Poverty, protest and popular education in discourses of climate change

Eurig Scandrett (Queen Margaret University), Jim Crowther and Callum McGregor (University of Edinburgh)

Abstract
Discourses of climate change emerged in scientific epistemic communities, were taken up by activists in the environmental movement and found their way into policy. During this journey, this discourse shifted and adapted to reflect the interests of competing social groups and divergent social interests. Issues of redistributive social justice emerged as a fringe component of the discourse, largely as a result of development, international and Southern NGOs. Although environmental movements of the poor and victims of environmental injustice have increasingly been a significant component of political contestation, the extent to which these movements, or indeed the voice of the poor and victims of climate related policy, have contributed to narratives of climate change is negligible. This paper explores the implications of this exclusion for such a narrative and critically analyses initiatives of popular education, protest and culture which have attempted to engender dialogue between anti-poverty and climate justice activists.

Introduction
All environmental-ecological arguments are arguments about society and, therefore, complex refractions of all sorts of struggles being waged in other realms Each one of these composite discourses shapes a unique blend of complicity and dissent with respect to existing beliefs, institutions, material social practices, social relations, and dominant systems of organising politicaleconomic power. This is their specific virtue: they pose problems of defining relations across different moments in the social process and reveal much about the pattern of social conflict in all realms of social action. (Harvey 1996 p. 373) Discourses of climate change emerged from within the scientific community. Although the greenhouse effect had been known since the nineteenth century, the phenomenon of accelerated anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions leading to increased average temperatures at the earths surface was identified in the 1970s and recognised internationally as an environmental problem by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) at its World Climate Conference in 1979. Scientists, as an epistemic community, remain at the centre of climate change discourses, not least through the powerful position of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change established in 1988 by the WMO with the UN Environment Programme (van Beukering and Vellinga 1996, Simms 2005). However, climate change discourse was quickly taken up by the environmental movement, including environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs), and international policy makers, especially within the auspices of the UN. The 1970s witnessed a period of unprecedented growth in ENGOs. Friends of the Earth was founded in 1969 and Greenpeace in 1972 as the older organisations, such as the Sierra Club grew in support and membership. The Club of Rome published its seminal Limits to Growth in 1972. Thus, the ENGO sector emerged as a significant social

movement (at least in North America and Europe) by the time climate change was recognised, and this became a significant component of their campaigning programme. As the ENGOs became institutionally established, direct action environmentalism subsequently emerged, and this sector of the movement has made climate change a core part of its focus. The year 1972 was also the date of the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, and the acknowledgement in the policy community that environmental issues constituted a recognised area of social policy. The United Nations Environment Programme was established following the Stockholm conference and was therefore a key recipient and subsequent generator of policy led research and debates on climate change in the early 1980s when policy entrepreneurs in the scientific community were mobilising on the issue. It is important to recognise the origins and subsequent pathways of discourses on climate change because knowledge is never neutral but always carries with it accretions from the social groups through whose hands it has passed. Moreover, this process is ideological: it serves social interests through what is assumed, what is ignored and who is positioned in the discourse to speak. Not surprisingly, within the historical development of climate change discourse is embedded the material interests of the classes who have worked on them. The sectors with the most influence therefore on the early development and ongoing climate change discourse are the scientific epistemic community, the environmental movement, and the UN orientated international policy community. Moreover, these sectors, although representing discrete sets of interests in themselves, are also disproportionately drawn from similar social classes, the professional class, or knowledge class, which in the period between the second world war and the neoliberal turn at the end of the 20th century occupied a powerful position in global class dynamics. Other class interests have subsequently contributed to climate change discourse. National and transnational capitalists have mobilised around what has alternately been seen as a threat to their interests and an opportunity for promoting them through new forms of capital accumulation and achieving political power. The trope of sustainable development has been useful for this, especially in the decade 1992-2002, between the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, during which time UN policy shifted markedly from a state-led policy of stakeholder involvement to corporationled entrepreneurial voluntarism. Sklair (2001) describes this process as the development of a historic bloc of class realignment, achieved by the transnational capitalist class in order to divert a threat to its power base and transform it into an opportunity for new forms of capital accumulation. The various subaltern classes have, however, been largely absent from their contribution to climate change discourse. National and international working class interests, the urban and rural poor, peasants and indigenous communities have so far failed to engage with, or at least to influence, the language, values and analyses which are dominating policy and political discussions around climate change. As a result of this, most climate change discourse is blind to the interests of these subaltern classes. The ideology of the production, translation and distribution of knowledge and culture, the implementation of policy and the social processes which interact with these are

reflecting powerful and elite classes and constituting a hegemonic bloc which is excluding the vast majority of the worlds population. The development of climate change discourse in the absence of significant participation by subaltern classes is a problem principally for three reasons. 1. Any policy which attempts to tackle climate change whilst excluding the vast majority of the poor is not going to tackle climate change effectively. Policy discourses are just one component of social processes which, if they exclude subaltern interests, will hit against class conflicts in other areas. There will be resistance, both of the weapons of the weak form (Scott 1985), in which those who are oppressed will seek to obtain marginal benefits with minimal risk through neglect, noncompliance or even sabotage. There are likely to be divisions amongst subaltern interests which will be exploited by those classes benefiting from these discourses. Thus there will be no effective solution to climate change by drawing on narratives which exclude the interests of the subaltern classes. 2. As with all forms of environmental damage climate change is already affecting the poor to a greater extent than the rich. If we are to understand how climate change is socially constructed in discourses, we need to start from those who suffer most from its effects. Moreover, social movements which emerge from ecological distribution conflicts provide a distinctive form of critique to the extent that they oppose the logic of economic development with an insistence on incommensurable languages of valuation (Martinez-Alier 2002). 3. In order to achieve a socially just solution to climate change, rather than delaying its onset, a transformation of economic processes is needed. Since capitalist accumulation is a core generator of climate change and producer of poverty and exploitation, any socially just and ecologically sustainable solution needs to involve the interests of the subaltern classes. Discourses, as a constituent part of social practice, contribute to the social change which is required for transforming society. As the quotation from Harvey at the beginning of this chapter points out, discourse is one moment in the social process and stands in dialectical relation to others of which he identifies power, desire, institution building, material practices and social relations (Harvey 1996: p.78-83). Nonetheless, as educators, the authors are especially interested in discourse, and in particular the generation, distribution and production of knowledge and culture. As popular educators moreover we are interested in the pedagogy of the oppressed (Freire 1972), those forms of education and learning in communities in which knowledge from below, in critical dialogue with other sources of knowledge, is an integral part of struggles against oppression. We therefore explore the discourse of climate change by identifying diverse narratives and story lines, and relating these to major discourses with class agendas: social democracy, neoliberalism, ecological modernisation, socialist transformation. We look at barriers and opportunities between climate change narratives and the thematic universe of people living in poverty or with the consequences of climate damage. We also explore some of the initiatives which have been used to create a dialogue between the narratives of environmental activists and communities living with poverty and the consequences of climate change. This work is based on the reflections of fifteen years of observation of and participation in environmental justice campaigning, including on climate justice, by Eurig Scandrett; research into learning

