UNIT 3 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS IN DISASTER

PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES IN DISASTERS Psychological Services Introduction Purpose of this Guideline

The Guidelines for the delivery of Psychological Services in the Disaster Context (henceforth called the Guidelines), have been endorsed by the Standing Committee of Community Services and Income Security Administrators (SCCSISA) and the Australasian Society of Traumatic Stress Studies (ASTSS). They have also been commended by the National Emergency Management Committee (NEMC). In addition, the Guidelines draw on the Mental Health National Action Plan, the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists Position Statement 35 on the Role of Psychiatrists in Disasters, March 1996 DSRU discussion paper on Personal Support Guidelines, and the World Health Organisation project on disaster management. The purpose of the Guidelines is to incorporate and update information and knowledge previously available in two documents within Emergency Management Australias Australian Emergency Manuals Series: The Australian Emergency Manual Disaster Recovery, and Community and Personal Support Services Guidelines. The Guidelines have been developed to offer service providers, managers and practitioners with insights, principles and strategies in key facets of assessment and delivery of psychological services in the disaster context. Their aims are to facilitate recovery, ensure ethical practice, and to protect victims and support workers in their respective roles. As psychological dimensions inform all aspects of disaster services, the Guidelines should be read by all involved government departments, agencies and individuals. At the same time, as psychological services are but part of a broader recovery process, it is essential that psychological service providers and their agencies are aware of the specific recovery management system in which they operate, and to integrate within it. Although these Guidelines have been produced to encourage consistency in the delivery of psychological services in an Australian context, that is, across the boundaries of States, government and non-government organisations, and professional disciplines, in any given situation the prevailing management systems must be respected.

Key topics addressed in the Guidelines include Need for and process of production of this Guide to psychological service provision in the disaster context, Rationale and principles for the provision of psychological services in disasters, Assessment of particular needs for psychological interventions at different times for different disaster populations, Nature of particular interventions at different times for different populations, Assessment of service provider needs and nature of interventions to help them, and Research. It is acknowledged that the body of knowledge in these Guidelines is in the process of development. Consequently this document is intended to be reviewed and updated periodically or as new information comes to light.

Need for, Guidelines

and

Process

of

Production

of

the

Psychological service provision in a disaster context has been addressed previously in the Australian Emergency Manual Disaster Recovery, and in Community and personal Support Services - Guide 2. While these publications provided reasonable overviews of the principles and practice of psychological recovery processes, more up to date and sophisticated approaches have evolved since their publications. It was therefore considered necessary to combine and update the previous publications for use by all levels of planning, training and operations personnel. Consequently, a submission to conduct a workshop on the topic as part of EMAs National Studies Program was prepared by the Disaster Recovery Coordinators subcommittee of the Standing Committee of Community Services and Income Security Administrators, in conjunction with the Australasian Society for Traumatic Stress Studies. Following the acceptance of the proposal by EMA a steering committee was formed to identify key issues to be addressed and develop the workshop program and content. Participants invited to the workshop represented a cross section of managers and service providers from the range of government and non-government agencies involved in the delivery of psychological services in the disaster context, and the best available disaster traumatologists and academics in the field. The steering committee

then compiled the workshops suggestions and used them to update the previous publications.

Definitions disasters

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concepts

of

psychological

effects

in

The definitions and conceptualization of psychological effects described in this section will be applied through the rest of this manual. The reader is also referred to Appendices A and B.

Definition of disasters
For the purposes of this publication the term disasters refers to events which cause or threaten death within an identifiable and relatively circumscribed community. Natural disasters include floods, bushfires, cyclones and earthquakes. Man made disasters include mass shootings, hostage taking, major crashes and industrial accidents.

Definitions of disaster effects

Disasters cause major environmental, societal and personal upheavals. Most disturbances are in the nature of strains, often called stresses. Situations which give rise to stresses may be called crises or critical incidents. Stresses may be reversed, or stopped from worsening, by adaptive stress responses. Stress responses may be parts of survival and preservation strategies such as fight, flight, rescue, and attachment. When stress responses are insufficient or inappropriate, stresses may give, and irreversible disruptions called traumas develop. The event in which traumas develop is a traumatic event, and the situation in which this occurs is a traumatic situation. Stressors are agents which lead to stresses and traumas. Those which lead to traumas are called traumatic stressors. Because disasters are stressors which almost by definition lead to trauma, disasters are often implied to be traumatic stressors. Stresses and traumas have biological, psychological and social (actually integral biopsychosocial) ripple effects. Like ripples from a pebble in the pond, they radiate through the different dimensions of disasters.

