DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs.

MARIANO FUNTILAR, MAGDALENA FUNTILAR, HEIRS OF FELIPE ROCETE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Civil Cases Division), respondents.

not having acquired the same under any of the recognized Spanish titles under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; that neither applicants, nor their predecessors have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. Donaciano Pumarada, with three others also filed an opposition alleging that they have registrable title on account of their possession since time immemorial. Rafael M. Morales filed a separate opposition, alleging that there was no actual survey of the land applied for; and that he is entitled to registration on account of his occupation and that of his predecessor. The spouses Dominador Lacson and Esperanza Lacson likewise filed their opposition with respect to "the portion of land embraced by points 22 to 24 to 25 to 26 to 27 and by a straight line drawn between point 27 to point 23 of Plan Psu215779" in answer to which the applicants-respondents agreed to relinquish or quitclaim whatever right, title, and interest they might have over the above specified portion in favor of oppositors Lacson. In view thereof, the oppositor spouses withdrew their opposition in the land registration case. On November 26, 1982, the trial court rendered its decision adjudicating the land to applicants as follows: WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the applicants, namely MARIANO FUNTILAR, MAGDALENA FUNTILAR and the HEIRS OF FELIPE ROCETE are hereby declared owners proindiviso of the parcel of land described according to Plan Psu215779, with an area of 22.6773 square meters, subject to the claim of oppositors Dominador Lacson and Esperanza Lacson as per agreement with the applicants and when the decision becomes final and executory, let a final decree be issued for the issuance of title as provided by Act 496. The Government alone, represented by the Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development, filed its appeal with the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision now under review dated August 24, 1984 states: xxx xxx xxx According to the government oppositors, the land in question was certified as alienable and disposable only on September 3, 1953, They, therefore, conclude that herein applicants could not have been in possession of said land for more than 30 years. There is no evidence presented by the government, however, that said land in question was part of the forest zone. For that matter, during the hearing, the Director of Forestry and the Director of Lands manifested in writing that they have no

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent court which affirmed the adjudication by the land registration court of a parcel of land in Mulanay, Quezon in favor of the private respondents. In 1972, Mariano Funtilar, Magdalena Funtilar, and the Heirs of Felipe Rocete applied for the registration of a parcel of land described in PSU-215779, with an area of 226,773 square meters. Unrebutted testimonial evidence established that the land was part of the property originally belonging to one Candida Fernandez whose ownership and possession began sometime during her lifetime and extended until 1936 when she died. (Tsn., August 6, 1976, Testimony of Florencio Marquez, Exhibit "U"). The present applicants are the grandchildren of Candida Fernandez. In 1936, after the death of Candida Fernandez, her real property was declared in the name of the "Heirs of Candida Fernandez under Tax Declaration No. 9622, with an area of thirty (30) hectares. Subsequently, sometime in 1940 or 1941, the parcel of land was forfeited in favor of the government for failure to pay real estate taxes. However, the same was redeemed in 1942 by Vitaliano Aguirre, one of the three children of Candida Fernandez, who was then the administrator of the property. A final deed of sale (Exhibit "N") was executed by the Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas in 1944 in favor of Vitaliano Aguirre. It had been agreed among the heirs that the property would first be held by Vitaliano in trust for the others until such time that partition among them was effected. The evidence shows Vitaliano's public and continuous possession. The heirs of Candida Fernandez later partitioned the property among themselves. The particular lot now disputed in this petition was adjudicated in favor of the applicants-respondents. Shortly after the partition, in 1948, the new owners declared their share for taxation purposes. Tax Declaration 91 for that year indicated the land as 12 hectares. This declaration was followed by another one, Tax Declaration No. 2021, in 1958. In 1965, the private respondents caused a survey of their property to be made. The property was found to actually contain an area of 22.6773 hectares. This corrected area was reflected in subsequent tax declarations. The last one submitted in evidence is dated 1974. An ocular inspection conducted by the trial court found more than one hundred (100) coconut trees with ages over thirty (30) years old, out of a total of more or less one thousand four hundred (1,400) coconut trees on the land. The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development filed an opposition alleging that neither applicants nor their predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the land,