in environmental justice campaigns led by Jim Crowther; and research conducted towards a doctoral thesis by Callum McGregor. The remainder of this chapter illuminates the analytical tools by which the class interests embedded in discourses of climate change can be understood. This will be followed by three Scottish case studies including a community development project in a poor sector of Edinburgh resourced through the Scottish policy-led Climate Challenge Fund; the environmental justice campaign of the ENGO, Friends of the Earth Scotland (FoES); and the direct action environmental movement in its interactions with working class campaigns. Finally we will assess the proposal that popular education might be valuable in engendering a climate change discourse which embeds the interests of subaltern classes, and argue for a wider employment of this dialogical approach amongst activists and policy makers working on climate change.1

Narratives and discourses

Narratives, in the sense used here, constitute the various story-lines, shared meanings and collective assumptions which are employed by groups when communicating about climate change. Discourses are more coherent meta-level broad frameworks that explain and encompass a wide variety of values and beliefs, which draw on amalgams of narratives. The narratives vary as to their ideological character, and strands of them make up the discourses, whereas the discourses are more clearly associated with the interests of particular social groups. Narratives and discourses are processes, never fixed outcomes, and exist in dynamic relations with one another and other moments in social change. It is possible to identify a range of narratives within climate change communication and explore the matrix of interests with which they are aligned, thereby indicating which groups interests are reinforced through these narratives and which ones overlooked. Such an analysis can therefore be used to identify and differentiate discourses of complicity and of dissent, both between and within these narratives (see Harvey 1996) and thereby suggest opportunities for intervention. a) Narratives of Climate change Generally associated with the liberal emphasis on individual action and personal behaviour, lifestyle choice, a major narrative associated with climate change, varies from a minimalist, good citizenship approach, as in the environmental awareness campaign of the Scottish Executive of 2003-7 encouraging citizens to: do a little, change a lot (Scottish Government 2004), through consumerist versions of lifestyle
1

A caveat must be acknowledged that the principal discourses on climate change which will be addressed concern the release of carbon dioxide through the burning of fossil fuels. This is only one component of the complexity of climate change, which includes carbon loss from modern, intensive and chemically saturated agriculture (between 1980 and 2003, an estimated 12-15% of total carbon was lost from soil through arable agriculture in England and Wales (Bellamy et al. 2005)) and the emissions of other greenhouse gases, such as methane from organic waste and cattle farming. There is no doubt that the socio-ecological transformation required to address climate change is ecosystemic, involving food production and material flow systems and the role of human ecology within biological and genetic diversity of other species. However, the disruption to the carbon cycle caused by intensive fossil fuel consumption is the most dominant component of climate change discourse and therefore provides the greatest opportunity for analysis.

choice in which products are marketed as climate friendly, through to the more demanding calls for individual carbon rationing of some activists and ENGOs. Across this range of versions, lifestyle choice stories have in common a liberal focus on individualised choices within a competitive market. Likewise, a wide range of ideological versions of technological narratives are used in end of pipe discourses, as in carbon capture, or the more demanding power down accounts of the Zero Carbon Britain project (2010) as well as the more laissez faire approaches of weak sustainability, in which technology is expected to be driven by market forces to substitute less damaging solutions. At the far end of laissez faire is climate change denial whose advocates may be technological (Lomberg 2001), obfuscating (Lawson 2008) or even militant particularist (eg. fuel protestors). Narratives of austerity are also used in the individualised arguments of carbon rationing, anti-consumerist and the more pietistic approaches to simple living, as well as the more utopian alternative communities. These can range between the UK government-sponsored Sustainable Development Commissions Prosperity without Growth (Jackson 2009), through to the anarchist direct action activists in the Camp for Climate Action. Communitarian approaches vary from ecovillage proponents to transition towns. Transition towns constitute a 12 stage process of mobilising communities to take action to reduce oil dependency (as resilience to peak oil and climate change prevention), starting from easy win community projects and lifestyle choices often attached to romantic win-win communitarianism and leading to a more radical utopian energy descent plan. Some radical utopians also combine with a form of apocalyptic narrative, which ranges from direct action climate campers to the more resigned dark mountain project (Kingsnorth 2009). However, elements of the direct action movement also incorporate a strong social justice narrative which can overlap with more socialist versions such as just transition and climate justice campaigns (STUC 2010). Combinations of these narratives are drawn on to support discourses which serve particular class interests or shifting alliances of classes struggling for hegemony. Here we explore three discourses representing blocs of different class interests before exploring the possibility of a discourse of transformation. b) Social democratic discourse Social democracy constituted the hegemonic political discourse in most parts of the western capitalist world from the end of the Second World War until its influence started to decline from the neoliberal 1970s. Combining a large welfare state with Keynsian state intervention in the economy, the significance of social democracy lay in its compromise between on the one hand the interests of local, national and transnational bourgeoisie in capital accumulation, and on the other, those of the working class and the poor. Social democratic discourse remains significant in Europe, reflecting stages of hegemonic struggle between these classes. In February 2002, Jack McConnell, the Labour First Minister of the Scottish Executive (government) gave a speech in which he committed his government to environmental justice by incorporating the environment of the poor into a discourse of social democracy. Too often the environment is dismissed as the concern of those who are not confronted with bread and butter issues. But the reality is that the people who

