Final Exam

NE 591: Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Safeguards Technology and Policy

Dr. Steve Skutnik Spring, 2012

This is a take-home final exam: you may use your notes and any other reference materials from this course (e.g., lecture slides, notes, videos, etc.) to complete this exam. However, you are expected to provide all answers in your own words. Answers which are directly copied from the notes will receive no credit. Additionally, you are expected to complete this exam with no outside assistance from others; all relevant portions of the NCSU policies on academic integrity apply. By signing in the space below, you indicate that you have read and understand the above policies.

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NE 591: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safeguards Technology and Policy Spring 2012 Final Examination (take-home)
Total points: 500 Proliferation at the national level (90 points)
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1. (15 points) Describe the types of incentives which lead to a national proliferation decision. What dengelemek(karsilik olarak) types of actions could the international community take to counterbalance these incentives? 2. (10 points) Describe the interaction between proliferation resistance and national decisions to proliferate. 3. (10 points) What is the difference between physical protection and proliferation resistance? 4. (10 points) Characterize the three main categories of state-based proliferation threats. How do they differ from one another? 5. (10 points) Describe the four main motivations for insider threats. How do human reliability programs screen against these types of threats? 6. The following questions address proliferation by states following the ratification by the NPT (5 points) Name the states which either are known or are believed to possess nuclear weapons which are not recognized as NPT nuclear weapons states (NWS) (10 points) Characterize the process by which these states acquired weapons. What parallels (if any) exist between these cases? (10 points) Describe the key motivations of each of these states in pursuing nuclear weapons. What conclusions can you draw from this? (10 points) Each time a state has either gained nuclear weapons (or has made significant progress in an attempt to do so), this has resulted in significant revisions to the international nonproliferation regime. List each of the major events which lead to reevaluations of the international nonproliferation regime and what was done in response.

Radiation detection for safeguards (95 points) 7. Describe the measurement system (or systems) best suited to making the following measurements and a justification for your answer (35 points). a. Monitoring for gamma-emitting sources at a heavy traffic vehicle portal monitor b. Detecting plutonium being carried on an individual walking through a personnel portal monitor c. Verifying the contents of a canister bearing enriched uranium d. Verifying the contents of a canister bearing plutonium oxide powder e. Identifying an unknown radiological source f. Measuring uranium holdup in a facility g. Measuring fissile content of a sample containing fission products 8. (10 points) Compare the relative advantages of sodium iodine (NaI) detectors to their high-purity germanium (HPGe) counterparts. Characterize the types of situations in which one might be more appropriate than the other. 9. (10 points) How can uranium-235 be easily identified using radiation detection? 10. (10 points) Describe the process of neutron radiation detection. (How are neutrons detected?)

NE 591: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safeguards Technology and Policy Spring 2012 Final Examination (take-home)
11. (10 points) Describe one or more processes an adversary could potentially use to smuggle nuclear materials through a radiation portal monitor and what effective countermeasures can be used to prevent this. 12. (10 points) Describe why background suppression presents an issue in radiation portal monitoring. What generally is the cause of background suppression? 13. (10 points) Describe why a typical gamma ray spectra from a mono-energetic gamma source typically includes many other features than the full-energy photopeak alone. Name the other major features and describe their physical origin.

Nuclear materials in weapons (25 points) 14. (15 points) Describe the concept of a Significant Quantity as defined by the IAEA and how it relates to nuclear weapons design. What are the defined SQs for LEU, HEU, and Pu? 15. (10 points) Describe the characteristics which make a material more attractive / useful for direct use in weapons.

Safeguards for spent nuclear fuel (55 points) 16. (10 points) What is the chief safeguards concern in spent fuel reprocessing facilities? 17. (10 points) Describe how solution inventories are measured and verified in reprocessing facilities 18. (5 points) Describe why plutonium produced from fuel exposed to higher burnups is generally less attractive for weapons purposes. 19. (10 points) Why is accurate quantification of spent fuel burnup important for safeguards purposes? 20. (10 points) Describe the process in which plutonium is produced in uranium-based fuels. How does the relative plutonium content of nuclear fuel change with burnup (both in quantity and in concentration of Pu-239) and why? 21. (10 points) Characterize how the IAEA or a national intelligence agency might discover an undeclared reprocessing facility. (What kind of indicators might be present?)

