the order and before the Bank
had nished cataloguing the stones for
valuation, Mpofu directed the police to
remove them to the Zimbabwe Minerals
Marketing Corporation.
Earlier, the Zimbabwe Mining
Development Corporation Chief
Executive, Dominic Mubaiwa, had
given the parliamentary committee some
astonishing details of Mpofus directives to
ZMDC, whose partner Mbada Investments
is named after a South African scrap
metal dealer thought to be a front for
more substantial gures. Mpofu ordered
the appointment as its Chairman of
Robert Mhlanga (a retired Air Force Vice-
Marshall and former helicopter pilot on
the presidential ight) and, as directors,
of Sthengisiwe Mpofu (the ministers
sister-in-law) and Dingiswayo Ndlovu
(his personal aide), along with the little-
known Crystesona Kanjoma.
Mpofus appointments often annoy
other powerful gures, not least because
he insists on equal opportunities for his
fellow Ndebele people. While he was on
holiday in January, his ministerial ofce
was burgled four times; he lost hard disc
drives and documents. Some suspect that
the Central Intelligence Organisation was
involved.
A politically charged dispute over ownership of diamond elds in Chiadzwa
could turn into an international lawsuit
ANALYSIS
SUDAN
As elections arrive, the
opposition shuns Omer
Sudan is set to become the rst country to elect an
indicted war criminal as president. Yet the elections
are deemed so unlikely to be free and fair that, as AC
went to press, the focus was on the extent and effects
of the opposition boycott. Oppositionists argued there
was little to be gained by participating and lending
credence to the elections as the regime had rigged
a victory with a manipulated census and elector
registration, gerrymandered constituency boundaries
and used state funds to buy loyalty.
TOUGH DECISIONS
I
n the face of blatant preparations for election rigging, the Sudan
Peoples Liberation Movement decided on 31 March to boycott
the national presidential election and all elections in Darfur but
it will stand in the South, where it dominates the Government
of South Sudan (GOSS). As Africa Condential went to press,
the SPLMs partners in the National Consensus Forces (NCF, or
Juba Alliance) the National Umma Party (NUP), Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP) and Sudan Communist Party had
decided to withdraw from the presidential vote and, with other
parties in the NCF, were still discussing whether to boycott other
polls. Hassan Abdullah el Turabis Popular Congress Party said
it would not boycott.
A furious President Omer Hassan Ahmed el Beshir had
threatened on 29 March that if the SPLM were to boycott
the polls, he would delay Januarys Southern independence
referendum, the most important issue in Southern political life.
The Northern opposition was shaken by the SPLM
announcement as it had expected any move to be a joint one
with the SPLM. Southern Vice-President Riek Machar Teny
Dhurgon jumped the gun by announcing the decision, taken
by the SPLM Political Bureau that afternoon, before the SPLM
had informed its NCF allies, said an SPLM source. The SPLM
presidential candidate who had withdrawn, Yasir Saeed Arman
Saeed, who is head of the SPLM-Northern Sector, was deep in
discussion at Umma leader El Sadig Sadeeg el Mahdis house in
the small hours, we hear.
Interested governments were also jolted by the SPLMs
move. Alluding, unusually, to restrictions on political freedoms,
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Troika of Britain,
Norway and the United States issued an anxious 1 April plea
for the polls to proceed peacefully and credibly. Governments
have shown every sign of preparing to judge the elections
credible enough.
The key will be how the ruling National Congress Party (aka
National Islamic Front, NIF) acts next. NCP leaders are far more
subtle than Omer, whose knee-jerk antics
help to disguise the partys long-term policy
planning. On that same day, it had cancelled
a crucial meeting of the Presidency, which
comprises Field Marshal (formerly Brigadier
General) Omer, First Vice-President and
SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir Mayardit (in
permanent minority) and Vice-President
Ali Osman Mohamed Taha (long Turabis
deputy in the NIF). The opposition had
agreed to postpone its boycott decision
until after that meeting.
It is a tough decision for opposition
politicians. There is much enthusiasm for
the elections: in the North, with no free
polls since 1986, many had hoped these
would restore the democracy and human
rights the NIF took from them in its 1989
coup. There are also politicians who dream
of returning to power, even in coalition with
the NCP, especially Umma leader El Sadig
el Mahdi, the Premier the NIF overthrew,
and Mohamed Osman el Mirghani, head
of the DUP, who has lately been closer to
the regime than has El Sadig.
FIRST-TIME VOTERS
T
he other major complicating factor is
GOSS policy. The Southern public has
no experience of democratic elections
but is impatient for the independence
referendum. The SPLM sees elections in the
South as giving it a strong mandate for the
THE MOST COMPLEX ELECTIONS
The combination of one of the most elaborate and time-consuming electoral
systems and mass illiteracy across most of the country virtually guarantees chaos
in Sudans elections on 11-13 April. Compounding such logistical problems is the
political one of the ruling National Congress Partys (NCP, aka National Islamic
Front, NIF) determination to rig the polls, according to Sudanese of many political
shades and several March 2010 reports* by independent organisations.
The NCPs tactics include buying local leaders, especially important in Darfur,
an inaccurate and partial census and chronically awed elector registration, says
the International Crisis Group.
An Islamist regime that has ruled for nearly 21 years through several security
organisations has many electoral options. There are 450 National Assembly seats,
only 270 of which are on a majority (plurality) geographical vote. The others are
on lists, by proportional representation: 112 from womens lists and 68 from party
lists, by state (province). It was through manipulating graduate and expatriate
constituencies that the NIF won 28 seats in the 1986 elections, though it had less
than 10% of the Northern geographical vote.
There are 749 seats in the state assemblies and 171 in the Southern Sudan
Legislative Assembly. With the national and Southern presidential and state
gubernatorial ballots, this provides what one report called the worlds most
complex electoral system. This complexity, with up to 20 candidates per ballot, is
the regimes secret weapon, observed one analyst.
Northern voters will have eight separate ballot papers and Southerners, twelve.
About 80% of Southern men cannot read, 92% of women. United Nations gures
for women are 62% and 54% nationwide in Darfur. Test runs have shown that it
takes a literate person 19 minutes to complete the Southern ballots.
* Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan, International Crisis
Group, Brussels; Government Repression Threatens Fair Elections, Human Rights Watch, New York; Electoral
Designs: Proportionality, representation, and constituency boundaries in Sudans 2010 elections, Rift Valley
Institute; The Sudanese Elections of April 2010: A Missed Opportunity for Peace and Democracy, Waging Peace,
London; Preliminary Statement on the Final Stages of Sudans Electoral Process, The Carter Center, Atlanta.
referendum and to counter interference from Khartoum. The
GOSS wants to maintain its compliance with the 2005 CPA,
which it signed with the NCP, making the two parties theoretical
partners in the Government of National Unity.
The NCP has exploited this partnership from the start,
using the guaranteed majority that the CPA gives it and having
planned for a post-electoral world where it can ignore the
SPLM and other governments.The SPLM Chairman and GOSS
President, Lieutenant General Salva, repeated on 28 March
that the SPLM would participate in the polls. He and a top-level
delegation ew in from Juba for talks with the NCP, in a bid
to win more concessions. However, the extent of NCP rigging
reported by Sudanese and foreign analysts means that late
concessions would change little.
There is a multiplicity of layers of deliberate and
happenstantial confusion, covert and overt manipulation, delay
and diversion noted one Western academic (see Box). These are
difcult to detect for outsiders with no experience of Sudan,
that is, the vast majority of foreign election observers. Northern
Sudanese protest that most rigging has already happened, with
a disputed population census in 2008 and then rigged elector
registration last year.
In the South, the issues also centre on the ruling party, the
SPLM, but in a very different way. Everyone (except for those
in the NCP pocket) is focused on independence and politicians
are positioning themselves for their role in the worlds next
independent state. Complaints about the GOSS are more
practical than ideological: that it has not paid civil servants
(including teachers), has not met promises of education, health
and employment, and is corrupt. Many complain of Dinka
domination.
Politicians from other Southern parties exploit these and
local issues. Many complain of harassment, most conspicuously
Lam Akol Ajawin, again detained by Sudan Peoples Liberation
Army security ofcers this week and whose SPLM-Democratic
Change the SPLM initially and clumsily tried to ban. Even
former SPLM candidates around 350 of them are standing
as independents. One of the founders of the SPLM, Alfred Ladu
Gore, is standing as an independent for the governorship of
Central Equatoria against the SPLMs Clement Wani Konga,
who controls several militias in the area.
Independents complain that the state (provincial) electoral
colleges, which chose two candidates per constituency to submit
to the SPLM Political Bureau, were weighted against them; Gore
claims that he won in the electoral college but was rigged out.
A GOSS source admitted that the system, supposed to be on a
US model, had not always worked but blamed the colleges. The
SPLM is trying to win independents back after the polls; it fears
that such divisions undermine the party and government in the
South in the lead up to the referendum.
The SPLM and, especially, the Northern opposition expected
far more international help than has been forthcoming. This
hope was based on promised foreign support for the CPA. After
the CPA was signed, Britain and the USA focused on the South,
paying scant attention to the Northern opposition which, despite
its faults, represented the majority of the Northern public. Most
interested foreign governments, the United Nations and non-
governmental agencies have continued to engage with the NCP
regime and to treat the elections as if they would be free and
fair, something few Sudanese believe, at least in the North. This
has allowed the NCP free rein.
As NCP inner core members such as Ali Osman and
Presidential Advisor Nae Ali Nae toured Northern Sudan
last year, the campaign had effectively begun. The promises of
local development and the buying of leaders who could deliver
the vote meant the polls were effectively xed already, noted
one Sudanese analyst at the time. Elector registration was
enthusiastic in some areas but distorted partly by being based
on the disputed census (AC Vol 49 No 9).
The South ended up with registered electors numbering
108% of those eligible, according to a census which the SPLM
had challenged, later changing its mind to avoid more conict
with the NCP. The gure even made its way into a generally
uncritical report by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in
January 2010. Most Western governments were reluctant to
speak out about electoral abuses before the vote.
PROMISES TO JIMMY CARTER
T
he usually reticent Carter Center spoke out on 17 March, though.
After complaining last year about the electoral procedures, it
Peace Accord breakdown
Particularly heavy fighting
Abyei District:
Pre-referendum tension
Base of regime and opposition
ICC-indicted governor delays
elections indefinitely
Lords Resistance Army (LRA)
attacks from Central African
Republic and Congo-Kinshasa
Throughout the South:
Khartoum interference;
Ex-SPLM independent candidates
Especially strong Khartoum
interference
Darfur:
War, displacement,
low voter registration
Areas not included
in any constituencies
North-South border not defined
Alignment shown: Government of
Southern Sudan (GoSS), 2009
Taban Deng and Angelina Jany
compete for governorship of the
oil state amid NCP attention
Administrative boundary
Administrative boundary
Northern
Northern
Darfur
Red Sea
Nile
Khar. Kassala
Gedaref
El
Gezira
Sennar
Blue
Nile
Northern
Kordofan
Southern
Kordofan
Upper
Nile
Jonglei
Southern
Darfur
Western
Darfur
N. Bahr
el Ghazal
Western Bahr
el Ghazal
Unity
Warrap
Western
Equatoria
Lakes
Eastern
Equatoria
C.
Equatoria
W
h
i
t
e
N
i
l
e
KHARTOUM
Port
Sudan
Juba
confronted Omer el Beshir directly: The Carter Center expresses
concern regarding restrictions on citizens freedom of assembly
and freedom of speech under certain provisions in the National
Security Forces Act, Press and Publications Act, and the criminal
justice legislation that are incompatible with Sudans CPA and
the Interim National Constitution (INC).
The Center urges Sudanese authorities to uphold the
commitment President Al-Bashir made to former US President
Jimmy Carter during his February 2010 visit to refrain from
enforcing these laws with respect to political parties and
candidates during the electoral period.
President Omers reaction deepened concern: We wanted
them to see the free and fair elections, but if they interfere in
our affairs, we will cut their ngers off, put them under our
shoes, and throw them out, he said of foreign election monitors.
Khartoums response referred to the Carter Centers call for
a slight delay in polling but what worried it was the echo of
opposition calls for postponement and the reference to the
failure to turn the National Intelligence and Security Service into
a purely information gathering agency, as the CPA stipulates.
This may have encouraged others to take on Omer. Referring
to the Carter Center report, an editorial in the inuential daily Al
Ayyam said: I could not understand the statements and threats
made by the President of the Republic and the candidate of the
National Congress Party for the presidential elections against
the organisations and the international monitoring group. I
could not understand whether these statements were made in
his capacity as the current president of the country, while he is
in the heat of his electoral campaign in Port Sudan. I believe this
was neither appropriate nor needed, especially at this time.
Meanwhile, the Southern Parliament Speaker and SPLM
Deputy Chairman, Gen. James Wani Igga, declared, I want
to condemn El Beshir over his decision on the international
observers that it is million times wrong. This could spread. The
Carter Centre also drew attention to a movement the regime
would rather forget, because it reminds them of the successful
popular uprisings of 1964 and 1985: the
youthful movement Girifna, meaning We
are fed up. Videos circulate on the internet
of eloquent young men and women
gathering interested if passive crowds as
they lecture on freedom and human rights,
with slogans such as Sagata ya keizan!
(Down with the cups! a nickname for the
Islamists coined after a Turabi speech).
This was unthinkable a few years ago
and several have been arrested as have
other election activists, as the Carter Centre
complained. One of the Sudanese in the
Centers Domestic Observation Program
(separate from the international one) was
briey detained and interrogated this week:
Abdel Majeed Saleh, head of the Darfur
Democratic Forum. Domestic Observations
Deputy Director, Ammar Abboud, a
Lebanese, was deported last month. This
has all encouraged an opposition largely
ignored by Western governments, aid
agencies and press.
INTERNATIONAL REACTION
T
he NCP has tested international reaction
to its electoral manipulation. This
week, both Gen. Scott Gration, the US
Special Envoy, and Haile Menkerios, the
new UN chief in Sudan, have encouraged
Sudanese to vote. Menkerios is an Eritrean
former Ambassador to Ethiopia who broke
with President Issayas Afewerki and
rose rapidly through the UN system after
working in Congo-Kinshasa. He has been
expected to be feistier than his Pakistani
predecessor, Ashraf Qazi, a master of
diplomatic silence short-listed for the UN
SGs post before Ban won it.
On 30 March, opposition leaders walked
out of a live television broadcast, protesting
that the National Elections Commission had
been given too much time. Politicians and
the public see the NEC as too inuenced
by the regime. Faith in its ability to deliver
sound election results is not universal.
THE MANY WAYS TO WIN THE ELECTIONS
Independent analysts identify Khartoums efforts to rig the polls and logistical
difculties (which the regime can exploit):
The regime tried to print the ballot papers. Khartoum sources say the National
Elections Commission accepted a tender to print the presidential and governorship
ballots from the government press for US$6 million (a Slovenian company bid less
than $1 mn). The United Nations, which was paying the bill, rejected the government
bid, so then the NEC said it would pay for the ballots itself. Most ballots have been
printed in South Africa or Britain but the national and southern presidential ballots
are from Khartoums Currency Printing Company, which said on 30 March that it
had no relations with any political party.
The regime tried to use the military to y the ballots to the South; after opposition
protests, the UN took the job.
Constituency boundaries: Constituency boundaries are often unclear, are
unmapped, and have been determined inconsistently from state to state. Many
villages have not been specically assigned to constituencies; in some cases,
notably North Darfur, entire sections of states have been left out of the delimitation
process, said a Rift Valley Institute report.
Abyei District: its controversial boundaries have still not been demarcated.
The North-South boundary: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement requires it to
be demarcated before the polls but it has not been.
Intimidation: The National Intelligence and Security Service has harassed party
politicians and civic education workers, sometimes arresting and beating them.
The Sudan Peoples Liberation Army security and the Southern Sudan Police
Service stand similarly accused in the South.
Opposition parties and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement in the North
have been largely kept off the state-controlled radio and television.
Parties have to give the authorities 72 hours notice of election meetings, even in
their own buildings.
President Omer Hassan Ahmed el Beshirs campaign manager in the South is
his Security Advisor and former NISS Director, General Salah Abdullah Mohamed
Gosh.
Violence in Darfur and the South prevents safe voting or even registration. Worst
hit areas are Jonglei, Western Equatoria (by the Khartoum-backed Lords Resistance
Army) and Jebel Marra (by government ground and air attacks).
Displacement: over 250,000 Darfur people in Chad; hundreds of thousands in
South and Darfur unable to vote.
NEC: monitors charge belated and inadequate preparations. Ensuring efciency
and probity at 17,914 polling stations will be challenging (21,000 were planned; the
reduction may affect voting).
A lack of independent and properly trained police to protect voters in both North
and South.
Biased or inexperienced poll monitors: the NCP claims there are 200,000 monitors
and observers, but these would be mostly local party agents. The few hundred
international monitors mostly do not speak Arabic or local languages and few have
detailed knowledge and experience of Sudan.
AFRICA/EUROPE/UNITED STATES
US military calls up Europe
T
he United States Africa Command
(Africom) wants help with its task
of promoting stability and ghting
terrorism on the continent and hopes to get
it from the European Union. On 4 March,
an Africom team from its base in Stuttgart
travelled to Brussels to meet European
ministers and staff of the European
Commission Secretariat to discuss how
to coordinate their programmes. Military
cooperation has to involve arrangements
for troops and hardware from individual
EU member states (some formerly colonial
ones but also others including Poland),
backed sometimes by money from the
EUs Cooperation budget.
To sort out this problem, Africom has
assigned two ofcials with, between them,
one investigative name: Major General
Richard J. Sherlock and Ambassador J.
Anthony Holmes. Sherlock is Director,
Washington wants the European Union to work with its African military
missions, which may be more complicated than it seems
Strategy, Plans and Programs Directorate;
Holmes is Deputy to the Commander for
Civil-Military Activities. They will evaluate
how they and the EU could complement
one another when working with African
partners on security issues.
The most urgent case for Sherlock and
Holmes is Congo-Kinshasa. The United
Nations military mission, the Mission des
Nations Unies en Rpublique Dmocratique
du Congo (Monuc), which was intended
to help to stabilise the country, will start
pulling out in July, says Alain le Roy,
of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations. Therefore the two EU
operations Eupol, which is intended to
reinforce the capacity of the Congolese
police, and Eusec, which aims to separate
Congos army pay from its chain of
command will become more important.
Ofcers often steal their soldiers pay and
MILITARY MONEY
In budget-cutting Washington DC, European cooperation is welcome even if
European budgets are a fraction of United States funds. The US government
has cut its Africom budget to US$278 million this year, compared to $310 mn. in
2009. Africom has about 1,300 staff and oversees about 5% of US aid to Africa.
Washingtons military operations in Africa remain tiny, less than 1% of its operations
in Asia, Europe and Latin America.
Outside Africom, US military assistance arms, training and construction is
growing slowly. It rose to about $600 mn. in 2007/08 from less than $80 mn. in
2000. It occasionally includes direct action, such as giving intelligence and logistic
support to the Ugandan armys pursuit of the Lords Resistance Army (December
2008) or ying supplies to Malian counterinsurgency troops (September 2007).
Washingtons third biggest counter-terrorism programme, after those in Iraq
and Afghanistan, is Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS). It was
allocated more than $436 mn. in 2005/09 and involved up to 170 US soldiers training
local armies on the ground. Regular regional military exercises include Natural Fire
(East Africa, involving 600 US troops), African Lion (Morocco, 700 US troops),
Africa Endeavour (Central Africa, 60 troops) and Flintlock in the Sahel, due in May,
with about 600 US troops headquartered in Burkina Faso.
US soldiers and diplomats combine to train peacekeepers under the Africa
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, whose funding grew
from $15 mn. in 1997 to over $81 mn. in 2008 ($49 mn. in 2009) for 24 countries,
training about 20 battalions a year. ACOTAs headquarters are in the US Department
of State while the Defence Departments Africom takes the lead in the direct training
of peacekeepers and provision of military equipment.
In 2008, it helped to deploy 1,600 Ugandan peacekeepers to Somalia; in January
2009, the 17th Air Force, based at Ramstein, Germany, airlifted two recovery
vehicles to Rwandan peacekeepers in Darfur, Sudan. Both Africom and the State
Departments Bureau of African Affairs are helping to overhaul military and civil
security in Congo-Kinshasa, Liberia, Somalia and South Sudan. Before 2008,
Africoms Military Information Support Team (MIST) in Somalia received $600,000,
while the Embassys Public Affairs Ofce got $30,000. Ofcials said that the military
is stepping into a void created by a lack of resources for traditional development
and public diplomacy.
a lack of training and discipline has led to
instability and racketeering. Separately,
Belgian and British teams have trained
some Congolese ofcers and units.
To emphasise the US military interest,
Holmes and Sherlock visited Kisangani in
late February for the opening of a training
programme for an 800-1,000-strong
battalion of light infantry.
The 80 trainers include 50 US
Army ofcers and 30 employees of the
Virginia-based private company Military
Professional Resources Incorporated
(MPRI). The training is intended to last
until October at a cost of US$35 mn. and to
produce (according to Sherlock) a centre
of excellence within the Forces Armes de
la Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo, with
soldiers taught how to operate within the
rule of law and to address issues of sexual
violence. Congos government is supposed
to pay the soldiers and Africom will try
to work with it and foreign organisations
to see that the men get their pay. The US
team is studying the past experience of
their Eusec allies.
US-European military cooperation is
also under way in Somalia, on land as
well as in the anti-piracy campaign, for
which the navies of European and other
countries work together in Operation
Atalanta (AC Vol 51 No 3 and Vol 50
No 25). The European Council and the
Commissions development division have
agreed that Africom will equip 2,000
soldiers serving the Transitional Federal
Government, to be trained by European
instructors at Bihanga camp in Uganda,
starting in May. Africom itself also
intends to train troops for the TFG, which,
according to Italian politician Roberto
Gualtieri, needs 7,000-10,000 men. The
US contribution could involve helping
Somali troops to cope with improvised
explosive devices, such as car bombs.
The Sherlock-Holmes team reckons that
this pattern of US-EU cooperation may
increase, since both parties see the security
of African countries, especially resource-
rich ones and ones targeted by Islamists,
including Al Qaida, as a priority.
The Gulf of Guineas oil and gas
industry makes it especially interesting
to the USA, which buys about a fth of
its oil from the region. The Pentagon has
been working in Guinea Bissau, too,
a hub through which Colombian drug
cartels move their product into Europe.
The cartels also operate in other West
African states, such as Gambia, Ghana
(where local authorities have cracked
down over the past year) and Senegal.
The USA has sent ships to Guinea Bissau
and trainers for local navies, while a
European contribution started in February
2008, when the EU began an advice and
assistance mission, with 21 trainers to
support security sector reform, at an
annual cost of about 6 mn. euros ($8.23
mn.). It will last until May and is intended
to help the army, police and customs
service curb drug trafcking.
A politically sensitive point is the aim
of cutting Bissaus army in half, from 5,000
men when the programme began.Quasi-
military cooperation involves the training
by American and Belgian instructors of
naval ofcers from Benin, Cameroon,
Congo-Brazzaville and Togo in Douala,
where they are taught how to observe
and suppress piracy at sea. The rst
course, aboard the Belgian command-
and-logistics vessel Godetia, runs from
1-23 March, under the framework of the
African Partnership Station, set up by
Africom as part of its programme.
Africoms operations in Equatorial
Guinea and Nigeria also involve MPRI,
a division of L-3 Communications, which
has a $58 mn. multiyear contract with
the Malabo government to establish
a Maritime Security Enhancement
Programme. It is trying to recruit former
US Navy or Coast Guard staff for this.
In Guinea-Conakry, Africom hopes to
include the EU in its expansion plans. I
think we will be working together under
some sort of UN umbrella, says Holmes.
In the Sahel, where Touareg and other
local opposition movements overlap with
externally backed Islamist movements,
Africom is involved in the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership. Trainers
working with the Xe private military
company (it was called Blackwater
Worldwide until it got into trouble in
Iraq) support, among others, the army of
Burkina Faso. Africoms main concern is
to curb illegal ows of arms, goods and
people through the region. Holmes also
says, suitably vaguely, It wouldnt surprise
me if something came out of Niger and the
transition to democracy in this country.
Africom has International Military
Education and Training Programs in
16 African countries and runs an Africa
Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance Program to help governments
to respond quickly to crises. So far, ACOTA
has trained approximately 45,000 African
soldiers and 3,200 African trainers to
support peacekeeping operations in
Burundi, Congo-K, Cte dIvoire, Liberia,
Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and Lebanon.
European involvement in African
defence has moved on since Lisbons
Europe-Africa summit of December 2007.
That was followed by Euro Recamp-Amani
Africa to strengthen Africas capacity to
mount peacekeeping operations. Recamp
(Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping
Capabilities) was originally French while
Amani is Peace in Kiswahili.
A network of training centres is being
developed, including the Ko Annan
International Peacekeeping Centre in
Accra and the International Peace Support
Training Centre in Karen, Kenya.
SOMALIA
More troops for Mogadishu
The government has new allies against Al Shabaab but the facts on the
ground remain much the same
T
he Transitional Federal Government
has a new component. On 15 March
in Addis Ababa, the TFG signed
an agreement with Ahlu Sunna wal
Jamaa, the council (and militia) that
administers Galgadud and other areas.
It gets the right to ve ministers, one
minister of state, ve assistant ministers,
ten director generals and directors, three
ambassadors and twelve other diplomatic
posts, and the deputy commanders of the
armed forces, police and security. ASWJ
troops will become an integral part of
the TFG army. A joint committee is to
try to implement the agreement within
a month.
This was a top-level deal, signed
for the TFG by Sheikh Sharif Hassan
Sheikh Aden, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Finance, and for the
ASWJ by Sheikh Mahamoud Yussuf
Heefaw, who became Chairman in
January, in the presence of its spiritual
leader, Sheikh Mahamoud Sheikh
Hassan. The witnesses were Ethiopias
Foreign Minister, Seyoum Mesn;
Gabons Jean Ping, Chairperson of the
African Union Commission; Ambassador
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the United
Nations Secretary Generals Special
Representative for Somalia; plus
representatives of the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development Partners
Forum and the League of Arab States.
The accord is based on the Djibouti
Agreement, which brought President
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed into the TFG early
last year. He missed the signing, being
in London on another of his frequent
overseas tours (see Box).
Some ASWJ members complain the
agreement favours leaders from Galgadud
and from the Ayr/Habr Gidir/Hawiye,
to which both Heefaw and Mahamoud
Sheikh Hassan belong. The critics include
a former Chairman of ASWJs Executive
Council, Sheikh Mohamed Omar Roble
(Murasade/Hawiye) from Mogadishu.
The ASWJ has leaders and supporters
from numerous clans but is widely seen
as mainly Hawiye. It began as an ad
hoc group of Su clerics, angry at the
desecration of Su graves by Al Shabaab
and other Sala extremists; its aim is to
promote traditional Islamic practice and
shared traditional values of the people
of Somalia in order to combat foreign
extremist and terrorist ideologies. Since
January 2009, it has driven Al Shabaab
and the Salast Hizbul Islam out of most
of Galgadud, Mudug and much of Hiraan,
and it is raising forces in Middle Shebelle,
Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions.
The new alliance should strengthen
the basis for the offensive planned by
the TFGs new Chief of Staff, General
Mohamed Gelle Kahiye (a hangover
from Mohamed Siad Barres in the
1980s). TFG troops trained abroad are
now back in Mogadishu, paid with funds
from Western governments. Control of
the city and surrounding region would
allow aid to reach many of the displaced
people along the Afgoye-Mogadishu
corridor.
TAKING BACK KISMAYO
The TFG and its military supporters in
the African Union Mission in Somalia
(Amisom) have already taken over parts
of the capital; further planned military
operations would use Somali troops
(mostly from Ogaden) trained in Kenya,
with others from Gedo, to advance on
Kismayo. Ogadenis see it as their own
territory but Al Shabaab brings in most
of its arms and ammunition via Kismayo,
exporting cattle and charcoal.
Last year, Al Shabaab defeated its
former ally, Hizbul Islam, under Sheikh
Ahmed Mohamed Islaan Madobe and
retained control of Kismayo but Madobes
ghters are still active there, threatening
Al Shabaabs control of Lower Juba; towns
such as Dhobley near the Kenyan border
have changed hands several times.
Following the loss of Kismayo, in
late January one of Hizbul Islams four
component groups, the Ras Kamboni
militia, headed by Sheikh Hassan
Abdullahi Al Turki, decided to join Al
Shabaab, though by no means all its men
obeyed. Al Turkis entry into Al Shabaab
was overseen by the Emir of Al Shabaab,
Sheikh Mukhtar Abdurahman Abu
Zubeyr, and other Hizbul Islam groups
were invited to join a global jihad, form
an Islamic state in Somalia and liberate
East Africa from its Christian rulers.
Last month in Kismayo, a Shabaab
meeting discussed tactics for countering
any possible TFG or ASWJ advance from
Gedo or Mogadishu. Sheikh Mukhtar
Robow Abu Mansur (Rahenweyne)
and others wanted Sheikh Madobe
declared an apostate. Sheikh Al Turki,
another Ogadeni, reportedly refused
point-blank.
The TFG and its allies are likely soon
to try to retake Belet Weyne in Hiraan,
which has changed hands several times,
and Baidoa in Bay region, and to drive
Al Shabaab right out of Galgadud. The
advance will involve troops trained in
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda,
and by Amisom. Although both Addis
Ababa and AWSJ deny it, Ethiopia seems
to have provided ASWJ with considerable
logistical assistance over the last year.
Moreover, the United States has sent
arms and ammunition, and promises
aerial intelligence from unmanned aerial
vehicles (drones); it may do more now that
Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, a Comoran
terrorist wanted for the 1998 US East
Africa Embassy bombings, has taken over
a senior command in Al Shabaab. His
predecessor as the main Al Shabaab-Al
Qaida link, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, was
killed by a US helicopter in September.
Western observers see the deal
between ASWJ and the TFG as an
essential part of building a moderate
Islamic option in Somalia, although
there are doubts about President Sharifs
moderation and some members of ASWJ
perceive Wahabi elements within the TFG.
Although Sheikh Sharif was Chairman of
the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 (AC Vol
47 No 16), his differences with Sheikh
Hassan Dahir Aweys, the Chairman of
Hizbul Islam, were fundamental. Aweys
sent Adan Hashi Ayro to Afghanistan
and later encouraged him to set up the
group which developed into Al Shabaab.
When Sheikh Sharif himself the
founder and chair of the ICU in 2005 and
early 2006 said in June 2006 that he
wanted a deal with the TFG, Aweys took
over Hizbul Islam and appointed all the
members of a Shura, or guiding council.
It met only once, to control policy and
ensure that Sharif would be subject to the
authority of Aweys. Sharif, like the ASWJ,
would like to implement Sharia (Islamic
law) in Somalia but he shows no interest
in the extreme measures called for by Al
Shabaab.
There is widespread agreement on the
need for reconciliation but the differences
between Al Shabaab and Sharifs faction
remain fundamental. Both Britain and
Canada have just put Al Shabaab on
their terrorist lists but the inuential
Washington think tank, the Council for
Foreign Relations, still wants the USA to
bring Al Shabaab in from the cold and
involve Somalias hard-liners.
The Councils latest report, Somalia: A
New Approach, repeats last years proposal
for constructive disengagement, with
the USA accepting an Islamist authority
(including Al Shabaab) in Somalia, as
long as it does not impede international
humanitarian activities and refrains
from regional aggression or support for
international jihad or Al Qaida.
WHITEHALL STRENGTHENS SHARIF
No one was left in any doubt about the purpose of President Sharif Sheikh Ahmeds
four-day trip to Britain last week. He wanted, he told a 9 March audience at the
Karimia Institute, political, economic, humanitarian, military and security support.
This included money, training and continued acknowledgement that he was the
voice of religious moderation. To stabilise Somalia, he told an 8 March meeting
at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), The only way is to
strengthen the government everything needs strengthening. To audiences packed
with ofcials of many kinds, he proved adept at appealing to the diplomatic urge to
nd someone to engage with.
He proved less adept at being presidential. There was little sense of his Transitional
Federal Government (TFG)s policies and he wove detours around question, aided by
his own able interpreter. He had rejected one from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Ofce (FCO), we hear. His biography says he speaks English but he showed no sign
of it.
Sharif may not control even Mogadishu but he controlled what he wanted to tell
his audiences. Two themes emerged: the threat from Al Shabaab and other groups
he called terrorist, and the peaceful nature of Islam. He made clear his politics
remain Islamist but distanced himself from the violent version of his enemies. I have
the same Islam I had yesterday, he said, but later ignored the rst part of a question
that began, You used to be allied with Shabaab. He talked much about the chopping
off of limbs but not of the political and economic issues of an Islamic constitution.
Referring to Somalias long tradition of secularist politics, Africa Condential
asked if he would allow space for that and for different interpretations of Islam. He
replied only that it was found in Islam to choose leaders in free and fair elections.
This reects the shifting of the goal posts which Sharifs moderate Islamism has
achieved. The Islamic Courts Union he once led and its TFG successor have redened
political normality.
The British counter-extremism think tank Quilliam did not shy away. Describing
itself as founded by former leading ideologues of UK-based extremist Islamist
organisations, Quilliam receives UK government funding. Sharif was to speak there
on 9 March; Quilliams invitation called the ICU a hard-line Islamist militia movement
that repeatedly violated human rights while seeking to restore a measure of peace
and stability to Somalia. It had enacted hard-line sharia as state law and stoned a
number of individuals to death... Killed people for watching football... Conducted
suicide bombings against the then Somali government and its supporters... Sheltered
known members of al-Qaeda... Threatened to kill Somalis who didnt pray ve times
daily.... Sharif, it continued, had split from the more hard-line members in 2007 but
in February 2009 he again introduced sharia as state law in place of the countrys
secular constitution. Sharif then refused to go to Quilliam, AC hears. Karimia took
over. It also gets Whitehall funding but is less political about Islam, though it called
for support for Sharif.
