From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Emigrants as Human Capital Elements in the Socio-Economic Development of Nigeria Olufemi Olarewaju,

PAFF PhD Candidate, The University of Texas at Dallas December 2007

Abstract Human capital flight or brain drain, represents the loss of highly skilled professionals from a source country to a recipient country (Sako, 2002). The socio-economic challenges that plagued the subSaharan African country of Nigeria coupled with its large population forced a migration from the country that started in the early 1980s and continues till today. A typical characteristic of Nigerians abroad is that most aim to and actually do return to the home country and invest what they have earned both intellectually and financially. Events in the global stage that include advancements in communications through computer information systems, globalization, and upward climb in the price and demand for crude oil has fueled vast and aggressive economic reforms in the country. This paper will present the profile of Nigeria and Nigerian emigrants with particular emphasis on level of education and professional attainment. It will review the current socio-economic environment in the country with relation to global events and communication technology. Finally, the paper will analyze the roles of migrants as agents of development by emphasizing the need for the government to create stable infrastructures conducive for an effective and more permanent reinsertion of these returnees into the countrys social and economic environment.

I.

Introduction The last three decades witnessed an exponential migration to the west from the continent of Africa

of educated and economic elites in pursuit of better living conditions, opportunities for professional advancements, and the existence of environments that are more conducive to peace and security. Human capital flight or brain drain, represents the loss of highly skilled professionals from a source country to a recipient country. According to Sako (2002), a 1990 U.S. census showed that there were 2.5 million highly educated immigrants from developing countries residing in the United States alone. This figure is said to exclude students, one-third of who usually end up as residents after completing their studies. In the case of Africa, it is estimated that one-third of its most highly qualified nationals live outside their country of origin, mainly in Western Europe and North America. This estimate is supported by Stalkers (1994) report, that sub-Saharan Africa lost thirty percent of its skilled personnel between 1960 and 1987. The continuous loss of skilled and experienced professionals has been attributed mostly to poor economic and political governance, sociopolitical instability, inappropriate economic policies and declining economic growth rate, poor infrastructure, and weak institutions (Sako 2002, 25). There is a general agreement amongst economic scholars that the brain drain is largely a negative externality imposed on the source country, amounting to a zero-sum gain, with developed recipient countries becoming richer at the expense of the source developing countries (Onimode, 2001). One-third of the most qualified Africans living outside their country translate to about 200,000 abroad, while 300,000 expatriates are working on the continent on technical assistance programs. From this, it is easy to see why the cost to the continent is estimated at $4 billion a year to fill up the capacity gaps created (Sako 2002, 26).
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There is no accurate data on the number of skilled professionals that Africa has lost to the developed world, both at the local and international levels. This paper will therefore rely mostly on the analyses of two of the several existing schools of thought on brain drain. One school of thought suggests that the country with the outflow of qualified workers looses critical human capital in which it has invested resources through education and specialized training and for which it will not be compensated; the second school of thought argues that human capital investments that were made in high-level migrants are partly recovered through remittances (Sako 2002, 27). The paper will also build on the positive roles of the returning skilled workers, most of who are better educated and better equipped to serve in both public and private endeavors. These returnees are positioned to contribute to the growth of local human capital, to the transfer of skills, and to the provision of links to foreign networks and investments. II. Nigeria: A Brief Political History Nigeria, Africas most populous country, is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups. The country became independent from Great Britain in 1960. Following sixteen years of military rule, a new constitution was adopted in 1999, and a peaceful transition to civilian government was completed. The country is currently experiencing its longest period of civilian rule since independence. Also in its fortyseven years as an independent nation, an election held in 2007 marked the countrys first civilian-tocivilian transfer of power. Many trace the roots of the political imbalance in post-independence Nigeria to the colonization periods. The independent Nigeria adopted the Federal system of government largely in an attempt to reflect diverse political, social, cultural, and economic systems in a framework of unity (Eliagwu 1988, 173). Eliagwu argues that the period 1914-1945 that was supposed to embody the unification of the
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Northern and Southern protectorates for a unified Nigeria never really materialized as each protectorate was virtually independent of each other, except for the coordinating role of the central government. This unresolved division is believed to be the origin of the problems of integration that the country would face for years to come, problems that led to two post-colonization challenges. First, is the structural imbalance in the countrys federalism, and second, are the fears and suspicions among minority groups in their relations with ethno regional majority groups. Ethnic and cultural diversity, fears, and mistrust amongst groups led to an imposition of self-centered heterogeneous demands on the countrys political system. Consequently, the framework of unity under which Nigerias post-independence federal government was meant to operate never fully achieved the objectives. Claude Ake (1996) summarized this foundational challenge of ethnic diversity and trust accurately when he wrote that a conflict among nationalities, ethnic groups, and communal and interest groups broke out after the independence of African nations, with a resultant struggle for power that was so absorbing that everything else, including development, was marginalized The large ethnic diversity in Nigeria is typical of several sub-Saharan African nations. Easterly and Levin (1997) examined the effect of ethnic diversity on economic growth and concluded that potential causes of sub-Saharan Africa s ills, ranging from bad policies, to poor education, to political instability, to inadequate infrastructure, have an indirect linkage to ethnic strife that leads to poor policy choices by these nations. Easterly and Levin utilized an existing variable called ETHNIC for their analysis. ETHNIC measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country will belong to different ethno linguistic groups. An existing measure of ETHNIC reveals that fourteen out of the fifteen most ethnically heterogeneous countries in the world are in Africa. While eight countries classified as high-income countries by the World Banks Development Report are amongst the most

