A critical psychology of pride

Gavin B. Sullivan

ride is a personally and culturally significant feeling that has received little attention in psychology and has largely been examined as a positive emotional product of self-evaluative cognitions. Even when the self and identity are included in such theories, it is rare for psychologists to engage in reflexive consideration of the complexities that result from the experience and expression of pride within and by collectives. Critical examination of the work that references to pride and occurrences of proud feelings do in contemporary moral, political and cultural practices is required. Pride can also be understood in terms of waves of emotion and in broad connections with shame, racism, marginalization, patriotism. In this paper, critical connections with cultural and other theories of pride and shame are highlighted, followed by a brief analysis of events in Australia and Germany which manifest contradictions and tensions in the background to proud feelings. An important role for critical psychology is argued for in challenging disciplinary boundaries and exploring new directions in the understanding of emotional feelings. Keywords: Pride, national pride, patriotism, self-evaluative emotions, emotion theory Interest in emotion or affect has spread across and beyond the human sciences as biologists, psychologists, historians, sociologists, anthropologists and cultural theorists compete for the legitimacy of pronouncing upon the expressions, experiences, and descriptions of significant feelings. Despite disciplinary borders, it is now possible

to explore multiple aspects, features or dimensions of emotion and to consider, for example, the neurobiology of shame in specific social and cultural practices without fear of contradiction or paradox. Considerable tensions both metaphorical and real exist between adherents to these perspectives. However, in combination they provide conceptual and empirical resources with which to fashion insightful and compelling theoretical stories which, in turn, may change existing practices. It is in the context of these recent developments that I will explore the possibilities for a critical psychology of pride, including relationships with other significant emotions in public and private life as well as the importance of proud feelings for understanding collective and cultural practices. When adopting a thoroughly reflexive stance towards the current state of knowledge about pride critical questions arise: How can compelling critical accounts of pride as a self-evaluative emotion and self-conscious affect be fashioned? What features of feelings like pride are beyond the consciousness or control of the individual? What do liminal experiences tell us about people and practices that are exceptions to normative or natural senses of pride? What is the role of one eyed reporting of national participation in international competitions in creating a positive sense of nation self ? How significant are changing constructions of the imagined observer of events that are reported worldwide? What pleasures, irrationalities and extremes become possible when people merge or even dissolve their identity in a collective? Why do proud attachments to notions of nation states persist in a globalised world? What possibilities does critical psychological theorising and investigation of pride and patriotism create in practice? Given such questions and the need for reflexive interdisciplinary work to be done with regard to our feelings, the response will have three parts. The first section will provide a critical account of the methodological, conceptual and epistemological limitations of contemporary psychological theories and empirical research on pride. A central focus in this section will be to critique mainstream work on pride, although alternative theories and research will be included along with accounts of patriotism, group and national pride. The second section explores connections with critical work on pride that is gathered from outside the discipline of psychology.

166

critical psychology

a critical psychology of pride 167

The authors use of a Wittgensteinian descriptive bersicht or overview of the grammar of pride provides a starting point from which to explore the elucidatory and elaborative interpretations and generalities of cultural theorists. Rather than follow-up multiple, potentially competing theoretical leads, the third section examines the applicability of the emerging critical psychology of pride to recent events in Australia and Germany. The conclusion provides a summary of possibilities for future critical psychology work on pride and related feelings.

A critique of contemporary pride research From a psychological perspective, the topic of feelings easily evokes a set of overlapping concepts. It is tempting to connect feeling with sensation and to investigate empirically what this link may indicate about ourselves and others. For example, are the sensations of physiological arousal part of a sequence of bodily changes that result in an emotion, do they accompany particular forms of action tendency, and do we use these sensations to draw de facto conclusions about ourselves and others (e.g., to infer that I must be experiencing a particular emotion)? Links can also be made between feelings and judgments, particularly where a range of feelings which are not necessarily identifiable as emotions invite particular judgments. For instance, uncomfortable feelings can tell a person who is in the midst of a patriotic crowd that flag-waving is still the wrong thing to do. An expression of a feeling can also demonstrate an error of judgment which may generate further emotions in others, which then move the offender to conform, defend themselves or deny a particular reality. In contemporary parlance, feelings are thought to contain information which may have been biologically encoded to serve a social purpose and also to form relatively discrete objects of individual reflexive cognition and other forms of self-referential emotion work (Rosenberg, 1990). Judgment, in turn, implies forms of cognition which range from machine-like processes which take place outside of consciousness to agentic self-reflection which are more conversational or dialogical in nature. Feelings can also be performed and aligned in collective forms that can be contradicted by discourses of emotional contagion. For instance, an individuals performance of national pride in a
168

passionate sporting crowd may be treated, somewhat dismissively, as a product of powerful social influence. It is relevant too that the general public now expect their political representatives to literate in the use emotion vocabularies and techniques (Squire, 2001; i.e., to capture accurately or to convey the mood of a nation). Despite the a priori relevance of discourse to understanding ones own and others emotions, accounts of emotion words as labels for inner feelings persist in much of the psychological literature. However, social constructionist and discourse analytic alternatives invite criticisms that the embodiment of feeling is important only where it becomes a topic of talk that does something in individuals and collectives (e.g., praise unintentionally embarrasses the recipient). Cultural theory analyses of emotion often produce important insights, but even recognition of culture as a cognitive resource is typically regarded by mainstream psychologists as a shift from hard to soft science (Bem and de Jong, 2007, p. 210). Exploration of multiple dimensions or modalities of emotional feelings can lead to contradictory emphases. Hochschild (1990) succinctly captures a central paradox: a feeling is what happens to us . . . yet it is also what we do to make it happen (p. 120). Just as it is important to avoid extreme conceptual vacillations between the subject and object in psychology, so it is important to avoid extremes of subjectivity and objectivity in understanding feelings and analysing emotions. Theoretical conflicts between positions on emotion in which reality constructs person and person constructs reality (Buss, 1978) need to be avoided if clear understanding of particular emotional feelings like pride is to be achieved. Rather than adopting a middle ground theoretical solution, it is possible to build upon Wittgensteins (1978) way of treating paradoxes (i.e., self-contradictory stances about emotion in psychology): Something surprising, a paradox, is a paradox only in a particular, as it were defective surrounding. One needs to complete this surrounding in such a way that what looked like a paradox no longer seems one (Wittgenstein, 1978, p. 410). By complete this surrounding, Wittgenstein can be taken to mean an examination of the detail of language use in relation to practices such as judging the genuineness of anothers emotions (Wittgenstein, 1958). Wittgensteins descriptive philosophical approach is an important counter to the type of theoretical excesses

