EN ARCHE

Indonesian Journal of Inter-Religious Studies Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012) ISSN 2088-8228

En Arche is a biannual journal published in March and September by the Student Council of ICRS-Yogya. It is dedicated to publish and disseminate research and critical thought on inter-religious studies. EDITORIAL BOARD Prof. Dr. E. Gerrit Singgih, Duta Wacana Christian University Prof. Dr. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, Duta Wacana Christian University Dr. Jeanny Dhewayani, Duta Wacana Christian University Prof. Dr. Heddy Shri Ahimsa-Putra, Gadjah Mada University Dr. Sri Margana, Gadjah Mada University Dr. Wening Udasmoro, DEA, Gadjah Mada University Siti Syamsiyatun, M.A., Ph.D., UIN Sunan Kalijaga Dr. Phil. Al Makin, M.A., UIN Sunan Kalijaga SUPERVISORY EDITOR President of Student Council of ICRS-Yogya EDITOR IN CHIEF Fransiskus Borgias M. MANAGING EDITOR Nyong ETIS LANGUAGE ADVISOR Charlotte A. Blackburn

PUBLISHER Student Council of ICRS-Yogya OFFICE ADDRESS UGM Graduate School, Third Floor Jln. Teknika Utara Pogung, Sleman, Yogyakarta Email: enarchejournal@yahoo.com Copyright 2012 by Student Council of ICRS-Yogya All rights reserved.

Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

ISSN 2088-8228

CONTENTS
Foreword Editors (pp. 1-5) Religious Education in Indonesian Laws of the National Educational System in the Old and New Order Fransiska Widyawati (pp. 6-35) The Meaning of Prince Dipanagaras Sorban and Kyai Sadrachs Iket Yahya Tirta Prewita (pp. 36-62) The Myth of Religious Tolerance during the Expansion of Islamic Kingdoms in Java: From Demak until Mataram Nyong Eka Teguh Iman Santosa (pp. 63-82) Christian-Muslim Religio-Political Tensions: The Issue of Christianization Andreas Jonathan (pp. 83-104) The Jakarta Charter and the Construction of Indonesian Identity Khairullah Zikri (pp. 105-124)

Nasakom: Soekarnos Failed Political Move Fransiskus Borgias M. (pp. 125-148) Animal Right Vs Animal Welfare: Is It Possible to Apply the Principles of Human Right to Animal? Cut Mita (pp. 149-201) Theology of Nature in the Book of Job: A Theological Reflection on Natural Disasters Lily Kadoe (pp. 202-227) Notes for Authors (pp. 228)

FOREWORD
En Arche is a journal dedicated by the Student Council of ICRS-Yogya to publish and disseminate research and critical thought on interreligious studies. En Arche means in the beginning. It envisions to develop an inter-religious aura among civil society in Indonesia. It should be realized, however, that every individual writers should responsible for the contents of their respective articles. En Arche in its second edition presents eight papers which bring various issues from different fields such as education, social spirituality, politics, religion, inter-religiuos discourse, theology, and animal rights. The first one is Fransiska Widyawatis article on religious education in Indonesia. She discusses the place of religious education in two Laws of the National Education System in 1950 promulgated during Soekarnos era (Old Order) and the one in 1989 during Soehartos era (New Order). It is a historical study on the politics of religion of Indonesian government. It compares the laws on religious education in the Old and New Older, how governments have mapped religious (education) discourses in Indonesian political sphere. It explores on socio, history and political factors that have shaped the laws and how various religious groups have used and perceived the laws. She argues that it is important to address how religion was included in those two regulations from different period. Critical debates have occurred among Indonesians concerning the issue. She identifies several paradigms on religious education circulated within the debates. The axis of the controversy is the place of the religious education in the national education system, whether it should be state-supported in public schools or trusted to private institutions. The issues on religious education in Indonesian laws of National Education System have caused a lot of tension among religious
1 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Foreword

groups and other secular groups in Indonesia, a state which is neither religious nor secular. The dynamics of state-religion relationship in Indonesian context confirms the theory that religious influences remain strong in modern era. Siska hereby argues for the urgency of strengthening inter-religious dialogue in practice as well as in the development of religious education curriculums. In his article, Yahya Tirta Prewita contemplates on the meaning of well-known head covers worn by two prominent figures for Javanese Islam and Christian in the 19th century, Prince Dipanagaras sorban and Kyai Sadrachs iket. Yahya argues that the sorban and iket are symbols which function to express certain preferences related to the wearers identity. Both Dipanegara and Sadrach had used it to demonstrate their own position. At that time, they were actually making a clear line which differed their way from the common. Dipanagaras sorban was the symbol of disapproval to follow and rebellion against the way of the ruling Dutch and their alliance of Javanese aristocrats, while Sadrachs iket was a disconnection with the hegemony of Dutchs Christian among the Javanese congregations. Here, Yahya also emphasizes the decisive role of pilgrimage in the formation of their leadership spirituality. It was this practices that made the sorban and iket were not merely a usual headcover. In the next article, Nyong ETIS tries to problematize the case of religious tolerance during the expansion of Islamic kingdoms in Java, whether the story is supported by historical records or it is a myth which is not fully right as it was told by any reasons. To recognize it he uses the rise of Islam in the period of Demak, Pajang, dan Mataram as lens. He then concludes that at that time there are historical records showing violent and bloody occurrences during the discursive process of Islamization of Java. The fourth paper brings Christian-Muslim religio-political tensions at the center of discussion. Andreas Jonathan talks about the Christian2 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Foreword

Muslim relationship in Indonesia, viewed from the religio-political perspective. He thinks that Christianization and syariah as two factors which cannot be separated in the related issue. A long history of Indonesia has shown misunderstandings around the two topics having generated prejudices or preserved them alive in the relation between both communities. There are a lot of conflicts between Christians and Muslim in Indonesia. From the list of conflicts we can conclude that there are two great problems. First, the attempt from Muslims (some party of them) to made Indonesia an Islamic country, something that considered a threat for the existence of other believers (including Christians). Second, the attempt from Christians (some parties of them) to mission and Christianization; it is considered a threat for the existence of Muslim who accustomed to think in the pattern of majority versus minority in political power. Though the tensions are still shadowing the present days of this republic and even it seems beyond our imagination, after observing some promising developments of recent inter-religious relations, Andreas still believes that, Nothing is impossible. Khairullah Zikris article discusses further Piagam Jakarta or the Jakarta Charter from Muslim perspective. He argues for the necessary of proper explanation and contextualization of the history of the omission of seven words from the charter which has provoked tensions particularly with non-Muslims parties. Zikri promotes an idea not to unlink the issue to the post-colonial context of Indonesia. The installment of those words and also the quarrel to reintroduce syariah has to be seen as a symbol of resistance against or independence from colonialism as well as an indication of the plurality of political Islam in Indonesia. For Zikri himself, the Pancasila on which Indonesia today stand for is a win-win solution. And otherwise an Islamic state, he believes that the most compatible and possible political form with Islam and for Indonesia is a modern nation-state. Zikri states that making Islam identical to the state
3 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Foreword

gives rise to the danger of corruption of both and of hampering their ability to achieve their distinct and common goals. In his paper, Fransiskus Borgias M., talks about the political movement of Soekarno at the beginning of sixties to unite the different political and ideological streams in Indonesia so that the whole energy of the nation could be allocated to the establishment of the common good of society. This is a political movement of Sukarno aimed at the unification of the country. It was designed, to quote Benedict Anderson, ... to encourage mutual trust and cooperation between the groups and parties .... It is known in an acronym, NASAKOM, stands for Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunis (Nationalism, Religion, and Communism). Actually NASAKOM is the third attempt of Sukarno to strengthen the state. The other two are his campaign to against what he called it in an acronym NEKOLIM (Neo Kolonialisme Imperialisme or Neo Colonialism Imperialism) and also his concern to made Pancasila the stronghold of Indonesian ideology. Those two points are more or less succeeded in their pursue; the previous one, NASAKOM, is failed. This article tries to answer this simple question: Why it failed? Cut Mita proposes a critical question in her paper: Is it possible to apply the principles of human right to animal? To seek for its answer, she explores a wide array of philosophical difference between those who support and those who oppose what so called animal rights and the meaning of right itself. Mita explores deeper in arguments widely circulated within ideological debates between animal rightists and animal welfarists. For the former, animals have equal rights which belong to human beings. It implies that people have no right to use non-human animals for their own purposes including food, clothing, entertainment and vivisection. While for the later, animal welfarists, people in such degree have still rights use animals for some purposes as long as respectful and ethical treatment provided.
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Foreword

In her paper, Naw Lily Kadoe presents her reflections on natural disasters by interpreting theology of nature in the Book of Job. There are different ways of attitudes of the people in responding natural disasters and sufferings that can be explored from this study. These differences include those who became the victims as well as who did not. Lily Kadoe affirms that the Book of Jobs teachings enable us to see alternative perspective in dealing with the nature. It suggests a new mode of thinking of the nature, from anthropocentric to ecotheocentric. Here, the author reminds us about rapid ecological changes in our era and also supports the need of reinterpretation of the traditional theology of nature. She also argues that disasters are natural, not Gods intervention, but God of nature is also suffering with the victims. That is why, for Lily, Christians should put the issues of ecological deterioration in their mission agenda. Editors

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RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN INDONESIAN LAWS OF THE NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE OLD AND NEW ORDER
Fransiska Widyawati
STKIP St. Paulus, Ruteng, Manggarai, Flores, East Nusa Tenggara

6 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

Introduction and the Focus of Study Indonesia is neither a religious nor a secular state. It is religiously non-aligned, Donald K. Emerson labels it a nonconfessional state1, but it is based on religious fundamentals as indicated by the first principle of Pancasila, the Indonesian national foundational ideology, The Great Unity of Deity (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa). By inserting this first principle, religion becomes an important issue in Indonesian state discourse. Secularization theory which predicted that the role of religion will disappear from the public sphere as modernization grows is not altogether true in the case of the Indonesian context. Since the preindependence period religion has become an important and crucial issue in modern Indonesian state history. Almost in Indonesian socio, cultural and political discourse, issues about religion become a point of reference. Jos Cassanova, one of the theorists, for instance, postulates that religion will increasingly become privatized, marginalized and politically irrelevant.2 Western social theorists, mostly influenced by Max Webers thought, presume that modernization increases rationalization, secularization, and disillusionment within the spiritual realm.3 But, the empirical facts of more religion through recent decades have borne witness to the global presence of religion in the public arena, as in Indonesia. Peter Berger identifies it as the phenomenon of de-secularization of the

Donald K. Emerson, Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and Cultural politics (Itacha and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 2. 2 Jos Cassanova, Public Religion in the Modern World (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 3-6. 3 Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities and State Development in Indonesia (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 39. 7 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

world. He rejects the idea that modernization leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals.4 In Indonesian history of struggle toward the independence, religion has been forced to play a role in the public sphere, especially in providing the backbone for the character of nation-building and national development.5 For instance, during the Soekarno period, religion played a part in the revolution and nation-building as well as in the ideology of NASAKOM (Nasionalisme, Agama dan Komunisme: Nationalism, Religion and Communism). Religion was used as a protective shield against the dangers of neocolonialism and imperialism. In 1968, Soeharto was inaugurated as the second president. It was the year after the most tremendous events, the G 30 S/PKI movement and the massacre. Almost every single thing changed drastically after those events, in particular, religious matters. Early of his presidency, Soeharto used religion as a shield to combat communism. During the second decade of his rule, religion functioned to strengthen the governments development program, which was embodied in PELITA (Five Years Development). Religion was also embodied in marriage, inter-religious relationship laws, and as well as education, the focus of this study. 6 This research is devoted to studying the place of religious education in two Laws of the National Education System in 1950 and 1989. The first was promulgated during Soekarnoss era and the last during Soehartos era. The major questions to be answered in this study are: What was the place of religious education in those National Education Systems? How and why were they created? What
4

Peter L. Berger, Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview, in Desecularization of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics, edited by Peter L. Berger (USA, 1999), 2-3. 5 Moch. Nur Ichwan, Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia (1966-2004), 2. 6 Ibid., 5-8. 8 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

were the backgrounds? What were the differences between each law? All of these discussions are related to the complex dynamics of Indonesian sociopolitical processes. Therefore, it is important to address the question of the changes over time of the socio politics between the two governments to see how religion was included. This article is divided into four parts. The first part consists of the introduction, in which the background, focus and research questions are described. The second part concentrates on the first the Law of National Education System in 1950, which was promulgated during Soekarnos period. The third part examines the New Orders Law of the National Education System and its background, and the fourth part draws a conclusion. Religious Education in the Law of National Education System No. 4/1950 juncto No. 12/1954 The constitutional basis of the national education system of Indonesia is the 1945 Constitution, article 31: Every citizen has the right to obtain an education (verse 1) and The government will undertake efforts to organize a national education system in accordance with the laws (verse 2). The inclusion of religious education is constructed on the first principle of the Pancasila and article 29 of the 1945 Constitution which states, The basis of the state is belief in One Supreme God (verse 1) and verse 2, The state guarantees the freedom of every citizen to adhere to any religion and to conduct their devotions according to his/her religion. The Ministry of Education and Culture7 is responsible for administering all educational matters and the Ministry of Religious Affairs is for
7

There have been several different names for the Ministry of Education such as The Ministry of Instruction, the Ministry of Education, Instruction and Culture, the Ministry of National Education, and the Ministry of Education and Culture. This paper often uses The Ministry of Education. 9 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

religious matters. Thus, religious education is administered by both of them. This fact is the basis of the controversial nature concerning the place of the religious education in the national educational system, the debate between the supporters of state-supported religious education and their opponents who promotes secular education. The first Indonesian Law on the National Education System was enacted in 1950 (No. 4/1950), but due to national political instability and other considerations, it wasnt legally applied until four years later, in 1954 with a new name, the 1954 Law of National Education System (No. 12/1954). Even though there were two laws, they were the same. This law was withdrawn in 1989, when a new law promulgated by the New Order government. Before describing and analyzing this law, this paper will present the broader background, the context, and the fundamental questions behind the issues. Understanding the place of religious education in that law requires an examination of at least these two important things: First, the early discussion of the place of religious education in the polemics rising long before, around and after the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945; Second, Soekarnos religious political orientation in broader-spectrum. Religious education had been taught at religious schools for a long time and even the earliest schools in Indonesia were religious schools, which developed to spread religion and its teachings. For instance, the pesantren and madrasah, Islamic schools and boarding houses to study the AlQuran, have existed since the coming of Islam to Indonesia.8 There were very old Zending schools in Minahasa and

Husni Rahim, Corak dan Ragam Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia: Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Lembaga Pendidikan Islam, in On the Edge of Many Worlds, edited by Freek L. Bakker & Jan Sihar Aritonang (Zoetermeer: Uitverij Meninema, 2006), 13. 10 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

Mollucas.9 From the beginning, the expansion of Catholic missions formerly has been in the education field. There are among the missionary congregations entering Indonesia who specialized in education. The Catholic schools laid the foundation of a Catholic intelligentsia.10 To deal with religious affairs in education field, at the institutional level, the Dutch established the Ministry for Education and Devotion (Departement van Onderwijs, Eeredienst en Nijverheit). Despite its general name, it dealt mostly with the European and Protestant Schools, later the Catholics and some Muslim schools, in particular those formulated on European model.11 The Departement van Onderwijs, Eeredienst en Nijverheit was the basic inspiration of the establishment of the two separated ministries, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in independent Indonesia which together endeavor on religious education system. At the beginning of the Dutch colony, religious education (read: Christian) had a specific place in their national education system. Verse 75 of the School Regulation (School-reglement) underlined the goal of the education which was to strengthen students belief in God, to teach the student a basic knowledge of Christianity, to encourage them to sing, to go to church and to read catechism.12 The states policy changed drastically in early 19th century. In 1870 the government issued a new regulation: there might be a uniform system of education for all of the Dutch colony; Malay and
9

Karel Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah, translated by Abdurrahman and K. Steenbrink (Jakarta: LP3ES), 3-4. 10 Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel Steenbrink (eds.), A History of Christianity in Indonesia (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2008), 166. 11 Ibid., 27-28. 12 Makmur Djohan et al., Sejarah Pendidikan di Indonesia Zaman Penjajahan (Jakarta: Depdikbud Ditjen Kebudayaan, 1993), 12-13. 11 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

local language could be used as medium of instruction; It was forbidden to teach religious education at all state schools or private schools which received subsidies from the government; and a society had to participate in developing education by an obligation to pay the school fee.13 Actually, separation between religion and state, or religious neutrality, was based on the spirit of Enlightenment era in Europe. For the case of the Dutch, conquering a region which was inhabited by a large number of Muslim, they had to deal with a question about state and religion relationship. According to Regeeringsreglement number 119, the policy on religious was basically neutral; it did not allow religious intervention in a matter of the governance and vice versa.14 According to some scholars, even though officially the religious neutrality was the basic formulation, the fact there was a religiously engaged policy, which cannot be disassociated from the Christianization (mainly Protestant) politics. While the government concerned more on Christianity, the Muslim political movement grew stronger in the 1920s which determined political policy direction on education as well as in other fields in the future of new Indonesia.15 During three years of its occupation, questions about religion and state relationship and how it dealt with education system were also faced by the Japan. The Shmubu, the Religious Affairs of Japan, was a government official institution for dealing with religious matter. Unlike the Dutch, the Japan took a side of Islam in order to mobilize Muslim in its wars effort. Some of the Shmubu members were the Muslim ulamas. Steenbrink believes that it was the Shmubu that became a core for the future Ministry of Religious

13

Jan S. Aritonang, Sejarah Pendidikan Kristen di Tanah Batak (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia), 137. 14 Ichwan, Official Reform of Islam, 25-26. 15 Ibid. 26-27. 12 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

Affairs of Indonesia.16 Since the Japans concerned mainly on war and military matters, religion and politics were seen as social forces which had to be made to fit the general goal of promoting their victory in the war.17 At the beginning of 1944, the discussion of the place of religion in the future independent state intensified. During the constitutional debate in May to June 1945, the Indonesian founding fathers had seriously discussed about the position of religion in our constitution. In dealing with the two conflicting ideologies, the solution offered by the Pancasila is that Indonesia would be neither a secular state, nor a religious one. Non secular means that Indonesian refused to absolutely separate religion from the state. And non religion based means that no one religion would be a fundamental base of the state ideology. The state does not refer to one single religion. Or in other word, both Pancasila and secularization as differentiation allow us to avoid choosing between a secular state and a narrowly religious state.18 On October 1944, the Japan government announced the establishment of the Investigating Body for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUKI, Badan Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) which replaced by the Preparatory Committee for Independence Indonesia (PPKI, Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia). These bodies were responsible for determining the concrete tasks to prepare a new Indonesian. The establishment of the Ministries of Education and Religious Affair was an important issue.

16 17

Steenbrink, Pesantren, 84. Ibid., 32. 18 Benyamin Fleming Intan, Public Religion and the Pancasila-Based State of Indonesia: An Ethical and Sociological Analysis, AUS (American University Study), Series VII, in Theology and Religion, Vol. 238, 18. 13 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

On 19 August 1945, the PPKI suggested establishing of the Ministry of Religious Affair, but Latuharhary, one of the PPKI members, objected with an argument that this issue might give rise to feelings of offence and dislike. He suggested that religious affairs should be handled by the Ministry of Education. This suggestion was supported even by certain members from Islamic faction, so the proposal was suspended. But when this proposal was repeated during the session of KNIP on November 24-28, 1945, it received a positive response so that on January 3, 1946 this ministry was set up, although it raised some criticism, with K.H. Rasjidi as the first minister.19 The Ministry of Instructional (Kementerian Pengajaran) was established earlier, with Ki Hadjar Dewantara as the first minister.20 These two ministries together with several committees had endeavored for five years before a new first law on National Education System promulgated in 1950 which named as the Law of National Education System No. 4/1950. The Law consisted of 17 chapters and 30 verses. H. A. R. Tilaar, an Indonesian educational observer, notes that before this Law was enacted there were seven previous controversy meetings about some specific issues mainly about the place of religious education at school. They questioned on what consideration should be followed by school to teach religious education to students, whether to consider on their age or their intellectual ability. Can students determine themselves in joining religious education class? Who should responsible for their religious education? Should the students join the religious education class? Should the characteristic of the religious education as well as the
19 20

Aritonang and Steenbrink, A History of Christianity, 190. Anhar Gonggong (ed.), Sejarah Pendidikan di Indonesia Zaman Kemerdekaan (1945-1966) (Jakarta: DepDikBud, 1993), 8. See also Sartono Kartodirdjo et al., Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, Vol. VI (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1997), 265. 14 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

credits hour of the course determined and regulated by the government? Should the students mark on religious education determine them to get remove to a higher grade?21 Those questions, in fact, were also related to issue about Christian-Muslim relationship. Until the beginning of 20th century, in fact, most of the precious and on the top grade schools were private (particular) schools which held by the Christian foundation (Catholic and Protestant). The students were not merely the Christians, but also Muslims which regularly followed Christian religious education class after their parents signed a letter of agreement. Some Muslims group did not agree if the Muslim students who entered Christian schools should study Christian religious education. As Karel Streenbrink argues that the Christian-Muslim relationship had not been smooth since their first meeting in the colonialism period.22 Beside the Muslim-Christian relationship issue, the questions were also connected to Islamic schools such as pesantren and madrasah, whether those schools should be integrated into national education system or not.23 After the independence, the Central National Indonesian Body of Work Committee (BPKNIP, Badan Pekerja Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat) proposed some suggestions to the Ministry of Education such as: religious education should have a specific place on the educational system; the government must give much attention to it; the government should provide specific attention and

21

H. A. R. Tilaar, Lima Puluh Tahun Pembangunan Pendidikan Nasional 1945-1995: Suatu Analisa Kebijakan (Jakarta: Grasindo), 71-76. 22 The Relationship between Muslim and Christian can be read in Karel Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and Islam in Indonesia: Conflict and Contact. 23 Husni Rahim, Corak dan Ragam Pendidikan, 140. 15 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

financial supporting to the madrasah and pesantren (Islamic schools and boarding houses).24 On December 29, 1945 the Ministry of Instruction established the Panitia Penyelidik Pendidikan (Investigating Committee on Education). Those suggestions were taken seriously by the Ministry of Education. The committee discussed intensively the issue and sent several suggestions to the minister. On the point about religious education they proposed: 1). Religious education in all schools is taught during school-time, 2). Religious education teachers are paid by the government, 3). In primary schools, religious education is taught from grade four, 4). Religious education is given once a week on a specific time, 5). The teachers are appointed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 6). The teachers must also be qualified in secular education; 7). The government should provide teaching materials for religious education, 8). The government should provide special training for teachers of religious education, 9). The quality of the pesantren and madrasah should be enhanced, 10). Arabic language is not essential.25 On the first curriculum done by the government, the 1946 curriculum for the Junior High School, the religious education was listed as one course which should be given in two hour a week.26 On December 1946, the Ministry of Education, Instruction and Culture and the Ministry of Religious Affairs declared a Joint Regulation (Perber, Peraturan Bersama) which stated that religious education should be given from four to six grade of Primary School (Sekolah Rakyat), while in fact the Islamic schools outside of Java and

24

Rendja Mudyaharjo, Pengantar Pendidikan, Sebuah Studi Awal tentang Dasar-dasar Pendidikan pada Umumnya dan Pendidikan di Indonesia (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2002), 373-374. 25 Soegarda Peorbakawatja, Pendidikan dalam Alam Indonesia Merdeka (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1970), 38-41. 26 Mudyaharjo, Pengantar Pendidikan, 373-374. 16 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

the Christian schools had already taught the course since grade one.27 In 1947, the government established the Majelis Pertimbangan Pengajaran Agama (Religious Instruction Council), with Ki Hajar Dewantara as a representative of the Ministry of Education, Instruction and Culture and Prof. Dr. Abudullah Sigit as a representative of the Ministry of Religion Affairs. This council had to regulate the material of religious education at school, and its operational system.28 For Christian schools, since they had already had their own hierarchy and experts in religious education, they were free to design their own materials. By this regulation, it seems that the material instructional became centralized, in particular to Islamic schools. 29 According to Karel Steenbrink, in practice this regulation then included the Islam, Christian (read: Protestant), and Catholic, and later Hindu since 1960.30 After long controversy, on April 4, 1950 the Law of National Education System was promulgated in Yogyakarta, the capital of the RIS (Republik Indonesia Serikat, United Republic of Indonesian).31 It consisted of 17 chapters and 30 articles. Article 20 stated that a) Religious instruction should be given in public schools; parents have right to decide whether or not their children will participate; b) The way religious instruction is provided in public schools is under the guidance of the Minister of Education, Instruction and Culture, and

27

H. A. Mustafa and Aly Abdullah, Sejarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia (Bandung: Pustaka Setia), 124. 28 Iskandar Wiryokususma and Usman Mulyadi, Dasar-dasar Pengembangan Kurikulum (Jakarta: PT. Bina Aksara, 1988), 383-385. 29 Steenbrink, Pesantren, 93. 30 Ibid. 31 Mudyaharjo, Pengantar Pendidikan, 370. 17 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

the Minister of Religious Affairs.32 Article 13 no. 1 and 2 stated about private school: in the name of citizens freedom of religion and their beliefs, it is open to establish and develop a private school (1), and It will be regulated by the laws (2).33 A more concrete and operational regulations about religious education matters which stated on the Law was then regulated through a Joint Regulation between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (no. 1432/Bab and no. K.I./651) which was enacted on January 1951. It was then revised on a new Joint Regulation, No. 17678/Kab and K.I./9180, on July 16, 1951. 34 The Joint Regulation regulated, for instance, these things: 1) Religious education would be taught from grade one of Primary School (Sekolah Rakyat); 2) For the region in which the religious environment was very strong (such as Kalimantan, Sumatra, etc), religious education could be given from grade one, but the school has to guarantee that the quality of other course is not less than other schools quality where religious education is taught from grade one; 3) At Junior High School (SMP) and Senior High School (SMA), religious education is taught in two hours a week; 4) Religious education can be taught for children in a class that has at least 10 pupils if their parents give them permission to participate; 5) The religious education teacher will be appointed and paid by the Ministry of Religious Affair.35

32

Arief Furchan, Developing Pancasilaist Muslims: Islamic Religious Education in Public Shcools in Indonesia (Jakarta: Logos, 2002), 99. 33 Abd. Rachman Assegaf, Politik Pendidikan Nasional: Pergeseran Kebijakan Pendidikan Agama Islam dari Praproklamasi ke Reformasi (Yogyakarta: Kurnia Kalam), 69. 34 Gonggong, Sejaran Pendidikan, 8. 35 Mustafa and Abdullah, Sejarah Pendidikan Islam, 124-125. 18 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

This Joint Regulation was protested by some Pesantrens because it was seen as a discriminative regulation.36 A new Joint Regulation then was promulgated. There were several changes in that new regulation: 1) Religious education is taught at all schools from Primary to Senior High School; 2) At Primary School it is taught from grade four in two hours a week; 3) At a specific place, religious education can be taught from grade one. The school can add the credits but not more than four hours a week. The school has to guarantee that the quality of other course is not less than other schools quality; 4) At Junior and Senior High School, both in general and vocational school, religious education is taught two hours a week; 5) Religious education should be taught according to the students religion; 6) Religious education can be taught if the number of pupils who have a same religion not least than ten; 7) The student who has different religion may leave the class if their parents do not give them permission to join the class, even though they have a same religion. 37 All of those Joint Regulations were under the umbrella of the Law no. 4/1950 of National Educational System. This Law was valid only in Yogyakarta during the period of the United Republic of Indonesia (RIS, Republik Indonesia Serikat). It was then reemphasized and reinforced four years latter by Law no. 12/1954. This law covered the whole territory of the Republic Indonesia. Since Soekarno enacted a decree of President on July 5, 1959 to return to 1945 Constitution, the Old Orders political orientation changed relatively smooth, as Benedict Anderson argues, from parliamentary to Guided Democracy, the Manipol Usdek (Politics Manifest, and 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, and Indonesian Personality), and the NASAKOM

36 37

Steenbrink, Pesantren, 93. Mustafa and Abdullah, Sejarah Pendidikan Islam, 125. 19 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

(Nationalism, Religious and Communism).38 Even though this change gave impact to education political orientation as well as religious education position on the system, but the Law of the National Education System No. 4/1950 juncto No. 12/1954 still became an umbrella to regulate education and religious education in this country until 1989. It was then withdrawn in 1989, when a new law promulgated by the New Order government as will be described on the next part. The Law of National Education System No. 2/1989 Following the great developments after more than twenty five years being under one law umbrella, the first Law of the National Education System was rendered irrelevant and out of dated. In early 1980s, the government invited the Ministry of Education to think about a new law. It took about five years to get an agreement to the one law. Then, on March 27, 1989, the government promulgated the law which was named as The Law of National Education System No. 2/1989. To understand religious education place in this law, it is important to understand the socio political context before Soeharto was inaugurated as the President, in particular the G 30 S/PKI, the Gestapu movement and the massacre in 1965-1966, as well as the whole socio, religious and political orientation of the New Order. It is not the purpose of this study to explore on the G 30 S/PKI event exclusively but provides insight into the challenged faced by Indonesian regarding to religious issue in general, and religious education in particular. The year of 1965 was an unforgettable year for Indonesia as it marked the peak and the fall of the Communist Party and its abortive coup. According to Robert Hefner, the event of
38

Benedict Anderson, Language and Power (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1990), 106-107. 20 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

1965-1966 had changed everything in the nations politics.39 The communism/PKI was banned and destroyed. Its members were identified as atheists, anti-religion and immoral. Regimes strategies appeared to organized religion as a ground for public morality, and a solution to communism, and a shield against Western liberalism.40 The event of 1965-1966 forced Indonesian, both personally and communally (social, religious, cultural and political groups) to question about their political and social identity. For instance, the event inflicted on Indonesian society was challenged into the wave of religious conversion which followed them. Since 1966, the government has insisted that all Indonesian must believe in one God and adhere to a religion, so they cannot be identified as an atheist which was seen as linked to communism.41 Avery T. Willis reports on his book that in around six years after the massacre, an estimated 2.8 million people converted to Christianity (both Catholicism and Protestantism), predominantly in Java, Timor and North Sumatra.42 Significant numbers of people in Java converted to Hinduism during the same period.43 Thus, it is understandable if the Law of National Education set the religious education as a strict obligation for all Indonesian students.

39

Robert W. Hefner, Politics and Social Identity: The 1965-1966 Violence and its Aftermath, in The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretative History (Victoria: Aristoc Press Pty. Ltd., 1990), 58. 40 Ibid., 59. 41 Robert Cribb, The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies for Java and Bali (Victoria: Monash University, 1990), 40. 42 Avery T. Willis, Indonesian Revival: Why Two Million Came to Christ (South Pasadena: William Carey Library, 1997). See also Frank L. Cooley, Indonesia: Church and Society (New York: Friendship Press, 1968), 6-7. 43 M. L. Lyon, The Hindu Revival in Java: Politics and Religious Identity in Indonesia: The Making of Culture, edited by J. J. Fox (Canberra: Australian National University, 1980), 205-220. 21 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

In order to eliminate the Communism and its latent threat (bahaya laten), the government strengthened the presence of religious education in both public and private schools. It was based on the argumentation that Communism was basically anti-religious; its influence would be best eliminated through religious education for younger generation. On a part about Religion, Education and Culture article 1 of the TAP MPRS No. XXII/MPRS/1966, the MPR stated that It is decided that religious education is a required course for the students of Primary School up to public University44 It means that the religious education position became stronger in the national educational system. Following this TAP MPRS, which formulated mainly to respond the communism movement, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs issued a Joint Regulation on October 23, 1967 stipulating that religious education should be given in grades one (I) and two (II) of public primary schools for two hours a week, grade three (III) three hours a week, grades four-six (IV-VI) and Junior and Senior High Schools four hours a week, and university two hours a week. 45 In 1970, the Ministry of Religious Affairs suggested to rise the instruction time of religious education in certain grades of primary, junior and senior high schools up to six hours a week. It was rejected by the Ministry of Education. According to Karel Steenbrink, it shows that the Ministry of Religious Affair consistently developed religious education at school.46 Besides insisting religious education on formal education level as a way to fight against the latent danger of communism, a slogan which constantly be emphasized after the G 30 S/PKI movement, the New Order set a new obligatory course which should be given at all schools, that was PSPB, Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa (the
44 45

Mustafa and Abdullah, Sejarah Pendidikan Islam, 125. Ibid. 46 Steenbrink, Pesantren, 94. 22 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

History of the National Struggle). It was distinguished from the historical subject that had already existed.47 According to David Bourchier, PSPB was introduced as part of the broader framework of ideological education and this sense is more closely allied to the Pancasila education such as PMP and P4.48 One of the goals of education is to extend and develop the spirit and values of 1945 to younger generation. Throughout the PSPB, rather than learning the history, the main purpose of PSPB was to flame up the students spirit and awareness on heroism, bravery and willingness to sacrifice to and for the sake of the state.49 The course presented the Soehartos profile strongly as a hero of the Struggle War (Perang Mempertahankan Kemerdekaan) and the coup de tat of G 30 S/PKI. It also emphasized the role of the Pancasila, in particular the first principle, and the role of religion to war against the enemies of the state and the Pancasila, which were defined as communism and other anti-Pancasila attitudes. After three years of his presidency, Soeharto started to concentrate on national development program. The government formulated the national development program on the GBHN (Grand National Guidelines) and the Long Term Development (PJP, Pembangungan Jangka Panjang) which covering 25 years. Each PJP divided into five PELITAs (Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Five Years Development). The first PJP and PELITA started in 1969. Every single element in the country was expected to contribute to national development including religious education. That is why the 1989 Law of National Education should be understood in this context.
47

H. M. Arifin, Kapita Selekta Pendidikan, Islam dan Umum (Jakarta: Bumi Aksara, 2002), 231-232. 48 David Bourchier, The 1950s in the New Order Ideology and Politics, in Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s, edited by David Borchier and John Legge (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University), 51. 49 Ibid., 51-53. 23 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

The aims of the national education according to the PELITA I (1969-1973) were producing man power, creating a more rational and democratic society, developing technical and vocational secondary schools, in particular the agriculture, improving teaching methods, eliminating illiteracy, and developing educational research. Each of these goals touched upon development issues.50 After the 1971 General Election, the MPR (General Representative Council) declared the Tap MPRRI No. IV/MPR/1973. On the education component, there were several statements: 1) Education is a long life consciousness effort to develop ones personality and capability both within and out of school. 2). The development on education field is based on the Pancasila as the states ideology. It is directed to form the Pancasilaist developmentminded people, and to form Indonesian modern people who physically and mentally health, who have good knowledge and skill, who can create democratic and tolerant society, who are smart, who are good in moral and behavior, and who love her/his state as well as other people as stated in the 1945 Constitution. Based on that TAP MPR, the government completed the 1974 curriculum for Primary, Junior and Senior High School. Religious education has a specific place on it.51 Since 1970s, the government has seriously thought to change the old Law of National Education System (1954) which was considered irrelevant and out of dated. But like the first law, there were solemn debate and conflict in formulating it, in particular to the matter of religious education. A long and hard controversy, for instance, happened during a meeting of the Peoples Consultative Body (MPR) in 1973. The Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Faction) demanded that religious education should be
50

H. A. R. Tilaar, Pendidikan dalam Pembangunan Nasional Menyongsong Abad XXI (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1999), 143. 51 Mudyaharjo, Pengantar Pendidikan, 434-435. 24 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

maintained as a required subject in public schools, while The Fraksi Karya Pembangunan (the Golkar faction), conversely, opposed the idea on the ground that religious is a private matter. The meeting reached a deadlock. Soeharto then cut it and issued Presidential Instruction no. 15/1974 which strengthened religious education for Indonesian students to build better Indonesian development man.52 Religious education, thus, was to support the government program on development. According to the 1983 GBHN, National education is based on the Pancasila, with the purpose of enhancing devotion to One Almighty God, intelligence, and skills, raising morality, strengthening character, the spirit of nationalism and love of the motherland, in order to create development-minded persons capable of improving themselves and being responsible for the development of the nation53 The words enhancing devotion to the One Almighty God was a sign to the state to obligate itself by law to provide religious education in public schools. In early 1985, the government suggested having comparative study of religion into the national Senior High School curriculum, but some Muslim rejected the idea because they thought that it could weaken students faith.54 In May 1988 Fuad Hasan, the Minister of Education and Culture, presented a revised draft of a Law of the National Education System, which actually had been formulated five years earlier. It had survived three changes of minister. Like the first law, it contained a classical controversial issues concerning religious education. One of
52 53

Ichwan, Official Reform of Islam, 142-143. Ibid., 141-142. 54 Kautsar Azhari Noer, Pluralisme dan Pendidikan di Indonesia: Menggugat Ketidakberdayaan Sistem Pendidikan Agama, in Th. Sumarthana, Pluralisme, Konflik dan Pendidikan Agama di Indonesia (Yogyakarya: DIANInterfidei), 237. 25 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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the main issues was whether and how far this law gave a place to religious education and how far the government had authority to regulate this matter. The basic problem was whether the students who studied in a private school run by a religious-background institution were entitled to get religious education according to their religion. From the perspective of some Christians, as Aritonang reports, in more concretely, actually they debated this question: Are the Muslim students entitled to get Islamic religious education in a Christian school? This based on the social fact that many Muslim students parents sent their children to have an education in Christian schools which are considered as favorite and top grade schools, but in contrary, it is very seldom for the Christian students to study at Islamic school, except at a university. If the question answer is yes, does a Christian school have an obligation to provide Islamic (or other religious) religious education according to their religion in their curriculum, during school time, and the teachers together with equipment, for instance, a special prayer room? If they should do it, it seems that, is it not contrary to the characteristic and the goal of the Christian schools? 55 Islamic political party, the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party) and Islamic organizations such as Badan Kerja Sama Pondok Pesantren (BKSPP, Pondok Pesantren Network Body), Yayasan Pondok Pesantren Indonesia (YPPI, the Foundation of Indonesian Pondok Pesantren), Muhhamadiah, NU, MUI, DI, al-Jamaitul Washliyah, HMI, Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), Gabungan Usaha Pembaharuan Pendidikan Islam (GUPPI), and Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiah (PERTI) rejected the draft. They argued that the draft contained several controversial issues: it did not mention an obligation to provide religious education in public schools; it did not recognize a freedom to establish private educational institutions including religious ones; it omitted the word
55

Aritonang and Steenbrink, A History of Christianity, 215. 26 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

believe (beriman) in wording of GBHN Beriman dan bertaqwa kepada Tuhan yang Mahaesa (believe in and devotion to One Almighty God); it mentioned punishment for the schools which incapable in providing proper educational facilities such as library, namely a years imprisonment or a fine of Rp 10 million, while in fact, most Islamic schools were poor; it allowed the government too much freedom to create Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation) that could abuse certain ambiguous and non-operational articles in the draft law.56 Most Muslim leaders suspected that the draft law was to eliminate the role of religious education at schools. They criticized the draft law using the words as secular, unbelief, deIslamization, and religiously dry.57 After a heated and hard debate in parliament, Soeharto gave a positive signal to support the last draft. It was then enacted as Law No. 2/1989 on National Education System. On the study of the role of Muslim leaders in endorsing the law, as argued by Muhammad Sirozi, this law was seen as a reflection of the government willingness to accommodate Muslim demands for Islamic education. 58 Article 4 of the Law stated about national education objection: The aim of national education is to develop the intellectual life of the nation and to develop rounded Indonesian human beings, namely, people with a belief in and devotion to One Almighty God; people of impeccable character, blessed with knowledge, skill and personality; people who could act independently and posses a sense of personality for the welfare of the society and the nation.59

