The Interpretation of the Namibian Constitution: A discussion on the dichotomy between the purposive and literal approaches of interpretation.

David de Klerk

University of Namibia B. Juris, 3rd year (part time) Lecturer: Mr. F.Mundia Student nr: 200511297 4/20/2012

Table of contents
1. Introduction 2. Namibian Colonial Background and the attainment if Independence 3. The Doctrine of Constitutionalism 4. Westminster and American model 5. Interpretation of the Constitution 6. Conclusion 7. Bibliography 8. Table of Cases ..Page 2 .Page 2-4 ...Page 4-8 Page 8-9 .Page 9-14 .Page 14 ..Page 15 Page 15-16

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Introduction
The Constitution of a nation is not simply a statute which mechanically defines the structures of government and the relations between the government and the governed. It is a 'mirror reflecting the national soul', the identification of the ideals and aspirations of a nation; the articulation of the values bonding its people and disciplining its government. The spirit and tenor of the Constitution must therefore preside over and permeate the process of judicial interpretation and judicial discretion.1

This profound and philosophical statement was made by the late Chief Justice Mahomed in the S v Acheson case. Inference drawn from it is that the constitution of a country is not merely just a document according to which a country must be governed, but that it is so much more. It is what defines a country and in essence what ensures that a country is governed according the best interest of the entirety of its population. This essay will make an audacious attempt at examining the purposive interpretative theory in the Namibian jurisdiction. It will start by giving a brief historical background of the attainment of independence by the Namibian people, followed by a look at how the Namibian constitution was promulgated and subsequently adopted. Thereafter we will look at the doctrine of constitutionalism under which the constitution as the supreme law of the land, the doctrine of separation of powers and the concept of the rule of law will be succinctly addressed. After that has been done a concise discussion on the Westminster model of parliament and the American model will ensue and Namibia as a country will be placed in one of the two mentioned models. What will then succeed is the crux of this essay: namely how the purposive interpretation theory is applied to the Namibian constitution and if any other interpretive theory, for purposes of this composition, is applicable to our constitution.

Namibian Colonial Background and the Attainment of Independence

On June 28 1919 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations gave the South African Administration mandate to take control of Namibia, then South West Africa, from the initial German colonizers. In 1924 the appellate division of the Supreme Court of South Africa ruled in

S v Acheson 1991 NR 1 (HC).

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Rex v Christians2 that South Africa had sovereign power over South West Africa (SWA). The case was about a leader of a community in Southern SWA, called the Bondelswartz, who was charged with high treason, He alleged that he could not be prosecuted as the League of Nations and not South Africa was the sovereign authority in SWA. In 1948 after the National Party won the South African general elections they immediately started to administer SWA as a fifth province and implemented the apartheid policy3. Despite tremendous pressure from the League of Nations the South African Appellate Division, which was awarded the legal sovereign authority in SWA, did not depart from their stance on political sovereignty. After decades of turmoil and conflict, Namibia finally managed to gain its independence and on February 9th 1990 the Namibian Constitution was adopted and a new era of constitutional supremacy was on the horizon. The Namibian Constitution is the supreme law of the country as provided for by Article 1(6)4 thus all acts of parliament are subject to review by the judiciary against the constitution. However, the cost of this victory, measured in human lives, was extreme and a bitter pill to swallow. Let us now take a look at the history of the Namibian Constitution and how it came into being. The Honorable Mr.Hage Geingob5 forwarded that the activity of formulating a constitution is a compromise and influenced by the vision and self-interest of various stakeholders. It seems to be a very sensitive issue and in Namibia it seemed to be extra extra-ordinary given the extreme and appalling nature of our liberation struggle and it is quite clear by looking at paragraph five (5) of the Preamble of the Namibian constitution that states; Whereas we the people of Namibia-Have finally emerged victorious in our struggle against colonialism racism and apartheid.

2 3

1924 AD 101. A system legal racial segregation enforced by the National Party government in South Africa between 1948 and 1994, under which the rights of the majority non white inhabitants of South Africa were curtailed and minority rule by white people was maintained. 4 This Constitution shall be the Supreme law of Namibia. 5 Geingob, HG. 2010. Drafting of Namibia s Constitution. Constitutional Democracy in Namibia. Windhoek:Macmillan Education Namibia, p 84.