critical psychology

a critical psychology of pride 169

and generalities that allow emotional feelings to be regarded mostly as social constructions or as largely involuntary products of causal-cognitive or biological mechanisms. Although Wittgensteins philosophy is often taken to represent a negative and destructive approach to philosophical and other theories, there is much to be gained from using his later philosophy as a starting point in a critical psychology of feeling. Wittgensteins Private Language Argument provides a convincing demolition of a central Western individual picture of sensation, feeling and emotion as private objects that are the referents of public linguistic labels. Rejecting the object-label view of first-person feeling words, provides a strong basis for examining how language actually works to express, replace and ascribe feelings in context. A picture of the autonomous individual is deconstructed and the way is opened for a more nuanced consideration of language and relational features of psychological experience. The grammatical approach not only encourages the charting of first-person language use (e.g., of a concept like pride) but also other grammatical forms including the expression and description of feelings in second-person and thirdperson language, and in both singular and plural forms. The implication is that language of feeling can be explored in all forms of relationships, from the interpersonal to the collective and national and the imaginary (i.e., different forms in which we and they are experienced and expressed). This stance is not without controversy as language-based approaches to emotion encouraged by Wittgensteins (1958) ordinary language stance have been regarded, perhaps unfairly, as politically and morally neutral. The emphasis on description also displays an apparent disdain for theory in any domain. Critics argue that Wittgensteins later philosophy and the discursive psychology he inspired lack the critical realism required to make reflexive moral and political judgments about the experiences, judgments and practices of others (see Gill, 1995). It may appear that an exploration of ordinary language use of feeling concepts fails to focus on private feelings or complex experiences (e.g., of vacillating or ambivalent emotions)1, and largely ignores the experiences of marginalised individuals. Instead, it appears to prioritise and examine only one modality through which emotions are created and refined. To put this point in a way that draws upon the history
170

of emotion, such a stance seems to encourage the view that we only need to focus on emotion standards and how their cultural articulations change and not the feeling or experiences themselves (Bourke, 2005). Despite these potential objections, Wittgenstein provides cogent criticisms of the psychology of feeling that afford a critical analysis of pride and still allows for connections with critical theories to be created. Wittgensteins critical approach is useful because it contrasts with the subject-object distinction of Descartes and the sensitivity to language use in context encourages alternatives to a Darwinian biological focus. Although social constructionists argued against the biological approaches which at one time dominated psychology (see Harr, 1986), even Darwin (1872/1999) indicated that emotions like pride and shame were dependent on social circumstances: Our self-attention is excited almost exclusively by the opinion of others, for no person living in absolute solitude would care about his appearance (p. 342). However, Darwin indirectly devalued pride when he noted that everyone feels blame more acutely than praise (p. 342), particularly when it concerns our personal appearance. He suggested further that whenever we know, or suppose, that others are depreciating our personal appearance, our attention is strongly drawn towards ourselves, more especially to our faces (p. 342). The extended examination of Darwin is important here because his work continues to provide a focal point for the rival of interest in pride in recent mainstream psychological and cultural theory. With regard to psychology, the literature on pride is relatively limited in comparison to accounts of other specific emotions. The work of Weiner (1989), Lewis (1999), and Tracy and Robins (2004a) typifies mainstream theories which are thought to improve upon the Darwinian account. That is, Darwin provided an initial explanation of the way in which shame and embarrassment are expressed in a facial glow, presumably downgrading the evolutionary significance of the opposite experience in the process. Through a focus on the face, Darwin believed that shame (or embarrassment) had a universal basis, in contrast to pride which has no distinctive universal facial expression.2 The central idea behind cognitive appraisal theory, articulated earlier by Lewis (1999) in the context of developmental psychology, is that pride is experienced when a

