The

Middle Kingdoms Lighter Touch: Chinese Soft-Power in Africa

Constantine J Petallides
Govt-498: Contemporary Chinese Military Thought

Petallides 2 Table of Contents I. Introduction.......3 II. An Offer they Cant Refuse: The History of Chinese Aid in Africa.......5 III. A History of Sino-African Military Development.........9 IV. Implications of Chinese Influence......15 Attachs, Arms, and Aid.Oh My!......15 Influence in Action......19 V. Conclusion Implications for the US.....22 Bibliography25

Petallides 3 I. Introduction Today, China finds itself in a uniquely difficult, yet opportune position. As a rising economic and military power at a time when the status quo is slowly shifting in their favor, China can offer a great deal of aid and assistance, both economic and military, to developing countries; thus buying favor and extending Chinese influence far beyond the confines of Asia. On the other hand, traditional powers like the United States and European Union along with regional actors like India view each Chinese move with suspicion and have been working to combat Chinese influence and compete with their own aid packages. Nowhere is this tension more apparent than on the African continent. China has a long history of involvement with Africa, and Chinese investment on the continent has been steadily growing over the last decades. Modern political and economic relations commenced in the era of Mao Zedong. Sino-African relations are embedded in the long history of interchange. The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new era in China- Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchange of high-level visits and contacts.1 Starting in the beginning of the 21st century, the People's Republic of China built increasingly stronger economic ties with African nations; and as of August 2007, there are more than 750,000 Chinese nationals working in different African countries.2 Trade 1 China's African Policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China. January 2006 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm> 2 French, Howard W.; Polgreen, Lydia (2007-08-18). "Entrepreneurs From China Flourish in Africa". The New York Times.

Petallides 4 between China and Africa increased 700% during the 1990s.3 China is currently Africa's largest trading partner before the EU and the United States.4 This continued growth of development aid to Africa has been coupled with an increased Chinese military presence. While China has no bases in Africa, there has been a marked increase in Chinese arms sales, training exercises, military attachs, and peacekeeping forces in Africa. This paper will explore the history that led to these developments and how aid and military involvement have affected Chinas relationship with Africa. These developments allow China to increase its economic ties to resource-rich African nations, pressure African nations to support the One China Policy, and bolster its own economy through trade deals and arms sales. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/18/world/africa/18malawi.html?_r=1&em&e x=1187582400&en=7b8806ea0f69e210&ei=5087%0A> 3 Servant, Jean-Christophe Chinas trade safari in Africa Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2005 <http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/11chinafrica> 4 "China boosts African economies, offering a 'second opportunity". Christian Science Monitor. <http://www.csmonitor.com/centennial/timeline/2008/07/china- boosts-african-economies-offering-a-second-opportunity>

Petallides 5 II. An Offer they Cant Refuse: The History of Chinese Aid in Africa China has had a growing hand in African affairs since the Communist Party threw its support behind the anti-colonialist liberation movements that swept across the continent throughout the 20th Century. While China is not a new player in Africa, its economic and political presence on the continent and its impact on Africa have grown exponentially in the last few years.5 Li Xiaoyun at the College of Humanities and Development in Beijing categorizes Chinese aid policy in Africa can into three phases. Phase I (1950-1974) was the phase of political aid and ideology exportation.6 During this period, aid as a portion of GNP steadily rose, and large projects were undertaken. The total amount of foreign aid increased to 337 million RMB in 1959 from the average annual amount of 76 million RMB during the period of 1950 to 1952, which covered 0.23 % the GNP at that time and 0.62% of financial expenditures. In 1973, the total amount of Chinas foreign aid rose up to 5.584 billion RMB, which shared 2.05% of the GNP at that time and 6.9% of the financial expenditure.7 Examples of such projects include Chinas support of the Egyptian government in 1956 during the Suez Canal crises; Chinas 1961 agricultural initiatives in Mali; and the 1965 plan to build a Tanzania-Zimbabwe railroad.8 5 Wild, Leni The New Sinosphere: China in Africa Institute for Public Policy Research 11/1/2006 Pg. 1 <http://www.ippr.org/images/media/files/publication/2012/03/The%20New%2 0Sinosphere%20-%20China%20in%20Africa_1539.pdf> 6 Li Xiaoyun Chinas Foreign Aid and Aid to Africa: Overview College of Humanities and Development, China Agricultural University. 2004 7 Ibid 8 Ibid

