Lusthaus: The Two Truths in Early Yogcra

The Two Truths (Savti-satya and Paramrtha-satya) in Early Yogcra1

Dan Lusthaus
Few Buddhist or Indian concepts are more familiar than the notion of two truths, paramrtha-satya and savti-satya, typically understood as ultimate and relative truths, or absolute and conventional truths. The modern understanding of these two truths is shaped by relatively late developments in Indian Buddhism (5th century or later), so that earlier formulations, or concurrent formulations have been eclipsed and receive little attention from scholars. To begin to remedy that, I offer the following exposition of how Asaga discusses the two truths in his works. Some initial considerations: (1) While the two truths do appear by name in many Yogcra texts, sometimes at strategic junctures, their role in Yogcra thinking is not nearly as prominent or foundational as in some other Buddhist schools, such as other forms of Mahyna, notably Madhyamaka. (2) While many different types of distinctions between two truths can be found in the full range of Buddhist literature, especially amongst the bhidharmikasand Yogcra usage reflects many of these (sometimes with new twists)the not insubstantial scholarly literature on the subject of the two truths tends to focus on a narrow range of interpretations, namely the trajectory stemming from Ngrjunas Mla-madhyamakakrik ch. 24, most notably k.10.2 That trajectory has become the dominant metonymy for Buddhist two-truth theory, leading to the presupposition that all other Buddhist usages of the two-truths either fit within the discourse of this trajectory (and thus one can interpret them from the vantage point of the extent to which they share the concerns and sensibilities of Madhyamaka and its offshoots), or they are atavistic prefigurings in search of the sophisticated developments of this trajectory. (3) Since Yogcra usage reflects a much broader spectrum of twotruth theories, much of what it says about them is susceptible to misunderstanding when viewed reductively through the prism of that

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metonymy. Scholars are aware that prior to and outside this trajectory other versions of two-truth theory occurred, but detailed study of these remains more a desideratum than an established set of data from which to perform analyses. Consequently, Yogcra deployment of two-truth theory has tended to be either analyzed in terms of its relation to the metonymy (e.g., the relation between two-truths and trisvabhva theories), or viewed as an appendage, possibly aberrant, to the metonymy, or, because of all the unfamiliar and thus seemingly incongruous usages, those passages reflecting understandings outside the metonymy have been largely ignored. To remedy this, a fuller accounting of alternate applications of two-truth theory in Buddhism would be necessary, something which, in a modest, limited way, I shall try to do in this paper. (4) By achieving a central and foundational status, the metonymic version of the two-truth theory engenders a finite set of familiar philosophemes which can be made to undergo permutations that the tradition and scholars can recount, reiterate and re-parse endlessly. Reducing all of Buddhism to two, and only two truths, everything must be made to fit into one or the other truth. Alternate analytic pairs, such as dravya-sat vs. prajaptisat, are devalued, or atrophy, or are simply reduced to operations within the lower truth. Deeming one of the two truths to be higher and the other lower, obvious issues include: What makes one higher than the other? Which of the countless Buddhist models, doctrines and practices are to be sorted into which truth? Is the lower truth good, bad, both or neither? What relation, if any, obtains between both truths, and how specifically does that work? If, as was the tendency within Mahyna (Yogcra included), the highest truth loses all or most of its concrete content, characterized as being beyond predication or meaningful articulation, what sort of truth does this contentless abstraction represent, or can it even serve a representational function? Some of the Yogcra passages to be discussed below make contributions to such questions, but perhaps we may notice additional dimensions as well. (5) Taking all the above into account, doing justice to how Yogcra actually used two-truth theory and the terms associated with it (savti, vyavahra, paramrtha, sat, satya) runs the risk of offering something that seems out of synch with current academic discussions. The most common strategy for sidestepping this (as mentioned in 3 above) is to substitute ones own theorizing for the apparent lack of interest in theorizing about the two truths in Yogcra, providing them with 102

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an argument they themselves never made, while implying that they themselves implied just such a theory. When the two truths are compared to the three natures, that is precisely what is being done. 3 As interesting as such speculation might be, it merely reinforces the metonymic version of two-truth theory, and leaves neglected much of what Yogcra texts themselves do have to say about these terms, which, while less familiar, is not without interest for understanding Buddhist thinking. Therefore what follows is not an argument proffered in the name of Yogcra, nor a metaargument that judges the aptness of Yogcra twotruths thinking. Instead passages typical of early Yogcra usage have been collected in an effort to indicate some of what went on in twotruth thinking beyond the metonymic version. To proceed, a series of observations about the use of the two truths by Yogcras will be offered, accompanied by representational passages from the Yogcra literature. I will primarily focus on the writings of Asaga, since it is there that we may catch a glimpse of the formative stages of Yogcra two-truth discourse. A quick survey of some abhidharma ideas on the two truths will be undertaken since they, more so than the more familiar Madhyamakan frames, provide important contextual background for recognizing what is going on in the Yogcra usage. I will, nonetheless, propose an alternate way to interpret Ngrjunas discussion in MMK 24 that may be closer to what he had in mind before the metonymic version eclipsed all competing models.

I. To privilege or not to privilege the Two Truths

One of the first things one notices in surveying Yogcra literature is that the pair savti-paramrtha is not an indissoluble dyad. Each term can not only be found without the other term anywhere in the vicinity, but each can be found as a component of different lists, some recurring more often than others. To be sure, the pair does occur as a pair and some examples of that will be discussed below. Both paramrtha and savti, however, are often individually included in classificatory lists that omit the other term. Significantly, in Asagas writings when the two are paired they are always denoted as paramrtha and savti, never vyavahra. Vyavahra taken in the metonymic version as an interchangeable synonym for savti4 is one of a group of terms used by Asaga for issues related to the conventional use of language, but it is never paired with paramrtha as far as I can tell.5 (Ill return to this later.) 103

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Even when the two-truth pair savti-paramrtha appear in tandem, thepair is often not treated as either central or foundational, but becomes relativized among other evaluative categories and even other types of truths (satya). One of the more striking examples of this is a passage in the Bodhisattvabhmi section of the Yogcrabhmi that asks:
How is the Dharma nominally set up with names (= words, nma) (nma-dharma-prajapti-vyavasthnam)? That refers to what was said by the Buddha in the twelve divisions of the scriptures6, such as the stras, etc. Next came the Buddhist Councils.7 Next, [Buddhas sayings] were codified.8 Next, they were promulgated.9 This is how the Dharma was nominally set up with names (=words). How is truth (satya) nominally set up in names (= words)? In innumerable ways.10 For instance: Setting up One Truth: That means no falsity, since there is only one truth without a second. Or, setting up Twofold Truth: (1) savti-satya and (2) paramrthasatya. Or setting up Threefold Truth: (1) Truth through definitions (lakaa), (2) truth in speech (vk), and (3) truth in activities (kriy). Or Fourfold Truth: (1) Truth of suffering (dukha), (2) Truth of etiology (samudaya), (3) Truth of cessation (nirodha), and (4) Truth of the Way (mrga).11 Or Fivefold Truth: (1) Truth of cause, (2) Truth of effect, (3) Truth of knowing (jna), (4) Truth of the known (jeya),12 and (5) Foremost Truth (agrya-satya). Or Sixfold Truth: (1) Truth of truth (satya-satya), (2) truth of the false (m-satya), (3) truth that will be fully understood (parijeya satya), (4) truth of what will be forever extinguished (prahtavya satya), (5) truth of direct realization (sktkartavya satya), and(6) truth of cultivation (bhvayitavya satya). Or Sevenfold Truth: (1) truth of savoring the enjoyable (svda satya), (2) truth of misfortune (dnava satya), (3) truth of going forth (into the Buddhist life)(nisarana-satya), (4) truth of dharmahood (dharmat-satya), (5) truth of liberation (adhimukti-satya), (6) the Noble Truths, and (7) the non-Noble Truths. Or Eightfold Truth: (1) truth of suffering as due to conditioning (saskra-dukhat-satya), (2) truth of suffering as due to change (viparima-dukhat-satya), (3) truth of suffering due to suffering (dukha-dukhat-satya), (4) truth of ongoing processes (pravttisatya), (5) truth of bringing processes to an end (nivttisatya),

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Lusthaus: The Two Truths in Early Yogcra (6) truth of adventitious defilements (saklea-satya), (7) truth of purity (vyavadna-satya), and (8) truth of correctly applied practices (samyak-prayoga-satya). Or Ninefold Truth: (1) truth of impermanence, (2) truth of suffering, (3) truth of emptiness, (4) truth of no-self, (5) truth of [the relation between the prattya-samutpda links] Ongoing (bhava) and Desire (t), (6) truth of non-Ongoing and non-desire, (7) truth of expedient means to eliminate those, (8) truth of nirva with remainder, and (9) truth of nirva without remainder. Or Tenfold Truth: (1) truth of oppressive suffering, (2) truth of prestigious wealth and poverty as suffering, (3) truth of suffering from an imbalance of elements, (4) truth of suffering from the dissolution of what is pleasant, (5) truth of suffering from the gross [impediments] (dauhulya-dukha-satya), (6) truth of karma, (7) truth of klea, (8) truth of careful thinking about the Correct-Dharma one has heard (tath-ravaa-yonio-manaskra-satya),13 (9) truth of Right View, and (10) truth of the fruit of Right View. In such ways do Bodhisattvas nominally set up truths in words (nma). You should know that such distinctions can be extended without limit (aprama).14

So there are potentially innumerable truths, with the set savtiparamrtha only being one of them. There are several interesting dimensions to the way Asaga formulates this. The question arises in a section of the Yogcrabhmi that explicitly examines the question of how language works a concern that Asaga repeatedly returns to. Here Asaga is asking how truth is constructed or transferred over to words (nma). His preamble clearly frames it as asocial process, a process of group construction of conventions. Buddha speaks. That is only the first step. That speech is grouped into various categories, worked over through a variety of processes, collected, collated, edited, codified, modified, and made communicative by groups of people, such as Buddhist Councils. And unlimited numbers or configurations of truths can be extracted and codified, put into words, on that basis. Truth(s), when put into words, including the two truths, are conventions. The insightful bodhisattva can generate them ad infinitum. They are truths to the extent that they communicate, via conventions, communally, some sense of Buddhas understanding, which he himself initially put into words in the same manner, since language is precisely engaging in conventionality par excellence.

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Lest we be tempted to assume too quickly that when mentioning the two truths this passage is evoking the metonymic version, or that the twotruth pair appearing so high up on the list indicates a near-primacy rather than mere enumerative order, we now turn to the first chapter of the second of two parts of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, appropriately entitled Satyavinicaya (determination of truth), though satya here denotes the Four Noble Truths, which are the subject of this chapter. Discussing the first Noble Truth, suffering (dukha), Asaga lists eight kinds of suffering:15
[1] suffering of birth (jtidukha), [2] of aging (jar), [3] of disease (vydhi), [4] of death (maraa), [5] suffering associated with what is unpleasant (apriyasamprayoga), [6] suffering of separation from what is pleasant (priyaviprayoga), [7] suffering if one does not obtain what one desires (yad apcchan na labhate), and [8] in brief (sakiptena) the five aggregates of attachment (pacopdnaskandha)

Asaga then provides further explanations for each of the eight, followed by a list of six types of suffering16 to which, he says, the eight can be reduced. Whether six or eight, it is the same thing (Boin-Webb, 2001, 85; a samnny aau bhavanti; ). This is followed with the well-known list of three types of suffering: mere suffering (dukha-dukhat), suffering caused by transformation (viparimadukhat), and suffering caused by conditioning (saskra-dukhat). He explains:
The eight kinds of suffering are included in them the sufferings of birth, aging, disease, death and association with what is unpleasant are mere sufferings; the sufferings of separation from what is pleasant and not obtaining what one desires are suffering caused by transformation; in brief, the five aggregates of attachment are suffering as suffering caused by conditioning. (Boin-Webb, 2001, 85)

The two-truth pair now make their brief appearance in this chapter.
It is said that there are two forms of suffering: suffering according to conventional truth (savtisatya) and suffering according to ultimate truth (paramrthasatya). What is suffering according to conventional truth and what is suffering according to ultimate truth? From the suffering of birth up to thesuffering of not obtaining what one desires those are

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Lusthaus: The Two Truths in Early Yogcra suffering according to conventional truth. In brief, the five aggregates of attachment are suffering that is suffering according to ultimate truth. (Ibid.)