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In S v Van Wyk6 the provisions of the preamble was emphasized. This was an appeal case against a conviction of murder and sentence of 12 years imprisonment. Van Wyk, a white man, and his friends in the early morning hours in early 1990 met a black man walking in the street, and they decided to brutally assault this black man, horrendously doing it over and over again. After he had become unconscious they took him to the rubbish dump and left his body there. An intense investigation ensued and they were eventually convicted of murder. The defense called a psychologist that testified that Van Wyk was only 21 years old and that Namibia had only recently obtained independence and as a result had been groomed by his surroundings and experiences of the pre-independent administration into being a racist. The court in passing judgment made a distinct reference to the preamble of the constitution talking about the vigorous revulsion towards racism and apartheid that is so evident throughout the preamble. Suffice it to say that it is no wonder that the Namibian constitution was drafted in only 80 days and dubbed the 80 day miracle. So urgent was the desire for the founding fathers and mothers to finalize this important event. But exactly how was this done? The answer follows. In 1989 a Constituent Assembly was formed tasked with drawing up a Constitution and organizing an election to elect a Namibian administration. This assembly was provided with a set of principles by the international community to include in the Constitution. Most of these principles are contained in the Bill of Rights7, on 9 February 1990 the Namibian constitution was adopted and on the 21 March 1990 Namibia became an independent nation.

The Doctrine of Constitutionalism

Upon attainment of its independence and the adoption of a supreme constitution8 Namibia became a constitutional state to be governed for the people by the people. Amoo9 postulates that constitutionalism deals with limitation on Government and the system of checks and balances. It is a doctrine governing the legitimacy of Government action and is concerned with the doctrine of separation of powers, constitutional supremacy, and independence of the judiciary, judicial

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1993 NR 426(SC). Chapter 3 which is entrenched. 8 Article 1 (6) of the Namibian constitution. 9 Amoo, SK. 2008. An Introduction to Namibian Law Materials and Cases. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, p313.

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review of administrative action and the legislature and the rule of law. For purposes of relevance to this text only a selected group of the above mentioned topics will be discussed. Judicial review of the Legislature can be defined as; where the actions and decisions made by the legislature are subject to review and possible invalidation by the Judiciary. This ensures that the powers of the Legislature are kept in check and encourages the sought after culture of checks and balances. In Namibia the doctrine of separation of powers recognises that there are three organs of state namely the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary as provided for by Article 1(3)10 of the Namibian Constitution. The Executive is made up of the President and the cabinet, the legislature comprises of the National Assembly and the Judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the High Court and the Lower Courts of Namibia. The separation of powers ensures the deterrence of dictatorship by guaranteeing that each branch of the state remains independent from the other through the previously mentioned system of checks and balances. This doctrine was very effectively used in the Ex Parte Attorney-General In re: The Constitutional relationship between the Attorney-General and the Prosecutor-General11 where the court was tasked with the issue of determining the constitutional relationship between the Attorney-General (AG) and the Prosecutor-General (PG). A discussion of the case follows. The AG is appointed by the President and Article 87 of the Namibian Constitution (NC) sets out his or her powers, among which are to exercise the final responsibility for the office of the PG . Appointment of the AG is a political one and his/her functions are executive in nature. The PG is also appointed by the President, but this appointment is done on recommendation by the Judicial Service Commission. The PG derives his mandate from Article 88 of the NC and his/her appointment is not political in nature. The brief facts of the case are as follows: Differences between the two arose in 1993 when the AG instructed the PG to withdraw prosecution of a particular matter and the PG refused. The AG applied that the case catalyzing the friction between them be postponed pending a decision by the Supreme Court of Namibia on the constitutional relationship between the AG and the PG and the power of the AG to overrule decisions of the PG.

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The main organs of the state shall be the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. 1998 NR 282 (SC).

