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Conchita Ang 7905 Drake Street Fontana, CA 92336 Plaintiff in Pro Per

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO Conchita Ang, an individual, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) Aurora Loan Services, LLC, Aurora Bank ) ) FSB, Mortgage Electronic Registration ) System, Inc. (MERS), Homewide Lending ) Corp., Quality Loan Service Corp., And all ) persons claiming by, through, or under such ) persons; All persons unknown, claiming any ) legal or equitable right, title, the state, lien, or ) ) interest in the property described in this ) complaint adverse to plaintiffs title thereto; ) and Does 1-150, inclusive. ) ) ) Defendants. ) Case No.: Complaint for (1) Wrongful Foreclosure; (2) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; (3) Wrongful Foreclosure; (4) Quiet Title; (5) Fraud; To Set Aside the Trustee's Sale; and Violation of Civil Code section 2923.5 (Unknown holder of the note and the note was not otherwise assigned by an unrecorded document). UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

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COMES NOW Plaintiff alleging her causes of action as follows: Jurisdiction and Venue 1. Plaintiff is an individual domiciled at the premises commonly known as 7905

Drake St., Fontana, CA 92336 ("Property"). The legal description of the Property is: Lot 1, Tract 13 00 8-3, city of Fontana, County of San Bernardino, state of California, as per map recorded in Book 208, pages 70 through 72 of Maps in the office of the County recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel No.: 1100-321-32-0-000. Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 1

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2.

Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 392 (a) (1), jurisdiction and

venue are proper because the aforesaid real estate that is the subject matter of this dispute is located in the County of San Bernardino, state of California. Parties 3. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant Aurora Loan

Services Corp. (hereinafter "ALS") was, at all times mentioned herein, an organization of unknown exact origin and transacting business in the state of California and was doing business in the County of San Bernardino, state of California. ALS purported to be the servicer of the loan at issue herein. 4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant Mortgage

Electronic Registration System, Inc. (hereinafter "MERS") was, at all times mentioned herein a Corporation transacting business in the state of California. 5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant Homewide

Lending Corp. (hereinafter "HLC") was, at all times mentioned herein a Corporation transacting business in the state of California. 6. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant Quality Loan

Service Corp. (hereinafter "QLS") was, at all times mentioned herein a Corporation transacting business in the state of California. 7. The true names and capacities of defendant's Does 1 through 150, inclusive, are

unknown to plaintiff, who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to show the true names and capacities of the Doe defendants when the same have been ascertained. Factual Allegations 8. On or about June 1, 2006 plaintiff refinanced the subject property for $456,000.

Attached as Exhibit 1 is a copy of the deed of trust for the refinancing. The lender is listed as HLC. Defendant MERS is stated to be acting solely as a nominee of lender.. MERS is the beneficiary under this security instrument." 9. On or about June 1, 2006 plaintiff executed an adjustable-rate note with defendant

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HLC, attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 10. On May 15, 2009 a Substitution of Trustee was recorded wherein defendant HLC

(the original beneficiary) and defendant MERS (also referred to as a beneficiary) purported to substitute Quality Loan Service Corp. (QLS herein) as Trustee under the Deed of Trust of June 1, 2006 (Exhibit 4). 11. By way of an Assignment of Deed of Trust, attached hereto as Exhibit 3,

defendant MERS "as nominee for Homewide Lending Corp. (HLC herein), purported to assign the Deed of Trust to defendant ALS. This purported assignment was recorded on October 12, 2010. 12. There is no explanation as to how MERS and HLC were both acting as the

Beneficiary at the same time. Nor are there any recorded or unrecorded documents indicating how defendant MERS had the right or authority to execute the Assignment of Corporate Deed of Trust (Exhibit 3) on September 28, 2010 and to record that document on October 12, 2010 while HLC on both the Deed of Trust and the Note. Here, the Note was not otherwise assigned by an unrecorded document. 13. Attached to the Adjustable-Rate Rider (Exhibit 2) as page 5, is an alleged

"Endorsement Allonge to the Promissory Note." However, there is no chain of title to the Note, and no explanation of how defendant ALS obtained authority or ownership to endorse the Note. 14. A Notice of Default was recorded on the subject Property by defendant Aurora

Loan Services, LLC c/o Quality Loan Service Corp. on April 1, 2009 (attached as Exhibit 5). 15. A Notice of Trustee's Sale of the subject Property was recorded on July 8, 2009

(attached as Exhibit 6) and the Property was sold pursuant thereto. 16. A Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed Upon Sale was subsequently recorded

on April 30, 2010 restoring the parties to their positions held prior to the Notice of Trustees Sale recorded on July 8, 2009 (attached as Exhibit 7). 17. No new Notice of Default was ever recorded or served with respect to the

property after the date of the Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed Upon Sale was recorded on April 30, 2010.