Conceptualising Disaster Effects

Stress responses of various strategies of survival, both adaptive and maladaptive, biological, psychological and social, may be conceptualized to ripple along three dimensions. The three dimensional ripple view of disasters informs much of what follows. The first (parameter) axis describes the what of the disaster, when it struck and who was affected. Disaster phases (when) and social system levels (who) will be used in

this manual as primary bases for further exploration of the dimensions of assessments and interventions. The process axis describes the ripple process, and makes sense of how and why which biological, psychological and social stress responses make their way to fulfilling results or symptoms and dysfunctions. The depth axis orientates responses along human levels ranging from instincts to spirituality. The levels include moral judgements, identity, beliefs, meanings, and purpose. Survival strategies The choice of survival strategy(ies) determines the specific nature of stress responses and their adaptive and maladaptive biological, psychological and social ripples. The variety of survival strategies and their various ripple effects in three dimensions determines the great variety and complexity of traumatic stress responses in disasters. Nevertheless, one can make sense of such responses by orienting them on the triaxial framework and tracing them back to specific survival strategies evoked in the context of traumatic events. Specific survival strategies are fight, flight, rescue/caretaking, attachment, assertiveness/goal achievement, adaptation/goal surrender, competition and cooperation. A table in Appendix B indicates how survival strategies may be used to classify adaptive and maladaptive biological, psychological and social responses in disasters.

Rationale and principles for the provision of psychological services in disasters

This section will consider the rationale for specialised psychological services, and requirements of psychological service providers

Definition of psychological services

For the purposes of this publication the term psychological services refers to those services which apply specialist psychological skills of a level appropriate to the task, to psychological assessments, diagnoses and interventions in disasters in all their dimensions.

Rationale disasters

for

specialised

psychological

services

in

Psychological services in disasters are needed to help affected populations to shift the balance from maladaptive or traumatic responses to adaptive ones, and to preempt later pathology. Psychological services need to be specialised because in disasters responses need to be conceptualized in ways different from orthodox ones. Further, delivery of service requires special skills and cooperation with others, including informing other services with the psychological perspective. Lastly, because personnel deal with fresh and open wounds professional sensitivity, skill ethical standards and self-monitoring must be of an exceptional order. Special nature of psychological responses in disasters Orthodox psychological services usually deal with established problems and are customarily delivered within established diagnoses, frameworks and social structures. Disaster responses are acute, varied, fluid, and requiring specialised conceptualizations (3.3) to assist assessment, diagnosis and help, so that they do not become established. While orthodox treatments see clients and patients as needing cures from pathology, psychological services in early disaster phases emphasise normative responses and aid them, preempting illnesses. Established professional and institutional attitudes can be quite unhelpful. People struggling with effects from threats to their lives may resent being seen as crazy, ill, or pathological, and experience such judgements as additional stressors.

Logistics of service delivery While orthodox treatments often take the form of patterned office-based clinical therapies, in disasters social structures and patterns are may be disrupted, there may be a rapid increase in client numbers, and the psychological services may themselves be strained. Therefore service delivery has to be flexible, mobile, creative, extensive, while at the same time being able to prioritise. The approach is outreach, with all in the affected community contacted. Such coverage can identify the need to prioritise services to the vulnerable and those with established dysfunctions. Secondly, outreach may be able to prevent widespread distress and help prevent dysfunctions by for instance providing information about the nature and sense of common stress responses and what can be done about them. Psychological services should be a special but integral part of other established emergency and recovery services. The logistics of the service delivery is in the context of disaster management as a whole. Special skills are required to see the bigger picture, communicate along hierarchical lines and across services, liaise with them, integrate into emergency and recovery services as a whole, as well as have consultant and healing roles toward the service network. Special nature of psychological services as integral to Emergency Management