Support was forthcoming. Sharif met Premier Gordon Brown (briey) and
ve other ministers. A Joint UK-Somalia press statement spoke of open and
frank discussions on issues of mutual concern. Sharif still left with promises of an
additional 7.5 million to support humanitarian activities, bringing the Department
for International Developments 2009/10 spending to 19 mn., plus 5.8 mn. to support
reconciliation and local peace building initiatives between clans and communities.
Military aid is hidden in the European Union Foreign and Security Policy. Ofcers
will train 2,000 TFG soldiers in Uganda later this year, an FCO source told AC. Sharif
deferred a UK offer to help build a new Defence Ministry.
Sharif and his UK consultants, Albany Associates, may have hoped for more.
Albany says it is delivering communications and public diplomacy strategies and
even visions. At least Sharif survived. Londons Westminster Central Hall) was
bristling with watchful police, as was Chatham House. Britains terrorist-listing of
Al Shabaab just before Sharifs visit may explain the seven-vehicle, two-motor-bike
police convey which swept him around London. Thats serious security! observed
one police onlooker.
Neither the FCO nor Quilliam used the Sheikh title Sharif chooses. Hes not a
real Sheikh, said one analyst. Hes a Geography teacher. His CV says he registered
for a geography degree at Sudans University of Kordofan in 1992. Many Somalis
and other Muslims owed into Sudan in that period. The National Islamic Front (now
National Congress Party) founded the Peoples Arab Islamic Congress, now seen as
a precursor of Al Qaida. Usama bin Laden was a welcome guest and the killing,
torture and arrest of opponents was rampant. Sharif then says he went on to Libya,
to study law.
Africa Condential is without doubt the best written, best informed and most enjoyable publication on contemporary Africa
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SUDAN
Doubts over Darfur
T
he latest Darfur peace deal announced
on 23 February meets the strategic
aims of the ruling National Congress
Party (aka National Islamic Front, NIF):
to consolidate a fragmented Islamist
movement; to contain the Chad and Darfur
conicts so as to focus on the South; and to
reinforce the NCPs position, both at home
and abroad, before next months national
elections. The signatories to the deal are
the NCP and the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM), widely seen as Islamist;
none of the secular Darfur groups have
signed up so far.
In Darfur, outside the JEM heartland
of the Zaghawa people in Western Darfur,
the Darfur Framework Agreement (DFA)
was met with indifference at best: the NCP
followed it with air and ground attacks on
eastern Jebel Marra, stronghold of the
Sudan Liberation Movement faction of
Abdel Wahed Mohamed Ahmed el Nur
(SLM-AW), reportedly killing hundreds.
Aid workers ed towns such as Deribat,
leaving tens of thousands of people
without health care. Even in JEMs areas,
the welcome was tainted: as the United
Nations Ofce for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs conrmed,
Khartoum had bombed JEMs areas in
January and early February just before
the ceasere agreement.
The NCP often combines peace deals
with military onslaughts: it began its
main attacks on Darfur in 2001, once it
had joined the negotiations that led to the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement with
the South. Now, many believe it is doing
the reverse: reining in the Chadian rebels
it arms and nances while containing
the Darfur conict so it can concentrate
its political and military attention on the
South, before the Southern and Abyei
referenda due next January.
The NCP-JEM pact brings together
apparently divided Islamist factions. JEM
leader Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed was an
NIF minister who led jihad in the South.
Suleiman Jamous, a Zaghawa in his 60s
and the SLM Humanitarian Coordinator
who moved to SLM-Unity and then to
JEM, acknowledged to Africa Condential
in 2008 that he had been a senior NIF
ofcial in the early 1990s. Though JEM
says it wants democracy and even,
sometimes, political secularism, many
see it as the armed wing of the Popular
Congress Party the PCP of Hassan
Abdullah el Turabi.
Foreign governments welcome claims of a peace deal in Darfur but many
Sudanese see it as another pre-election trick by Khartoum
The PCP is now in the Juba Alliance of
Northern opposition parties which includes
the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement.
However, from SPLM to the Umma Party,
no one has forgotten that Hassan el Turabi
was the real leader of a regime that killed
or tortured tens of thousands of Sudanese.
The main Juba parties pulled out of the
Media Commission of the National Election
Commission on 1 March protesting about
the NCPs control of radio and television.
The opposition is debating whether to
boycott Aprils national elections, which
almost everyone (except a few Western
diplomats) expects to be decisively rigged
by the NCP. In Juba this week, the head of
the African Union Panel of Experts, South
African ex-President Thabo Mbeki, told
the Juba Alliance that a high-ranking
delegation of AU election observers would
assess all phases of the coming elections.
Sudanese, though, say the polls were xed
long ago, largely through the contested
census, electoral registration and buying
off local leaders. Its just like slaughtering
after skinning! said one veteran activist.
GRATIONS NEW FRIENDS
The DFA boosts Khartoums image as
peacemaker. The NCP rallied the AU,
Arab League, Organisation of Islamic
Conference and Non-Aligned Movement
by claiming the International Criminal
Courts arrest warrant for President Omer
Hassan Ahmed el Beshir threatened
peace, in both the South and Darfur.
Therefore the NCP can mitigate any
international electoral criticism by
claiming this threatens imminent peace
in Darfur especially when United States
Special Envoy Scott Gration is a driving
force in the Qatar peace process (AC Vol
51 No 4).
The NCP knows how to exploit Western
ambivalence towards stolen elections and
oft-broken peace treaties. After meeting
on 21 February Vice-President Ali Osman
Mohamed Taha, who epitomises the
NCPs Islamist spirit, Major General
(Retired) Gration was quoted as saying: It
is wonderful to be able to meet with the
people that I have gotten to know as the
leadership but also as friends.
The NCP has resuscitated some
friendships. During Chadian President
Idriss Dby Itnos visit to Khartoum, Field
Marshal Omer el Beshir announced on 10
February that relations with Ndjamena
had been normalised and that war had
ended. Then, Khartoum signed the DFA
and Omer announced that the Darfur
war was over, too. Its great to have all
these agreements, peace breaking out all
over the place, but where are the ghters
coming back or handing over their
weapons? the former Coordinator of the
UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, Enrico
Carisch, told Africa Condential (AC Vol
50 No 23). Is JEM-land being evacuated?
A full agreement is due on 15 March
but JEM has been threatening to pull
out of the DFA if other groups sign,
too. Grations grand plan is two-track
negotiations, with JEM on one track and
SLM groups on the other. How they will
meet is unclear: SLM factions do not trust
JEM and JEM knows that they challenge
its claims to supremacy on the ground.
We hear Khalil Ibrahim is talking to Dby
about abandoning the DFA.
Eight other Darfur factions (the
Road Map or Addis Ababa Group) had
been trying for months to unite, in talks
facilitated by Gration and AU mediator
Djibril Yipn Bassol, nanced by host
Qatar. However, mediators apparently
lost patience and on 22 February, the
eve of the DFA, three Road Map leaders
disappeared and the next thing we were
told we were unied and El Tigani Seisi
was being congratulated as leader, said
one participant, labelling it political
piracy.
The trio was Taj el Din Beshir Nyam
(United Revolutionary Front, Bahar
Idriss Abu Gardas group), Abdel Lateef
Mazoul (SLM-Mainstream, one of the
smaller outts) and Babiker Khalid
(SLM-Democratic, led by Ali Abdullah
Karabino, formerly of SLM-U, before that,
with Minni Arkou Minnawi). Echoes of
the failed 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement,
signed only by Minnis SLM faction, are
deafening.
El Tigani Seisi Mohamed Ateem
seemed an ideal candidate. A personable
former Umma Governor of Darfur with a
masters in business studies from Britain,
he has spent years at the UN Economic
Commission for Africa in Ethiopia. He left
the Darfur Union he once headed because
of internal politicking and is supposed to
be a gure of reconciliation. Mediators
were seeking a Fur to replace Abdel
Wahed, who refuses to come to Doha.
However, the Liberation and Justice
Movement that El Tigani now heads has
in fact split the Road Map group. As Africa
Condential went to press, the other groups
which included the major SLM-U, SLM-
AW, SLM-Abdel Shae and the (Arab)
United Revolutionary Forces Front were
still in Doha, just. Increasingly criticised
at home, Gration was pushing hard for a
quick x, to the delight of the NCP. Sighed
one delegate: A wadi [seasonal river],
when it rains, it collects everything in its
way.
B
lamed for the massacre of over 100
civilians last September, the junta in
Conakry is trying to improve its image
via a United States-based public relations
company run by two former Department
of Defense (DOD) ofcials. David Crane,
who was the rst Chief Prosecutor at the
Special Court for Sierra Leone before his
departure in 2005, has made a surprise
return to West Africa as a consultant to
Guineas embattled military junta, the
Conseil National pour la Dmocratie et le
Dveloppement (CNDD).
Crane, together with the Special Courts
former Chief Investigator, fellow US citizen
Alan White, has set up a consultancy
called CW Group International. According
to a copy of a report written by CW
Group International obtained by Africa
Condential, the Guinean government
engaged its services on 15 October 2009,
some three weeks after the 28 September
massacre at Conakrys national sports
stadium that brought international
notoriety to the CNDD (AC Vol 50 No 20 &
AC Vol 50 No 22). The agreement was for
CW to conduct a condential investigation
into the recent allegations of shootings and
sexual assaults at the stadium.
On 21 October, members of the CW
Group arrived in Conakry. It is not clear
whether Crane and White arrived alone.
Two days later, the then CNDD leader,
Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, received
them. The CW team then spent some
eleven days interviewing people about
events at the stadium. They concluded that
the violence had begun when opposition
leaders led a demonstration which the
government had banned.
CW claims in its report to the junta
that during the morning of 28 September,
demonstrators attacked a police unit,
injuring several ofcers, and later
attacked two police stations, stealing 45
weapons and damaging property. They
broke into the national stadium to hold
their illegal meeting. Only later in the day
did a military force enter the stadium and
take action, with the result that 52 people
according to Crane and Whites gures
lost their lives.
They identied 14 cases of rape or other
sexual assault, allegedly perpetrated by
military. They said the military force that
attacked the demonstrators at the stadium
was a unit of red berets led by Lieutenant
Aboubacar Sidiki Diakit Toumba.
Dadis, CW reported, had specically
ordered the military not to respond. No
sooner had the assault taken place that
morning than Dadis took immediate and
appropriate action to ensure the safety
and security of the opposition politicians
in the stadium, it continues.
Crane and Whites ndings run counter
to those of other observers, most notably
the United Nations investigation which
found that more than 150 people were
killed and that dozens of women were
raped and otherwise assaulted. Others
put the number of deaths still higher. The
UN found that those responsible for the
killings included not only Toumba but
also Major Moussa Tiegboro Camara,
Secretary of State for the Suppression of
Drugs and Organised Crime and Dadis
himself. A Guinean military commission
headed by Siriman Kouyat found that
63 people had died, 58 in the stadium and
ve in hospital, but concluded that Dadis
Camara bore no responsibility.
Crane and White make the lowest
death estimate of any of the inquiries.
They support the ofcial military view
that the killings were the responsibility
of Toumba alone. He admitted shooting
Dadis on 3 December 2009 (AC Vol 50 No
25) but he told Radio France Internationale
that it was because he was being lined up
as the scapegoat for Septembers killings.
In its report, CW doubts that there
are grounds for international legal action
against the perpetrators of the stadium
killings. There can be no question of war
crimes since these events were not part
of an internal or international armed
conict, they note. Nor can there be
grounds for suspecting a crime against
humanity, since the crimes committed do
not appear to have been either widespread
or systematic, as dened under Article 7
of the Rome Statute, which established
the International Criminal Court.
Cranes involvement in the Guinean
imbroglio complicates matters for his
former colleagues at the Sierra Leone
Special Court, now working on the trial
of Liberian former President Charles
Ghankay Taylor. This is now reaching its
climax with the nal stages of his cross-
examination by prosecutors Brenda Hollis
and Nicholas Koumjian. Taylors defence
team makes much of some of Cranes
extravagant claims about their client
during his time at the Special Court.
Crane campaigned for Taylor to be
tried after he ed into exile in Nigeria in
August 2003. Crane argued that Taylor
was continuing to stir up trouble from
his base in Calabar. He accused Taylor of
being behind an attempted assassination
of Guineas President, Lansana Cont,
whose death in December 2008 paved the
way for the CNDD to seize power. Crane
insisted that the war in Sierra Leone, which
he accused Taylor of masterminding, was
solely a ght over diamonds.
GUINEA
The junta explains
The putschists use former Pentagon ofcials to polish their image
ZIMBABWE
Economic clouds, platinum
lining
Foreign mining companies benet more from the halting recovery as
local political problems mount
H
efty political obstacles block further
economic progress in Zimbabwe
after last years impressive
turnaround (AC Vol 51 No 1). Mining
operations, such as those involving gold
and platinum, will grow faster, boosted
by some of the worlds most generous
royalty and corporate taxation terms.
Yet the economys most productive parts
farming and manufacturing will be
held back in 2010 by political meddling
and mismanagement.
The International Monetary Fund
expects the economy to grow by almost
6% this year, not nearly enough to repair
the damage of a decade in which gross
domestic product fell by about 40% and
ination rivalled the previous excesses
of Latin America. Since February 2009,
when the Government of National Unity
started up and Tendai Biti was appointed
Finance Minister, Zimbabwes economy
has grown by about 3.5%, after a 12.5%
decline in 2008.
Government nances have gradually
picked up. State revenue reached US$100
million a month by the end of 2009, up
from $3 mn. at the beginning of the
year. Local bank deposits increased
sixfold over the year to about $1.2 billion.
Some aid for social projects trickled in.
Yet the recovery is extremely tentative.
More political are-ups could hold back
a sustainable turnaround that would
create jobs and enable the government to
rebuild the schools and the ailing health
service.
The IMF currently projects GDP
growth of about 7% by 2011. At that
rate, it would take a decade before
living standards reached the levels of
2000.Already constraints are beginning
to appear which make faster recovery
difcult; infrastructure has been run
down particularly electricity, water and
telecommunications and skilled labour
is in short supply.
Agricultural decline has probably
bottomed out, with smallholder harvests
beneting from both humanitarian
aid and favourable weather. Output of
commercial crops remains at a fraction of
previous levels, though; the destruction
of support networks (and a reduction in
Western tobacco consumption) make it
unlikely that Zimbabwe will ever again
be a world-class tobacco producer.
Dollarisation of the currency removes the
comparative price advantage of export
crops, many of which cannot compete in
domestic or regional markets.
The lack of power and water, plus
high wage awards, put the few remaining
horticultural producers under strain.
Faced with another poor harvest,
Agriculture Minister Joseph Made
complains that it is the fault of sanctions
that new farmers have not got the capital
to farm properly. They did not last year
either but they were able to convert their
subsidised fuel and other inputs into
handsome prots by selling them on the
black market. Even if the Movement for
Democratic Change parliamentarian,
Morgan Tsvangirais ally Roy Bennett,
is conrmed as Mades deputy (and the
political violence charges against him are
dropped), it will be too late to improve
matters this season.
Industrial production has recovered
towards 50% capacity utilisation but is
held back by poor infrastructure, skill
shortages and competition from imports
in price and reliability. The Zimbabwe
African National Union-Patriotic Front
(ZANU-PF) persists with a black economic
empowerment (BEE) programme which
aims to put its place men in control of
larger companies.
The depressed tourist sector had hoped
for a spin-off from the football World Cup
in South Africa but many new operators
are putting off the punters by asking
rip-off prices. Thanks to dollarisation,
ination has been held at 3-4% a year
and in late 2009 prices actually fell by
just under 1%, but prices are still higher
than in neighbouring countries. This has
prompted some to argue that Zimbabwe
should use the South African rand more
and the US dollar less (both are legal
tender in the country).
As world metal prices soared,
minerals, led by platinum, became by far
the most prosperous sector. The ZANU-PF
Mines Minister, Obert Mpofu, is far from
the sharpest knife in the cabinet but the
stranglehold of the parastatal Zimbabwe
Mineral and Development Corporation
has been broken. Marketing is being
liberalised, helping gold producers, and
some medium-sized mining interests are
resuming production. Diamond production
is on the rise but sales are impeded by the
haphazard licensing system and failure
to abide by international standards.
Nobody seems to have a grip on how the
international diamond market works and
the army longs to be in control.
The power-hungry Emmerson
Mnangagwa and Solomon Mujuru are
at daggers drawn over which of their
frontmen and companies should get a
grip on the richest diamond elds. An
attempt to bypass the Kimberley Process
Certication with an auction of 300,000
carats of rough unsorted diamonds had
to be abandoned when it was exposed
and risked damaging the governments
reputation again.
Accused of trying to take advantage
of the deal, the MDC Deputy Mines and
Mining Development Minister, Murisi
Zwizwai, is now under an internal party
investigation for corruption. Mpofu has
packed the Control Board with henchmen
and relatives.
MILITARY-BACKED DIAMOND MINES
The Chiadzwa diamond eld, now
covering some 4,000 hectares, is alluvial,
meaning that its stones have been washed
down from a volcanic pipe upstream in
the Highlands. Such stones, close to the
surface, can be harvested without heavy
investment by small-scale diggers. The
army is moving the locals out, sealing off
the area and imposing a news blackout.
The original concessionaire, the
British-registered African Consolidated
Resources, has also been pushed out,
despite a High Court ruling in its favour.
Two obscure rms, Mbada Diamond
Mining and Canadile Minerals, each
have 1,000 ha. concessions and two more
awards are in prospect for the other half
of the eld.
These alluvial diamonds, rarely of gem
quality, are suitable only for industrial
use as drill bits, abrasives and the like, so
are not hugely valuable. The carat weight
of a gem stone is important only once its
other qualities have been assessed (pure
white colour is the yardstick) and its
suitability for being cut into a gem. There
are few skilled assessors in Zimbabwe, so
high prices have been paid for large low-
quality stones and low prices for good
smaller ones, to the joy and dismay of
various parties.
Regulating the supply and thus the
price of gems by stockpiling and timely
release is the speciality of the Central
Selling Organisation, controlled by
De Beers, although it is not quite as
omnipotent as a few decades back. The
illicit diamond trade has traditionally
been dominated by Lebanese business
people with strong links to West Africa
and the trade is accused of helping to fund
terrorism, insurrection and human rights
abuses. In 2009, the main producers
and countries agreed on the Kimberley
Process, which aims to identify the
origins of diamonds. So it was delusional
for government ofcials to believe they
could publicly auction off 300,000 carats
of uncut uncertied diamonds.
The star of the economy, however,
is platinum. International platinum
producers have always been secretive
about production but the platinum group
metals are now clearly Zimbabwes largest
single export earner, perhaps over a third
of visible exports, which goes a long way
to evening up the balance of payments.
Zimbabwes deposits could make it the
second ranking producer, after South
Africa, and the present trading price,
around $1,600 per ounce, is double that
of a year ago. Zimplats has completed its
$350 mn. Phase 1 expansion programme,
which should double its annual output to
180,000 oz.
Anglo American Platinum
Corporations Unki mine began operating
only in 2008 and aims to mill 120,000
tonnes of ore per month from early
2010; it is coy about how many ounces
this would represent but the high price
would return prots from lower-grade
ore. The more mining thrives, the more
strident will be ZANU-PFs insistence
on localisation of some ownership and
control. Platinum, unlike gold, is still
mainly an industrial metal subject to
uctuations in international business but
industrial demand is nite and restraint
will be required to prevent overproduction
from depressing prices.
An intriguing tussle is developing
between Mpofu and Energy Minister
Elias Mudzuri over future extensions
to the Hwange coalelds. Mudzuri, from
the MDC, is also subject to the internal
party probe into abuse of ofce and
is no stranger to such charges. Before
turning his back on ZANU-PF, he was a
Harare City engineer and ran a private
consultancy ofce alongside his mayoral
one in Town House.
To add further spice, the Parliamentary
Portfolio Committee for Mines is chaired
by ZANU-PFs Edward Chindori-
Chininga, who was briey Mines Minister
before running foul of more powerful
interests. Chindori-Chininga is regarded
as one of the few ZANU-PF gures who
understands how a modern economy
works. Together with his friendly links
to leading MDC gures, that makes him
doubly suspect to ZANU-PFs chiefs.
THE BID TO CLEAN UP MPLA INC.
President Jos Eduardo dos Santos says he laments the rise of grand corruption in
Angola as it undermines the social fabric. If so, some members of his government
may be in trouble. Any serious anti-corruption campaign must tackle key institutions,
including the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertao de Angola (MPLA) and foreign
corporations involved in oil, gas, diamonds and construction.
The anti-corruption campaigner Rafael Marques wants investigators to look at
the MPLAs own business interests which, his investigations show, play a growing
role in the national economy. The party controls a big investment company,
Sociedade de Gesto e Participaes Financeiras (GEFI), established in September
1992, a week before Angolas rst multiparty elections, by a string of MPLA people.
The founders are MPLA member of Parliament Francisco Magalhes Paiva Nvunda;
ex-Interior Minister Jos Mateus Adelino Peixoto on the Central Committee and
ex-Chief of Staff to Dos Santos; Antnio de Campos Van-Dnem, Dos Santoss
former legal advisor; Augusto Lopes Teixeira, former MPLA Politburo member and
Chairman of state-owned Angola Telecom; Carlos Alberto Ferreira Pinto, MPLA
MP and Politburo member; and the Fundao Sagrada Esperana (Sacred Hope
Foundation), the partys charity and social investment arm.
GEFI has stakes in 64 companies. Its involvement in hotels, industry, banking,
sheries, media, construction and property indicate that many foreigners do
business in Angola by cosying up to the MPLA and ceding its members a slice of
the action. This is despite conventions on corruption (incorporated into Angolan
law) with the United Nations, African Union and Southern African Development
Community.
In April 2009, Transport Minister Augusto Toms authorised Kenya-based airline
Fly540 to begin operating. GEFIs subsidiary Planar owns 51% of Fly540, with 49%
for Lonrho, which is listed in London and Johannesburg, and is now back operating
in 17 African countries, it says. Toms had approval from the Council of Ministers,
whose Secretary, Joaquim Antnio Carlos dos Reis Junior, owns 20% of Planar.
This pattern is familiar in the economys most lucrative non-oil sectors.
In March 2006, GEFIs alliances included partnerships with the state oil and
diamond companies, Sonangol and Endiama; Luanda port; Grupo Ensa (insurance);
and the forthcoming Angolan stock exchange, Bolsa de Valores e Derivativos de
Angola. GEFIs accounts are neither audited or published. Some MPLA politicians
point out that another party holding company, Maboque, presents annual accounts.
Maboque is well known for its annual journalism prize worth $100,000, which in
2009 went to Joo Melo, Editor of the magazine frica 21. He is, not surprisingly, an
MPLA MP.
ANGOLA
Dos Santos prepares for
power, again
After three decades in power, the President chooses his next team
I
ntending to run for another term in ofce
in 2012, President Jos Eduardo dos
Santos has moved close allies into key
ministries. He faces a vote not by electors
but by Parliament, where his Movimento
Popular de Libertao de Angola (MPLA)
controls 87% of seats.
Dos Santos has promised to get
tough on corruption (see Box) and has
commissioned the consultancy rm
Ernst & Young to report on how public
nances are run. The newly-created role
of vice-president went neither to Engineer
Manuel Vicente, boss of state oil company
Sonangol, nor to General Manuel Hlder
Vieira Dias Junior Kopelipa: both were
ineligible since the vice-president must
be a member of the National Assembly.
Instead, the job was awarded to Fernando
da Piedade Dias dos Santos (Nando), a
loyal apparatchik who will have almost no
independent power and is not a credible
replacement for the President, who has a
history of prostate problems (AC passim).
Military chief Kopelipas promotion as
one of three ministers of state makes him
the governments nominal number four
behind Dos Santos, Nando and Civil Chief
of Staff Carlos Maria da Siva Feij. Fifth
in line is another Minister of State, the
Economic Coordination Minister Manuel
Nunes Jr., who has steadily usurped the
Finance Ministrys remit to manage the
economy, as it did under former Finance
Minister Jos Pedro de Morais; the
Ministry now mainly looks after the
governments accounts.
Kopelipa, who joins the Council of
Ministers, also heads the military oversight
body, the Casa Militar, with a security
apparatus to manage a smooth re-election
for Dos Santos. He also remains in charge
of the Gabinete de Reconstruo Nacional
and the Chinese infrastructure money
though we hear that will soon be taken
over by his close ally, Jos dos Santos da
Silva Ferreira, the Minister of Urbanism
and Construction.
BEIJING BOOSTERS
Both China and Angola hope to boost
trade above last years US$17 billion (down
from $25.3 bn. in 2008, when oil was at its
peak). Last April, the China Development
Bank announced a $1.2 bn. loan over
four years for agriculture and this month
Xu Yan, Director General of the Sitaibo
International Group, said he was looking
at agroindustrial projects in Kwanza
Sul Province. Chinas state oil company
Sinopec hopes for juicy concessions in
next years licensing round.
So far, Angola has little to show
for Chinas billions. Bar a new hospital
in Luanda and some repaved roads,
none of the Presidents mega-projects is
complete and the Benguela railway has
yet again been delayed until next year.
Some contractors linked to Kopelipa
are suspected of corruption, for which
the long-time Minister of Public Works,
Brigadier Gen. Francisco Higino Lopes
Carneiro, has been shown the exit,
along with Antnio Burity (Education),
Salomo Jos Luheto Xirimbibi
(Fisheries), Virgilio Fontes Pereira
(Territorial Administration) and Manuel
Rabelais (Social Communication).
Finance Minister Eduardo Leopoldo
Severim de Morais (who succeeded Jos
de Morais in 2008) was also shown out
after being implicated in a $137 million
embezzlement scandal at the central
bank, the Banco Nacional de Angola, that
led to the arrest of 18 minor ofcials this
month. Investigators say that ministers
could be implicated but it is unlikely that
tough action will be taken. Tipped to lead
the new Capital Market Commission,
his departure could delay Angolas rst
sovereign bond issue.
Also threatened is Aguinaldo Jaime,
head of the Agncia Nacional para o
Investimento Privado and former Deputy
Finance Minister. He and his old boss,
Jos de Morais, were the respectable
public faces (especially in the West) of
Angolas economy. On 4 February, United
States Senator Carl Levin, Chairman
of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, named Jaime in a probe of
illicit transfers in the US using an Angolan
bank.
NIGERIA
The elite scrambles for
cover
Desperate to stop the crisis over President YarAduas illness from
spinning out of control, senior politicians plot compromise deals
P
oliticians in Abuja currently have
two main imperatives: to forestall
a military coup and to prevent war
restarting in the Niger Delta (AC Vol 50
No 25). They fear either development
would strain national unity to breaking
point. Then there is the matter of who
controls the more than US$80 billion a
year that Nigeria earns from oil and gas
exports.
Some back a compromise which
would allow Vice-President Goodluck
Jonathan to hold the presidency until
the 2011 elections. He would then be
pressed to appoint a vice-president from
the Muslim north, who could contest the
presidential primaries for the governing
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) later
this year. That would defer political
clashes and defuse the current crisis.
Others fear that Jonathan would be
unstoppable once he got the presidency,
especially with the backing of his native,
oil-rich Bayelsa State in the Delta. Instead,
they argue that a strong delegation of
senior PDP ofcials should propose a
lucrative package under which Jonathan
would agree to stand aside to allow a
northern candidate to replace Umaru
Musa YarAdua in the presidency.
A powerful clique in the presidency
insist that YarAdua is about to return
to Abuja and resume full control of
government. This group is led by the
redoubtable Turai YarAdua. She is the
only person with access to her husband
at Saudi Arabias King Faisal Specialist
Hospital and Research Centre.
Turai YarAdua is determined to
press on regardless. On 29 December,
David Edevbie, the Presidents Principal
Private Secretary, was dispatched to
Jeddah with the supplementary budget
for YarAdua to sign. Turai and her
allies Katsina State Governor Ibrahim
Shema, Bauchi Governor Isa Yuguda,
Presidential Economic Advisor Tanimu
Yakubu and Agriculture Minister Abba
Sayyadi Ruma hoped to assuage
Delta militants with an allocation of 114
bn. naira (US$764.14 million) for post-
amnesty development projects in the
Delta.
The charging of Nigerian Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab, 23, with
attempting to bomb a Northwestern
Airlines jet aircraft in the United States
on 25 December highlights the problems
caused by the political vacuum. Todd
Moss, Vice-President and Senior Fellow
at the Center for Global Development in
Washington DC and formerly US Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, published a column asking, Where
in the World is the Nigerian President?
on 6 January. Normally, President
Obama would be on the phone with his
counterpart, discussing what went wrong
and agreeing on ways to work better
in the future to prevent such attacks,
wrote Moss, explaining that YarAduas
absence and sickness was holding back
cooperation on counter-terrorism. Such
cooperation means sharing information
and security training but that cannot
happen amid a continuing crisis over
the presidency. Progress on the planned
bilateral commission between Nigeria
and the US has stalled. Against the
background of the Abdulmutallab case,
opportunists on all sides are stepping up
the rhetoric and narrowing the ground for
compromise.
On 28 December, a clash in Bauchi
State between police and military forces,
and the adherents of an Islamist sect, Kala
Kato (He has said), led to the death of
38 or more people. It was the third big
religious clash in 2009 (AC Vol 50 No 16).
A spokesman for a Delta militant group
claims the Islamic militants are covertly
backed by the norths Muslim elite. Kala
Kato is said to be an offshoot of the
Maitatsine sect of the 1980s.
Umar Abdulmutallabs father, Alhaji
Umaru Abdul Mutallab, exemplies
the traditional northern leader whom
Islamist militants usually deride. He
was Chairman of First Bank of Nigeria,
where he worked closely with the
current Governor of the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN), Lamido Sanusi. Mutallab,
an old business associate of Oil Minister
Rilwanu Lukman, twice served as a
minister in northern-dominated military
governments.
Even if the presidential crisis is
resolved, progress on constitutional
reform will be painfully slow. Late
last year, public hearings took place
on constitutional changes in the six
geopolitical zones, covering topics such
as federalism, resource control, electoral
reform and state creation.
Thanks to the thorough work of Justice
Mohammed Uwaiss panel, the electoral
reform bill could pass this year and some
want a fresh election to follow. The Uwais
report suggests a six-month period for
settling electoral disputes and making
the Independent National Electoral
Commission independent of the executive.
Doubts reign as to whether the 8 February
governorship elections in Anambra State
will be free and credible.
A KHAKI OPTION ON THE TABLE
Nigerias military, though much diminished, still sees itself as the last truly national
institution and the nal custodian of the state. If the current crisis unravels, senior
ofcers are likely to intervene, possibly with a nominal civilian head. Ofcers may
try to justify such action by arguing that they would prepare for elections and deal
with extremism in the Niger Delta and the north.
Security procedures at Murtala Muhammed Airport in Lagos are much
criticised, but they were approved as recently as November by the United States
Transportation Security Administration. Ofcers may use claimed breaches in
security procedures in Decembers Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab bombing case to
justify military intervention.
Once the military assumes power, it is, historically, reluctant to leave. Neither
Washington nor London seems to have worked out its response to a putsch; in
reality, they would work with almost any credible regime, military or civilian, able
to impose order in the oil elds. One military plan mooted is that a group of senior
ofcers seize power in coordination with civilians to forestall a more radical coup
by junior ofcers.
Some senior ofcers are equally frustrated with the stasis in Abuja and worry
that it might trigger a wider security crisis. Particularly critical of the political failures
are a clique of ofcers from Kano including the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant
General Abdulrahman Bello Dambazau; the National Security Advisor, Major Gen.
Abdullahi Sarki Mukhtar, and the Commander of the Third Armoured Division, Maj.
Gen. Saleh Maina. However, many would oppose such a coup, which would be seen
as the northern-dominated military blocking the presidency of the Niger Deltas
Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan. Two months ago, Ijaw militant spokeswoman
Cynthia Whyte dismissed Jonathan as a stooge; now she threatens his critics with
violence.
EGYPT
Generational change
After three decades, President Mubarak is determined to keep a grip on
power for as long as it takes to prepare his son Gamal to succeed him
T
he suggestions that the internationally
respected diplomat Mohamed
Mostafa el Baradei is an enemy of the
Egyptian state show the desperation of the
power clique around the fading, 81-year-
old President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak,
even if the prospects for his early exit are,
barring health crises, slim. Egyptians were
shocked by the vehemence with which
the ofcial press attacked the former
Director General of the United Nations
International Atomic Energy Agency. El
Baradei had been a national hero and won
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005 for standing
up to United States President George W.
Bushs government over claims that the
late President Saddam Husseins Iraq
was developing nuclear weapons.
When the 67-year-old Cairene
suggested in November that he was
contemplating a run for the presidency,
he received the backing of the old Al Wafd
party and other mainstream opposition
parties. This prompted thunderous state
propaganda suggesting that El Baradei
was a traitor acting for foreign interests.
Egypts second contested presidential
election is due in 2011. The ruling group
will block any interloper, as well as
established opponents led by Al Ikhwan
el Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood, MB),
from launching an effective campaign.
After four decades of autocratic rule, the
Mubarak presidencys primary aim is for
the ruling family and the clique around
it to continue to dominate. This group
has a candidate to replace the President,
his son Gamal el Deen Mohamed
Hosni Sayed Mubarak, and a political/
security machine to crush opposition.
Liberal opposition leaders such as the
Al Ghad partys Ayman Nour have been
marginalised, if not crushed. President
Mubarak may countenance generational
but certainly not regime change.
