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Index
Index..................................................................................................................................................................................................................1
Nano Link..........................................................................................................................................................................................................2
Discourse Link...................................................................................................................................................................................................3
China Link.........................................................................................................................................................................................................4
Air Force Link...................................................................................................................................................................................................5
Air Force Link...................................................................................................................................................................................................6
Impact - Coviello...............................................................................................................................................................................................8
Predictions bad..................................................................................................................................................................................................9
Link Overview.................................................................................................................................................................................................10
Impact overview..............................................................................................................................................................................................11
AT: Harris Utopian threats...............................................................................................................................................................................12
AT: Perm..........................................................................................................................................................................................................13
AT: Realism inevitable.....................................................................................................................................................................................14
AT: Realism Inev-Humans...............................................................................................................................................................................16
AT: Realism Good...........................................................................................................................................................................................17

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Nano Link
Security discourse in the realm of nanotechnology ensures endless threat construction and deterrence
breakdown
Gubrud 2005
(Mark, “Nanotechnology and International Security”, professor at University of Maryland, http://www.foresight.org
/Conferences/MNT05/Papers/Gubrud/) [Ciborowski]

It is highly likely the world will continue to be divided into sovereign states with competing militaries as the nanotechnic
revolution approaches, and that, certainly in the United States at least, much of the research leading to it will be sponsored
through the military with an eye to military applications. Therefore, if we are to have any hope of avoiding a catastrophic arms
race it is essential to consider possibilities for control of nanotechnic arms. It is easy to dismiss the idea of an outright ban on
the use of assemblers in weapons manufacture, the use of nanostructures in weapons, or any similar proposal, as impractical and
unverifiable. What is often lost sight of, however, is that arms control always involves more than treaties and "national means of
verification." Above all, it requires the will to control dangerous and undesirable weapons, and a willingness to cooperate in order
to achieve such control. If such will is present among the parties who need to be involved, there is much that can be done. The
most threatening aspect of a possible nanotechnic arms buildup is the sheer mass of weaponry that may be produced. Not
producing such masses of arms, nor preparing the facilities that may be required for their production, is not an unverifiable
commitment. Voluntary transparency, by which nations allow their treaty partners to maintain prescribed monitoring capabilities
on national territory, can permit asssurance that no such large-scale buildup is taking place. Such arrangements will only remain
effective, however, as long as nations refrain from attempting to settle disputes by violence. Even the mere threat of
violence, ordinary "peaceful" confrontation, is likely to provoke withdrawal from a weak control regime in the event of a
serious crisis.

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Discourse Link
Security Discourse in national policy ensures endless threat construction against perceived threats
David Campbell et al. Professor of International Politics, at the University of Newcastle, 07 (“Performing security: The imaginative
geographies of current US strategy” Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey, Alison J. Williams, and Luiza Bialasiewicz Political
Geography 26 (2007) 405e422)

Again, it is essential that we conceptualize these strategies as both containing and making imaginative geographies; specifying the ways
"the world is" and, in so doing, actively (re)making that same world. This goes beyond merely the military action or aid programmes that
governments follow, but indicates a wider concern with the production of ways of seeing the world, which percolate through media,
popular imaginations as well as political strategy. These performative imaginative geographies are at the heart of this paper and will
re-occur throughout it. Our concern lies specifically with the ways in which the US portrays e and over the past decade has portrayed e
certain parts of the world as requiring involvement, as threats, as zones of instability, as rogue states, "states of concern", as "global
hotspots", as well as the associated suggestion that by bringing these within the "integrated" zones of democratic peace, US security e
both economically and militarily e can be preserved. Of course, the translation of such imaginations into actual practice (and certainly
results) is never as simple as some might like to suggest. Nonetheless, what we wish to highlight here is how these strategies, in essence,
produce the effect they name. This, again, is nothing new: the United States has long constituted its identity at least in part through
discourses of danger that materialize others as a threat (see Campbell, 1992). Equally, much has been written about the new set of threats
and enemies that emerged to fill the post-Soviet void e from radical Islam through the war on drugs to "rogue states" (for a critical
analyses see, among others, Benjamin & Simon, 2003; Stokes, 2005; on the genealogies of the idea of "rogue states" see Blum, 2002;

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China Link
Constructing China as a discursive threat to U.S. security ensures endless warfare
Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University”, 2004,
“The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want
to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of
Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of
China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this
sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist. ahistorical
framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars
have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity,
which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-
identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as
(neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"''5 and "All other states are potential threats."'•^ In
order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J.
Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other."
The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt
Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in
strategic studies or international relations than China itself. "" As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to
undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how
it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J.
Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat]
debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional
powers."''^ Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism. The
(neo) realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the
United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James
Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been
viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy."50 And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only
"tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W.
Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability.

