People vs.

Santos - Santos owns two fishing boats - the boats were caught fishing within the shoreline of Corregidor without the permission of the Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce - Sec. 28 of AO 2 issued by the Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce states that "No boats licensed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 4003 and this order to catch, collect, gather, take, or remove fish and other sea products from Philippine waters shall be allowed to fish, loiter, or anchor within 3 kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval or military authorities of the United States, particularly Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands and detached rocks lying between Mariveles Reservation on the north side of the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point Reservation on the south side of said entrance: Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas mentioned above only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned.' - violation of this act will be penalized under Sec. 45 of Federal Penal Code - above-stated order issued by Sec. of Agriculture of Commerce by virtue of Sec. 4, Act No. 4003: "The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall from time to time issue such instructions, orders, rules and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions. - Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. Inasmuch as the only authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such instructions, orders, rules, and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated, contains no provisions similar to those contained in the above quoted conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional clause in question supplies a defect of the law, extending it. This is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being exclusively reserved to the then Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law, and now to the National Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. Such act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore said conditional clause is null and void and without effect - For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2. issued by the

Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him. - CASE DISMISSED ================================== People vs. Que Po Lay - The appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. - Claim: Circular No. 20 not published in the Official Gazette as required by CA 638 and Act 2930, consequently, it has no force and effect. - SolGen's claim: CA 638 and Act 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette - We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing. - Sec. 11, Revised Administrative Code: 'statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. (same goes with Art. 2 of New Civil Code) - In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof. - But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then

in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below. - DECISION REVERSED, APPELLANT ACQUITTED ======================================== People vs. Maceren FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC. ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid? HELD: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power. "Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress." =================================== Peralta vs. CSC

- Petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II on 25 September 1989 in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). His appointment was classified as "Reinstatement/Permanent". Before said appointment, he was working at the Philippine Cotton Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation under the Department of Agriculture. - 120889 petitioner received his initial salary, covering the period from 25 September to 31 October 1989. Since he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from his salary the amount corresponding to his absences during the covered period, namely, 29 September 1989 and 20 October 1989, inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays. - Petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T. Alvis (Chief, General Administrative Service) on 15 December 1989 inquiring as to the law on salary deductions, if the employee has no leave credits. - Amando T. Alvis answered petitioner's query in a memorandum dated 30 January 1990 citing Chapter 5.49 of the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service which states that "when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall also be without pay. - Petitioner sent a letter addressed to CSC Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas raising the question: 'Is an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, also considered on leave of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday? - Petitioner: a reading of the General Leave Law as contained in the other laws fails to disclose a specific provision which supports the CSC rule at issue; he cannot be deprived of his pay or salary corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays (in the factual situation posed), and that the withholding (or deduction) of the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. - On 25 May 1990, respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. 90-497, ruling that the action of the DTI in deducting from the salary of petitioner, a part thereof corresponding to six (6) days is in order. - Issue: the validity of the respondent Commission's policy mandating salary deductions corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays where an employee without leave credits was absent on the immediately preceding working day. - During the pendency of this petition, the respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. 91-540 dated 23 April 1991 amending the questioned policy, considering that employees paid on a monthly basis are not required to work on Saturdays, Sunday or Holidays. - Because of these developments, it would seem at first blush that this petition has become moot and academic since the very CSC policy being questioned has already been amended and, in effect, Resolutions No. 90-497 and 90-797, subject of this petition for certiorari, have already been set aside and superseded. But the issue of whether or not the policy that had been adopted and in force since 1965 is valid or not, remains unresolved. Thus, for reasons of public interest and public policy, it is