have the most urgent environmental concerns in Scotland are those who daily cope with the consequences of a poor quality of life, and live in a rotten environment close to industrial pollution, plagued by vehicle emissions, streets filled by litter and walls covered in graffiti In the late 20th Century the big political challenge and the greatest success I believe for democrats on the left of centre was to develop combined objectives of economic prosperity and social justice. I believe the biggest challenge for the early 21st century is to combine economic progress with social and environmental justice. Scottish Executive 2002a Moreover, McConnells environmental justice also included a global dimension, in which the unequal cause and impact of climate change became an extension of the argument for social democracy. I am clear that environmental in-justice is at its most shocking when you consider the situation of the developing world. The entire African continent is responsible for a mere 3% of the world's carbon emissions - yet it pays the same price in terms of climate change as the rest of the world - but with less capacity to protect its citizens from the impact of this climate change. Scottish Executive 2002b However, as Scott and Mooney (2009) have argued, the particular variant of social democracy practiced in the devolved Scottish government constituted an uneasy hybrid with neoliberalism. Whilst Scotlands Labour Party arguably was able to sustain a higher level of social democratic discourse and policy than the UK Labour Party, there was still a compromise, with neoliberalism dominant. This was evident in environmental justice policy which, whilst influencing social policy, made no impact on economic policy, and therefore on the causes of environmental injustice (Scandrett 2007, 2010). c) Neoliberal discourses From the 1970s onwards, neoliberalism has been a project of re-establishment to power of the capitalist class, unhindered by compromise with any other class group (Harvey 2005). The discourse combines laissez-faire free market with a rhetorical commitment to reduction in the role and size of the state, although in practice, only certain sections of the state tend to be reduced that which is considered to be in competition at any time with private capital. Other sections of the state, those which serve the interests of capital accumulation, are often strengthened as in Margaret Thatchers Authoritarian Populism (Jessop et al 1988) in the 1980s, the bilateral and multilateral trade agreements initiated from the 1990s, the neoconservative project mobilised around George W Bush in the 2000s and, in different ways today, Indias security state and Chinas capitalist Communist Party. There is no single discourse on climate change from the neoliberal perspective. At one extreme, neoliberal discourses simply deny that climate change is occurring, treating the scientific discourse as a constraint on business freedom and economic growth in the self-interest of the professional class. More sophisticated neoliberal discourses focus on weak sustainability, in which financial capital and natural capital are treated as substitutable, so allocating property rights to elements of the carbon cycle (carbon dioxide emissions, carbon sequestration capacity) creates a free market which

responds to scarcity through substitution. Further to this logic involves creating carbon derivatives markets, in which trade in carbon leads to a speculative secondary trade in carbon derivatives, future carbon markets and risk, with the capacity for subprime carbon credits (futures contracts to deliver carbon that carry a relatively high risk of not being fulfilled, Friends of the Earth US 2009). In one of its more ludicrous forms, neoliberal discourses accept the reality of climate change, yet regard it as irrelevant to the principle task of capital accumulation. Matt Ridley, nonexecutive chair of the Northern Rock bank in the UK in the years prior to its spectacular collapse in 2007, nonetheless still believes in the god that has clearly failed him and most of the world. Referring to the developing countries of the global South he argues that The richer they get, the less weather-dependent their economies will be and the more affordable they will find adaptation to climate change. (Quoted in Gray, 2010, p. 51). Thus, despite being the dominant policy discourse throughout much of the world, neoliberalism has yet to develop a coherent narrative on climate change. This is perhaps part of the reason for the near universal failure of climate change policy. Climate change remains a constraint to the accumulation of capital and therefore to the power of the capitalist class. For this reason an alternative discourse of climate policy has received approval in some policy contexts, in which the state retains a more interventionist role in supporting the accumulation of capital: Ecological Modernisation. d) Ecological Modernisation Ecological Modernisation (EM) can be understood as an emerging discourse potentially of the same level of organisation as the more conventional ideological frameworks of social democracy and neoliberalism (Hajer 1995, Harvey 1996, Dryzek et al. 2003). EM differs from neoliberalism in the extent that it embraces state intervention and concedes some power to other class sectors whilst maintaining overall capitalist control and accumulation. EM attempts a systematic integration of ecological interests into market forces by such means as allocating property rights to natural commons (eg. water privatisation, enclosure of the atmosphere in carbon trading) and socio-environmental knowledge (eg. biopiracy, dispossession of indigenous technology); constructing commodities from waste, directly (energy from waste) or indirectly via state constructed quasi-markets (pollution permit trading), and other quasi market formation through state-manipulated price feedback (eg. fuel tax, cap and trade) or contingent valuation (eg. willingness to pay). Dryzek et al (2003) differentiate between what they call weak EM which makes capitalism less wasteful within the existing framework of production and consumption (p. 167), and its stronger variety which would democratise the state by including environmentalists in the core, creating the green state. However, just as social democracy, which made possible the welfare state, constituted a temporary compromise between the interests of capital accumulation and the material interests of the working class, so EM may be regarded as a compromise with the material interests of ecology, or more accurately, the self proclaimed representatives of ecological interests in the knowledge class. Dryzek et al (2003) inadvertently concede this by treating environmentalists as if they are a class of equivalent status as the bourgeoisie and the working class

We owe the liberal state to the movements of the bourgeoisie against monarchy, church, and aristocracy. We owe the welfare state to the movements of the organised working class against a capitalist-dominated liberal state Long banished from the core of the state, environmentalism is tied up with some contemporary developments that may, in the end, produce a new kind of state whose emergence is of comparable historical significance to the earlier emergence of the liberal capitalist state and then the welfare state. (p. 2) Through the influence of environmentalists the green state would be expected to employ EM in order to manage the constraints on capital accumulation in the conditions of production (physical limits of the environment to provide a climate conducive to capital accumulation) through finding new forms of dispossession. Just as the welfare state embedded a contradiction between class interests which eventually led to its fissure in the 1970s, so too there is a contradiction in EM. On the one hand, ecological modernisation provides a common discursive basis for a contested rapprochement between [the environmental movement] and dominant forms of political-economic power. But on the other, it presumes a certain kind of rationality that lessens the force of more purely moral arguments and exposes much of the environmental movement to the dangers of political cooptation. (Harvey 1996. p. 378) Writing before the hegemonic bloc had emerged in the 2002 World Summit, Harvey suggests that the environmental justice movement and environmentalism of the poor have influenced EM to the extent that some sort of configuration has to be envisaged in which ecological modernisation contributes both to growth and global distributive justice simultaneously (p. 379). As we shall see, this has been the case in some sectors of the ENGOs and environmental activists who have attempted serious dialogue with environmental justice struggles and other working class movements in order to build a dissenting discourse (see Scandrett 2007). e) Socialist transformation Challenging climate change involves a transformation of capital accumulation. Dissenting discourses of climate change which have the capacity to contribute to such a transformation must include, as a necessary but not sufficient element, the contribution from subaltern classes and in particular the victims of climate change, the fossil fuel industry and other environmental injustices (Bellamy Foster 2010). Environmental justice movements, or environmentalism of the poor (Martinez-Alier 2002), have been documented from a wide range of contexts throughout the world, where people who are directly affected by environmental damage mobilise into community or workplace campaigns and social movements to resist. Those directly affected by environmental damage tend to be the poor, working class, racialised minorities, indigenous peoples, politically disenfranchised and geographically isolated communities. Environmental justice campaigns tend to form around issues of social justice: racial segregation, land rights, workplace hazards, industrial compensation claims, poverty and urban decay (Faber and McCarthy 2003). The movements are often distinct from mainstream ENGOs whose membership largely comprises educated middle class professionals, although there are attempts to build alliances between them. Martinez-Alier (2002) argues that environmental justice movements