It is worth pointing out that the introduction of the two truths is prefaced by it is said that (yad ukta dvividhe dukhe iti, ), framing what is to follow as thoroughly enmeshed in language and retelling. Asaga is often very sensitive to the interplay of language and that towards which language purports to point. That is the main theme of the Tattvrtha chapter of the Bodhisattvabhmi. As well see in a moment, distinguishing between vastu, prajapti, dravya, etc., are crucial to his analysis. Alsoworthy of note is that in the passage just cited Paramrthasatya is given clear and specific content, viz., the five appropriational skandhas (skandha-updna) which Asaga had just explained are synonymous with saskra-dukhat, suffering caused by conditioning. This indicates that paramrtha signifies a type of discourse or understanding that points to what, below the obvious surface, is actually transpiring. It is language speaking with precision and true accuracy. The first seven types of dukha are ways of thinking about dukha; theeighth, the dynamics of the five appropriational skandhas thatis, the way a person is is, at bottom, what dukha is, the first seven merely indicating facets of those skandhas. The first seven still contain traces of selfhood thinking (whats pleasant to me, my goals, obstructions to me, etc.); the eighth indicates purely impersonal processes driven by appropriation (updna). Paramrtha here has specific content, namely the appropriational dynamics of the skandhas. To see things from that perspective is to see things as they are. This, as well see, is not an uncommon usage. However, Asaga elsewhere will undermine this type of application of paramrtha-satya. We will return to this as well. Finally, and this is perhaps the most significant point to take away from this passage, the two truths are explicitly treated as reductive forms of discourse that are not intended to replace or eclipse the other models (the eight, six and threefold enumerations), but are merely summations, shorthand (sakiptena) from which the other models may be extrapolated at any time. This illustrates the point made in the Yogcrabhmi passage about the ten truths, namely that Dharma-speech can expand or contract, 107

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as the need arises. The implication seems to be that the deeper ones understanding, the less that needs to be said or enumerated. But given the imperative to benefit others that is one of the signature notions of Mahyna, the ability to expand and enumerate on concise doctrinal statements is indispensable. Truths can be extrapolated, or they can be reductive. One might say that savti-satya and paramrtha-satya in this case are both cases of vyavahra. Savti and/or paramrtha are commonly found listed along with additional sat-s or satyas. For instance, the final section of the Yogcrabhmi states:
Briefly it is said that there are three types of existents (sat). (1)dravyasat, (2) prajapti-sat, and paramrtha-sat. (T.30.1579.878c19-21)

The passage goes on to define dravya-sat as the denotative use of language through which a thing (vastu) can be obtained or realized (*adhi gam). A dravya is explained as a thing or process that is always actually operating, to which such words refer. For instance, rpa, and so on, amongst groups of dharmas ().17 According to this passage, things such as vehicles, forests, grass, trees, robes, food can be denoted this way. Prajapti-sat consists of six types: (1) prajapti of a group (*smagr-prajapti), (2) prajapti as cause (hetu-prajapti), (3) prajapti as effect (phala-prajapti), (4) prajapti of what has been done, (5) prajapti of situations (*avasth-prajapti), and (6) positing something where it is not present (*apekprajapti).18 After explaining each of the six in greater detail, it asks:
What is paramrtha-sat? It is that from which all language and all prajaptis are forever eliminated, it is apart from conceptual proliferation (prapaca) and apart from conceptual construction (kalpan). It is expressed through skillful means (upya-kaualya) [bysuch terms as] dharmat, tathat, bhtakoi, nyat, nairtmya, and so on, as [was discussed in] the Bodhisattvabhmi, in the Tattvrtha [chapter], concerning the fourth type (of knowledge of real things),19 viz. the cognitive sphere completely purified of obstructions to theknowable (jeyvaraa) [attained by high-level Bodhisattvas and

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Lusthaus: The Two Truths in Early Yogcra Buddhas] (jeyvaraa-viuddhi-jna-gocara). You should know that images (*nimitta) of it are contradictory to the higher (truth). You ought to know it is not an existent.20 100 (T.30.1579.879a20-25)

We notice that savti did not appear in this discussion instead dravya-sat and prajapti-sat accompany paramrtha-sat. Paramrthasat can be articulated, via expedient means, through synonyms, such as tathat, dharmat, etc. Such strings of synonyms for paramrtha are common occurrences in Asagas texts, perhaps the best known example being the synonyms (paryya) for nyat in Madhynta-vibhga 1:15: tathat bhtakotica-animittam paramrthat | dharmadhtuca paryya nyat samsata (In sum, the synonyms for emptiness are tathat, the limits of reality [bhtakoi], animitta, paramrthat, and dharmadhtu.) Prefiguring Digngas definition of perception as thoroughly excluding all forms of language and conceptualization (kalpanpoha), Asaga here offers the same exclusions to define paramrtha-sat, adding prapaca, prajapti, and language as a whole to the list of exclusions. The cross-reference to the Tattvrtha chapter is intriguing, since not only does Asaga define there the type of purified cognition available only to bodhisattvas and Buddhas (and not to rvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, or others) namely the fourth type he refers to here but the entire chapter is concerned with the relation between language (prajapti, artha, etc.) and non-linguistic, non-conceptual realities (tattva, dravya, vastu, etc.). He emphasizes more than once that all Buddhist discourse, up to and including terms such as mah-parinirva, is prajapti. Atthe same time he firmly rejects nominalism, encouraging us to cognize beyond linguistic-conceptuals in order to see tattvas as they truly are but in anon-dual manner that doesnt reject the linguistic sphere. Hence the chapters title: tattva + artha, things and the words that refer to them. One or the other term savti or paramrtha can also be used without the other in different evaluative lists or mtks. For instance, in Abhidharmasamuccaya Asaga uses the following thirteen items as anevaluative mtk for determining aspects of kuala (beneficial karmic 109

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activity), in which paramrtha is the fifth item: distinct nature (svabhva), connections (sambandha), outcome (anubandha), emergence (utthna), ultimate significance (paramrtha), attaining birth (upapattilbha), application (prayoga), veneration (puraskra), granting favor (anugraha), receiving (parigraha), counteracting (pratipaka), tranquility (upasama) and the result that flows from a process (niyanda). Each is applied to kuala. For instance: What is favorable [kuala] by nature? The eleven mental associates (caittas) beginning with faith (raddh),21 i.e.,theeleven kuala caittas of the Yogcra list of dharmas.22 What is kuala as outcome? Its own habitual tendencies (vsan). And so on. For paramrtha, Asaga states: What is favorable as ultimate reality? It is suchness (tathat).23 A slightly shorter and slightly different list is used to analyze akuala (non-beneficial): distinct nature (svabhva), connections (sambandha), outcome (anubandha), emergence (utthna), ultimate significance (paramrtha), attaining birth (upapattilbha), application (prayoga), veneration (puraskra), offending (upaghta), receiving (parigraha), counter-case (vipaka), and obstructive adversity (paripantha). For instance: What is akuala as outcome? Its own habitual tendencies (vsan). For paramrtha, Asaga asks: What is akuala as ultimate reality? The whole continuity of existence (sarva-sasra).24 The same type of mtk is then applied to the karmically neutral (avykta). What is neutral as ultimate reality? Space (ka) and cessation without acquired knowledge (apratisakhy-nirodha).25 The paramrtha (ultimate significance or goal) of kuala is tathat; the paramrtha (ultimate referent) of akuala is the entirety of sasra; andwhat avykta figuratively implies in an ultimate sense are concepts of the unconditioned as neutrality, non-obstructive, non-productive, such as ka and apratisakhy-nirodha. Another example: Using a fivefold distinction (nimitta, nma, vikalpa, tathat, jna), Asaga, in the Yogcrabhmi (fascicle 72), asks whether each of these should be called savti-sat or paramrtha-sat. But before asking about the familiar two satyas, he asks whether they should be considered existent or nonexistent (sat or asat), and then whether each is dravya-sat or prajapti-sat.

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Lusthaus: The Two Truths in Early Yogcra [Sat or Asat?] Q: Should a nimitta be called an existent (sat) or a nonexistent (asat)? A: It should be called an existent. Q: As to what is established because of positing (prajapti) self-natures (svabhva) or particularity (viea), should this be called an existent? A: It should be called a nonexistent. Q: As to discriminating the range of experienced objects (, *gocara, *criylambana), should this be called an existent? A: Such should be called existent. For a bodhisattva who possesses the nature (for attaining Buddhahood), because he has attained skillfulness ( *kaualya, *kuala), there are images (nimitta) that are analyticallyperceived ( *vykaraa, *vy kt) as existent, analyticallyperceived as nonexistent, analytically-perceived as both existent and nonexistent, and analytically-perceived as neither existent nor nonexistent. Because he analytically-perceives in this way, he is far from the two extremes of increase or decrease, and so practices the middle way; the dharmadhtu is [the cognitive range] for his skill. Q: This image (nimitta) when considered as a referent (artha) of language, should it be called existent? When considered as a referent apart from language, should it be called existent? A: Both referents should be called existent. Why? If language is set up and stable (pada-sthna), such that referents (are apprehended) by means of language, then one should say (the referent) is existent. If [one realizes] that the designation of a self-nature (svabhva-prajapti) or the designation of a particular ( viea-prajapti) refers to [self-natures and particularites as] unconsummated (aparinipanna),26 just in this way the referent that is separate from language should be called existent. Q: Should suchness (tathat) and correct cognition (jna) be called existent or non-existent? A: They should be called existent. [Dravya-sat or prajapti-sat?] Q: Should nimittas be called dravya-sat or prajapti-sat? A: During [certain] practices they should be called dravya-sat. During [certain other] practices they should be called prajapti-sat. There are nimittas of both types. Q: Should name (= word, nma) be called dravya-sat or prajapti-sat? A: It should be called prajapti-sat since it is only nominally posited of the nimitta.

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Q: A: Q: A: Q: A:

Should vikalpa be called dravya-sat or prajapti-sat? It is both types of sat. Should tathat be called dravya-sat or prajapti-sat? It should be called dravya-sat, since it is classified as paramrtha. Should correct cognition (jna) be called dravya-sat or prajapti-sat? It should be called both sat-s. As to these, [correct] cognition [itself] is dravya-sat. If the cognition entails classifying citta and caittas, naming them as cognition, [etc.,] then call it prajapti. Hence [cognition] possesses both types of sat.

[Savti-sat or paramrtha-sat?] Q: Should nimittas be called savti-sat or paramrtha-sat? A: Nimittas should be called savti due to two causes and conditions: (1) Because they produce adventitious defilements (gantuka-klea); (2)because [they stimulate] the positing (*prajapti) of a representational [realm] based on utilitarian value (bhjana). Q: Should nma be called savti-sat or paramrtha-sat? A: It should be called savti-sat due to three causes and conditions: (1) Because it produces adventitious defilements; (2) because [it stimulates] the positing of a representational [realm] based on utilitarian value; (3) because it is the basis (raya) of figurative language ( *vk, *upacra, *prajapti, *abhidhna, *vyavahra, etc.). Q: Should vikalpa be called savti-sat or paramrtha-sat? A: It should be called savti-sat due to four causes and conditions: (1) Because it produces adventitious defilements (gantuka-klea); (2) because [it stimulates] the positing (*prajapti) of a representational [realm] based on utilitarian value (bhjana); (3) because proclivities (anuaya) are consequent on conventional language (vyavahra), (4) because Awakening (prati-buddh; vibuddhi) is consequent to conventional language (vyavahra). Q: Should tathat be called savti-sat or paramrtha-sat? A: It should be called paramrtha-sat since it is a pure cognitive object (*lambana-viayatva).27 Q: Should correct cognition (jna) be called savti-sat or paramrtha-sat? A: The first cognition [which simply and directly sees the object] is called paramrtha-sat; the second cognition [which reflects on and conceptually analyzes the components of the initial cognition] should be called both sat-s.28

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II. Language: Savti, vyavahra, prajapti, sketa, etc.

Prajapti is a wide-ranging term, deployed in multifarious ways with many different meanings and implications. As above, it can be contrasted with dravya (a real process that is in some sense irreducible, notasubstance). Prajapti may indicate a composite of distinct dravyas conflated under a single umbrella term or concept, such as conflating the five skandhas into a single person (pudgala), or conflating wheel, axle, etc., into a chariot. By this definition, any whole composed of parts is a prajapti. Prajapti can also signify a purely nominal entity that exists in name only, such as an eternal, invariant self (tman). Sometimes texts distinguish between prajapti and savti, since, despite both involving and being implicated in language to some extent, dravyasat may also be savti; in such instances, since dravya and prajapti are mutually exclusive, obviously prajapti-sat would be excluded. Since, sometimes, prajapti is used in certain Buddhist texts as asynonym for vyavahra, and prajapti is differentiated from savti, one may speculate that a distinction between savti and vyavahra was also assumed or possible, though I havent found a passage in aYogcra text that makes this fully explicit. Nonetheless, the two-truths, forYogcra, are just two of many truths, as shown above. In the cintmay-bhmi of the Yogcrabhmi, Asaga defines speech using linguistic signs (sketika vda) thus:
Speech whose conventions are shared by the multitude (sketiko vdah),29 is sixfold: (1) features of things (vastu-lakaa), (2) features of the known (vijeya-lakaa), (3) features of purity, etc., (ubhdilakaa), (4) pleasant, etc., features (anugrahdi-lakaa), (5) features of conventional language (vyavahra-lakaa), and (6) features of false assumptions (mithypratipattydi-lakaa).