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The court was faced with three legal issues. Whether in pursuance of Article 87 of the NC, the AG in exercising the final responsibility over the office of the PG has the authority to...: 1...instruct the PG to initiate or decline to prosecute a matter. 2...instruct the PG on the processes involved and to be followed in preparation and conduct of any prosecution. 3...to require the PG to keep him/her informed of all prosecutions initiated, especially those that may trigger public interest. Head counsel for the AG based his arguments on the following central issues: Firstly the reliance on the provision of Article 87 stating that the AG had to exercise the final responsibility over the office of the PG was very noteworthy, they felt that this meant that the PG fell under the power of the AG and had to report and adhere to decisions of the AG concerning any prosecution. Secondly the applicant relied on the provision of Section 3(5) of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977(the act) stating its applicability and that therefore the PG should prosecute subject to directions of the AG. It was contended that the act drew its applicability to the case at hand by virtue of Article 140 of the NC which states that all laws in place before independence shall remain in force until repealed or amended by a legally enacted statute. In his judgement Leon AJA addressed these issues as follows: In addressing the contention pertaining to Article 87 of the NC as mentioned above he made reliance on the precedent laid down in the Government of the Republic of Namibia and another v Cultura 200012 and another case and interpreted this provision purposively and broadly. He commented that one of the problems he had with the argument set forth by counsel for the AG was that if indeed the AG had final say and power over the office of the PG, a political functionary who might have political considerations and might allow these to influence their decisions subconsciously would then have final say over all prosecutions in the country. This was against the very essence of Article 88(2) and the doctrine of separation of powers in its entirety. A further point that was made on the reliance of counsel for the AG on the act was as follows: Once again Leon AJA relied on the Cultura judgement where the late Judge Mahomed stated... I know of no other constitution in the world which seeks to identify a legal ethos against apartheid with greater vigour and intensity.
12

1993 NR 282 (SC).

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Leon then pointed out that the fact that the pre-independent AG (who now had the role of the PG) had to report to the Minister of Justice (now in the role of the AG) was made applicable by an apartheid GRN bent on domination, no doubt determined to enforce its political will on the independence of the prosecuting authority on, then, South West Africa. The judge made it clear that such behaviour could in no way be in accordance with the ethos of the Namibian people. Allowing such an action to reoccur would most certainly be converse to the ideals and aspirations of our people as enshrined and protected by the doctrine of separation of powers. To put the independence of the judiciary at risk in such a way would most certainly mean completely and blatantly ignoring the constitutional democracy our forefathers and mother fought for so bitterly. Section 3(5) was thus declared unconstitutional. To support this Leon AJA held that Article 140 (1) begins with subject to the provisions of this constitution ... this signifies that Article 3 (5) of the act is overruled by Articles 87 and 88 of the NC. It was finally held that the first two issues was decided in the negative and that the PG was merely, as was stated by the third issue the court had to decide on, required to keep the AG informed of any matter the office of the PG considers for prosecution. This would allow the AG to, in turn; give account of this information to the President, the Executive and the Legislature. Ultimately it was held that our constitution creates, simultaneously, an independent PG and enabled the AG to exercise final responsibility over the office of the PG. These notions were not and would not create any incompatibility. The Rule of Law is very closely related to the doctrine of constitutionalism in that both concepts deal with limitation on governmental power. However the rule of law encompasses that governance in a country according to the law and not the momentary whims and caprices of government whilst in the process protecting and ensuring the rights of the citizenry in the country. We need to realise however that all these doctrines are of little or even no practicality if there is not a supreme constitution present in a country. This imbroglio means that the constitution of a country should be the transcendent over any other law in the country and that all laws should draw its validity from this constitution. And as a result any law that does not conform to this higher norm will not have any legal basis.

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An abrupt realisation comes to mind at this juncture however that if a constitution is not written or codified it will be almost impossible to have these doctrines present in a country. The explanation to this statement follows. Du Pisani13 clearly explains the concept as a written constitution when he acknowledges that Namibia indeed has a codified constitution, which is one where the constitutional provisions are collected together in a single legal document. He stresses the importance for this exercise in three points: 1. In a codified or written constitution the document itself carries immense legal authority, in fact the highest legal authority in the country. It binds all political and governmental institutions enacting laws. In a nutshell codification enables a hierarchy of laws 2. The legal status and justiciability of the constitution in ensured by at least some provisions contained within it being entrenched. In the Namibian context we see that Chapter 3, the bill of rights, containing the fundamental rights and freedoms of the nation is entrenched. 3. The lucidity of codification prescribes that as the constitution contains the duties powers and functions of government in terms of a higher law (the constitution) have to be subject to the authority of the courts. We see thus that Namibia is a constitutional state and does meet the requirements, if you will, of operating under the doctrine of constitutionalism and being a country governed under a supreme constitution. However before moving on it is vital to discuss the two historical models of constitutionalism and place Namibia in one.