Petallides 6 Phase II (1974-1990) was the adjustment and transformation phase.9 Both the total amount of the foreign aid and its proportion to GNP and the financial expenditure were all presenting a descending curve.10 These figures decreased from the total amount of 4.771 billion RMB, covering 1.71% of the GNP and 6.0% of the financial expenditure in 1974 down to 1.562 billion RMB of the total amount in foreign aid, covering 0.08% of GNP and 0.51% of the financial expenditure in 1990.11 This decrease was due to a shift in Chinese domestic priorities. After the opening reforms in 1978, China made adjustment in its diplomatic policies, and emphasized that external relations should serve domestic modernization projects.12 Finally they entered Phase III (1991-Present Day), which is the phase of financial aid and technical assistance with integrated-objectives.13 Chinas foreign aid entered a new period, which emphasized reciprocity and mutual goals; economic benefits; the integration of the political interest and the obligations of a big country.14 Since the 1990s, China has been shopping around for recipient countries that can best support Chinese interests. This can come in the form of trade deals, new markets for Chinese goods, energy resources and raw materials, and even political support. With all this in mind, China has chosen Africa as the main recipient area of its foreign aid. Over the past 50 years, Chinas foreign aid to Africa has amounted to 44.4 billion RMB covering 30% of the total amount of 120.773 9 Ibid 10 Ibid 11 Ibid 12 Ibid 13 Ibid 14 Ibid

Petallides 7 billion RMB.15 This foreign aid to Africa has sponsored about 900 infrastructure and social development projects.16 The figure below represents Chinas aid expenditures in Africa:

Source: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/7/40378067.pdf The pink dataset represents African aid as a percentage of total expenditures; the blue dataset represents African aid as a percentage of GNP; and the yellow dataset represents total aid expenditures. What is most striking about this graph is that while aid expenditures are going up, aid to Africa is a less significant percentage of the total than in years past. While this does not mean that the Chinese are spending 15 Ibid 16 Alden, Chris. China in Africa. London: Zed, 2007. Print.

Petallides 8 less on Africa, it does mean that they are spending smarter. Clearly, with China reaching its goal of $100 billion in trade by 2010, Africa is still a priority for China. Rather than the large blanket amounts that categorized Phases I and II, China has focused on delivering aid in a way that furthers its interests. The implications of this shift will be explored in a later section.

Petallides 9 III. A History of Sino-African Military Development Chinas military relations with Africa stretch back to 1950s when China gave

its support to for revolutionary and independence movements.17 The roots of this relationship can be found in the 1955 Asian-African Conference held in Bandung Indonesia. With 29 countries participating representing 1.5 billion people, the Bandung Conference was a major turning point for Sino-African relations.18 On the agenda was the promotion of Afro-Asian economic interests, cultural cooperation, and the opposition of any Cold War colonialism on the parts of the US or USSR.19 What the participating nations had in common was their shared history and perception of white dominance by the West.20 The conference served to cement Chinas interest in the regions economics and geopolitics. Shortly after its conclusion, China began gradually increasing its military involvement on the African continent. On top of any aid being distributed to the region, China began directly involving itself in African conflicts. From 1957 until Algerian independence, China supplied the Algerias National Liberation Front, FLN, with military weapons and training in the first fights against French colonial

17 Enuka, Chuka Chinas military presence in Africa: Implications for Africas wobbling peace Journal of Political Studies Vol. 18 Issue 1 pg 16 18 Larkin, B. (1971). China in Africa 1946-1970: The Foreign Policy of the Peoples Republic of China. Berkeley: University of California Press. 19 Ibid 20 Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C., & Pushak, N. (2009). Building Bridges: Chinas Growing Roles As Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington: World Bank.