Linguistic signs can be used to articulate and give linguistic form to actual things (vastu); what one is conscious of (vijeya); notions of purity and impurity (ubhubha); evaluative judgements such as deeming certain things to be pleasant, unpleasant, etc.; discussions of language itself as the common medium of communication; and as a means for giving ones false assumptions, presuppositions and opinions the illusion 113

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of reality. Signs (sketa), in other words, entail a spectrum stretching from discussing actual things, to analyzing and evaluating such articulated things, togiving life to erroneous ideas (as well as the tools for analyzing why those ideas are erroneous). As Asaga explains this:
Features of things (vastu-lakaa) are grasped by consciousness (vijna). Features of the known (vijeya-lakaa) are grasped by focusing attention (manaskra) arising from consciousness. The pure and wondrous, etc., is grasped by contact (spara); the pleasant, etc., isgrasped by pleasure-pain sensation (vedan); conventional linguistic marks (vyavahra-nimitta-lakaa) are grasped by associativecognizance (sajn); and the features of false assumptions are grasped by volition (cetan). 30

Five of the six graspers mentioned here (manaskra, spara, vedan, sajn, and cetan) are the five sarvatraga caittas, that is, the mental associates that are always active in every and any cognition. The remaining grasper, consciousness (vijna), would be classified as a citta dharma, not a caitta. Here we have an example of vyavahra appearing in a list that has no obvious link to the two truths. Importantly, vyavahra is linked with sajn, which besides its well-known use as the third of the five skandhas (and, as is obvious, the five sarvatraga caittas echo the five skandhas, replacing vijna with manaskra and rpa with spara), always carries linguistic connotations in Asagas texts, drawing on, amongst other things, the sense of sajn developed in the Pinian grammatical system. By associating not only consciousness, but each of the sarvatraga caittas with sketa, Asaga informs us that many levels of our cognitive processes are always poised to grasp linguistic signs. Sketa is only one type of language usage, the sharing of conventional signs. Sketa here is not a subset of vyavahra; it is the other way around: vyavahra is a subset of sketa. Vyavahra, which is a term Asaga uses often, appears in numerous models similar to this one, in a variety of configurations with other terms; but never, as far as Ive discovered, paired with paramrtha as the second truth.

III. Vyavahra and savti / sammuti

As previously mentioned Ngrjuna in MMK treats vyavahra and savti as synonyms or does he? Might the vyavahra in the famous MMK 24:10 be a sub-category of savti (i.e., a deliberate echo of 114

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the ali ammuti), reiterated from the opponents evocation of savyavahr P s at 24:6?31 Ngrjuna repeats the opponents term sarva-savyavahr at MMK 24:36, turning the opponents criticism back on the opponent with nearly the same language used by the opponent. Non-madhyamakan literature, including Yogcra texts, suggests that it might. Here are the passages in MMK 24 in which either vyavahra or savti appear:
nyat phalasadbhvam adharma dharmam eva ca | sarvasavyavahr ca laukikn pratibdhase || MMK 24:6 [The opponent complains:] Your emptiness is an assault on the actual existence of the fruit [of practice], and even on adharma and dharma (improper and proper actions), as well as all the conventions of the world. dve satye samupritya buddhn dharmadean | lokasavtisatya ca satya ca paramrthata || MMK 24:8 [Ngrjuna replies] The teaching of the Dharma of the Buddhas is entirely based on two truths; worldly conventional truth (loka-savti-satya) and the ultimately true. vyavahram anritya paramrtho na deyate | paramrtham angamya nirva ndhigamyate || MMK 24:10 Without vyavahra as a basis, paramrtha cannot be taught; if paramrtha is not realized, nirva will not be ultimately realized. sarvasavyavahrca laukikn pratibdhase | yatprattyasamutpdanyat pratibdhase || MMK 24:36|| You are assaulting all the conventions of the world if you assault the emptiness [related to] conditioned co-arising (prattya-samutpda).

In other words, Ngrjuna contends, it is not emptiness that threatens the everyday world of conventions, the moral (dharma and adharma) codes and sensibilities that these conventions entail, nor the actual attainment of the fruit of practice; emptiness understood in terms of conditioned coarising contextualizes, but never destroys them. It is failing to properly understand conditioned co-arising and emptiness that threatens the peaceful fulfillments of the ordinary world.

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It may be significant that vyavahra is not explicitly called atruth (satya) in these passages. The text never says vyavahra-satya. Only savti, inits single appearance in MMK at MMK 24:8c, is called savti-satya. If and this is merely speculation vyavahra and savti were not isomorphic synonyms for Ngrjuna, but rather vyavahra was a subset of savti, just talk that communicates, as it were, then not only its pedagogic value, but its necessity, even for Madhyamakas own debate method, suddenly becomes clearer. As is well known, savti is a distortive Sanskritization of the Pali term sammuti, which, like the Pali vohra (Skt. vyavahra), meansconventional discourse. While some have traced explicit discussions of the nirukta of savti as covered or enveloped only to Candrakrti (7th8th century), that interpretation is already discussed in the Mahvibh. As Dhammajoti (2007, 95 n.33) notes: Already in the MV (548b), we are told that the Grammarians (abdika) take this to be from v, to cover: This savti-satya is concealed by ajna, like that which is inside a vessel is concealed/covered by the vessel. The Sanskrit Buddhist tradition generally interprets it in terms of sa + vt/v. Thisetymology is also found in Yogcra-related texts. 32

IV Conventions and Abhidharma .

Yogcra texts deploy the two truths in accord with the conventions of various literatures. The early Yogcra literature (e.g., Asaga) more often than not tends to follow abhidharma usages. Yogcra uses the two truths (alone or in conjunction with additional truths) in different ways in different passages, reflecting the sources of the ideas and models they are adopting. So a study of Yogcra usage should also be a study of the different usages by different Buddhist schools and literatures over time. (I will not attempt a comprehensive survey here, however, but will give a few illustrations of shifting meanings.) Since the excellent study of Sarvstivda Abhidharma by Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti (2007) contains much pertinent material, I take the liberty of quoting it at length:
Succinctly, an bhidharmika is one who specializes in the abhidharma and takes the abhidharma as the final authority. For him, the abhidharma

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Lusthaus: The Two Truths in Early Yogcra is definitive (lkaika) and represents the true intention of the Buddha, taught at the level of absolute truth (paramrtha-satya), with fully drawn out meanings (ntrtha). In contrast, the stra-s do not represent the Buddhas true intention (bhipryika). They generally represent the expedient (aupacrika) teachings whose meanings are yet to be fully drawn out (neyrtha). (Dhammajoti, 18-19)

This is an extremely important issue, not just for Abhidharma but for Yogcra as well. Above all, the two truths serve as a value system, a prioritizing of some things over other things. Savti and paramrtha are evaluative labels, for things in general, but most especially for the components of Buddhist doctrine. The value or degree of definitiveness the truths assign are not necessarily ontological though their use doesnt exclude ontological determinations either. Nonetheless, they are not limited to ontological concerns. The Yogcrabhmi, and indeed many Yogcra texts, are more concerned with linguistic issues, linguistic-conceptual problems and their solutions, the relation of words (nma) to real things (vastu), etc. Certain teachings, models, concepts, etc., aredeemed definitive, of the highest order, while others are given a lower, provisional status. Hence savti and paramrtha are also synonymous with or parallel to the pair ntrtha (explicit) and neyrtha (implicit), especially when in hermeneutic contexts. Put another way, savti and paramrtha are themselves hermeneutic labels for evaluating how specific items and qualities treated within the variety of Buddhist teachings are to be classified and hierachized, and as such are synonymous in function to the neyrtha-ntrtha distinction (some texts make this explicit33). Which of the teachings are provisional, and which are definitive? As the sprawling mass of Buddhist literature and its proliferating categories exploded exponentially, generating countless new models and doctrinal enumerations, many of which did not fit well or easily with other models, finding keys to how to make all cases of buddhavacana accord with each other became an increasingly urgent matter. Is prattya-samutpda understood as the twelve links a provisional or definitive teaching? Which interpretation of prattya-samutpda was most accurate and best accounted for things as they are? Which teachings were primarily therapeutic expedients that served as transitional considerations (transitioning to a higher or deeper understanding)? Teachings that one school considered definitive, anothermight declare merely transitional. 34 In short, the savti-paramrtha distinction is less

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about levels of reality or even levels of epistemological approaches, and rather is about classification of Buddhist doctrine by Buddhists. That entailed questions of the reality described by various Buddhist teachings and those perspectives which were condoned or rejected or given provisional status, and even allowed for unsayable realities that resisted rational articulation (another gift from the Vtsputryas). For each type of Buddhism, paramrtha finally stands for the definitive statement by a thinker or school on what ultimately is the case and goal of Buddhist thinking and practice. To attain full enlightenment is to realize paramrtha. Everything else is savti, and any goal wrongly envisioned as paramrtha will lead to less than fully satisfactory consequences.
[Quoting Saghabhadras Nyynusara:] By stra is meant that which subsumes and contains all the words which accord with the firm principles of both the savti- and paramrtha-satya-s. Stra-s in this sense are either discoursed by the Buddha or the disciples, for [the latter] discoursed because [the content was] approved by theBuddha.35 (Dhammajoti, 21)

Buddhas speech is both savti and paramrtha. The same is true of the subsequent formulations and reformulations by his disciples, and by extension, all subsequent clear-thinking Buddhists. By declaring the stras to contain both types of truth, Saghabhadra is inviting us to engage them as a hermeneutic enterprise. Dhammajoti (p. 16 n.14) writes: AKB [Abhidharmakoa-bhya] 459. Also cf. MV [Mahvibh] 917c, where the Saddharma is subdivided into the conventional and the absolute (paramrtha) ones. The former comprises the verbal teachings of the tripiaka; the latter is the noble path, i.e., the outflow-free indriya, bla, bodhyaga and the mrgga.36 Here, as we saw in one of the examples from Asagas Abhidharmasamuccaya, paramrtha refers to specific doctrinal content, content that should be taken as ultimately true. Dhammajoti translates the following discussion in Mahvibh on the relation between the two truths:
Question: Is the fact of conventionality (; *savtitva?) in the conventional [truth] existent from the standpoint of the absolute truth or is it non-existent from the standpoint of the absolute truth?...

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Lusthaus: The Two Truths in Early Yogcra Answer: It should be said that the fact of conventionality in the conventional [truth] is existent from the standpoint of the absolute truth. If the fact of conventionality in the conventional [truth] is/ would be non-existent from the standpoint of the absolute truth, then the Buddhas discourse on the two truths would be false Question: If so, there should be only one truth, the absolute truth. Answer: There indeed is only one truth, the absolute truth. Question: If so, why are two truths established? Answer: The two truths are established in terms of differences in perspective (; different reasons), not in terms of substance [ vastu]: In terms of substance, there is only one truth, the absolute truth; in terms of difference in perspective, two types [oftruth] are established. The absolute truth is not established from the same perspective from which the conventional truth is established. Theconventional truth is not established from the same perspective as the absolute truth Question: Is it also possible to designate the conventional and the absolute as being each distinct, without the two mingled? Answer: It can also be so designated. How is this? According to Venerable Vasumitra: The word that reveals is conventional; thedharma that is revealed is absolute. He states further: thatwhich accords with conventional usage37 is conventional [savti]; that which accords with what the ryas say is absolute. According to the Bhadanta: The speech generated from a thought that not untrue, speaking of things like sentient beings, vase, garment, etc., isconventional truth. The speech generated from a thought that is not untrue, speaking of principles such as conditioned co-arising, etc., isabsolute truth. 38 (Dhammajoti, 78f; square brackets mine)

Dhammajoti (pp. 79-80) translates the distinction that the Abhidharmakoabhya draws between savti and paramrtha thus:
That, the buddhi of which does not arise when it is broken into parts (avayavao bhinne), is conventionally existent; for instance, a pot. For therein, when it is broken into pieces, the buddhi of a pot does not arise. And therein, when the [constituent] dharma-s [of a thing] are mentally removed (apohya), the buddhi of it does not arise that too is to be understood as a conventionally existent; for instance, water.