ethnically homogenous according to ETHNIC, no such rich countries are amongst the top-fifteen most ethnically diverse countries (Easterly and Levin 1997, 1219). Ethnic diversity is not presented here as a sole causation for growth and development problems in Nigeria. It nevertheless lends a measurable historical perspective that partially explains the challenges of ethnic integration and trust faced by most post-colonization sub-Saharan African countries. These challenges fostered polarization amongst groups, which in turn led to difficulties for collective agreement on public goods like infrastructure, education, and most significantly, good public policies. Such polarized societies of sub-Saharan Africa were good candidates for military coup dtats and wars. By the year 1982, twenty-two African nations had military rulers, and by 1985 the fifty-one independent African states had suffered at least sixty military coups (Sako 2002, 27). Nigeria faced its share of these post-colonization challenges, leading to decades-long inability of the nation to provide basic infrastructures for its citizenry. The ensuing poor political and economic governance, socio-political instability, and weak institutions contributed to the migration of skilled and experienced professionals to countries that can provide the needs that these professional elites consider to be important for professional advancement, peace, and security. III. The Migrant Nigerian and the Economic Effects of Brain Drain There is enough information to suggest that the migrant Nigerian is more highly educated than their compatriots in their home country. It will also be accurate to say that the existence of more advanced and better organized structures in their host countries, mostly Western Europe and North America, contribute significantly to their success. Remittances as an advantage of brain drain to home countries of African immigrants are reasonably documented, and have been reported to account for more than donor aid flows to the continent (Kaba 2004, 25). According to Adams (2003), in 1999 remittances
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from Nigerians abroad was estimated at $1.198 billion. Remittances represent the movement of physical capital, and because of their importance to both labor-exporting countries and their households, remittances are a well measured and recorded aspect of the migration experience. A less measured but critically important aspect is the level of educational attainment of Nigerians in their host countries. Since education has often been cited as a major determinant of long-term economic growth, conventional wisdom has argued that the international migration of people endowed with a high level of human capital is detrimental for the country of emigration (Adams 2003, 1). This argument infers that the large-scale departure of highly-educated workers from developing countries tends to depress income levels and long-run economic growth rates in the developing world. A more recent argument that recognizes a long-term benefit of brain drain refutes the conventional view by expressing three interrelated views (Adams 2003, 1): in a developing economy with a limited growth potential, the return to human capital is likely to be low the low return to human capital leads to limited incentive to acquire education, which is seen as the engine of economic growth finally since the world at large values education, allowing migration of the best and brightest from a developing country may actually increase the incentive to acquire education For a proper understanding of why the educated Nigerian emigrant is unlike any other emigrant in the sub-Saharan region of Africa, it is important to delve into a brief analysis of how the country adopted its education policy post-colonization. Anosike (1977) referenced Nigerias adoption of western
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orthodox economic theory which hypothesizes that a high level of education induces a higher efficiency in productivity of the labor force. Nigeria adopted this hypothesis as a source of modern theory of education for economic development for the country. The hypothesis was derived from the central role that capital formation is traditionally presumed to play in the modern engineering of economic growth and development. Later day economists made several efforts to extend and expand this capital theory into virtually all facets presumed to be important for economic growth, including the human capital factor (Anosike 1977, 29). It thus became recognized and argued that the principal source for the development of Nigeria lies in its human capital factor; that formal education is the principal avenue for transmitting technological and general capability skills to the nations labor force; and that a general, especially a high level of education for Nigerians, will result in an equally high rate of economic productivity, sociopolitical progress, and general economic development (Anosike 1977, 29). This proposition that technological skill transmission obtained through formal education would increase the capability of the national labor force formed the cardinal dimension of the pioneering manpower and educational projection of Nigerias requirements of intermediate and high-level personnel (Harbison, 1960). Armed with this model of the linkage between education and economic development, Nigeria, a country that was not lacking in finances, proceeded to train and educate its people. Anosike (1977) however felt that this model as applied to a country like Nigeria in its infant stage of development was flawed because it did not answer two basic questions: (a) to what extent and in what ways does formal education contribute to economic growth and development in the nations early stages of development, if any; and (b) does education or economic development precede the other in the process? Anosike (1977) concluded by saying that the western education policy model adopted by Nigeria did not take into consideration the two questions posted in the preceding paragraph, and that the
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education policy-makers took to a level and caliber of manpower and education that was necessary only for those nations in far advanced stages of economic development. He believes that this inappropriate manpower model has an indirect relation to the origin of Nigerias manpower related socio-economic problems. A better approach for Nigeria was an educational policy that is accompanied by economic and institutional policies, all working together to generate overall economic growth. In other words, the country was producing highly educated and skilled workers faster than it could implement growthfostering policies to build industries and acquire technologies that will employ its trained and elite workforce. Vaizey (1969) summed it all up: the education system of Nigeria is put under intolerable strain, and has shown signs of beginning to break down the demand for teachers became the biggest single factor in determining the size of higher education, and about half or more of the graduates become teachers the fiscal burden is gigantic white-collar unemployment continues to accelerate on the job training and other informal procedures (which are the true sources of skill information) are neglected the upgrading of existing workers is neglected the brain drain and the foreign emigration of the over-educated but indigenous elites who cannot find suitable employment at home follows