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18.

A Notice of Trustee's Sale of the subject Property was recorded on November 24,

2010 (attached as Exhibit 8) with a sale date of December 20, 2010. However, no new notice of any default was ever given or recorded. 19. By a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale (attached as Exhibit 9), defendant ALS was

granted the Property by QLS on December 14, 2011, six days prior to the sale date. The Trustee's Deed upon Sale was recorded on December 22, 2011. 20. In conducting the above activities defendant ALS was acting as a loan servicer.

According to In Re Hwang, 393 B.R. 701, 712 (2008), "a loan servicer cannot bring an action without the holder of the note." FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Wrongful Foreclosure in a Nonjudicial Foreclosure Action (Cal.Civ.Code 2924; Com.Code 3502) (As to Defendants ALS, QLS and MERS) 21. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each of the above paragraphs as

though set forth fully herein. 22. As previously noted herein defendant's ALS and/or QLS, on behalf of MERS and

for itself recorded a notice of default concerning the subject Property and commenced what is known as a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding. 23. California Civil Code 2924 governs nonjudicial foreclosures. That statute

provides that only one to whom an obligation is owed may enforce the power of sale clause in a deed of trust. The obligation is the promissory note. A promissory note is a negotiable instrument, governed by The California Commercial Code at 3104(a). 24. California Civil Code 2924 is comprehensive, but not exhaustive. California

Golf, LLC v. Cooper (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1053. California courts allow additional remedies to pursue misconduct arising out of nonjudicial foreclosure sales when not inconsistent with the policies behind the statutes. California Golf, LLC v. Cooper (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1067 1070.

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25.

Two important policies behind the statute are: (1) to protect the debtor from

wrongful loss of property, and (2) to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties. Id. 26. California Commercial Code 3502 sets forth the rules governing dishonor of a

note. As in the instant matter, where a note is payable upon demand, the note is only dishonored if "presentment" is duly made to the maker. 27. Under California Commercial Code 3501(a) "presentment" means a demand for

money by a person "entitled to enforce the instrument." 28. Further, the law requires that upon demand of the person to whom presentment is

made the person making presentment shall (A) exhibit the instrument, (B) give reasonable identification and, if presentment is made on behalf of another person, reasonable evidence or authority to do so, and (C) sign a receipt on the instrument for any payment made or surrender the instrument if full payment is made. California Commercial Code 3501(2). 29. This case, presentment did not occur. In fact, presentment could not occur.

Defendants Aurora Services, QLS and MERS did not pay for the obligation, did not receive the obligation, and did not collect or demand payments. Defendants Aurora Services, QLS and MERS do not have the ability to enforce the instrument or the obligation thereunder because these defendants are not the holder of the Note or validation of the underlying debt or obligation. 30. California case law provides that only the holder of the note can initiate

foreclosure proceedings regardless of to whom the mortgage is owed. See Adler vs. Sargent (1895) 109 Cal. 42, 49. In addition, a mortgagee's purported assignment of the mortgage without an assignment of the debt which is secured is a legal nullity. 31. In Bennett vs. Taylor (1855) 5 Cal. 502, the California Supreme Court held that a

mortgage is a mere incident to the debt secured by it, and in order to maintain an action on the mortgage, the debt must first be proved. (Emphasis added). That court made clear that the holder of the note is the only party entitled to enforce the rights granted by the note. 32. The California Supreme Court has also held that an action will not lie on the mere

recitals in a mortgage of the existence of the debt. Shafer v. Bear River & Auburn Water &

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Mining Co. (1855) 4 Cal. 294. 33. A loan servicer cannot bring an action without the holder of the note. In Re

Hwang, 393 B.R. 701, 712 (2008). 34. These cases are still valid. Other legal scholars agree with their rationale. The

