SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES The Problems and Progress of International Organization. "One world" is in some respects an ideal and an aspirational concept. Lnternational organization is a system of laws, treaties, treaties and agreements.
SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES The Problems and Progress of International Organization. "One world" is in some respects an ideal and an aspirational concept. Lnternational organization is a system of laws, treaties, treaties and agreements.
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SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES The Problems and Progress of International Organization. "One world" is in some respects an ideal and an aspirational concept. Lnternational organization is a system of laws, treaties, treaties and agreements.
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Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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''-'1" {')L\ i \ Books by Lnis L. Claude, Jr. SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES The Problems and Progress of lnternational Organization POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS NATIONAL MINORITIES An I nternationnl Problem THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS C5 131' ..-----.
,.. , " SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES The Problems and Progress of International Organization , INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. Edward R . Stettinius, Ir ., Profes sor of Government and Foreign Affairs Uni versit y of Virginia FOURTH EDITION ' ,,/ n1 .. 1' ' "' r - . II: \/ t " ". . ..... ...." - '" .. " . . -, . , . ' '(f.J. ' ;;;;;:0/ tB r . II RANDOM HOUSE I NEW YORK :}( , xii @J The 8uestion of Practical Attainability 414 The uestion of Th eor etical Validity 420 Suggest ed Readings 432 19 International Organization and World Order 434 435 The Progress of International Organization The Prospects of International Organization 445 Suggested Readings 449 r;:::y Appendixes Appendix I The Covenant of the League of Nations 453 Appendix II The Charter of the United Nations Appendix III The North Atlantic Treaty 463 490 Appendix IV The Members of the Unit ed Nations 494 Appendix V Costs of the United Nations System 499 r;:::y Index ' - ~ " " ""-. Introduction II .. .'--
1 Introduction ,....
"One World" is in some respects an ideal and an aspiration, born of modern interpretations of ancient moral insights and of rational estimates of the requirements for human survival ; it is in other respects a pressing reality, an actual condition of mankind, produced by a century of change that has tied all the peoples of the earth together in an unprecedented intimacy of contact, interdependence of welfare, and mutuality of vulner ability. Whether or not we obey the religious injunction to behave like brothers, or attain the ethical objective of a peaceful world community, !, we human beings cannot escape the hard fact that all of us are, as John Donne put it, "involved in Mankinde." Given the existence of One World defined as a set of objective conditions, disaster may be the price of failure to achieve One World defined in terms of a moral and political ideal. Sincere and sensible men may differ as to how much and what kind of world unity is possible and desirable, how it can or should be achieved, and how quickly it is likely to be or ought to be attempted. These are important questions, and some attention will be devoted to them in this book. However, we are not simply confronted with a debate about hypo thetical possibilities for the future. The growing complexity of interna tional relations has already produced international organizations; the world is engaged in the process of organizing. This process has a past which is not very long, as historians measure time, but which is nonethe less significant. It has a present which is confused and troubled, but which is not for that reason less important as an object of study. And, it may be confidently asserted, if man has a future, so has the process of interna tional organization. 3 5 , 4 Q Introduction Introduction The present state of international organization, representing an at tempt to adapt the institutions, procedures, and rules of international relations to the conditions of international interdependence, is far from satisfactory. But though much is lacking in international organizations, there is no lack of such agencies. Public international organizations, having states as their members, exist by the scores, and private interna tional associations, not officially sponsored by or connected with govern ments, exist by the hundreds. The population explosion of our time extends not only to human beings and to states but also to international agencies, as a cursory review of successive editions of the Yearbook of International Organizations, published by the Union of International Associations.in Brussels, will indicate. International agencies vary greatly in size and scope, in structure, in the nature of the subject matter with which they deal, and in the ambitiousness of the activities that they undertake to perform. They are global and regional, specialized and multipurpose; their concerns range from the great issues of war and peace to the technical problems of highway construction. In a given week the activities of international bodies may run from disarmament nego tiations to discussions of the microbiology of wine. It cannot be empha sized too strongly that the organization of international affairs is not just a gleam in the eyes of idealists, to be judged in terms of its accepta bility or feasibility as an ideal, but it is a process