An Egyptian security offensive drove
Al Gamaa el Islamiya and the most
violent Islamists from their strongholds a
decade ago. That forced Egyptian Islamic
Jihad leader Ayman al Zawahiri into
Afghanistan and an alliance with Usama
bin Laden that saw Al Qaida emerge in
1998. Al Ikhwan, which dates back to
the original Brotherhood of the 1920s, is
divided over strategy and personalities,
partly along generational lines. MB leader
Mohamed Mahdi Akef is due to step
down this month. Ideological differences
are also emerging: in December, the MB
held their rst internal elections in 14
years for the 16-strong governing body, the
Guidance Bureau. Old-guard candidates
took most seats; younger modernisers,
such as deputy leader Mohamed Habib
and Abdelmoneim Abul Futuh, failed to
get elected. Abul Futuh complained that
the MB has grown more conservative
in thought following years of state
oppression. A split is possible, further
weakening the Ikhwan as Islamists decide
their tactics for the 2010 legislative and
2011 presidential elections. In 2005, after a
deal brokered with the authorities, Ikhwan
candidates standing as independents took
20% of parliamentary seats.
El Baradei has called for constitutional
reform and more open politics, as has the
inuential journalist Mohamed Hassanein
Heikal. A presidential candidate needs
the backing of 250 elected representatives
across both houses of parliament and local
councils. The ruling National Democratic
Party dominates all these institutions and
is now Gamal Mubaraks ef.
Social protest is growing, fuelled
by the poverty which aficts millions of
Egyptians despite a decade of economic
growth. The security services have kept
grassroots organisations fragmented.
Mubarak spends much of his time in a
heavily fortied redoubt in Sinai at Sharm
el Sheikh. The system requires the Ras
(leader) to be closely involved in much
decision-taking and the signing of reams
of documents, but Mubarak has still cut
back his workload. His conservatism and
slow decision-making holds back the
country, even if Prime Minister (since
2004) Ahmed Nazif and key aides such as
Finance Minister Youssef Boutros Ghali
and Investment Minister Mahmoud
Mohieldin, have pushed through some
substantive economic reforms.
Presidential son Alaa el Din Mohamed
Hosni Sayed Mubarak led Egypts abuse
of Algeria during the November-December
World Cup soccer war, which pitted
him against Algerias Sad Bouteika
(President Abdelaziz Bouteikas brother
and preferred successor). Sad led Algerias
delegation to the play-off in Sudan after
fall outs between Egyptian companies
and the Bouteikas. He clashed with Alaa
over arrangements for commissions in
negotiations over a US military aircraft
sale to Algeria (AC Vol 50 No 24).
The choice of Cairo for US
President Barack Hussein Obamas
groundbreaking speech to the Arab-
Islamic world highlighted Mubaraks role
as Washingtons point-man in the region,
senior ofcials told Africa Condential.
The inclusion of Egypt, along with Saudi
Arabia, in US planning on the Middle
Easts latest crisis spot, Yemen, is another
sign the old alliance will not go away.
SUCCESSION IS A FAMILY BUSINESS
First Lady Suzanne Mubarak (ne Thabet, born in El Minya to an Egyptian doctor
and his Welsh wife) is building national alliances and an international prole for
herself, as well as promoting her second son, Gamal, to replace her husband. Gamal
Mubarak has built a power base in the National Democratic Party and developed
ties with the technocrats he met when he held executive positions in the Bank of
America, rst in Cairo and then in London in 1988-94.
His biggest problem has been his lack of a popular base. He needs time to build
that but while he is trying to do so, his increasingly unpopular father is determined
to stay in power. Even ex-ministers say the Muslim Brotherhood would easily win
free elections. Yet the succession is going Gamals way: he has supporters in the
military establishment and all the attributes of the modern Arab leader: powerful
family backing, a knowledge of global markets and a sassy, young wife, American
University in Cairo business graduate Khadija el Gamal, 27, daughter of the
construction magnate Mahmoud el Gamal.
A Gamal presidency may be sold abroad as progress towards reform: it would
end the line of military leaders who have dominated Egypt since 1952. Senior ofcers
have not yet found an alternative candidate to succeed Mubarak, a former Air Force
commander. The Defence Minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi,
has seniority but is too old even in a gerontocracy. Egyptian General Intelligence
Director Omar Suleiman, 73, brokers Israel-Palestine deals (AC Vol 50 No 8) but is
more diplomatic deal maker than politician. He also oversees Sudan policy.
Gamal can present himself as the candidate for change in a system that moves
painfully slowly unless violence intervenes. Other establishment candidates, such
as League of Arab States Secretary General Amr Moussa, represent the status quo.
In 2011, the odds are still in favour of Hosni Mubarak succeeding himself, even as he
paves the way for the next generation of Mubaraks.
NIGERIA
Rogues and rackets on trial
A corruption case in Geneva snares some of Nigerias political elite, and
judges order the return of stolen state assets
THE ABACHA FAMILYS PLUNDER MACHINE
David
Umaru
Financial and legal advisors Family network Ministers and security officers
General Sani Abacha
Military leader (1993-98), during which time he is reckoned to have stolen over US$3 billion of Nigerias
public assets, of which at least $1 bn. and 900 million Deutsche Marks were deposited in Swiss banks.
Gabriel
Katri
Gilbert
Chagoury
Ismaila
Gwarzo
Abubakar
Atiku Bagudu
Danilo
Djurovic
Ahmadu
Daura
Anthony
Ani
Dan
Etete
Abba
Abacha
Mohammed
Abacha
Mark
Rissar
Jean-Pierre
Decker
Richard
Granier-Deferre
Maryam
Abacha
Gabriel Katri
Veteran financial advisor to several heads of state in the Middle East and Africa
(including Kenyas President Daniel arap Moi and Nigerias Gen. Ibrahim
Babangida), Katri was convicted on 19 November for abetting Abba Abachas
criminal enterprise, fined $10 mn. and given a non-custodial sentence.
Gilbert Chagoury
Convicted in Geneva in 2002 of money laundering and aiding a criminal
organisation, Chagoury set up accounts with SG Ruegg Bank in Geneva for the
Abacha family enabling them to benefit from illegal transfers of over $120 mn.
from the Central Bank of Nigeria. Chagoury has returned $66 mn. stolen from
Nigeria and secured immunity from prosecution.
David Umaru
A legal advisor to the Abacha family, Umaru facilitated the payment of illegal
commissions to the family in return for securing repayment of debts of some
$470 mn. owed by the Nigerian government to Dumez Nigeria PLC, a company
controlled by Andr Kamel.
Abubakar Atiku Bagudu
A business associate of Abba and Mohammed Abacha, Bagudu set up Morgan
Procurement Corporation and Mecosta Securities, both of which were involved
in the illegal transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars from the Nigerian state
to the Abacha family. Bagudu is a prospective governorship candidate for Kebbi
State.
Danilo Djurovic
A representative for Ciba-Geigy Corporation in Nigeria and a business associate
of Gilbert Chagoury, Djurovic facilitated illegal transfers from the Nigerian state
to Abba and Mohammed Abacha. Djurovic was found guilty of money laundering
in December 2000 by order of a Geneva court.
Ahmadu Daura
Manager of the Sunshine Bureau de Change in Lagos, Daura facilitated the illegal
transfer of over $150 mn. to accounts controlled by Abba and Mohammed Abacha
with Warburg & Cie Bank in Luxembourg.
Mark Rissar
Recommended to Gen. Abacha by Ismaila Gwarzo as an experienced financial
consultant, Rissar set up several accounts held by intermediary offshore companies
with SG Ruegg Bank SA in Geneva which facilitated the illegal transfer of some
$50 mn. to Abba and Mohammed Abacha and their business associates.
Colonel
Mohammed
Buba Marwa
Paul
Ogwuma
Anthony Ani FINANCE MINISTER
Ani ordered the Central Bank of Nigeria
to pay 486.5 mn. Deutsche Marks into a
Goldman Sachs account in Zurich
controlled by Mecosta Securities in a
fraudulent debt-swap deal linked to a steel
production plant.
Ismaila Gwarzo NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR
Having presided over the torture and
murder of Gen. Abachas political
opponents, Gwarzo organised the theft
of $1.1 bn. from the Central Bank of Nigeria
in coordination with the Abacha family.
Dan Etete OIL MINISTER
The subject of an international arrest
warrant issued by France for money
laundering, Etete presided over
negotiations for the $6 bn. gas export
plant at Bonny Island which is under
investigation by the US, French, British
and Nigerian authorities.
Colonel Mohammed Buba Marwa
MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR OF LAGOS
STATE
Marwa was paid $4.1 mn. in illegal
commissions in a transport procurement
deal mediated by Gabriel Katri and Raj
Arjandas Bhojwani.
Paul Ogwuma GOVERNOR OF THE
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA
Former Managing Director of Union Bank,
Ogwuma was instructed by Gen. Abacha
and Ismaila Gwarzo to make a succession
of illegal transfers of funds from the
Central Bank of Nigeria to accounts which
they controlled.
Mohammed Abacha
Eldest surviving son of Gen. Abacha and
prospective governorship candidate for Kano
State. Charged with the murder of Kudirat
Abiola, Mohammed Abacha was acquitted in
2002 after he agreed that the Abacha family
would return all stolen state funds to Nigeria.
Abba Abacha
Second eldest son of Gen. Abacha, Abba
Abacha was convicted on 19 November 2009
for membership of a criminal organisation and
given a suspended sentence of two years
imprisonment. After seizing $350mn. of Abba
Abachas assets, Switzerland has ordered their
return to Nigeria.
Maryam Abacha
Wife of Gen. Abacha, Head of National
Commission of Women and director of national
vaccination campaign through which she and
Abubakar Bagudu fraudulently appropriated
$63 mn from a procurement contract with
Pasteur Mrieux.
Jean-Pierre Decker
Regional Operations Manager for Addax &
Oryx Advisory Services in Nigeria. Decker
agreed to transfer illegal commissions on
Nigerian oil contracts of over $76 mn. to
accounts linked to Abba and Mohammed
Abacha.
Richard Granier-Deferre
A founding director and third in command at
Addax and Oryx Advisory Services, Deferre
facilitated the illegal transfer of funds from the
Central Bank of Nigeria to accounts at Crdit
Agricole Indosuez linked to Abba and
Mohammed Abacha.
Sources: The Canton of Geneva;
independent research
africa-confidential.com 2009
T
he conviction in a Swiss Court on
19 November of Abba Abacha, son
of former military leader General
Sani Abacha, for participating in a
criminal organisation together with the
conscation of US$350 million in assets
stolen from Nigeria provide important
clues to the corruption linked to the
$6 billion Bonny Island gas scheme,
according to legal experts in Geneva.
Swiss investigators showed how
Abacha family members and their
advisors set up front companies and
channelled hundreds of millions of
dollars in stolen state funds through
established Western banks including
Credit Suisse, Merrill Lynch and
Goldman Sachs, with few questions
asked. Gen. Abachas Lebanese
nancial advisor Gilbert Chagoury and
the Swiss-Israeli banker Gabriel Katri
used their sway with international
institutions to open accounts for the
Abacha brothers using false names.
Detectives say several corporate
entities used by the Abacha family to
plunder state assets from 1993-1998
also featured in the bribery scheme
run by the United States Halliburton
to distribute millions of dollars to
individuals and companies working on
the Bonny gas project. In January 2009,
Halliburton paid $560 mn. in nes to
the US Justice Department and the US
Securities and Exchange Commission as
part of a plea bargain over its Nigerian
operations.
The Justice Department
investigation continues with a focus
on companies and individuals such
as British lawyer Jeffrey Tesler and
Halliburton ofcial Wojciech Chodan
involved in the bribe scheme. The US
is trying to extradite both men to help
the probe (AC Vol 50 No 5). British,
French, Italian and Nigerian teams are
all investigating the deals. US lawyer
Jack Blum, who represents the Nigerian
government in its efforts to obtain legal
assistance from the US government,
doubts the criminal case in Nigeria will
be launched before 2012.
Investigators from Britains Serious
Fraud Ofce working on the Bonny
Island case have requested copies of
the Abba Abacha prosecution notes
and details of the Abacha familys
nancial networks (see diagram). The
money trail should lead to even bigger
sums of stolen assets, especially those
diverted from Bonny Island through
in Monaco, for assisting Abachas
criminal endeavours. Katri, who advised
Kenyas President Daniel arap Moi,
Nigerias Gen. Ibrahim Babangida and
several Middle Eastern leaders on their
nances, has not informed the court
whether he intends to appeal. Katri,
who had been working as an external
manager for Union Bancaire Prive,
opened an account in the name of the
Nigerian company Allied Network
Ltd., whose beneciaries were falsely
declared as Mohammed Sani and
Abba Sani, when they were in fact
Mohammed and Abba Abacha.
over-priced procurement contracts and
massive under-invoicing on gas exports,
a Geneva-based legal expert told Africa
Condential.
More than $1.5 bn. is likely to have
been illegally diverted from the gas
project by company ofcials and senior
representatives of successive regimes
in Nigeria, the expert added. The real
black box would contain much bigger
contract commissions and extremely
high intermediation fees on the gas
export contracts.
On 19 November, the Geneva court
also convicted Katri, currently domiciled
F
or his Council of Economic Advisors,
President John Atta Mills has
picked a team with wide experience
of Western nancial and academic
institutions. They are academics, more
used to public service than to business,
and more centre-left than the strident
pro-market enthusiasts who worked
for ex-President John Kufuor but
companies have long complained that
successive governments will not listen
to them.
One of the ten members is the
Presidents brother, Cadman Atta Mills,
formerly a Director of the World Banks
Legal Department; another, Professor K.
N. Afful, is a brother-in-law. Emmanuel
Ablorh and Joel Hyde were classmates
of Mills at Achimota College. Kingsley
Y. Amoako was formerly Executive
Secretary of the Economic Commission
for Africa and now runs the United
Nations African Centre for Economic
Transformation in Accra; he and the
President were graduate students
together in California. Amoako and the
Councils chairman, Gobind Nankani,
both worked for the World Bank. After
serving in Latin America and Asia,
Nankani was appointed the Banks Vice-
President for Africa and left during Paul
Wolfowitzs brief and unhappy reign as
its President (2005-07); he also runs
the new London School of Economics-
Oxford International Growth Centre in
Britain.
The advisors role is strategic, to
review policy and major projects,
to suggest new initiatives and to
help to coordinate the governments
development strategy. In particular,
they will help to shape the countrys oil
and gas development as local production
starts next year. Complex questions
include deciding which are the best
companies to work with one current
investor, Kosmos of the United States,
is trying to sell its stake. How should a
domestic gas business be nanced and
built? How much crude oil should be
rened in Ghana for local and regional
use? Most importantly, how can Ghana
avoid following African oil producers
such as Angola and Nigeria, where the
industry has dominated the economy
to the detriment of wider development
and sparked conict?
The former Chief Executive of the
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation,
Tsatsu Tsikata, still has inuence
on energy policy, particularly on the
development of a gas network. He was
pardoned by the Kufuor government,
after being gaoled in a controversial
case for causing nancial loss to the
state (AC Vol 49 No 16). He remains
determined to clear his name by
overturning his 2008 conviction. His
cousin, the long-term National Security
Advisor Captain Kojo Tsikata, was
once feared as an inuence on the then
President, Jerry John Rawlings, and
still plays a discreet advisory role in
government.
The global downturn has worsened
Ghanas ballooning trade and budget
decits, so the advisors will be kept
busy. There will be tough questions
about how closely the government
should follow the policy prescriptions
of the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund, for which several of the
advisors have worked and which have
just agreed to lend the country more
than US$1.5 billion to ease the effects
of the downturn.
The role of the Bank of Ghana will
be crucial, and on 1 October, former
Deputy Finance Minister Kwesi Bekoe
Amissah-Arthur, 58, will become
its new Governor. He has lectured in
universities in Ghana and Nigeria,
and was a protg of Kwesi Botchwey
who, as Finance Minister, pioneered
the countrys economic reforms and
Structural Adjustment Programmes
in 1982-1996. Amissah-Arthurs
predecessor as Governor was Paul
Amoako Acquah, who was himself
preceded by the current Finance and
Economic Planning Minister, Kwabena
Duffuor. Under Acquah, the number
of banks increased to 26, six of them
Nigerian, following the arrival of Access
Bank in August 2006. Competition is
stiff and capital requirements have been
revised; electronic banking services and
cheque clearing are bringing the banks
many new customers.
Amissah-Arthur, a technocrat and
a successful business consultant, helps
to balance Millss team. It remains
to be seen whether he will jettison
Acquahs ination-targeting strategy.
Government spending spiralled out of
control in the run-up to the last elections
and the outgoing New Patriotic Party
left a scal decit of $941 million,
about 15% of gross domestic product.
The Mills government has promised
to bring this down to 9.4% in 2009
through increased revenue collection,
stricter auditing and tighter controls
on government spending policies that
carry a high political risk and, in the
words of one World Bank ofcial, are
extremely ambitious.
GHANA
A new economic team
emerges
Facing a downturn and needing an oil strategy, President Mills picks his
own experts
ZIMBABWE
Faint heart never beat stout
lady in the ruling party
Joice Mujurus victory in ZANU-PFs leadership election could encourage
more pragmatism as pressure mounts for Mugabes exit
E
mmerson Mnangagwa is nicknamed
the Crocodile partly for his ability to
snap after long periods of log-like but
watchful inertia. In Novembers election
for the Praesidium of the Zimbabwe
African National Union-Patriotic Front
(ZANU-PF), the croc seemed to have
mislaid his dentures and the followers of
Joice Mujuru skipped off with the prizes.
Mnangagwa has long been regarded as
the leading contender for the succession
but whenever his ambitions became too
blatant, President Robert Mugabe rmly
knocked him back and neutralised his
supporters. Notable cases occurred after
the ill-fated Tsholotsho Declaration in
2004, which led to the eclipse of Professor
Jonathan Moyo (recently reinstated),
and the rumoured manhandling of
Mnangagwa himself last year by the
Central Intelligence Organisation. His
caution was portrayed as strength but
the Praesidium elections, which required
decisive nimbleness, have unmasked it as
a at-footed aw.
The Mnangagwa slate for the four-
member Praesidium was Mugabe for First
Secretary (President, at national level),
Oppah Muchinguri and John Nkomo
for Second Secretaries (national Vice-
Presidents) and Kembo Mohadi for party
Chairman. The rationale was that Nkomo
and Mohadi, from the Matebeleland
provinces, would satisfy the spirit of the
1987 Unity Accord between ZANU-PF
and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
(ZAPU), while Muchinguri would bring
Manicaland on board. Together with the
Karanga provinces of Masvingo and the
Midlands Mnangagwas home base a
majority of the provinces would be lined
up, with Harare and Mashonaland West
as extra outside chances.
Victory by that list would have signalled
the waning of Mujuru and Mnangagwas
grip on the party machine. Yet on the
day, Masvingo was the only province to
vote the full slate. Midlands delayed for a
week, citing irregularities which many felt
were spurious and intended to buy time to
see which way the wind blew; when they
saw which way, they threw in the towel
and hopped on the bandwagon.
Mnangagwa had not reckoned on
Didymus Mutasas pretensions to the
Praesidium. There was nothing to offer
him, so when the Mujurus (Joice and
husband Solomon) Mashonaland Central
nominated him for the chair, Manicaland
slipped effortlessly over, giving its vice-
presidential nomination to Joice Mujuru
and the chair to Mutasa. Mohadi was
ignored by the three Matebeleland
provinces, two of which plumped for Simon
Khaya Moyo. For the past four years, he
has been an extremely skilful Ambassador
to South Africa but is relatively junior
and young. Matebeleland North made a
curious joint nomination of Khaya Moyo
and Mines Minister Obert Mpofu, a
bulky lightweight whom the Mujurus
had encouraged. Most of the provinces
that had delayed their nominations then
swung behind Khaya Moyo for chairman,
including Mashonaland Central, which
dropped Mutasa.
Mujuru thus ended up with nine
provincial nominations two more than
the number many had believed would
back the Mnangagwa list. As one of the
few ZANU-PF gures enthusiastically
to back 2008s Global Peace Agreement
(GPA) with the Movement for Democratic
Change and openly cooperate with the
MDC, she has probably caught the mood
of the country and even parts of ZANU-PF
itself. Attempts to smear her as a sell-out
have backred. She began the process by
cooperating with the MDC to block the
Mnangagwa nominee for the chair of the
parliamentary womens caucus (AC Vol
50 No 19); Olivia Muchena, a Mujuru
associate, won the key post (but the
ZANU-PF Youth League congress was a
stalemate). The disputed election of Amos
Midzi as Harare Provincial Chairperson
had blocked Hubert Nyanhongo,
a Mnangagwa man, and when the
Secretariat endorsed it, Midzi brought
Harare behind Mujuru. In Mashonaland
West, the Mnangagwa faction lost out in
an apparent tussle between Karanga and
Zezuru groups.
In the rst round, John Nkomo got
four clear and one joint nominations,
but in the second, the Mujurus threw
in their weight to give him a full house.
Had Dumiso Dabengwa still been in
the party, the position would have been
his. Nkomo is the great political trimmer;
whichever way the political train chugs,
he always nds a comfortable seat. When
Mugabe threw Joshua Nkomo out of
government in 1982, John Nkomo clung
to the wreckage and ministerial ofce
for another 18 months. With no agenda
or following, he is unpopular even in
Matebeleland. This was his strength:
everyone knew he would effortlessly
DIDYMUS MUTASA DITHERS
In the hierarchy of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, the
Politburo Secretary for Administration ranks fth, running the Secretariat that
sets agendas for the political calendar and supervises elections for party ofces.
Given the leaderships penchant for wriggling away from outcomes it dislikes,
these are no mean powers. The incumbent is Didymus Mutasa, who got there on
seniority, not political acumen or administrative skills.
The ve-yearly ZANU-PF congress was due to run from 8 December. It has
been postponed for a week, ostensibly because the venue had already been
booked by the Civil Aviation Authority of Zimbabwe; most commentators
believe ZANU-PF is having trouble raising funds for the jamboree. Finding the
breadbaskets, beds and transport for the hoped-for 10,000 delegates may prove
beyond the powers of even Robert Mugabe. A face-saver must be found.
The election of ZANU-PFs four-member Praesidium was uneasy and the
new team must work out how to present itself to congress delegates. For this,
Mutasa must accept some responsibility. His directives to the Matebeleland
provinces created confusion. First, the 1987 Unity Accord specied that the three
provinces were to agree candidates from the original Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe
African Peoples Union. Yet when it was pointed out that PF-ZAPU was not a
regional party, Joice and Solomon Mujuru mischievously persuaded retired
General Ambrose Mutinhiri, a member of parliament from Mashonaland East,
to toss his hat in the ring. Then the Central Committee and Politburo members
from the three provinces were meant to agree, which they did not. No fewer than
ve names were proposed for two vacancies, with Matebeleland North putting
forward two names for each. The elections had been scheduled for a specic
day but some provinces were allowed to wait until they saw how other provinces
had voted. In the end, the relative outsider Simon Khaya Moyo won the party
chairmanship.
Manicaland is calling foul and demanding a rerun of the election; Mutasa
placed the issue on the Politburo agenda for 3 December.
A
rms traders are getting around
Europes sanctions on Guinea and
playing games with the embargo
on Cte dIvoire. On 27 October, just a
month after Guinean soldiers massacred
160 demonstrators in Conakry (AC Vol 50
No 22), the European Unions ministers
of foreign affairs imposed an embargo on
sales of weapons to Guinea, and froze the
assets and blocked the visas of members
of its ruling Conseil National pour la
Dmocratie et le Dveloppement (CNDD).
However, Guineas leaders were
expecting it. We hear that the Vice-
President and Minister of Defence,
General Skouba Konat (The Tiger)
travelled to the Ukrainian capital, Kiev,
on 11 October with Guineas Consul in
Casablanca, Morocco, Roda Fawaz, a
Lebanese businessman. They negotiated
the delivery of light weapons worth US$45
million, which were ofoaded some days
later in Conkary port.
Meanwhile two newspapers, Ouest-
France and De Beeld of South Africa, saw
e-mails reporting the arrival in Conakry
in the second half of October of three
former ofcers of the South African Police,
Christo Delport, Eloff Meyer and Rudolf
Muller. They are said to be employed
by Omega Strategic Services, of Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, run by another
former South African policeman, Daniel
Oosthuizen.
Their job is to train Guinean soldiers
and militia, and to organise personal
security for senior ofcials; they are
said to have received the weapons from
Ukraine. Ouest-France claims that more
mercenaries have arrived in Conakry,
organised by another Dubai rm, Global
Maritime Security Solutions, whose boss is
Derek Coetzee. It specialises in protecting
hot spots along Africas coasts, including
in Nigeria. Around 50 foreign specialists
are said to have arrived in Guinea.
In Cte dIvoire, the presidential
election, set for late November, seems
likely to be postponed and a group of
United Nations experts told the UN
Security Council on 7 October that the
rival camps were rearming. The experts do
not think the governments Forces Armes
Nationales de Cte dIvoire need to break
the arms embargo, because they already
have far more materiel than the opposition
Forces Nouvelles (FN). Then the opposition
Parti Dmocratique de Cte dIvoire, led by
former President Henri Konan Bdi,
announced in July that it was forming a
new militia. The government is buying
anti-riot gear. Before the UN report, it
had ordered pistols and tear-gas grenades
worth $1.7 mn., assuring the UN that they
were not military supplies. The UN experts
fear that police with new weapons might
transfer their old ones to the FANCI.
The UN experts also believe the
purchase by the Ivorian Defence Ministry of
Japanese lorries and pick-up trucks could
be a breach of the embargo, perhaps for
President Laurent Gbagbos Republican
Guard. Of the newly imported vehicles,
24 were bought through the Comit de
Gestion de la Filire Caf-Cacao, the state-
controlled coffee and cocoa agency, which
had previously been suspected of buying
arms and military equipment.
The experts also found that Ivorian
ofcers go regularly for training in
Morocco, where the authorities admit they
trained 39 in the use of communications
equipment, weapons and armoured
vehicles. The experts call this a agrant
violation of the sanctions regime. In
the rebel-dominated north, the experts
found that civilians held large numbers
of twelve-bore shotgun cartridges made
in Mali, exported to Burkina Faso and
resold to Ivorians, which again breaches
the embargo.
The FN are thought to have a route
around the sanctions. Serial numbers have
been systematically led off thousands
of Kalashnikov assault ries found in
FN armouries at Odienn and Korhogo.
Cattle trucks are said to come loaded
with ries and ammunition from Burkina,
packed in rice sacks. The weapons that
can be identied (7.62 x 39 millimetre
calibre) came from Russia and elsewhere
via Sudan (see Feature). The FN have
Motorola personal radios made by Huaana
Guang Tong Electronic Limited of Beijing,
and Toyota pick-ups. The report says the
FN gets its weapons through Burkina but
could not prove that the Ouagadougou
authorities were involved.
Libya, which has sold weapons to
several African countries, has imported
large quantities from Belgium in recent
years.
AFRICA/ARMS TRADE
The smugglers make their
fortunes
The more embargoes and sanctions, the higher the rate of return for
international arms dealers
attach himself to the dominant faction,
so he was everyones choice for the time
being.
Two ghosts from the past have haunted
Mnangagwa. In the mid-1980s, he was
the security supremo during the brutal
suppression of ZAPU and is unforgiven in
Matebeleland (AC Vol 50 No 22). Yet he
felt it necessary to honour the spirit of the
1987 Unity Accord, which ensures that
one second secretary and the chairperson
should be from Matebeleland. He could
have written the province off but he did
not have the nerve. In the process, he has
irritated his closest allies in Masvingo, the
only province that stuck to the script.
It is too soon to write off Mnangagwa
entirely, given his close links with the
securocrats. However, an extra faction is
coalescing around Security Minister (and
GPA negotiator) Nicholas Goche and
Youth Minister Saviour Kasukuwere,
and this time, it operates in loose alliance
with the Mujurus.
The new Praesidium represents a
generational shift. Both Joice Mujuru
(54) and Khaya Moyo (64) are decades
younger than Mugabe. Mujuru is a
populist who now looks like a canny
tactician. Much of the legwork has been
undertaken by her husband Solomon, a
former head of the armed forces. Neither
is shy of rubbing shoulders with Morgan
Tsvangirai and the MDC or of being seen
as enthusiasts for power-sharing. Yet
nothing can be taken for granted. At the
cabinet meeting on 24 November, Mujuru
insured herself against another harvest
failure and launched an emotional attack
on Finance Minister Tendai Biti for not
using International Monetary Fund money
to purchase and distribute agricultural
inputs. The cabinet and Mugabe himself
were taken aback by her ferocity and
Mugabe called a second subcommittee
meeting, only to nd Mujuru and Biti still
on friendly terms.
Khaya Moyo is a backroom operator
who rst emerged as Joshua Nkomos
Political Secretary. As current Ambassador
to South Africa, he has played a bad
hand extremely well, enabling Mugabe
to withstand the mounting pressure
from the Southern African Development
Community countries. His success was
professional and does not mean he is
emotionally opposed to power sharing.
The Mujurus have now set their
sights on cutting down to size the war-
veteran showmen Jabulani Sibanda
and Joseph Chinotimba before the
ZANU-PF congress, postponed till 16
December. The next clues will be who
Mugabe nominates to the Politburo. He is
inevitably slowing down and the Mujurus
are unprecedentedly forcing the pace. The
softly menacing balance and manipulation
which Mugabe has favoured over the years
is increasingly a thing of the past.
CONGO-KINSHASA
Mines, dollars and dams
A decade after the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko, the Kinshasa government is
still plagued by grand corruption and its reform efforts look hollow
Lon Kengo wa Dondo, said it did exist
and a week later, Mende said it was just
a cogitation of experts. None of this has
prompted criticism from the European
Union which, with the United States,
provided much of the $500 mn. to pay for
the national elections in 2006. I am not
about to pay for a dictatorship here, said
Louis Michel, the Belgian minister who
was then European Union Development
Commissioner, before the elections; now
he believes in quiet diplomacy.
At the end of June, Kabila declared
that he intended to remodel the justice
system. Soon after, 90 judges were told
to retire or be red. Next in line was the
Ministry of Property Affairs; more than
80% of legal cases in Congo are about
property rights and a piece of land may
have several registered owners. Yet so far,
reform has touched only the lowest rungs
of the ladder. The much-criticised Finance
Minister Athanase Matenda and advisor
Katumba Mwanke hold on to their jobs
despite repeated accusations by parliament
and civil society. Katumba Mwanke faces
criminal charges in South Africa.
The apparent perpetuation of
the Mobutu-style system of political
patronage, pillage of state assets and
impoverishment of the citizenry provides
the backdrop to a new study by academics
in three continents, who argue that the
Congolese state is beyond reform
(1)
. Edited
by Theodore Trefon, the American who
directs the Belgian Reference Centre for
Expertise for Central Africa in Tervuren,
Belgium, the study concludes that foreign-
backed reforms have not produced any
sustained improvement rather tens of
billions of dollars have left the country
through capital ight and fraudulent
sales of state assets. Foreign lending
amounting to more than $15 bn. in
political loans for the pro-West Mobutu
regime further impoverished Congo.
The United Nations peacekeeping
force, the Mission des Nations Unies en
Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo, costs
over $1 bn. a year, yet ordinary people
do not live in safety, especially in the
east where there is ghting against the
Lords Resistance Army from Uganda and
the Forces Dmocratiques de Libration
du Rwanda (AC Vol 50 No 15). Unrest
persists in Goma and Lubero, involving
soldiers of the national army. Hundreds
of thousands of people have been chased
from their homes.
Grand macroeconomic reforms meant
to reduce poverty have done nothing for
Congolese, says Trefon. The UN Food
and Agriculture Organisation reckons
that at least 17% of the population is
malnourished, even in Kinshasa, where
there is no systematic conict. The
FAO reckons that a crisis exists when
malnutrition is at 10%. Trefon argues that
aid givers have exacerbated the calamity.
company directors were selling the states
capital equipment privately, including
machinery that Fortin needed to rebuild
Gcamines dilapidated factories.
The new man to watch at Gcamines
is Calixte Mukasa, Fortins former deputy
and now Managing Director. Mukasa
is the uncle of Augustin Katumba
Mwanke, a powerful advisor to President
Kabila who was named as corrupt by the
2002 United Nations Expert Panel on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
of Congo, after which he was briey
sidelined by Kabila. Mukasa is not thought
to be enthusiastic about reform and
accountability in the mining business.
Like previous Gcamines managing
directors such as Billy Rautenbach and
George Forrest, Fortin is likely to return
to Katanga in a private capacity, but he is
legally obliged to stay away for a year. We
hear he gets on well with former banker
Rebecca Gaskin, who now heads United
Resources and its joint venture operation
with Gcamines at Kipushi.
The troubles in Congos mining
business are matched by concerns about
political developments. It was recently
revealed that Kabila is planning to change
the constitution (adopted in December
2005) to abolish presidential term limits.
For many Congolese this suggests a return
to the pattern set by Mobutu Sese Seko.
In mid-September, Kabila set up a
commission to evaluate the constitution,
with a dozen representatives from the
Senate, House of Representatives and
Supreme Court. Under a senior lawyer,
Nhmie Mwilanya Wilondja, the
Commission held its rst meeting on 18
September and jettisoned a proposal to
create 15 extra provinces, in addition
to the present eleven. Radically, it will
consider extending the presidential
term from ve to seven years, with the
possibility of further terms.
The President would also chair the
body in charge of judicial matters, the
Conseil Suprieur de la Magistrature, thus
breaching the separation of powers. The
constitution prohibits alterations to the
presidential term and guarantees the
independence of the judiciary. Parliament
is to consider the Commissions report
next March.