evidence in support of their opposition. They have not presented plans or sketches to show that the land in question is part of the communal forest. Under the foregoing circumstances, We do not find any merit in the appeal of the Government. It has been ruled on this issue that the Director of Forestry has the burden of proving that a piece of land belongs to the forest zone (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; de Villa vs. Director of Lands, CAG.R. No. 5847-R, June 13, 1952). ... It has been ruled that the inclusion of portions of said lands within the reservations declared by the Director of Forestry in 1928 cannot affect the vested rights of applicants and her predecessors who have been continuously occupying and profiting from the land since time immemorial (Ankron vs. Government of the Phil., 40 Phil. 15; Llana vs. Director of Forestry, CA-G.R. No. 4887R, Sept. 23, 1950). Applicants have established by preponderance of evidence that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, adverse and public possession of the land in question for over 30 years introducing improvements thereon. As we have stated in previous decisions, the registration of public lands for private titles after satisfying the requirements of open, adverse and public possession will be more beneficial to the country as it will promote development of Idle lands. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Hence, this petition The petitioners contend that in affirming the decision of the lower court, the Intermediate Appellate Court committed the following errors: I 1. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE IdENTITY OF THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. 2. IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPLICANTS. RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF POSSESSION FOR AT LEAST THIRTY (30) YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE FILING OF THEIR APPLICATION IN 1972 AS TO ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTRATION. 3. IN NOT DECLARING APPLICANTS RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO REGISTRATION.

4. IN NOT FINDING THAT APPLICANTS RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS PUBLIC LAND The petitioners have come to us for a review on questions of fact property within the province of the trial courts to resolve. (Santos vs.Aranzanso 116 SCRA 1). This case furnishes occasion for us to reiterate the general principle that only legal questions, not factual issues, Should be raised in the Supreme Court (Magpantay vs. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 236) and that findings of fact of the Intermediate Appellate Court should not be disturbed absent any showing of grave error or abuse of discretion. Since the factual findings of the respondent court are fully substantiated by evidence on record ( Regalano vs. Northwest Finance Corporation, 117 SCRA 45), we decide not to disturb them. The first issue raised refers to identity. Petitioners allege that the identity of the land sought to be registered has not been established. We sustain the contrary finding. Survey Plan Psu-215779 of the property, showing its boundaries and total area, clearly Identifies and delineates the extent of the land. The petitioners cite the insufficiency of such a survey to identify the land. The petitioners overlook the fact that no survey would at all be possible where the Identity of the land is not first properly established. More importantly, without such Identification, no opposition, even its own, to the application for registration could be interposed. Encroachment on or adverse possession of property could not be justly claimed. The petitioners cite differences in the description of the land boundaries, as well as in the land area stated in the tax declarations submitted in evidence by applicants-respondents. They allege that these do not refer to one and the same property. A careful examination of the record shows a misinterpretation of the evidence as to the Identification of the land. Tax Declaration Nos. 91 and 2021 in 1948 describe a twelvehectare property bounded as follows: "N-Mocboc Brook; ECampacat Mt. ; S-Emilio Aguirre; W-Mocboc Brook and Briccio Morales. Tax Declaration Nos. 3757 and 2662 in 1964 and 1974 speak of a 22.6773-hectare land bounded" N-Mariano Funtilar, et al.; "E-Heirs of Donaciano Pumarada; S-Emilio Aguirre; W-Emilio Aguirre and Bagopaye Creek." However, the applicants-respondents have satisfactorily explained the discrepancy. Tax Declaration Nos. 91 and 2021 followed in tax payments from 1948 to 1958 and beyond were made prior to the survey of the property in 1965. Tax Declaration Nos. 3757 and 2662 were made subsequent thereto and, hence, account for the difference in area stated. Such differences are not uncommon as early tax declarations are, more often than not, based on approximation or estimation rather than on computation. More so, if the land as in this case was merely inherited from a predecessor and was still held in common. Differences in boundaries described in required municipal forms may also occur with changes in boundary owners, changes of names of certain places, a certain natural boundary being known by more than one name or by plain error. Neither was it uncommon then to designate the nearest, most visible natural landmarks such as mountains, creeks, rivers, etc. to describe the location or situation of the boundaries of properties in the absence of knowledge of technical methods of measuring or determining boundaries with accuracy, especially