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For therein, when the dharma, rpa, etc., are removed mentally, thebuddhi of water does not arise. A conventional notion (savti-sajn) is made with regard to those very things. Thus, those saying that a pot or water exists by virtue of convention speak truly and not falsely; thus this is conventional truth (savtisatya). 39 Absolute truth (paramrthasatya) is other than this. Therein, evenwhen [a thing] has been broken, the buddhi of it definitely arises and likewise, even when its [constituent] dharma-s are removed mentally that is [to be understood as] an absolute existent (paramrthasat). For instance rpa: for, therein, when the thing is broken into the atoms (paramua), and when the [constituent] dharma-s taste, etc., have been removed mentally, the buddhi of the intrinsic nature of rpa definitely arises. Vedan, etc., are also to be seen in this way. This is called absolute truth as the existence is in the absolute sense (etat paramrthena bhvt paramrthasatyamiti).40

When mental, conceptual features are removable from something, excluded, if a cognition (buddhi) of it does not arise, then it is savtisatya. Leaving aside possible implications of this for Digngas apoha theories (he clearly draws on similar ideas in his lambana-park), what we find is that, for Vasubandhu, savti here is being defined in more or less the same terms by which prajapti is usually differentiated from dravya, thereby implying an equivalence or strong similarity between savti and prajapti. What is notable is that, even here, in his supposedly pre-Yogcra days, Vasubandhu is using buddhi i.e., a knowledge-producing cognition as the criterion by which the truths can be distinguished from each other, viz., the ability to form a clear cognitive object, even an intellective rather than perceptual one. What, after the conceptual features have been removed, still produces a buddhi, is paramrtha. If a buddhi fails to arise from a deconstructed object, then that object is savti. Since he explicitly indicates that the paramrthic cognition of a rpa is one from which sensations like taste, have been excluded, this implies that the irreducible cognitive object of a paramrthic buddhi is primarily intellective, rather than sensate, even when that of which it is a cognition, such as a material object, is itself a sensory item. Note the Sarvstivdin sense of what makes something real is its intrinsic nature which is atemporal in the sense that a buddhi of it arises even when the features which arise and cease temporally are excluded (apohoya). 120

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It is exactly this abstract intellective idea of things such as rpa, etc., that Asaga criticizes, as well see shortly when we turn to his Paramrtha gth. The idea (sajn) of rpa, etc., is prajapti, not (dravyato sti), nor is it paramrtha-sat. Such ideas, Asaga says, areonly parikalpita-svabhva. Saghabhadra carries Vasubandhus idea one step further (Dhammajoti, 81):
This is divisible into two: What exists truly (dravyo sti) and what exists conceptually (prajaptito sti), the two being designated on the basis of savti-satya and paramrtha-satya, [respectively]. If, with regard to a thing, a buddhi is produced without depending on anything else, this thing exists truly e.g., rpa, vedan, etc. If it depends on other things to produce a buddhi, then it exists conceptually/relatively e.g., a vase, army, etc. Those that exist truly are futher divisible into two: Those that have only their essential natures (svabhva/svarpa) and those that, [in addition,] have activities (kritra). Those that have kritra are again of two types: with or without function (smarthya/vypara/ akti) Those that exist relatively [prajapti-sat] are also of two types: having existence on the basis of something real [dravya-raya] or on something relative [prajapti-raya], like a vase and an army, respectively.41

There are all sorts of problems, as well as interesting ideas, in this short passage, but we will move on. Dhammajoti (77-78) translates the following discussion from the Mahvibh on the various theories held by different bhidharmikas on the existent. Words in square brackets are added by me. Regarding the existents, some say that they are of two kinds: 1. Existents as real entities (dravyata sat) the skandha, yatana, etc.; 2. Existents as concepts (prajaptita sat) male, female, etc.
Some say they are of three kinds: 1. What exists relatively a given thing [vastu] exists relatively to this but does not exist relatively to that; 2. What exists by virtue of an assemblage a given thing exists here but does not exist there; 3. What exists at some given time a given thing exists at this time but does not exist at another time.

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Some say they are of five kinds: 1. what exists in name (only) [nma-sat ] a tortoises hair, a hares horn, a garland of [sky] flowers, etc.; 2. what exists as a real entity (dravyato sti []) all dharma-s each of which is abiding in its own-nature (svabhva); 3. what exists conventionally [prajapti-sat ] a vase, garment, vehicle, army, forest, house, etc.; 4. what exists as an assemblage [ *saghta-, *smagr-sat, etc.] a pudgala is designated with regard to an assemblage of the skandha-s; 5. what exists relatively42 [ *apek-sat, *apekana-sat] this shore [exists relatively to] thatshore, a long thing [exists relatively to] a short thing, etc.43

Here we have a fivefold distinction that fails to explicitly mention either savti or paramrtha, though each of these with the exception of the first, that which exists in name only (nma-sat) could be construed as aspects of savti-sat. It is unclear whether for some bhidharmikas the second kind, dravya-sat, would qualify as paramrtha; Yogcra texts (following the Sautrntika position) make clear that dravya-sat should also be included in savti on those occasions when all the sat-s are subsumed in the two satyas. Cheng weishilun, for instance, explicitly argues that while consciousness is dravya-sat, it is so only in terms of savti-sat. Dhammajoti (567) translates the following passage from the Mahvibh which comments on what the stra refers to in speaking of the profound Abhidharma. Starting with paramrtha, it takes up the three phases of practice rutamay, cintmay and bhvanmay in reverse (i.e.,descending rather than ascending) order, since, in terms of practice, one first engages in rutimay, then cintmay, etc., until eventually attaining paramrtha:
In the absolute sense (paramrtha), the intrinsic nature of Abhidharma can only be the outflow-free faculty of understanding (prajendriya). From this very perspective, those which bring about the excellent (viia) worldy understanding derived from cultivation (bhvanmay praj) namely, warmed up, summits, receptivities and the worldly supreme dharma-s can also be called Abhidharma on account of their ability to discern the four noble truths separately. Again from this very perspective, those that bring about the excellent understanding derived from reflection (cintmay praj) namely, contemplation on the impure, mindfulness of breathing, etc., can also be called Abhidharma on account of their ability to discern the aggregates (skandha) separately and collectively.

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Lusthaus: The Two Truths in Early Yogcra Again from this very perspective, those that bring about the excellent understanding derived from listening (rutamay praj) [namely,] the analysis and establishment of the intrinsic and common characteristics44 destroying the delusion with regard to existent entities and cognitive objects (lambana) can also be called Abhidharma on account of the fact that they neither superimpose (sa--ruh) nor deny (apa-vad) with regard to dharma-s.45

As well see, Asagas description of the three may-s is significantly different. What the Mahvibh includes in the rutamay Asaga treats in the cintmay instead. The rutamay-bhmi for Asaga is concerned with the paca-vidys, the five sciences that a learned Buddhist is supposed to study. The cintmay-bhmi is, as expected, sandwiched between the rutamaybhmi and bhvanmay-bhmi. This well-known triad ruta, cint, bhvan prescribes the sequence of practice. First, listen to the teachings (ruta), then think about and reflect on what one has heard (cint), and then cultivate and develop this to fruition via meditation and other means (bhvan) (as one continues to listen to further teachings, etc.). The rutamay-bhmi is one of the most interesting sections of the Yogcrabhmi, since it deals with the pacavidy, devoting particular attention to hetu-vidy (logic and epistemology) and abda-vidy (grammar and linguistics). In other words, the bhmi of rutamay is not simply listening to or memorizing the scriptures per se, but involves acquiring the methodological skills to listen well. Cintmay-bhmi, on the other hand, deals with hermeneutics, how to interpret, or better, how to tease deeper meanings out of well known scriptural and buddhavacana-type statements, i.e., the type of sayings that would strike all Buddhists as extremely familiar, perhaps to the point of mind-numbing clich.

V Paramrtha Gth .
Since we have been snatching passages from various parts of Asagas works, one might get the impression that the two truths make frequent appearances throughout his corpus. Actually, they appear infrequently, and tend to be concentrated in specific sections of his texts. In Yogcrabhmi,

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for instance, the most sustained discussion comes in the cintmay-bhmi, which contains a long verse text (gth) aptly titled Paramrtha gth. Mention of the two truths occurs sporadically in the later sections of the Yogcrabhmi (which are interpretive reiterations of the first half of the text), as well as briefly in the Bodhisattvabhmi, and virtually nowhere else. Asaga does not conduct his workshop on hermeneutics in the cintmaybhmi by didactically setting down rules or principles. Instead he demonstrates how to bring out meanings from verses he composed, drawing on scriptural passages and sayings that were probably well known during his day.46 Asaga is attempting to show how one reenergizes the common rhetoric that has grown stale with familiarity, The Paramrtha gth consists of forty-four verses. This is followed by adetailed vykhy, or explanation that incorporates key words or phrases from the main text. Below is a translation of the vykhy for vs. 16-26.47

Selection from the Verses on Ultimate Meaning (Paramrtha gth ) From the Cintmay-bhmi of the Yogcrabhmi
Sanskrit (Asaga)-Chinese (Xuanzang)-English (Dan Lusthaus) 16 cintmay-bhmi () ata para vyavadnpaka darayati | yath parkyamno vyavadyate | The next section [of the verses] explicates purification, since when [one engages in] correct investigation ( yath-parikyamna48) one attains purification. svalakaato rpdn phenapidyupamay This may be [correct investigation in terms of] sva-lakaas, i.e., contemplating that rupa, etc., are like a heap of foam [phena-pia], etc.49 smnya-lakaata saskta-lakaasmnyd ekotpatti-sthiti-nirodhataya Or this may be [correct investigation in terms of] smnya-lakaas, i.e.,contemplating that conditioned (things) are the same in that they share the characteristics of arising, abiding and ceasing.

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Lusthaus: The Two Truths in Early Yogcra savti-paramrtha-satyatas ca | tath hi na kacid mohako na ca | moho nsti prattya samutpanna savty ca moho mohayatty ucyate | Or this may be [correct investigation in terms of] savti and paramarthasatya, i.e., although there is no deluder (), nor is it the case that delusion arisen from a multitude of conditions is nonexistent, because of savti-satya one says that delusion deludes.50 yan nmhasyyoniomanaskra tasmd asau moha na mohayatti | Moreover, [the verse] reveals that not being nondeluded [arises from] unfocused attention51 ( na-amhasya-ayonio-manasikra). It is, therefore, that which deludes the deluded.52 paridpayati | tath hi vijna puydisaskropagam ucyate savty paramrthatas tu nopagacchati | Further, from [the perspective of] savti, [the verse] teaches that the various consciousnesses are consequent on the fortuitous, [nonfortuitous and neutral] saskras. Once paramrtha is achieved, that linkage no longer follows.53 trividh mat ity attngatapratyutpann | Further, the three that should be known are past, future and present. trividha cpi yat karmeti kydikarma The three types of karma are bodily, [speech, and mental] karma. sarvam etad asagata | parasparesamadhnt tath All are not conjoined since [two items in] face-to-face mutual influence [can] not be conjoined ().54 Why? hi prabhgur vartamn | atit na kvacit sthit | ajt pratyaydhin citta cpy anuvartaka | [or ] The present quickly dissipates; the past abides nowhere; what is to come is based on a multitude of conditions; nonetheless the mind complies (with those circumstances; anuvartaka).

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tea yat tat saprayuktam | If that and this are associated with each other... ato yath puyadn saskr sagamo nsti | tath tat saprayuktasypi cittasyeti katha tasyopagatatva bhaviyati | ...just as saskras such as the fortuitous, etc., have no conjoining [i.e., they remain distinct types], the same case [would apply] to the mind and those associates.55 How will that have come into existence consequent on this?56 For what reason? yad dhi citta yena saskrea saprayukta v | viprayukta v | na ta tena | As to whether the mind and those saskras are associated, or not associated, that doesnt (follow from) this; kadcid asaprayukta v | aviprayukta v bhavati | sometimes they are not associated; sometimes they are not disassociated. na ca sarvasya cittasya saprayogo v viprayogo v | eva paramrthata cittasyopagatatvam asiddha | Again, not all mental [moments] are associated or disassociated. In this way, from [the perspective of] paramrtha, the coming into existence of the mind in consequence [of those associates] is not established [as a constant truth].57 citta copagam ucyate | savty yena kraena tad darayati | Now it should be explained that [it is] from [the perspective of] savti that it is said that the mind comes into existence consequent on a variety of causes and conditions. tasmin srotasya vicchinna iti gthy savti kriyate tv iyam ity upagam ity e yath csati krake | From this flows ceaselessly -- now in this verse, it shows that savti-satya is not inactive so that [things] come into existence [causally] consequent to [antecedents].