emerge when the cost-benefit analysis of development, which puts an exchange value on the environment, is resisted by those whose poverty and social position denies them leverage in this market. Such movements develop languages of valuation which are incommensurable with the cost-benefit analysis of economic development, leading to discursive, social and political conflicts. Climate change can be regarded as the ultimate conflict in the conditions of production (OConnor 1998), in which capitalism may destroy the environment which makes capital accumulation possible, thereby leading to an irresolvable crisis. In such analysis, social movements are likely to emerge amongst the victims of climate change with common interests in challenging its causes. the main historic agent and initiator of a new epoch of ecological revolution is to be found in the third world masses most directly in line to be hit first by the impending disasters They too, as in the case of Marxs proletariat, have nothing to lose from the radical changes necessary to avert (or adapt to) disaster. (Bellamy Foster 2010). But following Harvey (2006) climate change may also be regarded as accumulation by dispossession in which the global commons and significant geo-ecological cycles which make life possible on earth are being appropriated in the interests of capital accumulation. In which case: Accumulation by dispossession entails a very different set of practices from accumulation through the expansion of wage labour in industry and agriculture. The latter, which dominated processes of capital accumulation in the 1950s and 1960s, gave rise to an oppositional culture (such as that embedded in trade unions and working class political parties) that produced the social democratic compromise. Dispossession, on the other hand, is fragmented and particular It is hard to oppose all of this specificity and particularity without appeal to universal principles. (Harvey 2006 p.52-3) Such fragmented forms of militant particularism can therefore only unite against the causes of climate change through access to abstracted knowledge which has largely developed in the professional class. It is the poorest and most vulnerable who are already suffering from climate change and will continue to do so at an increasing rate. The elite are already discussing adaptation, investing in the defences and technologies to protect the few from devastation. The knowledge class, dependent on high levels of public expenditure in education and public services, is at high risk of material loss, potentially sinking back into the working class from which it largely emerged over the past few generations. It is the knowledge class, whose ascendancy contributed to the flowering of social movement activities in the postwar welfare capitalist countries, and who are the scientists, policy developers and public sector workers who make up the membership of the ENGOs, which will decline most steeply as a result of climate change. However, whilst this class will certainly suffer from climate change, it is the poorest who are the primary victims. Unlike most environmental justice movements, the campaigns against climate damaging activities are being led by the educated professionals in the ENGOs in the global North and their more recent offshoots in the

direct action environmentalists (Seel, Paterson and Doherty 2000). Any discourse which might provide a challenge both to the causes of climate change and to the powerful interests which protect these, must draw on the knowledge class and the poor. We propose that the methods and methodologies of popular education have a contribution to make to developing and reinforcing discourses of dissent. By methods of popular education, we mean the deliberate educational techniques devised originally by Paulo Freire and adapted and developed through the practices of radical professional educators and by grassroots social movements (Freire 1972, Hope and Timmel 1984, Crowther, Martin & Shaw 1999, Kane 2001, Crowther, Galloway & Martin 2005). By methodologies of popular education we refer to activities which are not explicitly educational but which engender dialogical exchanges between forms of knowledge and culture, in particular between climate change discourses and the cultural activities of one or more subaltern class or group. This knowledge from below is not necessarily better but it widens the opportunities for engaging with different knowledges. Such engagement might include meetings, networking, correspondence, electronic communication, publication exchange, joint campaigns, common struggles etc which includes a component of dialogical collective learning. In short, any activity in which subaltern class interests might be incorporated into climate change discourses which lead to new forms of discourse in the interests of those classes is a relationship of hegemony and therefore, necessarily a pedagogical relationship (Gramsci 1971, p. 350).

Case studies
We present several case studies in which there is some genuine attempt at dialogue between environmental activists and working class communities directly affected by climate change, climate affecting policies or other forms of exploitation during the lifecycle of the fossil fuel industries. Some of these use popular education approaches, in others can be discerned elements of popular education methodology. Case studies are presented on the basis that they provide examples of highly particularistic attempts to build on climate change discourse with subaltern classes, and expose contradictions and problems of practice, the analysis of which can lead to further work.

1. Environmental NGO: Friends of the Earth Scotlands environmental justice campaign

In 1999, a devolved parliament was instituted in Scotland. Friends of the Earth Scotland (FoES) used the opportunity to launch a campaign for environmental justice which explicitly linked together local environmental injustices with the globally unequal distribution of resource consumption, especially fossil fuels and their resultant waste stream, climate change. The campaign employed a strapline No less than a decent environment for all, with no more than our fair share of the earths resources which became widely influential amongst NGOs (see Agyeman 2005, Boardman, Bullock & McLaren 1999, Dunion 2003, Dunion and Scandrett 2003, McLaren 2003). FoESs practice shifted to include active support for communities, primarily working class or poor communities, directly affected by environmental pollution and

degradation, explicitly drawing on the methods of community development and popular education (Scandrett 2000, Wilkinson and Scandrett 2001, Agents for Environmental Justice and Scandrett 2003). Over a period of six years, FoES engaged in sustained dialogue through structured educational programmes with communities fighting against waste landfills, opencast coal mines, quarries, polluting industries, fish farms, poor quality housing and workplace hazards. Similar popular education methods were also used to generate dialogue between campaigners in Scotland and activists who are victims of the fossil fuel industry elsewhere in the world. Several exchange visits took place involving Ecuadorian activists, including from the industrial city Esmeraldas where a leak from an oil refinery led to a fatal explosion, and representatives from the Cofan nation, an indigenous people whose ancestral land has been expropriated, exploited and polluted by oil extraction (Scandrett, OLeary and Martinez 2005). As a direct result of the political practice of FoES, the Scottish Executive, under Jack McConnell embedded environmental justice into its policy discourse, including positioning climate change within narratives of inequality and social justice as a logical extension of social democracy, subject to neoliberal economic growth. Moreover, during this period, as environmental justice became incorporated into the policy discourse, its meaning was diluted towards the management of what Curtice et al (2005) have called environmental incivilities (Scandrett 2007). By contrast, and through ongoing dialogue with directly affected communities, FoESs narratives increasingly focused on the common causes of diverse environmental injustices reflected in the wider movement. However, the subsequent trajectory of FoESs campaign for environmental justice reflected the tension between the dialogue with community-based campaigns and servicing its own membership. FoESs members, in common with most western ENGOs, are predominantly drawn from the professional class whose interests do not always correspond with the working class victims of environmental injustice. Whilst the environmental justice campaign constituted a significant and relatively successful attempt to build alliances between these classes and to shift the ENGO discourse in order to incorporate the interests of the working class (Scandrett 2007), there was a limit in the extent to which this was achieved. In 2005, the G8 summit took place in Gleneagles, Scotland. In the context of the crisis in the Kyoto protocol created by George W. Bush, climate change was put on the agenda by the UK, and FoES, along with other NGOs mobilised around demands for climate justice. In collaboration with the student group People & Planet, FoES organised a demonstration at Grangemouth industrial estate (home to five of Scotlands highest carbon dioxide emitters) along with an open letter to the Chief Executive of the Inneos (formerly BP) oil refinery, and also coordinated a low threshold protest at the symbolic time of 13:45 on the first day of the summit (the G8 countries represent 13% of the worlds population and produce 45% of the worlds carbon dioxide). However, there were tensions within the movement over the focus on climate justice and relationships between participants in the oppositional movement, and the climate narrative was lost in demands to Make Poverty History and the depoliticised populism of Live 8 rock concerts.