On 21 September, Communications
Minister Lambert Mende Omalanga
denied that the Commission existed;
the following day, the Senate President,
S
everal inconvenient facts are
undermining President Joseph
Kabilas ambitious zero tolerance
anti-corruption campaign. Recent reports
highlight the failure of efforts to reform
Congos state and the continuing pillage
of its mining industry by local and
foreign interests. On 26 September, the
Senate published a 122-page report on
mismanagement in the mining business.
Congo made just US$92 million from this
key industry in 2008 but lost some $450
mn. through under-invoicing, tax evasion,
smuggling, fraudulent contracts and poor
accounting.
The Chairman of the Senate
Commission, David Mutamba Dibwe,
said most of the mineral exports are not
declared and the poorly equipped taxation
authorities are unable to track the trade
or the revenues. In North Kivu and South
Kivu Provinces, some 80% of exported
metals, which include Africas largest tin
shipments, are not registered. Only 1.09%
of the tax due was paid on the $74.73
mn. claimed by the tax authorities, the
Direction Gnrale des Impts. DGI ofcials
prefer to let debts accumulate, with arrears
subject to heavy penalties whose amount
they can then negotiate. Statistics bear
little relation to reality and are compiled
using only one computer, which is old and
has a very weak capacity.
Then on 30 September, the 70-year-
old Canadian mining lawyer Paul Fortin
resigned as Managing Director of the
state-owned copper mining company
Gcamines after four difcult years.
Frankly, Im tired, Fortin explained. He
had tried to resuscitate the companys
nances and administration: his declared
aim was to revive Gcamines production
of copper, cobalt, zinc and lead in tandem
with foreign partners while ensuring that
employees were paid and that its debt was
manageable. Fortins critics accuse him
of failing to tackle the rampantly corrupt
political elite which pushed through
mining deals for private benet, further
undermining Gcamines position.
Sources in Kolwezi said Fortin saw the
limits of his own efforts when he visited
Kamoto in western Katanga and discovered
the factory had been producing 50 tonnes
of copper a month without his knowledge
for a year. The ownership papers were
appropriately opaque, and the metal
was transported to Lubumbashi and sold
privately. Another report suggests that
As different agencies pursue different
agendas, he says, the international
community has no master plan. Some
want to pool their contributions, others
to supervise the spending of their funds,
allowing their Congolese partners to
drive wedges between them, a strategy
inherited from Mobutu.
One example is the 2002 forestry code
a carbon copy of an agreement developed
by Canada for Cameroon in 1994, which
did not work there. The aim was to involve
local communities in improving welfare;
the result was more rivalry between
communities. Forest concessions were to
be reallocated but the same players ended
up controlling the same resources. The
process, intended to be transparent, was
not. A review of mining contracts began
in 2007 and is still not complete (AC Vol
48 No 20). Louis Michel says it launched a
new dynamic of corruption.
Trefons team reports that corruption,
at every level, has become a way of life
and, in its way, a source of development,
since public servants must be paid for
private services. Civil servants are often
not paid their small ofcial salaries. The
public domain has been privatised into
the hands of anyone with an ofcial
stamp. The budget of $4.9 bn. is absurdly
small. Nobody knows what happens to
receipts from forestry concessions, farm
production or electricity from the Inga
Dam. Anyone with a small slice of power
is reluctant to swap it for donors peace
kits and templates, which endanger the
matabiches (tips) that ow his way.
The academics retell an old fable.
The scorpion asks the crocodile for a ride
across the river, promising not to use its
sting during the journey. Halfway across,
the scorpion strikes. As they both get ready
to drown, the crocodile asks why and the
scorpion replies: Because I am a scorpion.
Dont try to understand, we are in Congo.
The parable applies to the commercial
and state corruption of the 1990s, which
destroyed Congos economic fabric and
brought no investment.
The book says the problems are
known and the remedies acknowledged
but things get worse while aid continues.
External nance provided more than half
of the 4,182 bn. Congolese francs ($4.9
bn.) of the draft 2010 budget. Trefon calls
the reforms a masquerade. He says Congo
needs external nance only because it fails
to make proper use of its own vast riches,
including its hydroelectric potential (see
Box). Democratisation, also nanced
from outside, is another masquerade,
exemplied by Kabilas recent attempt
to hold on to power and do away with
judicial independence.
Presented on 17 September to the
Belgian Parliament in the presence of
the Foreign Minister, Yves Leterme,
the study drew a startled reaction from
Kinshasa, whose Ambassador in Brussels,
Henri Mova Sakanyi, produced a
booklet in refutation, also published by
LHarmattan
(2)
. Sakanyi said his own
gures showed improvements in security,
development and the re-establishment of
the state. He accused Trefon of claiming
that Congolese were incapable of economic
rationality and called on intellectuals
to produce a volume showing how well
things were going in their homeland.
Many mining companies share
Trefons conclusions in private but prefer
to keep quiet. There are exceptions. Israeli
magnate Dan Gertler is a vociferous
supporter of Kabilas regime and has
prospered. He reaped further dividends
when he switched from his already
lucrative diamond marketing contract for
the state-run Socit Minire de Bakwanga
in Eastern Kasai to operating Katangas
copper mines. He moved into the Central
African Mining & Exploration Company
and sold his stake for some $340 mn. when
Kazakhstans Eurasian Natural Resources
Corporation bought the company.
Other companies nd it harder to
work with the government. In August,
the government cancelled the contract of
Canadas First Quantum Minerals agship
Kingamyambo Musonoi Tailings in
Kolwezi and gave Freeport McMoRan 60
days to budge or face the same prospect.
The government wants a greater share in
and higher royalties from the ventures.
First Quantum realised the
governments seriousness when judicial
authorities ordered its Kolwezi ofce
to be shut. So it declared force majeure
and stopped building its factory. The
two parties are continuing negotiations.
The government is wary of international
arbitration, whereas First Quantum is
certain it will win. The company also
believes that the World Banks Investment
arm, the International Financial
Corporation, which has a stake in the
project, will press its case internationally.
The decision of whether the cancellation
is nal rests with Kabila, who may want
a more compliant business partner.
Some favour awarding the concession
to Shiraz Virji, the Lubumbashi-based
owner of Chemaf. Since adding mining
to his pharmacy and clinics bow, Virji has
considered oating his company to raise
funds.
(1)
Rforme au Congo (RDC): Attentes et
Dsillusions, Muse Royal de lAfrique Centrale,
Brussels et Editions LHarmattan, Paris, 2009.
(2)
Rformes au Congo (RDC): Pour un regard
alternatif, LHarmattan, Paris 2009.
DAM INTRIGUES
Congo-Kinshasas government has for ten years made no progress towards
building a new dam to replace the underused hydropower stations at Inga on the
Congo River. The existing Inga-1 and Inga-2 hydroelectric dams exploit less than
5% of the sites 40,000-megawatt potential, which could solve Southern Africas
chronic power shortages. The neighbouring countries seem at last to be taking the
matter in hand.
In 2005, Congo-Kinshasa created, in partnership with Angola, Botswana,
Namibia and South Africa, the Western Power Corridor Company (Westcor). It aimed
to build a huge new Inga-3, with an output of 4,320 MW, plus an interconnector some
2,500 kilometres long through Angola and Namibia on its way to South Africa, with
a spur to Botswana, for US$7.6 billion (not including the transmission line). Repairs
to Inga-1 and -2 have been delayed; the Socit Nationale dElectricit Congolaise
(SNEL) now claims it would be unfair to share the benet equally between the ve
participating countries.
SNEL prefers an alternative which would eliminate its contribution to the $2 bn.
cost of the interconnector. Its scheme would involve building, near the Inga site, a
$2.5 bn. aluminium smelter by the Australian mining giant BHP Billiton, which would
sell SNEL 2,000 MW and build a new deep-water port at Banana on the Atlantic for
some $400-500 mn. In early September, SNELs boss, Daniel Yengo, said he wanted
to pull out of Westcor and develop Inga-3 without the partners from the Southern
African Development Community (SADC).
At the 2-8 September SADC summit, President Joseph Kabila tried inviting the
Westcor partners and regional states to share in developing Inga. A SNEL ofcial
says Congo prefers the BHP Billiton option, not giving up on Westcor but shifting
emphasis towards the 6,000 MW Grand Inga Dam. To complicate matters, Nigerias
power authority wants a 1,000 MW line from Inga to Calabar.
Waiting until the Grand Inga Dam is built could take ages. Westcors Chief
Executive, Pat Naidoo, would like to start gradually with a 400-kilovolt line to
Luanda and the installation of two turbines, at 220 MW and 250 MW, producing a
cash ow that would help nance further development. In fact, he wants Inga-3 to
match both Westcors plans and those of BHP Billiton, with which he is ready to talk
in Johannesburg. A decision is as likely to come from there as from Kinshasa.
arbitrary rule as mildly as they can. On
21 September, Museveni arrived in New
York for the opening of the United Nations
General Assembly and was formally
welcomed by the US Ambassador to the
UN, Susan Rice, and the US Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Johnnie Carson, who have praised
the Ugandan militarys peacekeeping
deployment in Somalia.
ELECTORAL ARITHMETIC
None of this can much help the President
to deal with his countrys awkward ethnic
and electoral arithmetic. There are 15
main ethnic groups, of which the Baganda
are the most numerous. National elections
can be won only with strong support either
from Buganda in the south-west or from
the Acholi and Langi people of the north
and east, who tend to support the Uganda
Peoples Congress and Musevenis ageing
and exiled rival, ex-President (twice)
Milton Obote. Since he seized power in
1986, Museveni has had few friends in the
north and east.
Musevenis solid support has been
from his own Banyankole people in the
west and the Baganda in the south-west.
Banyankole support has dwindled because
of the challenge from Musevenis former
doctor, Kizza Besigye, candidate for the
opposition Forum for Democratic Change.
If Besigye and his activists joined forces
with the increasingly strident dissidents
in Buganda, they might outvote Museveni
and his National Resistance Movement
(NRM). Museveni won 62% of the vote in
Buganda in 2006 and his 1.9 million votes
there were almost half of his total of 4.1
mn. Without those votes, he could lose the
election or be forced into a run-off (from
UGANDA
A King takes on the
President
The Baganda people and their monarch are turning on the government
and hurting its election prospects
T
he most serious challenge to Yoweri
Musevenis presidency was always
going to come from within his own
coalition and that seems to have started in
Kampala this month. A dispute between
Museveni and Kabaka Ronald Muwenda
Mutebi, the titular king of Ugandas largest
ethnic group, the Baganda, sparked off
riots on 10-12 September during which
more than 20 people were shot dead. The
riots erupted after the government
blocked King Ronnies visit to a district of
his Kingdom. The consequences are likely
to be far-reaching. The most obvious one
is that President Museveni would struggle
to win a free election without substantial
support from the Baganda.
Two months ago, President Museveni
was rmly on his way to re-election in
2011 (AC Vol 50 No 17). The opposition
was divided, broke and lacking a coherent
message. Economic growth was slowing
but still bullish after the discovery of
oil, while regional trade was growing.
Musevenis political standing in opposition
centres in the north and east seemed
to have been helped by three years of
political stalemate in the regions and a
growing sense of desperation. Moreover,
there was less pressure from the rebel
Lords Resistance Army which, backed
by its sponsors in Khartoum, had moved
north to massacre and kidnap civilians in
Southern Sudan, before heading West to
attack civilians in Congo-Kinshasa and
Central African Republic.
Although Museveni has been irritated
by Western criticism of his policies and
his intolerance of domestic opponents,
the United States and Europe have kept
up substantial aid disbursements and
make their points about corruption and
which he was about 600,000 votes away
in 2006).
Museveni and Buganda have had an
uneasy marriage of convenience, held
together largely by some leading Baganda.
Mutebi, whom Museveni-supporters now
mock for his mood swings and upper-
class English manners, led Bugandas
support for the 1981-86 war that brought
Musevenis NRM to power and which
was largely fought in his kingdom. The
writer and cricketer John Nagenda, who
remains a key spokesman for Museveni,
did much to mobilise Baganda support
behind the NRM.
As a reward, Museveni restored in 1993
some of the traditional royal privileges
that had been abolished under Obote in
1966 and returned some property taken
by the central government. Buganda has
voted for Museveni and his NRM in the
last three elections and been rewarded
with several ministries and a Vice-
President, Professor Gilbert Balibaseka
Bukenya.
Musevenis government thought it
was giving back some ceremonial dignity.
Some of the Kabakas advisors thought
they had been promised a federal system
of government and the return of large
tracts of land given to the kingdom by the
British colonial government. Museveni has
sought to balance Bugandas discontent by
an alliance with its old rival, the Bunyoro
Kingdom, whose newly discovered oil
elds have increased its importance. He
also wants to cut down to size Bugandas
landed gentry, with legal reforms that
would give serfs ownership of land and
by encouraging smaller tribes including
one that opposed the Kabakas visit to
break away from Buganda.
The law bars cultural leaders from
politics but the Kabaka has been speaking
out and his courtiers have spearheaded
campaigns to undermine government
programmes, including land reform. The
riots have made the Kabaka a rallying
point for his loyalists and for other
disaffected Ugandans tired of corruption,
unemployment, and the accumulation of
wealth by presidential cronies. Museveni
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Source: 2002 census
MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS IN UGANDA
Total population: 24.7 mn.
Baganda 16.9%
Banyankole 9.5%
Basoga 8.4%
Iteso 6.4%
Langi 6.1%
Bakiga 6.9%
Acholi 4.7%
Bagisu 4.6%
Bunyoro 2.7%
Others 29.6%
(including Bakonjo,
Batoro, Karamojong,
Kenyi, Madi)
Lugbara 4.2%
BATORO
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UGANDA
LAKE
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KAMPALA
Masaka
Mbarara
Fort Portal
Entebbe
Tororo
Mbale
Soroti
Moroto
Kitgum
Arua
Gulu
Masindi
Kabale
Jinja
Wakiso
LEADERS IN WAITING
There are no credible challengers to President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni within the
top ranks of the governing National Resistance Movement. The respected Foreign
Minister James Wambogo Wapakhabulo, who had been a serious candidate for the
presidency, was pressured to quit as Speaker of Parliament and take a backroom
job, before he died in 2004.
With Vice-President Gilbert Balibaseka Bukenyas nocturnal exploits much
reported by Kampalas gutter press, few rate his chances in a succession battle;
NRM Secretary General and Security Minister John Patrick Amama Mbabazi was
badly damaged by a Pension Fund scandal. Ruhakana Rugunda, Ambassador to
the United Nations in New York, where Uganda has a two-year seat on the Security
Council, is regarded as too affable for the presidency. The most ambitious NRM
politicians are from the younger generation, including members of parliament
Henry Banyenzaki, Mary Mugyenyi, Adolf Mwesigye and the tough Theodore
Ssekikubo.
The younger opposition MPs are politically weightier. From Kizza Besigyes
Forum for Democratic Change, Nandala Mafabi is the most effective and as head
of Parliaments Public Accounts Committee, unrelentingly pursued ministers and
ofcials for explanations and ofcial records. His replacement as PAC Chairman,
Reagan Okumu, has a strong following in the north. The most ambitious
oppositionists are FDCs Gregory Mugisha Muntu and the Democratic Partys
Norbert Mao. Major General Mugisha Muntu used to command the National
Resistance Army (now Uganda Peoples Defence Force) and is a member of the
East African assembly. He lost the FDC presidency to Besigye this year. Meanwhile
Chairman Mao left his parliamentary seat to become Mayor of Gulu District. He
wants to run for the presidency in 2011, a dry run for the 2016 elections.
Academics are getting more outspoken, notably Professor Venasius
Baryamureeba, a computer science guru who runs the Information and Computer
Technology Faculty at Makerere University, and Prof. Augustine Nuwagaba, a
poverty and development consultant. Prof. Joe Oloka-Onyango, who runs a human
rights think tank at Makerere, is a erce critic of Musevenis regime while his wife and
fellow law don, Sylvia Tamale, staunchly defends civil rights. Leading civic activists
include Beatrice Anywar, an MP and environmental activist who successfully
campaigned against government handing part of a protected rain forest to a sugar
conglomerate; Godber Tumushabe, who monitors wasteful public spending; and
former minister, MP and spy chief David Pulkol, who tracks MPs performance.
Besigyes wife, Winnie Byanyima, keeps a low prole since quitting Parliament for
the African Union in Addis Ababa and then the UN.
Most of the richest companies, controlled by Ugandan Asians or multinationals,
claim they try to avoid politics. However, Sudhir Ruparelia is important as the
richest living Ugandan; Hassan Basajjabalaba, a wealthy kingmaker who has fallen
out with Museveni, also remains politically relevant.
The military remains hugely inuential, although Museveni insists he has
retired from the army. His son, Lieutenant Colonel Muhoozi Kainerugaba, heads the
Special Forces and guards his fathers back. Also important is Musevenis brother
(and sometime critic), Gen. Caleb Akandwanaho aka Salim Saleh, former Reserve
Army Commander and now Military Advisor to Museveni. Others include the Chief
of the Defence Forces, Gen. Aronda Nyakairima; Police Inspector General Maj.
Gen. Kale Kayihura and the Chief of Military Intelligence, Brigadier James Mugira.
Col. Moses Rwakitarate, Air Force Chief of Staff, and Brig. Patrick Kankiriho, who
commanded the ill-fated Operation Lightning Thunder against the Lords Resistance
Army in Congo-Kinshasa, are part of the ambitious military elite around Muhoozi,
as is Col. Octavious Buturo, once the Deputy Military Intelligence Chief, who is now
on study leave.
has claimed that Kizza Besigye and
his FDC helped to organise the riots. In
private, intelligence ofcials admit that
the trouble was spontaneous and a sign of
growing dissent.
The President has also accused an
unnamed foreign state of sponsoring
the trouble; more quietly Ugandan
Intelligence ofcers point to Libyas
Colonel Moammar el Gadaf, who
initially backed Museveni and the NRM
until they fell out over what Kampala
saw as the Libyan leaders duplicitous role
in Sudan and impractical schemes for
a United States of Africa. Other African
leaders are similarly worried by the
Brother Leader but are more prone to
diplomatic inaction than Museveni. The
falling out seems real Museveni has
cancelled two trips to Libya and blocked a
Libyan rm from buying a 60-acre cattle
ranch near the oil elds of Bunyoro.
ETHNIC TAPESTRY FRAYS
The President, who claims to be non-
sectarian, has for many years relied
heavily on people from his home
ground, appointing members of his tribe
to top positions in the army, cabinet
and government agencies. The ethnic
tapestry is beginning to come apart
though. In August, a leaked letter from
Museveni exposed his proposal to ring-
fence elective positions in Bunyoro for
indigenous people, a blatant attempt to
buy support that earned the wrath of the
numerous Ugandans who have moved
freely around the country. Museveni has
backtracked on his proposals but the
dispute with Buganda leaves his country
dangerously polarised.
During the September riots, people
from the Presidents people were targeted
in several areas, as happened in Kenyas
ethnic violence after the 2008 elections.
Museveni wants to ensure that Buganda,
with its large electorate and central
location in and around the capital, does
not turn against him. He has shut four
local-language radio stations, including
one belonging to the Buganda Kingdom,
vowed to bring a law to keep cultural
leaders like the Kabaka rmly out of
politics and offered a watered-down
version of a federal system that was
stillborn in 2005.
Voices critical of the regime face
growing repression. Attacks on the media
have doubled over the last two years and
at least 14 journalists are facing charges
of some sort. Yet Museveni badly needs
friends before the next election. His
courting of the Banyoro has cracked his
stronghold of western Uganda. If Buganda
voted for the opposition, he would need
to win in the east an opposition target
because of its poverty and in the north,
where his regime is still hated. He needs
to keep the ethnic groups divided, so that
they do not gang up against him and his
western-dominated regime.
He must also address the growing
unemployment and socio-economic
imbalances that feed youth militancy in
the towns. He has announced plans for
patriotism classes in secondary schools
and a US$15 mn. fund to create jobs
for young people. Uganda produces ve
college and university graduates for every
job created annually, so this investment
can have no impact before the 2011
elections.
A few days after the blocked trip,
Ronald Mutebi visited Wakiso outside
Kampala, an uncontested part of his
kingdom. His visits are usually low-key
affairs; this time, thousands turned up
and he was cheered all the way. The
Kabaka could have gone, in two weeks,
from cultural king to political kingmaker
for the coming election.
M
ore arrests, more vexatious court
verdicts against the Movement
for Democratic Change, thanks
to President Robert Mugabes loyalists
in the judiciary. The Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front is paving
its route to renewed political domination.
Both ZANU-PF and the MDC are divided,
but Mugabes team is the one with a plan.
Over the last week, police have arrested
ten more opposition MPs.
Although the terms of the Global
Political Agreement (GPA) were broadly
settled a year ago, ZANU-PF continues to
use bureaucratic zealotry and brute force
to obstruct the MDCs efforts to consolidate
power in the new dispensation. Leading
the charge are Reserve Bank Governor
Gideon Gono and Attorney General
Johannes Tomana; Gono with his
nancial schemes to counter MDC efforts
to reform the economy and reduce ZANU-
PFs powers of patronage; and Tomana for
his selective legal pursuit of MDC MPs.
After six months of power sharing,
Mugabe and his loyalists want the West to
admit defeat and lift sanctions. Improbable
as that seemed a few months ago, several
international instititutions are edging
towards direct budgetary support for the
power-sharing government.
The rows over sanctions and nancing
put the MDC in an awkward position: it
cannot campaign for sanctions against
itself, and without new funds the
economys fragile revival could falter and
prompt more tension and violence. With
important by-elections looming, the MDC
cannot take its popularity for granted. If it is
seen to fail on the economy, Zimbabweans
could rapidly lose enthusiasm for the brave
new dawn of six months ago.
Gideon Gono, the irrepressible
Governor of the Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe, has proposed relaunching the
Zimbabwe dollar, backed by the countrys
growing gold reserves. This economically
dubious plan makes sense only for ZANU-
PFs political ambitions. When the MDC
Finance Minister and chief strategist,
Tendai Biti, suspended the national
currency in February, it took away ZANU-
PFs capacity to print local money and
control the foreign exchange markets,
thus shutting many of its political friends
out of the economy. Gono claims that the
Zimbabwe dollar should be reinstated as
a matter of national pride and also for the
practical reason that nding change and
smaller denominations of US dollars or
South African rand is difcult. However,
Biti has threatened to resign if Gono tries
to reintroduce the Zim dollar unilaterally.
The partys big remaining asset is its
continuing control of the police, armed
forces and intelligence services, as well as
many of the mining projects from which
it and its senior ofcials draw substantial
revenue. Without control of the currency,
ZANU-PF would nd it hard to raise funds
for its 2013 election campaign (although
the MDC is in a much worse nancial
state). ZANU-PF seems condent it can
regain a parliamentary majority through
by-elections made necessary by the
death, suspension or court conviction of
opposition MPs (AC Vol 50 No 16).
Raphael Dube, MP for Emakhandeni
in Bulawayo, died on 15 August.
Meanwhile, three members of Premier
Morgan Tsvangirais MDC faction have
already been convicted and a dozen face
various charges. The Global Political
Agreement signed by ZANU-PF and
the two MDC factions last September
ZIMBABWE
Greed, gold and grit
Mugabe and his party nd new ways to thwart the MDC as both sides
prepare for a month of by-elections
AFTER MSIKA A NEW PECKING ORDER
Following the death on 4 August of Joseph Msika, the new Second Vice-President
is likely to be the Chairman of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front,
John Nkomo. He is Ndebele and already sits in the Presidium, among the ruling
partys top four ofcials. President Robert Mugabe regards him as dependable
and studiously neutral in the factional ghting between supporters of the former
Zimbabwe Defence Forces chief, General (retired) Solomon Mujuru, and current
Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa. Nkomo is clever but not politically bold
and is likely to return Mugabes favour with strong support for the 85-year-old
President at ZANU-PFs congress in December.
Arguments that Nkomos health is poor are shrugged aside. He has three main
qualications for the vice-presidency. The post is usually occupied by ZANU-
PFs most senior member and Nkomo is the man. The most senior person in the
former Zimbabwe African Peoples Union was Welshman Mabhena who, as its
General Secretary, was the partys number three just before it was swallowed up
by Mugabes organisation in 1988; the two above him were the late Joshua Nkomo
and Msika. Naison Ndlovu, currently Deputy President of the Senate, was ZAPU
National Chairman and ranked number six, with John Nkomo number eight, as
Secretary for Information and Publicity. Mabhena has lost favour with Mugabe;
Ndlovu has not displayed presidential ambitions.
The old ZAPU rankings no longer matter so much in ZANU-PF, as it confronts
the Movement for Democratic Change. Yet the party constitution adopted after the
unity accord stipulated that one vice-president had to be from ZAPU and the merged
parties were to share the top ve positions, in a three-to-two ratio. This implies that
if Nkomo becomes national Deputy President, the party Chairman will have to come
from the former ZAPU, not from ZANU-PF. There are many contenders, including
Ambassador to South Africa Simon Khaya Moyo, Mines Minister Obert Mpofu,
Sikhanyiso Ndlovu (in the Politburo, not government) and even Kembo Mohadi
(co-Minister of Home Affairs).
Nkomos only credible opponent from the former ZAPU was Dumiso
Dabengwa, who had political clout and was a member of the Politburo. He had
been number three in the party, after Msika and John Nkomo, whom he sometimes
overshadowed. Yet he left the coalition; rst, last year, he joined Mavambo-Kusile-
Dawn with Simba Makoni and later that year, he revived ZAPU and declared that the
unity agreement was over.
So far, all the provincial delegations at the ZANU-PF congresses have endorsed
Mugabe as the sole presidential candidate. The provinces are formally led by political
lightweights, but in fact, each province is dominated by a Politburo member. Vice-
President Joyce Mujuru is in charge of Mashonaland Central, her husband Solomon
of Mashonaland East. Didymus Mutasa rules the roost in Manicaland; Nathan
Shamuyarira in Mashonaland West; David Karimanzira in Harare; Emmerson
Mnangagwa in the Midlands; Stan Mudenge in Masvingo; and John Nkomo in
Matebeleland.
One ZANU-PF strategist claims that the party is aiming for stability: Yes, there
are factions within the party but these only demonstrate vibrancy within the party,
not that it is disintegrating. Another analyst said the succession will be determined
by whom the party barons believe will deliver victory in the next elections.
guaranteed that any parliamentary
vacancies would not be contested for the
following twelve months. That provision
expires on 15 September. Chaos in Arthur
Mutambaras MDC faction has not helped.
The party has suspended three MPs.
If Attorney General Tomana can win
convictions against all the MDC-Tsvangirai
legislators who face charges, there could
be as many as 20 by-elections. If ZANU-PF
won them all it could end up with 119 or
120 seats, giving it a comfortable majority.
Notwithstanding reports that the party
will resort to violence, the campaigns
might be smoother than last years.
The debate surrounding by-elections
hinges on an untested clause of the GPA.
Article 21 states that when a seat becomes
open for any reason, only the party
holding that seat prior to the vacancy
occurring shall be entitled to nominate
and eld a candidate to ll the seat.
The timing of the by-elections is
critical: it appears that if the by-elections
are held after 15 September this year,
all parties can contest. If vacancies were
announced before then, parties should be
able to replace their MPs unchallenged.
ZANU-PF strategy is to produce as many
vacancies as possible for its opponents
after the end of the year-long period of
uncontested by-elections.
So far, two MPs have been sentenced
to over six months in gaol, the tariff at
which they lose their seats. Another ten
prosecutions were in prospect until the
Army Commander in Masvingo, Brigadier
Gen. Douglas Nyikayaramba, gave
evidence in the trial of the MDC MP for
Gutu East. The magistrate found the
general dishonest in his evidence and
reprehensible in his conduct in court: he
threatened a major for giving evidence
favourable to the accused. The judge then
threw the case out as one which should
never have been started. The chances on
appeal of the two MPs already convicted
would now seem good and some expect
the Attorney General to take the reprimand
and drop the charges against the others.
ZANU-PF is not likely to scuttle the
unity agreement. The main reason why
it did not win the 2008 parliamentary
elections the economic devastation in
the country has not been addressed but
handed over to Tsvangirai and the MDC.
Mugabes team may hope to prolong the
life of the inclusive government, let the
dust settle, wait for signs of economic
improvement and hope the voters
forget ZANU-PFs record of violence and
incompetence at by-elections in September
or February, after the moratorium has
ended. The MDC factions will not want
to take on ZANU-PF with the electoral
ground tilted against them; the current
ZANU-PF provincial congresses still hail
Mugabe as Supreme Leader.
The prosecutions, with one exception,
are directed at members from the south
of Manicaland Province or the contiguous
eastern part of Masvingo, where MDC-
Tsvangirai made its breakthrough to the
rural areas in 2008. In ZANU-PFS internal
struggle, both provinces are in the camp
that follows Emmerson Mnangagwa;
around the Chipinge district of southern
Manicaland, the Shangaan-Ndau people
had remained unswervingly loyal to
Mugabes predecessor as party leader,
the late Ndabaningi Sithole, offering the
MDC a base on which it swept all but four
of the provinces seats last year. It is also
aiming for the governors post.
Air Marshal Perence Shiri, who
commanded the notorious Fifth Brigade
during the Matebeleland massacres thirty
years ago, is the regimes military supremo
for Manicaland, where there is a strong
military presence as the army secures its
interests in the Marange diamond elds.
There are reports of illicit diggers being
massacred. Former Finance Minister
Simba Makoni hails from north-central
Manicaland but his young Mavambo-
Kusile-Dawn party is not yet geared up for
a bruising election battle.
Next door in Masvingo, the MDC
breakthrough was less spectacular but the
party won half of the parliamentary seats
and is also claiming the governors post. All
but two of its wins were in the adjoining
districts of Bikita, Zaka and Gutu. It is the
MDC-Tsvangirai MPs from these districts
who face prosecution. Few of them are
well-known off their home turf. In Bikita
and Zaka, there is a sizeable Shangaan-
Ndau minority but Gutu is overwhelmingly
Karanga, Mnangagwas group, once the
bailiwick of the late Vice-President Simon
Muzenda. Attorney General Tomana has
an interest in Masvingo, where he acquired
a game conservancy after the latest round
of farm invasions.
MDC-Mutambara has other problems
in Matebeleland North. The faction is
in danger of disintegrating after the
expulsion of three of its MPs. Job Sikhala,
one of the three expelled, claims he has
deposed Mutambara and now heads the
party. Even if Mutambara can stitch things
up, his faction would face an uphill battle,
with the expelled MPs likely to stand as
independents or for MDC-Tsvangirai. On
top of that, Dumiso Dabengwas recently
relaunched Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe
African Peoples Union (PF-ZAPU, usually
known as ZAPU) could enter the fray and
transform politics in Matebeleland.
There are three vacancies in the
Senate. The MDCs amboyant Patrick
Kombayi died in June. (The Central
Intelligence Organisation tried to kill
him during the 1990 election and the
perpetrators got a presidential pardon.) On
the ZANU-PF side, Politburo member and
Senator Richard Chemist Hove died on
21 August. ZANU-PF lost another senator
with the election as Senate President of
Edna Madzongwe, known as the Deadly
Orange Blossom after her violent seizure
of a citrus estate in last years land grabs.
If the by-elections take place, they will
provide a snapshot of public sentiment
and probably some degree of violence. The
Shangaan-Ndau initiation schools will be
assembled over the coming months and
their area, with its military presence, is
dominated by the relentless Shiri.
SHIRI SALUTES, SORT OF
The military parades and razzamatazz over the Heroes and Defence Forces weekend
in August dovetailed with Vice-President Joseph Msikas state funeral and saw the
junta on its best behaviour. To ensure everyone knows who is boss, a directive to the
state media decreed that Robert Mugabe must always be referred to as President
and Commander in Chief. The state and independent media gave full coverage to
the fact that Air Marshal Perence Shiri and Lieutenant General Philip Sibanda gave
ostentatious full salutes to Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and, although other
service chiefs managed to stick to their guns by saluting only Mugabe, it was done
in a manner that was inoffensive.
Shiri, whose wounded saluting hand still gives him problems, on the rst attempt
managed something which looked like a cross between a Sieg Heil! and the open
palm greeting of the Tsvangirais Movement for Democratic Change. By the second
day, though, the therapeutic exercise had worked it up to an impeccable salute. As
Commander of the notorious Fifth Brigade during the Matebeleland conict, Shiri
probably has the most to be uneasy about from a vengeful MDC.
The Zimbabwe National Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Sibanda, on the other hand,
has always been an advocate of apolitical armed forces. In this, he is at one with
Central Intelligence Organisation chief Happyton Bonyongwe, who is in the happy
position of never having to wear uniform and so avoids the dilemma. Of the other
key members, Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander Constantine Chiwenga and
Chief of Staff Martin Chedondo greeted the Prime Minister only on the rst day and
then opted to appear in civilian dress on the second. Police Commissioner-General
Augustine Chihuri and Prisons Commissionier Paradzai Zimondi managed to avoid
an encounter.
SUING THE MESSENGER
Jacob Zuma styles himself a defender of free speech, but he has several libel actions
pending against South African journalists.
A four million rand (US$514,000) defamation suit against The Citizen, Martin
Williams and Paul Kirk for an article published in December 2006 about Zuma using
the services of a prostitute.
R4 mn. for defamation and R1 mn. for infringement of dignity against The
Independent News and Media, Jovial Rantao (Sunday Independent Editor and The
Star Deputy Editor), Andrew Walker and ex-President Thabo Mbekis biographer,
William Mervin Gumede, for an article published on 16 April 2006.
R4 mn. for defamation and R1 mn. for infringement of dignity against Johnnic
Communications, former Sowetan Editor Thabo Leshilo and journalist Bareng-
Batho Kortjaas for an article entitled Zuma clock in December 2005.