under way, to be studied with a view to understanding its causes and effects, its progress and limitations, its problems and prospects. International organization is a process; international organizations are representative aspects of the phase of that process which has been reached at a given time. This is a book about international organization, based primarily upon an analysis of the organizational efforts in which r governments participate as the official agencies of states. Thus, the realm occupied by nongovernmental organizations is largely excluded from its scope. It is a selective study, not a comprehensive digest, but its time range includes past, present, and possible future developments. It is writ ten in the conviction that international organizations, as institutions, have a double significance: they are important, though not decisively important, factors in contemporary world affairs; and they are significant expres sions of, and contributors to, the process of international organization, which may ultimately prove to be the most significant dynamic element in the developing reality of international relations. APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION The study of international organization involves certain difficulties that are traceable to the relative newness of the field, both as an aspect of reality and as a focus of scholarly attention. We are confronted with a complex and constantly changing subject matter, an ever-increasing mass of documentation that frequently fails to yield "the whole truth and nothing but the truth," and the proliferating output of a scholarship that, for all its valuable contributions, is still in the stage of fumbling uncer tainly with the problem of finding the real meaning and significance of events and developments in the field of international organization. These may be regarded as normal difficulties, but there are abnormal ones as well-special problems inherent in the subject that complicate the task of developing objective understanding and appraisal of international organization. The heart of the matter is the widespread tendency for international organization-particularly, in our time, the United Nations-to be treated as an ideological issue. It arouses hopes and fears of a fundamental sort, and its students may find themselves lost among its champions and critics. For many the United Nations presents an issue of faith and, morals: do you believe in the United Nations? On the one hand, the establishment and development of this organization are regarded as central elements of a noble crusade for peace, justice, and human brotherhood, so that being "for the United Nations" is the crucial test of a decent person. On the other, the creation of such agencies appears ~ as a plot to undermine the values of nationalism and sovereignty, an external threat to the integrity of one's own state that the true patriot must denounce and resist. This ideological dichotomy does not provide the most favorable context for careful, dispassionate study of the United Nations or other international bodies. The very posing of the "for or against" question betrays a basic immaturity in our approach to international institutions. We shall have achieved the maturity of outlook essential for the proper study of international organization when we find it as inappropriate to ask "Do you believe in the United Nations?" as to ask whether one believes in and supports the United States Congress or his state highway department or local school board. The point is that international organi zations are neither sacred nor diabolical ideological inventions, but a part of the political and administrative apparatus of human society made necessary by the complexity and interdependence of that society. The appropriate questions relate not to their status as objects of reverence or the reverse, but to their utility and to one's approval or disapproval of the policies that they serve. What the United Nations needs most is not to attract a larger array of avid supporters, but to begin to be taken for granted-to be regarded not as an idealistic scheme on trial, but as a political institution within which everyone expects to suffer defeats as well as to win victories and which no one can conceive as a dispensable part of the machinery for the management of international affairs. The development of this perspective is dependent upon an under 6
~ I \ Introduction standing of the history of international organizati on. Wh at is needed is not simpl y a knowledge of the facts concerning its origins and evolu tion, but a sense of history, a feel for the significance of the emerge nce of international organization in the histori cal context. To understand that international agencies are products not of the aspirat ions of idealists st anding outside of and above international politics, but of the necessities ! felt by statesmen operating within the arena of int ern ational politics, is to sense the fact that international organization is a functional response I to th e complexities of the modern state system, an organic development rooted in the realities of the system rather than an optional expe rime nt fast ened upon it. For one who grasps this fact, the issue of wh eth er we should have international organization is no more meaningful than th e issue of whether urbanization should result in th e provision of more exten sive public services and the imposition of more elaborate gove rnme ntal regulations. One recognizes international organization as a distinctive modern aspect of world politics, a relatively recent growth, but an esta b lished trend. Particular organizations may come and go, but int ern a ti onal org anization as a generic