Following the G8 summit, FoES reviewed its priorities. In 2007, Jack McConnell lost the election to a minority Scottish National Party government which abandoned any policy discourse on environmental justice, and by this time FoES had oriented its practice more explicitly on members interests of lifestyle environmentalism, technology and policy focused lobbying. Climate justice had reverted to climate change. Research into FoES cyberactivists (FoES members who participate in on-line campaigns) associated with FoES illustrates some of the complexities of discourse alliance in ENGOs (Scandrett, Crowther and Hemmi 2010). Surveyed during 2008, 78% of cyberactivists prioritised campaigns on global climate change, whereas 47% prioritised poverty and pollution, a significant figure which is almost certainly due to the environmental justice campaign conducted over the previous decade. However, specific environmental justice campaign issues which predominantly affect people living with poverty were given low prioritisation in cyberactivist campaigns: local planning issues (7%); fuel poverty (5%); incinerator campaigns (0%). On the other hand, environmental issues with negligible or negative associations with environmental justice received higher prioritisation: renewable energy technologies (48%); wildlife conservation (38%); population growth (24%). Cyberactivists could support environmental justice in the abstract but without a major shift in political practice. Dialogue between FoES and community-based environmental justice struggles had contributed to a construction of a discourse synthesising the interests of the knowledge class and the subaltern classes disproportionately affected by environmental injustice. The process was not sustained however, and a combination of internal conflicts of interest, changing political opportunities and the neutralising impact of vested interests led to its dissipation and a weakening of the movement in Scotland.

2. Community Development and the Climate Challenge Fund

The Climate Challenge Fund provided 27.4 million between 2007 and 2010, to 250 community level carbon reduction projects across Scotland. The Fund was the initiative of Green Party Members of the Scottish Parliament in return for their support for the first budget of the minority Scottish Nationalist Party government in 2007. Many community projects were able to take advantage of the Fund and deliver projects in ecological renovation, local food production, heating and transport etc, which benefited local communities as well as delivering reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. Some of the beneficiaries of the Fund were projects which integrated climate change into community development work designed to tackle poverty. Interviews were conducted with a community education worker in one such project in a working class community with a long history of poverty and deprivation. For this community worker, the purpose of engaging with the Climate Challenge was partially to respond to the changing policy agenda in order to access funding for antipoverty community development work, and partially to build on community education practice in order to generate discourses on climate change from the perspective of those struggling against poverty.

[W]eve tried to tackle issues to do with poverty in this community for a long time[W]e were very straight with the Climate Challenge Fund right from the start that we would be taking a poverty approach to this...So in a sense, were doing a classic community education thing which is trying to use the policy agenda to bring about outcomes that the community would value. The implications of a community development approach are explained by the worker in relation to a workshop on communicating about climate change. It wasnt a bad workshop, but the facilitator said different people have different interests and therefore if somebody is interested in money well then thats what you sell them; how they could save money if they reduce their energy. They dont bother with the science of it Ive been a community development worker a long time, and one of the principles of community development is that people often come into activism out of self-interest. But the idea in community development is [that] thats fine because youve actually engaged them, but then you try to broaden their interests so that its not just about whats happening in their street, its about the wider community, and other people, and its about collective interests. ... And I would say the same principle applies to climate change. You may come in because you want to save a bit of money. But you try to actually widen their understanding of climate change through that: where that actually leads to, why cut down CO2 emissions, what impact that will have, and the whole broader political debate and what have you. Because otherwise, youre actually not crediting people with intelligence Its about ownership of knowledgeYou know, how do you engage critically with the world. This is an explicitly dialogical agenda: responding to policy opportunities presented by climate change discourse with activities which generate both material benefits and educational opportunities for a working class community struggling against poverty. Thereby, the praxis of reducing poverty and carbon dioxide emissions generates new discourse on climate change. It also exposes contradictions, and through employing informal popular education, community workers are able to exploit such contradictions for educational purposes, seeking to expose at a local level the socioeconomic realities that lifestyle and technical discourses fail to recognise: [W]eve now got 11 local households and weve done training with them and all the different things that they can do through behaviour change to lower their carbon emissions and their energy use in the home. Weve provided them with a range of gadgets. They are now conducting this experiment in their own home and I meet with them on a monthly basis to bring back the results of their experiments. Weve had thermal images of their home, so theyre able to see what theyre up against 'cause weve emphasised very much right from the beginning that its as interesting to find why it's difficult to lower your carbon emissions as it is to find out how easy it isAnd weve said to

them that were looking at how much behaviour change alone can effect their energy use and carbon emissions and what theyre up against in terms of the structural fabric of their home, their personal living situation, their income, all of those things that are kind of going on in their lives as well, so that we can get a picture of: if we were to try and seriously lower the carbon emissions of a community like this, what are the real issues, and how much is down to individual behaviour and how much is down to other issues. The practical aspects of such work however can encounter contradictions relating to other moments, including structures of power, social relations, material practices and institutions (Harvey 1996 p. 78). In constructing questions for a survey on energy use the community educator recalls an incident which illustrates in a small way the discursive nature of power and the practices which constitute it. [W]e did a [carbon] footprint survey with another organisation thats worked in climate change issues for a long timeThey designed the survey based on an on-line survey system. We then looked at the survey and saidthat on its own is not enough. You would have to attach several social questions to that[W]e were saying well, just asking people what their winter bills are; how much they spend in a monetary senseis going to be meaningless. We insisted we put questions like how many hours a day is your heating on for? because a lot of people in this area are unemployed, and theyre at home all day. And thats a major issue, you have to have your heating up. But also, I wanted to ask In the winter do you feel your home is warm enough? So, brought together, [with] those two questions, you immediately get into a fuel poverty issue. [] And at one point the organisation said to us look were experts, we have done this survey in loads of places, and I said yes, youre experts in certain elements but were experts on this type of communityThis is not just for you, were seeing this as a bit of knowledge for the community to use for their own ends As far as we were concerned, it had implications for how the community was seen in terms of their behaviour, and fairly attributing things to their behaviour and also in the potential [to change]. Because what were saying is what might come out of this project is actually theres a real limit to what people can do. And yes we need to encourage people to do that but we also need to get some of these structural problems sorted out. We need to be able to use this as ammunition to fight, for people to be able to fight to get the changes - this is a great opportunity for people to make arguments about the state of their homes where theyve never been able to win any ground in the past. Heres a great opportunity- heres the climate change agenda! Despite recognising and responding to the opportunities for constructing alternative discourses from the experience and knowledge of working class groups struggling against poverty through community development processes, there is a real sense of the practical difficulties of engaging with this. With a long history of