Two separate claims for R4 mn. for defamation and R1 mn. for infringement of
dignity against Independent News, The Star Editor Moegsien Williams, Rantao and
Jonathan Shapiro aka Zapiro for a 4 April 2006 cartoon in The Star and another the
next day.
R1 mn. for infringement of dignity against The Independent Newspapers,
Williams, Rantao, Vuyo Bavuma, Moshoeshoe Monare, Angela Quintal, Thokozani
Mtshali and Lebogang Seale for a December 2005 article in The Star.
Two claims against Media24, one for defamation in a cartoon published by The
Sunday Sun during Zumas rape trial (R5 mn.), the other for R1 mn. for a story
published by Rapport about involvement with a prostitute in December 2005.
Zumas relationship with the media is ambiguous, or confused. Formally
favouring a free press, he even visited one of the biggest media houses, Avusa
(formerly Johnnic Communications). Addressing the inuential South African
National Editors Forum during the Nat Nakasa Awards in July, he declared: The
media is an important vehicle through which citizens should be able to freely
express themselves. It is not only a struggle to give voice to ordinary South Africans
to depict their lives as they truly were, to allow their concerns and views to receive
free expression. We seek reporting that is credible and honest and informative. We
seek comment and analysis that challenges us and provides a fresh insight into our
world and the challenges we face.
SOUTH AFRICA
So far, so Zuma
Economic downturns, rising joblessness and a wave of strikes and
protests fail to dampen the rising popularity of the new President
T
he standard criticism of Jacob
Gedleyihlekisa Zuma was that he
was a populist, seeking the presidency
mainly to protect himself against
prosecution for corrupt enrichment in
South Africas US$6 billion arms deal (AC
Vol 49 No 16). That idea has been promptly
abandoned. His rst 100 days in ofce,
marked by several astute appointments,
reveal him as a shrewd operator who
wants to leave a political mark on behalf of
his working-class constituents, while not
alienating Afrikaners and big business. It
is a delicate balancing act and he may not
pull it off, but he is making a far better go
of it than many had predicted.
Liberals, anti-corruption campaigners
and journalists suspect it will all end in
tears, but the government has other voices
to heed. It must manage South Africas
deepest recession for more than two
decades mainly externally caused and
try to rescue jobs and living standards.
Few dispute Zumas admiration for the
common people. His biographer Jeremy
Gordin says: Zuma has been accused of
being a greedy careerist, a chameleon, a
puppet of leftist forces. Others call him a
marauding Zulu warrior of yore, illiterate,
an inveterate womaniser and an amoral
populist. This has gone into reverse. A
political scientist from the University of the
North, Professor Tinyiko Maluleke, says
his presence among ordinary people shows
he cares about their plight and speaks the
language they understand very well.
Some fear a personality cult. Free State
Premier Ace Magashule recently told a
meeting in his province that Jacob Zuma
is like Chris Hani. Jacob Zuma is like
Oliver Tambo. He is like Moses Kotane.
He is like J.B. Marks. Mcebisi Ndletyana,
a political analyst at the Human Sciences
Research Council says Zuma has effectively
addressed the gap created by the cold
and aloof style of his predecessor, Thabo
Mbeki, and compares him tentatively to
former President Nelson Mandela. The
Presidency is well resourced, though, with
a Deputy President and two ministers of
National Planning and of Monitoring and
Evaluation as well as a Director General
and other top ofcials who take care of
day-to-day affairs.
At the end of his rst 100 days (AC Vol
50 No 9), a poll by TNS Research Surveys,
using a sample of 2,000 adults from the
seven major metropolitan areas, found
that Zumas approval rating levels were
rising sharply. By late June, 57% of this
urban sample thought he was doing a
good job, up from 52% over the election
period in April. Mbekis approval ratings
were in the middle to low 30s from 1999
to 2002, hitting a high of 66% in 2004 and
2005, and a low of 34% at the end of his
term. Among black South Africans, Zumas
rating has risen sharply, to 64% in April
and to 71% by June. Among whites, his
disapproval rating was 62% in April and
12% in June a dramatic improvement.
Among Coloured and Asian people, too,
the Presidents approval score has sharply
risen. Regionally, he scored highest in the
urban areas around Johannesburg, lowest
in Cape Town. Young people rated him
much more highly than the over-sixties.
Looking forward, the political research
company Markinor has been examining
some likely challenges. The formidable list
includes meeting the rising expectations of
the people and the many promises made
during the election campaign. Among
tricky issues are nding ways to do more
business in Africa, implementing the Bus
Rapid Transit system in Johannesburg
and introducing a national health
insurance scheme. All that must depend
on maintaining a stable macroeconomic
and pro-employment environment, an
effective counter-cyclical scal policy with
low ination, creating employment with
opportunities for the poor and promoting
small and medium-sized enterprises.
A 14 August implementation report
from the Presidency claimed that various
public works programmes have created
45,000 jobs since Zumas inauguration.
The Congress of South African Trade
Unions is scornful: These jobs are not
sustainable. They do not change peoples
lives. How do you plan your life around a
few months job? argues Cosatu President
Sdumo Dlamini.
The report says that some 14 billion
rand (US$1.8 bn.) has been allocated for
projects which will create 240,000 jobs
and R400 million more will be spent
in the social sector to create 80,000
work opportunities, 60,000 of them
by December. Expanded community
programmes are to reach a target of
60,000 jobs. Yet the country is short of
skilled people to run such projects.
Over half of all South Africans live in
rural areas, far from the cities which are
integrated into the mainstream economy.
A new ministry has been created for rural
development, to speed up reforms that
should enhance food security, provide
amenities in the countryside and bring
land reform, incorporating post-settlement
support for the beneciaries. This will be
expensive and funds are short.
In education, the challenge over the
next ve years is to double the number
of children under four in preschools,
increase secondary school enrolment to
95%, improve the pass rate in post-school
education by 20% and promote universal
access to rst-grade education. In health,
the aim is to phase in the controversial
insurance system by 2014 and to halve
the incidence of HIV/AIDS by 2011, with
anti-retroviral therapy available to 80% of
those who need it.
In the justice sector, Zuma must
deal with the legacy of his past legal
woes and questions of racial balance.
One of Zumas close allies, Judge John
Hlophe, Western Cape Judge-President,
is embroiled in a controversy with the 13
Constitutional Court judges who allege
that he improperly attempted to inuence
them to rule in favour of Zuma when the
president brought the case to the court
relating to the constitutionality of the raids
by the defunct Scorpions investigative
unit on his residence. The raids were
conducted as part of corruption and
fraud investigations. The Judicial Service
Commission (JSC), a body charged with
appointing and disciplining judges, is
dealing with this matter. Hlophe is also
said to have labelled Chief Justice Pius
Langa a white man (whose hand he will
not shake) in an interview with The Mail
& Guardians Sello Alcock.
Hlophe was widely tipped to succeed
Chief Justice Langa. In a surprising turn
of events, Judge Sandile Ngcobo, a judge
at the same court, has been nominated
to replace Langa. However, critics argue
that Ngcobo is just warming the bench for
Hlophe. They say that the appointment is
meant to allow Hlophe time to deal with
his opponents and clear his name. In terms
of the rules governing appointments of
judges, if a strict reading is applied, then
Ngcobo may serve only 20 months.
This matter is complicated further by
the perceived snub of Deputy Chief Justice
Dikgang Moseneke, who was widely seen
as the next chief justice. Moseneke served
time at Robben Island for his activities as
a member of the Pan Africanist Congress
in the 1960s. He may have shot himself in
the foot by criticising Zuma last year.
In a speech at the University of
Witwatersrand, former Constitutional
Court judge Johann Kriegler pointed to
the awkward balance between prioritising
the appointment of African and mixed-race
judges, and questions about their technical
training and experience, as required by
the JSCs constitutional mandate.
Crime is a huge issue, the more
so since the 2010 Football World Cup
tournament is due in under ten months.
Bheki Cele, the former Transport, Safety
and Security boss in KwaZulu-Natal,
supports national Safety and Security
Minister Nathi Mthethwa in his bid to
give police more powers to use force. First,
though, many more police are needed.
The government plans to increase their
numbers from 180,000 to 200,000 and to
train 12,000 detectives over the next year.
The opposition Democratic Alliance has
used United Nations guidelines to point
out that South Africa needs a minimum of
250,000 police and 50,000 detectives to
function effectively.
Local government, responsible for
delivering many government services,
has been the focus for the latest mass
protests (AC Vol 50 No 16). The national
government is reviewing local government
structures and has intervened in several
municipalities, notably in North West and
Eastern Cape provinces. It is hoped that
all 284 municipalities will achieve clean
audits by 2014 and one immediate task is
to turn around ailing town councils, such
as the capitals Tshwane Metropolitan
Council, which needs R700 mn. to meet
its immediate cash-ow requirements.
On the eve of his election, Zuma
promised to halt the new transport service
for Johannesburg until the concerns of taxi
drivers were addressed. The drivers are
threatening mass action when Rea Vaya
Bus Rapid Transit starts operating. Cape
Town and Nelson Mandela Bay Metro are
preparing a similar service. Such are the
details that, in due course, could push
Zumas support back down again.
P
ictures of police ring rubber
bullets into a crowd of protestors in
Thokoza township on 27 July gave
President Jacob Zumas three-month-old
government its strongest reality check
to date. Some 200 protestors stoned a
local municipal ofce after realising it
was closed due to the municipal workers
strike, which had started the day before.
Angry township residents complain
that they are still living in shacks and
lack running water and electricity 15
years after the African National Congress
came to power. President Zuma, who has
promised to create 500,000 jobs this year,
pledged to improve housing and access
to water in the wake of the protests.
However, he bitterly condemned the
wave of anti-government violence which
coincided with the strike season in the
depths of South Africas winter.
A new wage deal between the
countrys biggest union, the National
Union of Mineworkers, and gold and coal
producers, forestalled a strike in the critical
mining industry. So Zuma knows that the
biggest, short-term economic threat has
been averted. Yet some companies still
worry that the mix of labour unrest and
South Africas rst recession in 17 years
may prompt more random disruptions.
SMILES AND WARM WORDS
Despite the smiles and the warm words
of comradeship for the trades unions,
Zuma has been readying his government
for some tough times. That may be why
he has consulted the apartheid regimes
spymaster, former National Intelligence
Service Director, Neil Barnard, and has
appointed one of South Africas toughest
police ofcers, Bheki Cele, as Police
Chief. Cele replaces Jackie Selebi, who
has to defend himself against corruption
charges (AC Vol 47 No 24). Cele has
already stirred controversy by asking
parliament to ease the restrictions on
the polices use of lethal force against
suspects. He told members of parliament
that they needed to be sure that the law
did not give criminals greater rights than
their victims.
Beyond the security threats, Zuma
faces a growing roster of political
problems. The most pressing is the
state of his relations with his supporters
in the trades unions and the South
African Communist Party (SACP), who
are wholeheartedly backing the wave
of municipal strikes. To applause from
his improbable business friends, Zuma
condemned outright the strike action and
made clear that the government will not
submit to the strikers demands. Coming
so soon in the governments term, this
SOUTH AFRICA
Township protestors take
on the ANC government
After weeks of angry protests in the townships, President Zuma and his
ministers promise to make the problems of the poorest a priority
crisis may force Zuma to nail down his
ideological stance: many Communists
and trades unionists have suspected for
some time that Comrade Zumas populism
is actually rather right-wing.
This week, Zuma and his Housing
Minister, the multi-millionaire ex-
Communist Tokyo Sexwale, have been
touring the toughest townships promising
to address grievances systematically.
Sexwale slept at the Diepsloot squatter
camp on 3 August and expressed deep
concern about the squalid conditions
there. Zuma visited the Siyathemba
township in Mpumalanga (one of his core
provincial support bases) and promised to
audit the municipalities, saying that those
lacking basic services will get priority
treatment. In fact, both Sexwale and
Zuma lagged behind Sicelo Shiceka, the
Minister of Cooperative Governance and
Traditional Affairs, who sped around all
the affected townships just days after the
unrest started.
Most demands are localised. Some
hostel dwellers are calling for the
conversion of hostels into family units;
elsewhere, residents want the heads of
incompetent and corrupt councillors. The
wave of industrial action is underpinned
by demands for higher pay, even if it
leads to ination. Zuma was the peoples
choice in the governing ANC, largely
thanks to the pro-poor rhetoric of his
election campaign (AC Vol 50 No 11). In
his State of the Nation Address on 3 June,
his priorities included employment, with
a promise to create half a million jobs by
the end of the year and four million more
by 2014, along with rural development
and food security.
Improving public services was another
priority, with two new bodies the
National Planning Commission and the
Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation
Ministry to ensure performance at local,
provincial and national government
levels. Zumas ascendancy was pushed
through by overwhelming support from
the ANCs alliance partners, the Congress
of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu)
and the SACP (AC Vol 50 No 12). In the
new 34-member cabinet, former trades
unionists hold seven ministries, with the
SACP in charge of four, including the
inuential Trade and Industry, Labour
and Economic Development portfolios.
Just a month ago, Cosatu was gloating
over its increasing inuence on policy.
We are the policy-makers in the alliance
and the Government implements. The
Government does not lead any more...and
the ANC is in charge, claimed its General
Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi.
If so, why all the discontent? One
independent analyst blames the widening
economic gulf and historically entrenched
inequalities. There is no evidence so far
that the protests are orchestrated by a
hidden third force nor that a cohesive
social movement is growing, independent
of the tripartite alliance. It looks as if
the poor are venting their anger and
impatience at the shoddy manner
and snails pace at which services are
delivered.
PARTY INSIDERS ARE PLOTTING
Meanwhile, a prominent political
commentator and consultant, Sipho
Seepe, points out that the protests did
not start when the Zuma government
took ofce in May but they have become
more violent and strident. He thinks some
activities may be fuelled by party insiders
keen to revive their political fortunes
after failing to make their mark in Aprils
elections. Many are demanding the
removal of representatives and ofcials
associated with the previous government
under President Thabo Mbeki.
Seepe points out that most of the
anger seems to be directed at the
municipal authorities, where people who
did not make it on to the provincial and
national lists are getting ready for the
coming municipal elections in 2010. The
Director of Johannesburg Universitys
Centre for the Study of Democracy,
Steven Friedman, says the mass protests
preceded Zumas election and attributes
the problems to inefcient public services.
He thinks civil servants should listen to
the majority and ensure that what is done
is as close as possible to its demands.
Land activist Andile Mngxitama says
the poor feel excluded from decision-
making and have been given a raw deal by
the slow pace of economic transformation
at the grassroots. The South African Local
Government Association blames the ANC
for deploying party loyalists instead of
people qualied to run local government
efciently. Few of the ANCs political
rivals, not even the embittered Congress
of the People, have backed the upheavals;
only the Democratic Alliance has called
on the protesters to punish the ANC at
the municipal elections. There is talk of
an opposition alliance made up of the DA,
COPE and United Democratic Movement
to exploit the electorates dissatisfaction
and to contest the local elections.
Small groups ride on the back of mass
actions. Members of the South African
Unemployed Peoples Movement looted
retail stores including Checkers, Pick n
Pay and Shoprite in Durban last week; the
Movement claims 26 mn. unemployed
members, yet only an estimated 200
people took part. The Movement is
demanding a 1,500 rand (US$190) per
month payment for the jobless.
The Anti-Privatisation Forum seems
to be making no signicant inroads in
impoverished communities. Instead of
organised opposition groups, such as
the racially exclusive Azanian Peoples
Organisation, the Pan Africanist Congress
of Azania and civic associations, there is an
emergence of spontaneous self-organised
community groups. In Tembisa township
in the East Rand, residents recently
formed the Duduza Tswelopele Service
Delivery Forum, whose mandate is to
negotiate for the informal settlements of
Duduza and Tswelopele. There seems to
be no formal link between these groupings
and established political opponents of the
government and the ANC.
The crisis has prompted a rethink of
how resources are to be deployed in the
national budget, with special measures to
accelerate and improve services in urban
areas. Minister of Performance Monitoring
and Evaluation in the Presidency Collins
Chabane told the press that in response
to popular demand, the budget would
prioritise the allocation of resources to
the affected municipalities.
In Gauteng Province, where protests
are widespread, several municipalities
have moved swiftly. The Johannesburg
Executive Mayor, Amos Masondo, has
announced a plan to eradicate all squatter
or informal settlements over the next ve
years (by 2014) with new settlements
to be provided with basic infrastructure
including water, electricity, roads,
refuse removal, mobile clinics, libraries
and ambulances. Johannesburg has an
estimated 180 informal settlements,
accommodating a quarter of its population
in about 200,000 households.
Ekurhuleni municipality had become
notorious for corruption, abuse of power
by senior managers and inadequate
services. Now it has sacked its city
manager, Patrick Flusk, and appointed a
highly-rated technocrat, Khaya Ngema,
formerly Director General in Mpumalanga
Province. He gained experience in services
and capacity building while working in
the Department of Public Service and
Administration.
The world recession has compounded
South Africas long record of rising
unemployment. According to Statistics
South Africas Labour Force Survey, in
the second quarter of 2009 the economy
shed an estimated 267,000 jobs and
almost 302,000 unemployed people
gave up looking for work. The ofcial
unemployment rate (which excludes those
no longer seeking employment) rose very
slightly, to 23.6% in the rst quarter, while
the labour market shrank from 17.8 mn.
to 17.5 mn. in the same period because
more people dropped out. The retail and
wholesale sector, which used to drive
the domestic economy, lost 59,000 jobs
as consumer demand fell; transport lost
30,000 jobs, nancial services, 15,000.
The formal sector (businesses registered
for tax) lost 93,000 jobs. The informal
sector, excluding agriculture, lost 41,000,
while 28,000 farm jobs were also lost.
CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE
A stolen election, then a
coalition
President Denis Sassou-Nguesso wants to buy off his political opponents
and has his numerous family members right behind him
R
e-elected for a further seven-year
presidential term by a crushing
majority, according to the ofcial
count, Denis Sassou-Nguesso is thinking
about forming a national government. He
has oated the prospect of talks with his
opponents and there are suggestions that
he might invite Ange-Edouard Poungui,
the leading (but disqualied) opposition
contender, to become prime minister.
Poungui served as Premier in the 1980s
when Sassou-Nguesso ran a one-party
military regime which called itself Marxist.
Since several French restaurateurs had
stayed on in Congo, diplomats used to joke
that Brazzaville boasted the best cuisine
in the socialist block.
The election on 12 July gave Sassou
another seven years but failed to bolster
his domestic and international legitimacy.
The government claimed a 66% turnout
but local civic activists point to near empty
polling stations and an implausibly large
electoral register. The opposition says
the turnout was 5-10% and independent
organisations do not even attempt to
estimate the real gure. The Presidents
ofcial 78.61% rst-round victory is an
empty triumph. Two weeks later, he had
received congratulations from only one
foreign leader, Togos Faure Gnassingb,
plus the governments of Angola, Chad and
Tunisia. Sassou may hope, by coopting
politicians and distributing ministerial
posts, to secure the authority he failed to
gain at the polls.
CO-OPTING THE COUSINS
Poungui was the presidential candidate of
the Union Panafricaine pour la Dmocratie
Sociale (Upads), the party of exiled former
President Pascal Lissouba, and is a native
of Lissoubas home region and political
base, Niari. He is married to a cousin of
Sassous. Capturing him would broaden
the regimes base, marginalising its most
committed opponents and drawing
former foes such as Bernard Kollas
and Jacques-Joachim Yhombi-Opango
further into the ruling establishment and
weakening its diehard opponents.
Sassou had already attempted to
defuse any Upads challenge by giving a
ministerial post to Jean-Claude Gackosso,
who had tried to revive the party locally,
and by making return-from-exile deals
with former party leaders Christophe
Moukouk and Victor Tamba-Tamba.
Yet the most charismatic Upads gure still
in good health, former Finance Minister
Nguila Moungounga Nkombo, remains
in determined and hostile exile, as does
former Oil Minister Benot Koukbn.
The former number two of Kollass
Mouvement Congolais pour la Dmocratie
et le Dveloppment Intgrale, Paulin
Makaya, also campaigns from exile.
Such political manoeuvres may not
impress ordinary Congolese, who have
for decades watched oil revenue fuel
elite extravagance and the recruitment
of political militias, while basic needs
go unmet. Few politicians of any stripe
retain much respect. One who does is the
retired Gendarmerie General, Emmanuel
Ngouelondele-Mongo, leader of the small
Parti pour lAlternance Dmocratique. His
public criticism of his relative and fellow
retired general, Sassou, is couched in non-
partisan terms (see Box).
Internationally, the regimes position
has strengthened, despite the lack of post-
election congratulations. Sassou has learnt
from damaging corruption rows with the
International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank. Congo is performing solidly
under its latest IMF programme and
substantial debt relief is within reach.
The blatant election manipulation
speaks of self-condence, as if, in
showing that it could rig the polls without
interference, the regime wanted to
demonstrate its invincibility. Its security
forces were unembarrassed as they red
live rounds at post-election demonstrators
in front of a France 24 television crew.
Opponents allege that polling cards
were issued in the names of the dead
and handed out to citizens of Congo-
Kinshasa and Rwanda. Some government
supporters were given up to six cards each.
Ofcial photographs of electors queueing
to vote showed only young adult men, not
a normal cross-section of people.
The European Union did not bother
to send election monitors because so little
had been done to rectify aws evident at
the 2002 election. The EU representative
in Brazzaville, Miguel Amado, pointed out
that the ofcial electoral register of 2.2
million people was implausibly high for a
country containing only 3.8 mn. people, a
high proportion of them youngsters.
A GENERAL IN WAITING
Emmanuel Ngouelondele-Mongo was not the only critic of the conduct of Congos
12 July presidential election or President Denis Sassou-Nguessos record in power
(AC Vol 50 No 12). Former Finance Minister Mathias Dzon was equally outspoken.
Yet Ngouelondele, a retired Gendarmerie General, carries a certain moral authority
as a loyal professional soldier who served both the old Marxist regime as security
chief and, later, President Pascal Lissoubas government as head of the Presidents
Military Ofce. He speaks from his home in Brazzaville, rather than from the comfort
of exile. At 72, though, he is past the age limit for presidential candidates.
In May, Ngouelondele issued a ringing denunciation of the regime, couched
in poetic republican language and devoid of the factionalism that turns so many
Congolese off their leaders. In a theoretically prosperous oil-producing country, he
has regularly focussed on practical development failures, such as the lack of water
and electricity supply, and the poor education and health services.
Like Dzon and Joseph Miokono-Hondjuila, Ngouelondele is seen as a contender
for the traditional leadership of the Tk people, succeeding Charles-David Ganao.
However, his public agenda is resolutely national. The constitution is violated by
the Brazzaville regime on a daily basis, he told Africa Condential. That is why
I called on my compatriots not to go to vote. Yet he is in the presidential family.
His son Hugues, of Sassous Parti Congolais du Travail and Mayor of Brazza, is
married to one of Sassous daughters and his own youngest daughter is married to
Edgar Nguesso, presidential nephew and head of the Presidents Ofce. He is Tk
from Gamboma, of partly Mbochi descent, with blood ties to Sassou, to whom he
was loyal until multiparty democracy arrived in 1992. He was a friend and he is a
relative, he says of the President.
Ngouelondeles voice could help determine how the opposition reacts to
the governments offer of talks. If Denis Sassou-Nguesso invites them, the
opposition will go to listen. Pressed on whether he would accept a ministerial post,
Ngouelondele switches to the diversion of oil money that could have been used
for key development goals, such as water supply. Its not important that its me
or somebody else. What matters is that the means are made available to do the
job. Previous concertations between government and opposition have won no
concessions and Ngouelondele expects none this time.
GAMBIA
Fifteen years of one-man
rule
Few outsiders are prepared to support the doughty opponents of Yahya
Jammehs corrupt and brutal regime
S
ince Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh led
a succesful coup just 15 years ago on
22 July 1994, he has managed his
small country against strong domestic
complaints, but without much interference
from the neighbours. His regime poses
no noticeable threat to the region at
least while, as at present, the festering
problems of Senegals Casamance region
are on hold. The summit meeting of the
Economic Community of West African
States (Ecowas) in Abuja in June spent
a lot of time on the recent overthrow of
the governments of Guinea and Guinea-
Bissau, and on the drive for a third term
by President Mamadou Tandja in Niger.
Gambia was left alone.
However, Ecowas has been doing its
bit to see that Jammeh obeys the rules. In
June 2008 the Ecowas court ruled that a
disappeared journalist, Ebrima Manneh
of the Daily Observer, had been unlawfully
detained; Jammehs government denies all
knowledge of the detention and rejects the
courts jurisdiction. (Jammeh is reported
to have said at one point: The Ecowas
court can go to hell.) Manneh has not
been found. Another Gambian journalist,
Musa Saidykhan, editor-in-chief of the
banned Independent, won in June (against
Gambian objections) a landmark ruling
that the court is mandated by an Ecowas
protocol to hear cases of human rights
abuses. This concerned in particular
Saidykhans writ against the notorious
National Intelligence Agency, in whose
headquarters he was held for a month in
2006 without charge. Saidykhan claims
he was tortured.
Ecowas was also brought into the
affair of Ghanaian shermen killed in
Gambia in 2005, which has poisoned rela-
tions for some time. At the request of the
two governments, a joint United Nations/
Ecowas fact-nding mission set up in Au-
gust 2008 published its report in May. The
report says that they had been victims
of an immigration scam perpetrated by
Captain Taylor and Lamin Tunkara, a
Gambian, to transport them to Europe by
sea and that while there was no ofcial
government involvement, rogue elements
of the Gambian security services were in-
volved in the killing. This led to moves to
settle with Ghana. The numbers of those
killed or disappeared (which included citi-
zens of other West African countries) was
still uncertain. Gambia mentions eight,
while Ghana claims forty-four.
The Banul government, noting the
exoneration of the Gambian state over
the killings, still agreed to repatriate the
bodies of six identied Ghanaians and
compensate the families. A memorandum
of understanding (MoU) was signed on
2 July by the two governments in Sirte,
Libya, at the African Union summit at
which they agreed to pursue through all
available means the arrest and prosecution
of all those involved in the deaths and
disappearances. This may not seem to go
very far, but there is at least some implied
acknowledgement by the Gambians of
responsibility, as well as a commitment
to continued investigation. The ruling
National Democratic Congress in Ghana
made a big issue of the matter while in
opposition and Ghanaian public opinion
continues to be exercised on the subject.
There is a strong Nigerian community
in Banjul, where ve Nigerian banks have
opened their doors. Ex-President Olusegun
Obasanjo would occasionally pull rank
on Jammeh, whom he regarded as a very
junior ofcer, he mediated in judiciary
problems in 2005, but President Umaru
Musa YarAdua has shown little interest.
His Foreign Minister, Ojo Maduekwe, has
been heavily involved in Ecowas and was
a witness to the Ghana-Gambia MoU in
Sirte. Nigeria encouraged Gambia to send
98 policemen to the UN peacekeeping
operation in Darfur, Sudan.
Senegal keeps a watching eye on it,
treating Jammeh with kid gloves for fear
he might allow Gambia to be used for
subversive activities in Casamance. His
relations with the provinces rebels have
sometimes been suspect, but Casamance
is quiet now. President Abdoulaye Wade
barely hides his contempt for Jammeh,
but the only serious rift came four years
ago when Gambia tried to tax Senegalese
traders at the border. Obasanjo stepped in
to mediate and one result was a proposal
to revive both the Senegambia Secretariat
and the long-mooted bridge on the River
Gambia, but nothing happened. Senegal
is also anxious that Gambia might get
involved in Guinea-Bissaus turbulent,
drug-beset politics, but Jammeh has kept
clear of the international drug trades
dabblings in West Africa.
Libyas links to Gambia have
ourished since Jammeh came to power;
his predecessor, Sir Dawda Jawara was
deeply hostile to Moammar el Gadaf.
The Libyan leader is a quieter character
now (although unpredictable), and Gambia
is regularly represented at meetings of the
29-member Community of Sahel-Saharan
States (CEN-SAD), which includes all 15
members of Ecowas and forms Libyas
tame African grouping. Figures for Libyan
assistance are elusive (although Jammeh
got US$15 million in 1995, after his take-
over). Libyas contribution is probably next
to that of the leading benefactor, Taiwan,
which Gambia persists in recognising.
A glowing tribute from Gadaf on
Jammehs birthday (25 May) contrasted
with his rebuke to those, notably Sierra
Leones President Ernest Koroma, who
did not make it to the CEN-SAD summit
in Libya four days later. Jammeh strongly
supported Gadafs move at the AU
summit to defy the International Criminal
Courts warrant for Sudanese President
Omer el Beshir. He attended the Non-
Aligned Summit in Egypt in mid-July.
For a regime that began with a coup,
Jammehs has survived remarkably
well. Britain says little about Jammehs
human-rights violations, except when
those in trouble are British nationals.
Jammeh has not visited London since the
Commonwealth summit in 1997, probably
because of campaigning by London-based
organisations. Amnesty Internationals
damning report The Gambia: Fear
Rules, in November 2008, was followed
by a statement in March denouncing
the security services rounding up and
punishing of a thousand alleged witches,
said to have been treated by witch-doctors
brought in from Guinea. (In March,
around 1,000 people were detained on
suspicion of being witches. They said they
were forced to drink a hallucinogenic
beverage which induced vomiting and
diarrhoea. They were released in April.)
In Africa the Commonwealth tends to
take its cue from its African members, and
in 2001 removed Gambia from the list of
countries under scrutiny for their human-
rights record.
Jammeh seized power a few months
after completing his training as a military
policeman in Alabama; he is still an
honorary ofcer of that states militia, and
of the Alabama State Navy. Some Gambians
suspect his coup was tacitly backed by the
United States, and he sometimes tries
to market himself to Washington as a
reliable ally in the war against terror. Yet
Gambias participation in the Milliennium
Challenge Account was suspended seven
years ago because of its human rights
situation. In May this year, ve US Senators
petitioned Jammeh over Ebrima Mannehs
three-year disappearance. They said
Gambian indifference was reprehensible
and outrageous. President Jammeh, they
wrote: You owe the world and Mannehs
family an answer.
ANGOLA
Sonangol goes international
The state-owned oil company is expanding and forming new partnerships,
but the new focus is gas development, with tax incentives for exploration
U
ndaunted by the collapse of the
international oil and gas market,
Luandas state-owned oil company
Sonangol is setting its international sights
ever higher. On the back of Angolas
prodigious hydrocarbon reserves,
Sonangol is buying up acreage in Algeria
and Iraq, as well as going into partnership
with Portuguese construction company
Mota-Engil and with Chinas Beiya
International Development to form China
Sonangol, which has bought assets in
Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Sonangols growing business network
ts with the return to form of national oil
companies, especially those of countries
with substantial oil and gas reserves. It
also chimes with Angolas aspiration to
establish itself as one of Africas fastest-
growing economic and military powers.
Angola is one of the few African states
to have rejected categorically investment
proposals from China (for the planned
oil renery in Lobito), although it has
maintained a close diplomatic and
commerical relationship with Beijing.
Fting Russian President Dmitri
Medvedev in Luanda last month,
President Jos Eduardo dos Santos
and his colleagues from Sonangol played
off the Muscovite former backers of the
ruling Movimento Popular de Libertao
de Angola (MPLA) against the Beijing-
based former backers of late rebel leader
Jonas Savimbis Unio Nacional para a
Independncia Total de Angola (UNITA).
This was the rst visit of a Russian leader
to Luanda since the 1980s and Medvedev
left with a clutch of railway, hydroelectric
(in Malange and Kwanza Norte) and
satellite technology contracts, as well as
big plans for oil and gas.
Sonangols strengths are still
limited by Angolas domestic economic
constraints and the shadow of personal
politics. Despite the diversity of Angolas
natural resources and its impressive
economic growth rates since the formal
end of the war in 2002, the national
economy remains critically dependent on
crude oil exports, a dependence which
is sometimes at odds with Luandas
diplomatic ambitions.
In 2008, Angola had a budget surplus
of 12.5% and a trade surplus of 29%,
among the highest in the world, but they
reect the limits of the local economys
absorptive capacity and congestion of
the ports as much as the governments
improved macroeconomic management.
This year government spending will fall
further, in line with production cuts.
Luandas accession to the Organisation
of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 2007
may have enhanced its diplomatic kudos
among developing states, but over the past
year Angola has been forced to rein in oil
production from levels of 1.91 million
barrels per day in 2008 to less than 1.8
mn. bpd this year. Although or perhaps
because Angolas Oil Minister Jos
Botelho de Vasconcelos is now President
of OPEC, there is some confusion about
his countrys current OPEC quota: reports
vary from 1.52 mn. bpd to last years
1.91mn. bpd. Furthermore, Vasconcelos
is dissatised with the formula used to
calculate OPEC quotas, but Angola has
been producing well over quota this year.
Vasconcelos is determined to push
on with the development of Angolas gas
sector. Construction started last November
on a liqueed natural gas (LNG) export
plant in the northern town of Soyo in
a partnership between Sonangol and
United States-based Chevron. There are
also plans for a domestic gas industry to
fuel several power stations.
EXPENSIVE AND RISKY INVESTMENT
A row is already brewing over the
decision in late March by the National
Assembly to allow the government to
waive taxes from gas rms to stimulate
gas exploration. Civil society activists
say it will deprive the state of millions of
dollars in future revenue from gas sales.
State ofcials insist the tax concessions
are necessary to promote costly and risky
investment in Angolas deep and ultra-
deep elds.
In addition to the law, which
also bolstered efforts to Angola-nise
the hydrocarbon sector, 10-year gas
exploration rights were granted to Eni
Angola Exploration BV, Galp Exploration
Petrolifera SA, Gas Natural West Africa
SL and Exem Energy BV.