Restatement (3d) of Property (Mortgages) 5.4 states that "the person holding only the deed of trust will never experience default because only the holder of the note is entitled to payment of the underlying obligation." (Emphasis added). 35. Recently, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California

held, in Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Hillery, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100056 (N.D. Cal.), that the Restatement passage above establishes as valid California law - the deed alone is a legal nullity. 36. In this case, defendants ALS, QLS and MERS are nowhere named in the note and

none of them have the legal right to enforce the note. 37. The California legislature enacted Cal. Comm. Code 301, which states: "Person

entitled to enforce an instrument means (a) the holder of the instrument, (b) a non-holder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of the holder, or (c) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to 3309 or subdivision (d) of 3418. 38. Defendant ALS, QLS and MERS cannot meet any of the three requirements and

therefore none of them is entitled to enforce the note or to foreclose. 39. America. 40. Cal. Comm. Code 1201 defines a "holder" as: (a) the person in possession of a Such "standing" requirements have recently prohibited foreclosures throughout

negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to and identified person, or (b) the person in possession of a document of title if the goods are deliverable either to bear or to the order of the person in possession. 41. Here, the note is a negotiable instrument (Cal Comm. Code 3104). Defendants

ALS, QLS and MERS are not holders of the note.

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42.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that defendants ALS, QLS and MERS do not

possess the note. Moreover, plaintiff is informed and believes that these defendants also do not have any rights of a holder. 43. Accordingly, defendants ALS, QLS and MERS do not qualify as a non-holder in

possession of the note with rights of a holder and cannot foreclose under 3301(b). 44. Defendant ALS, QLS and MERS have not made the requisite showing and

plaintiff should be protected against, among other things, a claimant that may appear at some later time, claiming an interest in the obligation or this Property. 45. Accordingly defendants ALS, QLS and MERS failed to meet the requirements of

the Commercial Code and are thus precluded from foreclosing on the Property. 46. In light of the various transfers of interest of the obligation in this matter, it is

unclear as to whom, if anyone, has the legal right to foreclose. 47. Even assuming defendant's ALS, QLS and MERS had the legal right to enforce

the obligation, pursuant to California Civil Code 2924 (discussed below) the power of sale may not be exercised until California Civil Code 2935.5 has been complied with - and it was not. 48. Plaintiff seeks legal relief against the defendants for conducting an unlawful

foreclosure, including an order canceling and setting aside the Notice of Trustee's Sale, Trustee's Deed upon Sale and all documents related to the improper nonjudicial foreclosure, especially considering that defendants gave plaintiff "Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed upon Sale" on April 28, 2010 and recorded the notice on April 30, 2010 (see Exhibit 7). No new "notice of default" was ever filed by defendants. Plaintiff also seeks costs of suit, general damages, special damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Lack of Standing to Conduct a Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sale (As Against Defendants ALS, QLS and MERS) 49. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each of the prior paragraphs as

though set forth fully herein. 50. In order to conduct a foreclosure action a party must have standing. Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 7

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51.

California Code of Civil Procedure 725(a) and 726 provide for judicial

foreclosures, whereas California Civil Code 2924, et seq., provides for nonjudicial foreclosures. 52. If these defendants elected to proceed with judicial foreclosure under California

Code of Civil Procedure 726 it would be required to prove it has the ability to enforce the underlying note. 53. There are constitutional requirements (standing) and prudential requirements

(including real party in interest). Morrow v. Microsoft Corp. 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 2007). 54. Concerning procedural due process, the defendants nonjudicial foreclosure action

is defective, null and void, not only because the action violates California Civil Code section 2923.5, but also since it was not brought by both the present owner of the note and party entitled to enforce the note as required under Cal. Comm. Code 3301. Indeed, there is evidence that a defunct entity actually owns the note and is the real party that might be able to enforce the note. 55. Defendants are required to have standing. Defendants purport to own the note at

issue in this matter, thereby asserting they can enforce any rights granted thereunder. However, they seek to do this without showing they ever had possession of the note or somehow became the holder of the note. The law in this area is well settled based, in part on long-standing authority that a party seeking relief must assert his own legal rights and interests and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. Valley Forge Christian College v. AMS United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464, 476 (1982). 56. This standing requirement is an essential and unchanging part of the "case or

controversy" requirement of Article III of the US Constitution. Without the note, the defendants lack standing to enforce it or anything else related to it. 57. Defendant's ALS, QLS and MERS are not the owners of the note, did not possess

the note, and none of them is a "real party in interest." They cannot conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure. 58. The question becomes: how can an untouched and unseen document be legally

transferred when none of the parties had even seen it or knows where it is (especially if it is listed as being owned in some bundle of securities, located no one knows where)?