The level of international migration and remittances continue to grow but data on international migration remains unreliable. To get an idea of the general characteristics of migrants from some laborexporting countries, Adams (2003) used estimates of migration and educational attainment based on United States and the OECD records. Based on the data collected, Adams came up with three basic findings: with respect to legal migration, international migration involves the movement of the educated while migrants are well educated, international migration does not tend to take a very high proportion of the best educated for a handful of labor-exporting countries, international migration does not cause brain drain Remittances remain a clear benefit to the home countries of migrants. IMF data for the mid1990s put the total amount of remittances to US$65 billion. Fiani (2003) put this in perspective when he stated that the figures above is larger than the total flow of official development assistance for the same period. A question that arises is whether remittances are influenced by the skill and education composition of emigration. A finding that suggests that skilled migrants tend to remit more, if accurate, will diminish the concern about the welfare impact of brain drain, while the finding of smaller desire to remit by skilled migrants, also if accurate, would magnify welfare concerns (Fiani 2003, 7). Johnson and Whitelaw (1974) showed that remittances tend to increase with the level of education, while Rodriguez and Horton (1994) finds that the educational level of migrants has no effect on the amount of remittances. The conclusion here is that it remains very difficult to draw firm conclusions on the relationship between education and remittances.
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The level of education of emigrants tends to have a more direct impact on the welfare of nations affected by brain drain. As mentioned earlier, about 200,000 highly qualified Africans live outside their country, mainly in Western Europe and North America, while approximately 300,000 expatriates are working on the continent on technical assistance programs. This translates to about $4 billion a year to fill up the capacity gaps created (Sako 2002, 26). More striking is the drain of medical doctors from Africa. Sako quoted a 1993 report of the United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) Human Development Report that stated that more than 21,000 Nigerian doctors are practicing in the United States; at the same time Nigerias healthcare system suffers a severe depletion of qualified medical practitioners. The data presented in the preceding paragraph infers that the level of education of migrants has a direct relationship to the welfare impact of brain drain to the migrants home country. Adam (2003) used immigration data from the U.S Census Bureaus 2000 U.S. Population Census to determine levels of education of legal immigrants (age 25 and older) in the United States. The data gives, by country of origin, the educational attainment level of the foreign-born population living in the United States in the year 2000. He compiled data for twenty-four labor-exporting countries and defined three different levels of education of the immigrants. Primary education or less corresponds to 0-8 years of schooling; secondary education to 9-12 years of schooling; and tertiary education to more than 12 years of schooling. For comparative analysis, this paper will present the data of four countries and compare them to that of Nigeria. The countries are China, India, Pakistan, and Mexico. The first three countries were selected because of their known high participation in technology and the sciences in comparison to the rest of the countries in the world, while Mexico was chosen because of its proximity to the United States. Table 1 shows the immigration data for the year 2000 for these countries.