critical psychology

a critical psychology of pride 171

person evaluates themselves or their actions as having reached or exceeded certain internal representations of standards, rules or goals. This account contrasts with Darwins evolutionary account of blushing in which the physiological relaxation of the facial capillaries has become so habitual, in association with the belief that others are thinking of us that it can occur without any conscious thought about our faces (p. 343). On this view, there is a certain involuntariness and automaticity in the way proud feelings are thought to occur in everyday life. As with Darwins account, the cognitive appraisal theory of pride tends to undermine the active person in a social context even though new notions of mechanisms are used to explain how thought generates feelings, apparently without thought. In all of this, a physiological feeling or arousal component is central because a mere cognitive act or judgment is unlikely to move the person to engage in prosocial (achievement or moral) behaviour. This type of theory focuses on what might also be called self-ish emotions emotions that characterise an individual with a self in terms of the individual outcome of social and presumably cultural interactions: the primary distinctive characteristic of selfconscious emotions is that their elicitation requires the ability to form stable self-representations (me), to focus attention on those representations (i.e., to self-reflect; I), and to put it all together to generate a self-evaluation (Tracy and Robins, 2004a, p. 105). Other theoretical perspectives are possible, but they remain marginalized. For example, in contrast to a simplistic view of others as internalised, theorists inspired by Vygotsky argue that it is interaction-based interest in others mediated by appropriately nuanced and mediated social interaction, which provides the prerequisite for feelings like pride. Such an analysis does not need to rely on the logical prerequisite of internal cognitive representations of a world of people, things and events because the representations emerge relationally (see also Scheff, 2000).3 An individualised and asocial view of the person and identity is maintained in cognitive-appraisal theory (i.e., social practices are excluded from view; Parrott, 2004). Indeed, the focus on the self and self-representations approaches solipsism in that the individual internalises societal standards in a one-way process of increasing autonomy. The self exists in a manner that resembles Wittgensteins
172

(1961) early view which he later rejected: namely, the self as a point in a field (rather like the eye that surveys a particular area) in which solipsism and realism merge (i.e., the limits of the world are the limits of my experiential language and the world of the happy man is said to be different from that of the sad man). However, when we consider that individuals move through the world and relationships, rather than merely internalising and representing reality as they become more autonomous, then it makes sense to picture differently the relationships between individuals and the objects of their pride. For example, patriotism or being proud of my country is not simply a cognitive incorporation of external reality. Rather, the experience of national pride is something that occurs with others, often in particular settings. More importantly, the development of pride is not simply a one-way internalisation process because there is also the potential for various forms of externalisation of thoughts, feelings and practices (e.g., in therapy for low self-esteem). A persons expressions of pride in the context of a relationship can transform that relationship, putting a certificate on a wall can implicitly invite comments from others, and pride can be felt as a result of years of moral and political leadership within an organization (indeed a person may become a symbol and personification of organisations pride). Highlighting some of the oversimplified assumptions that underlie the cognitive account, Tracy and Robins (2004a) summarise the general model: Put simply, society tells us what kind of person we should be; we internalise these beliefs in the form of actual and ideal self-representations; and self-conscious emotions motivate behavioral action toward the goals embodied in these selfrepresentations (p. 107). Although there is an awareness that self-conscious emotions may be expressed more frequently through language than through nonverbal expressions (p. 108), this fact is still presented within a cognitive framework (with evolutionary backing) in which language has evolved to supplement existing expressive behaviours and their natural historical functions. Moreover, agency seems to be allowed only in the form of the messages conveyed by pride which are, in contrast to basic emotions, perhaps allow for more deliberate processing and the production of linguistic forms of conversation (p. 108). The authors appear to be unaware of the genesis of shame

critical psychology

a critical psychology of pride 173

and an empty self in early experiences of invalidation and abuse (Sullivan and Strongman, 2003; Meares and Sullivan, 2004), as well as the manner in which therapy can encourage positive feelings to emerge in a conversational and relational manner. The limited reflection on the intimate connections between language, agency and self-consciousness, extends to identity and culture. For example, identity-goal congruence is included in accounts of positive self-evaluation, but such process models only allow for complexity in identity from two sources: 1) when there might be a conflict with a survival-goal, and two, and 2) when an individual might experience a feeling like national pride because the event is congruent with his or her ideal collective self-representations (p. 116). To put this point in another way, the question are you proud? even in a specific situation does not highlight the relation between the person and the object of pride (e.g., if other than oneself). It is more appropriate to ask what are you proud of?, and the possible answers need not threaten a coherent sense of self. That is, an individual can be proud of their house, their car, their family, their country, their workplace in ways that do not generally contradict each other or imply a fragmented or distributed self. My point here is not to ignore a rich history of accounts of the self and identity in psychology, but rather to highlight the way in which cognitive accounts actively exclude full consideration of such social and linguistic connections. Similarly, the importance of culture in relation to pride is often limited to consideration of our evolutionary past in which complex and hierarchical social arrangements demanded new forms of social understanding. A few comments about collectivist self are also limited to the way in which the individual appraises how events reflect upon his or her family, rather than just him or herself. Tracy and Robins (2004a), for example, offer the unconvincing analysis that if an athlete represents the individuals country in the Olympics, then the individual might experience national pride because My nation is good at sports (p. 116).4 A vocabulary of sequences and processes is preferred to any investigation of how feelings, such as national pride and patriotism, occur in particular cultural and historical periods as individual and collective phenomena. Related feelings of collective guilt and shame are only now beginning to appear in the mainstream literature, along with
174

accounts of pride as a moral emotion (e.g., see Tangeny, Stuewig, and Mashek, 2007). Cultural differences cannot be so easily be reduced to cognitive interpretation as Mascolo and Bhatia (2002) have pointed out in relation to pride in Indian families. For example, they highlight the importance of different values, ideologies and myths. Similarly, although they employ traditional psychological methods,5 Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, and Fischer (2000) have demonstrated that pride is experienced and experienced very differently in an honour-related culture such as Spain. However, it is clear from patterns of citations that such social, relational and cultural accounts of pride are actively excluded from the emerging mainstream literature.

