David Johnson

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There has been a significant decline in electoral turnout in nearly all advanced industrial societies over the last fifty years. Using data from the comparative industrial democracies data set investigate the relationship between the turnout and the political characteristics of these systems. Discuss the explanations of the phenomena and examine your findings from this dataset.

Over the last fifty years, there has been a constant advancement in the social and economic conditions of advanced economies. We would like to think that these conditions would translate to increasing electoral participation; however the opposite has proven to be the case. Where intuition may have failed statistical analysis may prove to be the answer, specifically the use of regression models to help find correlation. By comparing the social conditions, political Institutions, and voter preferences of advanced industrial societies this essay sets out identify trends and linkages common to all countries, which may help explain falling electoral turnout across all advanced industrial economies. As such, this essay will not set out to prove any specific hypothesis but instead peruse an exploratory path; finding statistical evidence first and then seeking the relevant political theory or literature to explain these findings. The dependant variable in most of the analysis will be average voter turnout; as such it is only proper that we begin our analysis here. By analysing the descriptive statistics and the relevant histogram and box and whisker plots, we can better understand which nations have suffered most from turnout decline.

average turnout in national elections Mean 80.5796 N 21 Std. Deviation 10.97729 Range 40.35 Variance 120.501 Median 82.2371

With a range four times the standard deviation, but with a close median and mean; we find that sample of 21 has a significant difference between the highest and lowest value. It is important to note that our sample include three countries with mandatory voting: Australia, Belgium and Luxembourg. When these values are removed we find the following changes:

average turnout in national elections Mean 78.6255 N 18 Std. Deviation 10.60754 Range 36.78 Variance 112.520 Median 79.5647

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When excluded we see little change in the standard deviation but, as expected, there is a drop in the mean, median, and range; meaning that these countries were amongst the highest ranking, with one being the largest value on the table. Knowing that these values can have a skewing effect I will reject them from future samples; though I will not completely omit them from further analysis, as they represent unique voting conditions. When we observe the histogram produced by the original sample, we find 2 distinct groups of data; 70-75 and 85-95 with no outliers1. When we adjust the sample size, we find greater uniformity in the data distribution, but maintaining an equal spike in the 70-75 and 80-852. We also see a very slight increase in the Shapiro-Wilk significance, implying that the adjust value conforms more to a normal distribution; however this value is not significant enough to warrant further investigation. The most significant result of the adjusted sample is the creation of two outliers3, Sweden and USA, brought about by the reduction in the standard deviation. Despite their new classification I will not omit these values from the sample for three reasons. By removing the USA the sample size would lack geographical diversity, skewing the results through factors the data may not represent; additionally America also contains the largest population of any of the sample countries, bringing doubt over its valuation as an outlier. Finally, they only became outliers through my own manipulation of the data, and this does not change whatever characteristics justified their initial inclusion.

Governments and their makeup

Though each political institution is unique unto itself; the effect of percentages of government type (left, centre or right wing) and the proportionality of representation (i.e vote percentage to percentage of government held) on voting should be a transferable to all institution types. The most appropriate statistical approach to evaluate these effects should be regression analysis; running average turnout against the characteristics of the institutions and parliaments. Specifically the percentage of cabinet held by party, RAE scores, number of government changes, percentage of woman in parliament, index of ideology, and the degree of representation. Two things should be noted here; first is that there is a large number of variables to observe, too large to provide each variable with a meaning full commentary given the confines of an essay, as such I will compare each to the average R value of the sample to determine which factors correlate best and thus worthy of further analysis. The second is that I have introduced a new variable, a score of representation. This indicates the difference between votes obtained and percentage of seats held, achieved by taking
1 2

See appendix 1 See appendix 2 3 See appendix 3

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the absolute difference between votes and seats in countries which have above 75% of casted votes represented.

Report Variable Mean .0895 N 10 Std. Deviation .07960

Variable rightgov centgov leftgov govparty govtype change women parties rae represent

R .18 .01 .16 .19 .01 .08 .17 .01 .00 .07

From this initial analysis, we find 2 sets of data worth examining, the percentage of woman in parliament, and the ideological slant of the cabinet. Both of these variables represent two important factors, ideological slant should allow us to observe the effect on political incentives on voter turnout; while the percentage of woman in parliament is the only indicator of political participation outside of voting provided by the data, all be it within a specific social group. Starting with the percentage of woman in parliament, we find strong evidence for correlation, a strong person value, a large coefficient, with a small deviation from the significance level.
Correlations
average vote for left parties Pearson Correlation average vote for left parties Sig. (2-tailed) N 16 1 average turnout in national elections .721** .002 16

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Pearson Correlation average turnout in national elections Sig. (2-tailed) N **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

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.721** .002 16 18 1

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Coefficients Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

Sig.