56 57

Ichwan, Official Reform of Islam, 144-145. Ibid. 58 Muhammad Sirozi, Politik Kebijaksanaan Pendidikan di Indonesia: Peran Tokoh-tokoh Islam dalam Penyusunan UU No. 2/1989 (Jakarta: INIS, 2004). 59 Downloaded from www.depdiknas.go.id/inlink.php?to=uusisdiknas. 27 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Article 11:6 defined religious education as an education aiming to prepare students to be able to play a role on a field in which special knowledge about related religious teaching is required. Religious education was considered to be one of the recognized types of education, the others being general education, vocational education, disability education, official education, academic education and professional education (Article 11:1). The Law recognized cogently religious education as a sub-system of the national education system. It also maintained and justified religious education in the school from primary up to university both in public and private school (Article 39:2). On the point about religious education teacher, she/he should have the same religion with the students. Thus, students had a right to a religious education according to their own faith, and taught by teachers of the same religion.60 The elucidation (penjelasan) of the Law article 39:2 stated that: Religious education constitutes an effort to strengthen belief in and devotion to One Almighty God according to the religious education of the students, taking into consideration the demand to honor other religions in the context of interreligious relations in society for the sake of national unity.61 A teacher of religious education should profess a religious which is the same as the religion being instructed and is the same religion of the students in question. (Elucidation of Article 28:2). 62 There were two different reaction to the Law; some groups saw it as a good Law because the personal right of a student to have religious education based on their own religion was acknowledged;
60 61

Ibid. Ibid. 62 Ibid. 28 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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while conversely, other saw it as a pillarization which isolated one to another because of their religious diversity. This Law was rejected by private (Christian) schools with a religious base, because they are arguing that they cannot provide five religious teachers to teach as well as other facilities such as a room to pray at their school due to financial inadequacy and to the schools vision and mission. Thus, they refused to teach other religious education but the Christian.63 Because of this refusal, for instance, in 2001, the head of provincial office of the education department of Yogyakarta refused to sign the students certificate that already passed the examination if they did not have a score for their religion. It involved, in particular, the Muslim students who studied in Christian (Protestant and Catholic) schools. 64 In response to the Law, one another example, instead of providing religious education based on all religions, the Archdiocese of Semarang saw a challenge to create a new alternative curriculum for religious education, which no longer exclusively Catholic, but a more general education on ethics, moral and societal aspect of religions. It was a pendidikan religiusitas not a pendidikan agama. It aims to encourage students to live together peacefully and responsibly in pluralistic society and to respect the differences of each other as grace from God. 65

63

Kees de Jong, Inter-religious Relations in Present Indonesia: In between Good Corporation and Pilarization, in On the Edge of Many Worlds, edited by Freek L. Bakker and Jihar S. Aritonang, 172. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 29 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

Syamsul Maarif, one of Muslim leader argued that this Law did not give a dialogical room for the pupils. The Law tends to separate people based on their religion, rather than to unite them.66 During the Soeharto era, even though the controversy around the Law had been continuing, the Law was still used until the end of the New Order era. Following the tremendous development after the fall of Soeharto, the Law No. 2/1989 was considered irrelevant. As a result, a new law on national education system was enacted in 2003. But, likewise other Laws, the process of producing and enacting the Law was colored by long and hard controversy and demonstration, again, concerning religious education. Conclusion As a closing remark, some important points will be figured out. First, there are several paradigms on religious education. All of them based, generally, on the state-religion types of relationship, which mentioned by Max Weber as ideal types. Ideal types are abstractions of significant features of historical phenomena that help in the explanation of less clearly defined, and variable social phenomena. The categories employed here are ideal types and not generalizations from social-political realities.67 The first is an exclusive and isolated religious education in which only a single variant of religion can be taught at schools. It is the religion of the state. Saudi Arabia is as an example which is based on Islam and proscribes other. The second paradigm is no religious education at all. Communist state enacts this paradigm in which bans, or at least very severely restricts religion. The third paradigm
66

Syamsul Maarif, Pendidikan Pluralisme di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Logung Pustakan, 2005), 117. 67 Mark Woodward, StateReligion Relation in Indonesia: A Comparative Perspective, in www. Icrs.ugm.ac.id. 30 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiska Widyawati

can be seen in the United States, France and other secular countries where religion (and religious education) is not a matter of public. It is a private business. It means that religious education cannot be taught at public schools. People who want to have a religious education may learn it from private or religious school and institution. The state does not control its system. State-religion relations in Indonesia are extremely complex. Indonesia is a pluralist society characterized by ethnic and religious diversity. The Indonesian Constitution recognizes five (later on six) official religions. Its motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) and the states ideology, the Pancasila (The Five Principles) promotes religious harmony and freedom. The diversity is not only in a number of religions but even one same religion has many faces, which occasionally opposites each other. State-religion relations in Indonesia are derived from a fundamental compromise made in the earliest days of the republic. Indonesian society has not witnessed anything like the degree of secularization western societies have. But at the same time, the privatization of religion characteristic of western democracies has not occurred. By choosing Pancasila as the ideology, Indonesia has positioned itself neither a religious and nor a secular country. Religion remains one of the most important factors in politics and public life in a more general sense. This position has led Indonesia to devise complex strategies and approach to make fit a position of religious education in Indonesian national education system. The history of religious education as depicted above which colored by the tension between religious groups has shown this difficulties. Second, if the history of the Laws on National Education System is seen through the eyes of the de-secularization theory as mentioned on the introduction part above, it is clear that, the theory which argues that religions becomes stronger in modern era, was right in Indonesian context. There was a revival phenomenon of
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religions institution, in particular, Islam. This is a challenge, how this movement is followed by a willingness to share and to live together with those who has different religious believe. Third, while Indonesia is a pluralist country, it is urgent for the government as well as for religious institution to build inter-religious dialogue which should be integrated into religious education curriculum. There were too many conflict and controversies in Indonesian history dealing with religious matters. Religion should take a strategic role and an awakened movement that will bring a mission of peace and unity in our country. This task can be implemented through (religious) education as a consciousness process to encourage pupils to respect each other and to live together peacefully. Whether religious education is taught at school or not, its curriculum content should be designed to support true and pure inter-religious dialogue among students who have already lived in this pluralist society. Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. Language and Power. Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1990. Anhar, Gonggong (ed.). Sejaran Pendidikan di Indonesia Zaman Kemerdekaan (1945-1966), Proyek IDSN. Jakarta: DepDikBud, 1993. Aragon, V. Lorraine. Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities and State Development in Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000. Arifin, H.M. Kapita Selekta Pendidikan, Islam dan Umum. Jakarta: Bumi Aksara, fourth edition, 2002.

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Fransiska Widyawati

Assegaf, Rahcman Abd. Politik Pendidikan Nasional: Pergeseran Kebijakan Pendidikan Agama Islam dari Praproklamasi ke Reformasi. Yogyakarta: Kurnia Kalam, 2005. Benyamin Fleming Intan. Public Religion and the Pancasila-Based State of Indonesia, An Ethical and Sociological Analysis, AUS (American University Study), Series VII, Theology and Religion, Vol. 238. Berger, L. Peter. Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview, in Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, edited by Peter L. Berger. USA, 1999 Bourchier, David. The 1950s in the New Order Ideology and Politics, in Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s, edited by David Borchier and John Legge. Clayton, Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University. Cassanova, Jos. Public Religion in the Modern World. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994. Cribb, Robert. The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966, Studies from Java and Bali. Victoria, Australia: Monash University, 1990. Cooley, Frank L. Indonesia: Church and Society. New York: Friendship Press, 1968. Djohan, Makmur et.al. Sejarah Pendidikan di Indonesia Zaman Penjajahan, Proyek IDKN. Jakarta: Depdikbud Ditjen Kebudayaan, 1993. Emerson, Donald K. Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and Cultural politics. Itacha and London: Cornell University Press, 1976. Furchan, Arief. Developing Pancasilaist Muslims: Islamic Religious Education in Public Shcools in Indonesia. Jakarta: Logos, 2002. Hefner, Robert W. Politics and Social Identity: The 1965-1966 Violence and its Aftermath, in The Political Economy of
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Fransiska Widyawati

Mountain Java: An Interpretative History. Victoria, Australia: Aristoc Press Pty. Ltd., 1990. Ichwan, Nur Moch. Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 19662004. Aritonang, Jan S. Sejarah Pendidikan Kristen di Tanah Batak. Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia. Aritonang, Jan Sihar and Karel Steenbrink (eds.). A History of Christianity in Indonesia. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2008. Kartodirdjo, Sartono et.al. Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, Vol. VI. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1997. De Jong, Kees. Inter-religious Relations in Present Indonesia: In between Good Corporation and Pilarization in On the Edge of Many Worlds, edited by Freek L. Bakker and Jan Sihar Aritonang. Zoetermeer, Uitverij Meninema, 2006. Lyon, M.L. The Hindu Revival in Java: Politics and Religious Identity in Indonesia: The Making of Culture, edited by J.J. Fox. Canberra: Australian National University, 1980 Maarif, Syamsul. Pendidikan Pluralisme di Indonesia. Yogyakarta: Logung Pustakan, 2005. Mudyaharjo, Redja. Pengantar Pendidikan: Sebuah Studi Awal tentang Dasar-dasar Pendidikan pada Umumnya dan Pendidikan di Indonesia. Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2002. Mustafa, H.A. and Aly Abdullah. Sejarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia. Bandung: Pustaka Setia. Noer, Kautsar Azhari. Pluralisme dan Pendidikan di Indonesia: Menggugat Ketidakberdayaan Sistem Pendidikan Agama, in Pluralisme, Konflik dan Pendidikan Agama di Indonesia, edited by Th. Sumarthana. Yogyakarya: DIAN-Interfidei.
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Peorbakawatja, Soegarda. Pendidikan dalam Alam Indonesia Merdeka. Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1970. Rahim, Husni. Corak dan Ragam Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia: Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Lembaga Pendidikan Islam, in in On the Edge of Many Worlds, edited by Freek L. Bakker and Jan Sihar Aritonang. Zoetermeer, Uitverij Meninema, 2006. Sirozi, Muhammad. Politik Kebijaksanaan Pendidikan di Indonesia: Peran Tokoh-tokoh Islam dalam Penyusunan UU No. 2/1989. Jakarta: INIS, 2004. Steenbrink, Karel A. Pesantren Madrasah, Sekolah: Pendidikan Islam dalam Kurun Modern. Jakarta: LP3ES, second edition. _____. Dutch Colonialism and Islam in Indonesia: Conflict and Contact. Tilaar, H.A.R. Lima Puluh Tahun Pembangunan Pendidikan Nasional 1945-1995: Suatu Analisa Kebijakan. Jakarta: Grasindo. _____. Pendidikan dalam Pembangunan Nasional Menyongsong Abad XXI. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1999. Willis, Avery T. Indonesian Revival: Why Two Million Came to Christ. South Pasadena, California: William Carey Library, 1997. Wiryokususma, Iskandar and Usman Mulyadi. Dasar-dasar Pengembangan Kurikulum. Jakarta: P.T. Bina Aksara, 1988. Woodward, Mark. StateReligion Relation in Indonesia: A Comparative Perspective, in www. icrs.ugm.ac.id.

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THE MEANING OF PRINCE DIPANAGARAS SORBAN AND KYAI SADRACHS IKET

Yahya Tirta Prewita
Christian Church of Java (GKJ), Purwantoro, Wonogiri, Central Java

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Yahya Tirta Prewita

Introduction 1. Values in the Research This paper observes the two prominent figures for Javanese Muslims and Christians in the 19th century. History literally means an inquiries, or knowledge acquired by investigation1 that studies of the human past. History is a field of research which uses a narrative to examine and analyse the sequence of events, and it sometimes attempts to investigate objectively the patterns of cause and effect that determine events. There is no absolute truth in history. The presentation in the paper is a result of the research with specific resources and perspective on the topic. 2. Models Culturally, head is symbol of the body,2 the highest part of human body. Every community have their custom to wear. There were many customs used as heads cover, and every heads cover had different function and symbol. Prince Dipanagara3 is the head commander in the Java war. And Kyai Sadrach4 is the head of Christian Javanese community in Karangjasa. Prince Dipanagaras sorban and Kyai Sadrachs iket deliberately expressed their preferences to some meaning in those identity.
1

Brian Joseph and Richard Janda (Eds.), The Handbook of Historical Linguistics (Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 163. 2 Pars pro toto is Latin for "(taking) a part for the whole" where a portion of an object or concept represents the entire object or context. 3 The master piece of Peter Carey, The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785-1855 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), will be the main source to study Dipanagara. 4 The dissertation of Sutarman Partonadi, Sadrachs Community and Its Contextual Roots (Amsterdam: the Vrije Universiteit de Amsterdam, 1988), will be the main source to study Sadrach. 37 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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3. Problems of the Research 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Why did Dipanagara choose sorban while for Sadrach iket as their heads cover? What is their life structure that contributes in the development of their leadership spirituality? What is the most influential reason contributing in the development of their leadership spirituality? How was the process of their leadership spirituality formation? What is the impact of their leadership? 4. Concepts Sorban (Java) or turban (English word) used to refer to several sorts of headwear. A commonly used synonym is a Pagri, the Indian word for turban. Turbans are a popular form of headwear worn in the Middle East, North Africa and Southwest Asia. They are designed to keep the user cool in hot desert environments such as the Sahara. Turban wearers usually wind it anew for each wearing, using long strips of cloth. Turbans can be very large or quite modest dependent upon region, culture, and religion.5 (See picture of Dipanagara).

[Prince Dipanagara]
5

[Kyai Sadrach]

Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turban. 38 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Iket (Java) used to refer to several sorts of headwear for common people in Java. It is made from a piece of batik textile; same with turban the wearers wind it, but ussually only two times, and bundle the end of the fabric. (See picture of Sadrach). 5. Methods of Research 1. 2. Gathering data on the biography of Dipanagara and Sadrach. Identifying the structure of family, education, religion, culture, social-economical-political situations in the times of Dipanagara and Sadrach. Identifying the formation of leadership spirituality of Dipanagara and Sadrach. Investigating the impact of the leadership of Dipanagara and Sadrach.

3. 4.

All data gathering are done by literature or textual study, observation, and interview to some resource persons. 6 6. Analyses The structure and agency theory7 will be used as a tool to analyze the text. An actor or a figure as an agent is a fruit of his/her structure. Elements of the structure are: the family background, education, culture of the people, social-economic and politic conditions in times of their life. All contribute the development of their personal development. "Agency" refers to the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. "Structure", by contrast, refers to the recurrent patterned
6

Personally I appreciate the way my collegian Rev. Petrus Mardiyanto in GKJ Karangjasa and Rev. Paulus Pudjaprijatma in GKJ Purwodadi, who always wear iket and dress daily in peasants style. Also to GPH Pradjadiningrat who often wear iket as his unique identity. 7 George Ritzer and Douglas J. Goodman, Teori Sosiologi (Yogyakarta: Kreasi Wacana, 2008), 567-590. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structure and Agency. 39 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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arrangements which seem to influence or limit the choices and opportunities that individuals possess. Sorban and iket as key symbols are reliable indicators which point to cultural focus of interest. We will use Sherry B. Ortners theory8 that key symbols are summarizing and elaborating symbols. Summarizing symbols are primarily objects of attention and cultural respect; they synthesize complex experience, and relate the respondent to the grounds of the system as a whole. They include most importantly sacred symbols in the traditional sense. Elaborating symbols, are symbols valued for their contribution to the ordering or sorting out of experience. Within this type are symbols valued primarily for the ordering of conceptual experience. For example, symbols for providing cultural orientation, and those valued primarily for the ordering of action, for example, symbols for providing cultural strategy. The former includes root metaphors, the latter includes key scenarios, or elements of scenarios which are crucial to the means-end relationship postulated in the complete scenario. 7. Representation of the Research After introduction, the paper will narrate the biography of Dipanagara and Sadrach. We will especially focus on the pilgrimage of Prince Dipanagara as the important phase in the formation of his leadership spirituality. Examination in the light of structure and agency theory and key symbols theory will be done in the next part. And in the last discussion there will be some learnings of the research for us today.

S. B. Ortner, On Key Symbols (pp. 158-167), in Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthropological Approach, edited by W.A. Lessa and E.Z. Vogt (New York: Harper and Row, 1979). 40 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Between Prince Dipanagaras Sorban and Kyai Sadrachs Iket We begin with an explanation on how we imagine the picture of Prince Dipanagara and Kyai Sadrach. As an Indonesian national hero, all Indonesian people are familiar with the famous picture of Prince Dipanagara since we were in primary school. A handsome Javanese Prince, wearing white robe and surban, with a keris9 is attached in his waist. In Peter Careys book,10 there are several pictures of Dipanagara: twenty two years old Dipanagara (year 1807) dressed in Javanese kraton style in a surjan and blangkon. And second picture is charcoal sketch of Dipanagara by A. J. Bik, made in 1830;11 it shows him dressed in the priestly garments which he wore during the Java War, namely a sorban, an open necked cotton shirt, and a jubah (loose outer robe).12 The famous paintings of Raden Saleh Bustaman The Arrest of Pangeran Dipanagara, done two years after Dipanagara died (year 1857), showed Dipanagara with white robe and sorban. We do not have any pictures of Sadrach when he was young. All pictures of Sadrach were made after he led his Javanese Christian community/congregation in Karangjasa. Sutarman Partonadi shows a sensational portrait of Sadrach who sit in chair together with Rev. Jacob Wilhelm.13 He wore beskap, iket blangkon, kain jarik, and selop

A Javanese traditional dagger, dispersed throughout Sout-East Asia. Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 118. 11 Ibid., 705. 12 A sash hangs over his right shoulder, and his keris pusaka (heirloom dagger), Kanjeng Kyai Bandayuda, is stuck in his flowered silk waist band. The slightly sunken cheeks, which accentuate the princes high cheek bones, were the result of successive bouts of malaria (from which he had been suffering since his wanderings in the jungles of Bagelen, at the end of war. 13 Partonadi, Sadrachs Community, 77. The potrait became a polemic among the zending society in the Netherlands, it was the first time 41 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)
10

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sandal. Until now in Karangjasa Church we can see an old portrait of Sadrach, a half body, with the same custom: beskap and iket. The question now, how could Dipanagara decide to wear sorban, and how could Sadrach decide to wear iket? In any phase of their life, our reading shows that the pilgrimage phase is the most important time to urge them to the decision: wearing sorban and iket. 1. Prince Dipanagara (1785-1855) Dipanegara was born in Yogyas Karaton on Jumat Wage, 11 November 1785; he was given the childhood name, Bendara Raden Mas Mustahar.14 His mother Raden Ayu Mangkarawati is an unofficial wife of Sultan Hamengkubuwana III. Dipanagaras father was the eldest son of the Hamengkubuwana II. When he was a baby, he was presented to Sultan Mangkubumi by his mother, and the ageing ruler had foretold that he would cause the Dutch greater destruction than he had done, but only the Almighty knew the outcome.15 His great-grandmother, Ratu Ageng, adopted Dipanagara to her house in Tegalreja when he was seven years old. She was an exceedingly tough lady.16 She followed the first Sultan in war againts the Dutch, and was the commander of the elite female bodyguard. At the same times she renowned, according to Yogya court chronicle, for her Islamic piety and the pleasure she took in reading religious texts, as weel as her firm insistence on preserving traditional Javanese adat at the court.17 Living in the Tegalreja village in the athmosphere of farmers and santri who sought religious knowledge,
indigenous people sit together with Dutch people, usually they will be stand up, or sit on the floor. 14 Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 69. 15 Ibid., 70. 16 Ibid., 76. 17 Ibid., 77. 42 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Dipanegara was very much loved by the common people.18 Ratu Ageng died when Dipanagara was eighteen years old, living the Tegalreja estate in his charge and responsibility. Carey make an impressive list of work on Islam, Javanese-Islamic law and Javanese literature reportedly studied by Dipanagara.19 Carey gives us the following important information about the early manhood of the prince by saying that Dipanagaras emergence into manhood was marked by number of significant events: the passing of his great-grandmother Ratu Ageng, his inheritance of the Tegalreja estate, his investiture with his new adult name of Raden Antawirya on 1805, and finally his marriage with the daughter of the Yogya bupati of Panolan on 1807.20 So it was time required for him to come into his own and confirm the spiritual practices of his youth as well as to clarify his prophetic destiny. Carey cited Sumarsaid Moertonos21 explanation about Pilgrimage as spiritual wandering:22 The set off on wanderings when ones age was approaching adulthood mean to find wisdom in the sense of finding a teacher who could guide ones development in a fashion in which ones powers would outstrip those of ordinary men. It also sometimes entailed aquiring tranquility [...] so that on ones return one would be able to withstand all temptations. It was even occasionally a time of testing of the knowledge and wisdom which one had already acquired (through youthful spiritual and meditative practice). This tradition was continued during the Islamic period in Java when people set off on long
18 19

Ibid., 78. Ibid., 102-105. 20 Ibid., 127. 21 Soemarsaid Moertono, Budi dan Kekuasaan dalam Perspektif Kesejarahan; Suatu Contoh dari Sejarah Kerajaan di Jawa pada Abad ke 18 dan 19 (Jakarta: Institut Ilmu Pemerintahan, 1976), 20-21. 22 Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 127. 43 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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journeys sometimes from west to east Java and back again to find esoteric knowledge at religious schools. The Prince prepared himself for his spiritual quest by taking a new name, Seh Ngabdurahim;23 is is a sign that he wanted to become a santri. Dipanagara departed from Tegalreja and began to lead a typical wandering santri existence visiting many religious schools and mosques, and living together in the same pesantren with students of common background. According to the testimony in his Babad, Dipanagara ... ceased visiting pesantren and departed far from inhabited areas to engage in asceticism and meditation. Then Carey gave us the following complete report: ....There now began a very crucial stage in Dipanagaras wandering during which he sought out some of the most important shrines and holy places asociated with the Mataram dynasty.24 Further Carey give us this specific testimony: This period of withdrawal and self-negation, as we have seen in the citation from Soemarsono Moertono, had much of the quality of tirakat, the retreat from the world of a man who wished to prepare himself for a serious undertaking. It afforded an interval of solitude in which to purge himself of pamrih (selfish) and to legitimize his actions by contacts with his departed ancestors and spiritual guardians of Java.25 The first vision of Dipanagara, again according to Carey, ... occureed at the cave of Song Kamal,26 in the Jejeran district to the
23 24

Ibid., 128. Ibid., 131. 25 Ibid., 146; Babad Dipanagara (Manado), XXV (Pangkur), 63-70. Dipanagara understanding of Islam can be best assessed from the vantage point of his own writings, most notably his autobiographical babad and his Makassar notebook. It is very clear from his writing that he was more a typical Javanese mystic than an orthodox Muslim reformer (Ibid., 111). 26 Ibid., 132. 44 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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south of Yogya. It is said by Carey that Sunan Kalijaga appeared and ... informed the prince that it had been determined by God that in the future he would become a king. From Jejeran, Dipanagara made a week meditation in Imogiri, the royal gravesite of the Mataram rulers, where his close recently decease relations Sultan Mangkubumi and Ratu Ageng were burried, and the grave of Sultan Agung (reigned 1613-1645). The figure of Sultan Agung had a continuing importance for Dipanagara throughout his life. Carey makes a list of places associated with Sultan Agung which now visited by Dipanagara; for example, Mount Rasamuni in western of Gunung Kidul, Guwa Langse, and Tembayat in Klaten.27 From Imogiri, Dipanagara made his journey to the cave of Seluman near the Oyo River, and further spent two nights at the cave of Suracala at the left bank of Opak River in Gamelan Bantul, and two week meditation in Guwa Langse28 when Ratu Kidul, The Goddess Queen of the South Ocean, promised that when the time was right she would come to him again. It is very interesting that in his babad, Dipanagara refused to ask help from Ratu Kidul, because according to him ... in religion there is only the assistance of the Almighty, and then Ratu Kidul immediately disappeared.29 The final instruction to Dipanagara occured when he leaved (?) Parangtritis beach and slept at Parangkusuma. Carey gives us the following detail of description: A disembodied voice, perhaps that of Sunan Kalijaga, addressed Dipanagara telling him of the coming destruction of Yogya, and the beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java in just under three years.30 Then Carey continues with this interesting information: The voice ended on this enigmatic note: There is no other; you alone are the means, but that not for long, only
27 28

Ibid., 136. Ibid., 144. 29 Ibid., 146. 30 Ibid., 150. 45 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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to be counted amongst the ancestors. Ngabdulkamit, farewell, you must return home!31 Carey also informs us that The change of name from Ngadurahim to Ngabdulkamit was of great significance.32 When the Java war began, Dipanagara left his full princely title of Bendara Pangeran Aria Dipanagara and used a title Sultan Ngabdulkamit. Dipanagara also ... asked to be only addressed as Pangeran Ngabdulkamit33 and use the name in his writing rather than Pangeran Dipanagara, ... a title which he had passed on to his eldest son,34 when he was in exile after the Java war. Then Carey gives us the following information: The visitation at Parangkusuma was the last which Dipanagara received on his south coast pilgrimage. His period of tirakat was now over.35 Then Carey36 continues his description of the growing-up prince by saying that (...) the prince was now a capable young man, whose sense of self-importance was tempered by the insights gained on his pilgrimage. In particular, he had begun to understand the significant but fleeting role he would be called upon to play in the great events which were about to unfold in his native Yogyakarta.37 Later, on early 1824 July 1825, comes a very crucial time before the Java war; we are told that ... a whole series of dreams
31

Ibid., 151; BD (Manado) II:125, XIV (Sinom) 80. Carey, while qouting Ricklefs (1974b:241; 2006:210), refers to Abd al-Hamid, the first Turkish ruler in Ottoman Sultan to lay claim to the authority of caliph, the protector of all Muslims throughout the world. (p.152). 32 Ibid., 151. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., 152. 35 Ibid., 154. 36 Ibid., 155. 37 Ibid. 46 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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and visions occured which helped to clarify still further the princes view of himself, and the role he would be called upon to play in the coming upheaval in central Java.38 Then Carey adds this detailed description: To some extent, these later visions confirmed and elucidated those which the prince had received as a young man.39 Babad Dipanagara40 noted the striking description of Dipanagaras meeting with the Ratu Adil (The Just King), when he meditated in cave of Secang in Selarong, during the fasting month 1824. A year after in the site of Secang Stone, a dream of the eight wali wudhar came to Dipanagara, as a final confirmation of the favour which Dipanagara had found as Gods tool on earth.41 The dream reminded Dipanagara about his dialogue with Mangkubumi and then with Rahmanuddin,42 the former penghulu kraton in Yogya (royal ulama) explained to Dipanagara that the term wali wudhar here were prophet (nabi) rather than wali (friends of God) or saints as is found in the Sufi teachings. Among 124.000 prophets, thus Carey tells us, ... there were only six who merited the title of wali wudhar, Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad.43 And to these six prophets, Carey continues that, ... Rahmanuddin added two from Java, Sunan Giri and Sultan Agung, stating that these had also held the double office characteristic of a wali wudhar ....44 The former penghulu then suggested that Dipanagara might be the ninth but that God alone knows what the end shall be. Then Carey adds the following detailed description:

38 39

Ibid., 564. Ibid. 40 Ibid., 564-568, BD (Manado), II:311-15, XX (Dhandanggula) 7-20. 41 Ibid., 576-577, BD, (Manado), II:328-9, XX (Dhandanggula) 51-7. 42 In Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 573-4. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 47 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Thus Dipanagara appears to have accepted Rahmanudins explanation and to have connected it with the mandate given to him earlier by the Ratu Adil in Parangkusuma, which he had been ordered to combine secular and spiritual responsibilities in ruling over Java. So when the time is come, Dipanagara was ready to proclaimed his new name that he got in his vision and began the Java war: ingkang jumeneng Kanjeng Sultan Ngabdul Khamid Erucakra Kabirul Mukminin Sayidin Panatagama Rasullahi S.A.W. ing Tanah Jawi (He who is raised as His Highness Sultan Ngabdulkamid Erucakra, the First among the Believers, Lord of the Faith, Regulator of Religion, (Caliph) of the Prophet of God, may peace be on Him, in Java Island.45 2. Kyai Sadrach In all literatures on biography of Sadrach, there were not enough concern on the pilgrimage of Kyai Sadrach. Guillot46 writes more on the history of Christianity in Java, Patmono47 concerns on how Sadrach developed and took care his community in Karangjasa, Lidya Herwanto48 studies on the dynamic tension between Islam, Java and Christian (Europe) in Sadrachs time. Partonadis book, Sadrachs Community and Its Contextual Roots, a dissertation from Vrije University in the Amsterdam (1988) will be a basic narration for the topic pilgrimage of Kyai Sadrach. Sadrachs given name is Radin. There was no explanation about the place and the date of his birth, maybe on 1835. By his name we
45 46

Ibid., 580-1; 622. C. Guillot, Sejarah Kekristenan di Jawa (Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1984). 47 Patmono, Sadrah Sang Pamong (Jakarta: Yayasan Cipta Sejahtera Indonesia, 1994). 48 Lidya Herwanto, Kiai Sadrach: Gerakan Jemaat Kristen Jawa Merdeka (Jogjakarta: Matabangsa, 2002). 48 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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know that his parents were only common people. Some notes wrote his origin either near Japara, Demak, or in the village of Luring near Semarang.49 All of these places are in the coastal region of North Central Java. When he was a child, Radin was adopted into a fairly wealthy Moslem family in Kauman, where he was raised according to the Javanese Moslem tradition.50 The first school for Radin is Koran school, where the children learn an hour in the morning and in the evening. They needed to finish reading Koran and memorizing some verses and prayers before they got circumcision.51 The first pilgrimage of Radin is to be a pupil of Pak Kurmen, a Javanese ngelmu52 teacher in Semarang. Radin was
49 50

Partonadi, Sadrachs Community, 55. Ibid., 56. He explains that the practice of adoption into higher class families was common practice in nineteenth century Java. In Javanese it was called nyuwita (outright patronage), ngenger (patronage entailing some duties), or magang (apprenticeship), and was a form of apprenticeship. It was not done for economic reasons, but rather as a part of the traditional Javanese educational system. 51 Circumcision in Javanese tradition is a sign that children come to puberty, in Islam teaching circumcision is sunah [obliged upon male Muslims according to Muhammads tradition Ed.]. 52 Partonadi, Sadrachs Community, 87. Ngelmu is the way someone who learn Javanese mysticism learn to a teacher, who teach and guide personally. Partonadi explains Javanese mysticism in the past was developed in various mystical schools, called Javanese paguron (discipleship systems), usually under the leadership of a guru or kyai. Emphasis was phaced on the questions regarding sangkan paraning dumadi (the origin and the destiny of life). The mystery of life was to be grasped through the human experience of unity with the highest reality, known as God, or Gusti, and how to implement unity between man and God. The life of the mystics was one of harsh discipline which included fasting (puasa), refraining from pleasure and deliberately seeking hardship (tirakat), asceticism (tapa) and meditation (semedi). They usually became moralists who emphasized good conduct (Sadrachs Community, 22). 49 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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17 years old when he left Semarang and wandered in East Java. He became santri in some pesantrens, at least in Jombang and Gontor Ponorogo.53 Radin learned not only Islam religion, but also Kejawen (Javanese Mysticism). He had learned how to heal sick people, and how to deal with demon possesion or places with evil spirits. We do not know how long Radin wandered in East Java. When he came back to Semarang, he put an Islam name as his additional name: Abas. As a student of Pak Kurmen, Radin Abas visited his teacher. But now Pak Kurmen was no longer a Javanese ngelmu teacher; he even told Radin Abas that now he followed Kyai Tunggul Wulung who teaches him to be a Christian.54 Radin Abas was interested to learn about Christianity, and moved from Kauman to a village in south of Semarang. The Haezoo Church in Semarang is the first place for Radin Abas to learn about Christianity. In 1866, Radin Abas decided to go to Batavia, accompanied by Tunggul Wulung, to meet Anthing, who accepted him as a helper. During his stay with Anthing, Radin Abas made the very important decision to be baptized. Matteus Teffer, a missionary of the Netherlansche Zendeling Genootschap (the Dutch Missionary Society) prepared Radin Abas in religious teaching in preparation for baptism. On April 14, 1867, Radin Abas was baptized by Rev. Ader, the minister of the Indische Ker, Buitenkerk. As a Christian name, Radin Abas chose Sadrach, a biblical character who kept concistenly his faith in the living God.55 After the baptism, Sadrach worked together with GIUZ (Organizationfor Home and Foreign Missions)56 as a distributor of Christian literatures. Sadrachs work for the mission society was
53 54

Herwanto, Kiai Sadrach, 24-27. Partonadi, Sadrachs Community, 58. 55 Ibid., 59. 56 Ibid. GIUZ (Genootschap voor In en Uitwendige Zending). 50 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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promising, and some of the local indigenous Christian communities grew extensively as result. In 1868 he joined with Tunggul Wulung and Pak Kurmen in developing Chirstian villages in Bondo, Jepara. Sadrach decided to leave after one year. Yotham, a son of Sadrach accounted57 that Sadrach left Bondo out of obedience to Gods calling. It is told that one day Sadrach received a divine call to leave Bondo for an unknown place. He was already settled in Bondo, having participated in the development of this Christian village for nearly a year. Deep in his heart he was sad to leave, but he was not able to refuse the Gods call. Sadrach, it is told, left Bondo with tears in his eyes, for the place where God would lead him. This story reminds us of Abraham in Genesis Chapter 12 in the Bible. It demonstrates Sadrachs obedienct submission to Gods calling, surpassing all human interests. From Bondo he moved to Tuksanga Purwareja, assisted to Stevens-Philips house church. Same with Tunggul Wulung, Sadrach employed the method of public debate used by Javanese gurus, who would challenge other gurus to debate. The defeated guru submitted himself and his pupils to the winning guru to be his murids. Sadrach gained many conversts debating Christian ngelmu with the Javanese gurus. Further religious instruction was given to these converts by Stevens-Philips.58 Sadrach continued his former position as guru ngelmu when he tought Christian teachings. After a year with Stevens-Philips, Sadrach moved to Karangjasa, a village 20 km south-west of Purwareja. Sadrachs departure from Stevens-Philips enabled him to work independently. In Karangjasa Sadrach met with his early followers, all of them converted by Sadrachs public debate method. Because they are kyai, they followed Sadrach also with their followers. Sadrach taught his followers by himself, rather than going to Stevens-Philips for further religious instruction as had previously been done. Now he
57 58

Ibid., 60. Ibid., 62-63. 51 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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was autonomous, although his relationship with Stevens-Philips continued. Stevens-Philips was considered by Sadrach as his protector, and the bridging figure with the Dutch authorities, including the Indische Kerk and the Dutch missionaries. All of Sadrachs Javanese converts were baptized by the minister of the Indische Kerk in Purwareja as a result of Stevens-Philips mediation.59 In Karangjasa Sadrach became a powerful guru, known not only for his superior in public debates, but also for his ability to control the devil and evil spirits. According to Javanese beliefs, Karangjasa is not a good place to live (angker, sangar). It was believed that those who dared to stay and cultivate there would suddenly die. There were places where these evil spirits dwelt, haunted places were dangerous and brought misfortune, sickness, and death. But Sadrach rented these fields and cultivated them without harm. A short prayer asking for Gods protection against angker place was used by Sadrach.60 Because of poverty situation among the peasants in Central Java during the cultivation system, the fertile rice fields in the Karangjasa village maybe also important factor that attracted many people to stay together with Sadrach. Karangjasa first church was built on 1871. Sadrach called it as mesjid (mosque), the name of Islamic building to do a prayer and congregation meeting. The first Javanese Christian community grew fastly. While European missionary only resulted some Javanese Christian for centuries, in Karangjasa only in three years (1871-1873) more than twenty five hundreds people be baptized, and five churches were erected in Karangjasa, Banjur, Karangpucung,

59 60

Ibid., 66. Ibid., 67. The prayer against angker place: God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, neutralize the dangerous poison of plants so they become advantageous; render the spirits which haunt the soil and tress powerless. May the blessing of the Lord Jesus Christ give us prosperity. Amin. 52 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Kedungpring and Karangjambu.61 The center of Javanese Christianity gradually shifted from Tuksanga to Karangjasa. And as StevensPhilips illness progressed, it soon became clear that Sadrach was indeed not a helper, but a prestigious Javanese Christian kyai. When Stevens-Philips was death in 1876, following the Javanese tradition, Radin Abas Sadrach put a new name to indicate his new position, Surapranata. Surapranata literally means he who has the courage to govern.62 Because his way to teach teachings is the way of kyai, so we got Sadrach is well known as Kyai Sadrach. Radin Abas Sadrach Surapranata is the complete name. A Javanese Christian congregation was a new development both for missionary and church, and also for the Dutch authority. Especially to Sadrach, many people from Indische Kerk, missionaries and the Dutch authority worried on his autonomous and independent Javanese Christian congregation in Karangjasa. Without Stevens-Philips mediation, the vaccination affair happened in 1878. Sadrach refused vaccination for religious reasons, it grew become open conflict with Bieger, the minister in the Indische Kerk in Purwareja who accused that Sadrach practiced a syncretism and paganism,63 and that his Javanese Christian teachings was heresy. In short story, in 1883 Sadrach proclaimed his community as Golongane Wong Kristen Kang Mardika (The Group of Independent Christians) and recognized Wilhelm as the only minister for the community. The relation between Sadrach and the missionary became worst, and Sadrach found that new partner in Apostolische Kerk was very

61 62

Ibid., 68. Ibid., 71. 63 Herwanto, Kiai Sadrach, 116. 53 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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appealing.64 In 1899, Sadrach formally separated his community from Indische Kerk, and he was ordained as the Apostle of Java in the Apostolische Kerk in Jakarta, now he had a right to serve sacrament of baptism and communion.