phenomenon is her e to st ay. Th e coll aps e of the League of Nations led almost automatically to conside ration of th e nature of its replacement, and similar failure by the United Nations might be expected to produce the same reaction. A sense of history pro vides th e basis for the understanding that int ernational orga nization has become a necessar y part of the syst em for dealing wit h int ernational pr obl ems, and that "to organize or not to organi ze" is no longer an open qu estion for statesme n or a usef ul one for stude nts of int erna tional rel ations. Moreover , an understanding of the historical development of political institutions in gen eral and of int ern ational organizations in particul ar should esta blish the point that ideological pr econceptions provide a most uns ati sfactory basis for attitudes toward su ch agencies as the United Nat ions. Founding fathers are amon g the most frustrat ed and double crossed hero es of history; they can st at e the purposes of the institutions that th ey create, but they cannot det ermine thos e purposes or contro l the course of development of those institutions . To chang e the figur e, they can only launch the institutional ships, which ar e then tossed on the seas of history, driven by the winds of political for ces, and st eer ed by a succession of men who have their own ideas about whe re th ey want to go. Politi cal institutions evolve, not along lines rigidl y set by their cr ea tor s and definitively stated in constitutional documents, but in respons e to a dynamic process that combines the propulsive and dir ecti ve impulses of trends running through the political context and of purposes inj ect ed by participants in their opl:'rations. The potentialities of institutions are limited in some measure by the characteristics or iginally impressed upon th em, but th" prohahilitil:'s of their development deri ve from contin .-, -5" Introduction 7 gencies beyond the power of their founders to antici pa te. Even the oper ators of a political agency at any given time are restri ct ed in th eir capacity to control its evolution; the course of the development of an international organization may be det ermined less by the consciously adopted plans of the governments that participate in its decisions or of the officials who serve it than by the cumulative influence of day-to-day pressures and case-by-case decisions. Th e unpredi ctabl e history of the future, no less than the ineradicabl e history of the past, ,is- a factor in the shaping of political institutions. To adopt this perspective is to acknowledge that it makes as little sense to base one's attitude toward the United Nations upon one's appraisal of the purposes proclaimed in its Ch arter as to bas e one's attitude toward the Nixon Administrat ion upon a reading of the Pre amble of the Constitution of the United Stat es. One ought not to take too literally the formally stated purposes of any political inst itution. The United Nations Charter gives expression to a set of lofty purposes including the maintenance of peac e and securit y, the development of friendly international relations, and the promotion of coope rative solu tions to basic problems of human welfare and human rights. Thi s is not to say that the governments responsibl e for formul ati ng the Ch art er were, in fact , unanimousl y devot ed to the realizati on of these purposes or det ermined to use the new organization exclusively for their realiza tion . We can sa y with assurance only that they we re all willin g to make this formal asserti on of the ends appropri ate to the United Nations. In pr actice, statesmen use, or compe te for the ca paci ty to use, the United Nations for a variety of purposes, some of which are not ment ioned in the Charter and may even be among thos e customaril y regarded as unmentionable by the dr aft ers of the constit utions of interna tional organizations. In a very real sense the Unit ed Nati ons has no fixed purposes, either as to wh at it shall do or as to wh at it shall become; its functional objecti ves and development al directi ons are set and shift ed by the operation of its polit ical pr ocess, in which the clash and consensus of the aims of member stat es det ermine the choices made among the possibilities provided by the general state of the int ernati onal system at a given point in time. Equipped with this underst anding, one is confronted not with the question of believing in th e United Nations as a sacred cause, but with the necessity of recognizing that the United Nations is an age ncy subject to utilization by states for such purposes as they may jointly decid e to pursue or competitively suc ceed in imposing upon it. Th e issue of whether the organization is destined to confirm one's hopes or one's fears by becoming a world gov ernment is suppl anted by consideration of how and by whom and t(w1.rd what result it is being shaped and may be shaped in the future; evaluati on of seminal potenti aliti es gives way
9