B (Constant) 1 percentage of women in parliament 72.313 .601

Std. Error 4.193 .331

Beta 17.248 .414 1.817 .000 .088

a. Dependent Variable: average turnout in national elections

The simplest explanation for this would be that women vote for women, that countries with higher turnouts simply have more women voting for female politicians. Such a theory is as easy disproved as it is formed. Female voters have been high in countries which do not have a strong female representation in parliament; in the UK and USA the gap is negligible, with some elections seeing a higher female turnout45. What we find instead is a representation of political participation, that countries with a higher percentage of women in parliament see a higher amount of the female population involvement in politics, a figure which has typically been lower than male involvement6. In their essay Schlozman, Burns and Verba describe the positive correlation between political participation and underlying social factors, that female involvement in politics reflects higher levels of female education and income. The correlation observed may not reflect direct causation, but rather indirect via increased social conditions so often cited as having a positive relationship with voter turnout7. This effect may be better observed in women than men, as their average income and education levels are lower than those of their male peers. Another explanation for the correlation between woman and turnout is a stronger preference for woman to vote for left parties.

Coefficients Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

Sig.

4 5

Young Women and Politics; Center for American Women and Politics; Gender and political participation; The Electoral Commission 6 Page 964; Gender and the Pathways to Participation: The Role of Resources; In: The Journal of Politics; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 7 Page 22, Economic Inequality and Electoral Participation. A Cross-Country Evaluation, Jaime-Castillo

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B (Constant) 1 percentage of women in parliament

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Std. Error 4.961 .399 .435 Beta

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28.442 .794

5.733 1.991

.000 .063

a. Dependent Variable: average vote for left parties

Regression analysis provides evidence for this theory, with a high coefficient and t statistic. Further on in the essay I will describe why there is a positive relationship between left party support and voter turnout; to minimize redundancy I will only explain the causality between female participation and left party voting. Lower rates of marriage, be they though increases in divorce or other reasons, have increased the gender income gap, specifically for deviations in the middle income group. Additionally there is also been a greater presence of women in the work force. As such female voters stand to gain more from the redistributive policies of left wing parties8, as income redistribution helps to reduce the income gap between men and women, as well as promoting policies which help women within the workplace, such as mandatory maternity leave. The ideology of the Cabinets also demonstrates correlation with average turnout, with a Pearson correlation of -0.422 and linier coefficient of -0.155 for right wing cabinets and .405 and .175 respectively for left wing. As we would also expect, ideology also shows very strong correlation with the percentage seats held by the relevant party. Due to this I will analyse the effect of both factors collectively in the next section, as we would intuitively expect common factors between the two as both are involved in the political decision making process., withhold any commentary on the ideology of the cabinet as we can produce a common , as statically and. Ideology As mentioned above, the data warrants investigation into the effects of ideology on turnout; do certain ideologies favour, or result in, a lower turnout; specifically left wing and right-wing, as these are the represented ideologies with the largest vote share as well as the greatest difference in policy. As the relationship between percentage of votes and percentage of seats is nearly co-liner for left and right ideologies I will focus my analysis on percentage of seats, as this value better represents the effect on political decision making.

Coefficients

Page 953; why have women become left-wing?; in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics; Edlund and Pande

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Model

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Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients B Std. Error 5.091 .143 -.493 Beta

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t Sig.

(Constant) 1 percentage seats in parliament held by right

88.033 -.304

17.291 -2.121

.000 .052

a. Dependent Variable: average turnout in national elections

Coefficients Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

Sig.