Prince Dipanagara and Kyai Sadrach: Key Symbols, Structure and Agency Theories Both Prince Dipanagara and Kyai Sadrach are prominent figures among Javanese people in 19th century. They learnt their religions in Javanese mystical way. Carey shows abundance resources to address the pilgrimage of Dipanagara, but there is not enough references to Sadrachs pilgrimage. KRMTH Pradjadiningrat65 personally explained about the lack of resources in literature about Sadrach pilgrimage, his response is a very interesting comment: Who made the literatures on Sadrach? All are Christian writers, and they used Christian resources who did not understand about pilgrimage and in fact prohibited the Javanese mysticism way, even accused them as heresy. The Javanese Christian in our time also inherits this approach. That is the reason why the followers of Kyai Sadrach lost the practice of pilgrimages, and did not have any notes on the pilgrimages of Kyai Sadrach. In Javanese mysticism, pilgrimage is a winadi things, it is only informed to trusted people personally. The relation between husband and wife is winadi, also the relation between man and God. In pilgrimage, we implement the manunggaling kawula lan Gusti (the unity between man and God), by meditation,
64 65

Partonadi, Sadrachs Community, 93. KRMTH Prajadiningrat is a descendant of Pakubuwono X from Kraton Surakarta, Christian, and practitioner of Javanese mysticism, a personal interview, 17 December 2010 in Kentingan, Solo. 54 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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going to the petilasan (holy place), graveyard of our anchestor, alone to ask what is Gods will in our specific situation. So it is very private, no Javanese teacher will teach about winadi things openly. And Pradjadiningrat explains the symbol of iket: I got this explanation about iket from my grandfather. Iket was his daily custom when he went out home. Iket is made from batik textile. The motif of batik for common people is different with the motif of batik for noble aristocrat. When we use the textile as iket, we need to roll in the fabric. So the meaning of iket is: Whatever you can roll in, you need to spread out. And whatever you can spread out, you need to roll in. And in order to be beauty, put it at your head.66 Both sorban and iket are key symbols to express the life and strugle of Prince Dipanagara and Kyai Sadrach. They become a tool to understand the preference to some values which became important in their context. The symbol became root metaphors, a symbol which operates to sort out experience, to place it in cultural categories, and to help us think about how it all hangs together. They are in that one can conceptualize the interrelationships among phenomena by analogy to the interrelations among the parts of the root metaphor.67 In Dipanagara, sorban is roll in his understanding, knowledge and expertise on Islam. And by wearing sorban, he spread out his influence to people who saw that there were no hope among the misconduct and maladministration of the Kraton, and tried other alternatif in Islam. In Sadrach, iket is his preference to Javanese

66

In Javanese: Sabarang kang bisa kok gelar, kudu bisa kok gulung. Lan sabarang kang bisa kok gulung, kudu bisa kok gelar. Lan supaya katon endah, papana ana mustakamu. 67 Ortner, On Key Symbols. 55 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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identity first. By wearing iket, he declared that his christianity was based in Javanese tradition and spirituality. LeRoy Eims68 says that a leader is not born, but made. There is a process to prepare and to support some people to be the future leader. The training to be a leader is a wholelife commitment. It involves the development of personal faith, character, insight, and practical skill in relationship with other people. McClendon69 explores in his study that we can search and describe the development of faith, character, insight and committment by studying biography of prominent figures in our history. Their biography expressed their theology. The Javanese tradition put a pilgrimage as important stage in life. Peter Carey gives special chapter about pilgrimage in his master pieace on biography of Prince Dipanegara. And Partonadi shows that before began his community in Karangjasa, the whole life of Kyai Sadrach shows his pilgrimage in search of eminence of life as a Javanese disciple. Both of Dipanagara and Sadrach passed their manhood exercise in pilgrimage in the Javanese mysticism tradition. Pilgrimage was the way for them to found their identity as Javanese Islam and Javanese Christian. They have passed all practices of Javanese mysticism exercises when he walk by foot alone to holy places or sites. Except the spiritual practice of pilgrimage, the experience gives to the pilgrim solidarity to the people and social conditions along his pilgrimage. It shows the reality from the daily people perspective. So, we can address their pilgrimage as the structure which influenced the formation of their leadership

68 69

LeRoy Eims, Pemuridan: Seni yang Hilang (Bandung: Kalam Hidup, 1982). In Biography as Theology, McClendon searches and describes how in Dag Hammarskjold and Martin Luther King, Jr. biography we find the way they pursuit their ethics and character, and expanding the theory to the biography of Clarence Leonard Jordan and Charles Edwar Ives. 56 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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spirituality. And in the other hand, the result of their pilgrimage give impact to people among them. In the Dipanagara biography, there are clear the structure that constructed his life. He lived as the prince and family of the Yogyakarta Kingdom, he studied from the best literatures and teacher on Islam, along with Javanese legends and history. He was familiar with the Hindhu-Budhist-derived literary classics of Java and admired the figure of Sultan Agung. He was aware of being part of a world-wide fellowship of Muslims. As a result of visions that helped to propel him into war, he adopted a name taken from the Ottoman Sultan. Those visions also brought him into contact both with the spirit of Sunan Kalijaga, one of Javas walis, and with Ratu Kidul, The Goddess of the Southern Ocean. He was charged with the awesome task of purifying Java of its corruption through bloody war. Ricklefs told us that Dipanagara personified the mystic synthesis.70 Syncretism in the case of Dipanagara was not a problem at all. This mystic synthesis consists of two elements: Islamic mysticism and Javanese mysticism. And we all know that, as it is written by Ricklefs, He was a devout Muslim mystic who believed himself to be part of the international community of Muslims. Yet he was also visited by The Goddess of Southern Ocean, who promised him the supernatural help in war that she promised only to kings.71 But we also know from Carey that Dipanagara refused to accept the Ratu Kiduls help. Ricklefs72 shows the troubled times because of intriques, maladministration, and the way Dutch intervened the ruler of Yogyakarta Kingdom from his Grandfather HB II, his father HB III,
70

M. C. Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), 8-

9.
71 72

Ibid. M.C. Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries (CT, USA: Signature Book, 2006), 206-207. 57 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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his brother IV and his nephew HB V. The visions from Ratu Adil a month before the break of Java War is the final spiritual experience that completed his decision to war. In the case of Sadrach, -same with Dipanagara- Sadrach and Javanese mystical are difficult to be separated. Although Sadrach was born in a common family, his structure in early life education in Kauman Semarang, and especially his pilgrimage to some guru ngelmu and pesantren made Sadrach was a powerful evangeliser. He challenged Javanese gurus to public debate, and upon defeating them, accepted their conversion to Christianity along with their followers. With such skills, he produced a significant expansion in the Christian community already founded by Stevens-Philips. In Karangjasa he created his own Christian village 1871. He continued converting kyais and their followers through public debates and gained a reputation for being able to control malign spiritual forces. In other ways, his version of Christianity preserved Javanese customs as far as possible. Jesus was presented as the Ratu Adil. Circumcision was not abolished. Slametan were held. The church was called as mesjid, and the church at Karangjasa was built to look mesjid. But tayuban dances, opium usage and polygamy were condemned strickly.73 In Sadrachs time, Christianity is the religion of European people. Sadrach story shows that he could break the label of Landa wurung Jawa tanggung (failed Dutchmen and half-baked Javanese). He gave example how to be a committed Christian and also a committed Javanese. The synthesis of Javanese mysticism and Islam in the life of Dipanagara was easier to do because officially Islam is the state religion from Sultan Agung. But we know that nothing easy for someone who sought a development of his/her own spirituality. It

73

Partonadi, Sadrachs Community, 138; 147-154; 209-210. 58 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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is winadi thing. It must be done by laku (pilgrimage) in tapa lelana pasa tirakat and semedi. As symbols, Dipanagaras sorban and Sadrachs iket expressed clearly a refusal to imitate the way the aristocrat dressed in their time, and at once expressed solidarity to the people. With different context, Dipanagara sorban address to Islam as the value that constructed his life to against the Dutch, and Sadrachs iket address to Javanese culture as the basic value to against the hegemony of Dutchs Christian among the Javanese congregations. In a short conclusions, we can say that the symbols of sorban and iket are the main meaning of pilgrimage in the formation of leadership spirituality of Prince Dipanagara and Kyai Sadrach. Learnings from History and Culture of Religions If we see other cases in the history of religions in Indonesia, the hybridity of religion with culture as we observe in Dipanagara and Sadrach is not an extraordinary thing. Steenbrink74 gave an example on Coenraad Laurens Coolen who cleared a forest in the isolated region of Ngoro, close to Mojoagung in 1830s. Coolen became the founder of a new village that attracted many Javanese from the region. In the mid 1840s there were about one thousand people. Coolen was a pious Christian, but also continued much of Javanese tradition and wisdom in his life. He was convinced that his son was the incarnation of the local saint whose grave was found in the forest of Ngoro. He was acknowledged as a Kyai, a traditional wise and holy man, albeit in a Christian version, but still one who could give advice and receive visions. He did not urge the new villagers to become Christian, and accepted that many of them remained Muslim. But he set a number of specific rules for his foundation like abstention from
74

Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel Steenbrink (eds.), A History of Christianity in Indonesia (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 640-641. 59 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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work on Sunday. The Christians were obliged to attend Sunday morning worship, as well as the midweek meeting in private houses. In the early 1840-s a number of Ngoro villagers went to Emde in Surabaya to be baptised, something that was not practised by Coolen. Emde did not only baptised the group but also told them to cut their hair, wear European clothes and refrain from semi-sacral wayang (traditional puppet) play. They were initially chased away from Ngoro by Coolen who did not like that Christians should behave like Europeans. But later Coolen gave in, and 2000 of his people were baptised in 1854, but he forbade them to cut their hair or to change their names as was customary for other Javanese who were baptised. Coolen translated the basic doctrines of Christianity into Javanese and composed hymns in traditional Javanese style where his version of the Christian creed came very close to the Islamic confession. The history is in the side of the winner. Same in the Sadrachs case, Coolen was addressed as the founding father of Christianity in East Java, but the model of Christianity in the next generation was in European style. The heritage of Javanese mystical spirituality succession ceased when the practice of Javanese mysticism was no longer exercised by the new Javanese Christian. The iket was powerless againts the steel helmet of the Dutch. In the other hand, Prince Dipanagara had no troubles to exercises his devout Islam religion together with Javanese mysticism. The unity of Islam and Kejawen as symbolized by his sorban became his strength in the formation of his leadership spirituality. Up to now, the holy sites related with Prince Dipanagara become places where the Javanese and the Muslim people do their pilgrimages. Without changes in life, the pilgrimage has no meaning. In Dipanagara and Sadrach biography, we observe that their pilgrimage is the most importance phase of their life. Pilgrimage is the arena where the habitus of the people is processed. By pilgrimage, they knew their deep roots as a Javanese and as a creature who seek the
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will of God, and it became their basic of their identity. And as the result of pilgrimage, they can contribute new understanding, attitudes, and actions to the contemporary challenges based on their spirituality. The Catholic Church and community in Java strongly understands the problem of pilgrimage among the Javanese people. That is why in every place they make special sites for pilgrimage; for example: Goa Maria Sendangsono, a special place for the Catholic Community in Central Java; or Goa Maria Puhsarang in Kediri, a special place for the Catholic Community in East Java. The Catholic Church in Ganjuran, Bantul, Yogyakarta is also a good example to systhesis of mysticism and Javanese. Especially for the Christian Churches of Java, the Javanese name in their name strongly pointed to their Javanese identity. Learning from Dipanagara and Sadrach show us, it is very difficult to construct a contextual leadership spirituality as a Javanese people if we do not concern to the pilgrimage. Bibliography Ahimsa-Putra, H. S. Strukturalisme Levi-Strauss: Mitos dan Karya Sastra. Yogyakarta: Kepel Press, 2006. Aritonang, Jan Sihar & Karel Steenbrink (eds.). A History of Christianity in Indonesia. Leiden: Brill, 2008. Carey, Peter. The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785-1855. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007. Eims, LeRoy. Pemuridan: Seni yang Hilang. Bandung: Kalam Hidup, 1982. Herwanto, Lydya. Pikiran dan Aksi Kiai Sadrach, Gerakan Jemaat Krtisten Jawa Merdeka. Jogjakarta: Matabangsa, 2002.
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Kartodirdjo, Sartono. The Peasants Revolt of Banten in 1888, Its Conditions, Course and Sequel, Academisch Proefschrift, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1966. Margana, Sri. Javas Last Frontier: The Struggle for Hegemony of Blambangan. Leiden: Universiteit Leiden, 2007. Partonadi, Sutarman S. Sadrachs Community and Its Contextual Roots. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit de Amsterdam, 1988. Patmono. Sadrah Sang Pamong: Kisah Perjuangan Kyai Sadrah dalam Mengembangkan Jemaah Kristen Mardiko di Karangjoso. Jakarta: Yayasan Cipta Sejahtera Indonesia, 1994. Perrin, David B. Studying Christian Spirituality. New York: Routledge, 2007. Ricklefs, M. C. Sejarah Indonesia Modern. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989. ____ . Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries. CT, USA: Signature Book, 2006. ____ . Polarising Javanese Society. Singapore: NUS Press, 2007. Ritzer, George & Douglas J. Goodman. Teori Sosiologi. Yogyakarta, Kreasi Wacana, 2008. Ortner, S. B. On Key Symbols (pp. 158-167), in Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthropological Approach, edited by W.A. Lessa and E.Z. Vogt. New York: Harper and Row, 1979. Vlekke, Bernard H. M. Nusantara: Sejarah Indonesia. Jakarta: Gramedia, 2008. Yamin, Muhammad. Sedjarah Peperangan Dipanegara: Pahlawan Kemerdekaan Indonesia. Djakarta: Jajasan Pembangunan, 1952.

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THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE DURING THE EXPANSION OF ISLAMIC KINGDOMS IN JAVA: FROM DEMAK UNTIL MATARAM
Nyong Eka Teguh Iman Santosa
Muhammadiyah University of Sidoarjo, East Java

63 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Nyong Eka Teguh Iman Santosa

Introduction Islam at the beginning was surely alien for Javanese people. This religion needed for almost five hundred years from eleventh to fifteenth centuries to be embraced widely by Javanese people whether in the coastal areas as well as in the interior. This discursive process of Islamization entered into its decisive stages when Islamic presence among Javanese was supported by political regimes such as Demak, Pajang, and Mataram. They proceeded and strengthened Islam not only as a political symbol of elites but also a mass cultural identity integrated within Javanese identity. Islam then became one element which marked a long and complex history of Javanese civilization.1 How foreign elements come to be transformed and accepted as parts of indigenous identity is obviously interesting to be pondered further in this context. Promoting new ideas particularly of religion is not easy. It is a formidable task which usually faces critical periods in its process. Moreover if the process reaches certain level which makes previous elements almost being unrecognizable. Islam in Java absolutely found the same challenge. According to Mark R. Woodward, it was what happened with the conversion process in Java. He says that the transformation of Javanese culture has occurred at least twice, first at the integration of Hinduism and Buddhism within Javanese identity during the early centuries of the Christian era, and then Islam in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Woodward illustrates it being so complete that native elements are scarcely recognizable. Those which have been retained have been assimilated by the great

Mark R. Woodward, Java, Indonesia and Islam (Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer, 2010), 10. 64 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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traditions so completely as to fundamentally alter their cultural and/or religious meanings.2 It means that Islam was not the only one element introduced and integrated to Javanese identity in the Islamization process of Java. Hinduism and Buddhism or even Animism as existing elements were also surviving and taking their place in the new stage of transformation. Consequently, the new identity of Javanese is a result of such modification which allows synthesis of different elements from various sources. Javanese identity including religion is then properly called a hybrid identity.3 Here, religious or cultural tradition should not be perceived living in vacuum or isolation. Even if religious believers admit the hybridity of their identity, they still often claim that their identity is pure and genuine. However, it usually does not stop some of them to seek what they perceive as purer or more genuine identity. It may be done by rejecting such teachings or abandoning such rituals supposed as incompatible with their religious faith. This is why it is difficult and even controversial to decide what is properly understood as Islamic. In fact, Muslims are varied and differed in comprehending and perceiving what really Islam is. They sometimes regard their theological opponents as unbelievers excluded from the community of the faithful.4 For practical usage, Islam in this article is referred to its broader sense. Fazlurrahman said,
2

Mark R. Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989), 17. 3 See M.C. Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries (Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006), 27. 4 Mark R. Woodward, Introduction. Talking Across Paradigms: Indonesia, Islam, and Orientalism in Mark R. Woodward (ed.), Toward New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought (Tempe: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), 7. 65 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Islam is the name of certain norms and ideals which are to be progressively realized through different social phenomena and set-ups. Indeed, Islam, understood properly, ever seeks new and fresh forms for self-realization and finds these forms.5 Elsewhere Woodward states, Religious variation can be understood as a range of possible answers to a single set of questions concerning the way or ways in which Islam should be interpreted and acted upon.6 This paper will focus on the exploration of historical records of religious violence related to the process of Islamization in the early period of Islamic Javanese kingdoms. In other words, this writing is actually trying to question the truth of the story that Islam was spread in Java peacefully. There is an assumption here that the Islamization of Java which had transformed Javanese identity was not empty from religious violence even among Muslims themselves. The concept of religious violence includes violent attitudes or actions which are showed or performed against persons or groups identified as the others based on their religious differences. The actors of religious violence are possible coming from individuals, religious groups, or even states. The study tries to identify historical events occurred during the expansion period of Islamic kingdoms in Java. The span of time covered the period of Demak, Pajang, and Mataram. These three Islamic kingdoms were known politically and culturally as the Islamic centers in Java. They can be regarded as representations of Islamic existence within Javanese civilization. They clearly used Islam as their power symbol and political propaganda. Therefore, it is reasonable to explore the image of religious tolerance

Fazlurrahman, Islamic Methodology in History (Delhi: Adam Publisher & Distributors, 1994), 189. 6 Woodward, Islam in Java, 30. 66 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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and religious violence related to the process of Islamization during their time jointly. The Dawn of Islamization in Java Muslim merchants and preachers were supposed to have arrived and settled in pesisir utara and timur (the northern and eastern coastal areas) of Java around the eleventh century. As archeological evidence, a Muslim gravestone named Fatimah binti Maimun bin Hibatullah was found in Leran (Gresik) dated 475 H or 1082 M. 7 However, the process of Islamization seemly was begun massively during Majapahits era.8 When Islam reached and was spread in China, Siam, and Malakas areas at the fourteenth century, Majapahit had used Muslim seamen and soldiers for its military expansions. It might relate to the tributary system which managed the mutual exchange relationship between Majapahit and external powers.9 The introduction of Islam in the coastal areas then moved to more interior areas of Java. The Muslim graves at Trowulan and Troloyo near the capital of Majapahit dated 1376 to 1475 M signified that Muslims of high status having existed within the royal palace.10 It was very significant for indicating the stage of Islam spread over Javanese people. If the noble elites could be perceived as cultural

Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia III: Zaman Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Kerajaan-Kerajaan Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2008), 50; M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200 (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 4. 8 M.C. Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java, 5. 9 Anthony Reid, Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 31. 10 Ibid., 31; Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java, 12-13; Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 5. 67 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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definers,11 it can be understood that by reaching Majapahits court Islam had succeeded in fostering its influence. Furthermore, in the middle of the fifteenth century, there was a record of Islamic presence at the heart of Majapahits court. The king of Majapahit Brawijaya married a daughter of Champas ruler who was supposed a Muslim. There she was visited by her nephew called Raden Rahmat. The king subsequently permitted this man to inhabit Ampel near Surabaya where he served religious activities and establish Muslim community.12 Ma Huan, who observed Java in 1405 to 1421 M, as Anthony Reid quoted, noted that Muslim communities had settled in coastal areas of Java such as Tuban, Gresik, and Surabaya.13 According to Tome Pires who visited Java in 1513 M, the lords of these areas commonly were descendants from Chinese, Parsees, Kling and other foreign nationalities. This multiethnic society was predominantly Islams adherents. Those Muslims seemed to become Javanese even having foreign origin.14 The breakthrough of Islamization process was signed with the ascension of Raden Patah as the ruler of Demak. He was a son of the king Brawijaya from Puteri Champa, the aunt of Raden Rahmat or Sunan Ampel. Raden Patah was portrayed as a warlike Muslim ruler. By conquering Semarang in 1477 M and then Majapahit in 1478 M,15 he played important role in the establishment of Islam as a religion and also a political power in Java. Demak had signified a new stage of Islamization process of Java. However, there were some records on the existence of Islamic local states on the northern and eastern coasts of Java established and led by foreign origin Muslims before
11 12

See ibid., 14. Reid, Charting the Shape, 30-31. 13 Ibid., 62. 14 Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java, 17-19. 15 Reid, Charting the Shape, 68. 68 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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the rise of Demak under Raden Patah as mentioned above.16 Demak itself was one of them. Religious Violence during the Expansion of Islamic kingdoms in Java Woodward argues that the becoming of Islam as an imperial religion was very crucial in the history of Javanese Islam. The fact that Islam has its position as the religion of Java cannot be separated from the role of Muslim kings. This process includes at least two features: first, the elimination of existing cultures of Hinduism and Buddhism; and second, the subordination of the Muslim clergy to royal authority.17 Unfortunately, that process of Islamization in fact was not empty from religious violence. There were convincing evidences that violent process of Islamization having occurred during the time of Demak as the first Islamic kingdom in Java. When the power shifted to Pajang and then to Mataram, similar occurrences were also found accompanying the process. Warfare or violent conflict seemed not to be regarded as something evil in such degree for it was ubiquitous. It may be the common character of political regimes based on kingship system in pre-modern era. In order to expand or maintain their power, territories, and influences warfare or violence was usually used as a main instrument to realize their goals. Similar to the ancient Mataram and Majapahit which belonged to Hinduism and Buddhism, Demak, Pajang, and Mataram which belonged to Islam were not an exception. Violent approaches were employed to ensure their interests. At that time, submission seemed to be extremely important to maintain the state with its prestige and wealth. G. Mudjanto says that submission was not only the sign of recognition
16

M.C. Ricklefs, Yogyakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792: A History of the Division of Java (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 10-12. 17 Woodward, Islam in Java, 54. 69 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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toward certain political authority, but also the subject of providing tributary taxes for the dominant or center state.18 In the case of Islam in Java, this religion was not accepted particularly by the major Javanese states voluntarily.19 Even in the early accommodation of Islam within Majapahits court, the contestation between the early religious and cultural elements mainly Buddhism and Islam as the new one had been started.20 And this resistance against Islam got stronger when it appeared as a political threat. Demak, Pajang, and then Mataram actually showed the continuing line of kingship from Majapahit. Raden Patah the founder of Demak was the son of the last king of Majapahit, Brawijaya, from Champa princess. Jaka Tingkir or Adiwijaya the founder of Pajang was a descendant of Brawijayas daughter who married Jayaningrat, the regent of Pengging. He was also an adopted son of Ki Ageng Sela who was a son of Brawijayas grandson, Ki Getas Pendawa. Senapati, the founder of Mataram, was the son of Ki Ageng Pemanahan, the grandson of Ki Ageng Sela.21 Demak was located in the north coast of Java. Its land was fertile. In the place named Gelagahwangi Raden Patah was told starting a Muslim community. He chose this place following the instruction of Sunan Ampel a prominent Muslim priest who was still his relative from his mother.22 This region then grew rapidly under his leadership. In 1513 M, it was established as the first Islamic kingdom

18

Gregory Mudjanto, The Concept of Power in Javanese Culture (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1993), 19. 19 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, Vol. 2: Expansion and Crisis (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1993), 173. 20 Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java, 15. 21 Mudjanto, The Concept of Power, 157. 22 See Poesponegoro, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia III, 52. 70 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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in Java.23 When he passed away, Pati Unus was enthroned even not for long. The third ruler of Demak was Trenggana. He was the first Muslim ruler in Java using Sultan as his reign title authorized from Mecca brought by Sunan Gunung Jati about 1524 M. Trenggana was portrayed as a warlike ruler like Raden Patah and Pati Unus or Pangeran Sabrang Lor who came to the throne before him. If his father Raden Patah was known as the founder of the regime and who declared the break with Majapahit, Trenggana was the Muslim ruler who completed the fall of Majapahit in Kediri 1527 M.24 On contrary with his brother Pati Unus who had sent bravely the military expedition to Malaka strait in the west direction of Java, he conquered almost the whole eastern part of Java. This mission, however, was interrupted when he died in Panarukan 1546 M. Interestingly, Manoel Pinto, a Portuguese who visited Java at that time, described Trenggana as a ruler who had aim to Islamicise all the surrounding peoples.25 This statement supported another indicator that showed Trenggana having strong intention to develop Demak as an Islamic kingdom in Java.26 It actually said that the warfare done by Trenggana was militarily and politically based on such religious purposes. In addition, there are Muslim clergies around Trenggana who were not only playing religious role but also political one. Their advices were obeyed by the ruler. It significantly showed their power, authority, and greatness in influencing the politics of the regime.27 However, it can be assumed that there was mutual exchange of benefits or advantages between the ruler and the clergy. The
23

Sri Margana, Javas Last Frontier: The Struggle for Hegemony of Blambangan, c. 1763-1813 (Leiden: Universiteit Leiden, 2007), 148. 24 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 41. 25 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 175-176. 26 Ibid., 175. 27 Mudjanto, The Concept of Power, 15-16. 71 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Muslim priests, on one hand, might be able to apply their Islamic aspirations to wider possibilities with political support and military guard from the ruler. On other hand, the ruler could expand his political sovereignty by using religious justification. He had also powerful source to mobilize the people for political purposes. We possibly acknowledge that the Muslim priests who were recruited as official advisers must be persons who kept supportive standpoints for the ruler. Meanwhile, the priests who had rival or even threatening views against the court should be marginalized or eliminated. Seh Siti Jenar, Seh Malang Sumirang, and Ki Ageng Pengging were prominent examples for this tendency. The three gurus (spiritual teachers) were executed not only for being suspected of committing religious transgression but in fact for political threat emerging among people from their opposition against the court.28 All of these confirm the existence of mutual relations between politics and religious centers. Along with this relation between politics and religion in the form of relationship between the ruler and the priests, there was also mutual as well as conflicting relation among the priests. For the latter type of relation, it was not only between official priests who supported the ruler and who opposed as what had occurred between dewan wali sembilan (the council of Nine Muslim apostles) and tiga guru (three spiritual teachers including Siti Jenar, Malang Sumirang, and Ki Ageng Pengging), but also among dewan wali sembilan themselves. In the clash between Jipang and Pajang, for example, we can see the tension between Sunan Kudus in one side and Sunan Parapen (Giri) and Sunan Kalijaga in other side. Arya Penangsang the regent of Jipang was the student of Sunan Kudus29 who killed Ki
28

Nancy K. Florida, Writing the Past Inscribing the Future: History as Prophecy in Colonial Java (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1995), 352-253. 29 Mudjanto, The Concept of Power, 15. 72 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Ageng Pengging,30 the father of Adiwijaya or Jaka Tingkir the regent of Pajang. Arya Penangsang himself was the son of Prince Suryawiyata or Sekar Seda Lepen who was killed by his nephew Prince Mukmin or Sunan Prawata, the son of Trenggana who reigned Demak as sultan.31 When the clash finally was won by Pajang, Adiwijaya then was crowned sultan with the blessing of Sunan Giri.32 And as a disciple of Sunan Kalijaga,33 he also always accepted advice from this prominent wali.34 These two figures, Sunan Giri and Sunan Kalijaga, actually reflected the stream of Javanese Islam. Meanwhile Sunan Kudus represented the orthodox Islam.35 Mudjanto noted that the clash between Jipang and Pajang can also be seen as the clash between these two types of Islamic ideology, the orthodox Islam which resembled the common ideology of coastal Muslim elements and Javanese Islam as the mainland ideology.36 Later, after Adiwijaya died, the similar conflict happened within the tensions between Arya Pangiri, the son of Sunan Prawata and also Adiwijayas son-in-law, and Prince Benawa, the son of Adiwijaya who was backed up by Senapati, his brother-in-law. Pangiri was supported by Sunan Kudus. Benawa and Senapati obtained supports from Sunan Giri and Sunan Kalijaga.37 The existence of orthodox Islam in Java and its dispute with different schools could be broader understood by reading Reids note that the conversion to Islam was clearly seen in the sixteenth century. It was identified explicitly by acquiring new ways of life,
30 31

Florida, Writing the Past, 388-391. Mudjanto, The Concept of Power, 14. 32 Ibid., 15. 33 Ibid., 160. 34 Ibid., 16. 35 Ibid., 17. 36 Ibid., 15. 37 Ibid., 17. 73 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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wearing Islamic attributes, and associating with international Islamic community. Two factors played in this kind of development: the progress of maritime relations between Southeast Asia and the Red Sea area and the sharper distinction between the Dar al-Islam and its opponents.38 The latter could be related to the emerging concept of pan-Islamic. It was well-documented that Aceh made diplomatic relations with Turkey Ottoman in the 1560s.39 Although it opens a question how far this phenomena gave its effects to Islamic kingdom in Java. However, it could be supposed through survived writings that the orthodox stream of Islam having reached coastal areas of Java at that time. It implied sharpening boundaries between Islamic and non-Islamic.40 This tendency was apparently not unique in Java. In the intellectual history of Aceh as a comparison the conflicting ideas also occurred between Hamzah Fansuri who promoted wahdat alwujud in the period of Sultan Iskandar Muda and Nuruddin Ar-Raniri who opposed the former by promoting wahdat al-syuhud in the period of Sultan Iskandar Tsani.41 The bloodshed flowed in the period of Pajang then also colored the history of Mataram even in its very early period. It can be read from the story of Senopati the founder of Mataram written by van Goens. Both Reid and Ricklefs quoted relevant statement from his writing in translation: And because his neighbours were, in his judgement, stubbornly refusing to adopt this religion with him, he immediately prepared for war, having power and means
38 39

Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 143-144. Ibid., 147. 40 Ibid., 149; Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java, 23-25. 41 See Taufik Abdullah, The Pesantren in Historical Perspective in T. Abdullah & S. Siddique (eds.), Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 1986), 89; Poesponegoro, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia III, 33-34. 74 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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for this in his hands. He first attacked the most powerful, populous and fruitful province of all, named Mataram, which in a short time he had conquered. He immediately killed with great cruelty all the royal family and their retainers, sparing neither woman nor children. He thereupon introduced his newly acquired religion and made his new residence in Mataram, in a new court which was constructed for this purpose after their fashion, and which I have myself seen42 After conquering this province, he made war to the end of his life, having made himself lord and master before his death of the province of Purbaya, Blitar, Salaron and Pamalang.43 This is really a remarkable description showing how religious element used in the violent action against others. The violence had not stopped after Panembahan Senopati died in 1601 M.44 Thereupon the brutal military conquest was done in the reign of Agung from 1613 M. Several areas such as Surabaya, Pati, Giri, and Blambangan which took a break from Mataram after Senopati passing away45 forced his successor to regain those areas. Agung who started using the title of sultan at 1641 M sent his army to defeat his rival lords, banish their rice crops, and sometimes carry forward their populations to his Matarams mainland districts.46

42 43

Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java, 33. Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 177. 44 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 48. 45 Poesponegoro, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia III, 57. 46 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 50-52; Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java, 34; Florence Lamoureux, Indonesia: A Global Studies Handbook (Santa Barbara, Denver, and Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 15. 75 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Thousand people captured in many towns during military expeditions against Blambangan were also forced to be slaves.47 In the reign of Amangkurat I the successor of Sultan Agung, Mataram entered new episode in relation with Islamization. The massacre of about thousands priests and their families or followers in his early time of accession and his lifestyle that far from religious (Islamic) piety put Amangkurat I as the ruler who did not support Islamization of Javanese culture.48 His tight alliance with VOC which interfered deeply into Matarams political policies brought Islam likely taking oppositional position. The violent approaches of the court then got reaction from the people who identified themselves as devout or pious Muslims. The prominent figure rising in this context was Raden Trunajaya.49 This bitter conflict with the dilemma of Islamic identity continued until the reign of Amangkurat II and then his successors. Islamization and the Myth of Religious Tolerance By mentioning the above historical records it does not mean that the process of Islamization in Java identical with violence. The Islamization in Java was a complex process. Even if it was colored by several violent events we should not disregard the other accounts which affirmed the existing non-violent phenomena during the early period of Islamization in Java. Even within the gray epoch of the massive expansion period of Islamic kingdoms in Java particularly Demak and Mataram, religious tolerance had marked the process of Islamization. For this reason, it is important to note carefully several
47

Andrew Beatty, Varieties of Javanese Religion: An Anthropological Account (Cambridge, New York and Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13. 48 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 92. 49 Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java, 58. 76 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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points related to the process of Islamization and the myth of religious tolerance in Java. Firstly, the violence in the early period of Islamic kingdoms in Java was predominantly geopolitical in character.50 This is what Ricklefs sees when he analyzes the warfare between coast and interior described by Pires. The introduction and reception of Islam within Javanese culture should not be confused with the political and economical conflict between both areas. He argues that the warfare still continued even long after both regions had embraced Islam as religion.51 It means that the violence conducted by Muslim rulers basically was driven by real geopolitical challenges. The violent approaches seemed to be adequate alternatives to ensure their political and economical position in the geopolitical constellation with external states of power. However, the fact that there were similar warfare done by Hindu and Buddhist kings or rulers before the coming of Islam in Java supported the claim that violence was not introduced by or identical with Islam. Furthermore, it cannot be denied that some rulers having imperial ambitions that tempted them to conquer foreign territories as much as possible to widen and enhance their influence, prestige and wealth. This is why Panembahan Senopati or Sultan Agung insisting to subdue several areas mostly in the coastal parts of Java even these areas were known as Islamic viewed from their lords or people. Similar reasons might be taken in understanding the way of Sultan Agung when he crushed brutally the rebellion led by Muslim leaders of twenty villages in the heartland of Mataram. He was not reluctant to execute them by force.52 Secondly, along with the first reason it is clear that the Islamic symbol used by the Muslim rulers and the presence of Muslim priests
50 51

See ibid., 20. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 8-10. 52 Ibid., 39. 77 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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at the court did not always imply a full application of Islamic law.53 Although we may agree that the criteria to become Islamic does not need the full representation of the syariah. But, it undoubtedly enforces the assumption that the kings or rulers in Java embraced Islam basically in order to enhance and strengthen their supernatural power.54 The increase of such power was trusted having great influence to sustain their possession of the throne. It also secured their exclusive claim of divine inspiration for their position as the political and also religious leader.55 Trunajayas rebellion against Amangkurat I in 1674 M could also be understood in this sense. The issue of trivial Islam or nominal Muslim that was suspected to Amangkurat I showed the existing question about the sincere intention and commitment of the court in its position as the religious exemplar for its people and also as the guardian of the religion, Islam.56 Thirdly, there were historical data showing that the process of Islamization in Java mainly took place in peaceful manner.57 Sultan Agung for instance in the latest period of his time initiated peaceful efforts in accommodating Islam within Javanese culture. These then embodied in several Islamic literatures written and brought to the court such as Carita Sultan Iskandar, Serat Yusuf, Kitab Usulbiyah and

53 54

Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 178. See Benedict R. OG. Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 28. 55 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 171. 56 See Simuh, Mistik Islam Kejawen Raden Ngabehi Ranggawarsita: Suatu Studi Terhadap Serat Wirid Hidayat Jati (Jakarta: UI-Press, 1988), 13. 57 Jill Forshee, Culture and Customs of Indonesia (Westport & London: Greenwood Press, 2006), 35; Clifford Geertz, After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Antropologist (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1995), 53; Andre Moller, Ramadan in Java: The Joy and Jihad of Ritual Fasting (Lund: Anpere, 2007), 66-67. 78 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Suluk Garwa Kancana.58 The new calendar combining Javanese and Islamic one was another evidence of Islamization done in nonviolence. Otherwise, we have to realize that the process of Islamization did not merely run by the Muslim rulers formally. In fact, the Islamization had taken place by individuals or groups initiatives and efforts. Long times before the rise of Demak, by wandering from one place to another place for preaching Islam or by establishing Islamic community or institution such as pesantren, Muslim priests had carried out Islamization in peaceful approaches. A foreigner like Tome Pires had also reported that in the early sixteenth century the northern coastal areas of Java were still inhabited by about fifty thousand non-Muslim ascetics (pertapa). Those men were also still honored and asked their advices by Muslims.59 It resembled clearly that such religious tolerance existed at that time. Although we have to notice that it is not easy to assess the degree of real religious tolerance in any particular cases.60 Overall, violence may occur with or without religious reasons. Even violence that seems to be religious violence may occur with or without religious reasons. The reasons to engage violence may rise from the womb of social, economical, or political interests. These all make violence seen as a discursive reality. However, it is hard to consider religious reason out of violence. In recent times, R. Scott Appleby shows to us that religious reason playing actively as the core of fundamentalist violence. The actors of violence in many cases are inspired and motivated deeply by and rooted in their religious faith. Appleby also indicates that religious violence may be carried out

58 59

Ibid., 43-47. Ibid., 11. 60 See Benedict R.OG. Anderson, Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1996), 13. 79 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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through mature preparations and definite goals.61 In addition, there are remarkable evidences convincing us that the Islamization process in Java had been tempted to use violent approaches against others. Ricklefs says that the process of Islamization mainly took place in peaceful manner but since Islamic kingdoms were found in Java the spread of Islam was not only done by persuasion and commercial pressures. Islamization was frequently also carried out by the sword or violent conquest.62 In conclusion, I say that the myth of religious tolerance and peaceful Islamization during the expansion of Islamic kingdoms in Java is not fully right as it was told. There were violent and bloody records during Islamization of Java. Bibliography Abdullah, Taufik. The Pesantren in Historical Perspective in T. Abdullah & S. Siddique (eds.), Islam and Society in Southeast Asia. Singapore: ISEAS, 1986. Anderson, Benedict R.OG. Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1996. _____. Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. Appleby, R. Scott. Violence as a Sacred Duty: Patterns of Religious Extremism in The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, Reconciliation. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

61

R. Scott Appleby, Violence as a Sacred Duty: Patterns of Religious Extremism in The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, Reconciliation (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 81-120. 62 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 17. 80 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Beatty, Andrew. Varieties of Javanese Religion: An Anthropological Account. Cambridge, New York and Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Fazlurrahman. Islamic Methodology in History. Delhi: Adam Publisher & Distributors, 1994. Florida, Nancy K. Writing the Past Inscribing the Future: History as Prophecy in Colonial Java. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1995. Forshee, Jill. Culture and Customs of Indonesia. Westport & London: Greenwood Press, 2006. Geertz, Clifford. After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Antropologist. Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1995. Lamoureux, Florence. Indonesia: A Global Studies Handbook. Santa Barbara, Denver, and Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2003. Margana, Sri. Javas Last Frontier: The Struggle for Hegemony of Blambangan, c. 1763-1813. Leiden: Universiteit Leiden, 2007. Moller, Andre. Ramadan in Java: The Joy and Jihad of Ritual Fasting. Lund: Anpere, 2007. Mudjanto, Gregory. The Concept of Power in Javanese Culture. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1993. Poesponegoro, Marwati Djoened. Sejarah Nasional Indonesia III: Zaman Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Kerajaan-Kerajaan Islam di Indonesia. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2008. Reid, Anthony. Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000. _____. Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, Vol. 2: Expansion and Crisis. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1993.

81 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Ricklefs, M.C. A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200. Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001. _____. Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries. Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006. _____. Yogyakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792: A History of the Division of Java. London: Oxford University Press, 1974. Simuh. Mistik Islam Kejawen Raden Ngabehi Ranggawarsita: Suatu Studi Terhadap Serat Wirid Hidayat Jati. Jakarta: UI-Press, 1988. Woodward, Mark R. Introduction. Talking Across Paradigms: Indonesia, Islam, and Orientalism in Mark R. Woodward (ed.), Toward New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought. Tempe: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996. _____. Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989. _____. Java, Indonesia and Islam. Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer, 2010.

