Security of Ad-Hoc Networks

Jayesh Rane
R.C.Patel Institute of Technology, Shirpur jayeshrane90@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Special wi reless Adh oc net wo rks enab le n ew and exciting applications, but also pose significant technical difficu lties. This paper gives a brief overview of ad hoc wireless networks and applications with particular emphasis on energy restriction. This paper provides security issues and their current solutions in wireless ad hoc network. Vu lnerable nature of the required wireless ad hoc network, there are many security threats, which violate the development. The main vulnerabilit ies in wireless ad hoc networks, which made it much easier to suffer from attacks than traditional wired networks. The criteria for wireless network security and provide special basic types of attacks that exist within it. There are a number of issues occur in ad hoc network. Ad-hoc network in this paper are based on the wireless infrastructure. Because of the restrictions radio, mult i-hop realized. The routing tables must maintain the integrity and confidentiality. In order to cope with a variety of ad hoc network, various security models are dev eloped. Fundamentals o f these models is still the encryption and decryption, however, the symmetric/asymmetric keys facing new challenges. Keywords: Wireless Adhoc networks, security, security issue, Attack on Adhoc Networks.

1. INTRODUCTION
The study of wireless ad hoc networks has been going on for decades. History of wireless ad hoc networks can be traced back to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DAPRPA) packet radio network (PRNet), wh ich has become a robust adaptive network radio (SURAD) program .Ad Hoc networks play an important role in military applications, and related research, such as Global Mobile Information System (GloMo) program and in the near term digital radio (NTDR) program. In recent years there has been a new wave of industrial and commercial applications for wireless ad hoc networks, as a viable means of communicat ion and portable computers become more co mpact and affordable. Since its inception in the 1970s, in format ion regard less of location. There are currently two options for mobile wireless networks: infrastructure and infrastructureless networks. Infrastructured fixed and wired gateways or fixed base stations that are connected other base stations on the wire. Each node within the base stations. "Hands off" is mobile host travels out of range of one base station and in the range of another, and thus, the exist ing mobile host can continue communication seamlessly throughout the network. An example of this type includes wireless LANs and mobile phone. Another type of wireless infrastructureless network,

Converges12, RCPIT Shirpur

knows how mobile ad hoc networks (MANET). These networks have no fixed routers; each node can be a router. All nodes that can move and can be connected dynamically in an arbitrary manner. Responsibility for organizing and managing the network are d istributed among the terminals themselves. Whole network of mobile terminals and some have the right to move freely. In this type of networks, some pair of terminals may not be able to communicate directly with each other and have to rely on some terminals, so that messages are delivered to their destination. Such networks are often judged as a mult i-hop or in the store and forward networks. Nodes of these networks function as routers which discover and maintain routes to other nodes in the network. Nodes can be located in or on aircraft, ships, trucks, cars, perhaps even on people or very small devices. Mobile ad hoc networks should be used for disaster recovery and also in battlefield co mmunications and rescue operations when the wired

network is unavailable. Th is can provide a feasible means for terrestrial communications and information access.

2. WIRELESS AD-HOC NETWORKS

Wireless ad hoc network is a set of two or more devices/nodes, or terminals with wireless communication and networking capabilities that communicate with each other without the aid of any centralized administrator. Each node in an ad hoc wireless networks and functions as a host and router. Topology of the network as a whole is dynamic, because the link b et ween n o d es may change over t i me due to node mobility, node departures and new arrivals site. Consequently, there is a need for efficient routing protocols, the nodes to communicate. The devices themselves are responsible to organize communication with each other. This means that routing, network management, maintenance, et c., must be made by each node (in general). This is called a peer level, a few ju mps and is the basic building block for ad hoc networks. This means that the special devices are more co mplex than other wi r e les s n et wo rks .