Connections with critical and cultural theories of pride Given the limitations of mainstream psychological accounts of pride, an outline can be provided of critical psychology alternatives. Language and the study of historical and cultural contexts should be central to any alternative account which also needs to be reflexive about psychologys current practices and problems. As with the previous section, the aim is not to produce a general account of emotion which can then be applied to or tested by examining the details of pride. Instead, the aim is to examine work that focuses on pride and the subject, where the latter is considered in relational, psychodynamic and self-regulatory terms (Henriques et al., 1984). Without this interest in the detail of pride, there is an ever present danger of defaulting to a general model of selfconscious emotion (e.g., Lewis, 1999) or theorising proud feelings only in terms of what their implications for understanding broader topics of gender, race, sexuality, nationality, marginalisation, oppression, politics, and globalization (some important connections are, however, described later in this paper). There are few cultural studies that focus attention specifically on pride while managing the tensions between different approaches. However, Probyns (2005) analysis of shame provides a direct indication of relevant issues for a critical psychology of pride, and indicates the need to examine the relationships between pride and other feelings (i.e., in contrast to viewing these as separate areas or objects for research). This is important because the psychological literature tends to view emotions like pride, shame, anger, and fear a critical psychology of pride 175

critical psychology

in isolation. A positive account of pride is assumed rather than explored: if pride is accepted and even vaunted, surely we must also acknowledge our individual and collective shame (p. xiv). The connections are important because an individual may attempt to overcome the shame of a marginalised identity, for example, by later acts that create some sense of personal value, individual triumph or superiority. As is often noted in the context of psychotherapy, these feelings can occur outside of consciousness while at the same time being experienced as they are embodied. For example, an individual may not be aware that he or she reacts with angry defiance, what might be called a defiant pride, when ones identity or origins are devalued. In addition, an arrogant person may have some awareness of their tone of voice or the angle of the head as consistent with a certain superiority, but may be unaware of the social forces that reinforce this habitus and way of enacting the past (Probyn, 2005). In the psychological literature, this issue has recently been explored as an important connection between posture and proud feelings (Roberts and Arefi-Afshar, 2007) and as a fundamental distinction between authentic and hubristic pride (Tracy and Robins, in press). However, investigations of this type fail to consider that the boundaries between real and extreme pride can shift over time as well as how the criteria are regulated in particular social and cultural groups, and what types of strategies and processes that might be used, directly or otherwise, to encourage an individual to self-regulate their superiority (e.g., strategies using shame or guilt). Probyns analysis of the corporeal blush of shame implies an account in which pride can be involuntary, automatic and unexpected as a result of conscious pursuit of particular goals, without necessarily returning to the traditional problems of determinism, causality, reductionism or essentialism. In other words, while some features of pride such as celebrating ones success in words and gestures or reacting to praise from others may appear to become automatised and have bodily features that can difficult if not impossible to control, this automatisation still does not entail that these actions have become involuntary (Shanker, 1993, p. 234). This perspective does not allow for any simplistic notion of internalisation of social, relational contexts to the point of autonomy or
176

cognitive determination of feeling. Instead, feelings can reflect ones place (e.g., discomfort with positive attention despite a positive view of ones actions or achievements), reinforce notions of nation and unity through a shared focus on events or people (e.g., a collective watching members of ones group achieve international success in a public setting), evoke early attachments in unexpected ways (e.g., when seeing familiar symbols when overseas for the first time), and encourage like feelings through engagement in similar activities (even though specific thoughts and feelings may differ considerably), encode specific ways of expressing feelings of personal triumph and demonstrate, for some individuals, that they have exceeded societal notions of what a good sporting body can achieve (Probyn, 2000). But what other prospects are there for critical connections to be forged? Work such as Probyns suggests how the relations between pride and shame can be embodied and articulated. Rather than treating pride and shame as opposite, we can explore how they are connected, such as where a person uses pride to ward off or replace shame. The following example shows how this may be achieved discursively. An Australian political leader registered his shame after sexually harassing female journalists and making racist remarks about the wife of a colleague: Im not at all proud for what Ive done. They were the sort of acts that Im not proud of and will never be proud of (ABC TV Lateline, 29 August 2005). The example is interesting because it seems that although he engaged in such acts he did not think that they could be valued positively by anyone, not least himself. Such discursive management occurs in many other settings where individuals manage their identities rather than evaluating themselves as achieving identity-congruent goals exposed to the gaze of a broader public. The example of New Zealander golf player Michael Campbell who won the American Open in 2005, demonstrates the complexity of emotional management, reconstruction of a personal narrative as a success and recognition of a new role as a spokesperson for New Zealanders and, particularly, for Maori. At a press conference,6 Campbell clearly struggles to maintain composure as he is asked to relive his moment of victory and its significance. When asked to recall what his caddy said to him, he says: and the words we exchanged was that he said youve made a lot of people back home

critical psychology

a critical psychology of pride 177

very very proud (excuse me) and I got pretty emotional again I lost it completely. At this point he follows immediately with:
but we have the understanding that ahh lot of Maori people back home are are trodden on ahh theyre very much a race that sometimes get very lazy I admit to that too you know you go through phases where they get very complacent but umm but then they turn they you turn your whole career around very quickly once again its like any sport we play any humans that we play that play the sport we sometimes get a little bit lazy and ahh Id be the first to admit to that.

will all achieve once we have overcome our nagging feelings of shame and once society becomes a place where no one shames another (p. 2).