82 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

CHRISTIANS-MUSLIM RELIGIO-POLITICAL TENSIONS: THE ISSUE OF CHRISTIANIZATION

Andreas Jonathan
STT Getsemani, Yogyakarta

83 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Andreas Jonathan

Introduction Religious life in Indonesia today is still colored by many concerns and struggles, as reported in CRCS Yearly Report of Religious Life in Indonesia 2010 (Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia 2010).1 Many tensions done in the name of religion with several reasons and purposes have been annoying the relation among the people. Religious harmony and religious freedom are two issues that often cannot walk together side by side because in fact religious life cannot be separated from other aspects of life. In the context of living together in a nation-state like Indonesia, politics and religion are tied tightly and almost impossible to separate. Religion and politics have been dynamic in Indonesian inter-religious affair since the beginning of the Republic, especially in ChristianMuslim relations. Some researches have been done in regards of ChristianMuslim relations in Indonesia which show that this issue is very important to discuss and to solve.2 Jan S. Aritonang, a Christian scholar, has written a very extensive book exploring the history of the Christian-Muslim encounters from 1511 to 2003, while Mujiburrahman and Fatimah Husein are focusing on the relations during the New Order Era more from Muslim perspectives. Those studies in general find out that in most cases the issue of Christianization and syariah become two prominent factors of the Christian-Muslim tensions from religio-political perspective.
1

CRCS, Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia 2010 (Yogyakarta: CRCS, 2011). 2 Jan S. Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan Kristen dan Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: BPK, 2005); Fatimah Husein, Muslim-Christian Relations in the New Order Indonesia: The Exclusivist and Inclusivist Muslims Perspectives (Bandung: Mizan, 2005); Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened: MuslimChristian Relations in Indonesias New Order (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). 84 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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However, I see that Christianization and syariah factors are not two separate issues but it is intertwined and interdependent to each other. I realize that Muslim-Christian relations are not only political and not always in tensions, but due to limited resources and space I choose to discuss the tensions from political aspect. The issue has tremendously impacted religious life in Indonesia. Therefore, in this paper I will discuss on certain tensions in Christian-Muslim relations from historical approach since the beginning of Indonesia up to current era to see the connecting themes. In particular I will discuss how Christianization has been the most sensitive issue among Muslims (Islamist) in order to answer my research question: How has the issue of Christianization developed religio-political tensions in Christians-Muslims relations? The findings of this research will contribute mainly to give a better understanding about the responses of both Christians and Muslims as well as what Christians should do to decrease the tension. 1945 1965 In the preparation of the Indonesian independence, Christians and Muslims were involved in some committees like BPUPKI, Panitia Perancang UUD and PPKI3. BPUPKI was formed by the Japanese in March 1945 with 62 members. From 62 members, 15 persons were representatives from Islamic4 groups (Islamist), the rest are secular3

BPUPKI= Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI= Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia. 4 Islamic group is addressed to organizations that based on Islamic ideology and to establish an Islamic State or to apply syariah law as normative law. I will use Islamist to identify this kind of group. Those 15 BPUPKI members who are considered as Islamists: Abikusno Cokrosuyoso (PSII), KH. Ahmad Sanusi (PUI), KH Abdul Halim (PUI), Raden Syamsudin (PUI), KH Mas Mansur 85 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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nationalist included three Christians.5 The discussion regarding the form of the state whether Islamic (Negara Islam) or united (Negara Kesatuan) was the hottest issue debated in BPUPKI. This debate did not come into any agreement and the topic of discussion was changed to Sukarnos speech on 1 June 1945 about the state foundation (Pancasila). The issue of religion was also mentioned deliberately in his speech. Sukarno was challenging both Muslims and Christians to work hard and fair to get more seats in the Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat DPR) if they wanted to make the state law and regulations according to their religions. However, Sukarno appealed to the assembly that Indonesia should be based on Divinity (Ketuhanan) that all people could worship their Lord freely and respect other religions. Because the debates between Islamist and secular-nationalist still have not come to an agreement, on 18 June 1945 out of 62 BPUPKI members were chosen 9 persons to be in special committee called Panitia Sembilan to draft the Preamble of the Constitution (Pembukaan UUD).6 Panitia Sembilan came to a compromise formulation called the Jakarta Charter, which the first
(Masyumi), Raden Ruslan Wongsokusumo (Masyumi), KH Masykur (NU), KH. Wachid Hasyim (NU), Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (Muhammadiyah), Abdul Kahar Muzakir (Muhammadiyah), Ny. Sunaryo Mangunpuspito (Aisyah), KH. Agus Salim (Penyadar), Sukiman (PII), AR. Baswedan (PAI), Abdul Rahim Pratalykrama (Residen Kediri). 5 Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan, 235-236. Islamist group is addressed to Muslims whose ideology is to establish an Islamic State or to apply syariah Law. The three Christians are Maramis (Minahasan), Latuharhary (Ambonese) and Parada Harahap (Bataks) (see http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daftar_Anggota_BPUPKI-PPKI). 6 The members of Panitia Sembilan were 5 from secular-nationalist camp: Sukarno, Hatta, Ahmad Subarjo, Muh. Yamin, Maramis and 4 from Islamist camp: Abikusno (SI), Abdul Kahar (Muhamadiyah), Wahid Hasyim (NU), Agus Salim (PI). Maramis is a Christian but considered as part of secularnationalist. 86 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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principle said Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya. In the second assembly on 10-16 July 1945, the Jakarta Charter formulation was reported by Panitia Sembilan. Johanes Latuharhary, an Ambonese Christian, raised his objection regarding the seven words7. The disagreement was not only from Latuharhary, but also from some Javanese Muslims like Wongsonegoro and Husein Jayadiningrat.8 However, finally the assembly accepted the Jakarta Charter and the discussion moved to the government structure. The Islamist proposed a kingdom with a Khalifah, but finally the majority agreed to have a republic with a president. Other tensions were on the proposal from the Islamist that the president must be a Muslim and the state religion is Islam. Sukarno in his speech on 16 July 1945 tried to mediate the debates and urged the assembly to accept the point of president must be a Muslim and to put the first principle of Jakarta Charter in chapter 29 verse 1. Sukarno in front of the assembly deliberately asked Latuharhary and Maramis as nonMuslim members to accept this proposal as their sacrifice to the country. Finally, the assembly was closed by that decision. After Japan was bombed by the USA, the Japanese formed PPKI on 7 August 1945 with 21 members (later became 27). From 27 people, 16 were former BPUPKI members, which only 2 were from the Islamist group: Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (Muhamaddiyah and KH. Wachid Hasyim (NU). Three members were Christians: GSSJ (Sam) Ratulangie (Minahasan), Johanes Latuharhary (Ambonese), and Yap Tjwan Bing (Javanese Chinese).9 On 15 August Japan surrendered to the Alliance, and on 17 August 1945 Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed
7

The problematic seven words are: dengan menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya. Latuharhary considered that words as discrimination to other religions. 8 Husein, Muslim-Christian Relations, 74. 9 Http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daftar_Anggota_BPUPKI-PPKI. 87 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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the independence of Indonesia. On 17 August evening Sukarno and Hatta called four Muslim leaders10 for an urgent meeting, asking to delete the seven words of the Jakarta Charter to accommodate objection from Christians. Finally, in relatively short time they agreed to change the first principle to Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa in order to keep the nation unity.11 On 18 August, PPKI assembly accepted that proposal together with deleting the clause must be a Muslim from the requirement of president. The Islamist leaders accepted this compromise with three reasons:12 1. 2. The Islamic group was aware the importance of nation unity, especially in the context Indonesia that was just founded. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is not against the meaning of tauhid in Islam.

10

Soekarno and Hatta talked to Ki Bagoes Hadikoesoemo, KH. Wahid Hasyim, Mr. Kasman Singodimejo, Mr. Teuku Mohammad Hasan after heard a message from Nishijima (the assitant of Admiral Maeda) about the objection of Christians to the seven words of the Jakarta Charter. If they did not delete the seven words, the Christians in East Indonesia would not join NKRI. Accroding to historian Dr. I.O. Nanulaitta, the Japanese soldier met Mr. J. Latuharhary and Dr. GSSJ Ratulangie. See Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan, 254. 11 Hatta said, Supaya kita jangan pecah sebagai bangsa, kami mufakat untuk menghilangkan bagian kalimat yang menusuk hati kaum Kristen itu dan menggantikannya dengan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. Quoted from Mohammad Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 (Jakarta, Tintamas, 1969), 56. See Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan, 255. According to Robert W. Hefner, it is the NU who proposed the words Yang Maha Esa [Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 42]. 12 Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan, 255. 88 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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3.

The Islamic group hopes for a general election would be held six months after the Proclamation. They were confident that they would win because the majority of Indonesia is Muslim. 13

If the third consideration is true, then it was a great faith of the Christians to finally decide to be part of Indonesia with a possibility of change in the future. However, I am doubt that was what Sukarno meant in his speech because the decision to have multi political party was not decided by PPKI. Conversely, on 22 August 1945, PPKI agreed to have one single political party to unite all political powers in PNI. It means that there would be no plan to form Islamic political party. The Islamic political parties, together with many other parties, were formed later because of Maklumat Pemerintah no X/1945 on 3 November 1945 which encouraged by international pressure rather than by the Islamist.14 Nevertheless, some Islamist leaders that felt betrayed because PPKI changed what they have discussed and agreed in BPUPKI, continued their struggle for the Jakarta Charter.15 The attempt to establish an Islamic State continued to occur in many ways from formal political means to the radical rebellions. One significant rebellion was DI/TII/NII16 rebellion by S.M. Kartosuwiryo and Kahar
13

This conviction was based on what Sukarno said, Nanti dalam suasana yang lebih tenteram, kita tentu ... dapat membuat UUD yang lebih lengkap, lebih sempurna. 14 The Islamic political parties were formed because of Maklumat Pemerintah X/1945 on 3 November 1945 which allowed and encouraged to form as many political parties as possible. It was not the demand from Islamist groups but because of the threat of Alliances accusation that Indonesia applying facism so that it will put Indonesia in difficult position in global context. 15 Hefner, Civil Islam, 42. 16 DI= Darul Islam, TII= Tentara Islam Indonesia, NII= Negara Islam Indonesia. 89 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Andreas Jonathan

Muzakkar. Kartosuwiryo proclaimed the founding of NII on 7 August 1949 and claimed himself as the Imam of NII. In the draft of NII Constitution, non-Muslim was totally excluded and forbidden to hold any government role.17 The formal political means was expected from general election 1955. Two years before the election, on 11-15 April 1953 the Ulamas held a Muktamar to prepare Dustur Islamiyah (Islamic Constitution) with a conviction that the Islamist parties would win the election. A fatwa was announced that it was haram for Muslim to vote for nonIslamic party. However, the result of the election was a shock for the Islamic parties that they could not win the majority votes as they expected confidently.18 From 1953 to 1959 there were never ending debates in the process of making the Indonesian new Constitution in Konstituante whether Islam or Pancasila would be the foundation of the state, Christians were part of Pancasila defender together with the nationalists. Both Islamists and Christians were using their beliefs and sacred texts in their arguments. Another hot issue that debated in Konstituante was regarding religious freedom. The Islamists argued that non-Muslims would be protected as dhimmi in observing their religious practices. For Christians, it means that non-Muslims were considered as lower class and not equal as Muslims. Masyumi also proposed that the new Constitution would prohibit religious conversion. The Christians argued that based on the article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right to choose and change his/her religion.19 This religious freedom and
17 18

Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan, 295. From 250 seats in parliament, the Islamic parties got in total 114 seats; from Masyumi: 57, NU: 45, PSII: 8, and PERTI: 4 seats this is equal to 45,6% from the total seats (See: http://kepustakaan-presiden.pnri.go.id/pemilu/). 19 Article 18 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 90 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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conversion are two hot issues that continue to exist during Suhartos era and even today. These long debates were encouraged Sukarno to issue a President Decree on 5 July 1959 to dismiss Konstituante and to be back to 1945 Constitution and began the Guided Democracy that later brought Sukarno to be a long-life president. In the fifth paragraph of the Decree, Sukarno said We believe that the Jakarta Charter 22 June 1945 was the spirit of (menjiwai) the 1945 Constitution and was integrated (suatu rangkaian kesatuan) to that constitution.20 1966 now At the end of Sukarnos era, the communist was crushed by Suharto and the army. The Islamist groups21, which were in tension with the communist in NASAKOM period, involved in the anticommunist and the mass killing of the communist party (Partai Komunis Indonesia PKI) members. When Suharto became the new president, the Islamist group expected that they could be given more opportunity than they got from Sukarno, but disappointingly Suharto marginalized them from power arena. Even, Suharto forced all organizations, including religious ones, to take Pancasila as the sole basis (asas tunggal).

freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance (emphasis is mine). 20 Ign. Gatut Saksono, Dialog Wacana Syariat Islam (Yogyakarta: Yabinkas, 2009). 21 At least two groups were involved: NU youth (Pemuda Ansor) and Masyumi student organisations (HMI and PII), see Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, 23-24. 91 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Andreas Jonathan

During and after the mass killing there were around two million people came to Christ. This conversion took place mostly among the abangan Muslim Javanese, for instance, the member of Baptist Church in 1971 at least 56% from nominal/statistical Muslims, and 30% were former Muslims.22 It triggered the old tension around Christianization that becomes a never-ending issue for the Islamist until today. The first tension in Suhartos era was the building of a Methodist church in Meulaboh, Aceh in 1967. The local people and some Islamist leaders protested so that the building was stopped by the local government. This Meulaboh case did not only become a local issue but a national issue since it was brought to the Parliament (DPRGR). On 17 June 1967 the Christian representatives in the Parliament issued an interpellation that known as Simorangkirs Question.23 Simorangkir raised this issue based on religious freedom that should be no restriction to build place of worship wherever in Pancasila state. After a long hot debate, Lukman Harun represented the Islam faction on 10 July 1967 also issued an interpellation on foreign aid to religious bodies. This question was directed to Christian mission that supported by foreign aid. Harun put forward that the foreign aid should be controlled by the government. In addition, he also proposed that religious propagation should be confined to the people outside the recognized religions or who do not have religion.24 The state through the Minister of Religious Affair responded to these questions ambivalently,

22

Avery T. Willis, Indonesian Revival: Why Two Million Came to Christ (Pasadena: William Carey Library, 1977), 176-177. 23 Simorangkir was one of the top leader of Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia Indonesia Christian Party). This question was also supported by the Catholic Party representatives. 24 Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, 31-34. 92 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Andreas Jonathan

Any religious group in our state is entitled to freedom to build places of worship and to follow the teachings of its respective religion but it should also be considered that to use this freedom one should not offend or hurt the feeling of other groups.25 A similar statement also delivered by Suharto on 16 August 1967 that tried to give a middle way. He said that based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, religious freedom is guaranteed because it is the most fundamental human right. It comes from the dignity of the human being as Gods creature, not given by the state or a group. In addition he also emphasized that it should be avoided the spreading of religion in ways that may hurt the feeling of people who happened to have a different religion.26 This tension continued with Peristiwa Makasar 27 on 1 October 1967 when a number of Muslim youth attacked and destroyed some church buildings, Christian schools and Christian organization offices and hurt some Christian youth. It was triggered by some factors: a Christian teacher offended Prophet Muhammad, the plan to hold Indonesian Council of Churches Assembly in Makasar and the building of a church in front of a mosque in Makasar, where practically no Christian lived around that place. However, the government and some Islamist leaders justified the violence by giving logical arguments that the attack was resulted from some Christians mistakes which had hurt Muslims heart. This attack was not spontaneous but organized and planned by the HMI which chaired by Jusuf Kalla.

25 26

Ibid., 36. Ibid., 37. Quoted from Pidato Kenegaraan Pd. Presiden Republik Indonesia Djenderal Soeharto di Depan Sidang DPRGR 16 Agustus 1967, p. 25. 27 Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan, 383; Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, 39. 93 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Andreas Jonathan

Responding to this conflict, Suharto through the Minister of Religious Affair gathered religious leaders in Musyawarah Antar Umat Beragama on 30 November 1967 in Jakarta. In his opening speech, Suharto delivered his concern that the religious propagation had been used only for increasing the number of their adherents; moreover if it was directed to the adherents of other religion, it could endanger national unity.28 Both Christians and Muslims admitted that it was a divine calling to spread their religions, thus it needed modus vivendi in this plural nation. M. Natsir, former leader of Masyumi and a leader of DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia), represented Islam accused that Christians mission was planned to remove (melenyapkan) Islam from Indonesia, so that the only way to improve the relationship among religious groups was by prohibiting one religions adherents became the aim of the mission of other religion. The Protestant representatives led by A.M. Tambunan from Parkindo and T.B. Simatupang from DGI (Indonesian Council of Churches) as well as Kasimo from Catholic Church rejected those accusation and proposal, because it is not the goal of Christian mission to remove any religion, and it is a divine command to share the gospel to everybody and the whole world. Moreover, every human being has right to change his/her religion.29 In addition, Simatupang said even if he and other Christian representatives signed the agreement, it would not be followed by Christian community because it against the Scripture. As the result, there was no agreement on this point and it had been a disappointment for the Muslims.30 The result of this
28 29

Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan, 389. According to article 18 of Human Rights Declaration. 30 Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan, 391. HAMKA commented cynically: Bagi golongan Kristen, Kristen dan Katholik, musyawarah ini telah memberikan hasil yang sangat, sangat positif. Baru sekali ini, sejak Zending dan Missi dibawa oleh penjajah ke negeri ini, sampai sekarang zaman merdeka, mereka dapat mengatakan dengan terus terang di hadapan pemimpinpemimpin dan pemuka Islam, ulamanya dan zuamanya, bahwa 94 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Andreas Jonathan

musyawarah has grown the tension and seed of suspiciousness and distrust between two religions. The Islamists through the government continuously watch over and hinder Christian mission by some regulations. The attempt to revive the Jakarta Charter in 1945 Constitution also continued in early period of Suhartos era when the NU and Parmusi31 raised the demand to the MPRS General Assembly in 1968. The first regulation that confined religious freedom is the Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affair and the Minister of Domestic Affair (SKB No. 1/1969) on 13 September 1969. This SKB was to control the building of worship place especially in Muslim areas. It followed by the Marriage Law as the first law that made according to Islamic law (UU No. 1/1974). The intention to make Marriage Law had started by assigning a committee in 1950. In 1952 this committee had finished a draft of the Public Marriage Law (RUU Perkawinan Peraturan Umum) and in 1954 finished a draft of the Islamic Marriage Law (RUU Perkawinan Umat Islam). In 1968 RUU Peraturan Pernikahan Umat Islam was proposed to DPRGR and in 1973 the government proposed to DPR RUU Perkawinan. This 1973 draft was shocking the Islamist group since there were many points not in tune with Islamic law. HAMKA accused this draft was part of Christianization, since it was taken from the Dutch (Christian) Marriage law.32 Finally, the Marriage Law 1974 was changed to be in tune with the syariah, but in the contrary it was not in tune with some Christian concepts.

mengkristenkan seluruh ummat Islam ini adalah mission sacre mereka, kejawiban suci mereka. (quoted from Panji Masyarakat, No. 21, 1968). 31 Parmusi was a new form of Masyumi that was banned by Sukarno and Suharto. 32 Panji Masyarakat, No. 142, 1974 (quoted in Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan, 412). 95 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Andreas Jonathan

Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranegara while being the Minister of Religious Affair, in 1978 issued two Minister Decrees (No. 70 and 77) to prohibit religious propagation to the other religion adherents and to regulate foreign aid for religious activities by government agreement. Both DGI and Indonesian Bishop Conference (Majelis Agung Wali Gereja Indonesia MAWI) rejected both decrees. These two decrees later on were united in the Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affair and the Minister of Domestic Affair No. 1/ 1979. Some laws that made during and after Suhartos era that spirited (dijiwai) by syariah for instance: UU Wakaf No. 41/1977, UU Peradilan Agama No. 7/ 1989 and No. 3/ 2006, UU Sistem Perbankan Nasional No. 7/1992 and No. 23/1999, UU Pengelolaan Zakat No. 38/1999, and some laws that mainly to protect Muslims: UU Sistem Pendidikan Nasional No. 20/2003, UU Perlindungan Anak No. 23/2002, as well as some other laws are in waiting. Not only at national level, the syariah is implemented at regional level through Peraturan Daerah (Regional Regulations) in not less than 22 kabupaten and city.33 After the fall of Suharto, the attempt to revive the Jakarta Charter came back.34 In the MPR General Assembly 1999 the Islamist parties voice out to amend 1945 Constitution including the Preamble with a hope to accept the Jakarta Charter. Interestingly, this time the NU had different position and not supporting this idea even against
33

For instance: Bulukumba, Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, Indarmayu, Garut, Sinjai, Gowa, Maros, Enrekang, Takalar, Lombok Timur, Pamekasan, Padang, Solok. Some of the Perda are: Perda Wajib Berbusana Muslim Kabupaten Solok No 6/2002, Perda Pencegahan Maksiat Provinsi Gorontalo No 10/2003, Perda Wajib Al-Quran bagi Siswa dan Pengantin Kota Solok No 10/2001, Perda Busana dan Pandai Baca Tulis AL-Quran Kabupaten Enrekang No 6/2005, quoted from Ign. Gatut Saksono, Dialog Wacana Syariat Islam dan Sumbangan Pikiran Orang Kristiani (Yogyakarta: Yabinkas: 2009), 117; 159. 34 Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan, 581. 96 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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it. This position was expressed by the Nation Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa PKB) that was founded as political vehicle for NU members by Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid had played a significant role in transforming NU to be more pluralist. Finally, it was decided that Preamble of the 1945 Constitution (including Pancasila) cannot be changed at any cost. This decision was supported by both NU and Muhammadiyah as the two largest Muslim groups, that both fought for Islamic State and the Jakarta Charter in 1945. The still-in-pending-law that is very closely related to this discussion is the Religious Harmony Law (UU Kerukunan Umat Beragama). This law is a kind of summary from all other laws that related to inter-religious relations, and will be a big umbrella that regulates most of the inter-religious relations. Based on the academic draft of this law (RUU KUB), Trisno Sutanto35 analyses its content and finds out that it is not to build a real harmony (kerukunan) but it is a harmonizing (perukunan) policy by segregation to avoid conversion. He points out that most chapters are related to conversion issue: 36 1. Religious propagation (chapter IV), related to the Minister of Religious Affair Decree No. 70/1978 and the Joint Decree No. 1/

35

Trisno Sutanto, Negara, Kekuasaan, dan Agama: Membedah Politik Perukunan Rezim Orba, in Pluralisme Kewargaan (Bandung: Mizan, 2011). 36 Some sentences taken from the RUU KUB that related to the conversion issues: a) Inter-marriage: perkawinan antar pemeluk agama dijadikan salah satu alat untuk mengajak pasangan agar berpindah agama. b) Child adoption: pengangkatan anak tidak akan dijadikan media untuk memaksa keyakinan agama orang tua kepada anak angkatnya c) Religious education: lembaga pendidikan merupakan alat terselubung konversi agama d) Foreign aid: agar tidak disalahgunakan oleh pihak-pihak tertentu sebagai media untuk berpindah agama. 97 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Andreas Jonathan

1979, that prohibit religious propagation to other religions adherents. 2. Foreign aids for religious activities and organizations (chapter V), related to the Minister of Religious Affair Decree No. 77/ 1978 and the Joint Decree No. 1/ 1979, that regulates any foreign aid for religious agencies should be approved by government. Celebration of Religious holidays (Chapter VI), related to the Minister of Religious Affair Circular (Surat Edaran) No. 432/ 1981 on 2 September 1981 that prohibits certain religious adherent to attend other religious celebration. This was initiated by a fatwa from Indonesia Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia - MUI) that prohibited Muslims to attend Common Christmas Celebration issued on 7 March 1981.37 Building of Worship Place (chapter VII), related to the Joint Decree (SKB) of the Minister of Religious Affair and the Minister of Domestic Affair No. 1/ 1969, which has been renewed by SKB No. 8 and 9/ 2006. Religious Education (chapter IX), related to the National Education System Law No. 20/ 2003 which requires every student should get religious education according to his/her religion. Inter-religious Marriage (chapter X), related to the Marriage Law No. 1/ 1974 that an inter-religious marriage is illegal. It was supported by Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 1/ 1991 on Islamic Law Compilation that prohibits a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man. Child Adoption (chapter XI), related to Child Protection Law No. 23/ 2002 that child adoption is only allowed by parents with same religion.
Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, 92. 98 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

37

Andreas Jonathan

Interestingly, the responses from Christians and Muslims regarding this RUU KUB are very different. Slamet Effendi Yusuf represented the MUI said that the MUI supported UU KUB because it is needed to maintain nation harmony and stability.38 In contrast, Albertus Patty represented the PGI said that UU KUB is not needed yet, because there is no equality yet in religious life in Indonesia today. In addition, there is a concern that this law is to serve the majority and sacrifice the minority. Patty argues that as long as the state only recognizes the six religions, it means that there is no equality especially to the minority groups. Without equality will be no real harmony.39 Analysis From the discussion above I can conclude that the issue of conversion (Christianization) seems to be the core of the religiopolitical tension in Christians-Muslims relations. I want to analyze the possible reasons of both responses from Muslims and Christians towards this issue: 1. From Muslims (Islamist) Side Islam theologically and historically does not separate religion and the state (politics) because Islam is the way of life in every aspect of life. Almost all countries where Muslims are majority (especially in the Middle East), Islam becomes the state religion and or an Islamic state. Because Indonesia has been identified as the largest Muslim population in the world, the Islamists that influenced by the Middle East teachings also want to make Indonesia an Islamic state. This effort failed because Islam in Indonesia was not like in the Middle East; Islam in Indonesia was spread mainly by Sufism that in some extend synthesized with local beliefs and traditions (especially the
38 39

Kompas, 17 January 2011. Kompas, 11 February 2011. 99 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Javanese). In the eyes of Islamists, most of Muslims in Indonesia need to be purified, especially the abangan. The state is needed to force the abangan Muslims to practice and obey Islamic law (syariah); this is the reason why the Jakarta Charter was formulated. When the Jakarta Charter was deleted, it hurt the Islamists deeply because it swept away the most effective way that they could do to achieve that purpose. Unfortunately, Christians were the culprit that pushed Sukarno and Hatta (and PPKI) to dismiss their dream. Sukarno-Hatta were secular-nationalist because in some extend were influenced by the Western education instead of Middle-eastern education. It triggered the bitter memories of crusades and the religio-political wars against colonization that considered as jihad against the kafir Christians (e.g. Diponegoro war). The Islamist had high expectation in 1955 election, but the fact the abangan did not support them (although they got almost 50% votes) made them disappointed and tried again their struggle in Konstituante. Once again in Konstituante the Christians became the hindrance in achieving their dream. The huge conversion after 1965 tragedy became a bigger threat for the Islamist, because most of those who converted were the abangan. This threat made them to protect the abangan from any suspected Christianization efforts. Slowly but sure, one law by another law is issued for this two-fold purpose: to protect Muslims from Christianization by 1) prohibiting/limiting Christians and 2) Islamizing the abangan. Thus, the syariah serves three aspects: first, theological aspect that syariah should be the guidance in every sphere of life; second, political aspect that Islam should be in power above others; and third, social aspect that Muslims need to be protected from Christianization. If syariah is followed, conversion is forbidden and considered as apostasy (murtad) which capital punishment
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Andreas Jonathan

could/should be applied.40 The issues of human rights, democracy, equality and religious freedom become threat for them. I wonder why do the Islamists see religious freedom more as an opportunity for Christian mission and a threat for Islam, rather than an opportunity for Islamic dakwah? 2. From the Christians Side For Christians, it seems that the most important freedom that they need is in religious propagation and church building. As argued by the Christian representatives in the debates with the Islamists, theologically Christians believe that mission is divine command for every Christian. Socio-culturally, church building becomes symbol of existence or identity. Because Christians are divided into many denominations, church building is needed in the competition among themselves to get more members. In fact, most of the churches do not evangelize the non-Christians but they attract other church members to join their church (known as sheep stealing). The growing number (multiplication) of church organizations and church buildings is caused more by division and internal conflict as well as biological growth rather than by evangelization. Nevertheless, evangelization and conversion do happen although in smaller percentage. The conversion after 1965 tragedy was an exception because of special socio-political factor of the mass killing that mainly executed by Muslims. Some (perhaps most) Christians misunderstood the meaning of sharing the gospel (evangelization) as to Christianize or to embrace Christian religion or to get more church members. Some of mission works take place in inappropriate ways just to achieve that purpose. As explained by Tambunan to Natsir in the Musyawarah Antar Umat Beragama 1967, Christian mission are to witness the salvation in God through Jesus Christ and only God by His Spirit can lead someone to
40

Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, 49. 101 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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faith.41 The divine command of Jesus Christ is not Christianization or to build religion and church organization, but to witness the salvation to all nations.42 The basic difference is that Christianization can be done by human agency by attracting, manipulating, and even forcing people to embrace Christian religion and be church member, even without sharing the gospel. This kind of conversion is only pseudoconversion. Whereas the true conversion is only by God who gives faith to those He wills, no human agency can create nor force it. This misinterpretation of mission has become factor that makes Christian to be syariah-phobia. Any attempts for Islamic state and syariah implementation have become threat for Christians. Christians response towards the Islamists always used Pancasila, 1945 Constitution and Human Rights Declaration that guarantee religious freedom, in which Christians feel secure. The other factor is that the discrimination towards minority groups for the sake of the majority is real. Christians are afraid if the more syariah is implemented, the more discrimination it will be. This misunderstanding (or different understanding) of mission is only one example of many other misunderstandings (or different understandings) of Christians towards the teaching of Jesus, let alone towards Islam. There are many prejudices in Christians mind that hinder them to build sincere relations to Muslims.43 Conclusion Having explored the historical background of Christian-Muslim tensions above, I predict that the issues of Christianization and syariah will continue in many other forms and ways as long as
41 42

Ibid., 46. Matthew 28: 18-20, Acts 1: 8, Luke 24: 46-48. 43 The common image of Islam today in most of Christians mind is violence and terrorist. 102 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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religion and politics are still tied. This tension has existed as old as the republic. There is no simple solution for it for the real problem is much more complex than my religio-political analysis; in fact it involves cultural, economics, identity, globalization and many other aspects. A different understanding of evangelization and Christianization that I offer is only one way of interpretation that may not be accepted by other Christian groups. The same thing is with the Muslims attempt to promote different interpretation of syariah that rejected by the Islamists. Some people say that we should not be afraid because the number of those Islamists who still want Islamic state is small, but in fact their influence is not that small. The fact that there are more perda syariah issued is evident. It was reflected also in BPUPKI when the Islamist were only 15 out of 62, even when the leaders were secular-nationalist like Sukarno-Hatta, they succeeded to force BPUPKI to agree to the Jakarta Charter. The same thing can happen today, when they influence the government. As Sukarno asked Latuharhary and Maramis (Christians) to sacrifice for the country by accepting the Jakarta Charter, in many times Christians and other minority groups have been sacrificed for the sake of the majority. However, I believe that will be a change if we do something. Who could imagine that NU and Muhammadiyah that in the beginning were fighting for the Jakarta Charter but now against that idea? Nothing is impossible, though it is beyond our imagination. ICRS-Yogya has played a little but significant piece to make the impossible comes true!

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Bibliography Aritonang, Jan Sihar. Sejarah perjumpaan Kristen dan Islam di Indonesia. Jakarta: BPK, 2005. CRCS. Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia 2010. Yogyakarta: CRCS, 2011. Hefner, Robert W. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000. Husein, Fatimah. Muslim-Christian Relations in the New Order Indonesia: The Exclusivist and Inclusivist Muslims Perspectives. Bandung: Mizan, 2005. Mujiburrahman. Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesias New Order. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006. Saksono, Ign. Gatut. Dialog Wacana Syariat Islam dan Sumbangan Pikiran Orang Kristiani. Yogyakarta: Yabinkas: 2009. Sidjabat, W.B. Partisipasi Kristen dalam Nation Building di Indonesia. Jakarta: BPK, 1968. Sutanto, Trisno. Negara, Kekuasaan dan Agama: Membedah Politik Perukunan Rezim Orba in Pluralisme Kewargaan. Bandung: Mizan, 2011. Sterkens, Carl (eds.). Religion, Civil Society and Conflict in Indonesia. Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2009. Willis, Avery T. Indonesian Revival: Why Two Million Came To Christ. Pasadena: William Carey Library, 1977.

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THE JAKARTA CHARTER AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDONESIAN IDENTITY

Khairullah Zikri
UIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta

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Khairullah Zikri

Introduction Hollenbach1 once states that there is a third alternative to integralism (church-state identity) on one hand and the privatization of religion on the other. In this third alternative, religious communities have an impact on public life, while at the same time free exercise and non establishment of religion are fully protected. Indonesia is seen to have exercised just such a third option between a secular state, which maintains a strict separation between church and state, and one in which the state identifies with a particular religion. This is indicated in the popular Indonesian expression that Indonesia is a Muslim state (as most of its population is Muslim) but not an Islamic state. The 1945 Piagam Jakarta, the Jakarta Charter, which amounted to a declaration of independence of Indonesia by the revolutionary leaders, contained the first principle of Pancasila and included the seven words which made it obligatory for Muslims to follow syariah. These seven words, dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya (with the obligation for adherents of Islam to follow syariah, Islamic law), expressing Islamist aspirations within the revolutionary leadership were omitted at the last moment from the Jakarta Charter. This indeed indicated a shift away from Islamism to an Islamic but inclusive political paradigm. Some months later Sukarno in a speech proclaimed the tenet of Pancasila. Pancasila added four additional principles to the first principle Belief in One God of the Jakarta Charter, juxtaposing an Islamic paradigm with a secular inclusive model.
1

D. Hollenbach, Politically Active Churches: Some empirical Prolegomena to a Normative Approach, in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, edited by P.J. Weithman (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 301. 106 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Khairullah Zikri

Since then Pancasila has remained the national ideology, widely taught in Indonesian schools. Pancasila represents a compromise between the advocates of a secular nationalist state and those of an Islamic state. The pluralism of political Islam in Indonesia continues to span these positions. However, some Islamist parties later on press for re-introduction of the seven words with the intention of applying the formal syariah. Other Muslims parties simply seek to ensure that Islamic values inform state policy where then a substantive syariah is in play, or simply either seek state support or non-interference in the development of Muslim affairs. During Indonesias struggle for independence, Muhammad Hatta, Haji Agus Salim, Ki Bagus Hadikusomo and Abdul Wahid Hasyim, prominent Muslim intellectuals and leaders of revolutionary Indonesia, are credited with Islamizing Pancasila so it became acceptable to Muslims.2 Principles two to five of Pancasila unity of Indonesia, civilized humanism, democracy and social justice are instances where Indonesian revolutionary leaders were able to take seemingly modern and secular principles and demonstrate to Muslims that they have cognates in the Islamic tradition. This critical ability of the Muslim leadership to translate secular humanist principles into Islamic cognates enabled their fellow Muslims to identify them as part of their own tradition. This in turn enabled Muslims to integrate into national political processes and structures. However, the first principle, Belief in One God, begs for a formulation that would be acceptable to other religions and to secularists. The complementary ability to translate central Muslim beliefs, i.e. Belief in One God, the first principle of Pancasila into a humanist language, would enable non-Muslims and secularists to recognize Islam as a
2

Nurcholish Madjid, In Search of Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism: The Indonesian Experience, in Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought, edited by Mark Woodward (Tucson: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Studies, 1996), 90. 107 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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familiar, as opposed to a foreign and antagonistic, tradition. I believe it was within these two movements of cross-traditional, crosscultural communication Muslim thought can develop a version of a universal or humanist Islam that serves as common language between Muslim and other religious communities. Without any further interpretation indeed the first sila is potentially instigate clashes with the beliefs of the other religions officially recognized by Indonesian state, and puts a strain on other principles of Pancasila such as national unity across religious communities and social justice. It therefore provides an opportunity for Muslim intellectuals to take a central Muslim belief and translate it into language that would make it acceptable to non-Muslims. One of such attempts was the initial inclusion of the seven words into the Jakarta Charter. This essay therefore intends to carefully analyze these seven words which later on were omitted from the charter. I would argue that the introduction of the words were not only to communicate the Muslim central tenet into a humanist language, they also served as part of the declaration of independence from a colonial state. On general, this essay intends to elucidate several questions such as whether independent from colonial master entail rejecting its legal legacy. Does independence not entail reversion to the law of the land prior to colonialization? Does the introduction of the Jakarta Charter reflect the Islamist intention to distant the newly created state from the colonial legacy? Does it also serve to reinforce the Indonesian identity based on the syariah precept? Do the seven words should be understood literally? By carefully addressing these questions I intend to argue that the introduction of the seven words must be understood as a symbol of resistance to exploitative terms of engagement with post-colonial masters. The attempt to reinstate the words in the modern Indonesian days may instigate strong

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resistance, especially without contextualization of the terms. The Jakarta Charter

proper

explanation

and

Pancasila since its inception has been the subject of differing opinion. One prime area of contention concerns the first of the five pillars, the requirement for a belief in the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, which may be roughly translated as the Great Unity of Deity. During the negotiations regarding this principle the nationalists were concerned that the formulation ought to promote religious freedom. On the other hand, the Muslims wanted a formulation where Islam is stated as the religion of Indonesia. The first draft of Pancasila was formulated by Sukarno, delivered on June 1, 1945 before the Investigating Committee for the Preparation for Independence or Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (BPUPK). Consisting the principles of nationalism, internationalism, representative democracy, social justice and belief in the one and only God, Sukarno argued that his Pancasila was a unique synthesis of nationalist, Muslim, Marxist, liberal democratic, and populist-Indonesian ideas. Indeed these principles would satisfy both secular and Islamic nationalists.3 However, to many Muslim leaders, Sukarnos principle on religion is vague and unspecific. It provides room for heretical mystics, apostates, ethnic religionists, communists, and others whom Muslims felt undeserving of recognition. Following Muslim objection, the first draft was then revised. The second draft of Pancasila was
3

George Mc. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952); Merle C. Ricklefs, A history of modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the present (London: Macmillan, 1981); Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University, 2000). 109 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Khairullah Zikri

formulated in the "Jakarta Charter" by the Committee of Nine, Panitia Sembilan, which consists of Sukarno, Muhammad Hatta, Muhammad Yamin, Alexander Andries Maramis, Ahmad Subardjo, Ki Hadikusumo, Wachid Hasyim, Agus Salim and Abikusno. Sukarno accepted the suggestion of the other members of the committee to change the "sequence" of Pancasila. The fifth Sila of Sukarno become the first Sila of the "Jakarta Charter" and the wording became "Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya" (Belief in Almighty God with the obligation for its Muslim adherents to carry out the Islamic law/Syari'ah). On August 18, 1945 the Committee for the preparation of Indonesian Independence changed the formulation of the first sentence of Pancasila by removing the words "with the obligation of its Muslims adherents to follow Syariah", so the first sila became "Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa".4 The reason for the omission was the rejection from the non-Muslims over the vague conception of the terms. According to Hatta, part of the rejection was the people from the eastern part of the archipelago threatened to boycott the establishment of new country if the seven words are still there.5 The omission of the seven words from the Preamble has acted as a point of contention for many Islamic groups in Indonesia, and has influenced their relationship with the government since Independence. During the last half century, Indonesian Islamic-based parties have periodically attempted to have the seven words reinstated, without success. Suhartos departure in May 1998 provided the opportunity for several Muslim groups and political
4