Fig: 1 Typical Ad Hoc Network An ad-hoc network can be classified into two main types: mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) and mobile ad-hoc sensors network. Our vision of ad hoc networking includes scenarios such as those depicted in Figure 1, where people carry devices that can network on an ad hoc basis. A users devices can both interconnect with one another and connect to local information points for examp le, to retrieve updates on flight departures, gate changes, and so on. The ad hoc devices can also relay traffic between devices that are

Converges12, RCPIT Shirpur

out of range. The airport scenario thus contains a mixture of single and mult iple radio hops.

Fig: 2 At an airport, where people can access Local- and wide-area networks Ad hoc Bluetooth connections are used to interconnect carried devices, such as PDAs, CDMA mobile phones and notebook computers. An important feature of AODV is the maintenance of timer-based states in each node, regarding utilization of indiv idual ro ut ing tab le ent ries. A routing t ab le entry is exp ired if not used recently. Asset of predecessor nodes is maintained for each routing table entry, indicating the set of neighboring nodes which use that entry to route data packets. The number of routing packets transmitted per data packet delivered at the destination. Each hop-wise transmission of a routing packet is counted as one transmission. The first two metrics are the most important for best-effort traffic. The routing load met ric evaluates the efficiency of the routing protocol. Note, however, that these metrics are not complet ely independent.

3. SECURITY GOALS

1) Availability: Ensures survivability despite Denial of Serv ice (DOS) attacks. On physical and media access control layer attacker can use jamming techniques to interfere with commun ication on physical channel. On network layer the attacker can disrupt the routing protocol. On higher layers, the attacker could bring down high level services e.g.: key management service. 2) Confidentiality: Ensures certain information is never disclosed to unauthorized entit ies. 3) Integrity: Message being transmitted is never corrupted. 4) Authentication: Enables a node to ensure the identity of the peer node it is communicating with. Without wh ich an attacker would impersonate a node, thus gaining unauthorized access to resource and sensitive information and interfering with operation of other nodes. 5) Non-repudiation: ensures that the origin of a message cannot deny having sent the message.

Converges12, RCPIT Shirpur

4. ATTACKS ON AD-HOC NETWORKS

There are various types of attacks on ad hoc network which are describing following :

Place of disclosure: Location disclosure attack that targets confidentiality requirements of the ad hoc
network. Through the use of methods of traffic analysis, or with a simp le sensing and monitoring approaches, an attacker can learn the location of nodes, or even the structure of the network.

A black hole: the black hole attack malicious node enters false answers route to route requests it receives,
advertising itself as having the shortest route to your d est in at io n These fake responses can be made to divert network traffic through a malicious node for eavesdropping or simply to drive traffic to it to perform den ial of service attack by dropping packets received.

Replay: An attacker who perfo rms a replay attack injects into the network routing of traffic that was
captured earlier. Th is attack usually targets the freshness of routes, but can also be used to undermine badly designed security solutions.

Wormholes: a wormhole attack is one of the most powerful, presented here, because it involves
cooperation between th e two malicious nodes that participate in the network to appear one attacker.

Blackmail: This is an attack against the appropriate routing protocols, which use mechanisms for
detecting malicious nodes and spread messages that are trying to blacklist offenders. This can be exp loited to produce such reports and statements to try to isolate the legitimate sites reliability of nonrepudiation property may be useful in such cases, since it connects a node reports it has generated.

Denial of Service: Denial of service attacks aim at the co mplete disruption of the routing function and
therefore the entire operation of the ad hoc network. Specific instances of denial of service attacks include the routing table overflow and the sleep deprivation torture. In a routing table overflow attack the malicious node floods the network with bogus route creation p ackets in o rd er to consume the resources of the participating nodes and disrupt the establishment of legitimate routes. The sleep deprivation torture attack aims at the consumption of batteries of a specific node by constantly keeping it engaged in routing decisions.