The planning, management and delivery of emergency services by disaster managers in many areas (such as evacuation, manner of dealing with personal loss and financial hardship) have the potential to have serious psychological consequences for affected individuals and communities. Positive consequences can be enhanced and negative ones avoided through disaster managers being informed by specialist psychological services of the psychological consequences of their decisions. Indeed, it is critical that the psychological dimension inform understanding, planning, training, assessment, decision making and service delivery components of emergency and recovery management. Lastly, managers may avail themselves of psychological services to deal with secondary stresses within their own sub-systems. Self-monitoring of psychological services to ensure effectiveness of the First do no harm. principle, and maintenance of own health. Specialist training is required to discern, and appropriately act on the wide range of biopsychosocial stress responses evoked in oneself during assessment and interventions. For instance, intense emotions at the professional level may be used as information for assessment and measured professional intervention rather than instinctive response. Nevertheless, because empathy requires openness to and reverberation with others, monitoring of ones responses by self, peer group and supervisors is necessary. This can prevent being overidentified, overcommitted, and overburdened, becoming a secondary victim and a burden on those one is supposed to help. The intense relationships developed with those one helps in disasters also requires ethical monitoring, in addition to the usual mental health professional ones. (See Appendix C for the code of ethics of the Australasian Society Traumatic Stress Studies.) In summary, specialist psychological services are needed in disasters, in order to

recognise, assess and deal with different dimensions of biological, psychological and social stresses outside the usual paradigms deal with unstructured and exacting logistical and organizational demands be able to liaise properly with other helpers, and interact advantageously with management be able to productively self-monitor oneself and ones organization.

Psychological Service Providers

Psychological service providers should be able to deliver the services described above in section 4.2. Integration of proven and trusted service providers may reduce

convergence by a multitude of service providers unfamiliar with specific requirements in disasters. Integration of psychological services needs to be maintained by regular network meetings with management. In the absence of current accreditations for specialised psychological services, and the frequency of unsolicited groups and individuals who offer psychological services in disaster areas, the following guidelines are offered to assess suitability of psychological service providers for disaster work. The guidelines should be used by organizations and individuals who contemplate offering psychological services to disaster areas, and managers who may need to determine suitability of such people at the disaster site. In the latter situation managers should consult senior psychological service personnel already trained in disaster work. Broadly, similar principles apply to potential acceptance and disposition of psychological service helpers as to those who offer help to other specialised services (such as firefighters). More specifically, the following questions can be asked of those wanting to help To what extent have they had prior experience, training and ability to perform the specialised psychological services in disasters described above? If not specially trained, to what extent do individuals/groups have a secure professional identity, matured professional experience and skills, knowledge of own limitations, and a secure work base which will enable the workers to stay as long as needed, be rostered, and be supported? What is their coping style, defenses and blind spots? How have they coped in previous disasters, and with personal disasters? Do they have capacities to prioritise? To what extent will they fit in with the culture of the population, other emergency and recovery services, and with community and established psychological services? To what extent do they have group process skills? Will they accept lines of responsibility and accountability within the disaster management framework? Do they accept self-monitoring (debriefs, supervision)? Are they bound by professional ethics? Will they accept the ethical guidelines for trauma work (Appendix C)? Do they accept that their prime responsibility is to affected populations, not third parties? Will they declare other interests and who pays them? Do they accept remuneration as conveyed by the disaster management authorities? Will they maintain proper duty of care in the context of informed consent and confidentiality?

 These questions will help to assess to what extent can service providers skills, attributes, capacities to fulfill roles, match needs of particular disaster populations, particular available resources, at particular times. If it is assessed that those offering their services can be utilised by specialised disaster psychological services, they should be helped to establish themselves into existing networks. If it is assessed that they cannot be of help, they may be treated as other well meaning people in convergence phenomena.

Assessment
General
In broad terms psychological service assessment may be defined as evaluation of the impact of a disaster at a particular time on individuals, families and communities, with the purpose of determining needs for psychological services. Assessment is a continuing process from pre-impact to healing. It is a complex, dynamic three dimensional enquiry which takes into account adaptive and maladaptive, predictable and unpredictable, uniform and fluctuating biological, psychological and social responses to threats of survival and of what is important in life. In this section general principles and modes of assessment will be followed by a description of more specific means of three dimensional assessment. The general and specific ingredients of assessment will be applied to specific populations at specific times in later sections.

Some general principles

The following key considerations applicable to assessments generally may be noted. FIRST DO NO HARM. Assessments are in themselves interpersonal interventions which have an effect on those assessed. It cannot be assumed that assessments are necessarily positive experiences or helpful for affected persons. One should continuously monitor whether ones assessment is helping or causing distress. For instance, a pathological bias may be selffulfilling, and assessment of vulnerabilities may expose and aggravate them. Assessments understand that most people respond normally, not pathologically in disasters. In this sense assessments are like in epidemics where all are potentially vulnerable, but only a sizable minority become ill. Assessments are directed to ascertaining best methods for prevention of pathology, and discerning the vulnerable and those already ill. Service providers must assess the situation in which they are assessing, and adapt to the unique requirements of interviewees, local issues and dynamics.