Petallides 10 power.21 China offered to send 280,000 volunteers to Egypt during the Suez crisis on top of the generous sums of money it was already sending.22 Because of its tense relationship with the Cold War powers, China saw disruption and promotion of unrest in Africa as central to Chinas policy of frustrating the ambitions of the United States and the Soviet Union.23 Such examples include Chinese military instructors making Ghana a base for training guerrilla fighters in 1964;24 Rhodesian freedom fighters receiving training in China;25 China supplying the Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO, with free weapons and education in the tactics of guerrilla warfare;26 and countless other incidents. By the early 1970s, China had deployed 112 military instructors to Zaire, to train the FNLA.27 It was notable that China ignored its rhetoric on noninterference, and got directly militarily involved in Africa. Chinas recent military involvement in Africa takes essentially the forms of selling Chinese arms, construction of small arms factories in a number of African states, participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and defense of Chinese oil investments and Chinese personnel who often come under heavy attacks in Africas 21 Taylor, I. (2006). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London: Routledge. 22 Ibid 23 Enuka, Chuka Chinas military presence in Africa: Implications for Africas wobbling peace pg 17 24 Chuka, E. (2010). China and Africas Bilateral Economic Relation. in the 21st Century Journal of International Politics and Development. 25 Ibid 26 Taylor, I. (2006). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London: Routledge. 27 Enuka, Chuka Chinas military presence in Africa: Implications for Africas wobbling peace pg 17

Petallides 11 conflict zones.28 From direct involvement in African affairs, China has become a major small arms and light weapons dealer to any and all groups in the market. It has been noted, military cooperation and growth of arms sales are major aspects of relations with African governments, especially those under threat of civil war, insurgency or even domestic opposition but which are barred from obtaining weapons from traditional western sources.29 This policy has led China to engage in military aid with certain less-than-democratic regimes including those of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Chad, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.30 In 2003, Chinas arms sales to Africa stood at $1.3 billion,31 and from 2000 to 2003 China delivered about 13% of all arms to sub-Saharan Africa, the second largest provider after Russia.32 From 2004 to 2007, Chinas percentage increased to almost 18%, featuring the delivery of artillery pieces, armored cars, minor surface combatants, supersonic combat aircraft, and other air assets.33 The classic contemporary example of Chinas weapon-exporting policy in Africa is Chinas involvement in the Sudan War; when Beijing pursued a policy that was entirely based on economic interest, and supplied the Sudanese government with fighter aircraft and an assortment of weaponry.34 The Chinese have set up three small arms 28 Ibid 18 29 Alden, Chris. China in Africa. London: Zed, 2007. Print. 30 Enuka, Chuka Chinas military presence in Africa: Implications for Africas wobbling peace pg 19 31 Alden, Chris. China in Africa. London: Zed, 2007. Print. 32 Ibid 33 Grimmett, R. (2008). Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000- 2007. CRS Report (October 23, 2008), pp.50-61. 34 Taylor, I. (2006). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London: Routledge.

Petallides 12 factories in Sudan that produce light weapons for use in the region as well as in Uganda.35 On top of these arms deals, China extends its military presence over the continent through its defense attachs. Chinese Embassy defense attach offices throughout Africa provide the diplomatic foundation for China's military contacts. Accredited defense attachs link the PLA to host country militaries.36 Attach duties vary, but as a minimum, they report on local matters from a military and/or security perspective and facilitate contacts with local armed forces. China currently maintains bilateral diplomatic military relations with at least 25 African countries, spread across the main regions of the continent.37 In Beijing, 18 African countries maintain permanent defense attach offices; six of which are directly reciprocal: Algeria (which has continuously maintained a defense attach in Beijing since January 1971), Egypt, Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.38 The 11 remaining countries that do not have known Chinese resident equivalents in Africa include Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Niger, South Africa and Tanzania.39 Since 1985, China has almost doubled the number of defense attach offices worldwide from 59 to 107. In Africa, however, the number of Chinese defense attach offices increased