disempowerment, the potential for engaged political struggle for social transformation is limited. I think were at the real initial stages of trying to engage people. Its potentially part of a social movement, but its probably not there yet. Theres potential to build that. To me whats worrying is the fact that a message like climate change for a community like this is going to take a long time to work on its not really got enough of an immediacy for people and even the issues that do have an immediacy for people dont necessarily get people going. So how can you get something like climate change really getting people going? The problems of longstanding poverty and disempowerment are compounded by the vested interests of powerful groups engaged in generating climate change discourses. Another informant with a wealth of experience of community work alongside such community based organisations to facilitate the development of climate change related projects articulates well the ambivalent effects of the Climate Challenge Fund on mobilisation potential more generally: I suppose when you are talking about building movements the one thing that I have noticed is how afraid bureaucracy is, or organisations, or government delivery bodies, or even government funds like the Climate Challenge Fund. They want to keep people divided. There is strength in numbers and everything that Ive seen like the Climate Challenge Fund, its all about keeping people divided [E]veryone gets funded to do stuff but they are so hesitant to actually link those groups up with each other. Interviewer: Whos they? The people who manage the fund, Keep Scotland BeautifulIf theyve all got the Climate Challenge Fund then they should all be sharing information about what they are doing, but by dividing people, and I think also by putting people in competition with each other, you also slow down change and the strength that these organisations have...[T]heres some organisations that really get it and they really want to support the growth of each other but when theyre applying for the same funding pots, then they dont want to be [sharing information] when youre in competition you cant build a movement Sometimes they cant see their common ground. So I think maybe something like climate justicethat could become ingrained, but some of them divide oversocial issues andenvironmental issue[s], and they dont want to work together; they dont think theyve got common ground but they obviously do. They are so ingrained in what they do everyday that they dont see the bigger picture. The contradictions of what is, for all intentions and purposes, a progressive policy context is revealed in the last quotation. Some sections of the environmental movement have moved away from trying to exploit the ambiguities of policy

initiatives or becoming trapped in their potential limitations and taken up direct action.

3. Direct Action environmentalism: Camps for Climate Action

Direct Action (DA) environmentalism emerged during the 1980s and 90s as a response to the growing professionalisation of the mainstream ENGOs and their apparent lack of success against neoliberal governments in the US and the UK (Seel, Paterson and Doherty 2000). Drawing inspiration from anarchism, deep ecology, animal rights and the peace camps, they developed new forms of autonomous organisation and confrontational political protest which focused on individual responsibility for directly preventing activities damaging to the environment. The demography of the DA environmentalists is disproportionately young and, as with mainstream environmentalism, educated and professional. An important focus of DA environmentalism in the UK since 2007, is an annual Camp for Climate Action, during which for a few days hundreds of activists set up camp on occupied land close to a source of pollution (power station, airport and, in 2010, the headquarters of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the part-publicly owned bank notorious for financing ecologically and socially destructive developments). When a group of DA environmentalists associated with Earth First! and Climate Camp realised the growing expansion of opencast coal extraction in Scotland they decided to take action. For them, there was a clear connection between climate change and the extractive fossil fuel industry directly affecting local working class communities: around 13 new mines all going through various stages of the planning process simultaneously and some seriously disenfranchised communities, bearing the brunt of Scotlands climate change impacts at home. Moreover: Despite the fact that the climate change movement or radical environmental movement was growing, it was turning further away from achieving the kind of social change that will be necessary to bring about any kind of revolutionary ecological society. The movement wasnt really talking about what really affects [working class] people, and increasingly our politics dealt with abstract carbon-counting, made worse by our obsession with the financial crisis. Coal Action Scotland (ca. 2009. no page number) This led to a series of Digger Diving (immobilising digging machinery) activities at various opencast mine sites and eventually to the establishment of the Mainshill Solidarity Camp at Mainshill proposed opencast site in South Lanarkshire. In a report of the action, incorporating advice to activists, Coal Action Scotland (ca. 2009) comment that: Many community campaigns focus only on the legal process, or pin their hopes on stopping a project at the planning stage. They know better than anyone the endemic corruption at local council level but many community groups will want to have exhausted all the legal options before supporting an occupation although you may disagree with leaving direct action until all else has failed, be sensitive to this. As trust is built up with the communities, hopefully direct action wont just be seen as a last resort to be taken by intrepid eco-activists, but

as an integral part of a campaign and an expression of the communities (sic) right to self-determination (no page number) The Solidarity Campers invested time and effort in building relationships with the local working class community through informal contact in the pub and other community spaces. The community, it seems, were generally glad to have the support of committed activists, invited them in for tea, dropping in to the camp and contributed food and materials for their temporary shelters. Much of this solidarity mobilising is very informal and unstructured, and without a concerted attempt to achieve common platforms or collective dialogue. Because of the illegal nature of much of the activity, the DA environmentalists mode of operation involves individuals and small groups carrying out actions secretly, within the parameters of shared codes of conduct, but without the knowledge even of the other activists. It was in the context of a piece of secretly conducted sabotage, or pixie action, that tensions between the two groups emerged. In the summer, during The Camp for Climate Action at Mainshill some people snuck out in the night and dismantled the conveyor belt at Glentaggart opencast mine. This was the first pixie action to be reported since the camp had arrived and it provoked an interesting and difficult discussion between campers and the local anti-opencast campaigners. At the camp we were excited by the news of the action and generally pleased that it had happened. But, in a large meeting at the camp some of the locals told us that they were unhappy with this kind of action that it increased the amount of lorries transporting coal by road in the area, that wed crossed a line and that if it happened again we wouldnt be seeing them at the camp any more. Wed pissed off the very people that we were there to support and it didnt feel good. This was a hard blow to our enthusiasm to push our limits and step-up our tactics to take the fight direct to those waging destruction. However, our relationship with the locals moved on from this point with continuous communication and although it is difficult to have frank discussion about anonymous actions I do believe that the supportive locals came with us on a journey of radicalisation that made our resistance stronger. (no page number) The conflict which emerged here is between two cultures of militant particularism. The traditions, codes of conduct and nomenclature of the DA environmentalists have grown through praxis and debate during actions and camps, on campuses and in squats, online and in the samizdat publications of the movement. This is a culture outwith the traditions of working class community action which have their own traditions of collective accountability, a critical respect for legal and state processes and an intimate knowledge of the local area and workings of open cast mines. The locals also had more to lose over the long term, and bore the consequences of increased lorry movements and association with criminality. The informal chats over tea or a pint were not up to the dialogue needed for mutual learning between cultures. A comparative conflict occurred during the 2010 climate camp at the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) headquarters in Edinburgh. RBS is financing the extraction of fossil fuel from tar sands in Canada, a process which, along with perpetuating climate damage is also dispossessing the First Nation peoples on whose land the tar sands