Westminster and American model14

The Westminster model is present in Britain and can briefly be assigned the following features:

13

Du Pisani, A. 2010. The Paradigm of Constitutional Democracy . Constitutional Democracy in Namibia. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, p9. 14 Amoo, SK. 2008. An Introduction to Namibian law Materials and Cases. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, p336.

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1. Constitutional monarchy: the power of the monarch is no longer absolute and limited by judicial conventions. 2. Parliamentary sovereignty: Parliament is the law-making body in the country and able to make whatever law it chooses without any accountability, in the most part, to any court. 3. Parliamentary government: The Queen instructs the leader of the majority party to in the House of Commons to form a government. This leader then becomes the Prime Minister. 4. Judicial independence: Judges exercise power in the name of the King. The American on the other hand has the following features; 1. Separation of powers: US Constitution 1787, set out the legislature that was separate from the executive. 2. Federal division of power: Two separate levels of government within the same nation. 3. Bill of rights: the entrenched protection of individual rights and liberties as a mechanism of limiting state powers. 4. Judicial review: Granting power to the judiciary to inquire into and express itself on whether laws made by parliament are in conformity with the constitution. 5. Constitutional supremacy: Where the constitution is the supreme law of the country and all laws must ultimately conform to it. Looking at the requirements and the discussion above it is clear that Namibia has an American model of constitutionalism. The next section of this text will now focus on the core of this essay namely the interpretation of the Namibian constitution.

Interpretation of the Namibian Constitution

In order to effectively address this issue it is of cardinal importance to initially have a brief discussion on the two most prominent models of interpretation namely the literal and purposive theories. There is often a need to interpret certain provisions of a statute or constitutional provision if ambiguities exist concerning the particular provision. Botha15 referred to the literal theory as the orthodox test-based and argues that according to this approach the interpreter should focus principally on the literal meaning of the words up for interpretation and not so much the intention of the legislature. This approach places a huge
15

Botha, C. 2005. Statutory Interpretations. Cape Town: Juta, p47.

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amount of emphasis on the words used. It does appear that over the years courts have accepted that the clear literal meaning of the words used is tantamount to a clear indication of what the legislature intended. In the words of Smallberger JA in Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd16: it must be accepted that the literal interpretation principle is firmly entrenched in or law and I do not seek to challenge it. Thus not much reference is made to the context in which the words in a statute are used. This form of interpretation is derived from parliamentary sovereignty and scholars from this school of thought contend that the role of judges is to apply the law and not to make it. They forward that by Judges attempting to ascertain the intention the meaning of a statute by using external factors and not only the words used they are making laws and in essence internalizing the law-making function which is supposed to be inherent to the legislature. Unfortunately the monumental difference in existence between acts of parliament and the constitution in that an act of parliament is specific and direct and focused at something particular whereas the constitutional provisions are open ended and very general poses a challenge to the interpretive model that is the literal approach. Therefore it appears that a different approach might be needed: The purposive approach. According to Du Plessis 17 this approach forwards that a legislative provision needs to be interpreted by considering the purpose that it seeks to achieve as the predominant factor. This purpose can be for example in Namibia s scenario of a history of being under a suppressive apartheid regime, to take full cognisance of morals and values of the people and to make a valuejudgement based upon the right that were for so long denied to the Namibian people. Thus employing this approach the scope of any right will be easily ascertainable.18 Where supposedly clear language and the purpose are at odds the latter prevails. The mischief rule is by many considered to be the predecessor of the purposive approach. The mischief rule was laid down in Heydon s Case19 as follows:

16 17

1990 (1) SA 925. Du Plessis, L. 2007. Re-interpretation of Statutes. Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths, p96. 18 Currie, I; De Waal, J. 2005. The Bill of Rights Handbook. Claremont: Juta, p149. 19 (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a.