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Air Force Link
Air force doctrine dictates weaponization and preemptive security strikes.

Tim DUNNE Prf. @ Wales (A berystywth) 2003 Society and Hierarchy in Int’l Relations Int’l
Relations 17 (3) p. 308-309

What are the techniques for establishing and maintaining imperium? The most important is
the production and projection of military power, or what Bush chillingly referred to as ‘full
spectrum dominance’. In terms of hardware, the US possesses a relative advantage not
seen before in history: it is so far ahead in conventional forces that other states are not
even trying to catch up. The US has nine supercarrier battle groups; no rival has a single
supercarrier. Air power superiority is such that in the last three wars its adversaries did not
get their fighter aircraft off the ground. And as we move to a new era in weapons
technology, the US holds a massive lead in the militarization of space.31 Post-9/11, this
overwhelming military superiority has been harnessed to a strategic doctrine that is
prepared to use it. The defensive ethos of deterrence that defined US strategy in the Cold
War has been supplemented by an offensive doctrine of pre-emption. The new enemies of
the US cannot be deterred in the same manner that the Soviet sphere was contained
during the long peace. These ‘rogue states’ sponsor terrorism, brutalize their people and
seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Their threat must be countered. In the words
of the National Security Strategy of the United States: ‘[t]o forestall or prevent such hostile
acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preventively’.32 This
argument is very slippery as it claims to rest on a justification based on a customary right
of prevention, yet as Wheeler argues, ‘it is clear from the text that what is meant here is a
doctrine of preventive or anticipatory action’.33 Offensive preventive wars are contrary to
international law, unless the fear of an imminent attack can be demonstrated. Moreover, by
naming certain states ‘evil’ and making them military targets accordingly, the US is
effectively clawing back the decision about rightful membership of international society
from the realm of collective judgement.34 The ethos of interventionism in the affairs of
other states around the world, and a hypersensitivity to any intrusion into their own
sovereignty, betrays what Pierre Hassner calls ‘an imperial mentality’.35 Such claims
likening the US to an empire have been widely debated and disputed. Philip Zelikow, for
instance, exalts everyone to ‘stop talking of American empire’; instead ‘we must speak of
American power and or responsible ways to wield it’.36 There is no doubt that the term
empire is problematic if it is meant to imply a connection with historical empires,
something Hardt and Negri cleverly avoid by severing the connection between empire and
territoriality.37 Whether the label fits or not, beyond the shores of the US there is a
consensus that America has too much power for its own good, but little agreement on what
to do about it. Its identity as a world power – and its strategy of pre-emptive/preventive
interventionism constitutes a danger to international society, as discussed further below.

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Air Force Link

Eduardo MENDIETA Philosophy @ University of San Francisco ‘6 “War the School of Space: The Space of War and the War for Space”
Ethics, Place and the Environment 9 (2) p. 223-224