5. SECURITY MODELS
Model based on Third Trusted Party (TTP): Lidong and Zygmunt described a design of authentication and key establishment in ad-hoc network. Th is infrastructure relies on a key management server wh ich is used to establish symmetric keys. In this case, both encryption and decryption will use same key. Symmet ric key itself will ensure integrity of information. Hence the established key could be also used for authentication. They also discussed about public/private key infrastructure. In this case, the key

management server could be named as Cert ificate Authority (CA). Certain ly, we must assume that CA has not been compro mised and trusted by all of the nodes. The private key of each node need to be stored securely in both of each node itself and the CA. When a node attempts to communicate with others, device A wants to communicate with device B, for example. Device A need to send request to CA for device Bs public key.

Converges12, RCPIT Shirpur

Fig: 3 Communication model for security Then A will have a secure channel to talk with B, and also the public key could be used to authenticate the identity. Furthermore, nodes have abilit ies to notify CA to change their key pairs .

6. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN AD-HOC NETWORKS

Using the wireless network provides a special subject to attacks these are ranging fro m the origin of passive link mon itoring for active impersonation; message playback and listen to messages distortion can an attacker access to sensitive information, thus violating confidentiality. Active attacks can range from deleting messages, injecting erroneous messages to impersonate a node, etc. thus disrupting the availability, integrity, authentication an d no repudiation. Nodes roaming freely in a hostile environ ment

with relatively poor physical protection, non -negligible probability of being comp ro mised. Therefore, we need to consider malicious attacks, not only outside but inside the network fro m comp romised nodes. Thus the following ways in wh ich security can be breached .

Vulnerability of channels: As in any wireless network, messages

can

be overheard

and

fake

messages can be introduced into the network without the difficulty of h aving physical access to network components. Vulnerability of nodes: Since the nodes do not usually reside in physically protected places, such as locked rooms, they can be more easily captured and fall under the control of the attacker. Lack of infrastructure: Special networks should operate independently of any fixed infrastructure. This makes the classical security solutions based on certification and on-line servers the sake of purpose. Dynamic Topology: In mobile ad hoc networks, the permanent changes of topology require sophisticated routing protocols, the security of which is an additional challenge. A particular d ifficulty is that incorrect routing information can be generated by compro mised nodes or as a result of some topology changes and it is hard to distinguish between the two cases. are not applicable for

Converges12, RCPIT Shirpur

7. CONCLUSION
Security issues in ad hoc network because of the special properties discussed previously. This paper has introduced some of the current security risks, an ad hoc network, as well as some of the models easy to implement with sufficient resources, however, it would have cost less than beer and relax, than other models. In fact, the ad hoc network is used in many kinds of applications. According to the properties and purposes of each individual application, the entire good security model does not exist. Mobile ad hoc in frastructureless for military

networks are the ideal technology for the creation of instant communication

use or failure of arch itecture has been bought out in this position paper. As we have shown, using three main technical themes Wireless Adhoc Networks, we believe that the wireless ad hoc networks are the disadvantages of architecture following technical reasons: The most important thing for the networks is security. It is even important for Wireless Ad hoc Networks because its applications are in military. The M A NET cannot appropriately solve the problem of the security. Routing is also a big problem.

All the routing protocols for Wireless Ad hoc Networks are need patches. No suitable and stable routing protocols until now.

8. REFERENCES
[1] Security Issues in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks - A Survey Wenjia Li and Anupam Joshi Department of Co mputer Science and Electrical Engineering University of Maryland, Baltimore County October 8, 2004 [2] H.-A. Wen, C.-L. Lin, and T. Hwang, Provably Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols for Low Power Computing Clients, Co mputers and Security, vol. 25, pp.106-113, 2006 [3] Yih -chun hu, adrian perrig, A Survey of Secure Wireless ad hoc routing IEEE security & privacy May-June 2004]. [4] Mohammad Al-Shurman and Seong-Moo Yoo, Seungjin Park, Black Hole Attack in Mobile Ad Hoc NetworkS ACMSE04, April 2-3, 2004, Huntsville, AL, USA.

Converges12, RCPIT Shirpur