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59.

The owner of the note is an unknown to any of the parties in this matter. These

defendants in fact do not even claim to own the note. Indeed, defendants are not lenders and never even attempt to claim ownership of notes generally. The procedural due process requirement of being a real party in interest in order to move for nonjudicial foreclosure should be enforced. 60. The law also has a requirement for substantive due process. This concerns the

ability to enforce the underlying obligation. Obligations in mortgages are governed by Article 3 of the negotiable instruments statutes. The underlying note is a negotiable instrument, and its enforceability is governed by Article 3. 61. Defendants do not possess the note and have no rights to enforce the note under

California commercial code sections 3301(a), (b) or (c). Defendant fails the substantive due process requirements to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure action. 62. It has been long understood that a mortgagee of record has standing to bring a

nonjudicial foreclosure action and foreclose its mortgage interest in the property, provided that the note is endorsed to it, or in blank, and it is in the possession of the party seeking to foreclose. 63. 64. Neither of the above possibilities is present. Notwithstanding that defendant's elected to proceed to foreclose nonjudicial he

pursuant to California Civil Code section 2924, et seq., it still must have the ability to enforce the underlying note. 65. This issue is so significant that other jurisdictions are enacting statutes which

require the trustee in a foreclosure sale to obtain proof the beneficiary is the actual holder of the promissory note. (See State of Washington, Deeds of Trust Foreclosure Law ESB 5810, effective July 2009. Similarly, many courts are denying foreclosure because of the failure to prove standing. This is all based on the simple proposition that the entity that is foreclosing has a legal right to foreclose. 66. The Kansas Supreme Court recently held that a nominee company called MERS

has no right or standing to bring an action for foreclosure. Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 2009 Kan, LEXIS 834.

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67.

Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Relief finding that none of the defendants

herein can enforce (1) the initial Notice of Default dated March 31, 2009 and recorded April 1, 2009 (Exhibit 5); (2) the initial Notice of Trustee's Sale dated July 2, 2009 and recorded July 8, 2009 (Exhibit 6); (3) the Notice of Trustee Sale dated November 4, 2010 nor (4) any subsequent foreclosure effort, because defendants gave plaintiff Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed upon Sale dated April 28, 2010 and recorded April 30, 2010 (Exhibit 7) and because defendants, nor any of them had any enforceable rights in the note Or Deed of Trust. 68. Defendant's threatened eviction of plaintiff from her residence and unless

restrained, will do so by conducting an unlawful, illegal and or fraudulent eviction (Exhibit 10). 69. 70. Pecuniary compensation is warranted as plaintiffs residence is unique. Injunctive relief is immediately necessary to enjoin defendants from completely

perfecting the fraudulent foreclosure, fraudulent Trustee's Deed upon Sale, and to prevent the defendants, and each of them, from perfecting clear title with respect to plaintiffs residence. All of this relief is justified because defendants have no real authority to enforce the underlying obligation in this matter. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Wrongful Foreclosure Where Defendants Failed to Make a Valid Attempt To Work-out the Loan (As to defendants ALS, QLS and MERS) 71. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each of the prior paragraphs as

though set forth fully herein. 72. California Civil Code section 2943.5(a)(1) provides that "a mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary or authorized agent may not file a notice of default pursuant to section 2924 until 30 days after contact is made as required by paragraph (2) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence requirements as described in subdivision (g). The law further requires that not less than three months shall elapse from the filing of the notice of default before Notice of Sale is provided stating the time and place thereof in the manner and for a time not less than set forth in section 2924f.

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73.

California Civil Code section 2925.52 provides that "a mortgagee, trustee or other

person authorized to take sale shall not give notice of sale until at least 90 days after the lapse of three months as set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of section 2924, in order to allow the parties to pursue a loan modification to prevent foreclosure, if all of the following conditions exist: (1) the loan was recorded during the period January 1, 2003 through January 1, 2008, inclusive, and is secured by residential real property; (2) the loan at issue is the first mortgage or deed of trust that the property secures; (3) the borrower occupied the property as the borrowers principal residence at the time the loan became delinquent; (4) the notice of default has been recorded on the property. 74. California Civil Code section 2923.52 provides that the three-month period for the

filing of a notice of default is extended by 90 days before a notice of sale may be given. 75. Defendant did not wait the additional 90 days and held the sale on December 20,