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Lusthaus: The Two Truths in Early Yogcra vedake ca paramrthata svaya-ktopabhoga savty nirucyate | Again, from [the perspective of] paramrtha, there is no doer or [consequent] enjoyer [of action];58 it is, therefore, from [the perspective of] savti that we get the teaching concerning doer and enjoyer. yath ca puna sa karoti | sa prativedayate | anyo veti no vykriyate | tat paridpayati | Again, one cant say whether doer and enjoyer are the same or different. Themeaning is thus illuminated [according to savti and paramrtha]. paurvparyea cyatvd iti | gthay eva paramrthata Next, the verses explain the differentiation of before and after according to paramrtha... (T.30.1579.364c26- 365a18)59

Paramrtha would mean, it seems, understanding via the Middle Way, in which neither things nor qualities are reified with selfhood, in which change, movement, transference, and even causal influence involve neither discrete entities, nor qualities and forces that pass in either self-same or radically different forms from one thing or time to another. Although rhetorically different from, for instance, Ngrjunas MMK, its underlying arguments and conclusions are virtually the same. Without evoking the rhetoric of emptiness, etc., Asaga has carefully deconstructed the first three links of prattya-samutpda (and by ellipsis implies that that analysis could be extended to the remaining nidnas), removing all traces of selfhood from each, as well as from the relation between them, while still allowing that the doctrine of karma can be taught from the perspective of savti-satya. Extirpating all traces of saskric conditioning has always been the underlying Buddhist project. The karmic activities of ignorance, saskras, and consciousness are cured simply by paying careful attention (yonio-manasikra) to conditions, investigating (park) them; karmic entrapment comes from lack of such attention, careless thinking. In terms of two-truth theory, the important point made by Asaga is a shifting in what paramrtha applies to. We have seen in Abhidharma treatments, paramrtha points to and validates certain central doctrines, 127

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such as the Four Noble Truths, the Mrga, and so on. Asaga himself, in an Abhidharmasamuccaya passage discussed above, indicated that the paramrtha-satya of dukha is the five appropriational skandhas. In his vykhy, Asaga removes all the items other Buddhists put on the paramrtha side of the divide between the two-truths, and repositions them as savti-satya. Chapter 19 of Buddhaghosas Visuddhimagga covers ground very similar to the Paramrtha gth-vykhy,60 sometimes in very similar language. A careful comparison between these two texts would be interesting, but in the interest of time, I will restrict my comments to one point. Buddhaghosas chapter is entitled Kakhvitaraavisuddhi-niddesa, Description of Purification by Overcoming Doubt, just as Asaga framed his own discussion as an explanation of how paying attention is euphemistically purification. Buddhaghosa begins: Knowledge established by overcoming doubt about the three divisions of time by means of discerning the conditions of that same mentalitymateriality [i.e., the five aggregates DL] is called Purification by Overcoming Doubt.61 Dealing with causality, kamma, conditioned co-arising, kamma-phala, and so on, Buddhaghosa also offers an extended poem in this chapter on kamma (PTS 602-03; amoli 700-01):
There is no doer of a deed, Or one who reaps the deeds result; Phenomena alone flow on No other view than this is right. Sectarians, not knowing this, Have failed to gain self-mastery, They assume a being, see it as Eternal or annihilated. Adopt the sixty-two wrong views, Each contradicting the other. A monk, disciple of the Buddha, With direct knowledge of this fact Can penetrate this deep and subtle Void conditionality. There is no kamma in result Nor does result exist in kamma; Though they are void of one another, There is no fruit without the kamma.

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Lusthaus: The Two Truths in Early Yogcra Phenomena alone flow on Cause and components their condition.62

The similarities between these sample verses and Asagas discussion should be obvious. Many more similarities are to be found in Buddhaghosas chapter. However, despite his evoking of empty conditions (sua paccaya) and empty dhammas (sua dhamm63), his counterpart to Asagas paramrtha remains doctrinal (the conditions of conditional co-arising, and, as he said at the beginning of the chapter, nma-rpa, i.e.,the five aggregates; cf. Asagas Abhidhammasamuccaya passage above), and he explicitly frames this as a doctrinal matter, something exclusively within the domain of monks, disciples of the Buddha, who avoid sectarianism (which means: do not hold views contrary to Buddhaghosas own views). At its core, this is still about doctrinal affirmation and confirmation, reassurance that if one can see deeply (gambhra) one will confirm what the doctrine promises is the case. Whatone sees deeply is what the doctrine asserts. In contrast, Asaga encourages us simply to pay attention and investigate the activity of our own mind in order to purify it of saskric influence. For Buddhaghosa, even on the paramrthic level, dharmas and conditions are flowing; forAsaga, suchclaims are only valid from the perspective of savti-satya.

VI. Paramrtha and savti in the Buddhabhmyupadea

In a previous article (Lusthaus 2008) I discussed a section of the Buddhabhmyupadea (BBh-U) that entertained opposing interpretations of Dignga in the course of commenting on a passage in the Buddhabhmistra. I will not revisit the details here, but summarize quickly some salient points in order to see how it concludes its discussion of this topic with an appeal to the two truths. In Abhidharmasamuccaya Asaga distinguishes cognition into two components, an object that offers its image (nimitta) and an observer who sees it (darana). To these two components Yogcras appended Digngas svasavitti, making it a third component. There is seeing (darana) of the object (nimitta), and there is also being aware of the seeing (svasavitti, ), i.e., realizing that one is seeing. To this, not without some controversy, some added a fourth component, a being aware of being aware of the seeing (*svasavitti-savitti, ). 129

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The Buddhabhmy-upadea passage debates several alternate proposals supporting the viability of these four-components, or, more accurately, attention is entirely focused on the proposed relations between darana, svasavitti, and svasavitti-savitti. Nimitta is initially overlooked. Once the debate about the three cognizing components is complete, attention turns to the nimitta. We are not given a definitive pronouncement as to its ontic or ontological status, but are immediately told that its status is philosophically inconclusive (, *anaikntika, *anicita). Then a three-sided debate on the status of the nimitta ensues. Once the positions have been laid out and argued, the discussion ends with the following statement:
Such distinctions (vikalpa) are only from the conventional point of view (savti), as explained logically. They are not from the [perspective] of ultimate meaning (paramrtha); the ultimate meaning is apart from words and deliberation. From the perspective of the imageless (nirkra-di ) one already is incapable of speaking of citta, caittas, and so on.64 It is beyond fictional proliferation (prapaca ) and incapable of being conceptualized (acintya ). (T.26.1530.303a26-c28)

This passage, in the light of what we saw Asaga say about paramrtha earlier, should serve as a caution for those still insisting that the name Yogcra entails some sort of metaphysical or absolutist idealism. From the point of view of the two truths, all talk of citta and caittas, eight consciousnesses, various partitions of consciousness, etc., are only conventionalisms. Ultimately (paramrthata), to speak of such things is to still dabble to some extent in prapaca and conceptualisms (cintya). Ultimately uncontaminated cognition is devoid of prapaca and its cognitive-object is nonconceptual (acintya). This is confirmed by Sthiramati in his Triik-vijapti-bhya and by Cheng weishilun, since they both characterize the first sixteen verses precisely those that discuss the laya-vijna and the other seven consciousnesses as upacra, figurative expressions.

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VII. Concluding Remark

Surveying a larger cross-section of Buddhist uses of the two truths than is usually considered in discussions of the metonymic version such as presented above from the writings of Asaga and the bhidharmikas suggests that, in the last analysis, the two truths are less about metaphysics per se, and rather are indicators of exegetical or doctrinal stances. Paramrtha-satya is invariably a positive value, even if sometimes expressed apophatically. Savti-satya has both positive and negative modes. Itincludes the domain of language. Language leads to conceptualization, which can engender false and pernicious views. Language also is the medium of communication and teaching, and hence is indispensible for communicating the Dharma, for orienting students to teacher, and for achieving analytic clarity about mental activities. Savti can entail prajapti what has only nominal reality or dravya actual causal events. In Asagas texts the word paramrtha can denote a variety of referents, including a domain devoid of kalpan and prapaca. When Dignga adopts and applies that sense of paramrtha to perception (pratyaka), which he does in Nyyamukha and Pramasamuccaya, one consequence is that savti and language acquire additional negative connotations, while being moved a step away from the reality only available to perception. Dignga does not emphasize this new burden on savti; infact, it may have been unintentional and an unrecognized consequence of his formulations. The negative savti that has become familiar in modern treatments, awaited Dharmakrti and Candrakrti for fuller articulation, but that is beyond the scope of the present study. The two truths are a kind of panjiao , an evaluative hierarchization of doctrines. Paramrtha-satya, in whatever way a particular text or thinker defines it, represents the non-negotiable doctrinal commitment that is being held as literally true, the doctrinal notion that is ultimate and indispensible. Savti-satya, by contrast, represents negotiable doctrinal expedients, negotiable in the sense that they are possibly useful, but expendable. In sectarian disputes between Buddhists, savti-satya may be what other Buddhists mistakenly adhere to as literal truths. In other words, paramrtha-satya is less a recognition of an ultimate metaphysical reality, than it is a declaration that this or that idea available amongst the Buddhist doctrines is the one that I and my school consider 131

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the most important, indispensable and non-negotiable. It is, in fact, the holding of that idea as ultimate that makes it metaphysical for the one holding it. As Asaga suggests, even paramrtha is vyavahra, and, if Buddhists are not careful, prapaca.

Appendix:
Passage #1: Abhidharmasamuccaya [Pradhan, 37,13-38,9] api khalu dukhalakaaprabhed aau | jtir dukha jar dukha vydhir dukha maraa dukham apriyasaprayogo dukha priyaviprayogo dukha yad apcchanna labhate tad api dukha sakiptena pacopdnaskandh dukha || jti kim updya dukham | sabdhadukhat tadanyadukhrayat copdya | jar kim updya dukham | kle vipariatidukhatm updya || vydhi kim updya dukham | bhteu vipariatidukhatm updya || maraa kim updya dukham | jvitavipraadukhatm updya || apriyasaprayoga kim updya dukham | sayogajadukhatm updya || priyaviprayoga kim updya duhkham | viprayogajadukhatm updya || yad apcchanna labhate tat kim updya dukham | kmyaphalalbhvajadukhatm updaya || sakiptena pacopdnaskandh kim updya dukham | dauhulyadukhatm updya || evam aau saghtni a bhavati | sabdhadukha vipariati dukha saprayogadukha viprayogadukha kmyaphalbhvadukha dauhalyadukha ca || eva a bhulyenau bhavanti | a samnny aau bhavanti || yadukta tisro dukhat | tsu aau dukhni saghtni bhavanti | tatra katha tisu saghtny aasu v saghts tisra | praparyalakaasagraht | jtir dukha jar dukha vydhir dukha maraa dukham apriyasaprayogo dukham iti santnadukhadukhat | priyaviprayogo dukha yad apcchanna labhate tad api dukha tadviparimadukhat | sakiptena pacopdnaskandh dukha tat saskradukhat || yad ukta dvividhe dukhe iti | tat savtisatyena dukha paramrthasatyena dukha ca | katamat savtisatyena dukha katamat paramrthasatyena dukham | jtir dukha yvat yad apcchanna labhate tad api dukham iti savtisatyena dukham | yad uktam sakiptena pacopdnaskandh dukham iti paramrthasatyena dukham 132

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31 (T.31.1605.674b14-c2) Passage #2: Abhidharmasamuccaya [Gokhale 23,6-24] katha kuala, kati kualni, kimartha kualapark | svabhvato pi, sabandhato pi, anubandhato pi, utthnato pi, paramrthato pi, upapattilbhato pi, prayogato pi, puraskrato pi, anugrahato pi, parigrahato pi, pratipakato pi, upaamato pi, niyandato pi, kuala draavyam | skandhn, dan dhtn, catur cyatann pradea | dharmayukttmbhiniveatyjanrtham || svabhvata kuala katamat | raddhdaya ekdaa caitasik dharm || sabandhata kuala katamat | tatsaprayukt dharm || anubandhata kuala katamat | tem eva y vsan | utthnata kuala katamat | tatsamutthita kyakarma vkkarma || paramrthata kuala katamat | tathat || upapattilbhata kuala katamat | em eva kualn dharm prvbhysam gamya tadrp vipkbhinirvtti, yath tev eva praktypratisakhyya ruci satihate || prayogata kuala katamat | satpuruasasevm gamya saddharmaravaa yonio manaskra dharmnudharmapratipatti kualasya bhvan || puraskrata kuala katamat | yat tathgata v purasktya caitye v purastagate v citragate v, dharma v purasktya dharmdhihne pustake pjkarma || anugrahata kuala katamat | yac caturbhi sagrahavastubhi sattvnughata || parigrahata kuala katamat | yaddnabhayena puuakriyvastun v lamayena v, svargopapattiparigraho v, hyo ccakulopapattiparigraho v, vyavadnnuklyaparigraho v || pratipakata kuala katamat | yo vidapratipaka, prahapratipaka, d hrapratipaka,drbhvapratipaka,vikambhapratipaka,visa

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yogapratipaka, klevaraapratipaka, jeyvaraapratipaka || upaamata kuala katamat | yattatparydya rga[praha], parydya dvea[praha], parydya moha[praha], parydya sa rvakleapraha,sajnvedayitanirodha, sopdhieo nirupdhieo nirvadhtu, apratihitanirva ca || niyandata kuala katamat | upaamaprptasya taddhipatyena vaieik gu abhijdayo laukikalokottar sdhrasdhra || 21 [4] (CBETA, T31, no. 1605, p. 669, a26-b21) [4]

