Search & Seizure:

People v. Brisendine (duplications), 13 Cal.3d 528 (1975) Two officers trekked to a campsite to cite four campers for a campfire in violation of a nocampfire ban. The officers searched the campers' bags for weapons, and found marijuana in an opaque bottle and drugs in an envelope. Held Mosk: The search for weapons was appropriate, as the officers were in close proximity for a while, but the search in the bottle and envelopes that yielded the drugs violated California's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure (Article 1, Section 13). That the California prohibition is more strict than the equivalent Fourth Amendment is no problem, as the state provisions are separate from those of the federal, and in many cases the Bill of Rights derived from those of early state constitutions. Dissent Burke: California's original constitution prohibition against was word for word identical to the Federal Constitution Article Four, so the state prohibition should be interpreted as the US Supreme Court has interpreted that of the federal. To do otherwise would create confusion. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) A Mexican citizen was arrested by Mexican police and extradited to the United States. US police searched his US apartment. Held Rehnquist: The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply to a Mexican citizen living outside the United States, because "the people" refers to those "who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered a part of that community." Dissent Brennan: If someone is prosecuted under federal laws, they should be protected under the federal Constitution. HOME: Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992) A family's trailer house was towed before an eviction hearing with the acquiescence of police. Held White: "[M]eaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests" in property constitutes seizure. [The case was remanded to determine if the seizure was unreasonable.]

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Katz v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) FBI placed a listening device on the outside of a telephone booth and recorded a man placing illegal bets. Held Stewart: The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, so analyzing whether a phone booth is a constitutionally protected space is not the correct analysis. The test is whether the person seeks to preserve something as private. Held The requirement that an intrusion must take place before a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred is no longer controlling. Held Recording the conversation violated the Fourth Amendment, even though it was probable an illegal action was occuring, and even though the search was restricted, because the officers did not first request permission from a judicial officer but instead imposed their own restraints. Concur Harlan: This case holds that for there to be a Fourth Amendment violation, there must 1) be a subjective expectation of privacy, and 2) that society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. [A "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy.] Goldman, requiring physical invasion, should therefore be overruled. There can still be exceptions to the rule of needing a warrant, but this is not one of them. Dissent Black: The language of the amendment itself should be followed, and the amendment refers to searches of physical

things. If the framers had wanted to outlaw eavesdropping (available then as well as now), they would have done so. United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir.1996) Police asked who owned a bag, and the owner was silent. Held Abandonment does not allow Fourth Amentment protection, because there must be a subjective manifestation of a desire for privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) Policemen went around a no tresspassing sign and found marijuana in a field. Held Powell: "Open fields" (which do not have to be "fields" or "open") are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, even if tresspassing is involved, except in the area immediately surrounding the house ("curtilage"). United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) DEFINE CURTILAGE Officers ignored fences and no tresspassing signs to find a barn 60 yards from a home and peered into the barn. Held White: The search was permissible. There are four factors in determining curtilage: 1) proximity of the area from the home, 2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, 3) how the area is being used, and 4) the steps taken by the resident to make the area private. Here the barn was outside the enclosure, 60 yards from the house, and there was no indication the barn was used in connection to the house. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) TRASH ON CURB Officers had a trash collector gather Greenwood's garbage from the curb and the officers then inspected the trash. Held White: Inspection of the trash was not a search, even though a city ordinance required disposal of garbage on the curb, because the owner sufficiently exposed the garbage to the public and potentially to "animals, children, scavengers, snoops," etc. Connecticut v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 588 A.2d 145 (1991) HOMELESS MAN Held Inspection of a homeless person's belongings constitute a search, even though they are on public property, because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy and was not (unlike in Greenwood) conveying his belongings to a third party.
3rd Party Bugged:

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) A third party with whom the defendant was speaking was bugged, transmitting information to the police. Held White: Surveillance via third parties is allowed if the defendant is aware the third party is listening, because the third party might at any time decide to voluntarily turn the information over to the police.