For Douhet, the lessons of WWI were that in order to obtain military dominance,
command of the air must also be gained. Command of the air, however, is not a
defensive position, but rather an offensive strategy. Air supremacy is not tactical, but
strategic. At all moments, an army now supplemented by an independent air
command must be in the position to vanquish the opponent, even before the enemy is
in a position to attack. Douhet held that offensiveness, preemption and attacks
behind the military lines become axiomatic, to use his language. Ullman has hardly
departed from this type of thinking. For Ullman and the military strategists in the
Pentagon and the Department of Defense, the revolution in military affairs has
necessitated a rethinking in the structuring principles of US military strategy. After
1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was time to evaluate the ‘decisive or
overwhelming force’ strategy that had guided the US military for the last half a
century. While ‘decisive force’ (which aimed to prevail militarily over an opponent)
required massive military material and personnel, could entail high casualties on
both sides, and used a technique of attrition, ‘rapid dominance’ aimed to ‘control the
adversary’s will’ by means of less, but more highly sophisticated, material and
personnel leading to rapid, full knowledge of the battle field. It used strategies to
paralyze, shock, unnerve, deny, and destroy in order to overcome the opponent’s
will. As Ullman put it succinctly:
The aim of Rapid Dominance is to affect the will, perception, and
understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our strategic policy ends
through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe. Clearly, the traditional military
aim of destroying, defeating, or neutralizing the adversary’s military capability
is a fundamental and necessary component of Rapid Dominance. Our intent,
however, is to field a range of capabilities to induce sufficient Shock and Awe
to render the adversary impotent.23
The ‘key objective’ of Rapid Dominance is to ‘seize control of the environment and
to paralyze or so overload an adversary’s perceptions and understanding of events
that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at tactical and strategic levels’.24
War the School of Space 223
But this is too crass a way to put it, according to Ullman. It should be noted
here that Paul Virilio, the foremost philosopher of the space of war to date, has
called this type of war a war on the atmospheric ecosystem of the enemy, in which
there is a complete undifferentiation between military and civilian space and
infrastructure. In this new form of total war, the total environment (seas, rivers,
air space, land, cities, deserts, etc.) of an opponent becomes viable military
targets (Virilio, 2000, p. 15). In more sophisticated and theoretical terms, the
magnitude of Shock and Awe that Rapid Dominance seeks, again according to
Ullman, to ‘impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact
that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese’
(Ullman & Wade, 1996, p. 4).
In our analysis of the thinking by Ratzel, Mahan, Mackinder, Schmitt, Douhet
and Ullman we have focused on the ways in which each one conceptualized the space
of war: land war, sea war, air war, atmospheric and environmental war. Each thinker
was also shown to have derived specific historical lessons and principles from the
ways in which wars are conducted in different theaters of war. Some gave privileged
place and primacy to land over sea, others reversed the order, and some to air over
both land and sea. What has become clear is how closely these thinkers thought war

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and space, or rather, how the warrior as philosopher conceptualized space as the
topos of polemos, of the violent encounter between enemies. We are now in the
position to offer a series of syllogisms that summarized the central lesson of this
overview, namely that space has been militarized. If war is the school of space, as
Ratzel affirmed, one lesson we have learned is that space is produced by war and that
all space is the space of war.
(1) The military representation of space became
(2) the production of military space [theater of war], which became
(3) the militarization of space, which in tandem entailed
(4) the spatialization of war, which in turned entailed
(5) war becomes permanent and total, and the world is an extension of war,
always by its means, to paraphrase Klaus von Clausewitz,
(6) or, in the words of Heraclitus’ fragments 53 and 80, according to Schmitt’s
Heideggerian rendering: ‘war brings together, and right is strife’.
Or, to put it in Lefebvreian language, the lived space, the represented space, and the
spatial practices that are made possible, produced and determined by militarism lead
to a militarization of space in which not only do we have the determination of
particular geographies by military ends, but in which space qua space gets to be both
lived and thought as a theater of war. It is not just a question of military geographies,
to use that felicitous expression by Rachel Woodward (2004), but also and
simultaneously of the weaponization of space. If space is produced by war, then
space itself becomes a weapon—continents, nations, cities, neighborhoods, and
homes become regions as well as sources of war and strife. Again, to echo Lefebvre,
if war produces space, it means that space itself is already part and parcel of the
arsenal of war. The militarization of space means the spatialization of war—space
seething, breeding, and bristling with war. It is time to de-militarize space and to
learn to spatialize in accordance with a humane comportment in which we are not
brought together by strife.

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Impact - Coviello
Apocalyptic representations ensures biopolitical control over populations – genocide is ongoing and
extinction is inevitable

Coviello 00 - Assistant Professor of English @ the Bowdoin College

[Peter, Queer Frontiers: Millennial Geographies, Genders, and Generations. "Apocalypse from Now On."]JB

Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second
assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and
everything with (in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) "remainderless and a-symbolic destruction," then in
the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in
substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people
whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and
prosperity of a cherished "general population." This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation,
from 1989, that, "Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not 'Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now
On.'" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at
length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is
ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the
figure of the apocalypse – the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a
particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume
of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than,
in his words, "life-administering." Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life … [and] endeavors to
administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations." In his
brief comments on what20he calls "the atomic situation," however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must
not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies
and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone." Whatsoever
might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no
matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modern
power," Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill' it is because power is
situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." For a state
that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over
the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise,
seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