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four things are to be discussed and considered: 1st, What was the common law before making the Act. 2nd, What was the mischief and defect for which the common Law did not provide, 3rd, What remedy hath the Parliament resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth; and 4th, the true reason of the remedy Purposivism allows for nonconformity to literalism20 and scholars of this school of thought propounds that when Judges use external factors to interpret a provision they do not make law but merely give effect to the existing law and act in their judicial capacity. It has become clear that the Namibian Courts, for the most part, have adopted this approach for interpretation of its constitutional provisions. In the Government of the Republic of Namibia & Another v Cultura 200021 the late Mahomed, C.J. poetically enforced a purposive interpretation of the Constitution when he stated: A constitution is an organic instrument. Although enacted in the form of a statute, it is sui generis. It must be broadly, liberally and purposively interpreted so as to avoid the austerity of tabulated legalism and so as to enable it to continue to play a creative and dynamic in the expression and the achievement of the ideals and aspirations of the nation, in the articulation of the values bonding its people and disciplining its Governement. Perhaps the locus classicus of the purposive interpretation as applied in Namibian courts is the decision in Ex Parte Attorney-General: In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State22 where the following transpired: In November 1990 the Attorney-General under the auspices of or by virtue of Article 79(2)23 and Article 87(c)24 of the Namibian Constitution, requested leave from the Chief Justice to allow the Supreme Court as a court of first instance to determine whether the imposition or infliction of corporal punishment by or on the authority of any judicial or quasi-judicial authority was unconstitutional and specifically against Article 8, the right to human dignity, of the Namibian constitution.
20 21

Du Plessis (2007:97). 1993 NR 328 (SC) 340 B-D. 22 1991 NR 178 (SC). 23 The Supreme Court shall be presided over by the Chief Justice and shall hear and adjudicate upon appeals emanating from the High Court, including appeals which involve the interpretation implementation and upholding of this Constitution and the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed thereunder. The Supreme court shall also deal with matters referred to it foe decision by the Attorney-General under this Constitution, and with such matters as may be authorized by Act of Parliament. 24 The powers and functions of the Attorney-General shall be: (c) to take all action necessary for the protection and upholding of the Constitution.

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The court held that the right to human dignity is inviolable and focused more specifically on Article 8(2)(b)25. In his judgement Mahomed C.J. attempted to define the concept value judgement by linking it to the decision he had to make with due regard to the morals and values of a new nation. He very expressively went into the preamble of the Constitution and said pronounced that all statutes permitting corporal punishment was from a past apartheid regime which ruled in a draconian manner and suppressed the people of Namibia. These laws were reminiscent of the bitter struggle for liberation and freedom that the Namibain people had so adamantly and at such bitter costs fought for. Mahomed said that the values of the nation were reflected in its national institutions and through the strong way our constitution detests apartheid and suppression of rights. He thus made use of a purposive interpretation when he interpreted what was meant by inhuman and degrading punishment and treatment by considering the values, expressions and experiences of the Namibian people. The court ultimately held that infliction of corporal punishment by Organs of State was against article 8 and all legislation authorizing it were subsequently declared unconstitutional. It is thus clear that a literal interpretation especially when it comes to constitutional provisions is to be quite frank trite. However there is a flip side to the coin. All the above being said it is not always possible for constitutional provisions to be interpreted purposively The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board v Frank and another.26 In this case in 1995 Ms Frank had been residing in Namibia for a number of years and had applied to the Namibian Immigration Selection Board for permanent residence in Namibia on more than one occasion, but her applications had all been turned down. She approached the High Court to seek redress and cited amongst other reasons as to why she should be granted permanent residence a very serious lesbian relationship she had had and claimed that were it with a man she would have gotten marries and attained residence in that way. The High Court held that she should be issued with the permanent residence as the state body had acted against Article 18 (administrative justice) of the Namibian constitution. The audi alterum partem rule was
25 26

This was proven in

No person shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 2001 NR 107 (SC).

