BRIEFS CRIM LAW- Ch. 5, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress p.

51-68
State Rubbish Collectors Assn v. Siliznoff Supreme Court of California, 1952. 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282.

p. 51

Facts: Siliznoff was intimidated into signing notes by the threat of future physical force. The plaintiffs sued Siliznoff for collection of the debts, but Siliznoff said that he was not liable for them because he signed under duress. Furthermore, Siliznoff filed a counterclaim saying that he had been assaulted after a fashion. The defendant prevailed on the claim and counterclaim, and the plaintiffs appealed on the basis that there was no evidence of assault. They argued that assault involves only threats of immediate force rather than threats of future force. Issue: Can someone be liable for an intentional tort if they violate only the mental and emotional well-being of another person? Rule: The old rules state that the law will not protect individuals from invasions of their emotional and mental well-being. However, the court cites a change in the law reflected in the Restatement of Torts that says there may be an action for infliction of severe emotional distress. Analysis: The court recognizes a change in the direction of the law. It makes analogies to other well-recognized torts, saying that in the case of assault, battery, false imprisonment and defamation, mental distress will be the primary component of the injury. The court also counters arguments that allowing mental distress claims will lead to a flood of litigation. The court says that it is up to juries to decide if the mental distress was serious enough to be actionable. Conclusion: The court upheld the verdicts for the defendant.
Notes and Questions 1. Assault does not lie because there was no threat of immediate harm. False imprisonment does not lie because the plaintiffs said they would beat him up later if he left the meeting now. Infliction of mental distress was rare in courts at the m o n on

Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida Supreme Court of Florida, 1958. 100 So.2d 396. p. 55 Facts: An employee of the defendant insulted the plaintiff while she was inquiring about a price of an item in the f n n o The plaintiff claimed that the language caused her to suffer a heart attack and other injuries. The defendant moved to dismiss the suit based on failure to state a cause of action. The motion was granted, and the plaintiff appealed. Issue: Does insulting language constitute a violation of a legally protected right? In other words, does it constitute a tort in itself? Rule: An action for intentional infliction of mental distress may lie if the distress is severe, or if an insult is suffered by a patron of a common carrier such as an employee of a hotel, theater, or telegraph office. Analysis: The court asserts that a line should be drawn between emotional distress that is severe and distress that is not severe. The line that the co c oo l l onl fo

con c xc n ll o n c co l ol that mere vulgar insults do not exceed such bounds. Conclusion: The motion to dismiss is affirmed.

oc

The court further determines

Harris v. Jones Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1977. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611. P. 58 Facts: Harris was teased by Jones for his stuttering. Harris claimed that the teasing worsened the condition and caused him emotional distress. The jury found for the plaintiff, but was overruled in the Court of Special Appeals. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Issue: W mo on l ff pl n ff v ?

Rule: An action for intentional infliction of mental distress must contain four elements: (1) intentional or reckless conduct, (2) extreme and outrageous conduct, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the distress, (4) distress that can be considered severe. Analysis: T co n c n v , on c n studied in a vacuum. Because the plaintiff had problems that preceded his employment and the pl c of mplo m n k n of o pl c , n n no v nc n o c that the distress could be considered severe. Conclusion: The court affirmed the reversal of the Court of Special Appeals.

Taylor v. Vallelunga District Court of Appeal of California, 1959. 171 Cal.App.2d 107, 339 P.2d 910. P. 65 Facts: T f n n p pl n ff f n f on of pl n ff The plaintiff alleged that this caused her severe emotional distress and sued. The defendants demurred and the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal. Issue: Can a witness to a battery state a cause of action for intentional infliction of mental distress? Rule: In order for the defendants to be liable for intentional infliction of mental distress, the beating must be done for the purpose of causing the plaintiff mental distress, or else the defendants must possess substantial certainty that the beating will cause the plaintiff substantial distress. Analysis: The court found that the claim failed to allege that either condition for intentional infliction of mental distress was met. Conclusion: The court affirmed the judgment of dismissal.