2010. In doing so they failed to follow proper procedures. Defendants previously gave plaintiff a Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed upon Sale dated July 28, 2010 and recorded on July 30, 2010 (Exhibit 7). Since there was a rescission defendants were required to file a new notice of default, which they did not do. 76. Defendants, and each of them, violated California Civil Code section 2923.52 by

pursuing its sale without giving plaintiff the benefit of the additional 90 days, resulting in the need to debtor to file bankruptcy to stop the sale.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION Quiet Title (As against All Defendants and all persons claiming by, through, or under such person, all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate lien or interest in the property described herein adverse to plaintiffs title thereto.) 77. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each of the above paragraphs as

though set forth fully herein.

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78.

Defendants failed to comply with required notice requirements specified by law

as described herein. Following the rescission of the Trustees Deed defendants were required by law to restart the notice of default process, but did not do so. 79. Plaintiff is the owner of the residence located at 7905 Drake St., Fontana, CA

80. Can the basis of plaintiff's title is a deed granting the above-described property in fee simple to plaintiff dated June 1, 2006 and recorded in the official records of the County of San Bernardino in Book 208, pages 70 through 72 (Exhibit 1). 81. Plaintiff is informed and believes in on such information and belief alleges that

defendants, and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through, or under such person, all persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest adverse to plaintiff in the above-described property. 82. Plaintiff seeks fee simple title to the property over any other claim. The legal

description of the Property is set forth hereinabove. 83. Plaintiff brings this action against defendants or any other person claiming

interest in the Property to quiet title to the Property, setting aside the fraudulent Trustee's Deed upon Sale. The claims of defendants are without any right whatsoever in such defendants have no right, title, estate, lien, or interest whatever in the above-described property or any part thereof. 84. 85. 86. Currently the Property is encumbered by the Trust Deeds held by defendants. None of the defendants have any legitimate interest in the Notes. Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court to release all other Trust Deeds and grant

quiet title to Plaintiff. 87. A lis pendens will be immediately filed against the Property. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION Fraud Knowingly Acting As Real Parties In Interest With Full Knowledge That The Deed of Trust Had Been Destroyed When the Note was Securitized. (As Against All Defendants)

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88.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each of the above paragraphs as

though set forth fully herein and further alleges on information and belief, the following: 89. As security for the Note which is the subject of this action Plaintiff executed a

Mortgage (hereinafter referred to as the "Deed of Trust") identifying MERS as "nominee for Lender and Lender's successor's and assigns .. [and as a] beneficiary under the Deed of Trust described herein. Subsequently the parties have changed from time to time as the defendants herein have seen fit in order to wrongfully claim to be parties in interest to the Note, though none has ever seen or touched the Note, nor can they determine its whereabouts, if there is. 90. The alleged loan was nevertheless registered on the SEC as a Real Estate

Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) Trust and became a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for the purpose of tax exemption. 91. REMICs are investment vehicles that hold commercial and residential mortgages

in trust and issues securities representing an undivided interest in these mortgages. 92. A master servicer of the REMIC was possibly appointed as was a Trustee,

Defendant Aurora Loan Services LLC. 93. Normally, the Trustee of a Trust has the power and responsibility to administer

the assets of the Trust but in the case of a REMIC no such power exists. 94. Once the REMIC containing Plaintiffs loan was formed, the loan was converted

into a security owned by thousands of shareholders throughout the world and was traded on Wall Street. 95. into a stock. 96. 97. Once Plaintiffs loan was securitized and converted, it forever lost its security. Since the loan was sold and securitized into stock, the lender can no longer claim At that point, the state of Plaintiffs loan changed and was converted forevermore

that it is a real party in interest, or even that the loan stills exists as a loan, since double dipping is a form of securities fraud. 98. A negotiable instrument can only be in one of two states after undergoing

securitization, not both at the same time. It can either be a loan or a stock.

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Once the instrument is traded as a stock, it is forever a stock and therefore regulated, as this loan was, by the SEC as a stock. 99. The subject Mortgage states that the Mortgage secures the Promissory Note.