, ~ . : : : ; ~ 8 Irurodu ctton ~ to analysis of politi cal pr ocess and appraisal of political possibil ities. The "for or against" question is discarded i ~ favor of "what, how, and who" qu estions pertinent to the task of polit ical analysis rather than to the det erminati on of ideological commitment. Thi s is the point at whi ch serious st udy of int ernational orga nization can begin. THE PROBLEM OF EDUCATED EXPECTATIONS Th e student of the Unit ed Nations and of the other int ernat ional bodies clustered about it requires some standard for the evaluation of perform ance and development , some pattern with which int ernational agencies can be compa red, some criterion of effectiveness against whi ch actual achi evem ent can be measured. Unfor tuna tely, there is no ready-made and easily avail abl e instrument for these purposes. We see the consequence of this lack in the qu alit at ive deficiency of much of the casual ( and some of the not -so-casual ) commentary about the Unit ed Nations to whi ch we are exposed. Peopl e express disappointment at what the organization has not proved able to do, hope as to wha t it may be able to do, or fear concerning what it might do, all too oft en wit hout relating the actions in qu esti on to any well-founded conception of what capaci ty the Uni ted Nati ons might reasonabl y be conside red to have. Just as no sane farmer would express disappointment becaus e his cow did not lay eggs or hop e that his cow might be induced to lay eggs, an int elligent observer should be expec ted to ref rain from critica l or hortatory discus sion of the functi onal capacity of th e Unit ed Nat ions that is uninformed by an In trodu ct ion Nations or of any other int ernational agency, it behooves us to examine the full range of availabl e images, educa ting our selves as to which aspec ts of realit y can be seen from each of seve ral vantage points and thus esta blishing our levels of expect ation and refining our sta ndards of evalua tion. Ima ges of th e Theater. For some reason, the vocabulary of the theat er has caught on in political science, as the ubi quity ' of the term "actor" attests. Thi s is no less tru e in the field of int ernati onal relati ons than in othe r sectors of the discipline, and with some justification, for there is hi gh dr am a-unfortunately, mor e ofte n tr agic than comic, but sometimes at the level of burlesque-in thi s realm. Hence, it is not sur prising that theatri cal notions have acquired a place in the imagery of int ernati onal organization. Perhaps the most standard , and surel y one of the most accura te, images of int ernati onal organization is that of the stage, emphasizing the provis ion of a place or setting for the act ion and interaction of per form ers. If the image of th e stag e also suggests that the cast of cha rac ters may include stars, prima donnas, and bit players, and th at a considera ble element of stylization and even of artifi cialit y tend s to mark their perf ormance, no valid objection can be made. Th e varian t noti on of the arena tend s to suggest , not improperl y, that the performers are frequ entl y engaged in wholly earnest competition with eac h other rathe r than in make-believe. Th e blending of the notions of ar ena and stage may contribu te to accurat e und erstanding, for both ser ious content ion and formal posturing enter into the typi cal pr oceedi ngs of int ernational accurate und erstanding of the realisti c possibil iti es. We ha ve no warrant for being hop eful , di sillusioned, cynicai, or fearful of the United Nations, unl ess the expec tations that enter int o Our judgm ent bear some sensible relationship to the nature of the orga nization and the limitations set by the political context within which it operates. Th e problem is to achieve and th en to use a set of educated expec tati ons conce rni ng the int ernational orga nizations of Our time. Thi s is no simpl e matter, for the capaci ties and incapaciti es of international bodies ar e not as clearl y established, as fixed, or as uniform as thos e of cows ( which may, pr esumabl y, be expected to maintain for all time their extremely minimal pr opensity for laying eggs ). and one may find the st at ed ambitions of founding fath ers and the promises and pr et ensions bodi es. Both noti ons have the additi onal and imp ortant impli cation that an aud ience is centrally involved-that the pr oceedings are a public per formance, that a significant interrelati on develops between actors and audience as well as among the actors, and that playing to the audie nce, seeking its appl ause, is a major feature of the performance. Devot ees of show business will not find the United Nations entirely alien to their int erests. Th e image of the stage assigns to int ernational orga niza tions only a passive fun ction , that of maintaining a locale for the playing of roles by the actors who constitute the int ernati onal cast. Th e qu estion imme di at ely arises as to whe ther such or gani zat ions may not be actors rather than mere stages. Seeking to identify int ernat ional orga nizations, should I I I ! l i I i I I of charters and constit utions misleading rath er than helpful. Moreover, we ask "who" rath er than "what"? Are they participants in international such an organi zati onal complex as the Unit ed Nati ons system ( a term relations with a pot ent ially import ant role to play- not merely facilities that I use to include the Specialized Agencies along with the Unit ed for the int erpl ay of states? Nations pr oper ) is a multifacet ed thing, incapabl e of being captured by An affi rmat ive assumption is suggested by the normal mode of di s a singl e definition or of being fully portrayed by one image. Rather than cussion of int ernati onal organizations. We say that the United Nati ons to adopt a sing le conception of the nature and potent iality of the Unit ed supports nati onal self-deter mination; we hope that it may solve the