where as in this case, the same were made merely by humble farm people. Certain discrepancies, if logically explained later, do not make doubtful, the Identification of the property as made, understood and accepted by the parties to the case. It is respondents' contention that the land in question was originally owned by Candida Fernandez; forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes; subsequently repurchased by Vitaliano Aguirre in a tax delinquency sale and finally adjudicated in favor of applicants in 1948. Petitioners, however, allege that the relationship of the land sold at auction with the land subject of registration has not been established, since the final deed of sale in favor of Aguirre and the survey plan Psu-215779 refer to two different parcels of land. The difference in boundary descriptions has already been explained. Anent the disparity in land area, it must be noted that the property mentioned in the final deed of sale issued by the provincial treasurer at the delinquency auction sale was the property originally owned by Candida Fernandez. The parcel of land sought to be registered and Identified by Survey Plan Psu-215779 is a part of that property. The surveyed land resulted from the partition of Candida's property among her heirs. Adjudicated in favor of herein respondents was 22.6773 hectares thereof, the rest having gone to Emilio Aguirre, a son of Candida whose property bounds the parcel of land in dispute on the south. Such fact is revealed by the testimony of Mariano Funtilar on direct examination, to wit: xxx xxx xxx Q. Your counsel has presented a certain Exhibit 1, which is a certification from the Municipal Treasurer of Mulanay. It clearly states that a certain parcel of land is declared in the name of the heirs of Candida Fernandez, the administrator of which is Petronila Aguirre which clearly shows that the tax declaration was only made in the name of the heirs Candida Fernandez, but in her name, is that right? A. Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q. Do we understand also that you are trying to register only the portion that you personally, your brother and sister are occupying? A. Yes, sir and we are applying for that. Q. In other words, it is clear that this land supposedly originally owned by Candida

Fernandez is a bigger portion, is that correct, a bigger parcel? A. Yes, sir. Q. And only a portion of the land is allotted to your brothers and sisters? A. Yes, sir. (Tsn-March 13, 1975, Land Reg. Case No. 192G, p. 7) xxx xxx xxx And on cross-examination ATTY. LAUREL: Q. Would you like to enlighten this Court that you and your brother and sister who are children of Antonia Resales received this property, this entire property were the only ones who received this entire property? A. That was the property pointed to uses our own, sir. Q. I am asking you whether this entire property was given- was inherited by the children of Antonia Rosales only? A. That is a big parcel but it is only a portion which was given to us which we are causing for registration, sir. xxx xxx xxx (Tsn-March 4, 1976, Land Reg. No. 192-G, p. 7) ATTY. LAUREL: Q. When you said portions were adjudicated to the heirs in order to avoid conflict in the repurchase do I get from you Mr. Funtilar, that the property repurchased that this property you are claiming in your application is only

a portion of the property repurchased from the Government? A. Yes, sir. (Tsn-April 27, 1976, Land Reg. Case No. 1921-G, p. 18) The petitioners contend that the private respondents have failed to establish possession for at least thirty years to entitle them to confirmation of imperfect title and registration under the law. The petitioners also fault the respondents reliance on the 1944 tax delinquency sale, forgetting that possession must still be proved. We are satisfied from the evidence that long before her death in 1936, Candida Fernandez already possessed the disputed property. This possession must be tacked to the possession of her heirs, through administrator Vitaliano Aguirre, and later to the possession of the private respondents themselves, who are Candida's grandchildren. The fact of possession is bolstered by the forfeiture in 1940 of the land in favor of the government. It would be rather absurd under the circumstances of this case to rule that the government would order the forfeiture of property for nonpayment of real estate taxes if the property is forest land. It is also reasonable to rule that the heirs of Candida Fernandez redeemed the property because they wanted to keep the land of the deceased in the possession of their family, thus continuing prior possession. From 1936 and earlier up to 1972 is more than the required period. As a matter of fact, the applicants' witnesses testified to their personal knowledge of more than 50 years possession. More important is the petitioners' allegation that the property sought to be registered was unclassified public forest until September 15, 1953 when L C Project No. 16-0, L C Map No. 1634 declared it alienable and disposable. It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his application for registration, the burden shifts totally to the government to prove that the land forms part of the unclassified forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. The private respondents tried their best to present the necessary evidence. A certification issued by then District Forester Fernando Roy on September 27, 1972 reads: xxxxxxxxx ... said parcel of land falls within the Alienable and Disposable LC Project No. 16D, LCMap No. 1634 certified" (not classified) "on September 15, 1953, by the Director of Forestry. In view thereof, this office interposes no objection in behalf of the Director of Forestry for the registration and/or confirmation of title on the property mentioned therein without prejudice to such