35 Shinn, D. (2009), Chinese Involvement in African Conflict Zones. China Brief. Volume ix, Issue 7, April2, 2009. 36 Puska, Susan Military backs China's Africa adventure Asia Times 6/8/2007 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/if08ad02.html> 37 Ibid 38 Ibid 39 Ibid

Petallides 13 quite modestly from only nine to 14, maintaining an average of 15% of all of China's attach offices over the past 20 years. Finally, China has become more involved in UN Peacekeeping missions and been more strategic with its veto on the UNSC. The 2006 White Paper, Chinas National Defense in 2006, charges the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) with implementing the military strategy of active defensea term that has grown to provide justification for use of military force outside the PRCs borders.40 For the first time, the paper outlines the PLAs responsibilities to: take the initiative to prevent and defuse crises and deter conflicts and wars; take part in international security cooperation; strengthen strategic coordination and consultation with major powers and neighboring countries; and conduct bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises and play an active part in maintaining global and regional peace and stability.41 Bolstered by the change in policy, China began to send troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Of roughly 2,000 peacekeepers China has deployed around the world, on average during the first nine months in 2008, 77 percent were in Africa. China is by far the largest contributor to Africa peacekeeping among the Security Councils permanent members, with 63 percent of total P-5 contributions to the continent.42

40 Enuka, Chuka Chinas military presence in Africa: Implications for Africas wobbling peace pg 19 41 Parenti, J. (2009). China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century. JFQ Issue 52,. www.ndupress.ndu.edu. 42 Qiang, S., and Tian, L. (2009). Peacekeeping: A Rising Role for Chinas PLA. China Daily, July 24, 2009.

Petallides 14 This type of influence is much harder to quantify because data comes from recently declassified reports, hearsay, and first-hand accounts rather than numerical evidence. Despite this lack of graphical data, the implications of this aid will be discussed and explored in the next section.

Petallides 15 IV. Implications of Chinese Influence Attachs, Arms, and Aid.Oh My! Aid in Africa can be best explained in an allegory. If, for example, Kenya wished to build a new highway and requested help from USAID, the Americans would impose conditions such as: construction must follow fair labor practices; waste and runoff from the project must be gathered before they can impact the environment; the highway must be at least 10km from the nearby elephant preserve; etc. When the frustrated Kenyan ministers present the same application to China, the only question asked is where do you want it?43 Officially, Chinas no-conditionality aid makes possible self-driven development for African countries;44 however, it really provides China with opportunities to extort political favors or pursue economic goals. China has sought from its aid partners such concessions as support of the One China Policy, access to energy resources, access to raw materials, and trade deals. To support its growing energy needs, China has pursued exploration and production deals in smaller, low-visibility countries, such as Gabon, while also targeting Africa's largest oil producers--with whom the United States and Europe have longstanding relationships--by offering integrated aid packages.45 In Angola, Africa's largest exporter of oil to China, oil deals "are characterized by loans and 43 Remarks by Fmr Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to her American National Security Toolbox Class. 2/25/2011 44 Li Xiaoyun Chinas Foreign Aid and Aid to Africa: Overview College of Humanities and Development, China Agricultural University. 2004 45 Alessi, Christopher Expanding China-Africa Oil Ties Council on Foreign Relations 2/8/2012 <http://www.cfr.org/china/expanding-china-africa-oil- ties/p9557?cid=rss-energy_environment-expanding_china_africa_oil_tie-020812>