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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Asaga. Abhidharmasamuccaya. Editions: (1) (2003) Abhidharmasamuccaya and Abhidharmasamuccayabhya, Composite edition. Shiga, Japan. PDF available at http://www.shiga-med.ac.jp/public/ yugagyo/ contains Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan versions of Asagas text and Sthiramatis commentary, including: V . Gokhale, ed. Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaga, JRAS, .V Bombay Branch, New Series 23, 1947, pp. 13-38; P. Pradhan, ed. Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asaga, Viva-Bharati Series 12. Santiniketan, 1950; Nathmal Tatia, ed. Abhidharmasamuccaya-Bhyam, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 17, Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976 (Sthiramatis commentary). (2) T.31.1605, tr. by Xuanzang. (3) (Sthiramatis commentary) T.31.1606, tr. by Xuanzang. (4) Abhidharmasamuccaya: The Compendium of the Higher Teaching (Philosophy). (2001). Translated into English by Sara Boin-Webb from the French translation by Walpola Rahula. Fremont, CA: Asian Humanities Press. Asaga. Mahynasamgraha. (1) T.31.1594, tr. by Xuanzang. (Vasubandhus bhya: T.31.1597, tr. by Xuanzang). (2) Lamotte, tienne. (1973) La Somme du Grand Vhicule dAsaga (Mahynasagraha). Louvain-la-Neuve: Universit de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste. 2 vols. Asaga. Yogcrabhmi. T.30.1579, tr. by Xuanzang. (also see Wayman 1984, Dutt 1966, and Wogihara 1971). Boin-Webb (2001). (see Asaga, Abhidharmasamuccaya) Buddhaghosa. Visuddhimagga. (1) PTS edition. (2) Eng. Tr.: (1975) The Path of Purification: Viuddhi Magga. Tr. by Bhikkhu amoli. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Dhammajoti, Bhikkhu KL. (2007) Sarvstivda Abhidharma. Hong Kong: Center of Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong, 3rd ed. (DDB) Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, edited by Charles Muller. <http://buddhism-dict. net/ddb>. Edition of 12/16/2007. Dutt, Nalinkasha, ed. (1966) Bodhisattvabhmi. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 7). Lusthaus, Dan. (2002) Buddhist Phenomenology. London; NY: RoutledgeCurzon. Lusthaus, Dan. (2008) A Pre-Dharmakrti Indian Discussion of Dignga Preserved in Chinese Translation: The Buddhabhmy-upadea, Journal of Buddhist Studies, vol. VI, 2008, 19-81. Lusthaus, Dan. (2009) Pudgalavda Doctrines of the Person, in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings, edited by William Edelglass and Jay Garfield, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 275-285.

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JCBSSL VOL. VII Mahvibh. T.27.1545, tr. by Xuanzang. (MW) Monier-Williams, Monier. (1899) A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon. Saghabhadra. Nyynusara. , T.29.1562, tr. by Xuanzang. Schmithausen, Lambert. (1987) layavijna. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. 2 vols. Sthiramati. Triik-vijapti-bhya. (1) Buescher, Hartmut. (2007) Sthiramati Triikvijaptibhasya: Critical Editions of s the Sanskrit Text and its Tibetan Translation. Vienna: sterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Vasubandhu. Abhidharmakoa-bhya Editions: (1) Abhidharmakoabhyam of Vasubandhu. (1975) Edited by P. Pradhan, Patna: KP Jayaswal Institute. (2) , T.29.1558, tr. by Xuanzang. (3) T.29.1559, tr. by Paramrtha. (4) LAbhidharmakoa de Vasubandhu. (1980 rpt) Louis de la Valle Poussin, Bruxelles, Institut Belge des Hautes tudes Chinoises. 6 vols. (5) Abhidharmakoa bhyam. (1989) translated from Valle Poussins French by Leo Pruden, Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press. Wayman, Alex. (1984) Asagas Treatise, the Paramrtha-gth. In Buddhist Insight. Edited by George Elder. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 333-352. Wayman, Alex. (1999) A Millenium of Buddhist Logic. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Willis, Janice Dean. (1979) On Knowing Reality: The Tattvrtha Chapter of Asaga s Bodhisattvabhmi. NY: Columbia University Press. Wogihara Unrai, ed. (1971) Bodhisattvabhmi. Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store. (originally publ. 1930-36)

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NOTES
1

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, June 23-28, 2008. vyavahram anritya paramrtho na deyate | paramrtham angamya nirva ndhigamyate || MMK 24:10. Without vyavahra as a basis, paramrtha cannot be taught; if paramrtha is not realized, nirva will not be ultimately realized. Note not only the indispensability claimed here, but the implication of a positive function for vyavahra. This is not to deny that there are indeed a handful of relatively small passages in which Yogcra texts do juxtapose the two truths with the three self-natures. E.g., cf. Cheng weishilun T.31. 1585.47b16-c16; Yogcrabhmi, fasc.78,T.30.1579.732b7-15; and fasc. 16, 362c21-363a7, though here five types of existences (astit) are presented, rather than only three natures (svabhva): pacavidhstit katam | parinipannalakastit paratantralakastit parikalpitalakastit viealakastitvaktavyalakastit ca | Here, in addition to parinipanna-lakaa, paratantra-lakaa, and parikalpita-lakaa, two additional astit-s are given: viea-lakaa-astit (existence characterized by discreteness) and avaktavya-lakaa-astit (existence characterized as incapable of being rationally articulated). This final term, avaktavya, is also how the pudgalavdins characterize the prajaptic pudgala.

This no doubt derives from the seeming interchangeability of vyavahra and savti in MMK 24, specifically k.8 (dve satye samupritya buddhn dharmadean | lokasavti-satya ca satya ca paramrthata), in which the term savti occurs for the one and only time in MMK. Elsewhere in this chapter (ks. 6, 8, 10, and 36) vyavahra is used; vyavahra makes only one other appearance at MMK 17:24. This has to be qualified by the fact that not all of Asagas writings are available in full in Sanskrit, which limits our ability to make definitive assertions. While, for instance, Xuanzang tends to use distinct Chinese equivalents for savti[-satya] ( []) and vyavahra (; ; ; ), it is not clear that he does so with infallible consistency. The twelve genres of Buddhist scriptures are: stra (also translated as or simply ; Buddhas discourses); geya (translated as and ); summary or segue verses. gth (translated as and ); verse part of a discourse. nidna (translated as ); historical narratives itivttaka (translated as ); activities of Buddha or his disciples in past lives jtaka (translated as ); Buddhas past life stories. adbhuta-dharma (); Buddhas miraculous acts. avadna (); legends. upadea (); didactic lessons. udna (); teachings offered by the Buddha without prompting. vaipulya (); expanded teachings. vykaraa (); guarantees of future attainment.

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JCBSSL VOL. VII DDB s.v. . On the nine (Theravda) and twelvefold divisions of the scriptures, cf. Maeda Egaku, (1961), Genshi bukky seiten no seiritsushi kenky, Tokyo, pp. 181549, esp. pp. 224-5. For an English translation of Asagas discussion of the twelvefold division in Abhidharmasamuccaya, cf. Boin-Webb (2001) 178ff. In contradistinction to the standard understanding, Asaga in Abhidharmasamuccaya defines vykaraa as the exposition of various present existences of the noble disciples (rya-rvaka) in relation to their distant past in different locations. Or it is clarification of a point indicated in discourses, since it is the open exposition of an abstruse meaning (abhisadhi). Boin-Webb (2001) 179. The councils in which the Sagha gathered to collect, memorize, edit, canonize, and establish official interpretations of the sayings of the Buddha. The mainstream tradition lists three such councils; other Buddhist literature adds additional councils while offering alternate details of the main three. Current scholars have questioned the historical veracity of the councils as transmitted in Buddhist tradition. means to settle, to properly establish, or to install and enshrine a Buddhist image. means to establish, set forth, and here translates vyavasthna-samyoga; it can also be used as an equivalent for prajapayanti, praj, and upacra. Xuanzang adds this phrase here in Chinese; it occurs at the end of the list of satyas in the Sanskrit, where he again translates it. The Sanskrit, expecting readers to know the Four Noble Truths, merely says truth of dukha up to truth of the mrga. Xuanzang fills in the two satyas in between. Skt: jeya; the Chinese has , which is commonly used for viaya. (Jeya is more commonly rendered .) Yonio-manaskra means thinking carefully, or paying careful attention, and is touted in many Buddhist sources as a vital ingredient in progressing on the path. The Chinese rendition of this truth (tath-ravaa-yonio-manaskra-satyam) carries a suggestive implication: . = saddharma; = yonio-manaskra; = ravaa, heard. The Chinese phrase implies ruta-vsan, i.e., careful attention to the saddharma that one has heard. All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. The Sanskrit and Chinese passages: [From the Bodhisattva-gua-paalam (Chapter 1.18) of the Bodhisattvabhmi:] prajapti-vyavasthna yuktiprajapti-vyavasthna yna-prajaptivyavasthna ca. tatra y dvdagasya strdikasya vaco-gatasynuprva-racan anuprvavyavasthna-samyoga. idam ucyate dharma-prajapti-vyavasthna. punar anekavidham avitathrthena tvad ekam eva satya. na dvityam asti. dvividha satyam. savrti-satya paramrtha-satya ca. 4618 15

8 9

10

11

12

13

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trividha satya. lakaa- satya vksatya kriy-satya ca. caturvidha dukha-satya yvan mrgasatya. pacavidha satya. hetu- satya phalasatya jna-satya jeya-satyam agrya (foremost)-satya ca. avidha satya. satya-satya msatya parijeya satya prahtavya satya sktkartavya satya bhvayitavya satya ca. [Dutt: satya-satya m-satya parijeyasatya prahtavya-satya sktkartavyasatya bhvayitavya-satya ca] saptavidham. svda-satyam dnavasatya nisaraa-satya dharmatsatyam adhimukti-satyam ry satyam anry ca satya. aavidha. saskra-dukhat-satya viparima-dukhat-satya dukhadukhat-satya pravtti-satya nivttisatya saklea-satya vyavadna-satya samyak-prayoga-satya ca. navavidha. anitya-satya dukha-satya nyat-satya nairtmya-satya bhavat-satya vibhava-t-satya tatprahopya-satya sopadhiea- nirvasatya nirupadhiea-nirva-satya ca. daavidha satya. aupakramika-dukhasatya bhoga-vaikalya-dukha-satya dhtu-vaiamya-dukha-satya priyaviparima-dukha-satya dauhulyadukha-satya karma-satya klea-satya tath-ravaa-yonio-manaskra-satya samyag-di-satya samyag-di-phalasatya ceti. idam ucyate bodhisattvn satyaprajapti-vyavasthna. prabhedaa punar etad aprama veditavya.

(T.30.1579.547b20-c15)

15

Wogihara (1971) 111b-112a; Dutt (1966) 198-99. Boin-Webb (2001) 84. For Pradhans reconstructed Skt, see Appendix, Passage #1 below. The six are: (1) suffering due to obstruction, (2) suffering due to transformation, (3)suffering due to association, (4) suffering due to separation, (5) suffering due to non-obtaining of the desired result, (6) suffering due to agitation.

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17

Contrary to the expectations of those who believe Yogcra represents Buddhist idealism, here is only one of countless examples of a root Yogcra text declaring explicitly that rpa (material form) is a dravya, a real thing. 100: [6] [] [] [] [] (T.30.1579.878c21-879a20) [6] [6-1] [6-2] [6-3] [6-4]

18

19

In the Tattvrtha chapter, Asaga distinguishes four types of knowledge: (1) What is generally accepted by the world (nave realism), (2) what is generally accepted through logical reasoning, (3) the cognitive field (jnagocara) fully purified of kleic obstructions (klevaraa), attained by rvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, and (4) and the cognitive field completely purified of obstructions to the knowable (jeyvaraa), attained by high-level Bodhisattvas and Buddhas. sa punar eva tattvrtha prakra-prabhedata catur-vidhah | loka-prasiddho yukti-prasiddha klevaraa-viuddhi-jna-gocara jeyvaraa-viuddhi-jna-gocara ca. (T.30.1579.486b12-15). Cf. Willis (1979) 70.

20

The final phrases are difficult: . It is not clear whether what is not an existent is simply the image one might form of paramrtha satya or paramrtha-satya itself (i.e., it is not an existent entity). That the final phrase begins with you ought to know (), while the issue of the image also begins with you should know () seems to signal that the subject (image) has changed to something else. Adding to the difficulty is that xiang can be used for a variety of terms. I am taking it here as representing nimitta, but xiang is also commonly used for lakaa (definition, characteristic), kra (in the sense of mental image, or the features of an object), and liga (defining mark), each of which could yield different interpretations of this line. No Sanskrit which could help clarify the meaning is currently available for this portion of Yogcrabhmi. Boin-Webb (2001) 45. For the standard list of the Yogcra One Hundred Dharmas, cf. Lusthaus (2002) Appendix One.