action, the Director of Lands and other government entities may deem proper to take on the premises. to which, the then District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands, Land District No. IV-2 in Lucena City, in a communication dated March 16, 1973 responded: 1. the parcel of land subject of this registration was originally claimed by Emilio Aguirre and A. Fernandez and the herein applicants have acquired the rights and interest therein thru predecessors-in-interest; and 2. that said parcel of land has not been disposed of, reserved, leased, applied for or granted as homestead or otherwise be alienated by the government. In view of the above findings, and basing from the report of the investigation submitted thereon by a representative of this office, and considering that this Agency has no evidence to support the opposition of the Government, it is further informed that this office interposes no opposition in the confirmation of the rights to and interest on the parcel of land particularly described under Plan Psu-215779 in favor of the herein applicants. The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact, all laws governing natural resources is a revered and long standing principle. It must, however, be applied together with the constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice. Every application for a concession of public land has to be viewed in the light of its peculiar circumstances. A strict application of the Heirs of Amunategui us. Director of Forestry (supra) ruling is warranted whenever a portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices. But when an application appears to enhance the very reasons behind the enactment of Act 496, as amended, or the Land Registration Act, and Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Public Land Act, then their provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their own implementation. The land sought to be registered was declared alienable and disposable 33 years ago. It is not forest land. It has been possessed and cultivated by the applicants and their predecessors for at least three generations. The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged. We see no strong reason to reverse the findings of the trial court and the appellate court. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the respondent appellate court is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ISABEL TESALONA and the HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. Rabendranath Y. Uy for private respondents.

During the hearing on January 18, 1972, the Fiscal moved to withdraw the opposition of the Director of Forestry and the 7 same was granted. On May 3, 1972, Assistant Fiscal Antonio Robles likewise moved for the withdrawal of the opposition of 8 the Director of Lands and the same was again granted. Reception of evidence was thereafter delegated to a 9 commissioner.

KAPUNAN, J.: This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered on December 29, 1983 which modified the decision dated December 8, 1976 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon. The controversy arose from an application for registration of five (5) parcels of land on the basis of an alleged possessory information title. The application was opposed by the government on the ground that the parcels of land are part of the inalienable land of the public domain. The subject property is situated in Barrio Butanyog, Mulanay, Quezon, and consists of about 7.4343 hectares alleged to have been originally acquired by Maria Rosita Lorenzo under a possessory information title dated May 20, 1896 under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894. Maria Rosita Lorenzo was married to Felipe Lizada. Maria Rosita begot two (2) sons, Laureano and Cipriano. Cipriano died a bachelor and without any issue. Upon the death of the spouses, Laureano inherited the land. Laureano Lizada married Baldomera Roces and the couple had two (2) children, Andres and Magdalena. Andres died a bachelor and without any issue, so upon the death of Laureano, Magdalena inherited the land. Magdalena married Nerio Tesalona and they had three (3) daughters, Isabel, Consuelo and Serapia, applicants herein. On June 23, 1971, Isabel, Consuelo and Serapia Tesalona filed an application for registration of five (5) parcels of land denominated as Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of plan Psu 215382 with the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Gumaca 1 Branch. Lot No. 1 has an area of 7,583 square meters; Lot No. 2 has 36,319 square meters; Lot No. 3 has 24,347 square meters; Lot No. 4 has 5,388 square meters; and Lot No. 5 has 2 706 square meters or a total of 74,343 square meters. The possessory information title covers only an area of 10,481 3 square meters. The Director of Lands through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Quezon filed his opposition to the application alleging that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title of the land applied for nor had they been in possession thereof for a period of at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application and that the 4 same is public land. On December 8, 1971, the applicants filed a reply to the government's opposition claiming that the land in question is private property covered by a possessory information title 5 dated May 20, 1896. At the initial hearing on the same date, the applicants presented proof of compliance of jurisdictional requirements. On motion of applicants' counsel, the court issued an order of general default with the exception of the Director of Lands and 6 the Director of Forestry.