Endang Saefuddin Anshari, The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A history of the gentlemans agreement between the Islamic and the secular nationalists in modern Indonesia, M.A. thesis, McGill University (1976). 5 Muh. Hatta, Memoir (Jakarta: Tinta Mas, 1982), 458; Lili Romli, Islam Yes Partai Islam Yes: Sejarah Perkembangan Partai-partai Islam di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006), 158. 110 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Khairullah Zikri

parties to propose the introduction of syariah into the Constitution. During the period of constitutional reform from 1999 to 2002, all political parties, Members of Parliament and the government examined the issue; no presidential decrees to unilaterally stop the discussion were issued, and no military force was used to influence the process. More significantly, during this period debates over the inclusion of words shifted from the idea of Islam becoming the foundation of the state (Dasar Negara) to the implementation of syariah in Article 29 of the Constitution, which declares that The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God. In other words, whilst the previous debate examined the Preamble to the Constitution, which could change the state ideology of the Indonesian Republic, the contemporary debate was more concerned with the special rights of Muslims and the obligation for the government to implement syariah. It is worth noting that for more than half a century Indonesia has been unable to conduct an un-interrupted dialogue concerning the position of syariah in the Constitution. In 1945 and 1955, efforts were hampered by the pressure of time, and political manoeuvrings by Sukarno and the military. Under Suharto debate on the issue was forbidden, since his government was afraid of its disruptive potential. As I have stated earlier, since 1945 there have been periodic attempt to re-introduce the Jakarta Charter. The significant one was during the period of constitutional reform from 1999 to 2002 when the Peoples Consultative Assembly, the highest parliamentary body, held an extensive parliamentary debate on the re-introduction of the seven words as part of the debate on Indonesian constitutional amendments. During the debate the following four views emerged:6 (1) The seven words should be re-inserted. This position was supported by the Islamist parties as a means of redressing the
6

N. Hosen, Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate (pp. 419-440), in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 36 (3), 2005. 111 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Khairullah Zikri

original inequity of the omission of the seven words; (2) Article 29 should be amended by mentioning all religions, and not just Islam. This view is inclusive, although the problem raised for religions other than Islam by Belief in One God is not addressed; 3. All five principles of Pancasila should be inserted. This view reinforces state ideology and the forced marriage between Islamist and secular nationalist ideologies; 4. Article 29 should not be amended. This last was the view of the majority of the parliament. The majority opted to maintain the status quo, the uneasy compromise, whereby the non-Muslim minorities are not given equal status, at least on a theological plain, but the Islamists are not granted their wish, which could imply legalizing discrimination against religious minority and women. A fifth position (not proposed in the parliamentary debate) would amend article 29 by rewording it and including a different version of the seven words: 5) the state is based on the principle of lack of compulsion in matter of religion, with the obligation upon the state to support individuals and communities in their efforts to observe their religions. An Islam-inclusive and secular-inclusive version of the seven words, this hypothetical fifth option addresses the historical grievance of the Islamist proponents of the first position outlined above. It clears the ambiguity inherent in the original as to whether the state or the Muslim community is obligated to observe the syariah. It delivers the inclusive intent of the second position, as all the religious communities would enjoy equal support from the state. Freedom of religion is not violated, as the state would not define or initiate but rather support measures initiated by the religious communities. The obligation of the state would be to support all traditions in an equal and appropriate manner without compromising the freedom of religion of an individual or a community. This position is compatible with principles

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2-5 of Pancasila and fits the description of Hollenbachs third option, which I cited in the epigraph of this paper. In short, the various positions taken by political parties during the parliamentary debate on the re-introduction of the seven words indicates that political Islam in Indonesia is pluralistic, i.e., there are many positions taken by political parties on the nature and role of Islam and syariah in Indonesia. This pluralism of (political) Islam has been a historical feature of the Muslim tradition. Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa and its Implication The first sila of Pancasila, Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa, is an imposition on some traditions recognized by the state and, by extension, the minority population that adheres to these traditions. This first sila marginalizes the Hindu tradition and excludes the Buddhist religion. Hindu Philosophy admits of an inclusive, overarching Divine Reality that is fragmented by the very act of language. In Buddhism, on the other hand, the question of the existence of God is irrelevant. Yet a state ideology that forces its citizens to adhere to religious belief contradictory to their own religious persuasion violates the freedom of religion guaranteed by the state and militates against national unity and stability. If the first sila is understood as an assertion of tauhid, which literally means making God one as understood by Islamic teaching, then it must be remember that tauhid is not a description of God but a description of a human act of faith and of right relation between humans and God. Islams fundamental tenet la ilaaha illallah, there is no god but Allah, is a universal negation of oppression at all level of existence. It is a constant struggle to negate the oppression that is created by forgetfulness of God, by making gods other than God. The first sila, belief in one God, insofar as it is imposed through human agency on another whose heart has not opened to it, becomes an
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instrument of oppression and the exact opposite of what its intention, purpose and nature is. What is more, it presumes the absence of tauhid in other traditions, even secular ones, simply because these may be using a different language for it. Yet languages are part of Gods grace, but they are not God. A most crucial consequence of tauhid is right relation with all of Gods creatures and not to impinge on the rights and freedoms given to them by God. Thus from my Muslim perspective, to require that every citizens of Indonesia must uphold belief in one God, regardless of their religious persuasion, is taking away a right that is God given. It goes against the principle of freedom from compulsion in matters of religion (Q. 2:256). Verses of the Quran (i.e 2:148 and 5:48) can be interpreted to provide an Islamic basis for religious pluralism, which recognizes diversity of belief and religion at the individual and community level. These verses can provide basis for a state ideology of an equitable religious pluralism that at the same time satisfies the concerns of a majority Muslim population: that the state is based on the principle of lack of compulsion in matters of religion (Q 2:256; 2:148; 5:48). Such a principle is both Islam-inclusive and secularinclusive. It also protects the right of individuals not to subscribe to any religion. If during a certain period in Indonesias history, the first sila, Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa, was intended as a theistic intervention (whether justified or unjustified) against the perceived threat of atheistic communism, then that intervention is no longer required. However, the rejection of the first sila as well as the seven words toward colonialism, in my opinion, is legitimate. It intends to symbolize an independent stands in legal and economic matter as well as freedom from colonialist oppression. Syariah, for instance, disagrees with excessive exploitation as was practiced by the colonial government. Although the seven words argue for a legitimate course, it is not clear what actual implementation of the phrase would entail.
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There are some questions that must be clarified: who is obligated to implement the syariah, the state or Muslims? What is the meaning and content of syariah? Indeed without rigorous intellectual activity in addressing these questions the seven words might merely add another layer of structural iniquity to the lives of Indonesia people. Yet syariah is a polyvalent term and an Islamic state is theoretically and theologically difficult to establish. Unreflective calls for the implementation of syariah by Islamists are calls for legitimizing the right of Muslim men to claim superiority and priority over the rest, simply by their (birth) identification with a religion and for the disenfranchisement of non-Muslims rendering the latter second class citizens. Islam is primary founded in the heart of Individual. Even when the individual proclaims his or her faith, the faith itself remains unseen and immeasurable. Individuals who freely proclaim their faith in tradition are bound together in a community (ummah) that upholds and continues the tradition established by the prophet. There are two important common foundations of both the ummah and the Indonesian state: (1) Primary accountability for individual actions lies squarely on the shoulders of individual, and (2) there is an obligation upon the collective to establish a just society. However, whereas the ummahs membership consists only of Muslims, the citizenship of the state is multi-religious. This is true of the reports of the first Muslim city of Madinah, and this true of all Muslim majority and minority countries today. What is more, within the ummah itself a multi-religious community is sharing one Din, or faith. Within the ummah one finds a spectrum of tendencies ranging from egalitarian pluralism to a militant exclusivism. Hence identifying the state with Islam would raise the question of which mazhab, school of Islamic thought or religious jurisprudence, the state would adopt and would result in the disenfranchisement of the rest of the views or schools of thought within Islam. In addition, as above, it would make non115 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Muslims second class citizens. Yet, I believe, a state in which citizens of all religions have equal rights is more Islamic, than just a syariahbased Islamic state that distorts the high standard of justice amongst all humans insisted upon by the (categorical, as opposed to particular statement of the) Quran. Even when sharing some common features and goals, the ummah and the state are, and must remain, separate, if interactive, entities for the benefit of both. The two have a very different genesis, history, trajectory and scope. The ummah has a much longer history, a much wider geographical scope and an existential focus. As Abdurrahman Wahid had commented, Islam should not be: A means of legitimizing the existing system of authority, and not a means of anticipating the development of a better system of government which more closely approximates Islamic ideals ... It must perform the task of transformation itself.7 As the guarantor of freedom of religion, a state must abstain from subscribing to a particular religion or a sect within it. This affords its citizen and subsequent generations of its citizens the right to choose or reject a certain religion or particular views within a tradition without fear of persecution. The religious affiliation of its citizens can shift without causing any harm to the individual or instability to the state. I believe a modern nation-state is only one possible form of self-governance compatible with Islam. The clear distinction between state and Islam leaves space for the development of post-national and post-militarist forms of selfgovernance that better approach the ideal of a just humanity. Thus, in my opinion, making Islam identical to the state gives rise to the
7

Cited in Mark Woodward (ed.), Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought (Tucson: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Studies, 1996), 149. 116 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Khairullah Zikri

danger of corruption of both and of hampering their ability to achieve their distinct and common goals. A relevant distinction here8 is between Syariah (or Divine Will) and fiqh, which is the human understanding of the Divine Will, i.e. faith-based law. Whereas it is incumbent on believers to continuously struggle to understand and to carry out the will of the Divine Syariah, it is also imperative on them to remember that any particular understanding of syariah i.e. fiqh, is limited and prone to error of human judgment. Unfortunately, the two words Syariah and fiqh are often used interchangeably, thus falsely ascribing divine infallibility to human understanding. Here I use Syariah (with a capital S) to point to the theological stand there is a Divine Will that must guide the action of the believers; and syariah (with lower case s, as used in the seven words cited above), for fiqh, the human understanding of Divine Will, i.e. Islamic law. It stands for Muslims commitment to ethical conduct, rule of law and establishment of a just society that ensues from their faith in God. Yet Islam, submission to God, means little without this commitment. Along with the classical distinction between syariah and fiqh, which is not always maintained, modern scholars, in discussing Indonesian politics, employ another distinction that identifies two understandings of syariah (fiqh). These are the substantive and the formal understandings. The substantive approach to syariah emphasizes the ethical values of the Quran, while the formal one adopts a literalist reading of the Quran, the Hadith and of the classical legal legacy. The substantive understanding emphasizes Islamic ethics, whereas the formal understanding stresses existing Islamic law. However, the substantive approach must either develop a body of law that expresses ethical principles, or it must provide ethical criteria for endorsing existing legal systems or particular laws
8

Fazlur Rahman, Law and Ethics in Islam, in Ethics in Islam, edited by R. C. Hovianissian (Malibu, CA: Undena Publications, 1983), 5. 117 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Khairullah Zikri

as compatible with Divine Will regardless of where or by whom they were developed. Given such criteria, maintaining a separate body of Islamic law may not be necessary. The criteria could be used to determine if the Dutch basis of the Indonesian legal system and laws is consonant with Syariah. It would also determine which, if any, portion and aspects of the received body of Islamic law, especially as it relates to family law, especially as it relates to family law, are in consonance with Syariah. The need for re-thinking both the founding principles and the content of syariah has been addressed by many contemporary Muslims scholars. The received principles of Islamic jurisprudence are inadequate and have assisted in supporting a legal edifice that in many areas is grossly iniquitous and hence against the Quranic imperative to establish a just society. These principles can be divided into textual sources (Quran and Hadith) and methodological tools used to derive laws from the texts. Within the latter, the principle of creative rational endeavor (ijtihad), which was mostly suspended after the initial exuberance of juristic creativity, is being re-instated by some contemporary scholars. Before ijtihad is applied to derive particular laws, it must be applied to the Quran as a source of law. This is imperative if we are to liberate the ethical principles reiterated throughout the Quran from certain specific verses that may have been relevant in the original context, but to insist on their validity as models for action now undermines the ethical imperative of the Quran itself.9 Fazlur Rahman, while arguing that Islamic theology, ethics and law must be developed in reference to each other, remarks that in his view the core ethical principle in Islam is rahma which means compassion and mercy. Rahman quotes the Quranic verse that states that God wrote compassion upon Himself, i.e., God bound himself
9

Ibid. 118 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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by the law of Compassion (Q.6:12 and 6:54). All other ethical principles (i.e. substantive syariah) and all Islamic law (i.e. formal syariah) must be subsumed under, and develop in consonance with, this divine decree. The entire syariah needs to be inscribed with rahma. Just as the Quranic verse He wrote compassion upon Himself cannot be read literally, verses that lead to a cruel or unfair outcome for any human being cannot be read literally. What God wrote upon Himself must be written over the Quran itself. In his efforts to bring Muslim theology ethics and law in relation to each other, Fazlur Rahman emphasizes the transcendence of God and the infinite distance between God and humans. According to Rahman, it is this distance that provides the space within which humans can progress ethically in their journey towards God. However, the immanence of God is equally relevant in the development of an integrated approach to theology, ethics and law. Whereas a rationalist ethics may be based in the transcendence of God, a mystical ethics is based in annihilation of the ego and the immanence of God. It is the recognition of the ethical significance of Divine Immanence of Grace that we shall arrive at a syariah that embodies the compassion and mercy God bound Himself by. In Muslim theological discussions like Fazlur Rahmans, it is assumed that transcendence of God is more literal or rational and less metaphoric a description of Gods attributes than immanence of God. The immanence or closeness or indwelling of God was considered metaphorical to the extent that the word for metaphor, tasybih, became synonymous with immanence. The Quranic statements that use human body part (i.e. hand, shin) to describe actions of God were categorized as tasybih. However, Quranic statements referring to word or speech of God were not considered tasybih and taken literally. Language and differences of languages are signs of Gods Grace. Nonetheless, language must admit its own limitation vis a vis God and not become a false god. All language is
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anthropomorphic, and when attempting to describe God, it is also metaphorical (whether referring to His hand, shin or speech). Thus both transcendence and immanence, as descriptions of God are equally metaphorical and anthropomorphic. When this is realized, transcendence no longer stands for (1) Making God distant from us or even for (2) Making God distant from our descriptions of God, but for (3) making ourselves distant from our own descriptions of God. This last process (3) entails the admission that unavoidable misunderstanding and reduction necessarily accompanies the use of our limited intellect and language to capture the Divine, which is unlimited and cannot be adequately described in language. Profound silence and abstention from language and judgement must counterbalance all our efforts at describing God and Gods will in language. When Islamic legal theory and laws, attempting to arrive at Divine Will, are formulated with this understanding of immanence (tasybih) and transcendence (tanzih), Islamic law shall become dynamic and relevant to the life of faith. Postscriptum For some Muslims, Jakarta Charter represents the attempt to reinforce their Islamic identity while at the same time detach themselves from the colonial heritage. Thus it is not surprising if some would view the omission of the famous seven words as a symbolic defeat of the Muslim struggle in Indonesian history to enforce Islamic law. Many therefore would engage in reviving the charter whenever a chance is available. However, if reinserting the charter means establishing an Indonesian identity, this then leaves us many works to do as identity involves reconstruction and negotiation. Identity is seen as a negotiation process as Richard Jenkins10 states that social identity is the product of agreement and
10

Richard Jenkins, Social identity (London: Routledge, 1996). 120 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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disagreement and is negotiable. In Stuart Halls opinion11 the identity is unfinished process of reconstruction: "perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as 'a production' which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation". Madan Sarup says identity is a construction, a consequence of a process of interaction between people, institutions and practices.12 This position embodies thus the idea of change, flexibility, fluidity, negotiation of identity, in relation to social change, dominant cultural elements and so forth. If the implementation of syariah is to be adopted then negotiation with others becomes imperative. This is because many citizens of this country would like to understand what precisely is meant by syariah does it mean, for example, the inclusion of hudud (punishments as determined by syariah)? Will Islamic law become one of the sources of Indonesian law, which would change the Indonesian legal system dramatically? Do we really need the syariah? The fact is, even without the incorporation of the famous seven words, the government has accommodated Muslim aspirations by, for instance, issuing numerous laws and regulating Muslim affairs. Furthermore, if the Jakarta Charter is to be implemented, then many would ask which has the obligation to observe syariah the state or Muslim society? If the legal consequence of adopting the phrase is to put an obligation on the state to implement syariah, then the phrase will be seen as breaking the third position that Indonesia is neither a secular nor a religious state.

11

Stuart Hall, Cultural identity and Diaspora, in Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, edited by Rutherford Jonathan (London: Lawrence Hill, 1998), 22. 12 Madan Sarup, Identity, Culture and the Post-modern World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), 11. 121 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Apart from the problem of having syariah as a source of law, there is also the problem with the word obligation (kewajiban) from the phrase dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya (with the obligation, for its adherents, of implementing the Islamic law). What does this word kewajiban mean? The obligation for Muslims to practise Islamic teachings comes from God, not from the state. It is essential to note that whether or not the phrase is included in the Constitution, Muslims are obliged by God to follow His rules. Constitutionally speaking, by adopting this phrase the state must ensure that every Muslim practises his or her religion; if they do not, the state may punish them. Again, one should note that the state is based on coercion, whilst civil society is based on voluntary participation. Clearly then much works need to be done if the Jakarta Charter has to be revived and to be taken literally. I would comfortably accept the well established conception of the Pancasila, without the need to reiterate the seven words. I believe the Pancasila-based state is a place where no religion in Indonesia wins, and no-one loses. It is a win-win solution for all religions, since it is a state where religious life is supported and advanced on one hand, and thus it is not secular; on the other hand, religion is not directed at other faiths coercively, and thus it is not a religious state, either. Bibliography Anshari, Endang Saefuddin. The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A history of the gentlemans agreement between the Islamic and the secular nationalists in modern Indonesia, M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1976. Boland, A. R. Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory (pp. 669-690), in Asian Survey, 44 (5), 2004.
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Boland, B.J. The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982. Effendy, Bahtiar. Islam and the State in Indonesia. Athens, OH and Singapore: Ohio University and Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2003. Hall, Stuart. Cultural identity and Diaspora, in Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, edited by Rutherford Jonathan. London: Lawrence Hill, 1998. Hatta, Muh. Memoir. Jakarta: Tinta Mas, 1982. Hefner, Robert W. Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University, 2000. Hollenbach, D. Politically Active Churches: Some empirical Prolegomena to a Normative Approach, Weithman, P.J. ed. Religion and Contemporary Liberalism. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997. Hosen, N., Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate (pp. 419-440), in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 36 (3), 2005. Jenkins, Richard. Social identity. London: Routledge, 1996. Kahin, George Mc. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952. Madjid, N. In Search of Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism: The Indonesian Experience, in Toward a new Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought, edited by Mark Woodward. Tucson: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Studies, 1996. Mujani, S. and R.W. Liddle. Politics, Islam and Public Opinion (pp. 109-123), in Journal of Democracy, 15 (1), 2004.

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Mujiburrahman. Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid (pp. 339-352), in Islam and Christian Muslim Relation, 10 (3), 1999. Porter, D. Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002. Rahman, F. Law and Ethics in Islam, in Ethics in Islam, edited by R. C. Hovianissian. Malibu, CA: Undena Publications, 1983. Ricklefs, Merle C. A History of Modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the Present. London: Macmillan, 1981. Romli, Lili. Islam Yes Partai Islam Yes: Sejarah Perkembangan Partaipartai Islam di Indonesia. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006. Sarup, Madan. Identity, Culture and the Post-Modern World. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996. Woodward, M. (ed.). Toward a new Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought. Tucson: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Studies, 1996. Yilmaz, I. Muslim Laws, Politics and Society in Modern Nation States. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005.

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NASAKOM: SOEKARNOS FAILED POLITICAL MOVE

Fransiskus Borgias M.
Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

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Fransiskus Borgias M.

Introduction Twenty years after he was appointed as president of Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno falls down from his power. Those years were not easy for him and also for Indonesia in general because almost all the time there were a lot of problems, criticisms, and also oppositions from his political opponents. That is why in 1965 Sukarno made a political movement to unite all Indonesian political power by putting forward three attempts: 1) Creating the strong feeling of opposition to colonialism-imperialism, especially western imperialism in it various new forms; Sukarno called it nekolim, stands for neokolonialisme-imperialisme (new colonialism-imperialism). 2) Strengthen national love, cherish, and appreciation of Pancasila as Indonesian state ideology. 3) Creating a new political attempt to unite all ideologies in Indonesia by coining NASAKOM.1 In my historical reading the first two attempts are more or less succeeded because Indonesian people agree with the opposition to nekolim and support state ideology, Pancasila. But to unite three elements in one bundle is a different matter. This paper is about the political movement of Soekarno at the beginning of sixties to unite the different streams in Indonesia so that the whole energy of the nation could be allocated to the establishment of the common good of society. This is a political movement of Sukarno aimed at the unification of the country. According to Anderson, The Nasakom-politique, pursued by Sukarno during the period of Guided Democracy, was designed to encourage mutual trust and cooperation between the groups and parties

See Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, Religion, Violence and Diversity: Negotiating the Boundaries of Indonesian Identity, in Religion, Civil Society and Conflict in Indonesia, edited by Carl Sterkens et.al. (Berlin: LIT Verlag Dr.W.Hopf, 2009), 10-11. 126 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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normally classified under each of these three rubrics.2 This move is known in an acronym, NASAKOM, stands for Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunis (Nationalism, Religion, and Communism). I call this an experiment because this is a kind of political creativity of Soekarno in his public appearance as a Demagogue. In such position he created some political slogans, acronyms. For instance: Manipol USDEK, Ganefo, NASAKOM, Nekolim, and including the slogan taken from Latin, Vivere in Periculoso. This is a kind of rhetoric art used by Soekarno in his political speeches.3 Initial Historical Analysis of the Three Elements NASAKOM consists of three fundamental elements. They are Nationalism (Nasionalisme), Religion (Agama), and Communism (Komunisme). The element of religion (Agama) has appeared since a long time in Indonesian history. That is why I put it in the first sequence. We can trace this element from various indigenous religions up to the coming of Indianization, Arabization, and Europanization process, each of which brings their own religions: Hindu and Buddha from India, Islam from Arabia (at the beginning via Northern and Southern India, later on directly from Arab), and finally
2

See Benedict Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 29, footnote 31. Also B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 41. 3 For information, see B. G. Setiono, Tionghoa Dalam Pusaran Politik (Jakarta: Elkasa), 273, 723, 782, etc. (on MANIPOL). On MANIPOL USDEK, see 785. On NASAKOM see 723, 788, 789, 809, 818. On GANEFO, see 802, 818, on NEKOLIM see 827, 828, 831, etc. Also Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 595, where he gives explanation of NASAKOM (the Unity of Nationalists, Religious People, and Communists). Also Boland, The Struggle of Islam, 101-102, during the period of his Guided Democracy (1959-1965). 127 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism) from Europe (some historians talked about the coming of Christianity before its coming from the West, even before the coming and the spreading of Islam). So, the element of religion has already existed since the beginning of the history of Nusantara.4 It is difficult to trace the historical awakening of national awareness and movement in the history of Nusantara. In general it is said that there is tribal awareness among local kings of Nusantara, although it is still limited to its locality; it existed as the awareness of Javanese, Sumatera, Borneo, or Celebes, etc,. Even within those great islands there were also some small and competitive sultanates. But such initial-local awareness is adequate as a basis for the movement to resist European imperialism (Dutch, British). In its historical development the national awareness was based on tribal awareness. It starts as a tribal awareness, but in its historical development it transforms, thanks to the transformative effect of modern-western education and pesantren-education system, into national awareness. Such a national awareness started to live at the beginning of twentieth century.5 Since that time it exists as a great unity among various groups of the nations. Since that time the sense of nationalism started to exist and become a significant factor in the history of national movement toward independence.
4

See Nicholas Tarling (editor), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume One, From early times to c.1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 5 Religion and Popular Beliefs of Southeast Asia before c.1500 by J.G.de Casparis and I.W.Mabbett). Also the short survey of J. Titaley in his From Abandonment to Blessing: the Theological Presence of Christianity in Indonesia, in Sebastian C. H. Kim, Christian Theology in Asia (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 71-88. 5 See Setiono, Tionghoa, 323-362 (Kebangkitan Nasional 1900-1927 or National Awakening). Also M. C. Ricklefs, Sejarah Indonesia Modern (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1998), 352-360. Also Anderson, Language and Power, 243-245. 128 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Communist factor is a new element in the combination. In Europe Communistic ideas have existed after the industrial revolution in England. Its great figures are Karl Marx and Engels who in 1848 proclaimed their Communist Manifesto. Communism and Marxism develop throughout Europe including the Netherlands. In Russia it became the official ideology of the state and governmental system after Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. From Dutch people this idea came to and spread in Indonesia. One of the main actors to bring this idea to Indonesia is a Dutch man name H.F.F.M.Sneevlit; he arrived in Indonesia in 1913. Only one year afterwards (1914) he established Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging in Surabaya.6 A few years afterwards there were also some Indonesians who are inspired by this idea during their stay for studying in Netherlands. This happens for Tan Malaka. Since 1917 Communism started to exist in Indonesia. It becomes one of the factors in the struggle for independence.7 There is a great difference between those three factors in the initial history of modern Indonesia. The three factors have influences in the map of Nusantaras politics toward independence. The synthetic category of this political-ideological triangle has been made since the beginning by Soekarno. In 1926, Soekarno has written that there are three compounds of main ideology that unite all political organizations in Indonesia. Those three great ideologies are Nationalism, Islam (represents Religion), and Marxism 8 (Communism). But at the time this was only depicted as a map of global and general outline of Indonesian political thinking. It is in the
6 7

See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 370. For short information see M. C. Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), 230-238; 241-244; also Setiono, Tionghoa, 347-362. 8 See H. Feith and L. Castles, Pemikiran Politik Indonesia 1945-1965 (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988), iiv. 129 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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sixties that Soekarno proclaims the synthetic ideological-idea as a new political doctrine, in a form of acronym, NASAKOM. Soekarno initially designed it as a binding ideology for the Nation in the making. But finally we know that this political experiment collapsed. This paper tries to answer the following questions: 1) Why does the great idea of synthetic-political NASAKOM proclaimed by Soekarno proved to fail?; 2) Does Soekarno not realize that there is a great difference between those three elements in NASAKOM that he blended them in one ideological synthesis and proclaim it to be a way out of the historical crisis in the process of nation building? Actually Soekarno really aware of their difference but it seems that he behave as if they can be amalgamated in a melting-pot of his great mind as a charismatic founding father of the republic; 3) After PKI was eliminated from Indonesia, I still have an extra question that maybe will not elaborated fully in this present paper. The question is this: Is there any certainty that there will be no more elimination of other two elements of Nationalism and Religion? In this study I will use historical criticism. Historical criticism is a methodological approach that tries to read history critically by making periodization of history and recognizing respective characteristic of those periodizations. In this approach I have made those steps: First, I made a survey of bibliography and collecting the literary resources from library and make a critically study of them. Having read the materials I realize that the historical problem I want to study can be divided into three periodizations. I will describe this periodization deeply in the later part of my paper. I will convey this historical criticism with the help of hermeneutical philosophy. In hermeneutical philosophy we recognize one of the principle of hermeneutics called as Reading as way of reproducing and reconstructing meaning. This is a hermeneutical principle connected to F.Schleiermacher, P.Ricoeur, and H.G.Gadamer. Those hermeneutical principles are developed more extensively in a
130 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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practical way by Wolfgang Isher in his book, The Act of Reading.9 I will use this approach in reading the resources related to the phenomenon of Nationalism, Religion, and Communism, in history of Indonesias struggle for independence. One of the important chapters in the book of Isher is the Phenomenology of Reading in which he develops his theory of critical reading.10 Based on this theory of reading some feminist and third world liberation theologians develop their own theory of reading, by saying that when we read, first of all, we read the lines. Then we have to read also between the lines. The most radical and creative theorist of reading even go further by saying that in reading activity we must also read the lies. Here we see the creative play of words: lines, between the lines, and also the lies. I will use all this approach in my reading resources. Three Historical Periodization of Indonesian Existence I will divide this part in three subparts: first I describe the situation in the twentieth; secondly I describe the situation in the thirtieth and fortieth. Thirdly, I describe the situation in the late fifties and the sixtieth. Let me start with the first sub-part. Having read the historical materials related to my topic I come to know that in the process of national awakening there are three great components in Indonesian political life. They play a significant role in the national struggle toward independence. There are an inter dynamic between those three great components. Based on their dynamic relationships, I make a historical periodization. I hope that this periodization will able to describe historically the dynamic interrelationship between them. These are three great historical
9

See W. Isher, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987). 10 See ibid., especially Part III Phenomenology of Reading, 107-162. 131 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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pillars which characterize their dynamic movements. The first historical pillar related to the twenties. The second historical pillar related to the sixties. Between those two great pillars there is one transitional pillar which I consider a third pillar; this pillar related to the forties and fifties. This third pillar was related to the wars for independence, the proclamation of independence. There are some important observations related to each period in which those three elements of political life of the nation took places. The first, it is clear that Communism made rebellions in those three periods. In the year of 1926 and 1927 there was a rebellion against the colonial government; the consequence was that the colonial government suppress the rebellion.11 Secondly, communism also made a rebellion in the year of 1948, but this time within the organization of military which has been penetrated by communism. This rebellion was triggered by the coming back of Musso in August 1948 from his exile in Soviet Union; he was one of PKI leaders from the twenties. This time, the new country of Indonesia can overcome the rebellion but still do not ban the ideology.12 Thirdly, communism in the year of 1965, once again made a rebellion. This time there is no forgiveness for them. No second opportunity. They are banned and the party was prohibited throughout Indonesia. It is strengthened by an official-formal decision made by MPR in 1966. To be honest, Religious group also made many rebellions even since before the related period we are dealing with. The nearest rebellion (started as a protest against the land reform, but then became a war in the name of religion) was the rebellion of Banten
11

See Ricklefs, Polarizing, 241-243. The most interesting document related to this issue see H. J. Benda and R. T. McVey, The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). 12 See Setiono, Tionghoa, 643-660 (on Madiun Incident). See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 479-482. 132 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Peasants in the year of 1888.13 At the beginning of nineteenth century there are some rebellion based on religion: for instance, the Java War,14 Padri War, and Aceh War. Even this last war, lasted until the beginning of twentieth century with the great name Cut Nya Dien. After the proclamation of Independence there were also some rebellion based on religion. For instance, the separatist rebellion made by Islamic rebels like Daud Beureueh (Aceh), DI and TII of Kartosuwirjo (West Java), and Kahar Muzakar (South Sulawesi).15 There is also the rebel of RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan), and GAM. RMS still becomes a problem until the present. GAM can only be resolved in the year 2005 after the natural disaster of Tsunami in Aceh.16 Those groups, although they are prohibited, are not banned. Their destiny is better than Communists. Finally in my observation, the nationalist group was the innocent one. They do not commit a rebellion. But maybe this observation is not wholly true, because the entire struggle toward the independence basically was supported by the ideology and the sense and the awareness of nationalism. And this is right. But to be sure there is no rebellion against their nation after the war for independence. In the history of national movement and awakening in Indonesia, we can see some important components which play a
13

See Sartono Kartodirjo, The Peasants Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel, A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia (N.V.De Nederlandsche Boek En Steendrukkerij v/h H.L.Smits SGravenhage, 1966). 14 For a good historical description of Java War, see Peter Carey, The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanegara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 17851855 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007). 15 See A. F. Bakti, Collective Memories of the Qahhar Movement, in Mary Zurbuchen, Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), 123-149; also Boland, The Struggle, 62-64. 16 See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 727-28; 735-36. 133 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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significant role in the whole process of struggling. The national awakening was agreed upon by historians to have been started at 20 May 1908 which was characterized by the establishment of an organization named Budi Utomo, with the main orientation toward nationalism (nation state). In general it can be stated that there are three great components. The first is the component of Nationalism with the main orientation toward the nationalism and the nation state. It started with Budi Utomo, but later on it was mainly represented by PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia). The second is the component of Religion; of course the religion here means Islam, religion of majority, although it is not excluding other religions. The third component is socialism-communism. Their basic idea was to establish Marxism and communism as the ideology of the state. Those three components play their important roles in the process of developing the national awareness and they also have participated in the process of struggle for independence. There is a great difference in their ideological orientations. The first tries to idealize the ideology of nationalism. The second tries to idealize the ideology of religion. The third tries to idealize the ideology of Marxism and Communism. If they are considered based on their ideological background it is clear that the three are so different from each other. But for the time being such a great difference do not make so many difficulties and problems because their focus was to confront the colonial power. In this context they are united to expel the colonial power from Indonesia. So, they are united because they have the same enemy; it is an external enemy. This kind of unity is not coming from inside, flow from the interest of their respective ideology. This is a kind of time bomb. Boland called it the period of relative unity-inthe-struggle.17 It is a unity because they are in struggle toward the
17

See Boland, The Struggle, 40. 134 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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same ideal of nationalism and struggle against the same external imperialist oppressive power. Tragedy of PKI in the Twenties After PKIs rebellion in 1926 and 1927, both failed, the party was banned by colonial power. The rebellion was suppressed by the Dutch in a strict way. The rebellion was not so adequately organized because there is no strong leadership. At that time their leaders were in exile; most of them were going abroad because they are included in the list of the people that should be arrested by police. At that time Semaun went to Russia, Tan Malaka fleed to Manila (Philippines). According to the historical analysis of Benda and McVey, there was actually a great difference between Indonesian PKI agenda and the agenda of International Communism. The later did not support the idea of making revolt but Indonesian PKI still insist on the idea of rebellion.18 But this is not the end of the story of PKI in Indonesia. PKI tries to survive in a secret way; it works in a clandestine in some cities, in Surabaya, and Madiun. Musso works in secret clandestine in Surabaya between the middle of 1935 to the middle of 1936. So it means they started to work again almost a decade following the failed rebellion. Musso worked with the aim to revive an organization of communism directed by Moscow. This is called later on PKI Muda or Illegal PKI.19 But the movement was quickly known by the government so in February 1937 it was once again banned by government. But Musso succeeded in recruiting some new young
18

See Benda and McVey, The Communist Uprisings, xxix-xxxi. Also Ricklefs, Sejarah, 384-385. 19 See Gerry van Klinken, Minorities, Modernity and the Emerging Nation: Christians in Indonesia, a Biographical Approach (Leiden: KILTV Press, 2003), 147. 135 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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cadre for this party. From those new followers only Pamoedji can escape the arrest undertaken by government. He also worked in a secret way to recruit some new and young activist to enter into the clandestine organization. According to an oral tradition, Amir Syariffudin joined this Illegal PKI because of the recruitment of a young activist of Eastern Java, Widarta, a follower of Pamoedji. This happens in the second Conggres of Gerindo in July 1939.20 It is stated by van Klinken that Amir Syarifuddin never become the core member of the Party.21 Whatever his case is and the actual problem of the matter, there is one thing which is clear that is PKI never died. After the first ban in the end of twenties and also the ban at the end of the thirties, PKI still exist and active in the political sphere of life of Indonesia. Disappearance of PKI during the Struggle for Independence The elimination of PKI (communism), in a certain sense has been made in the process of the formation of BPUPKI/PPKI. Those institutions are given a special task to make preparation necessary for Indonesian independence. It cannot be denied that since its early existence in Indonesia, communism, like or dislike it, have played a role in the process of struggle toward Independence. It cannot be denied that PKI, in the end of twenties have made a rebellion toward a colonial government, something that at that time must have been appreciated as a form of nationalism and nationality. They are, therefore black-listed by the Dutch government. But, in the situation
20

See ibid, 148. Van Klinken only cited oral tradition and do not mention any written tradition concerning Amir Syariffudins official membership to PKI. Maybe he means something with this way of writing. Van Klinken, in this case, quotes Leclecq: 1993:33. 21 See discussion in van Klinken, Minorities, 148; in this case, he cites Poeze: 1984:169. 136 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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in which the sense of anti-Dutch was strong, the rebellion of PKI must have been considered a form of patriotism and nationalism. Almost twenty years later, in the process of the plan to prepare the independence for Indonesia, under Japaneses coordination, communism element was not represented. It can be understood because PKI as a political party was only reestablished in October 1945;22 it means that its reestablishment takes place some few months after the preparation and proclamation of Independence. That is why they did not participate in the preparation for independence though historically they are actively involved in national movements and struggles. This historical fact has a clear consequence in the whole process of the meetings of BPUPKI especially concerning the ideological foundation of the state. All those represented in these institutions are only the delegates of the Nationalist Islam, Islamist itself, and Christian Nationalist. That is why the result of the meeting on the formulation of Pancasila as the ideological foundation of the state was finally accepted and acknowledged, though it is through a long process of debates and discussions. The formulation of Pancasila which becomes the ideological foundation of the state was the formulation which we come to know in the preamble of the Constitution of 1945. As the endorsement of the Religionist wing of the institution, the accepted first principle of Pancasila was the principle of Ketuhanan Yang Mahaesa.23 It is clear that in one of the important event of the history of Indonesian independence, communist party was not represented in the preparatory body. It means that
22 23

See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 465. This is a difficult term to be translated into English. There are some suggestions: Believe in one God Almighty. But in the formulation of Pancasila there is no such word as believe. I consider the proposal of B.Adeney Risakotta. He proposes the following substitute: The Great Unity of Deity. See Adeney-Risakotta in Religion, 11. 137 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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communist element was slowly eliminated from Indonesian politics. Later on it will be totally eliminated. Or to use the political term of Soeharto, PKI will be totally eradicated from Indonesia.24 This happens after the failed coup detat in 1965.25 I will not describe in detail this tragedy. I just mention the fact that a year after this event, PKI was totally banned from Indonesia. With the formal-official decision of MPR in 1966, PKI was prohibited from all aspects of Indonesian life. PKI got a bad labeling or stigmatization. They are considered a bad moral people. They are not given the opportunity to live here in Indonesia. Even their children and offspring have so many difficulties in their daily life. Toward the Formulation of NASAKOM In this part I discuss the final elimination of PKI from Indonesian political life. In this connection I take much inspiration from the book of Herbert Feith and Lance Castles.26 Feith and Castles, mention that there are five streams in the Indonesian political thinking in the fifties and sixties. They drew a picture of political struggle in Indonesia. My explanation in the following part of this paper should be read based on the illustration given by this picture.27