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Country

Total Immigrants Primary or Less 173,545 41,185 11,630 3,081,310 2,630

Educational Level Secondary 217,185 127,540 43,365 2,398,000 15,910 Tertiary 456,050 668,055 110,430 895,515 90,620

China India Pakistan Mexico Nigeria

846,780 836,780 165,425 6,374,829 109,160

Table 1. Number of Immigrants (Age 25 and older) to the U.S by Level of Education Source: Data adapted from Richard H. Adams, International Migration, Remittance, and the Brain Drain: A study of 24 Labor-Exporting Countries (The World Bank, 2003), 26.

Figure 1. Graphical Representation of Relationship between Total immigrants and Immigrants with Tertiary Education in Four Countries

Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the direct relationship between the total number of immigrants and immigrants with a minimum of tertiary education from selected labor-exporting countries. Without correcting for factors like population of immigrants home country and the number of immigrants, the data shows that of the four selected countries shown in the graph, Nigeria has the highest number of immigrants with tertiary education in relation to the total number of immigrants in the
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United States for the year 2000. Figure 2 takes the same data and shows immigrants educational attainment as a percentage of total legal immigrants in the United States for the same year. The data reveals that over 97% of Nigerians of legal immigration status living in the United States for the period in question has attained at least a secondary education. This means that the first of Adams (2003) three findings, which concludes that with respect to legal migration, international migration involves the movement of the educated, does apply to Nigeria.

Figure 2. Graphical Representation of Immigrants with Tertiary Education as a Percentage of Total Immigrants / Immigrants with Secondary + Tertiary Education as a Percentage of Total Immigrants