 Assessments should continue in all disaster phases, include all social system levels (that is, communities as a whole, groups and organizations, families,individual adults and children, and emergency service and helper), include biological, psychological and social aspects, and include levels from instinctive to spiritual. Nevertheless, assessments may need to be tailored to the phase of the disaster (for instance, relatively more triage, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, relatively more emphasis on assessment of life meanings in later phases). Different types of assessments have their windows of opportunity of acceptability, both of the enquiry and the assessors. For instance, if the initial windows are missed, trust, bonding with, and integration of service providers into a disaster affected community may be compromised. Affected individuals must be given the opportunity to express their most pressing needs in their own language without preconception, judgement or need to straitjacket communications into prior paradigms. Assessors are themselves affected by traumatic situations. Caution must be exercised to not have assessments distorted, for instance by overidentification with victims, defenses such as dissociation or denial, or evocation of previous blind spots. Concurrent education should be given to affected people on different social levels about the nature and purpose of assessments. Assessments must be coordinated to ensure there is no unnecessary repetition. Where feasible, review assessments should be undertaken by the same person. Assessments should always be informed by the complexity of the process, and readiness to assuage any distress inadvertently evoked by the assessment.

General Modes of assessment

Given the complexity and variety of psychological responses to disasters there can be no simplistic proforma model for assessment. Ones whole person as well as specialist skills must be available to communications from affected people. The following modes are available for assessments. Within each mode are assessed both verbal and nonverbal means of communication. Nonverbal means include facial expressions, postures, body language and artistic expressions. 1. Telling the disaster story. People are facilitated to tell their stories fully and in their own words. Stories are filled in from other social systems, such as communities reporting about individuals and vice versa. Assessments are nonjudgemental, yet take into account defensive distortions. For instance parents and teachers often underestimate childrens distress, while people may project their own distress on

others. In such cases they may say that their neighbours are worse off than themselves. 2. Professional histories. They include personal and family histories of disasters and means of handling them, assessment of past illnesses, personalities, strengths and vulnerabilities. Again others may shed light on such histories. 3. Reenactments (Transference). Trauma stories may be transferred from the traumatic situation to the assessment situation and reenacted or dramatised in the latter. For instance, anger in the assessment situation may reflect anger from the disaster event. 4. Ones own responses (Countertransference). Ones own responses may be empathic identifications or reactions to other peoples feelings, even if the latter are unexpressed. For instance, ones own despair or denial may reflect the way interviewees feel, while ones impulse to protect and provide may stem from others attachment needs.

Specifics of Three Dimensional Assessment; Use of the Triaxial Framework

When the pebble hits the pond, effects from survival responses ripple across various dimensions and their components (section 3.3, Appendix A and B). Note that assessments include both A sweep of the ripples in all dimensions to see what effects the disaster caused and Diagnosis of salient points on the ripples by orienting the points and tracing their manifestations back to their original contexts. Assessments include adaptive and maladaptive, biological, psychological and social aspects of each ripple point which shows disturbance It is useful to do a checklist to see whether all the components of the three axes have been assessed. What follows is assessment of the various components of the three dimensions of the pond (i.e. population) affected in disasters. In section 5.5 assessments of the three dimensions will be applied in different disaster phases and social systems. The principles above are applied in a pragmatic framework. Parameter axis

Components of the parameter axis describe what happened when to whom. The following are assessed The details of the particular stressor (flood, shooting), and the extent and nature of devastation. Details of when it happened, over what period. The details of the affected community - demographics, social system groupings and networks, special groups who may be of help or are vulnerable. Ages of those affected - children, adults, elderly. The Process axis The process axis assesses the nature of the ripple effects, including the what how and why of disaster consequences. Each of the components which follows has biological, psychological and social (functionally biopsychosocial) aspects. Stressors. Assessment of the noxiousness of stressors includes the number dead and injured, degree of mutilation, presence of human motivation in the causation of the disaster, youth of victims closeness to the epicentre of the event, extensive destruction, suddenness of the event and unpreparedness. The more these factors are present the more stressors are likely to lead to trauma, and be traumatic stressors (3.2). Lesser stressors which may be resolved and even lead to better adjustments are called crises. Lesser stressors again may be daily hassles. Disaster stressors usually have a cascade of a mixture of stressors. Stress responses Assessment and making sense of stress responses relies on assessing which survival strategies (fight, flight, rescue, attachment, goal achievement, goal surrender, competition, cooperation) were evoked to deal with stressors. Stress responses may be adaptive, in which case they provide satisfaction. If insufficient or maladaptive, they may lead to stress and trauma (see below).. The wide range of fluctuating and often opposite (e.g., altruistic and selfish) manifestations is due to the multiplicity of survival strategies used in disasters, and their adaptive and maladaptive, biological, psychological and social aspects. (For classification of these responses see table in Appendix B.) The presence of even intense stress responses in the initial stages may not indicate bad prognosis, as they may lead to adaptive dealing with stressors. Stresses and Traumas