The complexity of the work that is being done discursively and in a very public way seems quite at odds with the very simplified account of the standard cognitive appraisal view of identity and pride. Moreover, there are vacillations between I and they (rather than we) which seem uncomfortable for Campbell and they end with an admission of occasional laziness. There are also political overtones to the description of Maori as trodden on and as a race...that sometimes get very lazy. Here it seems that Probyns (2005) remark that shame makes an appearance only in discussions about pride, and then only as a shameful feeling (p. 2) is insightful. However, there is also something that is never mentioned in research on pride, that being the first person of a group to achieve x, especially against a background of limited opportunities, oppression or marginalisation, is a very important occasion. Such moments need to be included in any account of pride that recognises both past injustice and the cultural significance of positive experiences.7, 8 However, it is possible that the connection between shame and pride is overstated. For example, it may not always be the case that an emerging sense of autonomy must always overcome a shameful past:
National pride, black pride, gay pride, and now fat pride are all projects premised on the eradication of shame. As political projects, they clearly, and often with very good reasons, denounce shame. Increasingly, there is a sense that pride is an entitlement, a state we
178

The topic of identity politics has explored the transformational potential of pride and, to a lesser extent, exposed the lack of grounds for a reading based on a right to pride, except in instances of oppression or denial. Britt and Heise (2000) note prideful behavior occupies public space, or more simply, involves public display (p. 253). While this account may help to explain some of the further examples of pride and shame in the next section, other manifestations of identity politics are relevant. That is, for someone to walk tall in a particular space, presumably one needs to feel that one owns that space or belongs there. Work by critical psychologists may provide the detail that complicates explanations of converted shame to pride that rely on older notions of collective emotional contagion. The latter is evident in Britt and Heises (2000) account of shamed individuals who seek such conversion: These individuals get pulled into demonstrations through network ties and crowd contagion. The collective public display of their stigma develops empathic solidarity and pride (p. 267). And:
The emotional transformation likely does not end with pride. Pride may be regenerated repeatedly through collective public displays, and that may be necessary to erase earlier feelings of shame, but ultimately individuals come to accept the stigmatised identity as simply another component of the self. Pride is a prerequisite to acceptance of the identity, and the threshold to its de-emotionalisation (p. 267).

Whether de-emotionalisation is possible through pride is an open question because the alternative sounds odd, if not impossible: namely to be proud of being ashamed. However, this is precisely what Ahmed (2005) suggests is possible in her cultural politics of emotion. Her position is built upon the some of the same events recounted by Probyn. That is, within the context of reconciliation with the Aboriginal peoples of Australia, she notes that being moved by the past seems better than

critical psychology

a critical psychology of pride 179

the process of remaining detached from the past, or assuming that the past has nothing to do with us (p. 72). Personal responsibility is not required as it is enough to know that you are identified and included within this domain of reference of the nation. The interesting claim is that shame may be restorative only when the shamed other can show that its failure to measure up to a social ideal is temporary (p. 76). Indeed, Ahmed (2005) notes that shame has the potential to make the nation:
By witnessing what is shameful about the past, the nation can live up to the ideals that secure its identity or being in the present.9 In other words, our shame means that we can mean well, and can work to reproduce the nation as an ideal. The transference of bad feeling to the subject in shame is only temporary, as the transference itself becomes evidence of the restoration of an identity of which we can be proud (p. 77).

A counter to this reading, however, is the example of pride and shame in present-day Germany. Until recently, a pervasive culture of shame and self-surveillance constantly threatened to destabilise any sense of unity, confidence, or positive identity. For example, there has been considerable attention in Germany devoted to the significance of the Wir-gefhl, a feeling of togetherness or unity, and euphorie that emerged during the 2006 World Cup and the wave of positive patriotism which was revived during the 2007 Handball World Championships. The intention here is not to use Ahmeds analysis to undermine the positive feelings that emerged in Germany and which seemed to surprise many Germans. Rather, Ahmed indicates that if serious restitution of the nation as ideal is the political aim, then the rhetoric needs to be matched by financial and moral reparation.

Further issues in a critical psychology of pride The desire to pass through shame (Ahmed, 2005) by demonstrating ones virtues to oneself as well as to international civil society may avoid the real, economic pain required to repair the costs of injustice (p. 82). Thus, the rhetoric of feeling and the political apologies may also need to acknowledge that resources also will establish the autonomy or provide the reparation that will
180

encourage collective pride. For Germans this seems to have emerged from taking seriously the notion of being a good European nation in everyday political life. Other concerns about low national morale are less concerned with a positive self-image for the sake of it, and more to do with using pride to encourage innovation, improve economic conditions and reduce forms of poverty that can be a breeding ground for nationalistic identities and prejudice (see Miller-Idriss, 2006). The recent euphoria in Germany is therefore very different to the situation in developing countries such as South Africa which are often not surveyed for international league tables of national pride (see Evans and Kelly, 2002). Rather, in 1994 it was reported that the anecdotal evidence is so strong that there can be no doubt that black South Africans perceived the election miracle as personal as well as collective triumph after years of oppression (Dickow and Mller, 2002, p. 178). Their more recent findings indicate that white South Africans who could not identify with national achievements in sport were amongst the least happiest individuals in the country. More importantly, the black and coloured majority appears to be experiencing the gap between the early national optimism and the current failure of genuine social and political change to address material and infrastructure problems. The World Cup in 2010 in South Africa may therefore turn out to be a good example of the manner in which being the focus of world attention and possibly sporting success addresses a binding problem within the nation without necessarily introducing new form of boundary problem (i.e.,, new conceptualizations or imaginings of a competing other or others who wish to impede the success of ones nation and thereby become temporary objects for the expression of disappointment and anger). Of much more importance is the recognition that pride created through international sporting victories is undermined by material and social inequity. This seems to be the point that Billig (1995) has made in relation to the ubiquitous discourse of us and them that we often fail to notice in everyday life. On this account, it is not any experience of a peak of national pride that will effect important personal and social changes, although things may feel different and there may be new confidence about what South Africa can collectively achieve in other forms of global competition. Rather, it is the