As a group, the 700,000 African immigrants in the United States (as of March 2000), were one of the most highly educated groups within the entire United States, with Nigerians making up about 41.3% (134,940) of the this group (Kaba 2004, 22). Kaba (2004) also referenced a U.S. Census Bureau publication of a list of over 65 ancestry groups that were listed in 1990. The publication showed that 52.9% of people of Nigerian descent age 25 and over had at least a bachelors degree. No other single group (English, German, Irish, Italian, Scottish, Dutch, etc.) had a 50% bachelors degree attainment rate.
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The data presented thus far indicate that migration of Africans with only a primary education is almost rare. Carrington and Detragiache (1999) put it well when they noted that immigrants from Africa to the United States consist primarily of highly educated individuals. The people of Africa however continue to linger at the bottom of the literacy ladder of the world. IV. The Returning Emigrants as Agents of Development So far it has been established that governance problems resulting from political insatiability led to the inability of Nigeria to create adequate and sustainable growth and development environment for its highly educated workforce. The brain drain and the foreign emigration of the educated elites who cannot find suitable employment at home followed. These Nigerian migrants consist primarily of highly educated individuals that tend to continue their quest for more knowledge in their host countries. Because of the advancements in the economies and development structures of their Western European and North American host countries, Nigerians as human capital found the educational training brought from their home country to be better suited for their new environment. They also acquired more sophisticated training through professional practice, and found employments in much better conditions than their country of origin could have provided them. An interesting dynamic that is worthy of mention is the emergence of knowledge-based industries as the key to wealth creation for nations, commonly referred to as the information era. Courchene (2002) summarized this emerging era when he stated that the information revolution will do for human capital what the Industrial Revolution did for the physical capital. Brought about by the impact of the Internet, this era introduces a level of privilege to citizens individually and collectively, with a degree of information, influence, and power that can neither be ignored nor suppressed. For the first time in history, one of the richest men in the world owns nothing tangible no factories or armies. Bill Gates
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only owns knowledge, expanded by the Internet, which in turn is accessible by all. This democratization of information, combined with the rise of knowledge or human capital as the cutting edge of international competitiveness, has allowed citizens to emerge as much more dominant socio-political actors on the domestic and international fronts and as the key to excelling on the economic and competitive fronts (Courchene 2002, 74). The Internet has hastened the globalization of the world economy and put human capital in the forefront. The preceding paragraph touches on a paradigm that has been responsible for the increase in the relevance of knowledgeable individuals, regardless of their geographical location on the globe. For the first time in history, peoples pay is not based on whether they live in a rich or a poor country but upon their individual skills. This only means that well educated and skilled immigrant professionals in the more economically advanced and developed nations of the world are positioned to utilize their brain gain for the socio-economic advancement of their home countries. Meyer and Brown (1999) referenced a database of the National Science Foundation (NSF) that shows that in 1995, 1.434 million people (12%) out of the 12 million people who have science and engineering degrees or who work in science and engineering occupations in the U.S.A. are of foreign origin. Over 72% of these were originally born in a developing country. Also 23% of those having a doctorate degree are foreign-born, and this proportion of the foreign-born with doctorate degrees rises to 40% for the field of engineering and computer sciences. This means that for labor-exporting countries, an important part of their nationals involved in research and development activities that influence global behaviors and direction are actually located beyond their borders. It is conclusive that the Nigerian emigrant is part of the top-tier pool of human capital that resides beyond the countrys borders. It is incumbent upon the country to find effective means of tapping into this pool. Meyer and Brown (1999) describes two ways to implement the brain grain; first is through the
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return of the expatriates to their countries of origin (return option), which involves the creation of networks in the home country in which the returnees could effectively find a place and be operational, and second is through their remote mobilization and association to its development (diaspora option). The diaspora option does not rely on whether the migrant intended to physically return to the home country. The objective here is to create the links through which they could be effectively and productively connected to its development. The diaspora option has a clear advantage in the sense that it does not rely on a prior massive infrastructure movement, as it consists in capitalizing on already existing resources. It is up to countries like Nigeria that can boast of crops of educated emigrants to take advantage of their capabilities by making the social, political, organizational, and technical efforts to mobilize such a diaspora (Meyer and Brown, 1999). Mobilization by itself will not serve the overall need of a comprehensive exploration of the countrys sophisticated migrant pool. The government has to create the environment that will encourage the participation of its migrant pool in the socio-economic development of the country. The history of the country is that of unachieved potentials, evidenced by years of economic stagnation, widespread corruption, rising poverty levels, and the decline of public institutions. The role of private-citizen contributions to the countrys economic growth were severely diminished for decades because of acute infrastructure bottlenecks that hindered private sector activities. With a population of 140 million people, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with a GDP second only to South Africas. The country has the tenth largest crude oil reserves in the world, and is the fifth largest supplier of same to the United States. The current democratically elected government is the longest in the history of the country without military intervention. The stable political environment and strengthened democratic practices has allowed for both local and international
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monitoring and support of the comprehensive reform program implemented by the government. OkonjoIweala and Osafo-Kwako (2007) describes the on-going public sector reforms in Nigeria as the most difficult in the country in recent decades. Heavy resistance to the reforms continues to be met and reconciled by the reform teams with support of the government and the citizenry. Modern communication and global dynamism of businesses and economies in the world has allowed for an increased sophistication of the average Nigerian, and also brought to the forefront the role of Nigeria in global energy security policies, mostly as it affects the United States of America. Energy policy is mentioned here to bring awareness to the level of influence oil and gas has on foreign policies of modern nations, policies that a stable and well-governed Nigeria, with its huge reserves, stands to benefit from. V. Conclusion The paper brings an optimistic view of brain drain by showing that the migrant population of Nigeria, mostly in Western Europe and the United States of America, are highly educated and has played and continue to play significant roles in the socio-economic development of their host countries. The paper also identified what may have been erroneous approaches to the countrys education policies that may have encouraged the migration of its educated elite. These educated elite are now more educated, better trained, better equipped, and are vast contributors to global knowledge bases in areas that include business, the sciences, engineering, and medicine. Globalization and advancements in communication technologies has rekindled and empowered the human capital element in the development and growth of nations. Nigeria is blessed with an abundance of these elements that now constitute a brain gain for the country. It is up to policymakers in the country to create an environment conducive for the assimilation of these sophisticated emigrants, most of who never broke ties with their home country to begin with, and most of who are willing to contribute to the socio-economic development of their motherland. It is also incumbent upon scholars, particularly those that are
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indigenous to the country, to engage in research efforts to identify growth solutions that will take into consideration the complexities of the countrys ethnic relationships. If Nigeria succeeds in its domestic reforms and thus create a platform upon which these emigrants can operate, then Nigeria will be finally reaping, albeit unplanned, from past investments in the education of its people.