Constancio dela Pena Tan likewise filed an opposition even as he supported the government's contention that the lands applied for are part of the public domain. Tan averred that he had possessed the land as lessee for a period of more than thirty five (35) years. Records reveal that Demetria dela Pena, mother of herein private oppositor occupied Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Plan Psu 215382, applied for registration, by virtue of a fishpond lease granted by the Bureau of Fisheries 10 sometime in 1953. Said lands were converted into fishponds and had been subject of a sales application sometime in 11 1963. The application to purchase filed by Constancio is still pending before the Bureau of Lands. Pending the resolution of whether or not the opposition of Constancio dela Pena Tan should be admitted, the lower court learned that the special counsel who had withdrawn the government's opposition was not authorized to do so. Acting accordingly, the court reinstated the opposition of the Director of Lands and directed that the opposition of the private oppositor be considered as evidence in support of the claim of the government that the land applied for is part of the public 12 domain. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment adjudicating Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in favor of the applicants and declaring Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as owned by the government subject to the rights of the lessee, Constancio dela Pena Tan, pending the approval of his sales application. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the application insofar as Lots 3, 4 and 5 of plan Psu-215382 are concerned and hereby adjudicates these properties in favor of the applicants Heirs of Isabel Tesalona namely: Lilia, Rebecca, Sonia, Emma, Imelda, Antonio, Minda, Luisa, Buenafe and Carmencita, all surnamed Pobeda; Consuelo L. Tesalona and Serapia L. Tesalona, together with all the improvements existing thereon and confirms their title thereto as their exclusive properties. The Court hereby declares Lots 1 and 2 as owned by the Government subject to the right of the lessee pending the approval of the sales application of private oppositor Constancio de la Pena. Upon this decision becoming final, let decree of confirmation and registration be entered and thereafter, upon payment of the fees required by law, let the corresponding certificate of title issue in the names of Heirs of Isabel Tesalona namely: LILIA POBEDA, married to Salvador Magtibay; REBECCA POBEDA, married to Jose Pineda; SONIA POBEDA, married to Ildefonso Avellano; EMMA POBEDA, married to Raul Capesano;

IMELDA POBEDA, married to Ceferino Jimenez; MINDA POBEDA, married to Rolando Nagar; LUISA POBEDA, single; BUENAFE POBEDA, married to Tomasito Javate; and CARMENCITA POBEDA, single; CONSUELO L. TESALONA, married to Eleuterio Luna; and SERAPIA L. TESALONA, single, all Filipino citizens and residents of Mulanay, Quezon as their exclusive properties, free from all liens and encumbrances. SO ORDERED.
13

mandatory character. While a blue print of survey Plan Psu 19 215382 as surveyed for the Heirs of Magdalena Lizada was presented before the trial court, the same falls short of the mandatory requirement of law. Private respondents contend that they are in possession of the original tracing cloth plan but they did not submit it in evidence for fear that it may be lost or misplaced while in possession of 20 the court. This contention spurs disbelief. The original tracing cloth plan, together with the duplicate copy of their application for registration of land title were under the custody of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) at that time. But such does not relieve the private respondents of their duty to retrieve the said tracing cloth plan and submit it before 21 the court. In the case ofDirector of Lands v. Reyes, this Court clearly declared that if the original tracing plan was forwarded to the LRC, "the applicants may easily retrieve the 22 same therefrom and submit the same in evidence." This was not done. Assuming that the same was in their possession during the trial, private respondents should have made it available to the trial court for verification. Private respondents further claim that petitioner failed to object to the submission of the blue print copy of the survey plan when the same was offered in evidence, thereby waiving objection to said evidence. We are not persuaded. Given the mandatory character of the requirement for the submission of the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, said requirement cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly. Besides, Rule 143 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that the rules do not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not provided therein, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. In the case at bench, there appears no reason to apply the exception to the aforesaid rule. The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona, herein private 23 respondents, is a Spanish title, a possessory information title issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo pursuant to the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 for 1.0481 hectares. But private respondents did not submit the original of the possessory information title. What was submitted was an unclear, illegible copy of a Spanish document purporting to be the title evidencing the land grant of 1896. Moreover, proof of loss or unavailability of the original document as required by Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was not established thus, rendering admissibility of the said secondary evidence questionable and dubious. This Court has time and again reiterated that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of secondary evidence of alleged possessory information titles considering the number of fake titles that have been discovered following their supposed reconstitution after the last 24 World War. In fact, the rash of anomalies prompted the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 892 which outlawed all Spanish titles, including possessory information titles, unless they were authenticated in appropriate registration 25 proceedings before August 16, 1976.