Several of these companies enjoy
close ties to the political elite. For
example, Sonangols Chief Executive
Manuel Vicente is a director of Galp,
in which Eni SpA (Italy) has a 33.3%
stake. Vincente is also on the board of
the Banco Africano de Investimentos, the
favourite bank of the Futungo de Belas
(the presidential palace); Vice-President
of the Fundao Eduardo dos Santos
(FESA), President Dos Santoss charity;
and Director of Unitel, Angolas largest
telecommunications company. Exem is
a junior oil company incorporated in
the tax haven of Zug, Switzerland, with
political connections to the Futungo de
Belas. Although its principals and capital
are Angolan, Exem is managed by Swiss
lawyer Martin Eisenring of the rm
Eisenring, Zimmerli & Partner. This
follows a long list of politically connected
start-ups which have partnered up with
Western majors for offshore acreage
recently, including Grupo Gema, Somoil
and Initial Oil.
One Exem investor is the Kinshasa-
born businessman Sindika Dokolo,
the son of the late Congolese magnate
Augustin Dokolo Sanu and husband to
President Dos Santoss daughter Isabel.
Dokolo is also an administrator of the
Portuguese-based Amorim Energia (AC
Vol 49 No 14), which like Eni has a
33.3% stake in Galp. Dokolo is further
involved with Vicente through Unitel,
which is owned by Isabel dos Santos and
works with Dokolos own mobile phone
company, Amigotel (AC Vol 49 No 16).
Exem is also linked to Antnio
Mosquito Mbakassy, who has myriad
interests in oil and other businesses
in Angola. Curiously, two of those
awarded exploration rightsEni Angola
Exploration BV and Exem Energy BV
are Dutch-registered post-box companies
that channel investments from Eni SpA
and Exem Holding AG (Switzerland) to
Angola via the Netherlands.
The week after the gas awards were
announced, Manuel Nunes Jnior,
Angolas Minister of Economic Affairs,
ew to the Netherlands to sign a bilateral
investment treaty with his Dutch
counterpart, Maria van der Hoeven.
She had been in Luanda at the end of
March with several Dutch companies
bidding for contracts in shipping, energy
and infrastructure.
Eni is already involved in the LNG
plant in Soyo where construction costs,
which were originally estimated at
US$4 bn., are escalating. It is due to
start up in 2012 with the involvement
of Chevron, Sonangol, Total and British
Petroleum; Exxon pulled out last year
after disagreements over export markets.
The USA will be the primary market but
Sonangol has suggested that it could also
ship to Europe, albeit at a later stage.
AFRICA/OIL TRADING
How to win in a recession
The trading of oil and other commodities is far more lucrative and resistant
to demands for scrutiny than the beleaguered banking sector
T
he world of oil trading is as
remarkable for its prots as for its
opacity, some of its largest businesses
having an annual turnover of several
hundred billion dollars a year. Swiss-
based Glencore handles 3% of the worlds
daily oil supply. Many trading businesses
are privately held, so their nancial
statements are not available, much
less their tax details. They would make
fascinating reading.
For consumers, traders are just
an added layer of cost. More than in
nancial services, the main issue in oil
trading is who you know. Securing access
to decision-makers and making prots
for all involved are the imperatives. The
commodity is money, not oil, commented
one veteran observer of the business.
Oil traders make their money by
selling oil for more than they paid for it.
Some own infrastructure to rene it and
sell it on as jet fuel, naptha, diesel and
so on. Giants such as Vitol, Tragura and
Addax have diversied into, among other
things, rice trading, biofuels, gold mining
and offshore hedge fund management.
Addax Petroleum is listed on the Toronto
bourse but that is only the production
side. The trading side is Addax & Oryx,
which is based in Zug, Switzerland: that
is the holding company and it permits
only minimal disclosures.
Oil traders have grown mainly by
consolidation: there are fewer than there
used to be. For the biggest players, Africa
is a small market but the margins there
are fat. It suits some business people and
their friends in government; the business
is complex and politically charged, and
the accounting is opaque.
The oil allocation system is a patronage
tool in Africa: especially in Angola and
Nigeria but also in Algeria and Libya. In
the latter two, substantial shipments of
oil are not registered; they are purely sold
for the prot of those involved, while the
state is cheated of revenue.
Traders usually receive allocations of
crude oil from state-run oil companies,
such as the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC), Sonangol in Angola
or Sudans Sudapet. Gabons Petrolin
markets its own crude; its owner is local
businessman Samuel Dossou-Aworet, a
business ally of the late President Omar
Bongo Ondimba and his family. Petrolin
has a near monopoly over the trade in
oil from independent producers such
as Tullow, which have to sell their oil
through the company.
Nigerias NNPC sells 55-60% of all oil
produced there. A company allocated a
given amount can rene it or sell it on
to another oil trader. Allocations can be
made by politicians, so patronage is rife.
Ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo tried
to ensure that bidding companies met
certain technical criteria (such as annual
turnover and years in business), intended
to ensure that only bona de companies
could compete.
NEW KIDS FROM THE BLOC
Big eastern European trading businesses
have emerged in the past ve years.
Mercuria, originally from Poland, is
now based in Switzerland, as is Russias
Gunvor, which has links to the Kremlin
and Premier Vladimir Putin and has
skilfully exploited markets in Angola,
Congo-Kinshasa and Nigeria, with
Equatorial Guinea in prospect.
The only companies which disclose
information are those involved in
upstream oil production, such as Addaxs
production arm. That is because the
companies need partners who have to
vet them nancially and have to submit
to the disclosure requirements of stock
exchanges.
Algerias Sonatrach and Libyas
National Oil Corporation do not trade
oil like their West African counterparts:
there is no formal auction or tender.
They sell to the big corporate clients,
in theory without middlemen besides
the big established oil traders. Yet there
are rumours of private reserves for
the politically connected. National oil
companies also approach big reners to
buy oil. In Algeria and Libya, the national
oil companies have their own shipping
eets: they sell direct to reneries.
West Africa is more of an aberration.
The system there has evolved as a
patronage machine for traders and
politicians; both sides benet from the
lack of accountability. In the upstream
sector (exploration and production) in
Angola and Congo-Brazzaville, there
has been some progress on transparency
but little in the downstream (rening and
oil trading) sectors. Upstream projects
require huge amounts of capital and are
more subject to nancial scrutiny.
The oil-producing majors such as
Exxon, Shell and Total trade their own
crude. Subject to closer scrutiny than
the independent companies, they are
generally regarded as less susceptible to
corruption. In Nigeria, they both trade
the crude they produce, and buy and sell
that from other producers. The traders
need them and as they cannot rene all
their own crude, they need traders to buy
any surplus.
Traders compete to secure the biggest
possible yearly allocation of crude.
That is why, in Nigeria, the NNPCs
infrastructure is funded by the trading
houses which vie for its favours. Angola
is different. Sonangol, with ofces in
Singapore and Houston, United States,
trades some oil itself and is regarded as
more sophisticated, if smaller and no
more accountable, than the NNPC.
Because allocations are determined
in condence, the traders relationships
with governments are crucial. Civil
society activists claim that allocations
made on the basis of relations with
certain government ofcials can mean
rigged tenders.
Getting greater accountability in
the trading business will be difcult.
Currently, it is impossible to judge how
much oil the big four multinational oil
companies in Africa are trading. They are
not obliged to disclose the amounts and
they trade under many different names
and afliates.
There is little pressure for
transparency from African or Western
governments. The trading companies
and their owners have assets throughout
the world and most of the companies are
offshore. Regulating hedge funds would
be easier. Companies face pressure only
when they are trading with anti-Western
regimes, such as those in Iran or North
Korea.
Generations of oil and commodity
traders have made their fortunes in
Nigeria, some more honestly than others.
Most have been foreigners; Lebanese
traders have done particularly well
over the past 30 years. The fortunes of
Nigerian-born, Lebanese-descended,
British trader Ely Claude Alan Calil
rose on the back of General Ibrahim
Babangidas military regime (1985-93)
but he fell out of favour with the successor
regime under Gen. Sani Abacha.
Calil had been an early enthusiast
for the building of a gas export plant
in Nigeria but says he was pushed out
of the deal, which is now the subject of
four different international corruption
investigations. Abachas advisors Gilbert
and Jack Chagoury, also of Lebanese
origin, have grand social ambitions in the
USA: they were listed as big nanciers of
its Democratic Party.
With no transparency and few rules,
traders fortunes change over time.
Glencore was important in Nigeria under
INSIDE THE FOUR BIG TRADERS
Glencore: The company does not name its chief executive. The rm began
in 1994 when the United States commodities trader Marc Rich (who secured a
pardon for tax offences from President Bill Clinton, AC passim) sold his interest in
his own rm to its senior traders. Its main markets are Congo-Kinshasa, Kenya and
Nigeria, where it has both upstream and downstream operations. Its tank farms in
Nigeria store gasoline to sell to industry and it hopes to challenge Vitol with a bigger
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) oil allocation when Nigerian
crude production recovers.
Glencore has signicant mining stakes in European, southern African, US
and Asian markets. In Zambia, it has 73% of the Mopani copper mine (which also
produces cobalt), bought in 2000 with a capacity to smelt 650,000 tonnes. In 2006-
07, Glencore built up a 70% stake in Shanduka Coal in South Africa and it hopes to
expand in the countrys coal industry. Glencore also holds 35% of the mining group
Xstrata (listed in Britain and Switzerland), which produces ferrochrome, vanadium
and coal in South Africa. In Congo-Kinshasa, Glencore has 40% of Mutanda Mining
and 8.5% of Katanga Mining, both producing copper and cobalt and listed in
Toronto, Canada.
Addax: Jean-Claude Gandur, Chairman. It was founded in 1987 to focus on
West Africa. Its Samax gold mining arm, established at the same time, was
later sold to Ashanti Goldelds. In 2006, Addax Petroleum listed on the Toronto
Stock Exchange. Addax exports crude from Nigeria, Cameroon and Cte dIvoire,
among others, to reneries in West Africa, Europe, America and Asia; it imports
gasoline, jet fuel and heating oil to Africa.
Addax has long enjoyed very close relations with the NNPC, some of whose
members are rumoured to be shareholders. Starting as a trading company
dealing with 60-90,000 barrels per day of Nigerian crude, it developed upstream,
the only foreign independent to do so in Nigeria. Across Africa, besides trading,
it works in storage, exploration, production, service stations and liqueed
petroleum gas (LPG) distribution. Its purchase of Pan Ocean Energy made it,
along with its Oryx subsidiary (which has eleven afliate companies in nine
African countries), one of West Africas largest independent oil producers.
Addaxs gold exploration subsidiary Axmin has permits in Mali, Senegal,
Sierra Leone and Central African Republic, through its wholly owned CAR-
registered subsidiary, Aurafrique. Addaxs trading arm, Ascot Commodities,
imports rice into several African countries.
Vitol: Ian R. Taylor, President and Chief Executive, Vitol Group; Rob Nijst,
Chief Executive, Vitol Tank Terminals International. The biggest oil trader in
Africa, Geneva-based Vitol operates in most African countries that import or
export crude or products, with ofces in Ghana, Libya, Morocco and Nigeria.
The core business remains oil trading, including storage terminals and selling
gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. Vitol is expanding into natural gas and power, coal,
biofuels and carbon credit trading, and has diversied into oil exploration and
production in Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana and offshore Nigeria. A big LPG storage
facility in Lagos is due for completion this year, 50% owned by a local partner,
Nidogas. In South Africa, it has a sugar trading arm and a mining subsidiary
concentrating on zinc.
Tragura: Frank Runge, Director. The third-largest global oil trader has ofces
in Angola (with representatives in Luanda and Lobito), Congo-B, Congo-K, Cte
dIvoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. Outside oil trading, its
Puma Energy provides onshore and offshore oil support services, for example in
Ghana, and has retail service stations. Tragura also trades in non-ferrous metals
and has a stake in the copper producer Seksaoua in Morocco with Anglo American.
In 2003, it set up Galena Asset Management, based in the Cayman Islands,
which manages US$700 million for offshore hedge funds, mostly in commodity
derivatives. Tragura faces Britains largest class action suit over the spill of toxic
waste ofoaded from the Probo Koala in Abidjan in 2006 (AC Vol 50 No 11).
the Abacha regime; under Obasanjo, oil
traders had to cultivate a new group of
apparatchiks. One of the most sought-
after contacts was the National Security
Advisor and former Military Intelligence
chief, Gen. Aliyu Mohammed Gusau.
He has since left government but
remains active in the governing Peoples
Democratic Party.
MOVING DOWNSTREAM
Two companies well established in
Nigeria, Vitol and Arcadia (which also
does business in Equatorial Guinea),
have good relationships with NNPC boss
Mohammed Barkindo and Petroleum
Minister Rilwanu Lukman, a former
Secretary General of the Organisation of
Petroleum Exporting Countries. Over the
past decade, Vitol has become the biggest
trader of Nigerian crude, handling
around 300,000 barrels per day (bpd)
through several investment vehicles.
Vitol also has a lucrative contract to
import gasoline and petroleum products.
The poor state of Nigerian reneries
means they can rene just 50,000 bpd out
of the installed capacity of 400,000 bpd.
The failure of successive governments
to institute a commercial pricing policy
for locally rened products has deterred
investors from reneries and made a
fortune for oil traders.
Femi Otedolas Zenon, given rights
to import diesel under Obasanjo, has in
the past four years turned into one of
Nigerias biggest fuel importers. State
subsidies distort the market and since the
government pays a premium when oil
products are scarce, there are incentives
for stockpiling.
To minimise the risks attending price
variations, oil traders like to diversify
into rening fuels and liqueed natural
gas (LNG). Addax began in Nigeria as a
trading company then reinvented itself as
a company with close links to the NNPC,
handling 60-90 thousand bpd. So far, it
is the only foreign independent to grow
in Nigerias market, while one of its arms
deals in fuel products, mainly gasoline.
Many grumbles are heard from
outsiders about indigenous companies,
some of which chip away business
from the multinationals. At rst, the
big traders tried to get local partners
involved in their deals, not least for their
political clout. More recently, there has
been an emphasis on developing the
infrastructure and skills of local rms.
Although they have some political
advantages, local traders cannot really
compete with the international traders.
Most of the local companies are based in
one country, perhaps two or three. They
cannot get the nance from their banks.
Africas three biggest Oando, Petrodel
Resources Limited (owned by Michael
Prest, an ex-Glencore trader) and Sahara
are all Nigerian owned and based but
they are active in the region: Prest in
Mauritania, Oando in Cte dIvoire,
Sahara in Ghana and Senegal.
Nigeria is the only country where
there is a more complex tendering process
for crude oil allocations. That is because it
is the largest market and the government
realised that if it were organised, there
would be more to gain. Accordingly, the
NNPC relies more on traders than, for
example, Sonangol does. Sonangol trades
its own oil.
In Sudan and Congo-Brazzaville
there are tenders but they are charades.
In Equatorial Guinea, there is a shell
company, controlled and owned by the
presidency, which markets state oil.
Edo
Ondo
Del ta
Bayel sa
I mo
Anambra
Abi a
Akwa
I bom
Cross
Ri ver
Ebonyi
CAM.
EQUAT.
GUINEA
Ri vers
0
0 25 50
50 100
Miles
Kilometres
Benin City
Port
Harcourt
Onitsha
Aba
Calabar
Ikot-
Ekpene
Uyo
Abakaliki
Awka
Sapele
Warri
Asaba
Owerri
G U L F O F G U I N E A
N
i
g
e
r
C
r
o
s
s
Forcados
Escravos
Pennington
Brass River
Bonny
Kwa Iboe
0
0 5
10
Miles
Kilometres
Oporoza
Escravos
Chevron facility
Benikrukru
Kurutie
Okerenkoko
Kurukunama
I B O
O G O NI
I B I B I O
E F I K
I J AW
NE MB E
I B O
Main JTF attacks
on non-combatants
Reported clashes
between JTF and MEND
State boundary
Oil/gas field
Pipeline
Oil export terminal
Ethnic group
NIGERIA
The ght gets more serious
President Umaru YarAduas government is letting the military take the
initiative in the Delta at the expense of a political solution
T
he latest government offensive in
the Niger Delta is the heaviest for
several years, with 3,000 troops,
two warships, 14 boats and at least
four helicopter gunships moving into
Gbaramatu Kingdom, an Ijaw region
in the Western Delta near Chevrons
Escravos oil facility. The Movement for
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
responded by destroying ve of Chevrons
nearby pipelines. MEND has a diffuse but
well-armed network of ghters, with up
to ve training bases hidden in the creeks
and a well-run system of weapon caches.
Gang leaders who sign up to MEND keep
their own camps and bases.
Human rights groups claim, with
varying degrees of credibility, that
between fty and several thousand
civilians have been killed in the operation
so far. Media-savvy militant groups hope
for a big propaganda advantage. The
military Joint Task Force (JTF) said it
could no longer fold its hands after
weeks of attacks on soldiers, hijacking
of oil vessels and kidnapping of workers
around Gbaramatu. Oil production has
fallen to under 1.6 million barrels per
day from a peak of 2.4 mn. bpd three
years ago.
Troops are hunting down militants
believed to follow High Chief
Government Ekpemupolo, alias
Tompolo, a MEND commander with
links to Delta politicians and whose
involvement in the conict goes back to
the Ijaw-Itsekiri communal violence in
1997. There are rumours that the army
plans to establish a permanent barracks
in the area, in Tompolos fathers house.
Amnesty International and others
report that 20-30,000 non-combatants,
caught in the crossre, are eeing the
area for safety near the oil centre of
Warri. There has been little reaction
from foreign governments although,
after visiting a Total oil platform, French
Prime Minister Franois Fillon signed
pacts with the federal government on
legal cooperation and security in the
Delta. There is plenty of oil on offer
internationally and no immediate risk of
a sudden price rise.
Security has been getting worse for
months, investment has been declining
and the currency, the naira, has grown
weaker as oil prices falter. On 23 May,
a week after the ghting began, state
governors from the Delta met with foreign
diplomats and the media. They blamed
the crisis largely on other governments
failure to address bunkering (the theft
of oil from pipelines) and small-arms
trafcking. Hitherto, they had mostly
blamed the petroleum industry.
MILITANTS ON STATE PAYROLL
In February, three governors Emmanuel
Uduaghan of Delta State, Rotimi
Amaechi of Rivers and Timipreye Sylva
of Bayelsa attended a Chatham House
roundtable in London. Sylva named six
militants who had been brought into the
government fold as proof that conditions
for business were improving. Yet by
March, companies from South Africa,
France, the Netherlands and the United
States had joined Willbros and Kellogg
Brown & Root in an exodus from the
Delta, all citing security concerns. Sylva
denounced militancy and declared that
allocations to militants on Bayelsa
States payroll would be cut.
Sylva and Uduaghan have close
links to militant groups. Uduaghan
set up the Delta Waterways Security
Committee, which many including, it
seems, the JTF commander, Brigadier
General Nanven Wuyep Rimtip call
the nationalisation of bunkering. Locals
say Uduaghan has often visited a known
training camp; George Timinimi, who
runs the Delta State Ministry of Water
Resources, was Tompolos friend but
is now his rival. Tompolo, who is close
to many Ijaw politicians, has security
contracts with the State government and
perhaps with oil companies. In January
2008, he was given his own oil pipeline.
Until recently, Tompolo received
N100 million a month from Governor
Uduaghan. Local sources say he has not
been paid for four months. Nobody knows
why the payments stopped but local
ethnic rivalries are involved. Gbaramatu
people in the refugee camps say that
festivities on 15 May would have revealed
a new paramount chief in Gbaramatu
Kingdom, a political power-base for
the Ijaw, one of Delta States eight
ethnic groups. Tompolo and Timinimi
had nominated rival candidates. JTF
helicopters attacked the festival.
Some claim that the armys real target
is the weak President in Abuja. They say
the army took action in the Delta in order
to precipitate a national crisis, provoke a
national state of emergency, stage a coup
and replace President Umaru Musa
YarAdua with a military gure. Military
conspiracies are not unusual in Nigeria
but no conspiracy is required to explain
recent events. They repeat a pattern
established when the gang leaders
Mujahid Dokubo-Asari and Ateke Tom
were ghting it out across the Delta, in
2003-05 (AC Vol 48 No 23).
Violence and mayhem are linked to
criminality and election-rigging. Alarmed
foreign investors leave the Delta in
droves. State governors then try to pay
off and accommodate militants and gang
leaders, the most intransigent of whom
are detained (as was Asari in 2005;
he was released in June 2007). The
removal of the most aggressive militants
calms investors and oil companies, and
persuades other gang leaders to limit
their aggression to an acceptable level
while remaining on hand for election-
xing and, probably, sharing illicit
revenue with Delta politicians.
TOMPOLO THE TARGET
Each time, the acceptable level of
violence rises and overall security moves
nearer to breakdown. Paying off and
rewarding bunkering and armed violence
attracts yet more politico-criminal
gangsters to the business. This time, the
attempt to co-opt Tompolo failed and his
revenue from oil bunkering is squeezed
by low prices. His base in Gbaramatu is
to be destroyed, and he is to be hung out
to dry by his former allies.
On 11 April, the daily Vanguard
published a leaked list of militant leaders
believed to be on a federal government
amnesty list. Tompolo was not on it. The
attacks seem designed to humiliate
him and make it impossible for him to
regain his earlier position, thanks to
coordination between state and federal
governments, and the JTF. A similar
manoeuvre failed with Asari and led to
the formation of MEND. If Tompolo is
removed, who will take his place? Will
his MEND brethren stay loyal, now his
friends in politics have abandoned him?
Much depends on whether the
JTF pursues other militant leaders
as vigorously and on the reaction of
the loose-knit MEND leadership. It
is possible that those on the leaked
amnesty list will accept that MEND
is formally disbanded, with control of
Escravos handed to state politicians
and a permanent military presence
(including control of illicit revenue).
Continued criminal operations would be
tolerated, if better security allowed the
oil industry contractors back.
The two most active gang leaders
linked to MEND in the Eastern Delta are
Ateke Tom and Soboma George. They
present the army with uid targets
and complex relationships between
communities, militants and criminals.
Wholesale attacks on regions where
militants are thought to train could
cause huge displaced populations and
other humanitarian issues. Delta-
watchers fear that the hardcore MEND
commanders would see this as the real
showdown and counterattack the federal
authorities.
This would precipitate, over months,
the scenario foreseen in the 2003
report for Shell by British nancial and
information company WAC Services
Limited: that the oil company would be
driven offshore entirely in 2009. In such
a conict, hundreds of complex local
disputes (like the succession of chiefs in
Gbaramatu) would become enmeshed
in ghting between disparate gangs
and the army, involving ever greater
numbers of federal forces.
NIGERIA
The hunt for Tompolo
The government troops who raided the militants hideout say they
discovered secret documents listing the ghters and their political contacts
T
he rebel commander High Chief
Government Ekpemupolo, alias
Tompolo, is on the run from
government forces, and the war in the
Niger Delta is intensifying. Some of
Tompolos supporters say he is lying low
in Warri, the capital of Delta State, or in a
well-fortied camp in the creeks. Others
claim he is in Cameroon.
Government forces claim Tompolo, in
his ight, left behind in his guesthouse
a package of documents giving details
about the identity of his ghters, arms
procurement and relations with senior
Delta politicians. If the documents
prove genuine, the repercussions could
be huge. Yet Tompolos Movement for
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND) rejects the documents as fake
and is stepping up hit-and-run operations
against government forces and oil
companies. Equally, politicians named in
the documents such as the Niger Delta
governors also claim the documents are
false and part of a conspiracy against
them. Yet the allegations of high-level
collaboration between militants and state
ofcials have thrown the regions politics
into confusion.
President Umaru Musa YarAduas
government looks determined to face
down the militants despite the human
cost. A Joint Task Force of army, air force
and navy personnel is trying to close
down MENDs bases, most of them in the
Gbaramatu kingdom, close to Chevrons
Escravos oil facility. This operation has
left 20,000-30,000 people stranded in
the creeks, according to the human rights
group Amnesty International, and 3,000-
4000 in the Ogbe-Ijoh displaced persons
camp near Warri. MEND ghters claim
to have killed 18 soldiers, and the JTF
acknowledges that they are missing in
action.
MEND says the cache of rusty ries
shown by the JTF to reporters was a
joke, left on the jetty at Camp 5 as MEND
ghters got away. The real armoury seems
to have vanished with its commander. It
is believed to include rocket-propelled
grenade launchers, newly acquired
German assault ries, and maybe some
of the surface-to-air missiles that other
groups such as those loyal to the semi-
retired gangster Mujahid Dokubo-Asari
had acquired (AC Vol 48 No 23).
The JTF commander in the eld, Major
General Sarkin Yarkin-Bello, says that
the documents in Tompolos guesthouse
included a Janes Defence manual on
armoured cars and ghter jets. Some
say MEND hopes to buy weapons, others
reckon it wants to nd out the capacity of
the JTFs equipment. Tompolo has acted
as an arms broker, so he is not just a
customer. Potentially the most damning
documents are said to link Camp 5 and
Tompolos MEND bases to politicians in
the ruling Peoples Democratic Party and
oil company ofcials. The military says
the documents also include a list of all
MEND ghters and their units, and local
political and business supporters.
Many activists and human rights
lawyers in the Delta claim that MEND
has links to three governors Emmanuel
Uduaghan of Delta State, Rotimi
Amaechi of Rivers State and Timipreye
Sylva of Bayelsa and George Timinimi,
who runs the Delta State Ministry of
Water Resources (AC Vol 50 No 11). All
four vehemently reject such allegations.
THE STATE EXCHEQUER HAS LIMITS
There have clearly been communications
about the release of hostages, but the
documents if real suggest involvement
by MEND and a range of political allies
in racketeering and extortion. Governor
Uduaghan has angrily denied allegations
that he paid Tompolo 100 million naira
(US$680,000) a month until recently.
Apart from rejecting the substance of
these claims, he says that the Delta State
exchequer would not run to such vast
sums as oil prices fall.
However, Uduaghan is under growing
political pressure, mainly due to the
worsening conict in his State. Perhaps
to distract attention from these problems,
he has suddenly suspended Ayiri Emami,
a member of the Governors Special
Security Committee, from the Vice-
Chairmanship of the Delta Waterways
Security Committee. Emami is involved
with security and community liaison in
the Escravos Gas to Liquid Project, which
is jointly run by Chevron and the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation. He has
also been suspended from the board of
the Nigercat Construction Company. He is
said to have made ethnically inammable
statements in a newspaper interview.
Other documents from Tompolos
house suggest that ex-President Olusegun
Obasanjo regularly used anti-corruption
measures to enforce his writ over Delta
politicians. The compliant were rewarded,
the dissidents pushed out and the
corruption continued.
International anti-corruption measures
make little impression on Nigerian politics.
Obasanjos government won kudos for
signing up to the British-backed Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative,
and some high-level malefactors were
prosecuted by the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission chaired by Nuhu
Ribadu. However, disagreements arose
when Ribadu produced strong evidence of
graft by some of Obasanjos political allies
in the Delta. Ribadu is now in exile and
the EFCC has lost all credibility.
MENDs Jomo Gbomo has dismissed
the Tompolo list as a fake. In the version
displayed by Maj. Gen. Yarkin-Bello,
Tompolo attacks his former political allies
and friends in the Delta along with other
state governments for benetting from
his operations and then betraying him.
Government forces seem to be uncertain
about who now directs MENDs military
campaign.
The JTF plans to establish a permanent
barracks in the creeks to control security.
That could break the collaboration
between rogue military ofcers and
politicians with militants who prot from
hijacking and bunkering (stealing oil and
gas from pipes) or it could facilitate
even more deals. The government says it
has ordered the JTF to allow a ceasere,
giving the militants a chance to negotiate
an amnesty and disband MEND. Yet the
soldiers continue with their house-to-house
hunts, and the chance that an amnesty
would work looks remote.
Opinion is polarised among the Ijaw,
whose communities especially Oporoza,
Kurutie and Okerenkoko have been
devastated. Professor Kimse Okoko, the
former President of the Ijaw National
Congress, described MEND as self-
styled leaders. The ultra-radical Joint
Revolutionary Force and its idiosyncratic
Spokeswoman, Cynthia Whyte, said the
ghting in Gbaramatu was the culmination
of an attempt by these ungrateful and
uncircumcised elements to cage the rising
stature of Government Ekpemupolo, a true
Ijaw freedom ghter and emancipator.
The fresh ghting has sidelined the
tentative political initiatives promoted by
third parties. As conditions deteriorate
for local people, there is no political
pressure from the Presidency, the National
Assembly or the military to change tactics
in the Delta. Onshore oil production will
be the big loser, further cutting Nigerias
foreign-exchange earnings.
ALGERIA
Victory in a vacuum
This time, rigging the turnout was more important than rigging the
vote
S
ince there was no heavyweight
candidate to stand against him, it
was little surprise that President
Abdelaziz Bouteika was re-elected with
90.24% of the vote in the 9 April election
(AC Vol 50 No 1). More surprising, given
the general apathy and the outright anger
with the regime in parts of the country,
was the 74.6% turnout announced by
Interior Minister Nourredine Yazid
Zerhouni, a long-standing friend of the
President.
The authorities had taken precautions
to avoid Boutef being humiliated by a low
turnout, after supposedly secret ofcial
polling had suggested that only around
15-20% of electors were going to vote,
with a lower percentage still in Algiers
and Kabylie.
Trouble broke out in the Kabylie
region: a bomb wounded two policemen at
a polling station in Boumerds and there
was trouble in Bouira wilaya (province)
and at Tazmalt near Bjaa, where youths
clashed with police. Members of the
armed forces and the burgeoning police
force reported that they had been ordered
to vote for the President candidate, as
the full apparatus of state swung behind
Bouteika. The Boura turnout was
ofcially 66.47%, with the Grande Kabylie
capital Tizi Ouzou at 30.75% and Algiers
at nearly 65%. Zerhouni had delivered.
Bouteika now has his third, ve-year
term in ofce, following the constitutional
changes wrought in late 2008 to allow
him to stand (AC Vol 49 No 25). The fact
that the rival clans in the military-security
elite that still dominates decision-making
could not nd a candidate with any hope of
winning is a tribute to Bouteikas success
in building up a power base during his rst
decade in power. Genuine candidates, such
as former President Lamine Zroual and
former Premier Mouloud Hamrouche,
had decided it was not even worthwhile
signalling any real interest in standing.
Amid claims of fraud, international
concern was muted. The only off note
came from Washington, where on 10
April, a Department of State spokesperson
expressed concern. This would not,
however, be sufcient to derail the United
States good relations with Bouteika,
though it may reect a return to US
attention to a democratic decit. The
DOS has also been leading on efforts to
isolate the Mauritanian junta, promoting
targeted sanctions. Most other partners
of Algeria issued speedy telegrams of
congratulation, led by France and quickly
followed by Spain and the European
Union presidency.
The 72-year-old President is not all-
powerful, though. His support among
factions of dcideurs (decision-makers)
within the military-security and business
elite also widely known as le pouvoir
(power) wanes markedly during his
periodic disappearances from centre stage,
which are believed to be due to chronic
illness. Some of his most cherished aims
remain blocked: the revised constitution
was delayed by debate over creating a
new post of vice-president, which Boutef
favoured. Many sources believe that behind
this issue lay the Presidents determination
to get his favoured younger brother, Sad
Bouteika, anointed as his successor. This
was blocked by dcideur factions, as well
as by public opinion. Many Algerians are
as wary of Sad Bouteikas reputation as a
man of business and backroom politicking
as they are of the emergence of political
dynasties.
The best gossip at the time of Bouteikas
campaign launch in February involved a
sighting of the arch eradicator and power
broker famously sacked by Boutef the
THE CONTENDERS
According to the ofcial result, conrmed by the Constitutional Council on 14 April,
President Abdelaziz Bouteika was re-elected with 90.24% of the vote, from a 74.6%
turnout. The other candidates represented different political tendencies but none of
them posed a threat to Boutef. Even though they all polled below 5%, some may
yet feature in political manoeuvres to come.
Louisa Hanoune, 4.22%: the Parti des Travailleurs (PT, Workers Party) leader
polled only 1% in 2004, when she gained prominence as the Arab worlds rst female
presidential candidate. At 55, Hanoune has built on her reputation as a human rights
and feminist campaigner; the PT now has 26 seats in the Assemble Populaire
Nationale (APN). In the jockeying for position before Bouteikas constitutional
changes, she seems to have secured some extra gains in womens rights for
agreeing to participate in the election. There was speculation that she would be
offered a government post but Hanoune has been highly critical of electoral fraud,
which none of the 48 wilayas (provinces) avoided. This may prove true, though her
claims that she might have won up to 30% of the vote seem far-fetched.
Moussa Touati, 2.31%: the Front National Algrien was originally rooted in the
eradicationist camp. In 2004, Touati failed to get sufcient signatures in enough
wilayas to take part; this time, he found it easier to stand. The result reected Touatis
real popular appeal, But he will continue to feature on the local political scene.
Mohamed Djahid Younsi,1.37%: the Islamic El Islah movements charismatic
founder, Sheikh Abdallah Djeballah, emerged from the moderate Islamist camp
but his party has been rife with bickering and now has only two APN members.
Ali Faouzi Rebane, 0.93%: the leader of AHD 54 (representing allegiance to the
1954 revolution) is another loyal opponent, with no real political weight but some
substance in society; he helped to found the respected Ligue Algrienne des Droits
de lHomme (Algerian Human Rights League) in 1985.