The Promissory Note, by conversion into stock, was extinguished as a collateralized asset and therefore the Trust secures absolutely nothing and ALS, QLS nor MERS, none being the real party in interest, have no standing to foreclose on Plaintiff. 100. Since the Lender sold the loan to a REMIC, it forever lost the ability to enforce,

control or otherwise foreclose on Plaintiff property, including the right to assign the Mortgage or endorse the Note. It was no longer the real party of interest. 101. If Aurora Loan Services LLC or any of the other defendants herein owned the

Note, it or they would have to be taxed on the interest earned from the Note. If the REMIC owned the Note it would have a tax liability. 102. To avoid double taxation, under Internal Revenue Code 860, the loan was put into

a SPV so that only the shareholders are taxed and therefore are the real parties in interest. 103. Because of IRS code 860, the Aurora Loan Services LLC/Trustee (or any other

defendant in this case) is not the real and beneficial party in interest because the REMIC does not own the Note, the shareholders do. 104. By distributing the tax liabilities to the shareholders, the REMIC has also

distributed the parties in interest. 105. Since a Promissory Note is only enforceable in its whole entirety and thousands

of shareholders own the subject Note, no one of them can foreclose on Plaintiff home. The asset of the REMIC was registered and traded as a part of a security and as such cannot be traded out and is permanently attached and converted into stock preventing the Note from being assigned and securitized again and again which would create securities fraud. 106. Since Plaintiff loan went into default, it was written off by the REMIC and

received tax credits from the IRS, was therefore discharged, and settled destroying the Note forever. 107. adhesion. Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 14 After securitization, the Note cannot be re-attached to the Mortgage through

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108.

Under the UCC, the Promissory Note is a one-of-a-kind instrument and any

assignment must be as a permanent fixture onto the original Note much like a check. 109. 110. There is no endorsement on the original Note. The original Promissory Note has the only legally binding chain of title, otherwise

the instrument is faulty. 111. The original Note had to be destroyed upon securitization because the Note and

the stock cannot exist at the same time. 112. All Defendants lack standing to enforce the Note.

PRAYERS FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: As to the First Cause of Action for Wrongful Foreclosure against all defendants. 1. 2. 3. For general damages in the sum of $4,560,000. For special damages and the court may determine. For punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish the defendant's and

deter others from engaging in similar misconduct. As to the Second Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief against all defendants. 4. That this court declare that defendants cannot enforce the fraudulent, illegal, and

unlawful Trustee's Deed upon Sale recorded December 22, 2011 (Exhibit 9). 5. A permanent injunction be issued that the defendants and each of them lack

standing to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure concerning the subject property. As to the Third Cause of Action for Wrongful Foreclosure against all defendants. 6. 7. 8. For general damages in the sum of $4,560,000. For special damages and the court may determine. For punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish the defendant's and

deter others from engaging in similar misconduct. As to the Fourth Cause of Action for Quiet Title against all defendants.

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9.

A permanent injunction that defendants lack standing to conduct a nonjudicial

foreclosure concerning the subject property. 10. A judgment that plaintiff is the owner of the subject property and that defendants

have no interest whatsoever in the property. As to the Fifth Cause of Action for Fraud against all defendants. 11. 12. 13. General damages in the sum of $4,560,000. For special damages and the court may determine. For punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish the defendant's and

deter others from engaging in similar misconduct.

Dated this ____ day of May, 2012.

____________________________ Conchita Ang, Plaintiff in Pro Per

VERIFICATION

I am the plaintiff in this proceeding and have read the answer. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated: __________, 2012

_______________________ Conchita Ang Plaintiff In Pro Per

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing complaint has been furnished by US Mail properly addressed and with proper postage on May ___ 2012. To: Aurora Loan Services, LLC Business Service - Residential Sub-Servicing 10350 Park Meadows Dr. Littleton, CO 80124 Aurora Loan Services PO Box 1706 Scott's Bluff, NE 69363 1706 Aurora Bank FSB 2617 College Park Scott's Bluff, NE 69363 1706 Quality Loan Service Corp. 2141 5th Ave. San Diego, CA 92106 Phone: 619-645-7711 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) 1818 Library St., Suite 300 Reston, VA 20190 McCarthy and Holthus, LLP 1770 4th Ave. San Diego, CA 92106 Phone: 619-685-4800 Fax: 619-685-4811 TFLG, A Law Corporation 2121 2nd St., Suite C 105 Davis, CA 95618 Phone: 530-750-3700 Fax: 530-750-3366

By: _______________________________________ Print Name: ________________________________ Address: ___________________________________ City, State, Zip: _____________________________ Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 17