B (Constant) 1 percentage seats in parliament held by left 60.083 .522

Std. Error 5.179 .134

Beta 11.601 .721 3.891 .000 .002

a. Dependent Variable: average turnout in national elections

Observing a negative relationship between turnout and percentage of seats held by the right and an even stronger positive relationship with percentage of seats held by the left, both with significance levels at or below 5%, and t statistics above 2. The explanation of the correlation and whether this is infers causation can be found through political economy. Specifically that the provision of redistributive polices by left wing parties, and their non-provision by the right; with redistribution having a positive effect on voter turnout9. We need to first assume that left wing governments will be more likely to redistribute income then right wing governments10. Secondly we assume that the median voter theory holds; that governments will make decisions based on the preferences of the median voter. Thirdly, we assume the positive relationship between education and wealth, and voter turnout holds. From our third assumption we can theorise that countries with low turnouts will see a proportionally wealthier voter base and that the median voter will be amongst the higher earners in the country. Countries with low voter turnouts should see proportionally higher right wing governments, as it is in the interest of the voter base to avoid costly policies of redistributions associated with left wing governments11. However, countries with high turnouts should see greater
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Page 565; Party control of state government and public expenditures; in : Scandinavian journal of economics, S. Ansolabehere and J. M. Snyder, J 10 Page 169; Negotiated expansion: Left-wing governments, corporatism and social expenditure in mature welfare states; in : Comparative European Politics; Jensen 11 Page 64, Redistribution, Income, and Voting; American Journal of Politcal Science; Filer, Lawrence and Morton

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left wing governments, as it is in their each voters individual incentive to promote income redistribution to raise average voters income. Though the logic holds this theory is not ideal as it implies that a preference for a certain type of government is the caused by the level voter turn, the opposite outcome we wished to obtain. Through we cant infer direct causality, the cause of the observed correlation could still be selfenforcing; both having a degree of causation on each other. The primary incentive for Governments is to remain in power; as such they will pursue policies which best appeal to their voter base. For Left wing governments, they will increase the utility of their voters by utilising redistributive policies such as welfare spending and distribution of tax burdens. Right wing governments have different policy incentives, as we have shown their median voter to be wealthier, they would be more concerned with policies such economic stability. Yet governments cannot completely ignore policies of income redistribution; assuming they care about economic activity, they would need to ensure a high level of social capital as there is a clear positive relationship between productiveness of labour and economic output12. The minimum requirement for social spending explains why turnout has a greater correlation with left governments. In order for the above statement to infer causality, we need to find an explanation for a positive relationship between redistribution and turnout. The first method of explanation is through voter self-interest. Voters who receive benefits through redistributive policies will wish to maintain them, as such it is in their interest to come out and vote. As they stand to see a reduction in their income if a government take power which will revoke their policies, the cost of not voting is much higher in countries which have had historically left wing governments. Redistribution is a form of ratchet effect, once there has been an increase in redistribution; it is difficult to undo it without seeing a reduction in support. This explains why there is positive relationship between left-wing cabinets and voter turnout, as left-wing cabinets are more likely to survive in high turnout countries. There is also another transmission mechanism, via the opportunity cost of voting. Increasing the average income of voters, specifically those in the lowest income bands, reduces the cost of becoming politically informed13. As they do not need to devote a large proportion of their time to generating a sufficient level of income we observe a positive relationship between free time and income, both a consequence of redistribution. Becoming politically informed will also lead to a greater ideological

12

See models such as the Solo Growth Model, and effect of increasing technology, a value which includes productivity of labour 13 Page 102; Why do High Income People Participate More in Politics?; in :Political choice; Frey

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belief amongst voters14, as they will become more aware of their own stakes in government decisions, and as we have shown before, results in higher turnout. With the intuitive knowledge in hand, we can also perform further statistical analysis. If we include countries with compulsory voting, Luxembourg, Australia, and Belgium, we should see a positive increase in the coefficient value of our regression; as a larger voting body should prefer more redistributive policies.
Coefficients Model
a

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

Sig.

B (Constant) 1 percentage seats in parliament held by left 60.873 .550

Std. Error 5.476 .141

Beta 11.117 .687 3.902 .000 .001

a. Dependent Variable: average turnout in national elections

Observing the increasing B value as infers casualty, if we assume that mandatory voting is independent of ideology. This is evidence for causality shows that increased ideology is to some extent being caused by increased turnout, not the other way around. We should also note a decreased R squared value, from .52 to .472, a worsening goodness of it, so we should not be entirely confident in this as proof of causality. It is also unreasonable to assume that mandatory voting is independent, since governments are incentivised by power, a prominently right-wing country would not pass such legislation, as it would jeopardise their likelihood of maintaining power. If we plot histograms for the data, we can see some explanation for the distribution of average voter turnout. We see similarities in shape when concentration of Left-wing15 parties and two concentrations in average voter turn -out. However we do not observe a similarly shaped histogram for right wing parties16. These similarities in distributions help to reinforce the statistical relevance of our data.