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23

Boin-Webb (2001) 46. Actually, the Sanskrit is more succinct: paramrthata kuala katamat | tathat. Ibid, 48, modified. [Gokhale 23,25-24,1] katham akuala, katy akualni, kimartham akualapark | svabhvato pi, sabandhato pi, anubandhato pi, utthnato pi, paramrtho pi, upapattikbhato pi, prayogato pi, puraskrato pi, upaghtato pi, parigrahato pi, vipakato pi, paripanthato py akuala draavyam | skandhn, dan dhtn, caturm yatann pradea | adharmayukttmbhiniveaty janrtham || svabhvato kuala katamat | mnasaprayukta rpryvacara ca klea sthpayitv tadanya kleopakleo ducaritasamutthpaka || sabandhato kuala katamat | tair eva kleopakleai saprayukt dharm || anubandhato kuala katamat | tem eva vsan || utthnato kuala katamat | [tat] samutthpita kyavkkarma || paramrthato kuala katamat | sarvasasra || upapattilbhato kuala katamat | yathpi tadakualbhysas tadrpo vipko abhinirvartate, yenkuala eva ruci satihate || prahogato kuala katamat | yathpi tadasatpuruasasevm gamysaddharmaravaam ayoniomanaskra kyena ducarita carati vc manas ducarita carati || 21 (T.31.1605.669b22-c13). For the previous passage on kuala in Sanskrit and Chinese, see Appendix, Passage #2.

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25

Boin-Webb (2001) 49. ka and apratisakhya-nirodha are unconditioned dharmas in the dharma lists of Yogcra and Sarvstivda; according to Asaga and Cheng weishilun, both are prajapti. Pratisakhya-nirodha (another unconditioned dharma) involves deliberately dissociating or disentangling from negative conditions, through meditative analysis. Apratisakhya-nirodha signifies the utter absence in a person, atacertain time, of certain negative conditions; since they are fully absent, extirpated, nothing that would depend on them to arise can come into existence. ka (spatiality) stands for the absence of resistance, as usually occurs between two physical objects. While two physical objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, ka can share its locus with any object. Both ka and apratisakhya-nirodha are neutral in that they represent the absence of anything karmically disadvantageous (akuala), but nonetheless involve no karmically advantageous (kuala) countermeasures. Both nconditioned dharmas stand for absences. One of the more interesting statements in the avykta passage is: What is neutral in delight [upabhoga]? It is the fact of delighting in ones fortune without reflecting and without having an impure mind (apratisakhyklia-citta). Ibid.

26

This alludes to another segment in the Tattvrtha chapter of the Bodhisattvabhmi. There Asaga discusses four types of investigation (paryea) and four types of

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complete knowing (parijna). The focus of both sets of four are: (1) names (nma), (2) things (vastu), (3) self-nature, and (4) knowing particulars (viea). To fully know names is to realize they are nothing-but-names (nma-mtra); knowing things knowing they are nothing-but-things (vastu-mtra); knowing svabhva is to see that svabhvas are nothing-but-figurative expressions (prajapti-mtra); knowing particulars is to also see that they are nothing-but-figurative expressions (prajapti-mtra). The third type of knowledge (recognizing that svabhvas are prajapti-mtra) is called knowing just as it is the object of the most profound cognitive field (yath-bhta-parijna sugambhrrtha-gocaram). The fourth, knowing particulars fully is described thus: What is knowing precisely, in detail, the investigated designations for particularity? Itis that knowing whereby the bodhisattva, after having investigated the designations for particularity as designations only attached to the things [vastu] called form, etc., seesthe designations for particularity as having a non-two meaning. The thing is neither completely present nor completely absent. It is not present, since it is not perfected (parinipannatva) owing to its expressible self. And it is not altogether absent, since in fact it is determined to have an inexpressible essence. Thus from the stance of absolute truth (paramrtha-satya), it is not formed (rp), yet from the stance of relative truth (savti-satya) it is not formless, since form is attributed to it. As with presence and absence, and formed and formless, just so is whatever is shown or not shown, etc.All the enumerations of designations for particularity should be understood in just the same manner. He [the bodhisattva] knows in detail as having a not-two meaning, whatever be the designations for particularity. This is knowing precisely, in detail the investigated designations for particularity. (Willis 1979, 172) viea-prajapty-ea-gata yath-bhta-parijna katamat | yata ca bodhisattva viea-prajaptau prajapti-mtrat paryeya tasmi rpdi-sajake vastuni viea-prajaptim advayrthena payati | na tad vastu bhvo nbhvah | abhilpyen tman a-parinipannatvn na bhva | na punar abhvo nir-abhilpyen tman vyavasthitatvt | eva na rpi paramrtha-satyatay | n-rpi savti-satyena tatra rpopacratay | yath bhva c-bhva ca rpi c-rpi ca | tath sa-nidarannidarandayo viea-prajapti-paryy sarve anena nayenaiva veditavy | iti yad et viea-prajaptim evam advayrthena yath-bhta prajnti | idam ucyate viea-prajapty-ea-gata yath-bhta-parijnam | 36 4 (T.30.1579.490c5-16)
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Note that this seems to contradict the passage cited earlier from fascicle 100 of Yogcrabhmi in which Asaga said of paramrtha-sat and any possible image of it: You should know it is not an existent (). That passage, following the argument in the Tattvrtha chapter, is attempting to avoid reification and objectification in the form of taking nominal realities to properly represent vastus. Here the focus has shifted to tathat, which itself is a prajapti for what occurs in correct cognition. Thatentails seeing objects purified of mental distortions (klevaraa and jeyvaraa). Put another way, paramrtha-sat is a way of seeing, while tathat is a euphemism forwhat is seen when one is perceiving correctly.

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28

The two types of correct cognition are explained immediately prior to the passages translated above: 72 [2] (T.30.1579.696a6-21) [2] What is correct cognition? Briefly, there are two types. (1) Correct cognition that is exclusively transmundate (lokuttara); and (2) correct cognition that is mundane and transmundane (lokiya lokuttara). What is called correct cognition that is exclusively transmundane? It is by this that rvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas fully understand tathat. Moreover, it is due to this that those Bodhisattvas skilled in the five sciences (paca-vidy-sthna) cultivate expedient means, since in multiple abodes such as this, theyeverywhere cultivate cognition of tathat, quickly realizing complete purification from the obstruction to the knowable (jeyvaraa). What is called correct cognition that is mundane and transmundane? Once rvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have fully understood tathat by means of the first correct cognition, they attain this subsequent cognition (phalabdha-jna) of the mundane and transmundane. By positing such truths (vyavasthna-satya), they make minds that are corrupted ( vi-d) in the Triple World pass beyond grief, experiencing the tranquility of blissful samdhi. Moreover, due to abundant peaceful abiding like this, they quickly realize complete purification from the obstructions by mental disturbances (klevaraa). Moreover, it precisely is this cognition of an artha unfamiliar (*asastavrtha) [to ordinary people] that is called transmundane. Takingfor its lambana linguistic expressions (*vk, *upacra) and images (*nimitta) as the referents (artha) of its cognitive field (*viaya-gocara) is also called mundane. Thus it is called [both] mundane and transmundane. The World Honored One, based on this implicit intention, spoke such words [e.g., in the Sayukta gama #37, T.2.99.8b16-28, or Sadhinirmocana stra T.16.675.682a20-22]: I say there are mundane cognitions and transmundane cognitions. As to having mundane and transmundane cognitions, if a cognition includes vikalpa, it is exclusively called mundane. The first cognition is classified as a cognition that is exclusively transmundane, while the second cognition is classified as a cognition that includes the mundane and transmundane.

29

Sketa is convention, something reached by common consent, such as a sign given significance by a consensus that assigns it that meaning. The Chinese literally reads: speech by conventional designations shared by the multitude. Inaddition to sketa, is used for prajapti, upacra,abhidhna, and related terms. 16

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JCBSSL VOL. VII (T.30.1579.362a29-b7; cintmay-bhmi ) sketiko vda katamah | avidhanimittalakae vyvahrika svabhvaprajaptivdah | savidha nimittalakaa katamat | vastulakaa vijeyalakaa ubhdilakaam anugrahdilakaa vyavahranimittalakaa mithypratipattydinimittalaka a ca | vastulakaa katamat | yad vijnena ghti | vijeyalakaa katamat | yan manaskrea vijnasyotpattaye savartate | ubhdilakaa katamat | yat sparena ghti | anugrahdilakaa katamat | yad vedanay ghti | vyavahranimittalakaa katamat | yat sajay ghti | mithypratipattydinimittal akaa katamat | yac cetanay ghti ||
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Vyavahra appears in MMK only one time outside the verses of Ch. 24 about to be cited: MMK 17:24. E.g., the commentary on the Diamond Stra ascribed to Asaga and Vasubandhu, tr. into Chinese by Yijing in 711, Vajracchedik-prajpramit-stra-stra , at T.25.1513.881b12-20 and 884a27-29: and ; Dharmaplas commentary on Vasubandhus Viatik, also tr. into Chinese by Yijing, in 710, , T.31.1591.79b19-c4 and 94a2-4. For instance the Mahvibh states: 9 (this is neyrtha) (that is ntrtha) (this is based on savti) (that is based on paramrtha) (T.27.1545.41b26-c7) The case of the so-called pudgalavdins is illustrative of this. Once almost every Buddhist agreed that antman was an indispensable and essential tenet, pudgalavda was doctrinally ostracized. Though, as Ive argued elsewhere, in terms of sheer numbers, longevity and influence the Vtsputrya and Samitya schools should be considered mainstream Buddhism their doctrines, even their explanation of the pudgala, were not very different from that of their opponents, and in fact they drove many of the subsequent developments in Buddhist thought but they refused to declare outright that pudgala should not even have provisional status (all surviving pudgalavda texts declare forcefully that the pudgala is a prajapti). Rehabilitating their reputation should become a higher priority among scholars today if we want to understand the evolution of Buddhist thought in India and China more accurately. E.g., the term pudgala occurs 832 times in the Yogcrabhmi; 67 times in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, 36 times in the Mahynasagraha, 12 times in the Madhynta-vibhga-bhya, etc., and virtually never in a negative light, but as a type of person [cf. Puggala-paati] or person in general. Pudgalavdins would have no problem with the statement There is no eternal self in the pudgala (pudgalanairtmya). In fact, they would insist on it. Cf. Lusthaus 2009.

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44 (T.29.1562.595a1-4) The Koa passage reads: dhynn rpadhtau tu tbhy dharmataypi ca ||838||

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rpdtau dhynotpdanametbhy hetukarmavalbhy dharmatay ca savartankle | tadn hi sarvasttv evdharabhmikstaddhacynamutpdayanti | ktsnn dharmmudbhtavttitvt | kiyaccira punaraya saddharma sthsyati | yatreme dnm dharm prakr prajyante | saddharmo dvividha sturgamdhigamtmaka | tatrgama stravinaybhidharm adhigamo bodhipaky ityea dvividha saddharma | dhtrastasya vaktra pratipattra eva ca ||839|| gamasya hi dhrayitro vaktra | adhigamasya pratipattra | ato yvadete sthsyanti tvatsaddharma iti veditavyam | te tu varasahasra mavasthnamhu | adhigamasyaivam | gamasya tu bhysa klamityapare | yo yamiha stre bhidharma ukta kimea eva strbhidharmo deita | kmravaibhikantisiddha pryo may ya kthito bhidharma | yaddurghta tadihsmadga saddharmantau manaya pramam ||840|| pryea hi kmravaibhik ntydisiddha eo smbhirabidharma dhyta | yadatrsmbhirdurghta so smkamapardha | saddharmantau tu punarbuddh eva prama buddhapunnca | nimilite stari lokacakui kaya gate skijane ca bhyas | adatattvairniravagrahai kta kutrkikai sanametadkulam ||841|| [Pradhan, p. 459, ln.4460, ln.7; cf. Valle Poussin (1980 rpt) v.5, 217-22 (VP numbers these verses 38-40) ; Pruden (1989) v.4, 1280-82] Xuanzangs Chinese rendering: 298

(T.29.1558.152a14-b12)

The Mahvibh passage (917c) (tr. by Xuanzang):

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37 38

This literally reads what accords with worldly expressions . 77 (T.27.1545.400a4-b2)

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Dhammajoti (p. 95 n.37) adds this footnote: Cf. Saghabhadras explanation that the two truths are really two aspects of the one, absolute truth, Ny [= Nyynusara, T.29. 1562.] 666a ff. [square brackets added] yatra bhinnena tadbuddhiranypohe dhiy ca tat | gharthavatsavtisat paramrthasadanyath ||604|| yasminnavayavao bhinne na tadbuddhirbhavati tat savtisat | tadyath ghaa | tatra hi kaplao bhinne ghaabuddhirna bhavati | tatra cnynapohya dharmn buddhacy tadbuddhirna bhavati taccpi savtisadveditavyam | tadyathmbu | tatra hi buddhacy rpdndharmnaohymbubuddhirna bhavati | teveva tu savtisaj kteti savtivat ghaacmbu cstti brbanta satyamevhurna metyetatsavtisatyam | atonyath paramrtha satyam | tatra bhinne pi tadbudhirbhavatyeva | anyadharmpohe pi buddhacy tat paramrthasat | tadyath rpam | tatra hi paramuo bhinne vastuni rasrhnapi ca dharmnapohya buddhacy rpasya svabhvabuddhirbhavatyeva | eva vedandayo pi draavy | etat paramrthena bhvt paramrthasatyamiti | [Pradhan p. 334, ln.1ln.11] Cf. Valle Poussin, v.4, pp. 139-41; Pruden, v. 3, pp. 910-11.