Petallides 16 credit lines in connection with infrastructure projects," writes Shelly Zhao for China Briefing magazine.46 In many cases, China also signs aid agreements with countries rich in raw materials desperately needed by China to maintain its production to achieve its growth targets. China currently has military alliances with 6 African states, 4 of which are major oil suppliers: Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt. In Africa, as elsewhere, Chinese aid agreements seem to follow diplomatic ties; however, China does not seem to distribute aid in larger amounts to resource- rich countries, as can be seen in flows to Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In fact, grants and zero-interest loans are distributed fairly evenly around the continent.47China gives money to almost every single country in Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding only those that dont acknowledge the One China policy.48 There is little evidence that China gives more aid to countries with more natural resources or specifically targets countries with worse governance.49 A mix of political, commercial, and social/ideological factors motivate aid packages and economic deals. Looking to the military side of things, it is once again obvious that China has been supporting undemocratic, oppressive regimes in exchange for political favors. Interestingly enough, some military aid and the presence of defense attachs seems 46 Ibid 47 Brautigam, Deborah Chinese development finance in Africa East Asia Forum 12/25/2011 <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/12/25/chinese-development- aid-in-africa/> 48 Freschi, Laura China in Africa myths and realities AID Watch 2/9/2010 <http://aidwatchers.com/2010/02/china-in-africa-myths-and-realities/> 49 Ibid

Petallides 17 to follow countries that are either most useful to China, or countries with the largest Chinese diaspora . For example, there are roughly 30,000-50,000 Chinese currently residing in Sudan50 which is the third largest diaspora on the continent. Sudan has also received a great deal of aid and political protection from China regarding the Darfur crisis. Through its peacekeeping involvement, China is able to dispel western accusations of supporting conflict and human rights violations; but this provides political cover for further unofficial arms deals that maintain the cycle of conflict, and ensure that there will always be more customers for Chinese arms. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China, the worlds top weapons importer for much of the past decade, fell to fourth place on an annual list as it produces more arms at home.51 In the same vein, Chinas arms exports nearly doubled over the period of 2007 to 2011 from five years earlier, making it the worlds sixth biggest supplier after the United Kingdom.52 China is able to continue circumventing US and EU arms embargoes in conflict zones with its growing domestic small arms industry, and further support any regime or guerilla force it so chooses. 50 Barm, Geremie Strangers at Home The Wall Street Journal 7/19/2010 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704682604575369390660095 122.html#articleTabs%3Dinteractive> 51 Kate, Daniel Ten China's Share of Global Arms Imports Falls, Sipri Says Bloomberg 3/18/2012 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-18/china- buys-fewer-weapons-as-local-industry-expands-sipri-says.html> 52 Ibid

Petallides 18 Through these processes, China is able to secure the energy resources and minerals it needs, while providing aid and arms in an economically symbiotic manner with recipient states. As this trend continues, Chinas reach will continue to extend and its influence in Africa will get stronger. Even countries that have good relations with the United States, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Angola, Ghana, and South Africa, find themselves in a position where they can be much more selective in taking advice from the United States.53 African countries under pressure from the United States and the West to improve their human rights and governance practices are less likely to do so when they know they can rely on China for support.54 While none of the official aid projects are in conflict with US interests, Chinese aid with its freedom from conditions may become a more attractive alternative to US offerings. As more countries follow this line of thinking, China will gain influence over the continent, many multilateral organizations, and can push for its political goals with more force. China holds a veto power in the UN Security Council and Africa has three non-permanent seats on the Council. Africa is well represented in organizations of interest to China such as the UN Human Rights Council and the World Trade Organization.55 China makes every effort to cultivate support among the maximum number of African countries on all issues of interest to Beijing that arise in international forums.56 Increased influence in Africa can directly lead to increased influence over the entire international system. 53 Africa: China's Growing Role in Africa - Implications for U.S. Policy All Africa 11/1/2011 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201111021230.html> 54 Ibid 55 Ibid 56 Ibid