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employed. However the Board appealed to the Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court much of the judgement dealt with procedural matters however the respondent also raised a number of constitutional issues in relation to the treatment of her lesbian relationship. She claimed that her constitutionally granted rights to equality, 27 privacy, 28 the protection of family29 and her right to freedom from discrimination had been violated. As a preliminary matter the court held that under the Namibian constitution the term spouse could only apply to a partner in a heterosexual marriage. Therefore it was impossible to infer that the respondent would be entitled to any preferential treatment as the foreign national spouse of a Namibian national under article 4(3).30 The court proceeded and held that Article 14 s (Family) protection only extended to the natural group of society as known at the time as an institution of Namibian society. It did not create any new types of family. According to the Court, in the Namibian context, homosexual relations fell outside the scope of Article 14. It refused to accept the respondents argument that granting permanent residency would be in the best interest of the second respondent s child, stating that it was debatable and controversial whether being raised in homosexual family could protect a child s interests. The court interpreted the family institution literally and said that under the constitution it is a formal heterosexual relationship focused on procreation. Furthermore it was held by the court that the respondent and her partner s right to privacy under the constitution were not relevant because the respondent was an alien with no existing right to residence. The Court then turned to the argument that the right to equality and nondiscrimination under Article 10 had been infringed because the Board had refused to recognise the respondent s relationship with a Namibian citizen. The court held that the situation in Namibia was fundamentally different from the situation under South African constitutional law, where under the right to equality, preferential treatment given to foreign national spouses was extended to partners in a permanent same-sex life partnership in applications for permanent residency. It was held that because the Constitution of South Africa explicitly prohibited

27 28

Article 10. Article 13. 29 Article 14. 30 Article showing ground on which foreign nationals become citizens of the country by marriage.

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discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, it could not be applied in Namibia as such though. The court even suggested that the implications of recognising sexual orientations as a prohibited ground of discrimination were such that it could extend to any sexual attraction of anyone or anything (emphasis in original). What this suggests, the court submitted, was that this could potentially extend to the decriminalization of bestiality. As a result the court held that they were not in a position to make orders usurping parliament s role as a legislator and held that there was no requirement to do so under the Constitution. Additionally the Court made it clear that nothing in this judgement justifies discrimination against homosexuals as individuals, or deprives them of the protection of other provisions of the Namibian Constitution.

Conclusion
The argument this essay therefore wishes to further is that, contrary to popular believe, it is not a necessity that interpretation of Constitutional provisions should be done purposively. The Frank case sets down the precedent that if a purposive interpretation amounts to an absurdity the literal rule is best applied. Therefore what is required is all encompassing approach, a best of both worlds ideology, for effective interpretation of a constitutional provision because at the end of the day no theory interpretation would exist in totality were it not for the words used which in essence is what the literal approach is about: Using the words in a provision. Ultimately if ambiguity then exists after employing the literal approach, the purposive approach can be employed. A trend has developed where it is believed that the purposive approach will reign supreme, however the literal approach will always exist and have a place in Namibian jurisprudential development.

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Bibliography
Amoo, SK. 2008. An Introduction to Namibian Law Materials and Cases. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia. Botha, C. 2005. Statutory Interpretations. Cape Town: Juta. Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. Currie, I; De Waal, J. 2005. The Bill of Rights Handbook. Claremont: Juta. Du Pisani, A. 2010. The Paradigm of Constitutional Democracy . Constitutional Democracy in Namibia. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia. Du Plessis, L. 2007. Re-interpretation of Statutes. Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths. Geingob, HG. 2010. Drafting of Namibia s Constitution. Constitutional Democracy in

Namibia. Windhoek:Macmillan Education Namibia.

Table of Cases
Ex Parte Attorney-General In re: The Constitutional relationship between the Attorney-General and the Prosecutor-General 1998 NR 282 (SC) Ex Parte Attorney-General: In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State 1991 NR 178 (SC) Government of the Republic of Namibia & Another v Cultura 2000 1993 NR 328(SC) Heydon (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a. Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd 1990 1 (SA) 925. Rex v Christiaans 1924 AD 101 S v Acheson 1991 NR 1 (HC) S v Van Wyk 1993 NR 526 (SC)

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The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board v Frank and another 2001 R 107 (SC)

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