critical psychology

a critical psychology of pride 181

continual background flagging of nationality that recreates the boundary and surface (Ahmed, 2005) conditions that may, in future circumstances, be resisted as new connections and collective bodies are formed. Such a focus may be complemented by the exploration of how children learn the habitus of enduring dispositional connections between personal and collective pride. There are a range of practices that position children as ideal subjects for induction into the realm of the proud nation, in addition to practices which increasingly target high self-esteem as the real source of disorder (see Emler, 2001). Although such constructions can appear to be positive and progressive (e.g., not just celebrating what is unique and good about the country but also talking about how we are all different), there can also leave little room for criticism and the maintenance of other identities. With regard to the politicisation of childrens feelings and identities, very quickly children learn what not to talk about as well as which figures are regarded as appropriate local and national heroes. However, such educational practices which aim to create a positive sense of pride does not stop those same heroes being evoked towards actions that are destructive and even shameful. Moreover, the flagging of the nation in small language may not contain and control tensions between groups that claim to represent the nation and others that feel excluded from it (Billig, 1995). In Australia, for instance, the ideological complexities of distinguishing between healthy patriotism and unhealthy nationalistic love for ones country, were displayed internationally. In 2005, riots occurred in the Sydney beachside suburb of Cronulla between predominantly white residents of Cronulla and Lebanese youths who lived in surrounding suburbs and regularly visited the beach. The basis of the riots was a feeling of ownership of the beach by the Cronulla youths, and a feeling that the Lebanese youths were taking over. During the riots some of the Australian youths wore Australian flags as capes and pride was evoked to shape the nations understanding of the violence, mayhem and bad feeling produced. The explicit use of flags, media images of 100% Aussie Pride written large on the beach and talk of a battle to defend the beach in language that evoked first world war Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) myths, did not appear to reflect the range of feelings involved: excitement, anger, hatred, triumph, satisfaction, fear.
182

The riots were not just about intolerance and racial insensitivity in a neighbourhood of Sydney, which might have been treated with traditional analysis of emotional contagion, loss of individual identity and the need for restoration of control by the state. These were also events that led to international attention and feelings of embarrassment (or shame if the riots were seen as revealing something deeper about Australia). The national narrative of tolerance failed to match the reality of ethnic tensions and feelings of exclusion. Forms of analysis that can identify cultural shifts from patriotism to nationalism if collective manifestations of changing feelings are to be understood (e.g., distancing comments that they dont represent us). It is possible that forms of moral panic can occur depending upon whether negative national events register as newsworthy on CNN and BBC World. In contrast, the largely positive euphoria in Germany surrounding the 2006 World Cup also invited reflection about what this meant and how it would be viewed by national neighbours and the world (e.g., would it help or hinder the recruitment of new members by Neo-Nazi groups). Against the background of Australian race relations and failure to fully address shameful past practices, Probyn (2005) indicates how the government can assume a central role in constructionist of national feeling which manifest class divisions. Particularly, she notes that: those who disagree with aspects of the past and present government cannot admit to any national pride, and those who disparage any admission of guilt become the flag wavers of pride (Probyn, 2005, p. 46). It is not always the case that experiences of pride or shame remain fixed in the flux of possible objects of pride which include material objects, other individuals and abstract notions such as pride (balanced also by previous experiences of individual or collective shame, embarrassment or guilt). For example, the success of the Australian soccer team at the 2006 World Cup seemed to generate more genuine unity through what was then a marginal, migrant sport than any post-Cronulla political or social initiative. After the euphoria of meeting or surpassing expectations for success, of course, persistent problems can return to awareness (coupled sometimes with repression of guilty feelings about excessive nationalistic celebrations). There is considerable potential for the emotion of reaching a standard to quickly give way to the somewhat less positive emotions that involve main-

critical psychology

a critical psychology of pride 183

taining that standard. If there is the potential for pride to be taken from a treatment of past sources of shame, then there is also the possibility for pride to be found in maintaining some core of value. Historical examples of connections between pride, fear and scapegoating can serve as a useful reminder of this points, as well as suggesting the potential for a cultural history of pride. For example, in Bourkes (2005) cultural history of fear there is an account of reactions to a crowd disaster in the east end of London during an air raid in the Second World War. Bourke notes that many of the individuals refused to acknowledge that we did this to ourselves. Instead various others were blamed for the resulting deaths in a narrative that maintained a view of proud British civilian resilience.

Acknowledgement This article was completed while the author was an Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellow and guest of the Free University Berlin. Notes
1. See Sullivan and Strongman (2003) for an extended conceptual-discursive account of vacillating and mixed emotions which uses pride as an example. The analysis builds upon remarks by Wittgenstein to challenge cognitiveappraisal theories and applies these ideas to the conceptualisation of psychotherapy for borderline personality disorder. 2. However, Tracey and Robins (2004b) have argued on the basis of experiments using posed photographs that pride might still be rendered a universal emotion because there is a natural expression (i.e., expanded posture and raised arms). 3. There seem to be two major difficulties for the development of a thorough Vygotskyan or sociocultural theory of pride and self-conscious emotions. First, there is very little in Vygotskys developmental writings about feelings and emotion, although the potential is implied at the end of Thought and Language. It is important to note here, however, that the author has not read Vygotskys writings on Spinoza. Second, the research focusing on public, private and inner speech tends not to examine the crucial role of feelings and feeling language. Twos exception are work by Reissland and Harris (1991) which appears to have been ignored by cognitive and developmental psychologists. More recent work by based on Wittgenstein and Vygotsky has the potential to contribute to a new understanding which is linguistic and relational (see Carpendale and Lewis, 2004). However, such work must still include and require considerable work to be conducted around how automatic emotion reactions are private and condensed forms of previous internal and external conversations. 4. National pride is often thought to have two overlapping components: the nationalism component is regarded as a predictor of out group prejudice and can be constructed in a banal manner (Billig, 1995) whereas patriotism seems to be mostly positive and tolerates a range of feelings about other groups (de Figueiredo Jr. and Elkins, 2003). Using traditional empirical social science techniques, the latter authors concluded that while both nationalists and patriots are alike in their deep esteem for the nation, nevertheless it is the patriots who tend to be tolerant and generous towards nonnatives (p. 187). The difference, very broadly, appears to be in the way that nationalists view their country as above all others which creates the space for feelings of victimisation. 5. A further reminder of Wittgensteins (1958) relevance here is his general criticism that methods in psychology and conceptual issues of fundamental importance often pass one another by. In this case, a Wittgensteinian philosophical perspective which engages with psychological theories and