Safeguards for uranium enrichment (60 points)

22. (20 points) Calculate the difference in separative work (in kg-SWU) required to produce 1000 kg of LEU at 3.25% enrichment versus 100 kg of HEU at 94% enrichment. Assume an input of natural uranium at 0.711% enrichment and tails at 0.2% enrichment. 23. (10 points) Describe the concept of holdup. Why is an accurate characterization of holdup essential to safeguards at uranium processing facilities? 24. (10 points) Describe the key factors contributing to the difficulty of implementing safeguards at uranium enrichment facilities. How do these factors impact safeguards implementation? (Conversely, how do they make it potentially easier for a noncompliant state to falsify declarations?) 25. (10 points) Describe how environmental sampling is used by IAEA inspectors to verify enrichment levels are consistent with those declared at uranium enrichment facilities

NE 591: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safeguards Technology and Policy Spring 2012 Final Examination (take-home)
26. (10 points) Describe possible ways by which an IAEA inspector or national intelligence agency might detect a clandestine uranium enrichment facility. What types of indicators may be present?

International safeguards (85 points) 27. (10 points) Describe the purpose the Design Information Questionnaire / Design Information Verification process. 28. (10 points) Describe the key features of the Addition Protocol. How does the Additional Protocol serve to strengthen the NPT? 29. (10 points) Describe two key weaknesses in the NPT. What can be done to potentially address these weaknesses? 30. (10 points) Describe the purpose of a state system of accountability and control. 31. (10 points) Describe the state-level approach to safeguards. How does this differ from the conventional approach to IAEA safeguards, and what advantages does this offer with respect to safeguards implementation? 32. The following questions pertain to export controls (20 points): a. What types of materials does the Dual Use List (published by the Nuclear Suppliers Group) cover? b. How does the Dual Use List go beyond the scope of the Zangger Committees Trigger List? c. What motivated the creation of the Dual Use List? d. What types of restrictions apply to materials exported under the Trigger List? 33. (15 points) In the diagram of a fuel processing facility below, identify the logical material balance areas (MBAs) along with appropriate key measurement points (KMPs)

Chopper Receipts SNF receiving & storage Dissolver Solvent Extraction

Conversion to PuO2 powder Waste stream Shipments

NE 591: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safeguards Technology and Policy Spring 2012 Final Examination (take-home) Physical security (60 points) 34. (40 points) Develop an adversary sequence diagram (ASD) for the following scenario, in which a small quantity of SNM is being stored in Dr. Skutniks temporary office (Burlington Engineering Laboratories, Room 2140). A PIDAS has been established at a uniform 10-foot perimeter around the building; otherwise, no further modifications have been made. In your ASD, indicate appropriate security layers based upon the physical layout of the building and indicate all plausible entry/exit pathways, along with means of traversing between layers of the security perimeter.

35. (10 points) Indicate the key vulnerabilities in the facility used for the joint physical security exercise conducted with the University of Tennessee. For ease of reference, a copy of the layout is provided below.

NE 591: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safeguards Technology and Policy Spring 2012 Final Examination (take-home)

36. (10 points) The diagram below is a roughly simplified diagram for a potential adversary attack on a SNM handling facility. Identify the critical detection point in this sequence for a response force time of 45 seconds. How will this change for response force time of 80 seconds? (i.e., are other modifications required?)

Error propagation for safeguards measurements (30 points) 37. (15 points) A radiation measurement made the following measurement of a source and a background count, each measured for equal times. The counts were as follows: Source: 728 Background: 527 Calculate the net counts and associated uncertainty. 38. (15 points) Three containers with a combined 1000 grams of Pu are received by your facility, with an associated inventory of 5% at 2 (i.e., within a 95% confidence limit, the material could fall between 950 grams and 1050 grams). This material is processed into a dissolver, whereupon the volume and concentration are measured as follows: Volume: 93.5 L 3.7% (at 2) Concentration: 10.0 grams Pu / L 1.5% Is the difference between the expected and measured inventories within the measurement uncertainty? Why or why not? (Justify your answer.)