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Predictions bad
The predictive planning scenarios of the affirmative are doomed to failure. The idea of management results
in a an endless cycle of problems to be fixed.
Der Derian 2005
(Brown, James International Studies, Predicting the Present, Vol. 27 (3) - Fall 2005, http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1430/)

It often takes a catastrophe to reveal the illusory beliefs we continue to harbor in national and
homeland security. To keep us safe, we place our faith in national borders and guards, bureaucracies
and experts, technologies and armies. These and other instruments of national security are empowered
and legitimated by the assumption that it falls upon the sovereign country to protect us from the
turbulent state of nature and anarchy that permanently lies in wait offshore and over the horizon for
the unprepared and inadequately defended. But this parochial fear, posing as a realistic worldview, has recently taken some very hard
knocks. Prior to September 11, 2001, national borders were thought to be necessary and sufficient to keep our enemies at bay; upon entry to Baghdad, a virtuous
triumphalism and a revolution in military affairs were touted as the best means to bring peace and democracy to the Middle East; and before Hurricane Katrina,
The intractability of disaster,
emergency preparedness and an intricate system of levees were supposed to keep New Orleans safe and dry.
especially its unexpected, unplanned, unprecedented nature, erodes not only the very distinction of the
local, national, and global, but, assisted and amplified by an unblinking global media, reveals the
contingent and highly interconnected character of life in general. Yet when it comes to dealing with natural and unnatural
disasters, we continue to expect (and, in the absence of a credible alternative, understandably so) if not certainty and total safety at least a high level of probability
and competence from our national and homeland security experts. However, between the mixed metaphors and behind the metaphysical concepts given voice by
US Homeland Security Director Michael Chertoff early into the Katrina crisis, there lurks an uneasy recognition that this administration—and perhaps no national
Indeed, they suggest that our national
government—is up to the task of managing incidents that so rapidly cascade into global events.
plans and preparations for the “big one”—a force-five hurricane, terrorist attack, pandemic disease—
have become part of the problem, not the solution. His use of hyberbolic terms like “ultra-
catastrophe” and “fall-out” is telling: such events exceed not only local and national capabilities, but
the capacity of conventional language itself.

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Link Overview
We’ll isolate a few links here

1. China threat construction- Their Navrozov has absolutely no warrant for why china goes to war
other than the quote “As soon as China acquires such weapons, its rulers will be likely to launch a
world war”. This proclamation is the height of threat construction it constructs china as an irrational
actor we have to contain in order to preserve our survival from the evil Chinese.
This turns the case
A. Pan evidence indicates that discursive constructions of china as a threat means we orient our
national policy towards violence against the Chinese. The only possibly scenario for war is the
way we representationally construct them as a threat.
B. The realist framing of the china threat means that the perception of china as a threat becomes a
reality as our response is dictated by our representations.

2. Hegemony- the idea of U.S. primacy is predicated on a violent will to order that constructs national
security in terms of perceived threats – our Campbell evidence is predicative all of their hegemony
good claims he says that when I.R. theorists write in terms of security they construct countries as
irrational and war loving. This turns all their war scenarios because we engage in wars around the
globe against countries we created into threats. The best examples of this are iraq and Vietnam we
constructed both as threats to world order regardless of the fact they weren’t and this allowed us to
intervene in both countries which has brought increased instability to both countries
This turns the case
A. The irrationality inspired by security in foreign policy means that we construct threats against
countries that aren’t. It means all the wars described by the 1ac are inevitable.

3. Nanotech weapons ensures extinction- The idea that we have to securitize ourselves against these
weapons that don’t even exist means that other countries will inevitably backlash against the U.S.
trying to build these doomsday weapons with conventional nukes.
4. With the irrational foreign policy perpetuated by the affirmative nanoweapons are a horrible idea-
giving a country that has no rational decision making is the certain path to extinction.

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Impact overview
1. Coviello- in a world where we construct apocalyptic threats the state co-opts these representations and
use them to exterminate populations- this is the internal link to all of our irrationality claims. The state
takes fear and uses to manage all forms of life.
Aside from the irrationality impact we’ll isolate an independent DA to the affirmative
Under a framework of fear and security life loses all meaning entire populations can be
exterminated in attempt to find security. Under this conception of life there is no meaning other
than the security of the whole. There’s no reason to vote for the affirmative impacts when people
have no meaning because they have been marginalized by the state.