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41

50 (T.29.1562.621c21- 622a2) more literally means "mutually dependent, interdependent." While seems to imply something like apek, more typically Xuanzang uses or or simply for apek. 9 (T.27.1545.42a24-b4) Intrinsic and common characteristics = svalakaa and smnya-lakaa , respectively. 1 (T.27.1545.3b5-13) Schmithausens tentative speculation that the verses and their explanation may have come from different authors seems to miss the point. Cf. Schmithausen (1987) v.1, 160-64 and Appendix 1. The Sanskrit text is taken from Alex Wayman, Buddhist Insight, pp. 333-352. Skt texts: verses pp. 335-341; Asagas vykhy on pp. 341-344; Wayman also offers anEnglish translation, but I follow the Chinese and my own reading of the Sanskrit. This is a diplomatic translation, drawing on both the Sanskrit and Chinese, which differ from each other in a number of details. Where they differ, I tend to follow the Chinese, sometimes offering a footnote to explain the difference, but sometimes, if the reading is better or the meaning clearer, I follow the Sanskrit. Both texts have their difficulties, and are profitably read together. Nonetheless, my translation is tentative in places. Note that Xuanzangs text grouping and the Skt grouping (marked by | ) dont always align. The verses and vykhy that come before and after the selection presented here are helpful for framing the meaning of the matters discussed in this portion, but in the interest of time and space I omit them. Note that rushiguan sometimes also renders *yathbhta-pratyavek and *bhta-pratyavek. Yath parikyamna would mean one examines or sees things as they actually are. Shortly this will be opposed to ayonia-manasikra, unfocused attention, or careless thinking. Cf. Sayutta-nikya III.22.95 - Pheapipama sutta: Pheapipama rpa vedan bubbuupam Maricikupam sa sakhr kadalpam, Mypamaca via dpit diccabandhun.

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48

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Form is like a lump of foam, Feeling like a water bubble; Perception is like a mirage, Volitions like a plantain trunk, And consciousness like an illusion. (tr. by Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, v.1, pp. 952-53.) Asaga quotes this as part of the Paramrtha gths in Yogcrabhmi as follows: phenapiopama rpa vedan budbudopama | marcisad sajn saskra kadaknibh | myopama ca vijnam uktam dutyabandhun | , , ,, (T.30.1579.363b20-22); see below.
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Note that moha/mha (, ) here acts as a synonym for avidy (), the first link of conditioned co-arising (prattya-samutpda; ). The subsequent discussion will continue through the next two links saskra and vijna , raising questions about the nature of their linkage. To paraphrase this line: There is no X that is the deluder an agent with distinct, singular selfhood that causes delusion. Delusion arises from multifarious conditions. But, by savti, one assumes the convenience of speaking of things like a deluder, even if that is identified as delusion itself, i.e., delusion deludes. This is a prajaptic selfhood. Richard Hayes has proposed careless thinking for rendering ayonio-manaskra, which captures another of its implications, i.e., failing to fully and successfully investigate and analyze something to the point of properly understanding it. The Sanskrit and Chinese seem to diverge in the last phrase, Xuanzangs Chinese providing a gloss on the implication of the Sanskrit rather than strictly reproducing it. The Chinese reads: It is, therefore, that [i.e., ayonio-manisikra] which deludes the deluded, whereas the Sanskrit is phrased negatively: tasmd asau moha na mohayatti, therefore it doesnt delude delusion. While, at first blush, these appear to be opposite statements, in fact, they make the same point, since the it (asau) refers to delusion in the tautology of the previous line: Delusion deludes. Previously Asaga allowed that, speaking savtically, one might say delusion deludes. This tends to imply that delusion is a self-existent thing acting as an agent; It is that which causes the delusion. Here we are told that delusion is a metaphor for ayonio-manasikra and its effects. In other words, unfocused or careless attention and thinking not something called delusion or the deluder is what causes delusion, i.e., delusion itself is a metaphor for this type of non-perspicacious mental activity. TheSanskrit states this in stark negative terms: Delusion doesnt delude (since ayonio-manasikra does that), while the Chinese expresses the same conclusion by saying: That (ayonio-manasikra), therefore, iswhat deludes the deluded. Note that while the Sanskrit follows moha na mohayat with an iti, implying this is a direct citation of the gth, that exact wording actually is not found in the gth. Therelevant verses, 19 and 20, state: na moho mohayed moha para naiva ca mohayet | na paro mohayaty ena na ca moho na vidyate || ayonio-manaskrt samoho jayate sa ca | ayonio-manaskro nsamhasya jyate. It is possible that by moha na mohayatti the vykhy is not suggesting a verbatim quote from the verse, but instead

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is offering a telescoped version of both verses 19 and 20, taking the accusative moha from moha para naiva ca mohayet (19b), the mohayati from 19c, and the na from its repetition in 19 and its modification (najyate) of asamuhasya in 20d.
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This begins the questioning of the relation between the second and third nidnas of prattya-samutpda, viz. saskra and vijna. Fortuitous, non-fortuitous, etc., indicates the type of karmafortuitous or non-fortuitousthat saskras embody due to past actions that will be passed on to present awareness (vijna) and circumstances. Note the Sanskrit is using the verb upagaccha(ti), which implies what is carried over, transmitted, goes from one place or time to another (Ch: ). The idea of such transference, including the problem of what goes from one life to another, underlies this discussion, since this precisely is the problem of self or continuity of identity. The vykhy begins by framing the entire Paramrtha gth as an antidote (pratipaka) that presents the non-self of persons (pudgala-nairtmya) paramrthically (paramrthatas) so as to counteract (pratipaka) the two extremes of projective reification (samropa) and denial (apavda), explicitly declaring that to be the main topic (adhikra) of the verses. (pudgala-nairtmya paramrthatas tad-adhikrt paramrtha gth | samroppavdntadvayapratipakea) 16 (T.30.1579.364a18-20)

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Both the Chinese and Sanskrit are somewhat unclear. The Chinese, I believe, reads as Ive translated it above. The Sanskrit might suggest something different however. Note that the verb previously introduced upagacchati, i.e., upagama is at play here again, this time in the form of asagata, which literally implies the negative of being put together or moved into the same place. Asaga is trying to get us to shift our focus from nouns (substantives, nominals, accusatives, etc.) to verbs, i.e., whatis sometimes viewed as the relations and linkages between nouns. Verbs are actions, movement; and movement is time. The go verbs and noun derivatives (upagacchati, upagata, [a-]sagata, gata/gata/angata, etc.,) are movements, temporalizations. It is those relations that give the illusion of continuities, of a substratum to actions that persists as the activities and modifications fluxuate, i.e., selfhood. Paying attention to the verbs which Asaga has carefully selected and employed provides important clues on how to understand his point. As for this line, parasparesamadhnt: parasparea = by mutual influence; asama = not the same; dhna = a place, seat, habitation. Thus: because they influence each other from different places, i.e., they occupy different loci, and thus are notconjoined. E.g., saskras are in time/place X while so-called resultant vijnas are in time/place Y, and these vijnas subsequently engender further saskras. So while mutually influencing, they nonetheless remain separate items with their own distinctive characteristics and loci. The same would apply to the three types of karma (body, speech, mind), the three times (past, present, future), the fortuitous vs. non-fortuitous types of saskras, and so on. Again, the issue is what transfers between them, what connects them while leaving them distinct and apart. Nothing can transfer if they are collapsed into the same locus (sagata), hence they are asagata. Being both apart and connected at the same time is a type of middle way. More importantly, being apart and staying apart is a necessary condition for having a connection. In order to be mutual, they must be distinct.

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That is, how could these types of saskras, being distinct from each other, nonetheless all be conjoined with the mind, which is distinct from all of them? According to

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prattya-samutpda, saskras are the conditions that give rise to vijnas. But the question being raised is how can that causal relation occur if these are dissociated in some absolute sense?
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The translation follows the Chinese. The Sanskrit asks: How would there be an upagatvam of saprayukta? Upagata another variant on the upagacchati, sagata, etc., verbs is a rich term. It means both gone to and to approach. Monier-Williams gives this range of meanings: gone to, met, approached (esp. for protection or refuge); attained, obtained; arrived, occurred, happened; undergone, experienced; agreed, allowed; promised; near at hand; passed away, dead. It is a movement, a promise, an act of possession. For upagam he gives: to go near to, come towards, approach, arrive at, reach, attain, visit; to come upon, attack; to press hard upon; to occur, happen, present itself; to undertake, begin; to approach (a woman sexually); to enter any state or relation, undergo, obtain, participate in, make choice of, suffer; to admit, agree to, allow, confess. For upaga: approaching, going towards; being or staying in or on; following, belonging to; fit for, conducive to; approached; furnished with; covered (as a female). Saprayukta is a relation, an association between two or more things. Ileave the reader to sort out the nuances. This is not an ontological statement about the mind and its associates, but an expression of the anticipatory perspective of paramrtha in which saskras will no longer karmically condition vijna; this is another way of describing enlightenment, i.e., the end of karmic conditioning. If, sometime in the future, saskras will not cease to condition vijna, then enlightenment is impossible. Doer and enjoyer are the performer of an action and the subsequent recipient of its consequences, respectively, which implies a theory of self (tma-di) by which the doer is the same person as the receiver of its consequences. The verses on which the above is commenting (with a few additional verses) (T30.1579.363b18): [16] kalpyate nubhta ca kalpyate | andimanta saskr di vaivopalabhyate || [17-18] phenapiopama rpa vedan budbudopama | marcisad sajn saskra kadaknibh | myopama ca vijnam uktam dutyabandhun | ekotpd ca saskr ekasthiti-nirodhina || [19] na moho mohayed moha para naiva ca mohayet | na paro mohayaty ena na ca moho na vidyate || [20] ayonio-manaskrt samoho jayate sa ca | ayonio-manaskro nsamhasya jyate ||

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[21] puy apuy nijy saskrs trividh mata | trividha cpi yat karma sarva etad sagatam || [22] prabhgur vartamn att na kvacit sthit | ajt pratyaydhin citta cpy anuvartaka || [23] atyantika saprayogo viprayogas tathaiva ca | na ca sarvair hi sarvasya citta copagam ucyate || [24] tasmin srotasya vicchinne sadsade puna | tmady-anusrea savti kriyate tv iya || [25] bhidyate rpa-kyas ca nma-kyo pi nayati | svayakto pabhoga ca paratreha nirucyate || [26] paurvparyea cnyatvt sva-hetu-phala-sagraht | sa eva kart vett ca anyo veti na kathyate || [27] hetu-vartmnupacchedt smagry vartate kriy | svasmd dheto ca jyante kurvanti ca parigraha || [28] prapacbhirati hetu tath karma ubhubham | sarvabjo vipka ca inia tath phala || [29] sarvabjo vipko bhijyate tmadarana | pratytmavedanyo sau arp anidarana || [30] kalpayanty antartmna ta va bl ajnak | tmadaranam ritya tath bahvya va daya || [31] piagrhtma-bjc ca prvbhyst sahyata | ravad anuklc ca jyate tma-darana ||

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JCBSSL VOL. VII [32] snehas tatpratyaya caiva adhytmam upayyate | anugrahbhila ca bahi sneho mamyita || [33] yato bibheti loko ya tan mohtma haraty asau | prva niveana ktv tenopaiti prapacita || [34] yat tan niveana kta tad ry dukhato vidu | yena dukhit sad bk kaa-mtram upaamito na hi || [35] vairpyaparigata cittam cinoti dukha tathvidha | yad citta bhavati blnm ahakra-sukha-dukha-pratyaya || [36] yatra sakt sarvablia pake patati kujaro yath | samohas tatra cdhika sarvatraga sarvaceite tatpara ||
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I thank Rev. Dhammadipa for bringing this to my attention. I would also like express my appreciation to Dhammadipa and Wei-jen Teng who read through the Chinese and Sanskrit of the vykhy with me at Harvard. Both offered helpful suggestions. This and other translations are from amoli (1975). Ch. 19 appears on pp. 693-703, and in the PTS Pali edition, pp. 598-605. Kammassa krako natthi vipkassa ca vedako, Suddhamm pavattanti eveta sammadassana. Etamatthamanaya titthiy asayavas. Sattasaa gahetvna sassatucchedadassino, Dvsahdihi gahanti aamaa virodhit. Evameta abhiya bhikkhu buddhassa svako, Gambhra nipua sua paccaya paivijjhati. Kamma natthi vipkamhi pko kamme na vijjati, Aamaa ubho su na ca kamma vin phala. Sua dhamm pavattanti hetusambhrapaccayti.

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amoli renders sua dhamm as phenomena alone, the same English phrase he used earlier and more appropriately for suddhamm. Why he chose to avoid voidphenomena here (mimicking his equivalents) is unclear. This final tag is crucial. It is not extolling an ineffable reality, but making clear that the basic components of Yogcra doctrine, such as mind (citta), mental associates (caittas), etc., are all only vyavahra, conventional descriptive terms, not the names of ultimate realities, much less anything absolute.

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