Petallides 19 Influence in Action Chinas use of this newfound influence can be seen in several examples. First

let us examine the case of South Africa. With a Chinese population of over 200,000,57 South Africa has the largest Chinese diaspora in Africa. Recently, South Africa sought to expand its trade ties with the BRIC countries, focusing for the most part on its relationship with China, which is both an important partner at a political and economic level for South Africa. Despite the benefits South Africa experiences, this relationship is equally one which has elicited criticism from some quarters.58 At the political level, South Africa regards China as a key player in the global debates that characterize the shift to multipolarity. Chinas developing country status, its identification as a member of the Global South, and the G77 in the UN are elements that carry significance for South Africa too.59 As the two counties deepened their economic ties and embarked on projects together, South Africa suddenly declared its support for the One China policy. The sudden change in foreign policy was viewed by many as a clear sign of Chinese political pressure. Shortly after the incident, President Jacob Zuma tried, in vain, to reassure South Africans that South African foreign policy is independent and decisions serve no one but South

57 Barm, Geremie Strangers at Home The Wall Street Journal 7/19/2010 58 Alves, Ana Cristina South Africa-China Relations: Getting Beyond the Cross- roads? South African Institute of International Affairs 8/29/2010 <http://www.saiia.org.za/china-in-africa-project-opinion/south-africa-china- relations-getting-beyond-the-cross-roads.html> 59 Ibid

Petallides 20 Africans.60 Despite these assurances, few domestic or international observers were convinced. In Zimbabwe, oppressive rule has been sustained owing to some extent,

Chinas substantial military support to president Robert Mugabe.61 Attempts by human rights activists and the international community to redress and halt this abuse were frustrated by Chinese continued military support to the dictator.62 With assured weaponry and military supplies from China, the brutality inflicted by the supporters of Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF was to continue.63 To meet its oil and mineral needs, Beijing has consistently delivered arms to pariah states in Africa especially those like Sudan and Zimbabwe which have come under western sanctions in the last decade.64 When sanctions were imposed, Mugabe turned to China for military assistance. Faced with EU and U.S. embargo, Mugabe in 2004 bought fighter aircraft and military vehicles from China.65 According to Peter Brookes of The Heritage Foundation, China sold Sudan $55 million worth of arms between 2003 and 2006, flouting UN arms embargoes.66 It was with Chinese assistance that the Sudanese government recently constructed an arms factory in 60 Rossouw, Mandy Independent SA supports One China Policy Zuma City Press 10/13/2011 <http://www.citypress.co.za/SouthAfrica/News/Independent-SA- supports-One-China-Policy-Zuma-20111013> 61 Enuka, Chuka Chinas military presence in Africa: Implications for Africas wobbling peace pg 22 62 Ibid 63 Ibid 23 64 Fowale, Tongkeh Joseph China's Military Presence in Africa 5/24/2009 <http://tongkeh-joseph-fowale.suite101.com/chinas-military-presence-in-africa- a119916> 65 Ibid 66 Ibid

Petallides 21 Khartoum.67 Chinas ability to ignore embargoes and continue fueling conflict and oppressive regimes in order to maintain access to energy belies Chinese priorities and Chinas clout on the international scene. With such an example, other countries may be willing to offer China resources or access to markets in exchange for support and protections. During the Darfur crisis China played a direct role in selling arms to Sudan

and in developing its weapons industry. Chinese arms sales to Sudan rose twenty- five fold during the crisis in spite of Security Council arms embargoes.68 In spite of Chinas denials, evidence points to the contrary, but with Chinas veto in the UNSC, there was little the rest of the international community could do. China is the leading developer of the Sudanese oil industry and major purchaser of Sudanese oil.69 Though Beijing regularly justifies Chinas economic involvement in Sudan as being key to that countrys development, it is obvious that in the context of rising needs for peace and multilateral efforts to halt the blood-thirsty Khartoum regime, the concentration of wealth and weapons among the Sudans ruling elite by Chinese investment and arms deals, unconditionally feeds conflict.70 In this example, China demonstrated that it is willing to protect countries under its influence from everyone, including the combined might of the UNSC. In the future, this may be too good an offer for other countries to pass up. 67 Ibid 68 Save Darfur. (2007). China in Sudan: Having it Both Ways Briefing Paper, October 18, 2007. 69 Enuka, Chuka Chinas military presence in Africa: Implications for Africas wobbling peace pg 22 70 Ibid