11 ( --' 10 , Introduction Middle Eastern CTIS IS; We regr et that it did not , or could not, save Czechoslovakia from Soviet int ervention; we not e that it opposes South Afri can apartheid; and we argue as to whether it improperl y intrudes upon the domesti c jur isd iction of some of its members. In all of this ther e is an impli cation that we regard the Unit ed Nations as an actor, playing a role in international relations along with and in relation to such oth er actors as the Unit cd States, Brazil, or Indi a. In this view international orga niza tions appear not as suppliers of stages up on whi ch st at es pl ay, but as members of th e cast of characters- unique in status and distincti ve in role, but nonethel ess members-performing upon the world sta ge. How valid is this conception? We would do well to pond er th e nature of the ide nti ty that we ascribe to internationa l organizations. Wh o is this United Nations to which we imput e action or inacti on, capacity or incapacity, wisdom or folly, courage or timidit y? In some cases the ref er ence is obvi ously to the member states, consi dered collectively; a unani mou sly supported proclamation or a resolution approved by the requisite majority passes as an expression of the will or judgment or int ention of the United Nations. For states incl uded in the conse nsus or the majorit y, the Unit ed Nations is si mply a massi ve "we and th ey," and its name is used as a short hand devi ce for some such gro uping as "most of th e states of the world" rather than as the designati on of an indep endent act or, added to the int erna tional cast by the c[('a tive act of th e San Franci sco Conference of 1945. Thus, to say that th e United Nations is concerned to promote world peace may not be meant to impl y anythi ng more than that the states of the world have organi zed thcmsel ves to wor k towar d that end. In other instances, sta tes, though they may be members, tr eat int er nati onal or ganizations as entit ies external to th emsel ves, as for eign bodies. Wh en South Africa accuses the United Nati ons of illegal int erf er ence in its domest ic affairs or the Unit ed States ur ges the United Nati ons to approve its policy in th e Cuban missil e crisi s, the or ganization is clearl y being conce ived not as "we and they" but as "they," Even so, the attri bution of int ern ational person ality to the United Nations is unlikely to be seriously int end ed or to be warrant ed. Th e ref er ence is again to a collection of sta tes: "those othe r states," or a ma jority of them, are to be cong rat ulated for the support that they gave "us," or are to be castigated for the bias that the y displayed aga inst "us." Again, the Unit ed Nati ons turns out to be not a new kind of ac tor, but a collective name for the tr adit ional rnern bers of the interna tional cast, the states. Admitt edly, the conce pt of collect iVity may be tr eat ed mor e seriously and regarded more subst ant ively than these observa tions impl y. It may be argue d that the numerous sta tes int o which the world is di Vided, desp ite their sep arateness, consti tute a whole that has acqui red a Cor porate reality; while' sove reignty symbolizes their indiViduality, interna ' i I ,r ] > .;..;.....~ , ' ' <:> Introduction tional organization expr esses their community. Is the forest a less meaningful unit than the Single tr ee wi thin its bounds? From thi s point of view the Unit ed Nations is virtually a synonym for the int ern ati onal syst em. Its essence is th at of a corporate enti ty rather th an a coll ection of component parts, and its acts, though they be determined by trans ient combinations of member stat es, are to be interpreted as expressions of the ~ will and poli cy of the collect ivit y. This is a view of int ernational organization that t ends to ar ouse varying reactions, linked to differ ent and shifti ng appraisals of organiza tion al activity. D ominant majorities and defensive minorit ies ar e incli ned to indulge in conceptual inflation and deflation, respectively, of the organizations in which they hold such status: when "we win : ' the organization that granted us victory looms as the community of man kind; but whe n "we lose," it takes on the more prosai c appearan ce of a gathering of states whose behavior is not notably improved by their assembling under an org anizational roof. It would hav e been surprising if th e United Stat es had not regarded the United Nat ions of 1950 as the embodime nt of the int ern ati onal community, or if South Africa had not regarded the Unit ed Nat ions of 1969 as a nefari ous combination of selfish, hypocr itical, and meddlesome states. Th e subjectivity of the issue makes it extremely difficult to reach a conclus ive judgment concerni ng the validity of the actor concept of the United Nations or any othe r int ern ational agency. Perh aps the critical subj ectivity is not that of winners and losers , but that of the great major ity of th e participants in the politi cal processes of interna tional orga niza tions. Do they regard themselves, in ideal and in fact , as spokesmen for nati onal interests or as custodians of the int er ests of the larger entity whos e scope is determined by the membership roster of the organizat ion in which they serve? We ca nnot easily det ermin e wit h assure d accuracy the answer to thi s qu esti on, though we ar e pr obabl y on safe ground in assuming that the former self-image is the normal starting point in inter nati onal organizat ions, th at the shift toward the latter is more likel y to occur in some typ es of or ganization than in others, and that , in any case, thi s shift is dest ined to t ake place slowly and unevenl y, At th e pr esent stage of development of most int ern ational orga nizations, it is doubtful that th e attributi on of decisions, resolutions, or actions to collective enti ties under their organizat ional lab els can be properl y regarded as much mor e than a rhet orical cover for the reality of actions t aken by sta tes, with varying degr ees of consensus and contention, within the frameworks -or on the sta ges-provided by int ern ational orga nizations. When the Unit ed Nat ions or any other internat ional organ izat ion is conceived as an act or, neith er th e "we and they" nor the "they" image is as likely to be held in mi nd as the "it" ima ge, This is to say th at the identity of th e organization is fre quentl y conside red to lie in a component