occur. The Climate Camp claimed to be acting in solidarity with these First Nation people, representatives of whom were present. When windows were smashed in an unsuccessful attempt to gain access to RBS offices, the First Nation representatives expressed their concern about the damage to property. This led to a wide ranging debate with views ranging between an unconditional apology, to defence of tactics which had been developed as part of the DA repertoire, to a desire for more effective communication between the two cultures of protest. Some DA environmentalists have gone a little further in understanding how dialogue between cultures develops. In 2009, DA environmentalists associated with the antiairport expansion group Plane Stupid organised a convergence with campaigners against fuel poverty in Clydebank, a working class community under the flightpath of Glasgow airport which, at the time, was being considered for expansion. These fuel poverty activists were victims of the oil industry in several ways: living in poor quality housing they spend a disproportionate amount of their low incomes on fossil fuels to heat their living spaces and water to provide a basic level of comfort and hygiene taken for granted in most European homes. At the same time they suffer the constant noise and gas emissions of low flying aeroplanes taking off and landing close to their community. The convergence used the methods of popular education to generate dialogue between the DA environmentalists and fuel poverty activists, and a number of popular educators also participated in the event. There were discussions on tackling fuel poverty without contributing to climate change: the Clydebank activists main focus was on supplementing their social security benefit income to pay for increased heating, whereas for the climate activists structural improvements to housing were necessary. The role of the state was also a source of debate: for the fuel poverty campaigners, the state was the source of their income and the focus of their campaigning, for both of which they asserted their democratic right; for the DA environmentalists the state is regarded as the enemy and inevitably corrupt. At the time of writing there are several initiatives in process which use popular education approaches to construct dialogues between DA climate activists and working class interests. Prior to the 2010 climate camp at the RBS headquarters in Edinburgh, a preliminary meeting took place between a small group of DA activists and trades union representatives including the shop stewards convenor at the nearby Grangemouth oil refinery, who represents over 50,000 oil industry workers. This is able to build on the UK trade union initiative for a million climate jobs, based on social democratic-socialist narratives of major state investment for a national climate service (Campaign against Climate Change 2009). There are also plans for a toxic tour, organised by DA activists and other environmentalists, using popular education methods, to link together communities in central Scotland negatively affected by different stages of the fossil fuel and other climate affecting industries: opencast mines, power stations, oil refinery, landfills, incinerators, airports, roads and flood risk.

Conclusion
It is no use simply saying to South Wales miners that all around them is an ecological disaster. They already know. They live in it. They have

lived in it for generations. They carry it with them in their lungs But you cannot just say to people who have committed their lives and their communities to certain kinds of production that this has all got to be changed. You cant just say: come out of the harmful industries, come out of the dangerous industries, let us do something better. if [environmentalists and the working class do] not really listen to what the other is saying, there will be a sterile conflict which will postpone any real solutions, at a time when it is already a matter for argument whether there is still time for the solutions. Williams 1989 p. 220 As Raymond Williams points out, dialogue between environmental and class based struggles is essential to the search for just solutions to ecological problems. There remains the possibility of constructing new hegemonic blocs of class interests, incorporating fragmented groups which share the experience of exploitation by the fossil fuel industry, in dialogue with the science-based discourses of climate change used by scientists, environmental campaigners and policy makers of the professional class. Through such processes, the connection between fragmented forms of oppression and climate change can be made and there is a capacity for generating an alternative, dissenting, climate change discourse or at least a discourse incorporating the insights of climate change. This project requires an understanding of the relationship between discourses and the alliances of class interests which make up hegemonic blocs at any particular stage in the process of social change. As a product of capital accumulation (via crisis in the conditions of production, and accumulation by dispossession) climate change cannot adequately be addressed without systemic transformation in how we produce goods and services. This transformation must occur across the various moments of the social process, including the production of discourse which itself reflects struggles amongst the material interests of classes. The contribution to climate change discourse from subaltern classes those who are dispossessed or rely on threatened productive conditions, the victims of climate change and those otherwise exploited by capitalist relations is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of this transformatory social process. This discourse construction requires dialogue between the subaltern and dissenting cultures, and the discourses of climate change which originate in the scientific, environmentalist and policy communities. It is in the interfaces between the professional class and the subaltern classes that the methods and methodologies of popular education can have a contribution. Examples of dialogue between environmental discourses of climate change and working class communities are small but significant. Case studies from environmental NGOs, community development and direct action environmentalism illustrate both the potential and the difficulties of constructing such a dialogue, although they provide evidence that the methods and methodologies of popular education provide the most important tools for constructing these dialogues. Climate change is a product of capitalist industrialisation and its discourses reflect the assemblage of class interests and their respective power struggles in the decades either side of the turn of the millennium. A discourse capable of contributing to the transformation of capitalist growth can only be constructed in the context of transformatory praxis in the political economy, institution building, creative

expression and social relations. Current dialogues are small and fragile and swimming against a powerful tide. However, history has shown that the momentum for change can build suddenly and quickly. We can only advocate continuing work in this area of dialogue allied to struggle, in the hope that transformation occurs before human societies and the ecosystems of which they are part are damaged irreversibly.