Conclusion A consistent thread in this critical psychology of pride has been individual experiences and expressions of proud feelings against the background of broader linguistic, social and cultural forces. Examples of theories and research on pride were explored in order to avoid any tendency to apply general accounts of self-conscious emotions or notions of class, race, gender and nation to an understanding of proud feelings. An initial Wittgensteinian critique of Darwinian biological and cognitive-individualistic theories was provided, and early accounts of prides embodiment were explored. Darwins elevation of shame and devaluation of pride was highlighted as a seminal point in the subsequent failure to address pride adequately in psychological theory and research. The critique of contemporary psychological studies indicated that many ignore important social, linguistic, performative and relational features of pride. Dual challenges were identified for individual and collective accounts of pride. Accounts of the individual should integrate dialogical approaches to self with recognition of embodiment that can lead to relatively automatic feelings and dispositions (i.e., reactions which have features that are difficult to control and which can also be experienced as surprising). Accounts of collective proud feelings need to highlight how self-regulation of healthy and unhealthy pride are constructed, including an analysis of the ideologies and social forces that facilitate, reinforce, undermine and reconfigure emotional experiences of us and them.
184

critical psychology

a critical psychology of pride 185

recognises important methodological limitations can do much to move forward our understanding of pride; despite claims that methods and theories inspired by realism are more likely to create insights about the real individual and collective forces responsible for particular word choices, narratives and symbols. 6. Transcript with discourse analysis notations produced from files available at http://www.usopen.com/2005/news/interviews/campbell_sun.html 7. There would appear to be considerable potential to produce a cultural and critical account of pride that examines features of the experience and expression of such collective emotions. For example, a careful examination and extension of Fredericksons (2003) broaden and build psychology theory of positive emotion. 8. In the third section of the paper, some of the issues surrounding subsequent shameful and prideful events will occur. These could be considered in quite narrow terms as the effects that sequences of major negative and positive events can have in narratives of nations for public consumption as well as how these . For example, Probyn (2005) describes the events in Australia some three years after the reports on the removal of Aboriginal children and the ongoing political and moral ramifications (described mainly as very public expressions of shame):
Not long afterward, while those feelings still simmered, the celebration of the 2000 Olympics in Sydney provided another distilled moment of public feeling. It came to a head when the Aboriginal athlete Cathy Freeman won a gold medal for the 400-meter race. As she ran her lap of honor wrapped in both the Australian and the Aboriginal flags, the nation cried with joy. (p. 6).

(Steingo, 2005), the relationship between pride and multiculturalism in Britain (Fortier, 2005), and nationalism in China (Gries, 2004) or the need for critical work on the links between patriotism and a politics of fear in US foreign policy. Moreover, the international league tables of pride give very little indication of these facts can be read (see Smith and Kim, 2006), except perhaps to indicate how normative expressions of collective national pride presently are. These international comparisons seem to mark out some nations either as lacking a national self-esteem or the confidence to compete and achieve internationally, rather than being humble or avoiding self-aggrandisement. In addition, the questions are often very simple and the standard criticisms of quantitative survey research apply: namely, what do the numbers actually mean?

References
Ahmed, S. (2005). The politics of bad feeling. Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association Journal 1: 72-85. Bem, S., and L. de Jong (2007). Theoretical issues in psychology: An introduction (2nd Ed). London: Sage. Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London: Sage. Bourke, J. (2005). Fear: A cultural history. London: Virago. Brinkman, S. (2005). Human kinds and looping effects in psychology. Foucauldian and Hermenuetic perspectives. Theory and Psychology 15: 769791. Britt, L. and Heise, D. (2000). From shame to pride in identity politics. S. Stryker, T.J. Owens, and R.W. White (eds). Self, identity, and social movements (pp. 252-268). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Buss, A.R. (1978). The structure of psychological revolutions. Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences 14: 57-64. Carpendale, J.I.M. and C. Lewis (2004). Constructing an understanding of mind: The development of childrens understanding within social interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27: 79-96. de Figueirido Jr, R.J.P and Z. Elkins (2003). Are patriots bigots? An inquiry . into the vices of in-group pride. American Journal of Political Science 47: 171188. Darwin, C. (1999). The expression of the emotions in man and animals. Introduction, afterword and commentaries by Paul Ekman (3rd ed.). London: Harper Collins. Dickow, H. and V. Mller (2002). South Africas Rainbow People, national pride and optimism: A trend study. Social Indicators Research 59: 175-202. Emler, N. (2001). Self-esteem: The costs and causes of low self-worth. York: York Publishing Services. Evans, M.D.R. and J. Kelley (2002). National pride in the developed world: Survey data from 24 nations. International Journal of Public Opinion Research 14: 303-338. Fortier, A.-M. (2005). Pride, politics and multicultural citizenship. Ethnic and Racial Studies 28: 651-654.