18

Not satisfied with the trial court's ruling, herein applicants interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals seeking confirmation of title over Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as well. On December 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court 14 through its First Civil Cases Division rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED but modified declaring the confirmation of the title of applicantsappellants over Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan PSU-215382, and ordering the registration of said Lots in their names, along with Lots 3, 4 and 5 of the same PSU Plan already adjudicated to them in said appealed decision. SO ORDERED.
15

The instant petition seeks to set aside the aforequoted decision on the basis of the following grounds, to wit: (a) the respondent court acted contrary to law in confirming private respondents' alleged title to Lot Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of a mere blue print copy of plan Psu 215382; and (b) the respondent court acted contrary to law in confirming private respondents' alleged title to Lot Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of a possessory information title dated May 20, 1896 which covers only an area 16 of 1.0481 hectares. The petition is impressed with merit. At the outset, we note that private respondents' application for registration of five (5) parcels of land denominated as Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Plan Psu 215382 ought to have been struck down at its inception for the reasons which we will discuss hereinafter. However, since the trial court ruled for confirmation of title over Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of Plan Psu 215382 in favor of the applicants (herein private respondents) and no appeal thereon was brought by the government to the Court of 17 Appeals, we cannot pass upon the validity of the registration of the other three (3) lots, the same was not put in issue in this petition. Suffice it to state that we deny the application for registration of Lot Nos. 1 and 2 without prejudice to the right of the government to pursue whatever means appropriate with respect to Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5. To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in evidence by private respondents. Such omission is fatal to their application as the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of

Another point to consider is the fact that there is a glaring and irreconcilable discrepancy between the area of 1.0481 hectares covered by the alleged possessory information title and the actual area of 7.4343 hectares applied for. Law and jurisprudence dictate that applicants have the burden of proving that the title justifies the considerable increase in land area, failure in which results in the resolution of the conflict in favor of the government and against them. Well-settled is the rule that land grants, being gratuitous in nature, are always construed favorably in favor of the government and strictly 26 against the grantee, and that possessory information titles, assuming them to be valid and legal, are grants from the State 27 which cannot extend beyond the terms thereof. Finally, Lot Nos. 1 and 2 were classified as swampy area and 28 were as early as 1955, filled with mangrove trees. Lorenzo del Mundo, husband of Demetria del Mundo, lessee of the lots in question, in his testimony declared that: Q When you first came to know these parcels of lands and possessed the same, what was the condition or nature of these lands? A That is (sic) a swampy land with bakawan trees, mangroves and some other swampy trees. Q Please name what "lalao" trees or swampy trees were planted when you possessed the same? A Bacawan, sasa, pipisik, tabigui, talisay, tingayos, langaray and bongalon. I forget (sic) the names of those other big trees 29 planted thereon. This belies the contention of herein private respondents that said lots were planted to coconuts in 1909 and, thereafter, to palay and other seasonal crops. Being swampy area covered by mangrove trees and the like, these lots may very well be considered and classified as forest lands. In the case of Heirs 30 of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, we declared that: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way place. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an

official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not 31 apply. (Emphasis ours) Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private 32 ownership. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens System, nullifies the title. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Appellate Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration of the Heirs of Isabel Tesalona of Lot Nos. 1 and 2 is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.