the duty of the Court to make a formal ruling on the validity or invalidity of such questioned policy. - pursuant to CSC's delegated rule-making power, it promulgated Resolution No. 91540. - the CSC ruled in an earlier case that an employee who has no leave credits in his favor is not entitled to the payment of salary on Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays unless such non-working days occur within the period of service actually rendered. The same policy is reiterated in the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service. - When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. It has also been held that interpretative regulations need not be published. - The Civil Service Commission in its here questioned Resolution No. 90-797 construed R.A. 2625 as referring only to government employees who have earned leave credits against which their absences may be charged with pay, as its letters speak only of leaves of absence with full pay. The respondent Commission ruled that a reading of R.A. 2625 does not show that a government employee who is on leave of absence without pay on a day before or immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days. - The intention of the legislature in the enactment of R.A. 2625 may be gleaned from, among others, the sponsorship speech of Senator Arturo M. Tolentino during the second reading of House Bill No. 41 (which became R.A. 2625). He said: The law actually provides for sick leave and vacation leave of 15 days each year of service to be with full pay. But under the present law, in computing these periods of leaves, Saturday, Sunday and holidays are included in the computation so that if an employee should become sick and absent himself on a Friday and then he reports for work on a Tuesday, in the computation of the leave the Saturday and Sunday will be included, so that he will be considered as having had a leave of Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday, or four days. - The purpose of the present bill is to exclude from the computation of the leave those days, Saturdays and Sundays, as well as holidays, because actually the employee is entitled not to go to office during those days. And it is unfair and unjust to him that those days should be counted in the computation of leaves. - With this in mind, the construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to fifteen days vacation leave of absence with full pay and fifteen (15) days sick leave with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays in both cases. Thus, the law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The fact remains that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not

be declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process. - Furthermore, before their amendment by R.A. 2625, Sections 284 and 285-A of the Revised Administrative Code applied to all government employee without any distinction. It follows that the effect of the amendment similarly applies to all employees enumerated in Sections 284 and 285-A, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits. - PETITION GRANTED ==================================== Javellana vs. DILG Facts: This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his profession while employed in the Government. Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto C.Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority. Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department. On the other hand, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. Held: Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service. Additional: As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction (Santiago vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 192 SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657). With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him. In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government. ==================================== Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, CTA, Fortune Tobacco Version I Facts: 1. RA 7654 was enacted by Congress on June 10, 1993 and took effect July 3, 1993. It amended partly Sec. 142 (c) of the NIRC 2. Fortune Tobacco manufactured the following cigaretter brands: Hope, More and Champion. Prior to RA 7654, these 3 brands were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax of 20 to 45%. Applying the amendment and nothing else, (see footnote below) the 3 brands should fall under Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC and be taxed at 20 to 45%.

3. However, on July 1, 1993, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Revenue Memorandum Circular37-93 which reclassified the 3 brands as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. The reclassification was before RA 7654 took effect. 4. In effect, the memo circular subjected the 3 brands to the provisions of Sec 142 (c) (1) NIRC imposing upon these brands a rate of 55% instead of just 20 to 45% under Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC. 5. There was no notice and hearing. CIR argued that the memo circular was merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR which did not require notice and hearing. Issue: WON RMC 37-93 was valid and enforceable Held: No; lack of notice and hearing violated due process required for promulgated rules. Moreover, it infringed on uniformity of taxation / equal protection since other local cigarettes bearing foreign brands had not been included within the scope of the memo circular. Ratio: 1. Contrary to petitioners contention, the memo was not a mere interpretative rule but a legislative rule in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. Promulgated legislative rules must be published. 2. On the other hand, interpretative rules only provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. 3. BIR, in reclassifying the 3 brands and raising their applicable tax rate, did not simply interpret RA 7654 but legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. BELLOSILLO separate opinion: the administrative issuance was not quasi-legislative but quasi-judicial. Due process should still be observed of course but use Ang Tibay v. CIR. Version II Facts: CIR, through RMC 37-93, aims to collect deficiencies on ad valorem taxes against Fortune Tobacco following a reclassification of foreign branded cigarettes, as per RA 7654. Fortune Tobacco raised the issue of the propriety of the assessment to the CTA, which decided against the CIR. CTA was affirmed by CA. ISSUE: Is RMC 37-93 a mere interpretative ruling, therefore not requiring, for its effectivity, hearing and filing with the UP Law Center?