References Agents for Environmental Justice and Scandrett, E. 2003 Voices from the Grassroots. Edinburgh, Friends of the Earth Scotland Agyeman J. 2005 Sustainable Communities and the Challenge of Environmental Justice. New York: New York University Press Bellamy, P.H., Loveland, P.J., Bradley, I., Lark, R.M. and Kirk, G.J.D. 2005 Carbon losses from all soils across England and Wales 1978-2003 Nature 437 p.245-248 8.9.2005 Bellamy Foster, J. 2010 Why Ecological Revolution? Monthly Review January 2010 pp 1-18 Boardman, B., Bullock, S. and McLaren, D. 1999 Equity and the environment: guidelines for a green and socially just government London: Catalyst Pamphlet 5 (with Friends of the Earth) Campaign against Climate Change 2009 A Million Climate Jobs London: Campaign against Climate Change Coal Action Scotland ca.2009 Mainshill: Stories from the woods. Anti Copyright Crowther, J., Martin, I. and Shaw, M. (eds) 1999 Popular education and social movements in Scotland today Leicester: NIACE Crowther, J., Galloway, V. and Martin, I. (eds) 2005 Popular Education: Engaging the Academy. Leicester: NIACE Curtice, J., Allaway, A., Robertson, C., Morris, G., Allardice, G. and Robertson, R. 2005 Public attitudes and environmental justice in Scotland Edinburgh: Scottish Executive Social Research. Dryzek, J.S., Downes, D. Hunold, C. Schlosberg, D. and Hernes, H-K. 2003 Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the US, UK, Germany and Norway Oxford: OUP Dunion, K (2003) Troublemakers: the struggle for environmental justice in Scotland. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

Dunion, K. and Scandrett, E. 2003 The Campaign for Environmental Justice in Scotland as a Response to Poverty in a Northern Nation. In Agyeman, J., Bullard, R.D. and Evans, B. (eds) Just Sustainabilites: Development in an Unequal World. London: Earthscan Faber, D. R. and McCarthy, D 2003 Neo-liberalism, Globalization and the Struggle for Ecological Democracy: Linking Sustainability and Environmental Justice. In Agyeman, J., Bullard, R.D. and Evans, B. (eds) Just Sustainabilites: Development in an Unequal World. London: Earthscan Freire, P. 1972 Pedagogy of the Oppressed London: Penguin Friends of the Earth US 2009 Subprime Carbon? Rethinking the worlds largest new derivatives market Washington DC: Friends of the Earth Gramsci, A. 1971 Selections from the Prison Notebooks translated and edited by Hoare, Q. and Nowell Smith, G. London: Lawrence and Wishart Gray, J 2010 Unnatural selection (review of Ridley, M. 2010 The Rational Optimist: How Porsperity Evolves Fourth Estate) New Statesman 2 August 2010. Hajer, M.A. 1995 The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological Modernisation and the Policy Process Oxford: OUP Harvey, D. 1996 Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference Oxford: Blackwell Harvey, D. 2005 A Brief History of Neoliberalism Oxford: OUP Harvey, D. 2006 Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development London: Verso Hope, A and Timmel, S. 1984 Training for Transformation: a handbook for community workers. Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press Jackson, T. 2009 Prosperity without Growth: the transition to a sustainable economy Sustainable Development Commission www.sdcommission.org.uk/publications/downloads/prosperity_without_growth_report.pdf accessed 3/9/2010 Jessop, R.D., Bonnett, K. Bromley, S and Ling, T. 1988 Thatcherism: a Tail of Two Nations Cambridge: Polity Press Kane, L. 2001 Popular Education and Social Change in Latin America London: Latin America Bureau Kingsnorth, P. 2009 Uncivilisation: The Dark Mountain Manifesto www.darkmountain.net/wordpress/dark-mountain.net/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads//uncivilisation-dark-mountain-manifesto.pdf accessed 3/9/2010

Lawson, N. 2008 An Appeal to Reason: a Cool Look at Global Warming London: Overlook Duckworth Lomberg, B. 2001 The Skeptical Environmentalist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Martinez-Alier, J. 2002 Environmentalism of the Poor: a study of ecological conflicts and valuation Cheltenham: Edward Elgar McLaren, D 2003 Environmental Space, Equity and the Ecological Debt In Agyeman, J., Bullard, R.D. and Evans, B. (eds) Just Sustainabilites: Development in an Unequal World. London: Earthscan OConnor, J. 1998 Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism. London: Guilford Press Scandrett, E. 2000 Community work, sustainable development and environmental justice Scottish Journal of Community Work and Development Vol 6 pp. 7-13 Scandrett, E 2007 Environmental justice in Scotland: policy, pedagogy and praxis Environ. Res. Lett. 2 045002 (7pp) www.stacks.iop.org/ERL/2/045002 Scandrett, E 2010 Environmental justice in Scotland: Incorporation and Conflict. In Davidson, N., McCafferty, P. and Miller, D. (ed.) NeoLiberal Scotland: Class and Society in a Stateless Nation. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing Scandrett, E., OLeary, T. and Martinez, T. 2005 Learning environmental justice through dialogue in Procedings of PASCAL conference: Making Knowledge Work. Leicester: NIACE Scandrett, E. Crowther, J. and Hemmi, A. 2009 Only the tip of the iceberg: making visible learning amongst cyberactivists in Friends of the Earth Scotland. Proceedings of the ECREA conference 2008, Barcelona: ECREA Scott, G. and Mooney, G. 2009 Poverty and Social Justice in the Devolved Scotland: Neoliberalism meets Social Democracy? Social Policy and Society 3, 4 p.379-389 Scott, J.C. 1985 Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance Yale: Yale University Press Scottish Executive 2002a First Ministers speech on environmental justice www.scotland.gov.uk/News/News-Extras/57 accessed 30/1/07 Scottish Executive 2002b Environmental Justice speech in South Africa www.scottishexecutive.gov.uk/News/News-Extras/101 accessed 30/1/07 Scottish Government 2004. Do a little change a lot News release 01/03/2004. www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2004/03/5132 accessed 3/9/2010

Simms, A. 2005 Ecological Debt: The Health of the Planet and the Wealth of Nations London: Pluto Press Sklair, L. 2001 The Transnational Capitalist Class Oxford: Blackwell Seel, B. Paterson, M and Doherty, B 2000 Direct Action in British Environmentalism Oxford: Routledge STUC 2010 A just transition to meet the challenge of climate change Scottish Trades Union Congress http://www.stuc.org.uk/rebuilding-collective-prosperity van Beukering, P. and Vellinga, P. 1996 Climate Change: from Science to Global Politics In Sloep, P and Blowers, A. (eds) Environmental Policy in an International Context: 2. Conflicts. London: Arnold Wilkinson, M. and Scandrett, E. 2003 A popular education approach to tackling environmental injustice and widening participation, Concept, 13 (1/2) 1116. Williams, R. 1989 Resources of Hope London: Verso Zero Carbon Britain project 2010 ZeroCarbonBritain2030: a new energy strategy Machynlleth: Centre for Alternative Technology zerocarbonbritain.com