It is important to assess and distinguish adaptive, maladaptive/stress, and trauma responses. While adaptive responses lead to satisfaction, unsuccessful/maladaptive ones are associated with a sense of strain stress or distress which are nevertheless still reversible. On the other hand, trauma responses are associated with a sense of overwhelming threat of death and irretrievable disruption. Severe stress and trauma responses (often called traumatic stress or critical incident stress responses) need to be assessed and monitored for their potential long term entrenchment and evolution of symptoms and illnesses. Stress and trauma responses are biological, psychological and social. Psychological stress responses include a variety of intense emotions, and cognitive difficulties experienced as difficulties in concentration, poor memory, sense of mental overload and fatigue with decreased mental functioning. Psychological trauma responses include intense helplessness, powerlessness, aloneness, abandonment, engulfment, constant danger, disintegration. Cognitive responses include shock, dissociation, inability to sequence and have insight and perspective. Strengths and Vulnerabilities Strengths are assessed in terms of training and successful past disaster experience, relevant coping skills, supportive networks and ability to use them, personal and financial resources, and resilience. Vulnerabilities to be assessed include past traumatic events and illnesses, past fragility and lack of resilience, current noxious stressors losses of people and resources (see Stressors above), lack of coping skills and supportive networks, and having young or elderly dependents. Defenses Defenses mitigate stresses and traumas by diminishing awareness of them. Assessment involves identifying particular defenses and the benefits and costs of the tense coping equilibrium of which they are part. Dissociation may manifest as a sense of unreality, out of body experiences or numbing. Fragmentation of responses may emphasise only one of biological, psychological or social responses. Disconnections (such as suppression or repression of awareness and memories), distortions of memories (such as projection, displacement), avoidance of anxieties (such as denial, withdrawal, overwork and substance abuse) all have benefits and costs in particular circumstances. Symptoms and Illnesses Though both affected people and helpers naturally reject illness models while they are trying to reconstitute normality and in fact to prevent pathology from occurring, it must be recognized that traumas and defenses do lead to a wide variety of biological, psychological (including PTSD), and social symptoms and illnesses, which account for well known increases in morbidity and mortality after disasters. Assessments include diagnosis of these dysfunctions, and assessments of past and present vulnerabilities and strengths which compound with current stress and trauma consequences.

5.4.3. The Depth axis Assessment of the depth axis (see also Appendix 1) is often forgotten as it does not deal with immediate survival issues. However, depth axis components include what makes life meaningful and worth surviving for. Thus disturbances to these components may actually cause more suffering than struggles for survival. Checking for these components, and diagnosing them when they present themselves, is therefore very important. Judgements Positive judgements include pride, worth, goodness and lovableness for actions in different disaster phases. Negative judgements include anger, guilt, shame, and a sense of injustice at ones own and others actions. Assessment includes understanding the specific sources of both positive and negative judgements. Beliefs Beliefs include basic assumptions about oneself and the world. They include values, ideals, principles, rights, and codes of conduct. Assessment includes identifying both upheld values and ideals, and beliefs which were shattered. Assessment also includes noting the source of false beliefs and basic assumptions which arose in the disaster. Identity, self Assessment includes enhanced and compromised aspects of identity. Enhanced selfrespect may stem from having acted altruistically or effectively according to expectations, or even beyond ones prior self-estimation. Loss of selfesteem may arise from a sense of failed roles, and having acted outside ones ideals. Dignity may be maintained in adversity through maintenance of selfrespect. It may be lost through loss of self-respect and its symbols, and denigrating treatment by others. Spirituality, sacredness, beauty Disasters may shatter assumptions about God, consequences of good and bad actions, and connections with an ordered purposeful universe. Disasters may also be seen as having destroyed beauty and harmony. On the other hand, survival and its accompaniments may come to be seen as sacred and meaningful. As well, inventiveness may spring from necessity, and creative impulses may flourish with regeneration. Existential meaning, purpose It is important to assess the balance of existential hope and despair, and the meanings, fulfillment and purpose which have been derailed. The latter can be central motifs of distress. Hope of positive meanings and purpose provide energy for

recovery. Disasters may reshape past meanings of life in the context of increased wisdom and maturity.