Mohand Oussad Belad (aka Mohammed Sad), 0.92%: under the banner of the
new Parti pour la Libert et la Justice (PLJ), the former diplomat once headed the
campaign of the ex-Foreign Minister and pillar of the regimes traditional Arab-
Islamist wing, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, to challenge Bouteika in 2004. Ahmed Talebs
attempt to stand then was blocked by the Constitutional Council, as were efforts to
legalise his Wafa party. The PLJ represents Talebs point of view but Belad lacks his
former bosss political weight and thus posed no threat to Boutef.
former Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General
Mohammed Lamari turning up to
show support. Boutefs most outspoken
establishment critic of recent months has
been former naval commander Rachid
Benyells, a high-yer during Chadli
Bendjedids presidency (1979-91) but now
not identied with any major dcideur clan
that might propel him towards eventual
power. The widely respected ex-President
Zeroual made it clear he would not stand,
despite his reservations about the direction
of policy.
A majority of dcideurs have decided,
for now, that Bouteika remains their
best bet. Yet they do not want to see his
family establishing a long-term hold
on the presidency: attempts to get Sad
Bouteika a formal seat at the top table
will continue to be resisted.
The election was historic, giving
Algeria a third-term President, but it was
no political watershed. Concern remains
over Bouteikas health and whether
he can see out his term, to 2014. In the
smoke-lled rooms where deals are
still cut, politicians are manoeuvring
for Algeria to enter the next phase of its
political development or at least move
towards factional change. The lines of
succession are unclear.
Critical to this will be any signs of
change within the senior and middle ranks
of the armed forces, where a generation
of generals is expected to be retired. The
Minister Delegate for National Defence,
Gen. Abdelmalek Guenazia, runs the
Defence Ministry for the formal Defence
Minister, the head of state. He has carved
out more of a niche for himself than
expected, as has the Chief of Staff who
replaced Lamari, the jovial and quietly
cunning Major Gen. Ahmed Salah Gad.
Yet neither man is seen as a major power
broker and younger ofcers are said
to be keen for them to stand down in a
wider military reshufe, to allow a new
generation to replace the old fat cats.
As ever, most speculation surrounds
the security chief, Maj. Gen. Mohamed
Tewk Medienne, who remains a
shadowy gure while being involved in
all levels of national and, indeed, regional,
politics. His security services are highly
active in Mali, Mauritania, Niger and
other Sahel states. Medienne has placed
himself at the centre of events in the
Sahara, making Algeria the key US ally in
the region by promoting the view that Al
Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and
the Groupe Salaste pour la Prdication et
le Combat (GSPC) that preceded it, are
creating a new zone of Islamic terrorism
in the Sahel. This has paid dividends
in helping to rehabilitate Mediennes
services following the dirty war of the
1990s but critics allege that agents of
the Dpartement du Renseignements et de
la Scurit have been actively involved
in fanning the ames of these conicts,
including Decembers kidnapping of
Canadian diplomats Robert Fowler and
Louis Guay, who are United Nations
Special Envoys to Niger.
SECURITY DOSSIERS
Closer to home, Medienne keeps the
dossiers on all of Algerias major gures.
With long-time dcideur Gen. Larbi
Belkheir ailing, this gives Medienne
unchallenged power, as well as a big
incentive to hang on at the top of the
powerful security apparatus.
After the election, the political mix
remains as before. The two leading Kabylie-
based opposition parties both boycotted
the poll. They are the Rassemblement pour
la Culture et la Dmocratie (RCD) led by
Sad Sadi, which has stood in some past
elections, and independent Algerias oldest
opposition party, Hocine At Ahmeds
Front des Forces Socialistes. Bouteikas
strategists wanted Sadi to stand (there is
speculation that he was offered a ministry
or two) and the RCDs decision not to
play ball has led to pressure from the
authorities since polling day.
Three major parties in the ruling
Alliance Prsidentielle (AP) of course
supported Bouteika: the Front de
Libration Nationale (FLN), Prime Minister
Ahmed Ouyahias Rassemblement
National Dmocratique (RND) and the
Mouvement de la Socit pour la Paix
(Harakat Mujtamaa as-Silm, in Arabic, or
MSP). The AP has come under pressure
from differences among the parties but
none of the incumbents seem inclined
to lose the benets of ofce. Ouyahia
retains his ambition to take the presidency
after Boutef and has the right dcideur
connections to be a contender, if his boss
does not derail him before then.
With low oil prices, ministers will come
under further pressure to cut spending.
Foreign investment remains lacklustre:
Arab investors and many multinationals
were discouraged by Bouteikas move
towards a more nationalist economic
policy over the last three years. This
suggests that bold predictions of tens of
thousands of new jobs being created during
the third term will not be met, making life
still harder for ordinary families. More
localised industrial disputes and social
protest can be expected, some of it violent;
a trickle of young recruits will continue
to join AQIM. Yet the power brokers in
Algiers show no sign of conceding that
they need to nd a new political formula
to better meet popular aspirations.
ETHIOPIA
A change is going to come
After 18 years in power, serious moves are afoot to renew the
leadership of the ruling EPRDF
C
hange is coming to Ethiopia, says
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. It
was time the countrys political
old guard stepped down, he told Africa
Condential in an interview on 3 May.
Meles has submitted his resignation and
the ruling party discussed it in February
but that does not make it inevitable. If
there is a change, it would be more of
personnel than policy, he suggested. The
issue was not that the Ethiopian Peoples
Revolutionary Democratic Front had ruled
for 18 years but that the same people have
been in positions of leadership throughout
the period. He included himself in the old
leadership which was leading the EPRDF
during the armed struggle and up to
now.
When asked if he was expecting a
collective transition, Meles replied, Yes, I
think that the next crucial step needs to be
taken, implying that the older generation
faced retirement. Meles has recently
repeated that he would like to step down
by the next elections. This statement has
been greeted with scepticism. He had
been less forthright about renewing the
leadership a message that many of his
colleagues will not welcome. The EPRDF
has ruled since 1991 and many leaders
of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front
(TPLF), the main party in its four-party
coalition, have been in positions of power
since they took up arms in 1975. No names
have ofcially been named.
Any changes on this scale require an
EPRDF congress. Several options would
open up regarding Meles successor. The
generation that moved the mountains, as
the war veterans that defeated Colonel
Mengistu Haile Mariams regime are
known, may be growing tired. It seems
unlikely that a collective transition could
pass unopposed: some in the EPRDF
might feel they should take over if Meles
left ofce.
Opposition could also come from
closer to home: the Premiers wife,
Azeb Mesn, is now in a controlling
position at the Endowment Fund for
the Rehabilitation of Tigray. She might
not relish a diminution of her growing
political role, even for the sake of the
ruling partys political health.
Leading potential candidates include
Seyoum Mesn, Abay Tsehaye, Addisu
Legesse, Tewodros Adhanom and
Arkebe Oqubay. All are Tigrayan:
ethnicity is an important bargaining
chip in this diverse society and despite
representing the major nationalities, the
EPRDF is dominated by Tigrayans, even
though they are nationally outnumbered
by both Amharas and Oromo. There are
those who think a Tigrayan successor to
Meles could widen ethnic divisions that
the EPRDF has never been able to close.
The question of succession may
be largely academic. Leaving the nal
decision on Meless resignation to the
party offers plenty of room for a change of
face. The issue was raised at the quarterly
EPRDF Executive Committee meeting in
February, attended by an equal number of
representatives from each member party:
the TPLF, Amhara National Democratic
Movement (both EPRDF founding
members), Oromo Peoples Democratic
Organisation and Southern Ethiopian
Peoples Democratic Movement.
There was heated discussion but no
consensus. Meless recognition of the
need to rejuvenate the EPRDF as a whole
demonstrates that he understands the
need for a show of democratic change. A
new party leader would set an important
precedent and mark the rst-ever peaceful
and voluntary handover of power in
Ethiopia.
However, a change of age group might
not trigger a change of attitude. Tewodros
would ostensibly constitute a departure
from the traditional leadership; he was
not involved in the student movement and
played no part in the liberation struggle,
yet he is very close to Meles and would
provide no real change of direction. Arkebe
took part in the liberation struggle, albeit
for less time than others of the old guard,
yet he retains more political independence
than might be expected.
In any event, the EPRDF has begun
to prepare actively for the elections.
The government has organised talks on
procedure: it is keen to avoid the violence
and other problems of 2005, when an
impressive pre-electoral process was
marred by post-poll violence, followed
by the refusal of some elected opposition
members to take their seats in Parliament.
The opposition has already said that it
does not expect a fair deal but although
still much divided, some elements have
begun organising.
The major challenge may come from
the Forum (Medrek) for Democratic
Dialogue in Ethiopia (FDDE), an alliance
of parties established by former Defence
Minister Siye Abraha and former President
Negasso Gidada. A central element in the
Forum is the Arena Tigray for Democracy
and Sovereignty, under Gebru Asrat, an
opposition party in Tigray Region which
threatens the TPLF in its own heartland.
The other parties in Forum include:
Ethiopian Democratic Unity Movement;
Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement,
led by member of parliament Bulcha
Demeksa; Somali Democratic Alliance
Forces; the United Ethiopian Democratic
Forces, which consists of the Ethiopian
Social Democratic Party and Southern
Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Congress
(both chaired by Beyene Petros, MP),
plus the Oromo Peoples Congress of
MP Merara Gudina; and Union for
Democracy and Justice (UDJ), chaired by
Birtukan Mideksa.
These parties have all agreed to
contest the elections under the Medrek
banner while maintaining their own
structures and leaders. They thus hope to
avoid a collapse like that of the opposition
Coalition for Unity and Democracy in
2005. The CUD had never been much
more than a veil covering major policy
disagreements and competing ambitions;
its leaders inability to put aside these
ambitions lost it many supporters. The
need for an effective coalition is pressing.
A group of former CUD members led by
Birtukan set up the UDJ, which is now in
the Forum. Former CUD Chairman Hailu
Shawel, who refuses to have anything to
do with his former colleagues, has formed
the All Ethiopia Unity Party. Yet another
splinter, led by Ayele Chamiso, has kept
the CUD name. The United Ethiopian
Democratic Party-Medhin is renamed the
Ethiopian Democratic Party. It is still led
by Lidetu Ayelew, who caused its split
with the CUD after a confrontation with
Hailu Shawel.
Ginbot 7 was founded last year in the
diaspora and is not registered in Ethiopia.
It is led by Berhanu Nega, the only
opposition leader to leave Ethiopia after
oppositionists were pardoned in 2007. The
24 April arrests have raised its prole (AC
Vol 50 No 9). Most ex-CUD parties suffer
from the widespread disenchantment
about their inghting; it is uncertain how
much support they will get.
Opposition fractures are visible, despite
the edgling alliances. Where power is
ercely contested, this is dangerous. Many
oppositionists have little faith that the
government will address their concerns:
expanding political freedom, freeing
all political prisoners, press freedom
and equal media access, neutrality for
the National Electoral Board, full and
independent judiciary, and freedom of
expression. Without a concerted attempt
at organisation, none of the opposition
parties can hope for a favourable outcome
to the 2010 elections.
CLAN TROUBLE
Apart from President Faure, other members of Gnassingb Eyadmas family have
been prominent in Togolese political life.
Ernest Gnassingb, the eldest son, trained as an army ofcer in preparation, many
assumed, to succeed his father. In 1993, as head of the para-commandos in Kara,
he led an ambush that left opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio seriously wounded.
In 2003, he was incapacitated by a stroke. There were rumours in January, still
unconrmed, that he had died in hospital in Paris.
Rock Gnassingb, a younger son, Commander of the Rgiment Blind (Armoured
Regiment) and head of the Togolese Football Federation, is considered a lightweight.
He sees himself as a family mediator and could ght to preserve its power.
Essozilam Gnassingb, another son, is in detention, though some think he has
disappeared. He has a communications company in Lom.
Captain Bagoubadi Gnassingb, alleged plotter and son of Colonel Toyi
Gnassingb, Eyadma seniors brother. Toyi was killed in the assault on Prime
Minister Ko Kofgohs ofce in 1991, which marked the end of Togos brief
experiment in democracy.
Gnassingb Eyadmas daughter Gnkl, said to have been her fathers favourite,
ran his electoral campaign in 2003. She is thought to be in the Faure camp.
TOGO
Brothers and enemies
The Gnassingb family that has run Togo for almost 42 years has split,
opening up competition for the presidential election due next year
T
he two most powerful sons of the late
President Gnassingb Eyadma have
fallen out. Kpatcha Gnassingb was
arrested on 12 April (AC Vol 50 No 8),
charged with plotting a coup dtat against
his elder half-brother, Faure Essozimna
Gnassingb, President of Togo since 2005.
Several of Kpatchas guards were killed in
the four-hour assault on his house. Two
other half-brothers and several inuential
ofcers along with other soldiers have
been arrested.
The old dictator had never made clear
which son he wanted to succeed him and
the Faure-Kpatcha rivalry was no secret.
Both accompanied their dying father on
the ight from Lom to Tripoli, whence he
was supposed to travel on to see doctors
in Israel. He died on the ight; local
rumour insists that he was dead before
departure and that the ight was a way
of buying time to x the succession. When
the brothers got home with the body, they
found that the ruling ethno-military clique
had pronounced Faure President in the
interest of stability. Under international
pressure, he resigned to stand for an
election which he unsurprisingly won.
Kpatcha became Defence Minister but was
referred to as the Vice-President.
By December 2007, the relationship
had become impossible. Kpatcha was
sacked but continued to represent his home
village in the National Assembly. Gabons
President Omar Bongo Ondimba,
Burkinab President Blaise Compaor
and Libyas Colonel Moammar el Gadaf
tried to mediate but failed. Modest and
soft-spoken, Faure was educated in
France and the United States in business
administration. Kpatcha is larger in size
and manner, with some of his fathers
thuggish ways. His supporters believe
that he was the rightful successor, of pure
Kaby descent, while Faures mother was
Ewe from Atakpam in central Togo.
A northern ethnic group making up
20% of the population, the Kaby have
dominated Togo over Eyadma Seniors 38
years as President and since. Some people
adopted the name Gnassingb as an aid to
promotion. Eyadma means courageous
in Kaby and Eyadma Pre, who gave
himself the name, had more than 50
children by many mothers. Rivalries were
inevitable. The macho-mystical nature
of Kaby traditions is well described in
the satirical novel by an Ivorian long
resident in Togo, Ahmadou Kourouma,
En Attendant le Vote des Btes Sauvages
(Waiting for the Wild Beasts to Vote). The
Kaby socio-religious evala wrestling
tournament, in July, was elevated to a
national event in the Eyadma years
a pseudo-tradition that Kpatcha was
comfortable with and Faure, less keenly,
had to observe as successor to the Great
Helmsman. After he was sworn in as
President in May 2005, he went off to the
Gnassingb home town of Pya for a Kaby
leadership initiation ceremony.
This months clash has worried the
Kaby heartland. Reporters who went
to the main town, Kara, said there had
been some initial unrest but Faures allies
were engaged in a calming exercise.
The army has played a key role; its Chief
of Staff, General Zakari Nandja, has
led the support for Faure. The powerful
commander of the Force dIntervention
Rapide (Rapid Intervention Force), Colonel
Abalo Flix Kadanga, led the assault on
Kpatchas house and backs the President.
Married to an Eyadma daughter, he is
Ewe from Atakpam, like Faures mother.
His assault was stopped after four hours
by another half-brother, Rock, said to
have been protecting family interests.
The French government and the
European Development Commissioner,
Louis Michel, a fan of Faure, have
applied pressure for due process and a
curb on intemperate action. A more direct
warning was delivered by Said Djinnit,
the United Nations Special Envoy to West
Africa, who told Faure on 21 April that
the UN wished the investigation into the
coup attempt to be in conformity with the
law and in the framework of strict respect
for judicial and legal procedures in force
in Togo under the norms of international
law. Benin and Nigeria sent envoys to see
what was going on.
In his rst appearance before a
magistrate, Kpatcha refused legal
representation. The court was told that
he had been trying to undermine the
security of the state, while Faure was
preparing to leave for China, a trip that
he immediately postponed. We hear that
foreign intelligence agencies had alerted
Faure to the threat. Less convincing was
the display of weapons said to have been
found in Kpatchas possession.
Gilchrist Olympio, 72, is girding his
Union des Forces de Changement for next
years presidential polls. In the awed
parliamentary elections of 2007, his party
won 38% of the seats and the ruling
Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais failed
to win a majority. The UFC condemned
as underhanded Faures 17 April speech
denouncing the coup attempt (Faures
father came to power in a coup dtat)
and said the events of 12-13 April showed
the falsity of his professed respect for
the rule of law, non-violence and the
presumption of innocence. The UFC
also wants the Commission Electorale
Nationale Indpendante du Togo reformed,
as promised.
Faure still has strong backers in Paris,
but Nicolas Sarkozys government is
keener on African democracy than its
predecessors. His Secretary of State for
Cooperation, Alain Joyandet, has said
that France wants an election open to all,
equitable, transparent and democratic.
Joyandet says Paris would not accept
the exclusion of any serious candidate in
2010, as Olympio was excluded in 2005.
Faures victory over Kpatcha could also be
Olympios opportunity.
SOUTH AFRICA
BEE hits the credit crunch
The transfer of wealth to black owners is slowing as the wealth fades,
leaving a deep political hole behind it
T
he collapse of the world economy,
and of demand for raw materials,
has brought down the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange, rocked South Africas
carefully regulated nancial sector and
endangered the big mining rms on
which the countrys relative prosperity
was built. Next, it threatens the strategy
of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)
which was designed to transfer economic
power into the hands of the majority. The
African National Congress, preparing for
elections on 22 April, faces a new and
intractable challenge, both economic and
political.
Some of the ANCs biggest business
backers are in nancial trouble. Rival
business gures had hoped that the
patronage of the probable next president,
Jacob Zuma, would bring them lavish
rewards, but now many once protable
companies have stopped paying dividends
and started ring workers. Should the
state nationalise companies that fail,
and run them until business picks up? Or
should foreign investors be summoned to
the rescue, scooping up (if they can afford
it) a cornucopia of bargain assets, and
forgetting the promise of empowerment?
BEE is intended to increase black
ownership, control and management of
state, parastatal and private economic
activity in the formal sector. It has so
far mainly involved transfers by existing
companies of 10% to 25.1% of their equity
to a racially suitable investor. Some
companies have donated shares to new
black owners, some BEE investors have
managed to borrow enough to nance
a straight purchase. Thousands of such
deals have been completed over the past
decade, peaking in 2008, as rms in
mining, banking and other sectors faced
deadlines imposed by law.
Stuart Theobald, the lead researcher
at Intellidex in Johannesburg, explained:
Usually bank nance is used in these
deals, serviced by dividend ows to the
empowerment investor. The company
often issues a guarantee to the bank
over nance, so its own balance sheet
underpins the transaction. In other
words, rms have paid BEE investors to
take the obligatory stake. Many deals
were done at very high valuations, at
the peak of the world commodity boom
which ended last year when, as Theobald
notes, company values in South Africa hit
record highs before they collapsed.
South Africa is the worlds second
biggest producer of gold and platinum
(after China), the second biggest of
palladium, ninth in nickel and tenth in
aluminum. Only gold has held its value, as
the others fell at. As commodity prices
sank, so did the prices of shares in publicly
traded companies and in the banks that
handle the money. This has halved the
valuation of many empowerment deals
and put a strain on some companies
cash ows. Dividends have been cut, and
companies have had difculty servicing
their debts. Two banks have suggested
that the government should intervene to
support struggling deals. The distribution
of risk is hard to determine, but all South
African businesses are exposed to it.
BEES NOT WORKING
Extra dangers beset companies that
have nanced BEE deals using their own
balance sheets as security for borrowing.
According to Iraj Abedian, Chief
Executive of Pan-African Investment &
Research Services in Johannesburg, the
threat to BEE may lead to systemic panic
in the banking system, but he cautions
that the balance sheet risk is unknown
and could be negligible. Theobald says
that the intention of such empowerment
deals, to develop meaningful black
capital, is not being realised. A potential
banking crisis has been created instead.
As far as risks to the banks, most
commentators accept the assurances
that South Africas banking system has
been relatively well and conservatively
regulated. Their main fear is that a crisis
in the real economy with factories and
mines closing and companies defaulting
on loans could trigger its own crisis in
South Africas nancial system.
Moreover, a potential political crisis
arises, because BEE was regarded as a
political priority rather than as a normal
investment programme. It seemed to
have created a narrow but prosperous
black middle-class founded on patronage.
Combined with the Employment Equity
policy, which moved many black people
rapidly up the management hierarchy,
it has fostered a booming black middle
class, commonly referred to as the
Black Diamonds, and was seen by its
beneciaries as a great success for the
otherwise conventional economic policies
of ex-President Thabo Mbeki.
The spending power of the black
middle class is estimated at 250 billion
rand (US$25.2 bn., even at todays
diminished exchange rate). A recent study
by the University of Cape Town found
that the black middle class grew by 15%
between 2007 and 2008. Nobody knows
how much of its new spending is nanced
by borrowing, but the UCT study found
that almost half of the black middle class
have a debt ratio of less than 50%, which
is good news so far. But when the black
middle class starts to suffer, there will be a
political swing against the present model
of empowerment. Any new government,
which probably means a government led
PROMINENT EMPOWERMENT DEALS
Estimated Date Deal Current % gain/
Year Parties Asset deal value announced share price share price loss
2004 Standard Bank to Tutuwa Consortium (Safika, Shanduka), 100.5 mn. Standard R 4.3 bn. 15 Jun 2004 R 43.75 R 67.00 +53.14%
black management and the community trust Bank shares
2005 Old Mutual PLC to black business partners (non-executive directors, 11.5% of Nedcor R 3.1 bn. 20 Apr 2005 R 14.60 R 7.01 51.99%
Wiphold and Brimstone Consortiums), employee & management schemes (2.42%:2.64%:6.44%)
2005 Public Investment Corporation to Elephant Consortium 6.73% of Telkorn SA R 3.5 bn. 25 May 2005 not disclosed: off market transaction
2006 Tongaat-Hulett to Sangena Investments Consortium (including the cane 25% (8%:10%:7%) of R 2.1 bn. 14 Dec 2006 R 113.70 R 69.30 38.61%
growers communities), the Ayavuna Womens Investments Consortium Tongaat-Hulett
2007 Anglo Platinum to Anglo Platinum staff (ESOP) 1.5% of Anglo Platinum R 3.3 bn. 4 Sep 2007 R 1,020.00 R 440.20 56.84%
2007 Sasol to BEE Consortium 10% of Sasol R 17.9 bn. 11 Sep 2007 R 294.50 R 258.46 12.24%
2008 Barloworld to BEE Consortium (strategic black partners 5.88%, employees 10% stake in Barloworld R 1.8 bn. 12 Jun 2008 R 86.90 R 34.19 60.66%
2.39%, educational trust 0.78% and community service organisations 2.00%)
2008 Pretoria Portland Cement to BEE Consortium (community service groups, 15.29% stake in Pretoria R 2.7 bn. 28 Aug 2008 R 33.90 R 30.00 11.50%
employees, education and industry associations trusts) Portland Cement
Source: Intellidex
by Zuma, will need both to navigate South
Africa through the world economic storm
and to reinvent BEE in order to retain the
support of the new moneyed class.
Most BEE deals are clear-cut, but
some have benetted from political
protection and preference. Inevitably
there are charges of cronyism, inuence-
peddling and the creation of a black
aristocracy amid poverty. The newly
rich include such prominent gures as
Patrice Motsepe, Mzi Khumalo, Saki
Macozoma, Tokyo Sexwale, Wendy
Luhabe, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngquka
and others, aligned with Mbeki and his
orthodox economic policies.
Since the ANC pushed Mbeki out of the
national presidency last September, many
of these BEE beneciaries left the ruling
party to join the new breakaway Congress
of the People. Last week, Saki Macozoma
and Phumzile Mlambo-Ngquka said they
would be joining it. COPE is starting to
look as if it represents the black oligarchs
who made their money in Mbekis time,
and risk losing it under Zuma.
Some BEE moguls, including
Sexwale, have joined Zumas inner circle.
Other ambitious people in Zumas camp
will expect to do at least as well as their
forerunners in Mbekis circle. With BEE
under threat and share prices at rock-
bottom, a Zuma government would need
to invent new techniques for making
itsfavourites rich. There will be a political
backlash, said Adam Habib, political
analyst and Deputy Vice Chancellor at
the University of Johannesburg. He fears
a crisis like that of 1988. It arose because,
when BEE began, some companies
promised to transfer ownership to black
investors because they favoured the idea,
without legislation in place.
These early transactions included
Sanlams sale of Metropolitan to Nail,
and Anglo Americans sale of Johnnic to
the National Empowerment Consortium
(NEC); by the markets peak in 1998
Nail was worth R6 billion. In the
subsequent market crash, several deals
and empowerment vehicles unravelled,
including Nail and the NEC. By the
end of 1998, the rst wave of BEE was
dead. It took eleven years and a wave of
legislation to scramble back to the present
level of empowerment. If BEE collapses
again it will be hard to persuade the
corporate sector that it is worth working
for. This is likely to lead companies to
increase their view of the cost of BEE,
with consequent general corporate
resistance to further engage with it, said
Theobald.
GOING DOWN
Since the global recession began to bite,
with the collapse of Lehman Brothers
on 15 September 2008, it is estimated
that between 2% and 5% of the value
of corporate South Africa has been
lost through the plummeting value of
empowerment transactions. At the end
of February, Mvelaphanda Resources,
the mining arm of Mvelaphanda
Holdings, announced that it will dispose
of its assets and wind up. In February,
MTNs R23-billion empowerment deal
collapsed because of the falling equity
markets. Abedian says Government
cannot afford to see the structure go
under because the private sector has
bought into empowerment as a result of
laws that the government pushed.
The government could facilitate the
restructuring of the deals by extending
the terms or re-pricing them. It could
also use state development-nance
institutions, such as the Industrial
Development Corporation, Public
Investment Corporation and the National
Empowerment Fund to fund some of the
failing deals. But the banking system
would remain at risk, although nobody
knows how much so.
Theobald notes that South African
banks have generally been more cautious
than their international counterparts and
would have used a variety of mechanisms
to reduce their risk; he thinks it highly
unlikely that BEE fallout would raise
a systemic issue for the banks. He also
points out that the BEE problems come
as the banks are battling with a general
economic slowdown, which has caused
consumer and corporate distress, and
increased the number of bank provisions
and write-offs.
Abedian says there is a case for
government and the banking system to
make an arrangement to collateralise
assets and thus to avoid a political-
economic debate about the role of the
state in the economy. The BEE codes
contain a once empowered, always
empowered provision, so that companies
sold by black investors do not lose their
empowerment status. Theobald expects
a big debate over whether companies
can call themselves empowered if their
deals never actually reach maturity.
For example, mining companies must
maintain their empowerment ownership
to keep their mining rights. Will
government strip mines of their rights,
forcing them to cease production? he
wonders.
To ease pressure on the industry,
the government has already said it will
postpone the introduction of a royalty on
all mining revenue until 2010. That will
help, but the government that takes ofce
at the end of April will still have to nd
a way through a political and economic
mineeld, as BEE deals begin to fall
apart.
ZIMBABWE: WORTHLESS CASH
South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is proud of the Southern
African Development Community for its brokering in Zimbabwe. At a meeting of
SADC nance ministers in Cape Town last week, she called for the lifting of United
States and European Union sanctions and claimed that we have played a major
role in facilitating the political solution to the situation in Zimbabwe. SADC called
for US$2 billion in aid from South Africa and Western donors to shore up the new
unity government. Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and the United Nations
Development Programme agree that rebuilding the economy will cost $5 bn.
The donors, strapped for cash, are unlikely to stump up and do not believe in
President Robert Mugabes reforms. It is not enough that bail was granted at the
beginning of March to eight of the (at least) 30 Movement for Democratic Change
activists facing terrorism charges. Mugabes people have proposed installing
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front permanent secretaries in several
MDC-dominated ministries.
At his 85th birthday bash in Chinhoyi, Mugabe was on vintage form, washing
his hands as a precaution against cholera before lambasting his Western enemies,
promising white-farm invasions and indigenous quotas on foreign companies. Yet
cholera has infected over 82,200 people and will soon have claimed 4,000 lives,
according to the UN World Health Organisation. The UN wants $350 million to feed
7,000,000 Zimbabweans over the next two years.
The national currency has disappeared, with no exchange rate quoted on the
parallel markets. Shops cannot operate, banks have stopped lending and people
must barter or work for tradeable commodities or food. Local economists busily
dream up ways of restoring the currency but they all involve restoring property
rights including rights to farm property and privatising the crippled parastatal
companies. While Mugabe is there, such things will not happen.
Tendai Biti, the MDC Finance Minister, talks of linking the Zimbabwe dollar to a
basket of currencies such as the dollar and the rand. That would not require huge
foreign reserves but means the government would have to stop borrowing and
printing money. Given its record and that of Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono,
there would be little condence at home or abroad in such a plan.
ZIMBABWE
Next, the mines
Mining companies, claims and assets offer hope of wealth to the Zimbabwe
governments cronies
T
he barons of the Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front are
jostling for mineral riches as the
power-sharing government struggles to
make its mark (AC Vol 50 Nos 3 & 4). They
are joined by Chinese companies, many
of them backed (until very lately, at least)
by deep-pocketed, Chinese government
or quasi-state institutions. It is a Look-
East policy, designed to spite the West
and counter sanctions by the European
Union, United States, Australia and New
Zealand. Whether it will survive Chinas
slump is quite another question.
At his 85th birthday celebrations,
President Robert Gabriel Mugabe
repeated ZANU-PFs determination to
indigenise the mining sector, insisting
that the diamond claim in Marange, for
example, expropriated from a British
rm, would be given to a foreign rm
from a friendly nation in partnership
with locals: Were looking at various
offers before us, he said. In the same
birthday interview, he asserted that he
was still in charge of the government in
which he is supposed to share power with
Morgan Tsvangirai of the opposition
Movement for Democratic Change.
The take-over of the Marange claim
from African Consolidated Resources
(ACR) highlighted the governments
determination to push out mining houses
from unfriendly nations. Omegacorp,
which had won a bid to mine uranium
in the Kenyemba area, had its licence
cancelled before the elections in March
2008, as Mugabe heightened rhetoric
about the indigenisation of mining
and the political stand-off with the
then Australian Prime Minister, John
Howard. The grab went ahead even
though Omegacorp was in partnership
with Lowenbrau Mining Services, owned
by Mugabes nephew, former Deputy
Science Minister Patrick Zhuwawo.
Lowenbrau is still entitled to the uranium
claim but only with a partner from a so-
called friendly country. Sources indicate
that Russian rms top the list.
Indigenisation of the mining sector is
expected to favour Mugabes cronies and
the ZANU-PF elite, as in previous deals. In
its biggest Black Economic Empowerment
(BEE) deal in Zimbabwe, Anglo American
Corporation sold its chrome producer,
Zim Alloys, to Benscore Investments, a
consortium led by banker Farai Rwodzi
and tobacco merchant Adam Molai. Molai
is married to the daughter of Mugabes late
brother, Rwodzi is a business associate
of retired General Solomon Mujuru,
husband of Vice-President Joyce Mujuru,
and Ray Kaukonde, a former Governor
of Mashonaland East. Solomon Mujurus
consortium includes a former ZANU-
PF member of parliament, Tirivanhu
Mudariki, and holds a minority stake
in the River Ranch diamond rm. Its
previous owners, Bubye Minerals, a local
company owned by Michael and Adele
Farquhar, were pushed out by Saudi
Arabian billionaire Adel Aujan in favour
of Mujuru.
The Mujurus are also linked to Ele
Resources, which has a joint venture with
China Machine-Building International
Corporation (CMIC) to start a coal mine
and two thermal power plants. Eles
mineral resources would support the deal;
the rm holds coal, nickel and chrome
claims and its holding rm, Dande
Capital, has a deal with China National
NOW BLOOD GOLD
Under Zimbabwes power-sharing government, the mining portfolio (like the army)
remains under the control of President Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front cronies, all of them subject to asset seizure and travel
restrictions in the European Union and United States. Their reputation was not
enhanced when Vice-President Joyce Mujuru threatened the head of a commodities
company for blacklisting her daughter Nyasha and her Spanish husband Pedro del
Campo for trying to sell gold from under the counter.
Pedro is administrator of a Geneva company, Berline Equities Corporate, which
on 31 October last year paid a nominal US$3 million for 3.7 tonnes of gold from
Paul Ilunga Ngoei in Congo-Kinshasa. Under a deal drawn up by a Nairobi law
Irm, Miller & Compahy AdvocaIes, Ihe mohey was wired Irom ah accouhI aI Ihe
Bankers Trust Co. in New York. Pedro then offered to sell part of the gold through
a Madrid company he administers, Onesafara International. In early December,
Nyasha contacted Firstar, a commodity-trading rm based in Germany and the
USA, offering to sell $35 mn. worth of gold a month over twelve months, plus
more than $18 mn. of diamonds. Firstar Vice-President Bernd Hagemann told Africa
Condential that Joyce Mujuru was to pay the $200,000 cost of moving the gold
from Nairobi to Zurich.
Firstar raised concerns over the golds provenance; one employee called it blood
gold. Nyasha offered to change its origin to Kenya. Firstar refused. Nyasha, claiming
she was victimised for being African, then referred to the vendors of the gold as
people registerad [sic] with the UN and are serious people otherwise my parents
would not have given me the money. Hagemann told Nyasha that the company
would blacklist her and report her to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. In early
January, he got a call from Joyce asking him to remove Nyasha and Pedro from the
blacklist. When he refused, Joyce said he would receive visitors in the next few
weeks and you see what happens then.
Zimbabwe has been expelled from the London Bullion Market Association,
and the government now allows producers to sell gold directly to international
buyers; hitherto Fidelity Printer and Reneries, a subsidiary of the ZRB, was the sole
authorised buyer. LBMA accreditation certies the quality of gold sold by members,
who must produce a minimum of ten tonnes per annum to maintain membership.