Held: NO. Ratio Decidendi: 1. When an administrative rule is merely interpretative, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. 2. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. 3. A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. 4. Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. (Prior to the issuance of the questioned circular, "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes were in the category of locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign brand subject to 45% ad valorem tax.) 5. Hence, without RMC 37-93, the enactment of RA 7654, would have had no new tax rate consequence on private respondent's products. 6. Evidently, in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes within the scope of the amendatory law and subject them to an increased tax rate, the now disputed RMC 37-93 had to be issued. 7. In so doing, the BIR not simply intrepreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored. CTA, CA DECISION AFFIRMED ==================================== Victorias Milling vs. SSS FACTS: The SSS issued Circular No. 22 which provides that, in computing the premiums due, all employers will include in the employees remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay. Victorias Milling Compnay protested the circular as being contradictory to its previous Circular which expressly excluded overtime pay

and bonus in the computation of premium contributions. Victorias questioned its validity for lack of authority on the part of the SSS to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the OG. SSS argues that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation, but a mere administrative interpretation in light of the amendments introduced by an amendatory law. Hence, there is no need for approval of the President and publication in the OG to be effective. ISSUE: Whether Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation? HELD: NO, Circular No. 22 is an administrative interpretation. There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. In this case, Circular No. 22 was issued by the SSS, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term compensation. While prior to the amendment, bonuses and overtime pay were expressly exclude, such exemption was deleted by the amendatory law. Hence, it thus became necessary for the SSS to interpret the effect of such deletion through Circular No. 22. ========================================= NFA vs Masada Security Agency FACTS: NFA had a 1-year contract with the services of MASADA in providing security services in their variousoffices in the region. Subsequently, the RTWPB issued several wage orders increasing the daily wagerate. In accord with this, NFA made adjustments in the daily wage but denied the adjustments withrespect to other benefits and remunerations computed on the basis of the daily wage. This caused thefiling of the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the liability of principals in service contracts under Section 6 of RA 6727 and the wage orders issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board is limited only to the increment in the minimum wage.

HELD: The National Wages and Productivity Commission is vested with the power to prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of appropriate minimum wage and productivity measures at the regional, provincial or industry levels; while the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards have the power to determine and fix the minimum wage rates applicable in their respective region, provinces, or industries therein and issue the corresponding wage orders, subject to the guidelines issued by the NWPC, through wage orders. Payment of the increases in the wage rate of workers is ordinarily shouldered by the employer. Section 6 of RA 6727, however, expressly lodged said obligation to the principals or indirect employers in construction projects and establishments providing security, janitorial and similar services. Substantially the same provision is incorporated in the wage orders issued by the RTWPB. NFA claims that its additional liability under the aforecited provision is limited only to the payment of the increment in the statutory minimum wage rate, i.e., the rate for a regular eight (8) hour work day. The contention is meritorious. The term "wage" as used in Section 6 of RA 6727 pertains to no other than the "statutory minimum wage" which is defined under the Rules Implementing RA 6727 as the lowest wage rate fixed by law that an employer can pay his worker. The basis thereof under Section 7 of the same Rules is the normal working hours, which shall not exceed eight hours a day. Hence, the prescribed increases or the additional liability to be borne by the principal under Section 6 of RA 6727 is the increment or amount added to the remuneration of an employee for an 8-hour work. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. Since the increase in wage referred to in Section 6 pertains to the "statutory minimum wage" as defined herein, principals in service contracts cannot be made to pay the corresponding wage increase in the overtime pay, night shift differential, holiday and rest day pay, premium pay and other benefits granted to workers. While basis of said remuneration and benefits is the statutory minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded as to include those not stated in the subject provision. The settled rule in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation... The presumption therefore is that lawmakers are well aware that the word "wage" as used in Section 6 means the statutory minimum wage. If their intention was to extend the obligation of principals in service contracts to the payment of the increment in the other benefits and remuneration of workers, it