24

See Soehartos writing (Mengakhiri Tiga Penyelewengan) in Feith, The Decline, 132-135. 25 See Anderson and McVey, A Preliminary Analysis. 26 See H. Feith and L. Castles, Pemikiran, iv. 27 I take this picture from Feiths and Castles book, ibid., iv. 138 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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In that picture they draw five circles representing five streams of political way of thinking in Indonesia. Within those circles there are four boxes representing the details of political thinking and ideology in Indonesia. In the extreme left there is the circle of the leftist. In this circle there is a box in which they wrote the words of PKI and Communism. In the middle (central position) there is the circle of the middle way. In this circle there is also a box in which they include the political stream of PNI, and Radical Nationalism. And on the extreme right we saw the circle in which there are two boxes. The circle itself was characterized as Islams circle. The two boxes represent the Islamic tendencies. On the far right extreme we see that they put the box of Masyumi. And near to the central position we see the box of NU.
139 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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There is the fourth circle which connects the left circle, the central circle and the right circle. They give name for this fourth circle Traditionalisme Jawa (Java Traditionalism). This fourth circle only includes those three circles and the two boxes of the middle (PNI, Nasionalisme Radikal) and of the right wing (NU), but do not include the far leftist box of PKI and Communism. On the other side we saw the fifth circle, which connect the central circle and the right wing circle. They name this fifth circle Sosialisme Demokrat (Democratic Socialism). This fifth circle only includes the central box of PNI and Radical Nationalism and the extreme right box of Masyumi, but did not include the box of NU in the soft-moderate right. Finally, beside those five circles and four boxes with their dynamic interconnections, we still find another two elements from outside. From below we saw the influence of traditions; here they put the Hindu-Java traditions and Islamic (traditions). But it is clear also that Hindu-Java traditions give their influence to the leftist wing and the Islamic traditions give their influence to the right wing of these political tendencies. From above we saw the influences of Western political and ideological thinking. This element from above orients its influence to both sides, to the left and to the right wings. It is in this context that Sukarno formulated his thinking on NASAKOM. Anderson said that this formulation was aimed at the unification of all political stream under one political umbrella, NASAKOM in one hand of Sukarno. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta also supports the same idea. As indicated in the title of this paper, this NASAKOM formula failed. But why it failed? It is this matter that I describe in the following part of my paper. Focus on Various Reasons for NASAKOMS Failure Why NASAKOM failed? Based on those historical explanations I have to say that the reason for NASAKOMS failure is very complicated. It is impossible to point only to one factor as its main
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cause. Actually there are a lot of factors behind this failure. There is an economical factor. During that period of time there is an economical and financial difficulty in Indonesia.28 Most of Indonesian people live under the line of dire poverty. Poverty always became the fertile field for communism, which always promises the justice for all, the improvement of life, and even also the promise of land reform. There is also an international political factor; at that time the international politics was characterized by a Cold War after the Second World War between East Block (Soviet Union and its allies including China) and West Block (United States of America and its allies including some European countries). West Block has their own pact of military defense well known in its abbreviation: NATO. East Block has also their own pact of military defense well known in its name Warsaw Pact. Indonesia under the leadership of Sukarno tries not to be trapped within those existing Blocks and together with some Third World leaders he tries to establish a Non-Aligned Movement. His friends at that time were Gamal Abdul Nasser (Egypt), Josef Tito (former Yugoslavia), and Jawaharlal Nehru (India). They succeeded in starting this movement. This was Sukarnos international political movement together with other Third-World leaders. Nationally, however, Sukarno himself was a nationalist who tried to unify the country in his own person by affirming the value of both Islam and Communism.29 In the meanwhile there was also a factor of competition between military power and non-military power in Indonesian political society and in our political life. As a non-military man, Sukarno tries very hard to strengthen the civil supremacy in Indonesian government over military power. Of course this is not an easy attempt at all. In this matter Sukarno was supported by PKI but

28 29

See Adeney-Risakotta, in Religion, 11; See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 554. See Adeney-Risakotta, in Religion, 11. 141 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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at the same time he was challenged and opposed by military (especially the army).30 There is also a special historical factor in Indonesia which displays a great difference and conflict between three elements within the idea of NASAKOM. A cultural factor also could not be simply neglected. Indonesia with various tribes, also have various cultures with its various physical expressions in language, customs, life style, rituals, arts, etc. Even in Java itself there are already a great cultural differences between Javanese and Sundanese. This is not to talk about the condition outside of Java to consider the aspects of life, for instance, in Borneo, Celebes, Papua, West and East Nusa Tenggara. In the meanwhile PKI itself as a political party was internally broken into many streams and factions. Such tendency toward factionalism was already started and existed since the beginning in Indonesian history. For instance, there was a difference between Semaun and Tan Malaka. Even PKI in Indonesia did not want to follow the advice of international Commintern in the year of 1926, and 1927. International Commintern wanted that there is no need to make a rebellion, but PKI in Indonesia finally still made a rebellion. The fractionalization of PKI continues to exist until the year of 1960.31 The other factor is the tendency toward internal conflict of Indonesia; this fact also should be taken into account. Indonesian historians said that actually the tragedy of Indonesian killing Indonesians are higher and more tragic and tremendous in numbers compared to the killings by the Dutch colonial power. There is a
30

See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 533-586 (the project of Guided Democracy); also Setiono, Tionghoa, 779-790 (the project of Guided Democracy). Boland, The Struggle, 99-104. 31 See Benda and McVey, The Communist Uprisings, xxviii-xxxi. Also Anderson and McVey, A Preliminary Analysis. The whole book describes this fact of fractionalization of PKI in sixties. 142 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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repertoire of violence in Indonesia as it is said by Benedict Anderson. In 1965 people still remember of Madiun Affair 1948, ...in which there were thousands of santris were killed by abangan communist in a failed coup attempt against the nationalist movement.32 NASAKOM finally failed. There are a lot of complicated factors. Actually Sukarno knew very well this complicated matter. So the question is Whether Sukarno was naive with the thinking that NASAKOM can be united within Indonesian society? Realizing all these factors I would like to put forward a hypothesis that maybe there was something wrong in Sukarnos way of political thinking. The answer can be YES but also can be NO. But after reading and exploring some resources books I tend to answer this question affirmatively (YES). It seems that Sukarno tries to enforce the idea of NASAKOM while in fact it is difficult to synthesize them. Following Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, I would like to say that Sukarnos attempt at NASAKOM failed.33 Conditions Afterwards Feith and Castle did not mention explicitly what happen with this map of political struggle in Indonesia. Of course there was a competition between them to gain and retain political power and influences, but there is no clear elaboration about the result of this competition. But I find the answer to this case in Heffners book. Having read the book of Robert Heffner, especially chapter five on The Modernist Travail, I come to the awareness that after Masyumi and PSI were banned by Soekarno (August 17, 1960) because of the black-campaign of PKI, the struggle for the Islamic state was not fully passed away from the Indonesian political discourse. It seems that PKI was given the space by the power. That is why PKI as if receive a
32 33

See Adeney-Risakotta, in Religion, 11. See ibid., 12. 143 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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broad space to launch their political ambition via their fierce Communist propaganda. Heffner mentions that PKI aims at HMI and PI. Even also they target the business leaders. Because of the campaign of PKI, then Masyumi sank into bitterness and despair something that cannot be imagined in the early 1950s. So it can be said that Masyumi was pressured and suffocated by the Old Order.34 Because they fail under the Old Order, they put very much hope in the New Order regime. They also try to get the support of the military. Their struggle in the Constituent Assembly, together with some other small Islamic parties was the demand that the constitutional bases of the nation become Islam. But this is not so easy because Islam itself is also plural. It is not easy to unite them into one boat. So because they fail in the time of Soekarno, they try once again in the time of Soeharto also with the same agenda, to Islamize the state. But others think that this is a foolish campaign and others think that Islamic state was an ideological mirage only. Here we see that there are already two wings in political life of Indonesia as described by Herbert Feith and Lance Castles. On the extreme left there is Communist, while on the extreme right there is Muslim separatist. In this context the military plays their game. To ban the PKI, military use the Muslim power. This give rise to the new hope for the Islamic parties that now they are on the side of the power. Because of those two extremes the military feel that they alone can unite the whole country. Military will not give the opportunity at all to those two extreme wings. It means that there is no opportunity also for the Masyumi remnants in the time of Soeharto which was dominated by military power. They try to find another form of political action. They try to avoid the direct confrontation with the political power. Now they try to do the religious predication or dakwah as a certain political activity. Later on they realize that the so-called political Islam will not able to realize
34

See Heffner, Civil Islam, 423. 144 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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their political agenda to Islamize the country. So they took another strategy. They took the so-called cultural Islam. This is a new and modern approach. It seems that this approach was succeeded at least at the last decade of Soehartos rule. Soeharto, in his last decade of his regime, finally realizes that he cannot control again military. So he tries to establish a new ally with the new front. This time the new ally was with Islam. This is called as the Islamization of the New Order at the last decade of its existence. This ally grows stronger and stronger. One of its important characteristic was the establishment of ICMI under the great figure of B.J.Habibie. If since the beginning of New Orders existence, only CSIS was the think tank of the New Order,35 but since the beginning of the nineties there are a lot of Islamic think tanks. It seemed that CSIS was abandoned and the regime tries to look to new allies, for instance to ICMI. ICMI has their own newspaper, Republika; also has their own think-tank, CIDES.36 If at the beginning of New Order it seems that Soeharto looks like more Javanese, in the beginning of the nineties he became more Islamist with his making a Hajj to Makkah, together with Tien Soeharto, also his changing of name by putting Muhammad in front of his original-Javanese name. It seems that at the last part of his rule Soeharto was more incline to Islam rather than to Nationalist-Javanese. For me it also means that nationalist at least its Javanese version of idealism was eliminated also from the political discourse in Indonesia. We saw that the element of Communism has been eliminated in the sixties. And now the element of (Javanese)-Nationalism was also eliminated in the nineties. What happen afterwards? We still do not know. We still have to wait. But one thing is clear; again to quote Bernard Adeney-Risakotta: Diversity was eliminated by the physical slaughter, imprisonment and repression of a sizable portion of the
35 36

See Setiono, Tionghoa, 989-1000. See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 668. 145 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Indonesian population. Even today, tolerance for diversity does not extend to communist or atheists. Religious freedom only applies to those who hold a recognized, universal religion, not to those who do not.37 Conclusion As a conclusion, I put forward the following three points. First, Soekarnos ideological experiment of NASAKOM failed because there are so many complicated factors and reasons. Sukarno thinks that he can unite the whole Indonesia in his great synthetic mind and thinking, as it is supposed by B.Anderson in his book Language and Power.38 Secondly, his great idea of NASAKOM also failed because he seemed to underestimate the great differences between those three elements. Thirdly, related to the third question in the research question: the process of elimination did not stop with the elimination of PKI. The process of elimination was going on in the new disguise of movements. If in the early history of Indonesia the political Islam have a very strong drive and ambition to make Indonesia as an Islamic state, but it is fail so far, so in the seventies, under the frustrating experience of New Order, they change their policy, from political Islam to cultural Islam. It seems that this strategy was succeeded in converting the Nationalist wing of the Republic. The nationalist are now subdued and absorbed into new kind of Islamic strategy. We do not know yet what happened after the nationalist wing being absorbed by Islam. I hope that the next step was not the elimination of the Religion element, especially religion outside of Islam, in the very idea of NASAKOM.

37 38

See Adeney-Risakotta, in Religion, 12. See Anderson, Language and Power, 29-30. 146 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiskus Borgias M.

Bibliography Anderson, Benedict R. and Ruth T. McVey. A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia, Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971. (Known in its popular name, Cornell Paper). Anderson, Benedict R. OG. Language and Power, Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. Bakti, Andi F. Collective Memories of the Qahhar Movement (pp. 123-149), in Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present, edited by Mary Zurbuchen. Singapore University Press, 2005. Benda, Harry J. and Ruth T. McVey. The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents, Translation Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Boland, B. J. The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. Feith, Herbert, and Lance Castles. Pemikiran Politik Indonesia 19451965. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988. Feith, Herbert. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978. Heffner, Robert. Civil Islam, Islam dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia (The original title: Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, translated by Ahmad Baso). Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001. Isher, Wolfgang. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987. Kartodirjo, Sartono. The Peasants Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel; A Case Study of Social
147 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

Fransiskus Borgias M.

Movements in Indonesia. N.V.De Nederlandsche Boek En Steendrukkerij v/h H.L.Smits S-Gravenhage, 1966. Kim, Sebastian C.H. Christian Theology in Asia. Cambridge: CUP, 2008. Van Klinken, Gerry. Minorities, Modernity and The Emerging Nation, Christians in Indonesia, a Biographical Approach. Leiden: KILTV Press, 2003. McVey, Ruth T. The Rise of Indonesian Communism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968. Ricklefs, Merle C. Polarizing Javanese Society, Islamic and Other Visions (c.1830-1930). Singapore: NUS Press, 2007. _____. Sejarah Indonesia Modern. Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1998. Setiono, Benny G. Tionghoa Dalam Pusaran Politik. Jakarta: Elkasa, (without year). (There is a reference by the author in the preface of the book, in which it is mentioned the year 2002; but this is only a personal note from the author). Sterkens, Carl et. al. (Eds.). Religion, Civil Society and Conflict in Indonesia. Berlin: LIT Verlag Dr.W.Hopf, 2009. Tarling, Nicholas (Ed.). The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume One: From Early Times to c.1500. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

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ANIMAL RIGHT VS ANIMAL WELFARE: IS IT POSSIBLE TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO ANIMAL?
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Gender Activist, Aceh With Prof.

Dr. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta

Duta Wacana Christian University, Yogyakarta

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Introduction Some people are passionate in their conviction that many animals have rights, others are no less passionate in their conviction that they do not. So what does it mean to have rights? To some extent, I will agree with opinion that says: that to have rights, it is really just saying that the relevant parties recognize that entity as having such-and-such rights. However, I think, no one has answered these questions definitively in regard to human beings, so it is certainly no surprise that they provoke disagreement when applied to other than human animals. Roger Scruton, for example, has written that the notion of a right . . . is an expression of the sovereignty that human beings claim over their own lives, and is only doubtfully applied to creatures who do not understand moral ideas, and who have no conception of their duties.1 Another argument comes from David S. Oderberg. In Human Life Review, he claims that even if some animals possess consciousness, self-concept, memories, desires, and even the ability to use languagethese characteristics do not entitle them to rights. He further argues that A right holder must, first, know that he is pursuing a good, and secondly, he must be free to do so. Neither of these things applies to animals: No animal knows why it lives the way it does; no animal is free to live in one way or another.2 As for Peter Singer, he does not argue that all animals should have all the rights granted to humans or that any animals should have the same rights as human beings. A living things level of inherent value depends on its level of sentience. He acknowledges that normal adult humans can suffer in ways that animals cannotby
1

Roger Scruton and Andrew Tyler, Do Animals Have Rights?, in The Ecologist, vol. 31 (March 2001), p. 24. 2 David S. Oderberg, The Illusion of Animal Rights, in Human Life Review, SpringSummer 2000, p. 42. 150 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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imagining future pain, for example. In short, Peter Singer sees animals not merely as means to human ends. It is because they have inherent value, or value in themselves.3 Philosophers who refuse that animals are designated to rights frequently argue that they are not thereby saying that it is morally acceptable to treat animals cruelly. Conservative Christian Matthew Scully writes, for instance, that we are called on to treat [animals] with kindness, not because they have rights or power or some claim to equality, but in a sense because they dont; because they all stand unequal and powerless before us.4 However, still connected to the points have been discussing above, I think the most essential question to ask in relation to the rights of animal is: Should we give them rights or should we recognize the rights of animals? The argument from David Cowles-Hamar may be considered as one of some answers to the question: "Humans are animals, so animal rights are human rights!"5 In a more serious argumentation, we can see that giving rights to black people and women does not lower or demean white males. In other words, bestowing rights to nonhumans does not demean humans. If anything, by being morally consistent, and widening the circle of compassion to deserving nonhumans, we ennoble humans. Yet, before going further to discuss the topic in this paper, I think it is needed to make a clarification about: first, a philosophical difference between proponent and opponent of animal rights; and second, a fundamental difference between animal rights and animal welfare. I assume that not all readers have a clear understanding about these differences. In doing this, I hope that the readers will be
3 4

Lisa Yount, Animal Rights (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2004), 6. Matthew Scully, quoted by Michael Mountain, Speaking for the Animal Right, in Best Friends Magazine, JanuaryFebruary 2003, p. 22. 5 See: Animal Rights FAQ, http://animal-rights.net/ar-faq/. 151 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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able to capture the basic distinctions between proponent and opponent of animal rights. I also expect that the readers will be able to get a more detailed understanding about what is meant with animal rights and animal welfare. Animal Rights: Its Proponents and Opponents Animal right proponents argue that animals have a capacity to think, to reason, to act rationally, to feel pain and/or to be cognizant; therefore, animal are deserving of rights. Even for some commentators, sentience is sufficient to warrant the recognition of rights. Further, among many organizations in the world that concerns on animal rights, PETA and ALDF can be considered as the representative proponents organization of animal rights,6 since these two organizations work for advocating the rights of animals.
6

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) is the largest animal rights organization in the world, with more than 2 million members and supporters. PETA focuses its attention on the four areas in which the largest numbers of animals suffer the most intensely for the longest periods of time: on factory farms, in the clothing trade, in laboratories, and in the entertainment industry. We also work on a variety of other issues, including the cruel killing of beavers, birds, and other "pests" as well as cruelty to domesticated animals. PETA works through public education, cruelty investigations, research, animal rescue, legislation, special events, celebrity involvement, and protest campaigns (See PETA, www.peta.org). On the other hand, ALDF is The Animal Legal Defense Fund. This organization, which was founded in 1979, is an American non-profit law organization that aims to protect the rights and advance the interests of animals through the legal system. It has campaigned for more humane treatment of animals and for stronger enforcement of anti-animal cruelty laws. Some of their activities include filing lawsuit, providing legal assistance to prosecutors handling cruelty cases, working to strengthen state anti-cruelty statues and hosting seminars, workshops and other outreach efforts (See http://www.aldf.org/section.php?id=3). 152 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Conversely, opponents of animal rights focus their argument around the notion that, animals do not survive by rational thought (but by instinct).7 In addition, these animal rights opponents also make another claim i.e. that the PETA and other animal protection organizations are extremist and misanthropic.8 Furthermore, sharp distinctions between the proponent and opponent of animal rights were also described by Susan Sperling in her book Animal Liberator: Research and Morality. She discovered that proponents of animal rights believe in human perfectibility. They adopt and/or embrace a tradition of hope for the redemption of human nature and predict a future in which humanity will live in peace with other species. They are also critical of many aspects of modem society; and many of them are dissatisfied with technological manipulation of both people and animals. In addition, this group is opposed to patriarchal power in Western culture, which they believe fosters oppression of the poor, racism, and sexism, speciesism as well as war. They assert that science and technology, as agents of pollution and environmental destruction, need to be controlled, and they view animal experimentation as symbolic of the human subjugation of nature.9 Otherwise, opponents of animal rights hold a different view that includes the concept of people as fundamentally predatory. According to them, evolutionary history displays that the human
7

Animal Legal Defense Fund, AnimalShould Be Entitled to Rights, in Animal Rights: Introducing Issues with Opposing Viewpoints, edited by William Dudley (Farmington Hills: Greenhaven Press, 2006), 15-20. 8 Misanthropy is a dislike of humankind. See ibid. 9 Susan Sperling, Animal liberators: Research and Morality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 200; 211-212. 153 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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species was adjusted or adapted for a carnivorous existence. So, as an impact of that thing, nature for them remains red in tooth and claw. Pragmatic use of the faculty of sound reason reveals a world characterized by struggle in which human beings should look out for their own species' interests. Unavoidable, one species' gain causes another's loss, yet they accept this process as the way of the world.10 Thus, they admit that although the gulf between humankind and animals is deep, human beings should acknowledge that separation and study it. Referring to the Descartes11 tradition, opponents of animal rights feel a mandate to engage in the conquest of knowledge by means of rationality, and they uphold human uniqueness on the basis of our species' distinctive reasoning ability.12 However, the descriptions mentioned above should not be taken for granted since Sperlings research dealt with particular people and groups at a particular point in time (the 1980s). In reality, actually, both camps are more internally diverse than what have been discussed or suggested by philosophers or animal rightists.

10 11

Ibid., 212-213. Descartes and his proponents refuted that animal deserve direct concern, because they believe that animal are not conscious, and hence have no interests or well-being to take into consideration when considering the effects of their actions. Someone who supports this position might agree that if animals were conscious then we would be obliged to think and to consider the animal interests to be directly relevant to the assessment of actions that affect them. Yet, since they lack of welfare, there is nothing to take directly into account when acting. See Animals and Ethics, in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/. 12 Sperling, Animal Liberators, 211; 213; 217. 154 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Animal Rights vs Animal Welfare Both animal rights and animal welfare organizations take the interests and well-being of animals into their consideration, yet, they may differ in political philosophy. Marquardt quotes Gary Francione as having admitted: The theory of animal rights simply is not consistent with the theory of animal welfare...Animal rights means dramatic social changes for humans and non-humans alike... Marquardt quotes Gary Francione and Tom Regan as having stated: Not only are the philosophies of animal rights and animal welfare separated by irreconcilable differences...the enactment of animal welfare measures actually impedes the achievement of animal rights. They conclude that: welfare reforms, by their very nature, can only serve to retard the pace at which animal rights goals are achieved. 13

13

Vasu Murti, Animal Scam: A Critique, URL: http://www.abolitionistonline.com/07r_murti.shtml; or http://www.americananimalwelfare.com/rights.html. There are also who argue that: Animal rights philosophies are closer to a medieval view of animals in that both treat animals and humans as similar in morally relevant ways. In medieval Europe, animals were executed for murder, bestiality, and theft under the same legal system that applied to humans. Todays animal rights activists argue that animals have the same right to be treated with respect that humans do; the more comprehensively committed animal rights activists will not eat meat, wear leather, drink milk, hunt, fish, go to zoos, have pets, or support any research that involves animals, from developing and testing drugs to basic research. Animal welfare groups tend to be relatively pragmatic, accept compromise, and avoid the more extreme tactics of the animal rights groups, tactics that include confrontation, civil disobedience, and, at the most extreme end, break-ins and vandalism. Animal pragmatists can point to more legal and economic victories, but pressure from animal rights groups has fundamentally changed the debate on how humans should treat animals. Then and now, moderates largely 155 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Thus, a fundamental difference between the two ideologies is on: the right of humans to use animals. Animal right proponents promote the idea that people should have no more rights than other animals.14 It means that humans do not have a right to use nonhuman animals for our own purposes, which include food, clothing, entertainment and vivisection. This is based on a rejection of speciesism and the acknowledgement that animals are sentient beings. Animal rightists argue that animals exist for their own reasons and were not made for humans. In addition, the extreme advocates of animal rights usually believe that the life and integrity of individuals is of paramount importance and cannot be sacrificed for the benefit of humans or other animals. Yet, Clive Phillip in his book the Welfare of Animals argued more generally that rights are unsuitable to be the building blocks of society, because they are firstly illogical in some instances (why do wild animals have fewer rights than farm animals, for example?) and they are secondly, focused on ourselves and those injustices that are uncomfortable for us to live with.15 Otherwise, animal welfarists believe that to some extent humans do have a right to use animals for some purposes; humans may own animals as property and use them for human interests such as labor, milk, nonfertile eggs, wool, or companionship, as long as they are accorded respect and ethical treatment.16

accept that humans should manage and use animals. See Animal Rights/Welfare, www.greyhouse.com/pdf/rural_pgs.pdf. 14 Murti, ibid. 15 Clive Phillips, The Welfare of Animals: The Silent Majority (Australia: Springer Science & Business Media B.V, 2009), 63-64. 16 Animal Rights vs Animal Welfare, http://animalrights.about.com/od/animalrights101/a/RightsvWelfare.htm 156 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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In brief, while the animal rights position seeks the elimination of the use of animals, the animal welfare position seeks more humane conditions for the animals. However, I personally think these claims are not totally true. To most supporters of the animal welfare, some uses of animals are also unacceptable because the human benefit is minimal compared to the amount of animal suffering involved. These usually include uses like fur, cosmetics testing, hunting, and dog fighting and so on. On these issues, not only the animal rights position would call for the elimination of these uses of animals, but also the animal welfare position. It demonstrates that actually to a certain extent, animal welfarists also care for the rights of animal, and it is a human's duty to exercise morally correct behavior in relation to animals. However, with increased communication around the world, we must remember that images and actions from places other than our immediate neighborhood may intrude on our daily lives. In several cases, the entitlement to life suggested by proponents of animal rights may conflict with the animal welfare advocates. For instance, animal welfare advocates believe that animals may legitimately be sacrificed in experimentation to find a technique for improving animal health, as far (if) it improves the welfare of other animals sufficiently, whereas animal rightists would oppose such sacrifice. For me, proponents of animal rights do not have to be extreme, conversely, they might espouse a rights view that did not provide for a right to life in an absolute sense, but rather recognized rights to freedom from mistreatment or abuse to a certain degree; and this have been formulated in many new rules and legislation concerning peoples duty of care to animals.

or Animal /rights.php.

Welfare,

http://www.animalwelfarecouncil.com/html/aw

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Thus, with all differences mentioned-above between animal rights and animal welfare, do we still need to talk about rights? I will answer yes, because I believe that there are still a space between these two extremes for a talk about rights both for human and animal. If so, what does a right, then, mean and how do we justify it? Second, how can we understand rights in connection to duty or obligation? Third, human rights and animal rights: Is it possible to apply some principles of human rights to animal? How is the way to do it? Last, what is my overall judgment on granting rights toward animal? What is right and how to justify it? Nowadays, we seem to have witnessed many appeals to rights such as gay rights, prisoners' rights, animal rights, smokers' rights, fetal rights, employee rights and so forth. So, what is a right? According to Manuel Velasquez, a right is a justified claim on others.17 For example, if I have a right to get an education, then I have a justified claim to be provided with an education by government or society. Furthermore, Amartya Sen writes that there is something deeply attractive in the idea that every person anywhere in the world, irrespective of citizenship or territorial legislation, has some basic rights, which others should respect.18 To serve this critical purpose, it is necessary that rights themselves should be, as Sen said,

17

Manuel Velasquez and his team, Rights, in Issues in Ethics V3 N1 (Winter 1990), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/rights.html. 18 Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 32: 2004, p. 315. 158 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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independent of existing laws and social practices. It is also important that these rights have special normative force.19 I myself would like to say that right (rights for human) is: when I say that someone has the right to do something, I mean that the action is right and must be morally permissible. But then the question becomes why talk about rights why not just talk about actions that are right? When I argue that there is a right to behave or to act in a certain way, it is to say that such acts are morally right, which implies that other people must not deny, criticize, punish or deliberately obstruct. Further, it is very possible that one act may be allowed and accepted by law, but that does not mean that that act is also correct according to morality or the customs where we live. For instance, it is permissible and will not violate any law to have a right to divorce or to get a divorce or to be a stingy person. But, usually most people will scorn or jeer at such acts. Very often, people will not accept those acts as morally right in society. Thus, a communitys recognition of rights is needed, and this can be seen as a way of reducing conflict among its members. Talking about right, we should also question regarding the criteria for rights. According to Almond, if the concept of rights is to have any meaning and to be explicitly acknowledged by society, rights should have five basic qualities i.e.: Who has them; what is
19

Special normative force is that claims about rights should be something more than claims that it would be better if . . . In addition, rights need to be able to stand against appeals to what would be good to have happen they need to trump such appeals, as Ronald Dworkin said. This is because actions, laws and policies that violate individual rightssuch as imprisonment without trial, torture of detainees, invasions of privacy, and curtailment of freedom of expressionare often held to be justified on the ground that they are necessary in order to produce better consequences, or to prevent very bad ones. See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977). 159 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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their content; on what are they based and justified; are they inalienable; and are they absolute?20 In addition, rights are of different kinds and when rights are connected to the terms of power, the persons who have them should be capable and free from interference of others in making decisions or choices. There are no simple answers to the question of what or who has rights. In other words, questions regarding the criteria for rights cannot be resolved until an answer has been provided to the question: who has rights?21 Furthermore, some people, for instance, Plato and Aristotle22 suggest that the ability to reason23 is prerequisite to having the

20

B. Almond, Rights, in A Companion to Ethics, edited by P. Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 259-269. 21 Ibid. 22 Bernard E. Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality, Third Edition (New York: Prometheus Books, 2006), 49. 23 Animal irrationality reduces/eliminates moral status. The following are some thoughts on animal irrationality. Aristotle: value hierarchy - men, women, slaves, animals. Descartes: denied that animals think or have minds. Kant: the ability to reason is fundamental to what makes humans worthy of moral status. Rawls and Carruthers: contractualists - animals have no ability to join a moral community, because they have no language. Contrast to statements above: some animal rightists argue that rationality and mental experience mean the interests of humans and other animals have moral value. Singers utilitarianism said that mental level affects degree of psychological suffering. Regans rights view stated that having a mental life/mental awareness grounds moral status for both humans and other animals, and Rowlands contractualism believed that rational animals have interests that matter to them, differentiating them from plants, e.g. 160 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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capacity for choice. Accordingly, most adult humans and members of some other animal species will be part of this group. Otherwise, Frey24 would exclude animals categorically on the grounds that they are unable to reason. This view can be seen from his philosophical position against granting animals moral standing based on his belief that animals do not have the necessary mental capacities. In addition, Frey denied animals rights because they have no minds and interests.25 In contrast to the arguments above mentioned, there are also some animal rightists like Regan26 and DeGrazia27 who consider this largely to be mistaken because it rests on an outmoded theory of mind and an inadequate appreciation of behavioral evidence. As for Stoic,28 he contended that one must be a person, which restricts rights to humans only. Likewise, others insist that the critical condition be the capacity to suffer, which will include animals, but excludes comatose humans; and to have interests, which covers
See Ed Ellesson, Animal Rationality and its Moral Significance, University of WisconsinMadison Contemporary Moral Issues Presentation July 12, 2006, http:// philosophy.wisc.edu/.../Joel%20341%20Animal%20Rationality.ppt 24 R. Gillespie Frey, Interests and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 25 Ibid., 73. 26 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 27 D. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 28 Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements, in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the Presidents Council on Bioethics, March 2008 (See Chapter 14), http://Users/HM/Documents/Nussbaum/chapter 14. html. Opposite to Stoics opinion, evidence of rationality in animals can be traced through: sense of self or metacognition; memory and experience; inferences/decision-making/ reflection; goals within social contexts; understanding of agency in others; and intention. See: Ellesson, ibid. 161 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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human fetuses, animals and perhaps plants, and also which could be construed to have a biological interest to reproduce. However, the criteria to determine rights are not so easy. If the criterion adopted is too wide, the concept loses force, because it applies to everyone and everything. Conversely, if it is too narrow it could omit categories of individuals that much desire to be included. Thus in general, different people will have different opinions about what the basis of a rights claim is: rationality, sentience or mere life has all had their defenders. They also differ about whether rights belong only to individual persons, or also to groups.29 The next question is how the recognition of a right may be justified?30 The problem of justification is not an easy one to talk
29

Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements (Chapter 3), in Capabilities, Freedom and Equality, edited by Bina Agarwal, Jane Humphries and Ingrid Robeyns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 43. 30 There are also two other particular approaches to the question of the validity or justification toward human rights. First is called the interests theory approach. According to this theory the primary function of human rights is to keep or protect the basic human interests. Protecting human interests is the main ground upon which human rights may be morally acknowledged or justified. John Finnis, a philosopher who concerns about human right, argues that justification of human rights can be done on the grounds of their instrumental value for securing the necessary conditions of human well-being. He further distinguishes seven fundamental interests, or what he calls 'basic forms of human good', as providing the basis for human rights. These are: life and its capacity for development; the acquisition of knowledge, as an end in itself; play, as the capacity for recreation; aesthetic expression; sociability and friendship; practical reasonableness, the capacity for intelligent and reasonable thought processes; and finally, religion, or the capacity for spiritual experience. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1980). Second is the will theory. This theory tries to establish its validity toward human rights based on a single human characteristic i.e. the capacity for freedom. In other words, what is different about human agency is the capacity for freedom and that this has to 162 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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about. That is why Petrinovich suggests that rights should not be used at all, because it is difficult to make decisions regarding which ones have moral priority.31 Similar to Petrinovich ideas Singer's theory does not concern rights since Singer does not believe that animals and humans have rights. Indeed, Singer himself refers to his theory as one of "animal liberation" and states that claims of rights are "irrelevant."32 It is easy to understand why Singer rejects rights in light of his view that only the consequences (understood in terms of the preference satisfaction of those affected) of acts matter. In opposition to arguments above, James M. Jasper wrote that a right is generally regarded as a moral trump card that cannot be disputed."33 A right cannot be sacrificed even if the consequences of doing so would be very desirable. Although some rights give strong prima facie protection and cannot be compromised without the most urgent or compelling reasons, most rights, not to say all rights, should not be considered absolute. For example, although overall social happiness might increase if soceity and/or health department is allowed to use my body without my consent in an experiment, because the goal and likely outcome of which would result in a cure for cancer, yet people can not forget that on the other hand, I have a moral and legal right not to have my interests in my life traded away in order to secure that admittedly desirable result.

constitute the core of any account of rights. See Human Rights, http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/h/hum-rts.htm. 31 L. Petrinovich, Darwinian Dominion: Animal Welfare and Human Interest (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999), 62. 32 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 2002), 8. 33 James M. Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin, The Animal Rights Crusade 5: The Growth of a Moral Protest (New York: The Free Press, 1992). 163 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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However, in general I think the justification of rights, especially human rights, can be traced. First, actually the justification of a claim may depend on some standards accepted and acknowledged not only by the claimant, but also by society in general. The Constitution, for instance, may be one example of these standards. This Constitution should guarantee the implementation of rights such as the right to speak freely and assures that every person accused of a crime shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury or a local law that spells out the legal rights of landlords and tenants and so on.34 Another version to justify a claim of right is that people are born with rights bestowed from God. Thus, rights are somehow innate or inherent in human beings. The U.S. Declaration of Independence written in 1776 claimed that people are granted by their Creator with natural rights namely the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. On this view, God is the supreme lawmaker and enacted some basic rights. In general, these kinds of rights usually are very general and abstract, like the right to life, the right to liberty, and others. Accordingly, those rights can apply to thousands of years of human history, not just recent centuries.35 Furthermore, justification toward rights can also be done by using moral standards that have been accepted and acknowledged by most people in society, but are not necessarily codified in law.36 We all will agree that most (not to say all) human groups have the principles of morality i.e. imperative norms of behavior backed by values and reasons. These moralities at least contain specific norms such as a prohibition of the intentional murder of an innocent person; and specific values, for instance, valuing human life. If almost all human groups have moralities containing norms prohibiting
34 35

Velasquez, Rights. Human Rights. See URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/. 36 Velasquez, Rights. 164 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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murder and other bad conducts, these norms could constitute the human right to life. In short, human rights may be present or exist independently (apart) from legal or divine enactment by being part of actual human moralities. However, apart from some argumentations above, some vital features of rights like their independence for established institutions, their special normative force and also their independence of direct appeals to what would yield the best consequences have been interpreted differently by people. And as corollary of that, it has borne some skepticism about rights. T. M. Scanlon, for instance, still questions: if rights are not justified either by their enactment by legitimate institutions or by the good consequences of respecting them, how are they justified? Where does their supposed special normative force come from? He further divides this skepticism into several forms: First is a skepticism that related to all moral claims. This kind of skepticism would lead to the view that the only rights are legal rights. Second, skepticism about rights flows from a consequentialist moral outlook. On such a view, there are moral truths, but no moral rights.37 All true moral claims are claims about what leads to the best consequences. The last one is related to questions whether rights are a distinctive and important moral category within a nonconsequentialist moral framework. Against the background of a consequentialist view, in which the basic moral requirement is to act so as to produce the best possible consequences, rights which constrain the pursuit of such consequences may be controversial, but they
37

Moral rights (also called natural rights or unalienable rights) are rights which are not contingent upon the laws, customs, or beliefs of a particular society or polity. Natural rights are thus necessarily universal, whereas legal rights are culturally and politically relative, as quoted from Natural and legal rights. See URL: http://www.answers.com/topic/inalienable-rights. 165 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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have, or at least claim to have, a distinctive and well-defined role in moral thinking.38 On one hand, I should admit that it is not easy to understand what Scanlon meant by his writings. Yet on the other hand, I intentionally quoted Scanlons opinion to show my readers that actually there are some people who still have a doubt or skepticism toward what we called rights. However, I myself would like to raise some questions in connection to Scanlons statements, such as what real role is there for rights within a moral framework that takes duties and obligations morally basic? If rights should be understood or defined as certain complexes of duties and the absence of duties, what is the reason for us to speak of rights at all? Rights in Connection to Duty and Obligation As people differ about what the basis of a rights claim is, people differ again, about the relationship between rights and duties. William David Rose, for instance, writes that: a right, when it is practiced or drilled in the society, raises certain duties on the part of other people; yet the duties are not part of the concept of the right. It is often said that rights and duties are correlative.39 Joseph Raz, for example, writes that X has a right if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of Xs well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be

38

T. M. Scanlon, Rights and Interests, in Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen, Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement, edited by Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2009), 69. 39 W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930), Appendix I to Chapter 2. 166 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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under a duty. 40 Much earlier, Mill wrote that a right is a claim that comes from an individual which society must protect (that is, that needs to be protected if overall utility is to be promoted).41 Yet, I myself think there are two possibilities regarding rights. Firstly, I would like to argue that rights would really relate to duties. The duty to pay taxes, for instance, is directly connected to either the right to enjoy the rights of citizenship, or the right to get some benefits from the things that the taxes pay for, such as roads, schools and so on. Otherwise, if a person refuses to pay taxes, they can be put in jail. For this, he will lose his right to freedom. Secondly, however, we can find that actually rights are not necessarily linked to duties and they may not be mutually supporting or contributory one another. For example, in ethical discourse we frequently attribute a moral status to the human embryo and hence connect rights to unborn children. According to activists in Pro-life, to have an abortion to the embryo means that we are committing to murder, a denial of the rights of the fetus. Here, we see that while children may have rights, it is not clear whether they have duties and obligations. Thus, there are many circumstances in which there does not seem to be a clear empirical connection between rights and duties.42 Rather similar arguments also come from Bryan S. Turner who argued that: () although there has been lot of discussions about duties or obligations from and to human beings, so far there is no formal declaration of human duties. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) started an
40

Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 166. 41 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism and Other Essays, edited by A. Ryan (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 327. 42 Bryan S. Turner, Vulnerability and Human Rights (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University, 2006), 3; 93. 167 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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initiative for a charter of the duties and responsibilities of states, but these initiatives have not yet had much practical consequence. Likewise, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights suggests obligations, but they are not clearly or forcefully specified. While states enforce social rights, no sovereign power exists to enforce human rights uniformly at a global level. Human rights are universal, but it is often said that they are not justifiable and have no correlativity with duties.43 Finally, whether one will agree with these analyses or not, Mark Cooray said that at the common sense level it cannot be denied that a right will raise a duty to another person or institution. As a consequence, it must also implicate an acceptance of that duty by the person who is subject to it. Yet today, one ironic thing is happening in society i.e. while many people are increasing their demand to have more rights, fewer and fewer people are concerned or aware about duties and obligations, least of all those who are most vocal in the assertion of rights such as Governments, the Human Rights Commission and many other government agencies. People are educated by these agents to be aware about their rights and they are also attempting to make more and more rights available with no reference to logic and common sense. But, on the other hand, they seem unconcerned about the need to educate people about duties and the importance of a sense of responsibility.44 The next question is: do humans have a duty to non human animals? Many of us will agree that we have at least some duties regarding our treatment of animals. For example, we all agree that it would be wrong of me to torment or to cause pain to animals. Most
43