2. Der derian is the internal link to all of our case turn arguments- he says when we inject security it means
our predictions of threats are flawed because of the irrationality security inspires.

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AT: Harris Utopian threats
1. The harris cards act as another link- when he makes predictions of people who hate us he fails to explore
why they hate us- the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 didn’t attack us for no reason. They attacked us
because we have military bases throughout the middle east, and the imperialist policies our government
persues.
2. We don’t deny that there are people who oppose the set of national security objectives set up by the
affirmative - There’s a critical distinction on the link level here our argument isn’t that nobody is a threat
but rather when you construct countries such as china as a threat the discursive practices make their case
impacts inevitable. We have to be skeptical of these values in that they’re rooted in false truths of
oppression. The burden of proof is on the affirmative to prove the Chinese are threats.
3. A reconception of the way security acts in national policy means we functionally link turn this argument-
Campbell says a deconstruction of the way we view policy in the international arena means that we stop
endlessly constructing these threats, solves the reasons why people hate us.
4. Doesn’t prove our link arguments false- all of our evidence is talking about how the affirmative specific
construction of china and nanotech as threats uniquely makes their impacts inevitable.
5. They’re more utopian- the belief that American primacy has led to a peaceful to a peaceful world is a
fallacy look at the past 8 years under the bush administration.
6. The mindset of endless threats is a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to the constant creation of more threats

Ronnie Lipschutz, Director – Politics PhD Program, UC Santa Cruz, 1998. “On Security” p. 8

Security is, to put Wæver's argument in other words, a socially constructed concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific
social context.18 It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and
subjects within states and among them.19 To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital
interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social
context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there."20 But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a
material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective"
reality independent of these constructions.21 That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real,
material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or
undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other, via the projections of their worst fears
onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other
acquire a material character. In other words, nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figments of our imagination, but their targeting is a
function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with theirs.

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AT: Perm
1. All of our links prove that the alternative is a mutually exclusive with the view of security the affirmative
perpetuates.
2. Combinations of the alternative and the state result in the cooption of intellectuals into a political,
interventionist sphere

Shampa BISWAS, Prof – Politics, Whitman, 2007 "Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International
Relations Theorist" Millennium 36 (1)

While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and
exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason
for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic
process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written
extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic
deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14
Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real
alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and
lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains
that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The
most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the
proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical
formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced
by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out
of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely
trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US
academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional
relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement
has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and
justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the
state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to
formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is
measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and
Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and
following the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

3. The perm is severance- You can’t kick out of the way you frame your impacts and the necessary
responses in the 1ac- it’s a voter
A. Ground- the aff can just kick out of everything in the world where severance is justified- means the
neg doesn’t have any kind of basis for writing positions
B. Fairness- If the 1AC can spike out of any position it means that we will also lose on the negative
4. It’s net beneficial to do the alt by itself- only then can we avoid all of the case turn arguements

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AT: Realism inevitable
1. All of their authors are flawed- they all wrote for the Washington think tanks that has supported the
bush administration they all made flawed predictions of the iraq war depicting it as a threat, we’ve
seen how well that has worked.
2. Security corrupts realism- we don’t even have to win realism isn’t inevitable, our der derian
evidence as well as our link arguments prove that the construction of threats means that we
inevitably engage in conflicts with these countries.
3. It’s a construct- there’s no proof that realism is anything other than a flawed way of looking at the
world. Were The only ones giving reasons why it is a uniquely bad way of viewing the world
4. The alternative solves- Our Campbell evidence says that a deconstruction of the way we view
security means that we no longer view states as threats destroying any need for such a worldview.
5. Realism is dead – it relies on an outdate conception of state and lives on only as an institution
without any an intellectual grounding
James Der Derian (“A VIRTUAL THEORY OF GLOBAL POLITICS, MIMETIC WAR, AND THE SPECTRAL STATE” journal
of the theoretical humanities 4:2 1999)