14 15

Page 29; Information Acquisition, Ideology and Turnout: Theory and Evidence from Britain; Larcinese See appendix 4 16 See appendix 5

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The final data set to analyse is age, under 25 and over 65.In order to account for the differences in population we need to calculate their values as a percentage of population17. Once this has been done we observe these regression results:

Coefficients Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

Sig.

B (Constant) 1 percentunder15 -.866 99.860

Std. Error 13.234 .585

Beta 7.545 -.321 -1.480 .000 .155

a. Dependent Variable: average turnout in national elections

Coefficients Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

Sig.

B (Constant) 1 percentover65 1.372 64.006

Std. Error 17.211 1.411

Beta 3.719 .218 .972 .001 .343

a. Dependent Variable: average turnout in national elections

The outcomes of both of this regression can be rejected, as the fall well beyond acceptable significance levels, observed at 5% throughout the essay, as well as having low t values. Though not significant, age still deserves some analysis, as it is one of the few examples of social data in the essay. There have been numerous studies showing the a negative relationship with youth populations and voter turnout18; supported by the data to some degree as we observe a better significance figure for under 15 then over 65. What we can infer form this is that the problems associated with low youth turnout are common to all countries, not just those with lower turnout. There may be other factors such as youth employment, and middle age turnout, which may better explain the lack of correlation. Conclusion

17 18

See appendix 6 Youth Voter Turnout has Declined, by Any Measure; Levine and Lopez

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This essay has been successful in achieving its purpose, to find common factors which explained the decline in voter turnout. The analysis of the data set produced 2 clear factors, percentage of woman in parliament and ideology. From the analysis of woman in parliament we defined a clear linkage between social factors and political participation. The correlation from ideology supports the ideas of political economy, that voter and government incentives can define the costs and benefits of voting and through this, explains the high voter turnout in countries with a strong left wing presence in government. Though we have found common factors, I purposefully ignored factors unique to certain countries, like Japans strong right wing cabinet or the lack of proportional vote representation in the UK. Though I did not set out to explain individual factors, the fact that they were completely ignored may cast doubt on the validity of our explanations of correlation, though it is doubtful that I could provide meaningful analysis of such factors given the restrictions of the essay. There is also a second criticism of the essay, not of the results, but of the data. So many of the justifications of correlation come from social circumstances, such as income and education, yet there are few variables in the data to reflect this. The only representation is through age and percentage of woman in parliament. This lack of data does not reflect negatively on essay, but instead invites further analysis if we wish to have a more complete understanding of common factors; especially as we have identified the significance of social conditions.

Word Count: 2949

David Johnson Bibliography:

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Young Women and Politics; Center for American Women and Politics; http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/voters/documents/young.pdf Gender and political participation; The Electoral Commission; www.electoralcommission.org.uk; 2004 Gender and the Pathways to Participation: The Role of Resources; The Journal of Politics; Schlozman, Burns and Verba; Cambirdge Univeristy Press; Cambridge; 1994 Economic Inequality and Electoral Participation. A Cross-Country Evaluation; Jaime-Castillo; University of Granada; 2006 Why have women become left-wing? the political gender gap and the decline in marriage; The Quarterly Journal of Economics; Edlund and Pande; Harvard; 2002 Party control of state government and public expenditures; Scandinavian journal of economics Vol 108, S. Ansolabehere and J. M. Snyder, J; 2006 Negotiated expansion: Left-wing governments, corporatism and social expenditure in mature welfare states; Comparative European Politics Vol. 9; Jensen; Macmillan Publishers; 2011 Redistribution, Income, and Voting; American Journal of Political Science Vol 37; Filer, Lawrence and Morton; Midwest Political Science Association; 1993 Why do High Income People Participate More in Politics?; Political choice Vol 11; Frey; Springer; 1971 Information Acquisition, Ideology and Turnout: Theory and Evidence from Britain; Larcinese; London School and Economics and Political Science; 2007 Youth Voter Turnout has Declined, by Any Measure; Levine and Lopez; The Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement; 2002

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