12 ~ ~ : : f Introduction other than its complement of member states; states are regarded as hav ing created the organization, as supporting it in more or less generous fashion, as being influenced, served, or otherwise affected by it, as being involved in it, as having attitudes toward it-but not as being it. It is not, as in the "they" conception, all its member states save the one which at a given moment sees itself as being judged or assisted or frustrated by "them," but it is none of them, something extraneous to all of them. The "it " in this conception is the professional staff, and particularly the secretary. general or other chief official together with his major associates in the bureaucracy. When one reads that the United Nations is negotiat ing with the World Health Organization or has agreed to collaborate with UNEScb, this should not be taken to mean that the composite formed by the member states of the United Nations is dealing with the corresponding composites of the two other organizations-indeed, these three agglomerations of states are largely, though not completely, identi cal-but that members of the international secretariats of the three organi zations are engaged in activities on behalf of and in the name of those organizations. More often than not the statement that "The United Nations hopes . . ." or "The International Monetary Fund intends ..." or "The International Labor Organization plans ..." is best translated as a reference to positions espoused by leading staff officers. When the secretary-general of the United Nations deplores the tendency of most or all members to neglect the organization and urges them to bolster its finances, it is clear that the organization to which he refers is not the states themselves in combination, not the organization to which they "belong," but the organization to which he "belongs" and which he heads, which they have created and undertaken to maintain. There is nothing strange about this phenomenon. For many a professor the American Association of University Professors is an "it," a headquarters group of salaried officials whose activities he helps to finance, whose publications he reads, and whose services he enjoys; his membership makes him not so much a segment of the organization as a customer, a client, or one who subsidizes the organization because he values what "it" does. Similar relationships may be found between mem bers and organizations of every variety from political parties to churches. This is not to say that such organizations are wholly autonomous or that their members may not be, or become, significantly involved in them; members may , in varying degrees, exercise direction and control over them. It is worthy of note, however, that in supporting, advising, crit icizing, opposing, or otherwise seeking to influence an organization, the active member tends to treat it as something external to himself; he acts vis-a-vis the organization, rather than for it or as it. Typically, he enters into the more intimate relationship of sharing in the identity of the organization along with its staff only when he serves as an officer. : ' - ~ - Introduction '\ 13 ~ International organizations tend, to a greater or lesser extent, to be such entities as I have described-agencies called into being by states, sustained by states, and actually or potentially directed by states, on the supposition that their existence and operation may be useful to them selves. This is rather clearly the status of such a service agency as the Universal Postal Union; it is composed of its staff and supported by its members, who benefit from its activities. As we move up the scale of political relevance to the United Nations, we should expect- to find ,1 progressive reversal of this relationship between staff and member states , toward the point at which an organization may be described as being composed of states and served by its staff . This reversal , however, is never absolute. In some of its aspects even the United Nations has the character that I have ascribed to the Universal Postal Union; though the Security Council may be described as a group of states served by the Secretariat, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) or the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) is more properly regarded as a bureaucratic mechanism maintained by states. In some respects the secretary-general is chief of an organization that exists because states have seen fit to sponsor its creation and that is dependent I upon, but essentially separate from, them. In other respects he is the servant of an organization that consists of states and that employs a sup porting staff. An international organization is most clearly an actor when it is most distinctly an "it," an entity distinguishable from its member states. , I Its real importance in international affairs , however, is not necessarily linked to its achievement of this status. As an actor it may be very useful, but it can hardly be expected to rank as a major participant in interna I tional affairs or even as an autonomous one, for its very survival is depend ent upon the will of states, and its functional capacity and utilization are I ultimately subject to their determination. At best, the organization-as actor is likely to be valued as an instrument of states, not to be accorded a status and role equivalent to that of a state. The organization-as-stage I may have greater significance; in providing facilities for the interplay of states and for the formulation and execution of such programs of joint activity as they may agree to undertake, it may make its most substantial contribution to international order. In short, the supplying of a stage for the stars is conceivably more important than the sneaking of an addi tional bit player into the cast. Images of Political Science. Abandoning the imagery of the theater, let us turn to the more prosaic conceptions of political science. As stu dents of political science and simply as human beings whose experience makes states and governments appear to be natural and inescapable features of the sociopolitical realm, comparable to moon and stars as