The sovereign state, having outlived its original purpose to end feudal and religious violence and bring order to the seventeenth-
century Cosmopolis, has become equally spectral-dependent in its violent effects, haunting world polities and international politics
with the white-sheet rhetoric of fear and insecurity. It is not difficult to find empirical support for Derrida’s theoretical suspensions of
disbelief. Take, for example, current mimetic conjuring for the exorcism of internal spirits by invocations of external evils, like drugs,
immigration, and Islam; black magic shows of virtual violence through the simulacrum of war games; and "humanitarian"
intervention (like the UN in Bosnia - but not Rwanda) for performative acts of deterrence and compellence.
Moreover. Derrida takes the critique of sovereignty afield, going beyond his usual concern with logocentrism to explore how the
haunting of politics has moved from the bounded text of geopolitical specters to the practically borderless electromagnetic spectrum:
“And if this important frontier is being displaced, it is because the medium in which it is instituted, namely, the medium of the
media themselves (news. the press- telecommunications. techno-telediscursivity. techno-teleiconicity. that which in general
assures and determines the spacing of public space, the very possibility of the revelation and the phenomenality of the political),
this element itself is neither living nor dead, present nor absent: it speetralizes. It does not belong to ontology, to the discourse of
Being of beings, or to the essence of life or death. It requires, then, what we call, to save time and space rather than just to make
up a word, hauntology.”
Nietzsche and Derrida offer a penetrating critique of sovereignty, vet ... it lives, most demonstrably in international theory and
diplomatic state-craft, as, no less, the realist perspective. What do we mean by "realism"? It encompasses a world-view in which
sovereign states, struggling for power under conditions of anarchy, do what they must to maintain and promote their own self-interests.
But what do "we" mean by "realism"? We realists constituted by and representing disciplinary schools of thought, diplomatic corps,
intelligence bureau depict things as they really are, rather than as idealists might wish them to be. And what do "we" mean by "realism"?
We mean what we say and say what we mean. in that transparent way of correspondence that provides the veridical, deadly discourses of
realism, like mutual assured destruction assures our security. or "we had to destroy the village in order to save it."
But with the end of the Cold War, and pace Nietzsche, why beat a dead horse? Precisely because realism does death so well, by refusing
to acknowledge not only its ongoing complicity in tine death of others but also the fact that it gave up the ghost a long time ago. How
many times, after how many "revolutionary" transitions, have we heard that sovereignty is at bay, at an end, dead? There is always the
easy deflection, that sovereignty is an "essentially contested concept," - a "convenient fiction." that changes with the times. But the
frequency of such death-notices, from politicians, military strategists and pundits, as well as academicians, leads one to suspect that
something other than funerary oration, philosophical speculation, or a topic for it special issue is at work. Is there a darker, even gothic
side to the sovereign state, a bidden power which resides in its recurrent morbidity? Take a look at some of the principle necroses.
Realism has built a life out of the transformation of fictions, like the immutability of human nature and the apopoditic threat of anarchy,
into facticity. With a little digging, realism conies to resemble nothing so much as the undead, a perverse mimesis of the living other,
haunting international politics through the objectification of power, the fetishisation of weaponry, the idealization of the state, the
virtualization of violence, and the globalization of new media. Now the fact of its own dealth lives on as a powerful fiction, as the morbid
customs, characteristics, and habits of the living dead.