Several interesting points are worth making here. Cathy Freeman seemingly placed the interests of aboriginal peoples of Australia above all Australians when she ran a victory lap at the 1994 Commonwealth Games with an aboriginal flag. At the time this caused some heated reactions as well as support for her actions. 9. An important grammatical reminder here with regard to identity is that we are not only proud of ourselves or others but also proud to be a particular identity or identities. Interestingly, the tautological nature of much South African pride I am proud to be who I am which does not identify characteristics or ideals is a form of pride that seems to avoid any type of justification (Steingo, 2005). Steingo bases this analysis on a set of ideas or expressions that occur with remarkable frequency in conversation, written texts, TV and radio broadcasting (p. 198), but it is possible that this discourse is based upon a notion of the right to pride as so fundamental that no justification is required. 10. I have not written about feminist accounts of pride and shame possibly because, as Probyn (2005) implies, I have been shamed into silence. 11. It would have been possible to explore many other examples of pride. There are useful critical accounts of emerging pride in South Africa 186

critical psychology

a critical psychology of pride 187

Foucault, M. (1994). The subject and power. J.D. Faubion (ed.). Essential works of Michel Foucault 3: 326348. London: Penguin. Frederickson, B.L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist 56: 218-226. Gill, R. (1995). Relativism, reflexivity and politics: Interrogating discourse analysis from a feminist perspective. S. Wilkinson and C. Kitzinger (eds). Feminism and Discourse: 165-186. London: Sage. Gries, P H. (2004). Chinas new nationalism: Pride, politics, and diplomacy. . Berkeley: University of California Press. Harr, R. (1986). An outline of the social constructionist viewpoint. R. Harr (ed.). The social construction of emotions (pp. 2-14). Oxford: Blackwell. Henriques, J., W. Hollway, C. Urwin, C. Venn and V. Walkerdine (eds) (1984). Changing the subject: Psychology, social regulation and subjectivity. London: Methuen. Hochschild, A.R. (1990). Ideology and emotion management: A perspective and path for future research. T.D. Kemper (ed.). Research agendas in the sociology of emotions: 117-142. Albany: State University of New York Press. Lewis, M. (1999). Self-conscious emotions: Embarrassment, pride, shame, and guilt. M. L. J. M. Haviland (eds.). Handbook of emotions (2nd ed): 623-636. New York: Guilford. Mascolo, M.F. and S. Bhatia (2002). The dynamic construction of culture, self and social relations. Psychology and Developing Societies 14: 55-89. Meares, R., and G.B. Sullivan (2004). Two forms of human language. G. Williams and A. Lukin (eds.). Language development: Functional perspectives on species and individuals (pp. 182-195). Continuum: London. Miller-Idriss, C. (2006). Everyday understandings of citizenship in Germany. Citizenship Studies 10: 541-570. Parrott, W.G. (2004). Appraisal, emotion words, and the social nature of selfconscious emotions. Psychological Inquiry 15: 136-138. Probyn, E. (2000). Sporting bodies: dynamics of shame and pride. Body and Society 6: 13-28. Probyn, E. (2005). Blush: Faces of shame. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. Reissland, N., and P Harris (1991). Childrens use of display rules in pride. elicting situations. British Journal of Developmental Psychology 9: 431-435. Roberts, T-A., and Y. Arefi-Afshar (2007) Not all who stand tall are proud: Gender differences in the proprioceptive effects of upright posture. Cognition and Emotion 21: 714-727. Rodriguez Mosquera, P .M., A.S.R. Manstead, and A.H. Fischer (2000). The role of honour-related values in the elicitation, experience, and communication of pride, shame, and anger: Spain and the Netherlands compared. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 26: 833-844. Rose, N. (1996). Inventing our selves: Psychology, power, and personhood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 188

Rosenberg, M. (1990). Reflexivity and emotions. Social Psychology Quarterly 53: 3-12. Scheff, T. J. (2000). Multipersonal dialogue in consciousness: an incident in Virginia Woolf s To the Lighthouse. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7: 319. Shanker, S. G. (1993). Wittgenstein versus James and Russell on the Nature of Willing. J.V. Canfield and S.G. Shanker (eds). Wittgensteins Intentions (pp. 195-239). New York: Garland. Smith, T.W. and S. Kim, (2006). National pride in comparative perspective: 1995/96 and 2003/4. International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18: 127136. Squire, C. (2001). The public life of emotions. International Journal of Critical Psychology 1: 16-27. Steingo, G. (2005). I am proud to be South African because I am South African: reflections on white pride in post-apartheid South Africa. African Identities 3: 195-210. Sullivan, G.B. (in press). Wittgenstein and the grammar of pride: The relevance of philosophy to theories of self-conscious emotions. New Ideas in Psychology. Sullivan, G.B. and K.T. Strongman (2003). Vacillating and mixed emotions: A conceptual-discursive perspective on contemporary emotion and cognitive appraisal theories through examples of pride. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33: 203-226. Tangney, J.P J. Stuewig, D.J. Mashek (2007). Moral emotions and moral ., behaviour. Annual Review of Psychology 58: 345-372. Tracy, J.L., and R.W. Robins (2004a). Putting the self into self-conscious emotions: A theoretical model. Psychological Inquiry 15: 103-125. Tracy, J.L., and R.W. Robins (2004b). Show your pride: Evidence for a discrete emotion expression. Psychological Science 15: 194-197. Tracy, J.L., and R.W. Robins (in press). The Prototypical Pride Expression: Development of a Nonverbal Behavior Coding Scheme. Emotion. Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical investigations (G.E.M. Anscombe. [trans.]. 3rd ed). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Wittgenstein, L. (1961). Tractatus logico-philosophicus (D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness [trans.]). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Wittgenstein, L. (1978). Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds), G.E.M. Anscombe [trans.].). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

critical psychology

a critical psychology of pride 189