14 15 Introduction features of the celestial realm, we can hardly avoid the application to international organizations of the analogy of the governmental apparatus of the state. Though we may and should be intellectually aware of the need for caution in this matter, we inexorably find ourselves asking ques tions about international agencies that betray the expectation of their being in some measure and manner comparable to the governments that preside over states. This assumption of comparability, this belief in the relevance of the standard of "stateliness," is evident even when we assert negative expectations; if we say that the United Nations has no prospect of becoming a world government, we express the view that it is appropri ate to analyze the nature of the United Nations and to assess its pros pective evolution in terms of the standard provided by our image of government. The issue of the degree to which international organizations are or may become government-like pervades our thinking. Even though we may not be able to escape from this style of approach to international organization, we can and should develop a critical understanding of the limits of its validity and an awareness of the pitfalls into which it may lead us as students of international institutional development. A familiar manifestation of this way of thinking is the conception of international organizations as inh erently antagonists Or rivals of states, or as potential replacements for them. According to this view it is to be expected ( or hoped or feared) that the norma! course of development of international organizations will make them elements of the governing apparatus of a society conceived as the state writ large. The role of the national government will be diminished as powers and functional respon sibilities are increasingly assigned to, or assumed by, agencies having a larger jurisdictional scope than that of a Single state. International or ganizations can be deemed successful in the degree to which their tasks are expanded, their authority is strengthened, and their appeal to the loyalties of men is increased-all of this at the expense of the state, which withers away in proportion to the flourishing of international bodies, In this conception the growth of international organization is not only a matter of the development of broader substitutes for jurisdictionally limited states, but also a matter of the emergence of superior entities, gaining authority and effective capacity to regulate, direct, and restrain the behavior of governments. Thus, for example, strengthening the United Nations is taken to mean the expansion of its theoretical compe tence and actual ability to impose its will upon the governments of its member states, to function in effect as a government over governments. In these terms international organization is conceived as a process of creating collective agencies whose Vitality is exhibited in the supplanting and subordinating of the gov/:'rmnents of their members. A zero-sum game is thought to be in progress between states and international organizations. I ~ . ., Introduction Is this an accurate characterization of the essential relationship between states and int ernational organizations? Is it compatible with the ideal of educated expectations to evaluate their progress by employing the criterion of the downgrading of the national state in favor of entities with wider span and higher status? These questions do not lend themselves to simple and easy answers. If we attempt to answer them in terms of the intentions and hopes of the official creators of and participants in international organizations, the results are mixed and variable according to the organizations being con sidered. Thus, the objective of the supersession and subordination of member states figures more prominently among the motivations involved in the establishment and development of the European Economic Com munity than among the motivations behind the United Nations, though it would be as great a mistake to assume that this objective has exclusive status in the case of the former as to assume that it is nonexistent in the case of the latter. It may make sense to adopt integration as the measur ing rod for the success of the EEC, but surely not for the United Nations -if we mean success in the realization of purposes dominant among participants in the two organizations. Allowing for the facts that an occasional statesman may embrace the ideal of elevating international organizations to the superstate level and that an exceptional organiza tion may be dominated by that ideal, we may yet conclude that the history of international organization fails to confirm the view that it represents a deliberate effort to accomplish such a revolutionary trans formation of the international system. The international organization movement has not been an antistate crusade in which statesmen have somehow been induced, knowingly or unknowingly, to collaborate. By and large international