would have so expressly specified. In not so doing, the only logical conclusion is that the legislature intended to limit the additional obligation imposed on principals in service contracts to the payment of the increment in the statutory minimum wage. The general rule is that construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting or applying the same is entitled to great weight and respect. The Court, however, is not bound to apply said rule where such executive interpretation, is clearly erroneous, or when there is no ambiguity in the law interpreted, or when the language of the words used is clear and plain, as in the case at bar. Besides, administrative interpretations are at best advisory for it is the Court that finally determines what the law means. Hence, the interpretation given by the labor agencies in the instant case which went as far as supplementing what is otherwise not stated in the law cannot bind this Court. It is not within the province of this Court to inquire into the wisdom of the law for indeed, we are bound by the words of the statute. The law is applied as it is. At any rate, the interest of the employees will not be adversely affected if the obligation of principals under the subject provision will be limited to the increase in the statutory minimum wage. This is so because all remuneration and benefits other than the increased statutory minimum wage would be shouldered and paid by the employer or service contractor to the workers concerned. Thus, in the end, all allowances and benefits as computed under the increased rate mandated by RA 6727 and the wage orders will be received by the workers. PETITION GRANTED ================================== SGMC vs. Office of the President FACTS: On March 29, 1994, petitioner filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for breach of contract, violation of property rights and damages against private respondents. After the parties filed their pleadings and supporting documents, the arbiter rendered a decision dismissing petitioner's complaint as well as private respondents' counterclaim. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB which, however, dismissed said petition. On October 23, 1995, petitioner got a copy of the decision of the Board of Commissioner of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Office of the President on November 20, 1995, but this was denied for having been filed outside of the required period. Petitioner argues that the period for appeal is actually 30 days pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987.

ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the reglementary period within which to appeal the decision of HLURB to public respondent is fifteen days. HELD: The SC ruled that the 30-day period of appeal is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957 and Section 2 of P.D. No. 1344 provide that the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from the date of its receipt. The period of appeal of 30 days in the Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board is invalid for being in conflict with Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and 1344. PETITION DISMISSED ====================================== CIR vs. Azucena Reyes FACTS: This case was borne out of these facts. Maria C. Tancinco died on July 8, 1993. A deficiencyestate tax assessment was issued against her estate on April 22, 1998. The assessment notice followedthe old procedure laid down RR No. 12-85 because at the time that the assessment was issued, noimplementing rules were as yet issued on the new procedure for issuing an assessment under Section228 of the NIRC, as amended by R.A. No. 8424. The procedure simply requires that the taxpayer must benotified of the findings of the Commissioner. However, the old provision of the NIRC (Section 229) wasamended and renumbered as Section 228 which in explicit language providedThe taxpayer otherwiseshall be informed in writing of the law and facts on which the assessment is made: otherwise, theassessment shall be void. This change was introduced by R.A. No. 8424 which took effect on January 1,1998. ISSUE: What is the status of an assessment issued in 1998 if it failed to inform the taxpayer of thelaw and the facts on which the assessment is made? Can this assessment be the basis of a compromise? HELD: The SC ruled that the assessment is void ab initio. Under the present provisions of the Tax Codeand pursuant to elementary due process, taxpayers must be informed in writing of the law and the factsupon which a tax assessment is based; otherwise, the assessment is void. Being invalid, the assessmentcannot in turn be used as a basis for the perfection of a tax compromise.

The Commissioner takes the position that since the assessment was issued at a time that the Regulations in force is RR No. 12-85, the old rule in making an assessment should therefore be followed.The provision of Section 228 which took effect on January 1, 1998 is self executing. While it is true that the implementing rules (RR No. 12-99) came out only on September 6, 1999, this is merely an administrative rule interpretative of the statute. The rule prevailing under our jurisdiction is that an administrative rule interpretative of a statute, and not declarative of certain rights and corresponding obligations, is given retroactive effect as of the date of the effectivity of the statute. (Adamson Ozanom Education Institution, Inc. vs. Adamson University Faculty and Employees Association, November 9,1989, 179 SCRA 279).