Ibid. See http://www.psupress.org/justataste/samplechapters/ justatasteTurner.html. 44 Mark Cooray, Human Rights. See http://www.ourcivilisation.com/cooray/ rights/chap2.htm. 168 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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of us would agree that it is wrong of me to hurt or to kill the animals in the zoo for fun or to reduce boredom. Although we all can accept these matters and it is very possible that no one will reject these premises, there tends to be little agreement on what grounds these duties of mine rest. Furthermore, there are two theories concerning the grounds of these kinds of duties.45 Theories of the first group maintain that the reason I have these duties is because my actions will injure or cause pain to animals, which is itself directly relevant to the moral assessment of my actions. Since no serious interest of them has been served to outweigh the harm caused to the animals, I have a duty to shun these actions. This type of theory usually is called direct theories.46 Lewis Petrinovich wrote in his book Darwinian Dominion47 that we have a direct duty as moral agents48 to respect rights of moral

45

Tom Regan, Animal Rights, Human Wrongs: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (New York: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), chapter 4 and 5. 46 Indirect Duty to Animals. See http://www.wright.edu/~scott.wilson/personal/indirect.doc 47 L. Petrinovich, Darwinian Dominion: Animal Welfare and Human Interest (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999), 185. 48 A basic distinction between moral patients and moral agents is crucial to moral standing. In the moral community, moral agents have direct moral duties to one another and must realize or assume burdens of moral responsibilities toward moral patients. Conversely, moral patients lack abilities that make them accountable for the outcomes of their actions. Petrinovich defines between two classes of moral patients. The first is composed of humans, such as neonates, infants, mental defectives, and the senile. The second includes most if not all nonhuman animals. This division is done to point up the critical nature of personhood i.e. an idea to emphasize the importance of species membership. See L. Petrinovich, 169 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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patients. This respect should not to be construed in connection to "kindness" toward animals, or as the result of "sentimentality" in respect to human infants and elderly humans. The treatment of moral patients-human and nonhuman-should be in terms of respect for their inherent value.49

Human Evolution, Reproduction, and Morality (New York: Plenum Press, 1995). Who can be moral agents? Tom Regan argues that normal adult are the individuals believed to be moral agents ... He further says that moral agents are individuals who have a variety of abilities. It will include the ability to bring impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what, all things considered, morally ought to be done, and having made this determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality requires. In contrast to moral agents are moral patients who lack the prerequisites that would enable them to control their own act and behavior in ways that would make them morally accountable for what they do. Moral patients can be on the receiving end of the right and wrong acts (and thus can be wronged). See Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 152-154. 49 According to Regan, to have an equal inherent value is crucial for moral agents because it becomes the grounds on which the possession of rights is to be based on. There are several inherent values have been listed by Regan and it becomes its "most important" characteristics such as: (1) If any being has inherent value, this value is logically independent of any other being's interest or respect of that value; (2) having inherent value makes it improper to treat an individual as though the value was only a means; and (3) if an individual has inherent value, there is an obligation to treat that individual with respect. These basic qualities are the required or stipulated basis for the concept of rights. See Tom Regan, An Examination and Defense of One Argument Concerning Animal Rgihts, in Inquiry, 22, # 1-2. (Reprinted in All That Dwell Therein, edited by T. Regan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 113-147. 170 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Opposite to the theory above is a theory called indirect theories. This theory claims that all of the duties and obligations we have to animals are indirect duties to humans. So, the fact that my actions harm animals is not directly relevant or has certain consequences to the moral assessment of my actions. My action to hurt animals is wrong simply because by doing so: first, it will upset humans. Second, I am also wrong to kill animals in the zoo because they belong to the owners of the zoo, just as your pets belong to you. Thus, at least indirect consideration must be given to animals because cruelty to them, who do not count intrinsically, may encourage cruelty to humans, who does not. Common to . . . [all such] views is the proposition that we have no direct duties to animals; rather, animals are a sort of medium through which we may either succeed or fail to discharge those direct duties we owe to non-animals, either ourselves, or other human beings, or, as in some views, God. 50 In other words, this approach, elaborated in the writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant, explains that although animals are not direct object of moral concern, there are nonetheless certain things that are not morally justifiable when done to animals. In this view, the duty to not hurt animals or not cause unnecessary cruelty to animals is something encouraged. Yet, it is not because animals are intrinsically objects of moral attention but, rather, because of the psychological fact that people who brutalizes animals will or may tend to act cruelly to other people. Clearly, in this view, people are the only object of moral concern; animals are relevant only insofar as treatment of them might affect our treatment of people.51

50 51

Regan, The Case, 150. Bernard E. Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality, Third Edition (New York: Prometheus Books, 2006), 48-49. 171 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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I myself think as follows i.e.; though we have indirect duties to people, that is not the whole story. What I mean here is that it would be wrong for you to use me as a projectile to harm or to injure an innocent person because you would be violating your duty to him in so using me. But that is not all that would be wrong; you would be wronging me as well. There are duties to people, things that we owe to other people, not just duties that pertain to the way we treat them. In some way, we do have to ponder the well-being or suffering of other people including their happiness and misery, their rights, survival, interests or freedom. Again, so much is a matter of common sense, namely the common sense of our moral relations with other people in society. Furthermore, where do other animals fit in? For this, at least, I will refer to mammals and birds which do not seem very much like rocks These two animals have wills, preferences and goals with a good level of consciousness and ability to adjust to and to manipulate the world around them. With all these instruments, mammals and birds can experience pleasure or pain, suffering or enjoyment. They have interests that can be achieved or frustrated and because of that, in many ways, then the animals look much more like human beings than like rocks. Now, if we agree that animals seem so much like human beings and do not look similar to rocks, it is reasonable to consider that there is a moral similarity between us and the animals. Here, what we are talking about is not only a claim about how much importance animals has or a denial that animals are also in many respects different from us. But more than that, it is to say that human beings who are morally sensitive should also consider the interests of other animals, not merely ignore or discount their wellbeing or suffering as something of no importance or no intrinsic value. Once again, because all animals are subjects of life, they have

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some degree of rights and moral status,52 so also their lives and interests must be respected. They may be used by humans only for important purposes. As they do have some interests that must be considered by human beings, especially an interest in avoiding pain and suffering, their use always must be made as painless as possible. Similar to points above, animals may have some moral status yet it is a lesser moral status than possessed by human being. And since animals have less moral status than humans, their lives and interests are not as important as human lives and interests. In other words, animals have some intrinsic value, though less of it than human beings. And, because animals have some moral status so animal welfare claims that causing animals to suffer is usually immoral. We should avoid being cruel to animals as a moral obligation. We should also work to eliminate the needless suffering inflicted on animals by others. We should especially work to end the cruel practices of factory farming, as well as the painful and often useless experiments in which animals are used as subjects. Thus, we do have duties or obligations directly to animals, just as we have duties or obligations directly to human beings. Another important point is that although causing needless animal sufferings is wrong, some animal suffering is allowed. I think
52

Wall wrote that: To say that a being has moral status is to say that it must be counted among those who have moral relationships to all beings with moral status. If we think of these relationships especially the rights and duties that exist among and between those with moral status- as comprising a moral universe, then having moral status means that a being is part of the moral universe. In the history of Western civilization this universe has gradually expanded over the centuries. Slaves, member of minority races, and women have gradually been given full moral status over many centuries, at least in principle. See Thomas F. Wall, Thinking Critically about Moral Problems (California: Thomson, Wadsworth, 2003), 287. 173 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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when the use of animals for human purposes is important enough, even when that involves some suffering and even death on the animals part, then using them may be morally acceptable. Sometimes animals are needed for food, and sometimes the experiments that use them as a subject save not only millions of human beings from suffering and death but also the animals themselves. The point is that we should always treat animals in the most humane way possible when we do use them for our own good. But because their moral status is not on a par with the moral status of humans, it is sometimes morally acceptable to use them for our own purposes. Rights for Humans and Animals 1. Human Rights The concept of human rights or individual rights is so new in human history results in not all men grasping it fully to this day.53 Because of that, the idea of human rights and inherent value has not always been accepted by people in society. There are debates going on in society about what is a human right?54 Are rights to be thought
53 54

Ayn Rand in Man's Rights. See http://freedomkeys.com/rights.htm. Margaret MacDonald wrote that from the beginning, the so-called rights of man have an eminently political character. They were not conceived in order to be enjoyed on an isolated island but in order to become clauses in Constitutions, the inspiration of social and governmental reforms. See Margaret MacDonald, Natural Rights, in Theories of Rights, edited by J. Waldron, p. 32. The essay originally appeared in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 194748, The Aristotelian Society, 1949. On the one hand, to say of a right that it is natural somehow implies the idea that it is unacquiredthat it does not arise from special circumstances, like particular transactions between individuals or particular positions within the communityand that it cannot, therefore, be lost as a consequence of changes in one's individual condition or in the general context. On the other 174 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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of as possessed by all or only persons or human beings? Do they apply to people of all races? Children? People who are brain damaged or senile? And the last question is about how other people should be treated? So far, there is no easy answer to these questions, even where humans are concerned. The principles of human rights have been understood by people in all cultures and countries as basic moral claim just because they are people. Calling these "rights", such as right to life, right for freedom and so on, implies that they are a high priority. These rights attach to individuals because they invoke them, and that compliance with them is mandatory rather than optional (discretionary).55 In general, human rights are universal in the sense that these rights should be possessed and enjoyed by all people. And at the same time, their existence should also be free and independent, that they are available as standards of criticism and justifications whether or not they are acknowledged, appreciated and implemented in one country by its legal system or officials.56 Thus, to live in society, we certainly need these moral doctrines of human rights. They can be employed to identify the basic prerequisites for each human being leading to a minimal standard of the good life. Fifty years ago, this aspiration was found and written in many declarations and legal conventions, which started by the Universal Declaration of Human

hand, although the injunction to keep promises or the exhortation to be beneficent are not very likely to be inserted among the watchwords of reformers or demonstrators, issues like the protection of life, of freedom, and of security are fundamental moral values that must be realized in any acceptable society. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 114 117. 55 Human Rights. See www.iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/. 56 James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1987), 561-562. 175 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Rights (1948)57 and perpetuated by, most importantly, the European Convention on Human Rights (1954) and the International Covenant on Civil and Economic Rights (1966). Together these three documents form and become the centerpiece of a moral doctrine and sets out a list of over two dozen specific human rights that all countries should respect and protect. These Declarations make it obvious that basic rights apply to everyone. This application is based on the fact that we all experience or have a life with its mosaic of thoughts and feelings. This prevails equally to everybody whether she/he is a hobo or a princess, rich or poor, brain surgeon or dunce. The value of one individual is not
57

There are more than two dozen specific human rights have been set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and these concepts of human rights should be respected and protected by all countries in this world. A team from Stanford divided these specific rights into six or more families i.e.: security rights that protect people against crimes such as murder, massacre, torture, and rape; due process rights that protect against abuses of the legal system such as imprisonment without trial, secret trials, and excessive punishments; liberty rights that protect freedoms in areas such as belief, expression, association, assembly, and movement; political rights that protect the liberty to participate in politics through actions such as communicating, assembling, protesting, voting, and serving in public office; equality rights that guarantee equal citizenship, equality before the law, and nondiscrimination; and social (or "welfare") rights that require provision of education to all children and protections against severe poverty and starvation. Another family that might be included is group rights. Although the Universal Declaration did not include group rights, subsequent treaties did. Group rights include protections of ethnic groups against genocide and the ownership by countries of their national territories and resources. See W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); S. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and J. Baker, Group Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). 176 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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determined because of any intelligence or usefulness to others, instead it reflects this capacity to experience life. Every person has an inherent value, and deserves to be treated with respect in order to make the most of their unique life experience.58 Because of those reasons, none is more justifiable to make a slave of someone who is intellectually handicapped or of a different race, gender and religion, and so forth. Furthermore, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,59 it is better to answer the question of what human rights are with a general description of the concept rather than just stating a list of specific rights. Different people may have different opinions about whether some particular rights are human rights. Nevertheless, in general people can have the same idea about what human rights are. Firstly, human rights are rights owned by human beings. They refer to all human beings i.e. all people living today. It can refer to all people in general, or all citizens of countries. It is often that people limit them just to all members of groups with particular vulnerabilities like women, children, native peoples, racial and religious minorities, and sometimes all ethnic groups (as with rights against genocide). Second, human rights are primarily political norms or standards rather than interpersonal standards which deal particularly with how governments and institutions should treat their people. Human rights are not common moral norms or rules like the prohibition of the lie or violence. As Thomas Pogge argue that "to engage human rights, conduct must be in some sense official."60
58

Anonymous, Human and Animal Rights, see http://www.animalliberation.org.au/ethics.php. 59 Human Rights, first published in 2003; See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/. 60 T. Pogge, "The International Significance of Human rights," in Journal of Ethics 4, 2000, p. 47. 177 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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These norms become standards of decent governmental conduct and especially concern social and political leaders and institutions. However, S. Okin in her article reminded us to be careful, especially in facing rights against gender and racial discrimination, which are concerned to regulate behavior that is more often private than governmental.61 Third, people consider human rights as moral and legal rights, which may function in society as a shared doctrine or norm of actual human moralities. As a legal right at the national level or as a legal right within international law, human rights can be a justified as moral norms because they are bolstered by strong reasons for their existence. The strong reasons here mean that: At the international level, human rights norms exist because of treaties that have turned them into international law. For example, the human right not to be held in slavery or servitude in article 4 of the European Convention and in article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights exists because these treaties establish it. At the national level, human rights norms exist because they have through legislative enactment, judicial decision, or custom become part of a country's law.62 Fourth, human rights are numerous (several dozen) rather than few.63 Like other bills of rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a list of more than two dozen specific rights. Thus, among those civil and political rights are rights to be free from discrimination; the right of persons to life, liberty, and security; the right to have freedom to embrace religion; freedom of thought and
61

S. Okin, "Feminism, Women's Human Rights, and Cultural Differences." In Hypatia 13: 1998, pp. 32-52. 62 See footnote no. 59. 63 J. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006). 178 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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expression; and so on. In connection to the UDHRs social and economic rights, it includes the rights to a suitable standard of living such as sufficient food, the right to have education, to work and have economic opportunities, and to be kept or cared for during disability and old age. Thus, human rights protect people against the abuses of people's dignity and fundamental interests. Fifth, as the minimum or lowest standard, human rights focus on the moral minimum and concern in areas of great injustice. Supporting arguments also come from Nickel and Shue. Nickel, for instance, says that human rights focus to protect minimally better lives for all human beings.64 Henry Shue comments that human rights concern the lower limits on tolerable human conduct rather than great aspirations and exalted ideals.65 As minimal standards, human rights aim or focus more on achieving the best result rather than shunning the terrible. In connection to many legal and policy matters, human rights leave most of those problems open to democratic decision-making whether at the local or national levels. Sixth, human rights are international norms covering all countries and when we argue that human rights have universal characteristic, it is because these rights act as standards of evaluation and criticism that should be held internationally and are unrestricted by political boundaries, also means that we recognize some rights, for example, the right to vote, are held only by adult citizens. Seventh, human rights are high-priority norms and usually these rights are strong enough to win most of the time when they compete with other considerations, despite the fact that they are not absolute. Further, to be put in a high priority, human rights must
64 65

Ibid. Henry Shue, Basic Rights, Second Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 179 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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have and obtain strong justifications, especially from a plausible connection with fundamental human interests. Rather similar statement comes from Maurice Cranston who says that human rights are matters of "paramount importance" and their violation a grave affront to justice."66 Although these rights are on paramount importance, once again it does not mean that we should take human rights to be absolute. From some characteristics of human rights above mentioned, it can be concluded that people should live in peace, according to their own needs and preferences. Also, none of the people may be treated cruelly, intimidated, exploited, imprisoned or killed for no good reason. Yet, in reality we often find that the rights of individuals will come into conflict and one has to decide which right has priority. When people are confronted with a moral dilemma, they need to ponder whether their action would respect the basic rights of each of the individuals involved. How would the action affect the basic well-being of those individuals? To understand this point, the following is a good example given by Manuel Velasquez i.e. a club has a rule or policy that women should be excluded from joining or becoming a member of that club. Here, we face a problem regarding how we equalize or balance between the right not to be discriminated against -- which requires equal treatment of women -and the right to freedom of association, which would permit the club to decide for itself whom to admit or allow to be its members? In cases like this, it is necessary to examine the freedoms or interests at stake and then the members of the club themselves need to decide which of these two options is the more crucial for securing human dignity.67

66

See M. Cranston, "Human Rights, Real and Supposed," in Political Theory and the Rights of Man, edited by D. D. Raphael (London: Macmillan, 1967). 67 Velasquez, Rights. 180 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Another point that also needs discussion here is that the doctrine of human rights does not aim to be a fully comprehensive moral doctrine. In other words, human rights do not give us a fully comprehensive account of morality per se. There are no certain criteria for us on how to respond to questions such as is telling a lie is inherently immoral, or what is the extent of one's moral obligations to human and non human animals? Moreover, according to Hugo Adam Bedau, the concept of human rights was not designed or formulated to embrace non-human persons, and it was clearly intended to exclude infra-human beings, such as animals.68 Conversely, opposite to Bedaus opinion, I myself think that it is necessary to examine the premises and implications of the doctrine of human rights to animal as it has gradually been elaborated and publicly established. What I mean here is: it is necessary to examine the possibility that its theoretical foundations offer a suitable solution for the problems of a community broader than the human one. In other words, the next points will try to investigate whether theories of human rights can be a plausible and logical preliminary answer for our human cohabitation with members of other species. 2. Animal Rights: Applying the Principles of Human Rights to Animals Based on the Animal Rightists View Do animals have rights?69 Feinberg proposes that a human right must be held by all people equally, unconditionally and
68

Hugo Adam Bedau, International Human Rights, in And Justice for All, edited by Tom Regan and Donald Van DeVeer (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983), 298. 69 PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) does hold that "animals deserve the most basic rightsconsideration of their own best interests regardless of whether they are useful to humans." This stance is based on the notion that animals are "capable of suffering and have an 181 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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unalterably. He further extended this definition by including animals, as long as there is respect for a basic right not to be treated cruelly; a creature capable of suffering should not endure unnecessary pain or torment.70 In addition, basic needs necessary to sustain the existence of organisms should be met. This means that all living beings including animals must be allowed to eat, to drink, to have opportunities to breed, be afforded freedom of movement, and so on. They should also be allowed to interact with conspecifics (belonging to the same species) and have environmental supports for social interaction.71 An extreme argument comes from Tom Regan who argued that if we acknowledge that animals have rights such as the rights to life and others, then the way we treat them in biomedical research, on farms and other treatments will violate their rights. So, those treatments are wrong and should be stopped, no matter how much humans have benefited from these practices in the past or how much we might benefit from having them continue in the future. 72

interest in leading their own lives" and therefore cannot be used for "food, clothing, entertainment, experimentation, or any other reason." See http://www.opposingviews.com/arguments/it-is-a-leap-to-say-animalshave-interest-in-leading-their-own-lives. 70 J. Feinberg, Human Duties and Animal Rights, in On the Fifth Day, edited by R. K. Morris & M. W. Fox (Washington: Acropolis Books, 1978), 45-69. 71 Lewis Petrinovich, Evolved Aspects of Morality Determine Legal Rights of Animals, in People, Property or Pet, edited by Marc D. Hauser (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006), 134. 72 Carl Cohens statement concerning why animal experimentation is wrong, if animals have rights, is from Do Animals Have Rights?, in Ethics and Behavior 7, no. 2 (1997): 92. Cohens arguments against animal rights are reviewed in chapter 8. 182 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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From several argumentations above, we can see that animal rightists do believe that animals do have rights and that those rights of animals need to be granted or established absolutely. So then, what is the way to establish it? According to Bernard E. Rollin,73 there are two major ways in which rights could be established for animals. First, that only people have rights, is easily denied by the fact that since the early nineteenth century many companies and corporations have enjoyed such legal standing, as have ships, trusts, cities, and nation-states. For Rollin, it is far easier to defend and to protect the legal rights of animals. Otherwise, it will be even more difficult for us to defend legal rights for such non-living things. The reason is because although these corporations, companies, ships or firms have legal rights, it is hard to advocate this notion because they are not a direct object of moral concern. Conversely, it is rationally almost impossible to reject or exclude animals because they are direct objects of moral concern. Consequence of that it is quite easy to demand rights for them. The second way of establishing legal rights for animals, according to Rollin is by involving not judicial extension but rather legislative conferral74 meaning that laws governing the treatment of animals must be written in the language of rights, because animals should be seen as objects of moral concern. Rollin further argues that in the long run, this route is probably more plausible than judicial extension.75 Unfortunately, he does not elaborate in more detail what he meant by that statement. Of course, this will raise another
73

Bernard E. Rollin, Animal Ethics and Legal Status, in People, Property or Pet, edited by Marc D. Hauser (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006), 3536. 74 Ibid, 37. 75 Ibid, 37. 183 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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question such as which rights need to be legally established and by what means? Furthermore, similar to Rollin, Alex Pollen also suggested that granting rights based upon some concrete standards that invariably conclude animal can be done in two ways. The first is to allow morally aware humans to revoke the rights of those marginal human cases who appear to not merit or deserve rights by cognitive standards. In this case, humans would be equally justified in denying rights to animals. The second alternative is to define rights as exclusive to the human species, or even by some absolute quality of humanness. In this manner, rights could be denied to animals, while conceivably still granted to all humans.76 Finally, according to Pollen, rights as the principle legal protection granted by the Constitution are inalienable protections and guarantees. If an absolute standard exists to protect human individuals, some animals will invariably merit protection as well. And at a very minimum, animals also have the right to be considered and to have their interests taken into account.77 Thus, the statements above displayed to us the ways to grant rights to animals based on the animal rightist point of view. The next discussion will focus on the reasons why we should expand the principles of human rights to animal. According to Martha Nussbaum,78 there are several important reasons why we should do
76

Alex Pollen, Consistency and Rights, in People, Property or Pet, edited by Marc D. Hauser (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006), 51. 77 Ibid., 50. 78 Nussbaum, Human Dignity Nussbaum argues that animals are capable of a dignified existence, which she considers this is as an issue of justice. In short, she concerns on defining a just relationship between 184 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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humans and non human animals. For this aim, people need philosophy and its theories of justice. Theories will help us to get the best out of our own ethical intuitions, preventing self-serving distortions of our thought. They also assist us expand our ethical commitments to new, less familiar cases. She openly refuses the Judeo-Christian idea that humans have been given by God dominion over animals. She writes, Although that idea has been interpreted in a variety of ways, it has standardly been understood to give humans license to do whatever they like to nonhuman species and to use them for human purposes. Disappointed and unsatisfied with the Kantian and the Utilitarian approach (most recently supported by Peter Singer), Nussbaum defends a capabilities approach, which she defines as Each form of life is worthy of respect, and it is a problem of justice when a creature does not have the opportunity to unfold its (valuable) power, to flourish in its own way, and to lead a life with dignity. The fact that so many animals never get to move around, enjoy the air, exchange affection with other members of their kindall that is a waste and a tragedy, and it is not a life in keeping with the dignity of such creatures. Finally, she contends that it is appropriate for each nation to include in its constitution or other founding statements of principle a commitment to regarding nonhuman animals as subjects of political justice and to treating them in accordance with their dignity. The constitution might also spell out some of the very general principles suggested by the capabilities approach, and judicial interpretation can make the ideas more concrete. Further, she prompts this issue should be a priority for international cooperation to keep and foster a truly global theory of justice. See Issue in Perspective with Dr. Jim Eckman, Do Animal Have Rights? Published in February 25, 2006, http://www.issuesinperspective.com/06feb25_26-2.cfm. Furthermore, in her book Frontiers of Justice, Nussbaum criticized the theory of justice from John Rawls. According to her, Rawls conception of justice is not able to handle: what is owed to people with disabilities (whether temporary and permanent, or mental and physical); justice across national boundaries; what is owed to animal and the rest of nature. Thus, Rawls does not consider or grant that these are issues of justice. Furthermore, Nussbaum also said that theories of social contract contain some obvious defects. It is because when people think about the concept of 185 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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this. The first reason is based on a premise that actual dignity79 is possessed not only by humans, but goes also to most animals (at least for all animals having complex forms of sentience and that move from place to place). So, we can easily move onward to recognize that the world contains many distinct varieties of dignity, some human and some belonging to other species, only if we refuse to ground dignity in rationality alone, and insist on grounding it in a varied set of capacities that are all elements in the life of a type of animal being. One way in respecting animal capacities, would require
global justice, we often typically think of extending our theories of justice geographically, so that they include more of the human beings on the Earths surface. Otherwise, what seldom appears or comes in mind -although we think about it more often present than people did in the past is the need to extend our theories of justice outside the realm of the human, to address issues of justice involving human animals. The main image of the social contract theories for the origin of principles of justice is that: a contract just made among rational human adults, there is no room, at least in basic social justice, for the needs and interests of non human creatures. Once again, the fact that such theories combine (conflate) the question who frames the principles of justice? with the question For whom are these principles framed? means that they cannot include animals in the group of subjects for whom the theory is devised, given that animal do not partake in the making of contracts. See Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (London: The Belknap Press, 2006), 14-23. 79 Dignity is the quality or state of being worthy of esteem or respect. See its definition from Oxford English Dictionary. It seems to me that nobody actually knows how to apply the concept consistently whether to human or to animal. However, we still need to admit that non-human animals have a level of dignity though it is lower than human beings who are rational and self-aware creatures. So, if we realize that many non-human animals have a level of dignity, we are duty-bound to respect and even morally reprehensible if we do not. 186 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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us, at least, undertaking not to impede animals chances to grow up and lead flourishing lives. Second, many cruel abuses toward animals such as the factory farming industry, and the desecration of habitat of animals in the wild, even to some extent hunting for game, fishing for sport have to stop. Some people will definitely lose their money if those practices are terminated or stopped. But there is no reason to think that the protection of animal life is so prohibitively costly that it will take needed resources away from our children, especially those with disabilities. Third, according to her, it seems morally weird or even unacceptable to harp on human dignity while rejecting dignity to other animals. Non human animals possess dignity for the very same reasons i.e. they are sentient and complex living beings provided with capacities for activity and striving. One example is medical research. Although some research using animal subjects have advantages not only for human beings, but also for animals, we still need to work as hard as we can to develop methods of medical research that do not require animals as a subject of experiment. It can be done through computer simulation, for instance.80 In doing so, the unnecessarily cruel treatments to animals used in research can be limited or even be ended. At the same time, it also reflects the change of our treatment of other species.

80

Nussbaum, Frontiers, 14-23. 187 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Concluding Remarks: Overall Judgment on Granting Rights toward Animals The following are several points that I think important to summarize. First, in a human society, a moral agent would have certain duties towards others within that same system, if she/he also wants to be able to enjoy certain concrete rights within a social system. One example is: someone may argue that to have the right to speak freely, means that one is duty bound to protect the freedom of speech for all others.81 Yet, according to me, this premise cannot prevail in animal nature. It is because animals do not recognize and/or understand the concept of right and duty in their community. Some animals must infringe upon the rights of other animals in order to survive. Killing and consuming other animals are done with the aim of surviving according to the rule of the "survival of the fittest." In this latter sense, "interest" means merely self-interest, without regard to any accompanying duties or obligations towards others.

81

The following quotations may help to explain point above mentioned: Kants Categorical Imperative tells us it is immoral to make an exception of yourself. If you would want other people to act in a certain way, you must hold yourself to the same standards. No one is above the moral law, and making excuses for yourself (such as that you're in distress) does not get you out of your moral duty. In summary, Kant believes that moral behavior requires that we do the right thing because it is right, and for no other reason, and that we hold ourselves up to the same standards we would require of everyone else. See http://philosophy.suite101.com/article.cfm/the_categorical_imperative_of_ immanuel_kant.

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Second, most of us will agree that the needs and interests of animals are different and/or not the same as human needs and interests. For instance, it is not in the list of animal needs like freedom of religion or fair taxation, freedom of speech, equality before the law. Animals do not also have an interest in getting a high school education or voting. Hence, talking about giving animals the right to these interests would only be vain, meaningless and silly. Nevertheless, it should not prevent us from granting some relevant or appropriate rights to animals, because these relevant rights can give benefits appropriate for animals. The following are some of relevant rights for animals, although these rights are also still debatable, namely: the right to live freely even if these animals are pets (no need to be chained, need to live in a bigger cage for a free move); the right to express normal behavior (e.g. food searching, grooming, nest building); the right to reproduce (i.e. pass on their genes to the next generation); the right to not be coerced into experiments or used as entertainment; the right to live free from human by induced harm (e.g. hunger, thirst, molestation, fear, distress, pain, injury or disease). Third, I should acknowledge that it is hard to be consistent with our stances in the treatment of humans and animals fairly, especially with respect to the categories of cruelty and kindness. A harsh debate inevitably occurs, with the advocates of animal rights stereotyping and accusing animal users as cruel persons and sadists, and with animal users seeing animal rightist or advocates as sentimental individuals. Again both are in the same dilemma. On one hand, dont be cruel or hurt animals is solely done in terms of what is prohibited, is a basically flawed idea. In the first place, most animal
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suffering is not a result of intentional cruelty. Many activities are held with the aim to advance knowledge, cure diseases and so forth. At the same time, these activities produce immeasurably more suffering to animal. On the other hand, kindness and love for animals are equally misled or misdirected because it does not assure the moral treatment of animals; and is not able to capture the conceptual basis of our moral obligation to animals. To make it clearer, the following is a good example: imagine someone suggesting that women or poor people should have equal access to educational opportunities only because we should be kind to them. The same as our treatment to animals, they might get their rights (or we do not grant the rights to animal) just because we as human beings should be kind to them in order to be acknowledged as a moral person. Furthermore, although we do have a consensus about ethics and morality on how the treatment toward humans and animals, a consensus we share in our society, one that is encoded in our theory, in our practice and the most significantly, in our legal and political systems, we still have not always applied the principle of rights, ethics and justice fairly and uniformly to humans and also to animals. In other words, although it seems imperative that we in society have an articulated and shared ideal for the treatment of animals, many of us, in fact, do not live up to our ideal for treating animals also for people, especially the poor, because of the weakness of will, selfishness, lack of resources and so forth. Many of us do not really treat people humanly; all sorts of prejudices color that ideal. At various times, we have excluded humans from those principles for reasons such as gender, place of national origin, race, color and the like. This also happens to animals. We have excluded them from
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getting a more humane treatment because animals are naturally slaves, non rational beings, linguistically deficient, not moral agents, soulless beings, and devoid of the divine image. Fourth, to a certain extent, I think that we should acknowledge some rights of animals. Connecting this issue to the principle of Equal Consideration,82 it means that the need and interest of both humans and animals should be taken into consideration. It is because, animals, irrespective of values given by human, have some intrinsic value in themselves, so we should treat them well. Nevertheless, giving an equal consideration or granting animals rights do not hold that rights are possessed absolutely. An animals rights, just like those of humans, must be limited, and rights can certainly be in conflict. For instance, we may consider that some animals are a direct threat to the survival of human beings such as creatures that carry diseases or that can destroy food crops. These creatures are pests and human self-defense justifies their elimination or even killing them. This is a natural process of nature.83

82

If we should extend the primary principle of equality from one living being to another, it does not mean that we should grant exactly the same rights to both groups or that we is required to treat these both groups with the same treatment. Whether we should do so, it will depend on the nature of the members of the two groups. What is meant by the basic principle of equality here is equality of consideration; equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights. See Peter Singer, All Animals are Equal, in Animal Rights and Human Obligation, Second Edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliff, 1989), 75. 83 Even Tom Regan, a prominent animal rights advocate, thinks it is permissible to throw a dog overboard a crowded life boat if not doing so would risk the lives of other humans on board. 191 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Fifth, back to the claim of human rights which states that none of human rights is alienable from its holder for whatever reason. This means that these rights cannot be forfeited or vanished temporarily or permanently either by bad conduct or by voluntarily giving than up. Some people may agree with this statement. However, I myself doubt it: whether it is true or not that all human rights are inalienable from their holders. For me, inalienability should not mean that rights are an absolute one or cannot be ignored by other considerations that are much more crucial. For instance: for somebody who is involved in a serious crime and must be imprisoned for his/her conduct, then the right of this person to freedom of movement can be lost or forfeited either temporarily or permanently. Likewise, in the case of one who is committed to live in monastery, the rights of this person to freedom of movement can be voluntarily alienated. The same thing must also be applied to the rights of animals. Once again, conferring rights to animals does not mean that those rights are absolute. Giving an absolute right to animals should not also be totally approved. This rejection is not simply for the sake of human beings themselves, but more than that it could become disastrous for animals health and well-being, especially if it would eliminate all biomedical research on animals. In other words, this view overlooks the fact that biomedical research, on the other hand, also directly benefits animals. Research on animals, as Loeb Hendee said, has led to immunizations against distemper such as rabies, infectious hepatitis, tetanus and anthrax. It has also led to treatments for immunotherapy for cancer in dogs, leukemia in felines, the prevention of tuberculosis in cattle, and so on. These are only some
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advantages of the many ways and benefits that animal experimentation has been employed to improve the health and relieve suffering of other animals.84 Finally, from the examples above we actually can also see that there is a fundamental difference between human beings like babies, the senile and the mentally incompetent and non human animal. For some animals, in order to survive they must infringe upon the rights of other animals without any punishment or penalty to the perpetrator. Secondly, an absolute legal right for animals would limit, if not abolish or nullify, the utilitarian considerations that are an integral part of veterinary medicine. For instance, what would happen if one member of an animal herd should be killed by a veterinarian in order to save and to keep the others from an infectious disease? How treat the importance of exterminating a disease-carrying animal that threatens a human population? Thus, I think in certain circumstances it seems appropriate to kill the animals. In addition, considering seriously animal interests does not mean that we have to take the interest of animals as the same as humans for all purposes. Nor are we obliged to accord to animals most or all of the rights that we accord to humans. We may still choose the humans over animals in the case of genuine conflict, when it is truly necessary to do so. Yet, it should not be understood that we are justified in treating animals for all purposes and as mere resources for our use. Indeed, I think under an emergency situation or under a certain circumstance, it is allowed (permissible) to use animals even
84

See W. Hendee et.al., Use of Animals in Biomedical Research: The Challenge and Response (Chicago: American Medical Association, 1988). 193 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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human (the very cruel criminalists/prisoners, for instance) without his/her consent in experiments as far as (if) the benefits for all affected outweigh the detriment to the humans or animals used in the experiment.85 Like Singer for instance, he acknowledges that he "would never deny that we are justified in using animals for human goals, because as a consequentialist, he must also hold that in

85

Let's talk about the issue of experiment on animals which used for the purposes of curing disease such as rats and mice. We need to acknowledge that a large part of medical research is done or focused on relatively rare diseases and conditions which primarily have influenced people in rich countries. Conversely, there is much fewer money and other resources have been devoted to research into diseases that kill millions in the third world, such as malaria. However, we are dealing with principles here, so let's put this aside for the moment. Ideally, this research or animal testing cannot and should not be prevented, if this judicious and restrained animal testing can be useful in finding a cure or treatment that will save millions of lives around the world. It is because mice, for instance, are not under threat of extinction, and if a small number of them should be sacrificed, as humanely as possible, so that we can find a cure for AIDS or malaria, then this should be done. Furthermore, dont forget that the majority of animal rights advocates live in the first world. Even those with low incomes are in the top 15 percent of the richest people in this world. It is easy to take a naive and black and white position that no animal should be killed, period, when they are not likely to suffer the consequences of such a decision. These people are putting the lives of a small number of non-threatened animals above the lives of millions of non-white people around the world. At the same time, they enjoy cheap products produced by sweat shops in the third world, and a standard of life made possible through the extraction of their natural resources. That smacks of racism and reverse-speciesism. See Animal Rights, http://www.selfdestructivebastards.com/2010/03/animal-rights.html. 194 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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appropriate circumstances we are justified in using humans to achieve human goals (or the goal of assisting animals)."86 To some extent, I may agree with Singers notion and there may still exist some rightness on it. We may reject or oppose many animal experimentation, only because we think that those animal experiments produce benefits that are insufficient to justify the animal suffering that results. But once again, we do not and must not reject and oppose all kinds of animal experimentation, especially if the use of animals would really produce a cure for a disease that will affect many humans directly. Yet, if there is a feasible alternative (like computer simulations) to our use of animals in a particular situation, then the principle would seem to proscribe such use.

Bibliography Anaya, S. Indigenous Peoples in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Animal Legal Defense Fund. AnimalShould Be Entitled to Rights. Animal Rights: Introducing Issues with Opposing Viewpoints. Ed. William Dudley. Farmington Hills: Greenhaven Press, 2006. Almond, B. Rights, in A companion to ethics, edited by P. Singer. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993. Baker, J. Group Rights. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

86

Peter Singer, Ethics and Animals, in Behavioral & Brain Sciences 13, (1990), p. 46. 195 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Bagaric, M. How to Live: Being Happy and Dealing with Moral Dilemmas. Lanham, MD, USA; University Press of America, 2006. Bedau, Hugo Adam. International Human Rights, in And Justice for All, ed. Tom Regan and Donald VanDeVeer. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983. Cohen, Carl. Do Animals Have Rights?, in Ethics and Behavior 7, no. 2 (1997). Cranston, M. Human Rights, Real and Supposed, in Political Theory and the Rights of Man, edited by D. D. Raphael. London: Macmillan, 1967. DeGrazia, D. Taking Animals Seriously. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. Feinberg, J. Human duties and animal rights, in On the fifth day, edited by R. K. Morris & M. W. Fox. Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1978. Finnis, John. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1980. Flew, Antony. Social Life and Moral Judgment. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2003. (Chapter 5) Frey, R. Gillespie. Interests and Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Hendee, W.J. Loeb, et.al. Use of Animals in Biomedical Research: The Challenge and Response. Chicago, American Medical Association, 1988. Jasper, James M. and Dorothy Nelkin. The Animal Rights Crusade 5: The Growth of a Moral Protest. New York: The Free Press, 1992.
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Kymlicka, W. Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Locke, John. The Second Treatise on Civil Government. New York: Prometheus Books, 1986. MacDonald, Margaret. Natural Rights, in Theories of Rights, edited by J. Waldron. The essay originally appeared in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 194748, The Aristotelian Society, 1949. Max Hocutts chapter. Rights: Literal and Proleptic, in Grounded Ethics: The Empirical Bases of Normative Judgments. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2000. Mill, J. S. Utilitarianism and Other Essays, edited by A. Ryan. London: Penguin Books, 1987. Nickel, James. Making Sense of Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Berkeley; University of California Press, 1987. Okin, S. "Feminism, Women's Human Rights, and Cultural Differences," in Hypatia 13: 1998. Petrinovich, Lewis. Evolved Aspects of Morality Determine Legal Rights of Animals, in People, Property, or Pet, edited by Marc D. Hauser. Indiana, USA: Purdue University Press, 2006. _____. Darwinian Dominion: Animal Welfare and Human Interest. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999. _____. Human evolution, reproduction, and morality. New York: Plenum Press, 1995. Phillips, Clive. The Welfare of Animals: the Silent Majority. Australia; Springer Science & Business Media B.V, 2009. Pogge, Thomas. "The International Significance of Human rights," in Journal of Ethics 4: 2000.
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Pollen, Alex. Consistency and Rights, in People, Property, or Pet?, edited by Marc D. Hausser. Indiana, USA: Purdue University Press, 2006. Raz, Joseph. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Regan, Tom. Animal Rights, Human Wrongs; An Introduction to Moral Philosophy. New York: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. _____. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. _____. An Examination and Defense of One Argument Concerning Animal Rights, Inquiry, 22, # 1-2. Reprinted in T. Regan (Ed.). All that dwell therein. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982. Rollin, Bernard E. Animal Rights and Human Morality, third edition. New York: Prometheus Books, 2006. _____. Animal Ethics and Legal Status, in People, Property, or Pet, edited by Marc D. Hauser. Indiana, USA: Purdue University Press, 2006. Ross, W.D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930. (Appendix I to Chapter 2) Scanlon, T.M. Rights and Interests, in Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen, Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement, edited by Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur. New York; Oxford University Press Inc., 2009. Sen, Amartya. Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 32: 2004. Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation. New York; Harper Collins Publisher, 2002.