organizations hav e been the products of states men whose purposes, however mixed and variable, have been confined within the limits of compatibility with the conventional multistate system. International organizations are, of course, no less subject than other human institutions to the potentiality of moving in directions unwilled and unanticipated by their founders or by any particular generation of their operators. The estimation of prospects should not be definitively settled by the analysis of purposes; no one can say with assurance that our present-day international organizations, Or some of them, will not evolve in such a way as to displace and dominate states, It is conceivable that historical forces running beneath the level of the conscious motiva tion of human beings are indeed pitting international organizations against states in a zero-sum game, Such speculation, however fascinating and attractive it may be, par ticularly for a generation acutely sensiti ve to evidence of the inadequacy and evils of the multistate system, provides an unsatisfactory basis for the achievement of educated expectations concerning the performance and
~ , 17 16 : i ~ f / : - Introduction Introduction C) development of international organizations. Moving beyond the pro claimed promises of charters and constitutions and the articulated pur poses of official participants in the work of international organizations, we find the best evidence as to what can reasonably and realistically be expected of international organizations not in the mystical realm of his torical undercurrents, but in the more prosaic record of how interna tional agencies have been and are being used. What they are "supposed" to be or to do should be determined not by our wishes as to what they might be or do, but by our understanding of the possibilities that appear in the situation in which they are embedded and of the probabilities that are revealed by the patterns of utilization established by states, their ultimate owners and operators. This test. provides overwhelming evidence that , with rare and un certain exceptions, international organizations are treated as agencies for the improvement of the multistate system, suppliers of modernized equipment for the use of states in the management of their relationships and the pursuit of their objectives within that system. They have been fashioned by states as instruments for their own use , and the measure of their flourishing is in the degree to which states find them usable and useful for their purposes. The dualism of conflictual and cooperative relationships in the international system is reflected in the efforts of states to use collective devices both against each other and with each other. The typical state-serving, state-supplementing, and state-assisting uses of international organizations have been brought to a focus in the era of decolonization; with respect to the new members of the interna tional system, the state-building function has emerged as the major pre occupation of the United Nations and of many other components of the world's organizational network. Given this emphasis, the evaluation of I ~ contemporary international organizations in terms of their contributions i to the shrinkage of the significance of states would be as inappropriate as the evaluation of schools in terms of their success in promoting illiteracy. " There is, of course, a state-restraining objective which persistently occupies a prominent place among the concerns of international organi zations, an essential corollary of the state-protecting function. The state's basic urge for security has been transmuted into an acknowledgment of I the necessity for world order; consequently, the central agenda of inter national organization has included the development of controls and the imposition of requirements upon states, designed to foster peace and stability in international relations. In a sense, then, international organi zations such as the United Nations are validly conceived as state- I regulatory enterprises. The essence of the matter, however, is that such enterprises represent the efforts of states to enhance their interests by collaborating in acceptance of restraint and responsibility and in the development of mechanisms that may assist them in making the multi- state system compatible with and conducive to the minimal order that their survival requires. In these terms the United Nations and oth er inter national organizations operating in the security sphere are more properly regarded as instruments of states, considered collectively as well as individually, than as competitors of states. If they succeed in producing a reliable world order, this success will be attributable not to the domi nance of agencies that stand above states, but to the capacity of states, coordinating their efforts , to discipline themselves and each other; and its consequence will be not the destruction, but the salvation, of the multistate system. The progressive development of international organization involves the increasing domestication of international relations-the introduction of features more characteristic of intrastate than of traditional interstate relationships. This is a process of reform and modernization of the system, not a revolutionary reaction against the system. For better or for worse, this is the sort of enterprise in which the states of the world are heavily engaged. Given the nature of the enterprise, the appropriate question to ask concerning international organizations is not whether they are succeeding in putting states out of business and taking that business for themselves, but whether they are contributing to the \ capacity of states to stay in business.