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6. Using the state as the starting point for its analysis, realism is unable to account for the accerating of
change present in modernity – in our virtual world, looking at discourses and their implications is a better
tool
James Der Derian (“A VIRTUAL THEORY OF GLOBAL POLITICS, MIMETIC WAR, AND THE SPECTRAL STATE” journal of
the theoretical humanities 4:2 1999)
In war, diplomacy, and the media, the real morphs with the virtual. Not even the state, the foundation of Real politick, is immune from
virtualization. Sovereignty, the primary means by which the supreme power and legitimate violence of the state is territorially fixed,
declared once, many-times dead, now seems only able to regain its vigor virtually, through media spawns which oppose ordered, identical
"heres" to external, alien "out-theres" through representations which are real in time, not space. Instant scandals, catastrophic
accidents, "live-feed" wars, and quick-in, quick-out interventions into still-born or moribund states provide the ephemeral.
virtual seuiblartce of sovereignty. Once upon a space, war was the ultimate reality-check of international politics; now,
seamlessly integrating battlefield simulations and public dissimulations through the convergence of PC and TV, war is
virtualized and commoditized as pure war, infowar, netwar, cyherwar. For the intractable problems of post-Cold War politics,
the technical fix has acquired a new lustre: primetime as well as C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence) networks bring us "virtual war"; beltway think-tanks and information technology industries promote a "virtual diplomacy."
And, according to a recent Time cover-story on high-finance, money verges toward the virtual: one financial expert emphatically states
that "the distinction between software and money is disappearing." to which a Citibank executive responds "it's revolutionary - and we
should be scared as hell." To be sure, questions of power and identity, space and borders, legitimacy and meaning will continue to be
framed by the necessitous narratives of personal and public security couched in the legal imperative of sovereignty. But in the new hyper-
realms of global politics produced by economic penetration, technological acceleration, and new media, these questions now entail virtual
investigations. Will the sovereign state become so spectral as to disappear all together, one more unholy relic for the museum of
modernity? Or will it re-emerge in global, virtual forms? Does globalization enhance the prospects of a democratic peace? Or does virtu-
alit ion assure the continuation of war by other means? Has Clausewitz been repudiated - or merely brought up to speed? Is virtuality
replacing the reality of war? Is it the harbinger of a new world order, or a brave new world? Most importantly, will processes of
virtualization help to close or to further open the gulf between those who have the technology and those who do not? New thinking often
lags behind transitions driven by new technologies, and, as Albert Einstein famously remarked about the atom bomb, the results can be
catastrophic. The virtual technologies of new media warrant a commensurate critical scrutiny. New media, generally identified as
digitized, interactive, networked forms of communication, now exercise a global effect if not ubiquitous presence, through instant video-
feeds, satellite link-ups, TI-T3 links, overhead surveillance, global mapping, distributed computer simulations, programmed trading, and
movies with Arnold Sehwarzenegger in them. Virtual media represent the most penetrating and sharpest - to the point of invisibility - edge
of globalization. The power of virtuality lies in its ability to collapse distance, between here and there, near and far, fact and fiction.
Moreover, the virtual effect of bringing "there" here in near real-time and with near-verisimilitude adds a strategic as well as comparative
advantage to the production of violence - what one futurist at a recent military conference referred to as the "fifth dimension" of global
warfare. However, like all complex systems, there is potential for catastrophe, from what organizational theorists call negitive synergy, of
the sort that produced a Three Mile Island or a Chernobyl. The spatialist, materialist - that is, realist - bias of thinking in international
theory renders it less than adequate for a critical inquiry into the temporal, representational, deterritorial, and potentially dangerous
powers of virtual technologies. Semiotic, critical, and discourse theories offer a better perspective, having led the way in tracing the
reconfiguration of power into new representational, immaterial forms. They have helped us to under-stand how acts of inscription and the
production of information tan reify consciousness, float signifiers, and render concepts undecidable. However, as the realities of
international politics increasingly are generated, mediated and simulated by successive technical means of reproduction, there is not so
much a distancing from some original, truth-bearing source as there is an implosion, where meaning disappears into a media black hole of
insignificance. As the globalization and virtualization of new media sunder meaning from conventional moorings, and set information
adrift as it moves with alacrity and celerity from phenomenal to virtual forms, one searches for new modes of understanding. Attenuated
by cant and deemed too popular for serious scholarship, the virtual has already become an academic taboo. All the more reason, I believe,
to extend the reach of critical approaches. Derrida and Nietzsche are valuable because they provide a philosophical perspective which
links public space with a responsive as well as responsible private space

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AT: Realism Inev-Humans
1. Not true- the idea that humans are biologically destined to be violent is ridiculous.

2. there have been plenty of movements and societies throughout history that have used non violent methods
to construct social change- our Campbell evidence indicates that a critical interrogation of how we’ve been
told to behave is necessary to solve.

3. Coviello indicates this is the internal link to our value life claims the idea that the state can set up social
structures where everyone is violent is exactly the reason why state violence is justified.

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AT: Realism Good
1. Realism is bad –
a. Our first Campbell card from the 1NC is a criticism of realist though. Campbell indicates that the
current realist mindset that the United States functions under is bad – he says that continuously
going out and trying to secure ourselves against the rest of the world leads to the destruction of
those who do not view the world in the same way that we do leading to an endless cycle of
biopolitical control and oppression
b. Realism causes an endless cycle of violence – through the realist construction of threats the state
allows itself to take whatever actions it deems necessary to prevent these threats from occurring
allow for a never ending apocalypse to occur – that’s coviello
c. Realism dictates that there will always be states to secure oneself against – Der Derian proves that
trying to predict threats leads to an endless cycle where we are constantly seeking out new threats
to secure our self against

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