Petallides 22 V. Conclusion Implications for the US From the early years of contact with Africa, China has pursued military

involvements in Africa. This has been in the areas of military training and assistance, arms sales, anti-piracy efforts, and peacekeeping operations. In as much as the peacekeeping efforts may have engaged China in a positive way in Africas conflict zones, but continued arm sales in a manner that exacerbate African conflicts, China certainly cannot be helping the much needed peace in Africa.71 While Chinas growing ties with Africa can be viewed as unsettling, Ambassador Johnnie Carson believes we should avoid alarmist or apprehensive72 responses to Chinas moves, and I am inclined to agree with him. While Chinese influence is growing, it does not pose the same threat the USSR did during the Cold War; and what little direct influence China has over Africa is quite limited. However, this does not mean the United States should sit idly by. While ideology was the overriding factor that fueled Chinese aid to Africa in

the 1950s and 1960s; today, with China on the verge of surpassing the US economy, Chinese motives are purely business. China has found that aid can secure access to energy, markets for Chinese goods, friends on human rights councils, and political support for One China among other policies. Normally this would not be a problem, but with the recent economic crisis and global downturn, the United States is less able to compete with Chinese deals. Furthermore, Chinese arms sales go 71 Ibid 26 72 Abry, George U.S., China, Africa an Expanding Circle Virginia Military Institute 11/4/2011 <http://www5.vmi.edu/Content.aspx?id=10737419972>

Petallides 23 toward fueling conflicts that distract the attention of the international community and drain the military resources of countries like the US, France, UK and organizations like NATO, the African Union, and the UNSC. This drain on the political will to fight may cost the United States dearly in a future conflict between China and a US ally like South Korea, Japan, or Taiwan. What can the United States do to successfully compete with Chinas

combined military-economic aid deals? First and foremost, steps must be taken in the UNGA or UNSC to expose and stop Chinas more flagrant violations of human rights and arms embargoes on the continent. Western powers must also make their aid deals more attractive to developing countries and reduce the number and nature of aid conditions in order to compete. In 2007, recognizing the need to curtail Chinese influence, the president of the European Investment Bank said in the face of competition from China we need to lower our environmental and social standards.73 If Chinese influence is not curtailed, it will become much more difficult for

the US to engage with countries like Taiwan or pursue its own strategic interests in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. With more and more countries falling under Chinese influence and voting with China in relevant assemblies, other countries will be hard-pressed to block measures introduced by China that require merely simple or 2/3 majorities. Also, Chinese military presence in Africa is limited, but if ties and 73 Davies, Penny China and the End of Poverty in Africa Towards Mutual Benefit Diakonia <http://oefse.at/Downloads/veranstaltungen/1011/Vienna_Penny%20Davies.pdf>

Petallides 24 relations develop, it is not beyond the realm of possibility to see bases springing up in the next 10-20 years. To combat piracy, China has floated the idea of naval bases in West Africa with access to the Indian ocean, and as recently as December 2011, China was considering a naval base agreement with the Seychelles.74 While this idea was dismissed quickly, Chinese expansion into the Indian Ocean will hinder the US and other powers efforts to contain Chinese ambitions at sea and will offer new routes into the Pacific Ocean and around the containment fields of the various Island Chains. In the end, the US must engage China and the nations of Africa in order to

reassert Americas position as a protector of rights and a supporter of development; while curtailing Chinas growing influence in the region. While the tide is still in Americas favor, action must be taken now, before it becomes too late. 74 China Base a Threat to India Navy? The Diplomat 12/17/2011 <http://the- diplomat.com/2011/12/17/china-base-a-threat-to-india-navy/>

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