In 2006, Zimbabwe produced 10.96 tonnes; in 2007, only 6,798 kilogrammes;
and in 2008, 3,072 kg. Production costs were rising, power supply was unreliable
and Fidelity had stopped paying 40% of earnings in foreign currency, making it
impossible to source necessary inputs.
Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono did not reveal the loss of LBMA
membership when, in January, he announced that producers could start selling
gold directly to offshore clients. Fidelity would do all the rening, and take 7.5% of
all gold produced.
Diamonds are dodgy, too. Smuggling is rampant. The army controls the main
diamond elds and has killed dozens of miners. Joyce Mujuru and her husband,
General (retired) Solomon Mujuru, have a stake in the River Ranch diamond
company, which has in the past been investigated on suspicion of breaching the
Kimberley Process, the 45-government body that certies the sources of traded
diamonds.
Construction and Agricultural Machinery
Import and Export Corporation (CAMC)
to establish a chrome mine in Dande.
In another BEE deal, Anglo American
sold its controlling stake in Bindura
Nickel Corporation to Mwana Africa
Holdings, domiciled in South Africa.
Its chief proprietors include Oliver
Chidawu, a former Mayor of Harare said
to be linked to Emmerson Mnangagwas
faction of ZANU-PF, who benetted when
Anglo American sold banking assets
to his consortium. Again, when Anglo
merged with Ashanti Gold, it sold the
Freda Rebecca gold mine to Chidawus
consortium.
Some of those who have won mining
concessions are failing to develop them.
Edward Raradza, a ruling party MP
and former Chairman of the Zimbabwe
Farmers Union, holds claims to the
19,000 hectare Entuba coalelds, said to
have more than 200 million tonnes of coal
reserves. His Zamesi Gas shelved plans
for a gas plant after failing to raise US$40
mn. for the project.
Gideon Gono, Governor of the Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe, highlighted the
stampede for mining assets when ZANU-
PF promoted laws for their forced seizure
under the indigenisation programme.
A mining industry source told Africa
Condential that Gono said he aims to
leverage his vast wealth and contacts to
structure personal deals in the mining
industry and that he attacked potential
rivals saying a few well-connected cliques
wanted to amass wealth to themselves in
a starkly greedy but irresponsible manner.
There is potential for a bloodbath among
ZANU-PF comrades.
A BEE transaction between Zimbabwe
Platinum Mines (Zimplats, a subsidiary of
South Africas Impala Platinum) and its
empowerment partner Needgate, led by
McDonald Chapka, brother of former
Deputy Finance Minister David Chapka,
was overturned by the government,
which requested Zimplats to negotiate
with Nkululeko-Rusununguko Mining
Company (NRMC) for the purchase of a
15% empowerment stake in Zimplats.
NRMCs board is chaired by Priscilla
Mupfumira, a ZANU-PF provincial
treasurer in Mugabes home province,
Mashonaland West, and a leading member
of the commission that ran Harare after
Mugabes team red its MDC-dominated
council. Jelly Mine, part of the NRMC
consortium, includes Sylvester Nguni,
a Minister of State in Vice-President
Mujurus ofce, and Mugabes nephew
Patrick Zhuwawo. A rival lobby within
ZANU-PF wants the government-owned
Zimbabwe Investment Trust to take over
the 15% BEE stake in Zimplats. There are
bound to be ghts over mining industry
empowerment that could seriously break
cohesion in the party, said a source.
SOMALIA
The Sheik Sharif show
T
he outsiders who drive Somalias
uncertain peace process do not
always see things as Somalis see
them. This became apparent with the
election on 31 January of Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Ahmed as the new President of
the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG, AC Vol 50 No 1).
Ethiopian troops were still pulling
out of Somalia when the Transitional
Federal Parliament (TFP) endorsed a
peace agreement, signed in Djibouti
on 25 November. This allocates 200
members of parliament to Sheikh
Sharifs faction of the Alliance for
the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS-
Djibouti) and 75 more to civil society
representatives and others.
Despite efforts, Sharif (Hawiye/
Abgal) could not immediately nd
the 200 names needed, even among
the Darod. Allegations of corruption
promptly spread, notably in the
designation of Dir MPs.
Diplomats from the United States
and Britain, plus the United Nations
Special Representative, Ahmadou Ould
Abdallah, had campaigned for Nur
Hassan Hussein Adde as Prime
Minister. Djibouti made a late attempt to
increase support for him by appointing
an extra 55 MPs, allegedly to represent
civil society.
Yet they all got the politics
wrong: Sheikh Sharif had the support of
most of the 180 MPs he had appointed
the week just before his own election
and few voted for Nur Adde. Some
had scores to settle with him, others
endorsed candidates from their own
clans. Yet he has been the only Somali
politician who actually did what he had
promised to work for reconciliation.
After he had been sworn in, Sheikh
Sharif went to Addis Ababa and
delivered a well calculated speech to the
African Union summit meeting (AC Vol
50 No 3). He underlined the continuing
need for the presence in Somalia of
the peacekeepers of the African Union
Mission in Somalia (Amisom) and for
greater efforts by the international
community to support reconciliation.
TALKING TO TURKI
Even his meeting with Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi was described
as warm and positive. He went on to
Mogadishu for a few days and rumours
spread that he had started negotiating
with insurgent leaders, including
Muktar Robow Ali Abu Mansoor,
Spokesman for Al Shabaab, which is
still pursuing armed jihad. In fact, such
talks have not yet happened, though he
did talk indirectly to Sheikh Hassan
Turki, who leads the Ogadeni Ras
Kamboni group.
Back in Djibouti on 14 February,
Sharif appointed his Prime Minister. He
is Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke
(Osman Mahmud/Majerteen/Darod),
son of a former President and the
Western-educated holder of a Canadian
passport who had been working for
the UN for the last ten years in Sierra
Leone and in Darfur, Sudan. He is close
to the branch of Al Islah (Reform, close
to the Muslim Brotherhood) that did not
endorse the Islamic Courts in 2006. Islah
is on the up and many supporters work
for foreign missions and international
organisations.
Aside from the international
optimism and euphoria among his
fellow Hawiye, who dominate the
capital, clouds are gathering above the
new President. The UNs Ould Abdallah
and his supporters in Washington had
feared a power vacuum would follow
the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces
and wanted to prevent the collapse of
the TFG (AC Vol 50 No 3). However,
the swift election of Sheikh Sharif
may weaken his own legitimacy more
than it increases that of the TFP, which
nominally has 275 members but now
has about 210.
The TFG has lost all the territory
it claimed to control a few days before
Sheikh Sharifs election. Moreover, while
Premier Omar Abdirashid was approved
by 414 votes to 9, the transitional charter
does not clearly dene how power is to
be shared between president and prime
minister. This may produce conict and
gives the UN and foreign governments
extra leverage, with former TFG
supporters hoping to raise the price
for their endorsement. The incoming
members of ARS-Djibouti have diverse
demands, some of which conict with
the international agenda.
Sheikh Sharif is widely perceived
as a moderate Islamist (this is not
Goodwill accompanies the new president but few people look at the
small print
establish their supply routes by winning
control of areas south of Mogadishu,
while attacking Amisom and troops
associated with former TFG President
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Fighting in
their own defence, those troops could
kill civilians and generate bitterness
against the TFG.
From the start, the TFG has
been badly managed and tainted by
corruption. If Hisbul Islam can survive
the rst two months of the new TFG
cabinet, it may become a rallying
point for those disappointed by Sheikh
Sharif. His election raises some quite
different issues, as well.
On the day after Sheik Sharif swore
the oath, Ethiopia launched an incursion
into Somalia near Beled Weyne. Meles
intends to show that he can do whatever
he wants, and in preparation, has invited
a number of warlords into Ethiopia.
ready to unleash them if necessary.
Meanwhile, Puntland and
Somaliland will have to adapt to a new
leadership in Mogadishu, which resists
secession. In Somaliland, President
Dahir Riyale Kahin again may try
to extend his own mandate, while his
SOMALIA: WHERE IS AL SHABAAB NOW?
Al Shabaab looks weak and divided as the new regime takes hold in
Mogadishu. This is only half true, though. The departure of Ethiopian troops
is a strategic loss for the group. Jihad! was a good slogan for Somalis who
saw their country as occupied by a foreign, Christian force (although most
Ethiopian soldiers were in fact Muslim).
Soldiers of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) despite recent
incidents in which they killed several dozen civilians are not regarded in the
same way as the enemy neighbour, while Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is widely
seen as genuinely religious, defusing Al Shabaabs jihadist ideology. The new
President hopes to mobilise Somali and foreign religious scholars (including
Kuwaiti Sheikh Suleiman Awad and the controversial Egyptian Sheikh Yusuf al
Qaradawi), to produce a fatwa to legitimise his position.
Al Shabaab made a costly mistake when some of its members destroyed
the tombs of Su saints in the Kismayo area, provoking popular hostility and
mobilising several groups which began ghting in Galgadud. They included
armed supporters of the main Su orders, mostly from Ayr/Hawiye, Sureh/
Dir and Marehan/Darod militias, loosely organised in the Su confederation
of brotherhoods, Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa. They also included business people
whose trade in charcoal and the narcotic qat had been restricted by Al Shabaab,
as well as bandits (moryaan). Through local brokers, Ethiopia provided weapons
and ammunition to this strange coalition. Al Shabaab lost its base in that part
of Galgadud (it still has one near El Bur), as well as its chief Commander in
Mogadishu, Saed Timo Jilic, with over 30 Shabaab ghters. Another blow was
the attitude of Muktar Robow, who saved the lives of members of parliament
from the Transitional Federal Government who belonged to his own Digil/
Mirie clan when his forces took Baidoa on 26 January, although he used to say
they deserved death, being kaar (indels).
Al Shabaab still controls Kismayo and held on there against Hassan Turki,
who then joined Hisbul Islam. There has also been ghting between Al Shabaab
and Turkis allies in the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Al Shabaab holds
large parts of Middle Jubba, Lower Shabelle, Bay and Bakool, and many of
its Galgadud members are back in Mogadishu for the next confrontation. Its
record indicates that it is slowly building a central organisation, against strong
security constraints and the dire handicap of avoiding telephones, which are
constantly monitored by Western security agencies.
Vice-President, Ahmed Yusuf Yasin,
highlights the need for dialogue with
Mogadishu. Politically and nancially,
the survival of the new TFG depends
crucially on international support. If
Somali reconciliation fails, there will
again be calls for military intervention.
The existing military intervention
in the form of about 3,500 Ugandan
and Burundian soldiers with South
African ofcers doing the training
under the banner of Amison has proved
woefully inadequate. Camped out near
Mogadishu airport with only the most
rudimentary protection, is likely to
bear the brunt of local and nationalist
attacks in the wake of the departure of
the Ethiopian troops.
With poor equipment and little
training, along with a weak mandate,
Amisom looks set up to fail. Its strength
has never exceeded half of the intended
8,000 soldiers. There is no sign of the
Nigerian and Ghanaian troops, still less
of the soldiers from Turkey, Jordan and
Malaysia. As security pressures mount,
the lack of a credible peacekeeping force
will be a serious weakness for Sheik
Sharifs government.
dened) but many of his supporters are
more insistent on constitutional Sharia
(Islamic law) than some of the active
jihadists. Several of his allies, including
the inuential Sheikh Abdulqadir Ali
Omar, agree with the insurgents in
wanting Amisom to leave the country.
The vast majority of those ARS
members selected as MPs have been in
the diaspora for years. They tend to be
better educated than those who have
stayed at home throughout the civil war
but their ideological commitment may
be greater than their realism and it is
often shaped by clan rhetoric, too.
THE MEN AND THE MONEY
President Sharif is buoyed by his
successful election and popular support
in Mogadishu and by the departure of
Ethiopian troops. This will last only
if he can improve the daily life of the
population and keep his supporters
under control. Money is a key issue
(as was clear throughout the electoral
process) and he is unlikely to get the
necessary huge nancial support from
donors for at least three months, if
ever.
The opposition has not disarmed.
In early February, several insurgent
groups rallied in Afmadow under a
new umbrella, the Hisbul Islam (Party
of Islam) led by Omar Imam Abubaker
(Badiadde/Hawiye), who was Deputy
Chairman to Hassan Dahir Aweys in
the Islamic Courts Shura (Parliament)
in mid-2006. The groups include:
Jabhat al Islamiyya (Islamic
Front), led by Abdulqader Kumandos
(Ajuran) and recruiting mostly among
the Garre and Gaal Jecel (all Hawiye
groups, with a warrior tradition);
Al Muqawama Islamiya (Islamic
Resistance), all Hawiye, mostly from
the Ayr and Duduble, with some
Gugundhabe;
Ras Kamboni (named after the
headland), led by Hassan Turki, mostly
Ogadeni;
Muaskar Anole (Anole Camp),
mostly Majerteen and Lelkasse from the
Kismayo area.
Their unity may prove fragile but
if it lasts, Hisbul Islam could take over
a large area south of Mogadishu. In
talks with the TFG, it would insist on
the departure of Amisom and strict
implementation of Sharia, plus other
matters that would worry both former
TFG politicians and the international
community.
Sheikh Sharif may in the short term
manage to weaken Hisbul Islam by buying
back some of its eld commanders. Yet
reconciliation is unlikely to go very far,
given that Sheikh Sharif is President
of an entity that his rivals have always
fought against. They may soon try to re-
WHOS WHO
NIGERIA CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR SANUSI
Urbane and intellectual, Nigerias new Central Bank Governor
Sanusi Lamido Sanusi has combined a long career in commercial
banking with studies for a degree in Islamic law and his duties as
a Prince in Kanos royal house. His grandfather, Alhaji Muhammadu
Sanusi, was the Eleventh Emir of Kano.
Sanusi has quickly shaken up the nancial sector with calls for
stricter regulation, more transparency and accountability. He is also
willing to allow more foreign banks to take controlling stakes in
Nigerian institutions. Citibanks highly protable stake in Citi Nigeria
is one of the few locally incorporated nancial institutions in which
foreign investors have a majority stake.
In contrast to his predecessor, Charles C. Soludo, who was
comfortable with looser regulation and close to several senior
banking executives, Sanusi warns that he is prepared to force
out bank chiefs who out Central Bank rules. His criticism of lax
management caused several banking executives, led by Oceanics
Cecilia Ibru, to campaign against his appointment.
An appointee from Kano (as are the ministers of Finance and
National Planning), Sanusi attracted criticism from southern
politicians, led by Tony Anenih, who objected to a third high-level
post going to someone from Kano. Sanusis relationship with
President Umaru Musa YarAdua will be interesting. A few days after
he started work at the Bank on 1 June, Sanusi asked that YarAduas
seven point agenda be scaled down, given the nancial crisis.
Optimists suggest that Sanusi together with the effective Finance
Minister Mansur Mukhtar and Oil Minister Rilwanu Lukman will
constitute a trio of reforming technocrats, to counter the inuence
of Attorney General Michael Aondoakaa and Anenih, the fundraiser
for the governing Peoples Democratic Party. Sanusi seems to have
little time for the political elite and the PDP. After the 2007 elections,
Sanusi said of the PDP, Maybe they have gone far, far beyond what
anyone would have expected they would do, but I think everybody
knew that they were going to rig the elections.
Sunusi took a masters of economics degree at the Ahmadu
Bello University, Zaria, in 1984 and then travelled to Sudan in 1991 to
study at the International Univeristy of Africa, Khartoum. He studied
Arabic there before obtaining a second bachelors degree in Sharia
and Islamic studies in 1997.
In the mid-1980s, Sanusi worked with ICON Limited, a merchant
bank, and became its area manager in Kano before leaving for
studies in Sudan. Upon his return, he was recruited by United Bank
for Africa and in May 1997, appointed a Principal Manager in its
Risk Management Division, and made Assistant General Manager
in 1998. Sanusis proposal that a risk department be established
had him appointed head of the department after it was formed. His
reputation in risk management was boosted when he transformed
what was a credit risk division into an enterprise risk management
department. In 2005, he joined First Bank as its Executive Director,
Risk Management and Control, and in January, became Chief
Executive.
SOUTH AFRICA SANDILE ZUNGU, CHIEF
EXECUTIVE, ZUNGU INVESTMENTS COMPANY
The leader of a new wave of politically inuential business
people, Sandile Gwabs Zungu has emerged as a key gure in Jacob
Zumas presidency. An important fundraiser for his many legal battles
and then for the African National Congress election campaign, Zungu
works with business gures in the Presidents camp such as Robert
Gumede, Executive Chairman of GijimaAst, who donated 10 million
rand (US$ 1.24 mn.) of his fortune at an ANC fundraising meeting last
year, and Vivian Reddy, Chairman of Edison Corporation.
More businessman than politician, Zungu lobbied for the Director
Generals post in the presidency. Instead, Zuma chose Vusi Mavimbela
of the National Intelligence Agency, in the belief (which he shares
with his rival, ex-President Thabo Mbeki) that a successful president
needs an intelligence-gathering capacity that is independent of the
national apparatus. Zungu, who would have been ill-suited to that
covert role, will nd other ways to work with Zuma. Although a
strident businessman, Zungu lines up with the radical nationalist
wing of the Zuma team and has criticised Planning Minister Trevor
Manuel for lacking policies to deal with the unemployment crisis.
Born on 10 February 1967 in Durbans Umlazi township, Sandile
Zungu went to school in KwaZulu-Natal, attending the prestigious
Hilton College, the most expensive boarding school in South Africa,
before graduating from the University of Cape Town in 1988 with a
bachelors in mechanical engineering. A brief career as an engineer
followed, with various positions at Richards Bay Minerals, Engen
Renery, National Sorghum Breweries and SA Breweries between
1989 and 1994. His career changed direction in 1995 when he attained
an MBA in marketing and nance from the UCT.
His move into business saw considerable success. He founded
Sarhwu Investment Holdings Limited, now Zungu Investments
Company (Zico) in 1997, and by 2000 it had grown from a zero asset
base to a net asset value of more than R400 mn. In May 2001-June 2005,
he was Chairman of Denel, the youngest-ever head of a parastatal in
SA. He remains a prominent business gure, chairing the boards of
companies such as Aease Gold and Spectrum Shipping.
The nancial downturn has weakened mining companies and
unsettled Zungus business empire. The Micawber Black Economic
Empowerment consortium, of which Zico is the leader, made a bad
investment in the now defunct Dominium uranium venture under
Uranium One. Zico also ran into problems with its stake in Rockwell
Diamonds, which has been badly hit by declining diamond demand.
ZIMBABWE TENDAI BITI, FINANCE MINISTER
AND ELTON MANGOMA, ECONOMIC PLANNING
MINISTER
As Finance Minister, Tendai Biti is jointly responsible with
Economic Planning Minister Elton Mangoma for the power-sharing
governments economic recovery programme. It is an effective
partnership that combines Mangomas management experience
in several manufacturing companies with Bitis track record as a
campaigning lawyer and astute political strategist.
Their differing styles were on show this week as the Harare
governments international roadshow, led by Prime Minister Morgan
Tsvangirai, sought to convince Western governments and businesses
that the new order was serious about economic and political reform.
Mangoma addressed the traditional corporate concerns about
regulations and state interference while Biti was happier discussing
the political implications of the economic reform programme and the
irreversible policy shifts that the government has made.
One of the youngest lawyers to become a partner in a large
Zimbabwean law rm, Biti became a rising star after handling several
important cases for the trades unions in the 1990s. Representing the
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Biti secured the repeal of the
Law and Order Maintenance Act, which forbade protests without
police clearance. This brought him close to Tsvangirai, then the ZCTU
Secretary General. Biti has been the Harare East MP for the Movement
for Democratic Change for since 2000 and has a power base within
the party but is no match for Tsvangirais grassroots support.
When Welshman Ncube left Tsvangirais MDC faction to join
Arthur Mutambaras in 2005, Biti stayed with Tsvangirai; he took over
as Secretary General and chief negotiator. He became Tsvangirais
second-in-command but they differed over tactics: Biti was far more
sceptical than his leader about the practicality of the power-sharing
government.
Since then, Biti has used his Finance post to chip away
at entrenched political patronage while Mangoma, closer in
temperament and politics to Tsvangirai, has been quietly convincing
companies of the real prospects of Zimbabwes economic revival.
A founding member of the MDC in 1999 along with Tsvangirai,
Mangoma has a track record in accounting and management that
has persuaded several companies to step up operations again.
WHOS WHO
KENYA UHURU KENYATTA, FINANCE MINISTER
Uhuru Kenyatta, 48, is the rst son of founding President
Jomo Kenyatta by his fourth wife, Ngina Kenyatta. Born at the
dawn of Kenyas Independence, he carried in his name, Uhuru
(Freedom), the aspirations of his father, recently freed from gaol,
and his countrys approaching freedom from British rule.
Uhuru attended the strictly Roman Catholic Saint Marys
School in Nairobi and then Amherst College, Massachusetts,
United States, where he graduated with a bachelors degree
in politics and economics. Despite his privileged background,
Uhurus sociability and fondness for the national favourite
Tusker beer has cast him as a man of the people.
In the early 1990s, Uhuru stood with the sons of the
Independence nationalists in calling for democratic reform.
Among them were Peter Mboya (son of the late Tom Mboya,
assassinated in 1969, many say by men close to Kenyatta) and
Gem Argwings-Kodhek (son of the late CMG Argwings-Kodhek,
himself killed a year earlier in the rst of the infamous and
politically instigated tragic road accidents. However, Uhuru
remained loyal to the ruling Kenya African National Union and got
closer to the then President, Daniel arap Moi, culminating in his
failed run for the presidency on the KANU ticket in 2002, which
badly split the party.
At rst strongly critical of President Mwai Kibakis government,
Uhuru helped Raila Odingas Orange Democratic Movement to
win its constitutional referendum victory. However, in the run-
up to the 2007 presidential election, he declared open support
for Kibaki. After the December 2007 election row, Uhuru changed
his rhetoric; dropping the inclusivist talk of the Independence
nationalists, he became a staunch defender of conservative
Kikuyu interests.
KANU, the party Uhuru inherited from Moi, is now split by
his move to a Central Province base and now claimed by Mois
Kalenjin allies. From his position as Finance Minister, despite
the current row over conicting gures, Uhuru is preparing his
next presidential bid and must be considered as one of the most
serious candidates in 2012.
ZIMBABWE JOSEPH MSIKA, VICE-PRESIDENT
Joseph Msika, 86, is pleading to retire from the vice-
presidency on the grounds of age and inrmity but President
Robert Mugabe is reluctant to let him go because of the problems
it would create in the hierarchy of his Zimbabwe African National
Union-Patriotic Front. Msika has been at the centre of nationalist
politics for over half a century and his life story runs parallel to
Zimbabwes liberation movement; he joined it a decade earlier
than Mugabe.
Born in Mazoe District, north of Harare, Msika lived briey
in South Africa before returning to Bulawayo where, in the mid-
1950s, he became Treasurer of Joshua Nkomos newly formed
African National Congress. He spent much of the next two
decades in and out of detention with his leader. When Nkomo
died in 1999, Msika stepped into his post of Vice-President.
For Nkomo, Msika represented the Mashonaland wing
of the Patriotic Front while for Mugabe, he served as the
Matebeleland presence in ZANU-PF. In fact, his family came from
the Musikavanhu Ndau chieftainship in southern Manicaland. His
role has always been that of a conciliator and he has never been
linked to the partys competing corrupt networks.
Mugabe strictly observes the terms the 1987 Unity Accord,
under which ZANU and the PF each have two members in the
four-man praesidium (at present Mugabe and Vice-President
Joyce Mujuru for ZANU and Msika and party Chairman John
Nkomo for the PF tradition). Nkomo is not interested in the vice-
presidency and the next most obvious candidate would be the
hefty and ponderous Obert Mpofu, the current Minister of Mines.
However, Mpofu backs Joyce Mujuru for the presidency against
Mugabes favourite, Emmerson Mnangagwa.
ZIMBABWE DUMISO DABENGWA, LEADER OF
THE PATRIOTIC FRONT
Dumiso Dabengwa, the former head of intelligence for the
Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army and a member of the
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Politburo,
emerged at a congress last month as interim Chairman of the
PF, which draws its support from the southern provinces of
Matebeleland.
Dabengwa remains a popular gure partly because of his
credentials from the liberation struggle and his criticism of the
regimes 1983-85 Gukuruhundi massacres in Matebeleland. He
was subsequently detained. His public defection from ZANU-PF
in February 2008 was a serious blow to the party.
Dabengwa had been getting progressively more disenchanted
with ZANU-PF and President Robert Mugabes rule, sometimes
taking him on head-to-head at stormy Politburo meetings. Now
Dabengwa and the PF say they have dissolved the Unity Accord
and demand the return of PF property that is in the hands of
ZANU-PF.
The PF is scheduled to hold another congress to elect a new
leadership; Dabengwa claims he will not stand. Meanwhile, with
Cyril Ndebele, Dabengwa heads a Council of Elders to guide the
transition. The new PF is expected to call for a federal constitution
with substantial powers for the regions when the drafting of a
new constitution begins. We hear that Vice-President Joseph
Msika is not unsympathetic to these moves.
NIGERIA HIGH CHIEF GOVERNMENT
EKPEMUPOLO, AKA TOMPOLO
The Nigerian militarys hunt for High Chief Government
Ekpemupolo, alias Tompolo, and the ght against the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta has turned the region into
a military camp. In contrast to the furore his military campaign
has provoked, Tompolo is quiet and unassuming.
In his mid-thirties, Tompolo is extremely self conscious: he is
far less educated than some of MENDs sophisticated operators,
who have delighted in getting their story across to foreign
journalists. Tompolos military career began during the Warri
crisis, the 1997 war between Ijaws and Itsekiris which started after
General Sani Abachas government had moved the headquarters
of a local government it had created and placed in the Ijaw part of
Warri to an Itsekiri area of the city.
Tompolo earned a reputation for bravery and ruthlessness.
After the ghting ended, threats to his life forced Tompolo to
ee Warri and move to Oporoza, in Gbaramatu Kingdom. There,
Tompolo and his ghters decided to lead a military campaign
against Shell oil company, accusing it of environmental
despoliation and exploitation; the operation turned into a
protection racket, with She ll making payments to Tompolo and his
associates. Impressed by this, the governors in Delta and Bayelsa
states hired Tompolo to assist with some political enforcement.
He was heavily involved in the war against Itsekiri neighbours of
Bayelsa ex-Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha. Politicians and
senior military ofcers also paid Tompolo to protect their illegal
bunkering operations.
Tompolo is much feared among the Ijaw. His reputation has
been boosted by his worship of Egbesu, an ancient Ijaw god
of war, revived to symbolise the struggle against the federal
government and oil companies. Followers of the god believe he
gives protection from death and capture during war; Tompolo is
in the inner sanctum of Egbesu warriors and an exponent of their
elaborate sacrices and rituals to the deity.
WHOS WHO
ZIMBABWE OPPAH MUCHINGURI, ZANU-PF
GOVERNOR OF MANICALAND PROVINCE
In Oppah Muchinguri, looks and luck have combined with
political acuity to make her a formidable force in the Zimbabwe
African National Union-Patriotic Fronts faction-ghting. Currently
she is challenging Vice-President Joyce Mujuru for leadership of
the Womens League. As an aide to Josiah Tongogara, the military
commander of ZANUs Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
in Mozambique, Oppah was a fellow passenger in the car crash
which killed Tongogara on the eve of Independence in December
1979. Miraculously, she emerged unscathed.
In the late 1980s and 1990s she held several junior ministerial
posts under her married name of Oppah Rushesha and became close
to Robert Mugabe. Her marriage ended in the late 1990s in a messy
divorce, and she reverted to her family name of Muchinguri. Mugabe
appointed her Governor of Manicaland (though the province voted
overwhelmingly for the Movement for Democratic Change). She now
works closely with Emmerson Mnangagwa.
Their strategy is to dethrone Joyce Mujuru at the Womens
Congress in August and then seek her removal as party Vice-
President at the full congress in December. They are believed to
have the support of First Lady Grace Mugabe. Mujuru will stoutly
defend herself but the accusation that she works hand in glove with
Morgan Tsvangirais faction of the Movement for Democratic Change
will be given an additional twist by the fact that, whether by design
or coincidence, she travelled on the plane returning Tsvangirai from
his three-week international fundraising foray in June and so was
greeted by the assembled MDC airport welcoming party (many of
whom had skipped Mugabes hastily rescheduled cabinet meeting).
Meanwhile, Muchinguri has been despatched with Emmerson
Mnangagwa to Asia by Mugabe on a mission to raise funds and so
upstage Tsvangirais modest US$300 million in humanitarian aid
packages from the West. Tsvangirais announcement of Chinas $950
mn. credit-line offer is now thought to refer to a facility mooted four
years ago but recently resurrected.
UNITED STATES JOSEPH WILSON, CEO JC
WILSON INTERNATIONAL VENTURES
A not-so-diplomatic Ambassador, Joseph Wilson publicly
confronted President George Bushs administration about its use
of contentious intelligence to justify the Iraq war. Wilson had been
sent on a mission to discover whether the Saddam Hussein regime
was attempting to acquire uranium from Niger. He found that it was
not and criticised Bushs stance in the New York Times. Within days,
Wilson says, Bush apparatchiks took revenge by brieng journalists
about his wife Valerie Plames undercover role with the Central
Intelligence Agency. Now Wilson is back on the African beat, where
he started his diplomatic career, as a director of Symbion Power and
Jarch Capital as well as running his own consulting company, JC
Wilson International Ventures.
Wilsons campaign against the Bush administration prompted
Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgeralds successful prosecution of I. Lewis
Scooter Libby, Chief of Staff to then Vice-President Dick Cheney, for
obstruction of justice, perjury and lying to federal investigators.
Wilson is continuing his legal battle against key gures from the
Bush-Cheney era. The saga has been made into a lm, Fair Game,
directed by Doug Liman. Washington journalists claim that Bush-
Cheney ofcials referred to Plame as fair game when they vengefully
exposed her undercover work with the CIA. The screenplay was
based on the couples memoirs.
Born in Bridgeport, Connecticut in 1949, Joseph C. Wilson IV
was raised in a Republican family. He attended the University of
California, matriculating in 1968, and describes himself as in tune
with the Sixties ethos. He joined the US Foreign Service in 1976
and held various positions in Niger, Togo, South Africa, Burundi and
Congo-Brazzaville. In 1988 he was appointed Deputy Chief of Mission
to Iraq, reporting to the then US Ambassador April Catherine Glaspie.
He was heralded as a true American hero for his role in evacuating
and protecting American citizens in Iraq when the rst Gulf War
broke out. Wilson returned to Africa as Ambassador to Gabon and
So Tom and Prncipe (1992-1995). He then moved to Germany as
Political Advisor to the Commander in Chief of the US Armed Forces
in Europe until 1997, when he was appointed Special Assistant to Bill
Clinton in Washington and Senior Director for African Affairs.
GHANA JOHN ATTA MILLS, PRESIDENT
The Professor-President basks in the reected glory of Barack
Obamas rst state visit to sub-Saharan African. Ghana is a favourite
with African-American tourists and Mills wants to attract serious
American investment, both in the new oil and gas industry and in
the lacklustre manufacturing sector. Soft-spoken and repeating
that he is humbled to have been elected, Mills is a total contrast to
his hyperactive predecessor as leader of the National Democratic
Congress, ex-President Flight-Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings.
Managing relations with Rawlings and his powerful NDC supporters
calls for special skills. So far Millss self-effacing style has gone down
well, but his apparent lack of toughness could be problematic if the
worlds economic crisis prompts social protests.
Atta Mills won with just 40,000 more votes than his rival, Nana
Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, and has been struggling to stabilise the
economy with trade and budget decits heading for 20% and 18%
respectively this year. He aims for a technically strong and less
politically partisan government, with a new economic advisory
committee bringing in experts from business and academia to help
coordinate government strategy.
Born in Western Ghana in 1944, Mills took a PhD in London before
winning a Fulbright Scholarship to Stanford University in the United
States. He returned to the law faculty of the University of Ghana,
then moved on to other teaching posts. His public career began in
1988 when he was appointed Acting Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service. He became Commissioner in 1996 and Rawlings
appointed him Vice-President in 1997.
SOUTH AFRICA PRAVIN GORDHAN, FINANCE
MINISTER
Making Pravin Gordhan Finance Minister was one of President
Jacob Zumas shrewder moves. Gordhan is a trusted ally and one
African National Congress leader who does not frighten the markets.
His reforms at the Revenue Service brought praise from big business
and politicians. The former communist now shares the views of
Trevor Manuel, his internationally admired predecessor, who is
Zumas economic supremo as Planning Minister. Gordhan favours
sound money, ination-targeting and scal discipline, all detested by
Zumas left-wing supporters.
From a family of Indian origin, Gordhan was reared in Durban,
capital of Zumas own KwaZulu-Natal province, and became a student
activist in the 1970s and early 1980s, in Zumas ANC faction. For four
years he worked in the ANC underground, helping to plan some of
its most audacious operations. In the mid-1970s, he was expelled
from his job as a pharmacist at King Edward VII Hospital after being
detained by the police, and was detained twice more.
In 1991, he was appointed Co-Chairman of the Transitional
Executive Council that oversaw the change to a democratically
elected government. He became a member of parliament, moving to
the South Africa Revenue Service in 1998. Until then, the country had
enjoyed a culture of non-payment in middle-class and corporate
life as in the townships. Gordhan and his team controversially
offered repeated tax amnesties to defaulters, bringing tens of
thousands of new entrants, rich and poor, into the system and
ensuring that they kept on paying. The tax take increased with
no increase in tax rates. This seemed to surprise Manuel, Finance
Minister at the time, whose team had under-forecast revenue
every year.
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