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_____. All Animals Are Equal, in Animal Rights and Human Obligation, Second Edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliff, 1989. _____. Ethics and Animals, in Behavioral & Brain Sciences 13, (1990). Shue, Henry. Basic Rights: Second Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Sperling, Susan. Animal Liberators: Research and Morality. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. Thomson, Judith. The Realm of Rights. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. Turner, Bryan S. Vulnerability and Human Rights. USA: the Pennsylvania State University, 2006. Wall, Thomas F. Thinking Critically about Moral Problems. California: Thomson, Wadsworth, 2003. Internet sources Animals and Ethics. Internet Encyclopedia Http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/ of Philosophy.

Animal Rights: Debatabase Debate Topics and Debate Motions. IDEA: International Debate Education Association Debate Resources & Debate Tools. Http://www.idebate.org/debatabase/topic_details.php?topicI D=8. (06 May 2009) Animal Rights vs Animal Welfare. Http://animalrights.about.com/od/ animalrights101/a/RightsvWelfare.htm. Animal Welfare. Http://www.animalwelfarecouncil.com/html/aw/ rights.php.
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Human and Animal Http://www.animalliberation.org.au/ethics.php. Rand, Ayn. Man's Rights. Http://freedomkeys.com/rights.htm.

Rights.

Cooray, Mark. Right without Duties. Http://www.ourcivilisation.com/cooray/btof/chap226.htm Ellesson. Animal Rationality and its Moral Significance. University of WisconsinMadison Contemporary Moral Issues Presentation July 12, 2006. Http://philosophy.wisc.edu/.../ Joel%20341%20Animal%20Rationality.ppt. Human Rights. Http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/ Indirect Duty to Animals. personal/indirect.doc. Www.wright.edu/~scott.wilson/

Issue in Perspective with Dr. Jim Eckman: Do Animal Have Rights? Published in February 25, 2006. Http://www.issuesinperspective.com/06feb25_26-2.cfm. Kants Category article.cfm/ Imperative. Http://philosophy.suite101.com/

Velasquez, Manuel and His Team. Rights, in Issues in Ethics, Vol.3 No.1 (Winter 1990). Http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/ decision/rights.html. Murti, Vasu. Animal Scam: A Critique. Http://www.abolitionistonline.com/07r_murti.shtml; Www.americananimalwelfare.com/rights.html. Natural and legal inalienable-rights. rights. Http://www.answers.com/topic/

Nussbaum, Martha. Human Dignity and Political Entitlements, in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the Presidents Council on Bioethics, March 2008. (Chapter 14). Http://Users/ HM/Documents/Nussbaum/chapter 14. html.
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PETA.

Http://www.opposingviews.com/arguments/it-is-a-leap-tosay-animals-have-interest-in-leading-their-own-lives.

Animal Rights. Http://www.selfdestructivebastards.com/2010/03/ animal-rights.html

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THEOLOGY OF NATURE IN THE BOOK OF JOB: A THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON NATURAL DISASTERS

Naw Lily Kadoe
Myanmar Institute of Theology (MIT), Myanmar

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Introduction On the 2nd May, 2008, Cyclone Nargis, a tropical cyclone, caused the worst natural disaster in Myanmar. The cyclone caused catastrophic destruction and left over 138,000 dead and over $ 10 billion in damaged. Although my family was safe, some parts of my house in Yangon, the capital city of Myanmar, were destroyed by the cyclone. Some of my students lost their family members and their possessions. The Myanmar Institute of Theology (MIT), where I serve as a lecture, held a condolence service for those students who lost their loved ones. The preacher comforted and encouraged the victimized students for their suffering and loss by the story of Job in the Old Testament of the Bible since Job was also a victim of disasters which came to pass in his life; the fire of God (lighting) fell from heaven and burned up his animals and servants (1:16), and all his children were killed by a storm (1:19). He was the one who also lost his loved ones and property by human and natural destruction. As Myanmar is a Theravada Buddhist country, majority people are Buddhists. They accepted this disaster as their consequence of their karma (fate) of their previous lives and they did not blame on anybody but only on themselves. On contrary, Christians were so confused about this disaster which caused death and suffering of people. In the annual meeting of MIT-Alumni Association in July 2009, the participants discussed about the disaster. Among those theologians, what I have heard was a debate between two convictions. One group believes that it was an act of God to punish people for the evil deeds and to warn us to obey the laws of God. The other group did not see it was the will of God as they believe that the loving God would not engage in this cruel act. Not all these victims were evil but many innocent and good people were among them. They pointed out that it was the consequence of global climate change caused by the ignorance of human beings. Therefore,

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they said that the blame should not be put on God; only the people are responsible for the natural disasters. The above debate between the theologians was not a new phenomenon. Throughout the history, Gary Stern states, the role of God or divine power has been debated whenever humankind has encountered catastrophe. The greater the suffering, the more human beings have invoked Gods name, sometimes for strength, sometimes in anger.1 Only within eleven years in the twenty-first century, the world faced more than twenty disasters. Since 2000, weather and nature related catastrophes have occurred in devastating countries such as India, Pakistan, Iran, Haiti, Chile, Brazil, Indonesia, Myanmar, China, Australia, Iceland, the United States and Japan. The most horrific natural disasters in the 21st century can be seen as earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, mudslides and volcanic eruptions.2 Taken the catastrophic statistics from the Insurance Information Institute (III), Aric Mitchell posted an article on 7 Worst Natural Disasters of the 21st Century. There have been many more natural disasters since the start of the millennium, but these seven were the most severe given their cost, the injuries inflicted and the lives they claimed (excluding earthquake and tsunami in Japan). 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1

Haiti Earthquake Indian Ocean Tsunami Sichuan Earthquake Myanmar Cyclone Nargis Kashmir Earthquake

Gary Stern, Can God Intervene? How Religion Explains Natural Disasters (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2007), 2. 2 See http://www.nydaily.news.com/news/world/galleries/tsunami-hitsjapan-the-most-devasting-natural-disasters-of-the-21st-century/tsunamihits-japan-the-most-devasting-natural-disasters-of-the-21st-century.html, accessed on 10 April 2011. 204 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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6. 7.

European Heat Wave Hurricane Katrina3

As long as the natural disasters do not affect on human being, people do not consider them seriously. Unfortunately, natural disasters affected many people, not only through the physical destruction such as injury, homelessness and even death, but also psychological trauma. John Campbell-Nelson examined the trauma of the victims of natural disaster and wrote: Anyone who faces such a loss will react: some wept uncontrollably, some wandered in confusion, some had nightmares and others were afraid to sleep. Some were angry, but frustrated because they could find no target for their anger. All were afraid, stunned at their vulnerability. Several people reported that the saddest thing was the realization that ones own home, the place that symbolized comfort and safety, had become the greatest threat. As the initial fear began to fade, it was replaced by a sense of collective grief in the face of such widespread loss.4 The victims may be wondering Why these things happened to me? What am I wrong? Other people may also be thinking Why these disasters occurred and took away the peoples lives and destroyed buildings and bridges? Who is behind these natural disasters; God or Satan? Who is responsible for these disasters? People who believe in a loving, personal god have more difficulty to

Http://blog.insure.com/2011/03/16/7-worst-natural-disasters-of-the-21stcentury/, accessed on 10 April 2011. 4 John Campbell-Nelson, Religion and Disaster, http://www.icrs.ugm.ac.id/article-index/94-religion-and-disaster.html (accessed on 3/5/2011). 205 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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reconcile disastrous events with their meaning system than do people whose god is remote and capricious.5 Disaster and death create a problem of theodicy. Theodicy is the philosophy of trying to explain the existence of evil in the world that is overseen by an all-loving, all-powerful God.6 Traditionally, in the Bible, people see nature as beauty and awesome creation of God (Psalms 8:1-10). Contemporary people also perceive the theology of nature the same as Psalmists. Alister McGrath writes: If the world is indeed created, it follows that the beauty, goodness and wisdom of its creator are reflected, however dimly, in the world around us. All of us have known a sense of delight at the beauty of the natural world. Yet this is but a shadow of the beauty of its creator. We see what is good, and realize that something still better lies beyond it. And what lies beyond is not an abstract, impersonal, and unknowable force, but a personal God who has created us in order to love and cherish us.7 However, the victims of natural disasters may see nature in different ways. Job saw the nature not as beauty but as chaos and hostility. Their theology of nature may be different from the traditional appreciative of God in nature. Job perceived God as hostile and unjust. The Book of Job gives us an idea about alternative interpretation the theology of nature from anthropocentric to ecocentric. This paper will mainly focus on how people reflect the humans suffering in natural disasters from the biblical and theological perspectives, rather than the causes of the natural disasters. I will explore how the biblical characters in the Book of Job reflect the role of God in nature and humans suffering. Then I will
5

Meredith B. McGuire, Religion: The Social Context (California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1992), 33. 6 Stern, Can God Intervene?, 3. 7 Alister McGrath, The Reenchantment of Nature: The Denial of Religion and the Ecological Crisis (USA: Doubleday, 2002), 18. 206 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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examine how people from different religions see the role of God in natural disasters. Finally, I will propose how the traditional theology of nature should be reinterpreted in the ecological change. The Book of Job The Book of Job is a story about a good man who suffers total disaster: he loses all his children and property by natural disasters and raiders, and afflicted with a repulsive disease. Then in three series of poetic dialogues the author shows how Jobs friends and Job himself react to these calamities. In the end, God himself, whose dealings with mankind have been a prominent part of the discussion, appears to Job. The friends of Job explain his suffering from disasters in traditional religious terms. They assume that the disasters happened to Job can only mean that he has sinned since God always rewards good and punishes evil. But for Job, he does not think he deserves such cruel punishment because he has been an unusually good and righteous man. He cannot understand how God can let such evil happen to one like him and he boldly challenges God. Job does not lose his faith but he longs to be justified before God and to regain his honor as a good man. God does not give an answer to Jobs questions but he responds to Jobs faith by overwhelming him with a poetic picture of his divine power and wisdom. Job then humbly acknowledges God as wise and great, and repents of the wild and angry words he had used. The story concludes how Job restores his former condition, even greater prosperity than before. God reprimands Jobs friends for failing to understand the meaning of Jobs suffering by the natural disasters. Only Job had really sensed that God is greater than traditional religion had depicted him.8 Now we are going to study
8

The Book of Job in Good News Bible, Todays English Version (USA: United Bible Societies, 1976), 553. 207 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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the Book of Job in the Old Testament of the Bible and its wider context in ancient Near Eastern literature. David J. A. Clines analyzes that most scholars agree the date of composition of the Book of Job to some point between the seventh and second centuries BCE with the probability that a prose folktale of a pious sufferer existed long before the largely poetic book itself was written.9 The discovery of many works of ancient Near Eastern literature makes us possible to examine the Book of Job within a wider context than that of the Hebrew Bible. Clines examines that: From the realm of Canaanite culture, there was the poetic epic of Keret, a king who loses all his family, including his wife, in a series of natural disasters. He himself is in danger of death, but at the command of the god El he finds a new wife and, like Job, begets a new family.10 He also tells us about the parallel stories from Egypt, Babylonia, and Sumer. From Egypt, a text with some analogies to Job is the Dispute over Suicide, known as the Dialogue of a Man with His Soul. In that story a man debates with himself whether in his present misery suicide is not to be preferred to life. Like Job, the man expresses his longing for someone who will take up his case in the heavenly council. From Babylonia, the parallel story to the Book of Job is called I will praise the Lord of Wisdom, in which a pious man is struck by disease. He is mocked by his friends as a wrongdoer, and his family has become hostile to him. He himself believes that he must have committed some sin so that punished by God. He is troubled by his human inability to understand the gods. He describes his suffering and appeals for deliverance from it. Finally, he is restored his health. Although there are differences from the Book of
9

David J. A. Clines, Word Biblical Commentary Volume 17 (Dallas, Texas: Word Books, 1989), lvii. 10 Ibid., lxi. 208 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Job, the story from Sumer has wording in common with Job. The title is translated as Man and his God. The sufferer in this story is complaining that he is being made to suffer by God and is being scorned by his friends. He begs God for mercy. Unlike Job, this man acknowledges his sins and the outcome is that the god turned his suffering into joy. Clines believes that the Hebrew tale of Job may be indebted to these texts, yet the Book of Job seems to be a new and independent creation.11 In the Old Testament, the whole book of Job is seen as a series of speeches; the narrator speaking in prologue and epilogue and the characters in the dialogue. The theme of the book is the problem of suffering from disaster. It deals with the questions such as: Why has the natural disasters happened to make people suffered? Is there justice of God where the innocents suffered? However, the Book of Job does not answer the mystery of human suffering and injustice in the world. According to Clines, the argument of the book of Job is By all means let Job the patient be your model so long as that is possible for you; but when equanimity fails, let the grief and anger of Job the impatient direct itself and yourself towards God, for only in encounter with him will be the tension of suffering be resolved.12 In other words, the Book of Job renders an inspiration how people should cope with the disasters in their lives. Reflections of the Characters in the Book of Job on Natural Disasters and Humans Suffering The characters in the Book of Job reflect different ways on the role of God in natural disaster and humans sufferings. We observe the discourses of six people in the Book of Job: Job and his wife, his three friends and Elihu, excluding God and Satan.
11 12

Ibid., lix-lx. Ibid., xxxix. 209 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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1. Job In the biblical story, Job was a man who lived in the land of Uz (1:1). He was the richest man in the East (1:3), and righteous (1:1, 5, 8; 2:3; Ezekiel 14:14, 20). Because of his righteousness, he was tested by the affliction of Satan (1:13-19; 2:7-10) for his loyalty to God. His servants were killed and his animals were stolen by the Sabeans, a tribe of wandering raiders from the south (1:15) and Chaldeans, a tribe of wandering raiders from the north (1:17). Lighting struck the sheep and shepherds and killed them all (1:16). When his children were having a feast at the house of his oldest son, a storm swept in from the desert and blew the house down and killed them all (1:18-19). Satan also made sores break out all over Jobs body; Job went and sat by the garbage dump and took a piece of broken pottery to scrape his sores (1:7-8). In spite of everything that had happened, Job did not sin against God by blaming Him (1:22). He was an example of patient endurance under suffering (James 5:11). Here, Job is seen as an innocent victim who was tested by Satan for his loyalty to God whether his piety depends only upon his prosperity. His innocence is not only claimed by himself (6:30; 9:15), but by the narrator (1:1) and by God (1:8; 2:3; 42:7-8). Jobs suffering was a test for his faith by God and Satan. According to Jeffrey K. Kuan, It was some kind of a silly contest and one-upmanship between God and the Satan.13 He lost his animals, servants and all his children by the destruction of human and natural disasters. Although he was spared from the disasters, he had to live his life in pain and anguish for his loss and suffering. He could not live with others because of his sores. He was bewildered why these calamities happened to him. He wanted to know Gods answer for justice as he thought he was not deserved to be the victim of these disasters. He
13

Jeffrey K. Kuan, Reading Amy Tan Reading Job, in Relating to the Text, edited by Timothy J. Sandoval & Carleen Mandolfo (London. New York: T&T Clark International, 2003), 267. 210 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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was a person of dignity and who feared God and turned from evil (1:2). As a result he was greatly blessed with offspring and possessions, making him the most wealthy and prominent man of the east. He even made sure his children to be blessed as we are told that he got up early in the morning after each feast given by his sons and sacrificed burnt offering for each of his children in order to purify them. He always did this because he thought that one of them might have sinned by insulting God unintentionally (1:5). However, all his children were killed by the disaster. Why? It is obvious that his sacrifices could not prevent the death of his children caused by the natural disaster. His righteousness had no effect in his suffering. At first, he accepted what had happened to him as Gods doing and he blessed God even for his misfortune: The Lord gave, and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord (1:21; 2:10). Even though he, as a pious man, accepted his calamity as Gods will, his mind was confused and his thoughts became more reflective and theological. We soon find him cursing the day he was born instead of cursing God (3:1). As he believed that these disasters were what God did, he cried out God to kill him: O that it would please God to crush me, that he would let loose his hand and cut me off! (6:9). He saw God is hostile to him and his own creation as he said, Your hands fashioned and made me; and now you turn and destroy me (10:8), and God will not turn back his anger; the helpers of Rahab bowed beneath him (9:13). Finally, he challenged God by presenting his case to God: See, he will kill me; I have no hope; but I will defend my ways to his face (13:15). He called for God to a lawsuit. He asked God to explain what he had done wrong that was deserved for his suffering from disasters. Since he believed that he had done nothing wrong, he challenged God to confess that God, but not Job is the criminal.14 Job reflects the pious and God fearer who naturally

14

Clines, Word Biblical Commentary, xlii- xliii. 211 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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responds to the natural disasters and humans suffering with acceptance, frustration and offense. 2. Jobs Wife We hear the voice of Jobs wife only once in the story bursting out with emotion: Do you still persist in your integrity? Curse God, and die? (2:9). She was scolded by her husband for saying like a foolish woman (2:10). We never hear her voice again in the narrative. Clines appeals, Though the androcentric narrator has excluded her from the parts of the narrative where she rightly belongs, as when he notes that there was born to Job seven sons and three daughters (1:2) - as those such were possible in her absence by introducing her at all, even as a minor character, he opens the way to our rereading the whole of the narrative from her perspective.15 As Clines has rightly said, we should read the story of Job from her perspective, too. From her point of view, as Clines notes, in spite of her husbands sacrifices for his childrens birthdays feasts and his way of life as a righteous man, she lost all her children by the natural disaster. The disasters caused reduction in her income and her social status, and at the same time, she had to look after her husband who was afflicted with loathsome sores all over his body. Although her family income had been reduced, she was not exempted to take the responsibility of managing her household and providing hospitality to Jobs friends who came to console him, but ignore her and her quite comparable degree of suffering.16 Jobs wife was not mentioned again in the book yet her presence was indispensible in the narrative of the restoration of Jobs fortune in chapter 42. We are not told that Job had other wives or concubines, but he acquired new seven
15 16

Ibid., xlix. Ibid. 212 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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sons and three daughters. We may assume that Jobs wife never left him and she also could share the joy and wealth as Gods blessing with her husband in the end. Jobs wife can be seen as a co-sufferer who resembles the victim of disasters like Job but responds the difficult situation with distress and anger to God. 3. The Three Friends of Job In the narrative, the three friends of Job were named Eliphaz, Bildad and Zophar. When they heard about the disasters happened to Job, they decided to go and comfort him. When they saw how much Job was suffering, they began to weep and wail, tearing their clothes in grief and throwing dust into the air and on their heads. Then they sat there on the ground with him for seven days and nights without saying a word (2:11-13). We see that they were good friends of Job who were with him in solidarity when he was suffering. When Job started to complain God for his misery and preferred to die, they tried to console Job. Unfortunately, their consolation was based on their theory of retribution, unquestioning belief that the disaster and suffering are the result of sin. Instead of giving comfort to Job, they were blaming on the victims and asking to confess his sin. Although they tried to console Job, their consolation gave him no comfort because Job himself knew this ancient wisdom very well (5:27). Eliphaz acknowledged that Job was a righteous man. According to the ancient wisdom, God punish the wicked but bless the righteous. Since Job was innocent, his assumption was that Jobs suffering would not be long: Think now, who that was innocent ever perished? Or where were the upright cut off? (4:7). For Eliphaz, Job was one of the innocent so whatever he did wrong must be comparatively insignificant and so his suffering was bound to be soon over.17 Eliphaz encouraged Job to have hope in God: Is not your fear of God your confidence and the integrity of your ways your hope?
17

Ibid., xl. 213 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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(4:6). He believed God would bless Job again in the future (4:15-27). It was how he could explain the mismatch of the theory of retribution and the practical life of Job in suffering. He said that Job should be happy for the correction of God because God rebukes the one he loves (5:17). Let alone human beings, even angels are punished by God (4:18-19) so that the most innocent of human like Job must expect to suffer on occasion and it would be temporary for him. He perceived natural disaster as a temporary punishment of God for a righteous man like Job. Bildad, on the other hand, put blame on Jobs children as he held and convinced the doctrine of retribution. He had just seen the death of Jobs children and he believed it is the fate of the wicked. He thought Jobs children must have sinned against God, and so he punished them as they deserved (8:4). The very fact that Job was still alive was a proof that he was not a gross sinner like his children. However serious his suffering, it was not as it might be; therefore his sin was not as serious as he may fear18 and he would be rewarded again; See, God will not reject a blameless person, nor take the hand of evildoers. He will yet fill your mouth with laughter, and your lips with shouts of joy. Those who hate you will be clothed with shame, and the tent of the wicked will be no more (8:20-22). He believed the loss of Job by the disasters will be regained in the future. He observed the natural disaster as a punishment for the sinners. Zophar had different perception on Jobs suffering from disasters. Whereas Eliphaz said Jobs suffering due to the disasters was a contemporary one as he was an innocent man, Bildad saw only Jobs children had sinned. However, Zophar believed Job must have sinned; thats why he was suffering at that moment for his sin. Since Job refused to acknowledge his sin, he would say that Job was a secret sinner.19 The natural disasters happened in Jobs family and
18 19

Ibid. Ibid., xli 214 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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he was suffering, and suffering was inevitably the result of sin. Zophar, according to Clines, held a theology of the essential knowability of God. God knows everything even people do not know. Where there is suffering but no visible reason, it is sure that Gods wisdom holds the reason. When people are suffering and affected by natural disasters, he is punishing them for some reason or another. The sufferings never take place without cause or gratuitously.20 In addition, Zophar concerned the role of Gods mercy in the working of the principle of retribution. He thought Job could have been worse in his suffering. He said, But oh, that God would speak, and open his lips to you, and that he would tell you the secrets of wisdom! For wisdom is many-sided. Know then that God exacts of you less than your guilt deserves (11:5-6). He was convinced that the natural disasters and Jobs suffering was the punishment from God. Elihu, according to Emanuel Gerrit Singgih, was the one who appeared out of nowhere and suddenly disappeared again after his speech.21 We did not see his name in the first part of the book as well as in the last part of book. Carol A. Newsom argues that the character and his speech are an insertion by a reader who lived some time after the composition of the Book of Job. Her own study of Elihu suggests the date of locating this assertion in the late Persian or early Hellenistic period.22 Elihu, a young man, at first was afraid to tell his opinion. Finally, however, he intervened the dialogue as he realized that it is not the old that are wise; it is the spirit in a man, the
20 21

Ibid. Emanuel Gerrit Singgih, An Alternative Creation Belief: An Interpretation of Job 36:26-37:13, Lecture note on 22/3/2011, p. 4. 22 Carol A. Newsom, Elihus Sapiential Hymn (Job 36.24-37.13), in Relating to the Text: Interdisciplinary and Form-Critical Insights on the Bible, edited by Timothy J. Sandoval & Carleen Mandolfo (London. New York: T&T Clark International, 2003), 161. 215 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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breath of the Almighty, that make him understand (32:6-9). For Elihuh, natural disasters and suffering is not so much a mystery; it is more revelation. The purpose of such suffering is not retribution, but to lead to confession by the sinner, ones restoration by God, and ones public praise of God. It is an instrument of Gods communication.23 In other words, the disaster is the revelation of God to warn people to repent or to turn away from their sins. Richard J. Clifford analyzes the tone of the creation accounts differs according to who is speaking24 in the book of Job. Job saw the nature as a violent and careless manipulation of things and living beings (9:5-13; 10:8-13; 12:13-25).25 It is explicable that as a victim of the natural disaster, Job saw God as creator and destroyer who created the nature and caused the natural disasters. Job said, Your hands fashioned and made me; and now you turn and destroy me (10:8). God has power so that he can do whatever he likes; With God are wisdom and strength; he has counsel and understanding. If he tears down, no one can rebuild; if he shut someone in, no one can open up. If he withholds the waters, they dry up; if he sends them out, they overwhelm the land (12:13-15). While the Psalmist wonders with awe, What are human beings that you are mindful of them? (Ps. 8:4), Job scornfully said, Look away from them and desist (14:6). The pious Bildad saw only order and Gods majesty in nature (25:1-6; 26:5-24), and Elihu saw the nature on the basis for unquestioning awe (36:24- 37:24). 26 Job was so painful for his overwhelming sufferings by the natural disasters that he wished creation away and invited chaos.
23 24

Clines, Word Biblical Commentary, xli. Richard J. Clifford, Creation Accounts in the Ancient Near East and in the Bible (Washington DC: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1994), 185. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 216 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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However, Gods response was simply to describe the created world, affirming chaos (darkness, unbounded waters, Behemoth and Leviathan) is part of the cosmic framework.27 Job claimed that the universe is in the hands of the unjust (9:16-24); whether or not he was innocent God would destroy him (9:22). Gods attention was hostile as the nature was hostile to him. His conduct, good or bad had no effect in his life. He saw God was unjust to his creation. Clifford writes, Job concedes Gods skill and power in creating the world (9:1315) but maintains that these qualities (v. 16a) are used arbitrarily to overturn innocent people like himself. The world God made is without design since it does not reward righteous human beings, and it is unjust since the wicked are favored over the righteous. Job imitates hymnic style, alluding ironically to Gods wisdom and power.28 Job accused God for natural disasters: without warning he moves mountains and in anger he destroys them. God sends earthquakes and shakes the ground (9:5-6). He claimed that God did not distinguish between the righteous and the wicked, and the earth had been handed over to the wicked (9:24). According to these verses, Job believed the natural disasters and his suffering had caused by God. We also see in the first and second chapters of the Book of Job that God allowed Satan to cause these disasters to test the faithfulness of Job. Therefore, according to the Book of Job, God was also responsible for the natural disasters and the suffering of Job. In the Book of Job, the characters reflect God as creator and destroyer of nature, including human beings.

27 28

Ibid., 186. Ibid., 189. 217 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Theological Reflections on the Role of God in Nature Clifford explains that the book of Job portrays the alternative perceptive of nature. In the traditional theology, man is the center of the world or the crown of creation. The alternative theology in the book of Job, Clifford states, is God creates for God; the divine purpose is inscrutable; human beings cannot assume that they are the centre of the universe. Traditional cosmogonies often began with the gods vanquishing evil, often personified as a monster. But creation in the Book of Job ends with the monsters unvanquished, with God admiring them in splendid poetry! They are, to be sure, on Gods leash, but move in ways that terrify the human race.29 Norman C. Habel also notes that Behemoth and Leviathan are mythic symbols of the forces of chaos which are overcome by Baal in Canaanite tradition, by Marduk in the Babylonian Enuma Elish, and by Horus in Egyptian mythology. Hippopotamus and crocodile are also the figures as symbols of chaos in Egypt.30 When God says he created these animals along with human (40:15), it implies that human is not greater than other creatures and the chaos of nature may overcome human beings. As Singgih warns, nature is not just to be looked upon as objects for human beings, but as symbol for the immanence of God.31 He also argues that Job 36:26- 37:13 illustrates the nature to be seen in itself, and helps us to imagine an alternative creation belief where humankind does not stand over against nature but God and nature stand over humankind. By knowing this truth, human beings have to appreciate their place in the world which is Gods creation.32 Since God is greater than nature including human,
29 30

Ibid., 196. Norman C. Habel, The Book of Job (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1985), 557. 31 Singgihs lecture note, 7. 32 Ibid., 2. 218 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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he can control the nature but human cannot. People should not look human beings as the centre of or above the nature. Gary Stern inquired the scholars, theologians and clergy for their perceptions on the role of God in natural disasters and he wrote the book, Can God Intervene? He investigates the people from different religions and even non-believers. He finds the various answers even within the same tradition. On the question of challenging God over the suffering of innocent people in a natural disaster in Jewish perspective, he breaks down the answers he heard this way: (1) Dont ask because we cant know; (2) You can ask_ but must arrive at a faithful answer; (3) You should challenge God, even loudly, but the end result will likely be a stronger faith; (4) You must challenge God and rethink who God is; and (5) Dont ask because we have earthly problems to contend with first.33 On the other hand, Christians agree that suffering is unavoidable. God sent his only son to die for humankinds sins. Jesus suffered for us because this is the broken world and humankind needs to be saved.34 From the Roman Catholic perspective, some answers are: God needs to create desperation within us but that the Holy Spirit will give us wisdom if we listen; We must live with an apocalyptic sensibility because of the uncertainty that we face at all times but that faith can be somehow restored in the face of any tragedy; We must accept that we live in a broken world; We must assume that God knows whats best for each of us, that suffering makes us holy, and the next life is better than this one; and Coyne, the Jesuit astronomer said that his scientific explorations only increase his faith, even if he doesnt believe that God causes actions

33 34

Stern, Can God Intervene?, 62. Ibid., 63. 219 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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in the common sense. His concept is based on faith and opened to mystery.35 From the Protestant perspective, Stern observes, they believe that the crucifixion of Jesus was typical because innocent people suffer unjustly each and every day. God is beyond humans understanding and does not intervene in our lives in any way that we can grasp. They believe that they must act as Jesus would want, and feel Gods presence with the survivors of the natural disaster and with relief workers.36 However, the Evangelical Christians see natural disasters as simply one part of a fallen world inhabited by fallen creatures. The victims of natural disasters only suffered in a different, temporarily more agonizing way than most people. In a fallen world, every person must face up to Gods disappointment and that one symptom of divine judgment was the natural disaster.37 The African American Christians have different perspective. They havent had the luxury of questioning God. For them, there are too many problems to deal with; housing, education, the military demand for resources and worry about an occasional disaster. They noted that at least natural disasters are fair; their victims are not chosen by race, class or culture.38 Instead of asking question about the role of God in natural disasters, Protestant Christians accept the suffering as divine judgment and the Christian way of life. They heavily rely on God and have hope for the future. Muslim responders see this world as a brief and unpredictable trial before Gods judgment. The world we live in is preparation for the next. They believe that all disasters are reminders of how brief, uncertain, and finally meaningless this life really is; what really matter is the life to come. Islam is about complete submission to
35 36

Ibid., 83. Ibid., 104-105. 37 Ibid., 124. 38 Ibid., 145. 220 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Gods will. The Muslims duty is to take up the challenge by countering entropy, the threat of natural disasters and all forms of injustice. Muslims believe that the victims of natural disasters are rewarded in paradise for their suffering here. So people should grieve for those who left, especially those who worry too much about this life.39 Unlike Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism believe in the law of karma and the illusion. For Hindus and Buddhists, natural disasters are part of the circle of creation and destruction. They believe that the world is in constant flux and that God is not necessarily looking out for us. Buddhist view of the world is predicated on inevitable pain and suffering of all kinds. The Buddhas teachings are designed to help people face the onslaught that this life brings.40 So they always prepare for the hardship of life and accept the suffering as their karma. While people of faith have been wrestling with the central questions of theodicy, non-believers do not face such a challenge. For them a natural disaster happens because the laws of physics demand it. They point out that if God is all-powerful, God must create our suffering; and that if God is all-loving, the innocent should not suffer. For them, a natural disaster is proof of the non-existence of God.41 The above reflections are general responses of the respective religious adherents, and not all people may agree with the same response in particular. Nevertheless, I would like to say that different religious persons have various views on the role of God in natural disasters.

39 40

Ibid., 163. Ibid., 202. 41 Ibid., 214. 221 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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Concerning the earthquake in Yogyakarta, Indonesia on 27 May 2006, Bernard Adeney-Risakotta examines the Book of Job but he does not find the answer Why it had happened? He writes: Attempts to answer the question why seem inexorably to lead to two extremes: blame the victim or blame God. At one extreme, there is the relentless logic that sufferers must somehow deserve their suffering and therefore should repent (Jobs friends). At the other extreme is the equally relentless logic that God is evil or at least unjust. Since there is no way to win against God, you might as well just curse God and die. The victims unjust fate is sealed. To Jobs credit, he refused to succumb to either of these extremes. But he also didnt answer the question Why?42 In my opinion, the wisdom and power of God is beyond our understanding as Elihu said and Job finally became aware of. The natural disaster may be a testing for our faith, a warning for our sins or a sign for the end time. God created this world in a perfect situation and said, It is good. He entrusted human beings to take care of the earth (Gen. 2:15). While we justify our subjugation over earth as a divine right (Gen. 1:28), we neglect the divine command to take care of the earth. The result is the deprivation of the nature and the occurrence of natural disasters. God or Satan is not responsible for natural disasters and human sufferings, only human beings who had been neglecting their mission to take care of the earth are only responsible for the disasters. However, we should also look beyond anthropocentric theology of nature to eco-centric theology of nature.

42

Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, Is there a Meaning in Natural Disasters?, http://www.icrs.ugm.ac.id/article-index/113-is-there-a-meaning-in-naturaldisaster.html (accessed on 3/5/2011). 222 | En Arche, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012)

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While we study the story of creation, we should not forget the story of fall. In the story of fall in Genesis 3, the divine curse fell not only upon disobedient human, but also on the ground (Gen. 3:1719). When we think about natural disasters, we tend to consider only for the human, forgetting animals and plants. Actually, they are covictims and co-sufferers of human beings. That is why St. Paul writes in Romans 8:19-25 that the creation is also groaning for the deliverance. Paul Tillich states: The creation waits in eager expectation for the sons of God to be revealed. For the creation was subjected to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the glorious freedom of the children of God. We know that the whole creation has been groaning as in the pains of childbirth right up to the present time, but, if we hope for what we do not yet have, we wait for it patiently.43 As nature and environment are victims of the divine curse, they are also groaning for the pain and eagerly looking forward to that day of salvation when all things will be put into a new creation. If so, can we see the natural disasters as the groaning of nature? Conclusion Job represents the victims of the natural disasters and those who have lost their place in the universe that nothing has meaning to them. He protests Why me? on behalf of everyone who lost their loved ones, their homes, or their hope due to the natural disasters. He calls for justice when the wicked are prospered and the righteous are suffered. He accuses God for his undeserved suffering. He questions the traditional theology of retribution. All he needs is the one who can explain about his suffering caused by natural disasters.
43

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Unfortunately, none of his friends who hold the theology of retribution could give him a satisfactory explanation. His attitude towards God has changed; he sees God as hostile to him as the natural disaster. However, Gods answer from the whirlwind alters his perception of nature and he does not challenge God any longer. He starts a new life that God blesses him in double. The victims of the natural disasters respond in many different ways to their sufferings. Some people blame on God, like the wife of Job, and no longer have faith in God. Some, like Job, accept their fate as it is at first but later question for their sufferings. Some People such as Hindus and Buddhists accept the suffering as law of karma and the result or the consequence of their bad deeds of the previous lives. On the other hand, those who are not the victims of the natural disasters see the calamities in various ways like the friends of Job and the above theologians and believers. It is not a deniable fact that the global climate is changing and more natural disasters occur in the 21st century. Since the later decades of the 20th century, many scientists have started to aware the changing nature of the world. Many seminars, conferences were held and many books were written about global warming and climate change. White, a Christian scientist, challenged the Biblical scholars and Christian theologians for the anthropocentric interpretation of Genesis 1:26-28.44 Many scholars and theologians had tried to respond Whites accusation of the role of Bible in climate change by producing eco-theologies. Along with the changing nature, Christian theology on nature should be changed. The traditional understanding of the relation of human and nature should be changed from anthropocentric to eco-centric since human is part of eco-system. The Book of Job teaches us that man is not above the nature but an only part of nature. Environmental theology in the Book of Job
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should be widespread while the theology of Liberation in Exodus is still emphasized. Gods longest speech in the Book of Job (chapters 38-41) warns us that man is only a small part of a very large picture of nature. As the spiritual pride of Job was corrected by God, the success of scientific inventions would be alarmed by the natural disasters. Finally, Christian mission agenda should be included the caring of nature in the saving of human. With the modifying of humannature relationship, a new mission agenda should be set for twentyfirst century. By doing so, we should accommodate environmental concern in our theological and mission education. The churches should formulate and propagate the relevant social ethic on environment and form a spiritual focus on environment. We should be in solidarity with the victims and relief workers in natural disasters instead of blaming on the victims. It is not only the Christian mission, but a humanitarian work also. We have to carry out this work with our brothers and sisters from all religions including non-believers in God. We also have to bear in mind that God is always with us even amidst the natural disasters in the world. God did not answer why Job was suffering, but he made him aware that human is only a part of nature and nature is the embodiment of God. Consequently, my theology of nature in the Book of Job is: Humans are suffered from natural disasters because the nature is groaning, and God of nature is also grieving. This theology of the imminent God in nature may be a consolation for the victims of natural disasters.

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Bibliography Clifford, Richard J. Creation Accounts in the Near East and in the Bible. Washington DC: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1994. Clines, David J. A. Word Biblical Commentary Volume 17. Dallas, Texas: Word Books, 1989. Good News Bible: Todays English Version. USA: United Bible Societies, 1976 Habel, Norman C. The Book of Job. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1985. Http://blog.insure.com/2011/03/16/7-worst-natural-disasters-ofthe-21st-century/. Http://www.icrs.ugm.ac.id/article-index/113-is-there-a-meaning-innatural-disaster.html. Http://www.icrs.ugm.ac.id/article-index/94-religion-anddisaster.html. Http://www.nydaily.news.com/news/world/galleries/tsunami-hitsjapan-the-most-devasting-natural-disasters-of-the-21stcentury/tsunami-hits-japan-the-most-devasting-naturaldisasters-of-the-21st-century.html. Http://www.tiptopten.com/2011/03/28/10-worst-natural-disastersof-21st-century/. McGrath, Alister. The Reenchantment of Nature: The Denial of Religion and the Ecological Crisis. USA: Doubleday, 2002. McGuire, Meredith B. Religion: The Social Context. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1992.

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Sandoval, Timothy J. & Carleen Mandolfo. Relating to the Text: Interdisciplinary and Form-Critical Insights on the Bible. London & New York: T&T Clark International, 2003. Singgih, Emanuel Gerrit. An Alternative Creation Belief: An Interpretation of Job 36:26-37:13. Lecture note on 22/3/2011. The New Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard Version. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991

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NOTES FOR AUTHORS

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