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Reference List Adams, Richard H. 2003. International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain: A Study of 24 Labor-Exporting Countries. The World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper 3069. http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/07/08/0000949 (accessed November 10, 2007) Ake, Claude. 1996. Democracy and Development in Africa. The Brookings Institution. Washington, D.C. Quoted in Easterly, William and Rose Levine.1997.Africas Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 ( November): 1203-1250 Anosike, Benji J. 1977. Education and Economic Development in Nigeria: The Need for a New Paradigm. Africa Studies Review 20, No 2 (September): 27-51 Carrington, William J., and Enrica Detragiache. 1999. How Extensive is the Brain Drain? Finance and Development, 36, No 2, 46-49. Quoted in Kaba, Amadu J. 2004. Africas Migration Brain Drain: The Costs and Benefits to the Continent. Columbia International Affairs Online 2, No 3 (FallWinter) 2004. http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/uaic/uaic_fallwinter2004/uaic_fallwinter04_04.pdf (accessed November 11, 2007) Courche, Thomas J. 2002. Human Capital in an Information Era. Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Poltiiques 28, No 1 (March): 73-80 Easterly, William and Rose Levine.1997.Africas Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 112 ( November): 1203-1250 Elaigwu, Isawa J. Nigeria Federalism under Civilian and Military Regimes. 1988. Publius 18, No 1 (Winter): 173-188 Faini, Riccardo. 2003. Is the Brain Drain an Unmitigated Blessing? United Nations University / World Institute of Development Economics Research. Working Paper No. 2003/64 http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/far03/far03.html (accessed November 11, 2007) Harbison, F.H. 1960. High-Level Manpower for Nigerias Future, in Federal Ministry of Education. Investment in Education (the Ashby Report). Quoted in Anosike, Benji J. 1977. Education and Economic Development in Nigeria: The Need for a New Paradigm. Africa Studies Review 20, No 2 (September): 27-51 Johnson, G., and W. Whitelaw. 1974.Urban-Rural Income Transfers in Kenya: An Estimated Remittances Function. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 22, 473-79. Quoted in Faini, Riccardo. 2003. Is the Brain Drain an Unmitigated Blessing? United Nations University / World Institute of Development Economics Research. Working Paper No. 2003/64 http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/far03/far03.html (accessed November 11, 2007)

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Kaba, Amadu J. 2004. Africas Migration Brain Drain: The Costs and Benefits to the Continent. Columbia International Affairs Online 2, No 3 (Fall-Winter) 2004. http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/uaic/uaic_fallwinter2004/uaic_fallwinter04_04.pdf (accessed November 11, 2007) Meyer, Jean-Baptiste and Mercy Brown. 1999. Scientific Diasporas: A new Approach to the Brain Drain. Management of Social Transformations / UNESCO-ICSU. Discussion Paper No. 41 www.unesco.org/most/meyer.htm (accessed November 18, 2007) Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi and Philip Osafo-Kwaako. 2007. Nigerias Economic Reforms: Progress and Challenges. The Brookings Institution. (March 2007) http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/0323globaleconomics_okonjo%20iweal a/20070323okonjo_iweala.pdf (accessed October 17, 2007) Onimode, Bade. 2001. Sociopolitical and Economic Factors in Capacity Utilization and Retention in Africa. (paper presented at the First Pan-Africa Capacity Building Forum, Bamako, Mali, 10/2001). Quoted in Sako, Soumana. 2002. Brain Drain and Africas Development: A Reflection. African Issues 30, No1, The African Brain Drain to the North: Pitfalls and Possibilities. 25-30 Rodriguez, E., and S. Horton. 1994. International Return Migration and Remittances in the Phillipines. OECD Development Center. Quoted in Faini, Riccardo. 2003. Is the Brain Drain an Unmitigated Blessing? United Nations University / World Institute of Development Economics Research. Working Paper No. 2003/64 http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/far03/far03.html (accessed November 11, 2007) Sako, Soumana. 2002. Brain Drain and Africas Development: A Reflection. African Issues 30, No1, The African Brain Drain to the North: Pitfalls and Possibilities. 25-30 Stalker, P. 1994. The Work of Strangers: A survey of International Labor Migration. Geneva. International Labor Office. Quoted in Faini, Riccardo. 2003. Is the Brain Drain an Unmitigated Blessing? United Nations University / World Institute of Development Economics Research. Working Paper No. 2003/64 http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/far03/far03.html (accessed November 11, 2007) Vaizey, J. 1969. Technology and Skill. U.N. Industrial Planning and Programming Series, No. 3, New York: U.N. Quoted in Anosike, Benji J. 1977. Education and Economic Development in Nigeria: The Need for a New Paradigm. Africa Studies Review 20, No 2 (September): 27-51

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