ASSESSMENTS AT DIFFERENT DISASTER PHASES OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEM LEVELS

The following section provides guidelines on assessment procedures at different disaster phases of specific social groups. Note that The underlying intention is to assess needs at any given time at any given level so as to specifically match them with appropriate interventions. This can only be an approximation as both phases and social systems overlap and impact on each other in a dynamic system. For instance, events in one phase influence those in subsequent ones, and social systems impact on each other. For the purpose of this manual the following definitions of disaster phases and social system levels will be used. (They are consistent with those in the AEM Disaster Recovery Manual.)

Definition of Disaster Phases

The phases considered are broadly preimpact, impact, post impact, and recovery and reconstruction. Preimpact Phase Preimpact phase is the time before the disaster strikes. It is the time for putting into effect lessons from past disasters, and for training and preparation. As the disaster approaches, it is the time for warnings, and possible evacuation. Impact Phase Sometimes called the heroic phase, it is the time during and immediately after the disaster strikes when people use strategies of survival to save themselves and others, and to preserve possessions. Postimpact Phase (First days to weeks) When the immediate threats of the disaster wane, the first part of the postimpact phase is characterised by joy of survival, strong egalitarian and generous bonds among survivors, strong sympathy and help from outside, and a sense of optimism about quickly returning to predisaster circumstances. This period is also called the honeymoon phase. The phase of disillusionment follows as the difficulties of coming

to terms with losses and rebuilding become apparent. Much frustration with scarce resources and bureaucratic and diminishing help may be accompanied by community tensions. As people try to assimilate their disaster experiences they may have a sense of still being immersed,reverberating or being assailed by images, responses, judgements and meanings from the disaster. Recovery and Reconstruction (First month to years) Physical and environmental reconstruction and replacement is accompanied by passage of identity from victim to survivor where individuals and communities resume responsibility for themselves and their disaster story. Disaster responses, their judgments and meanings are worked through into overarching wisdom. Yet unresolved griefs, entrenched stress responses, maladaptive defenses, may evolve in this stage into symptoms and illnesses, or may emerge in a delayed form in previously apparently well functioning people.

Definition of Social System Levels

The groups to be assessed are communities, families, adults and children. Helpers are a special group which needs assessment and help (see Section 7). Other secondary victims, such as family members outside the disaster area, nearby communities, media reporters, body handlers, hospitals to which the injured are transferred, should be remembered and assessed. Social system levels merge and overlap, and assessments within particular social groups use information from other social groups. For instance, individuals and families give information about communities and vice versa, and adults give information about children, and vice versa. Although this manual refers only to the Australian context, the same principles of preparedness and response apply when helping in disasters internationally. Communities Communities are generally defined by all those affected directly by a disaster. Yet communities include a variety of intersecting groups which may be defined by geographic location, cultural, ethnic, socioeconomic, functional, institutional, or accidental visitor criteria. Disasters may also create new groups such as evacuees, and bereaved groups. Community groups cohere through social networks, hierarchies, established codes and institutions, and channels of communication. Assessment therefore includes strengths and vulnerabilities of the community as a whole, its groups, networks, leadership, communication, and capacities of its institutions especially of its emergency services, local government, and health and welfare systems. Assessments are made of vulnerable parts of communities, such as hospitals, retirement villages, and ethnically and personally isolated groups. Special sources of information for community assessments include prior sociodemographic profiles and other community assessments, and current disaster command post and community leaders.

The following points should be noted in community assessments It is important to develop an assessment style that is relevant to the particular community (such as civilian / military; urban / rural), its current tone, mood and morale, and culture (such as psychological mindedness and capacity to deliver services in a psychological framework. Assessments may be undertaken through visiting places and people formally and informally, attending briefings and by convening meetings. Assessments are made by different people at different hierarchical levels. They need to be integrated by person/s who do not have operational responsibilities and have requisite experience and knowledge to make overall meta assessments. Assessments should be mapped over time and carefully integrated in the overall management process. Assessments should be monitored for potential adverse consequences. Families Families include parents, children and grandparents. Other members in the same household including relatives and friends, extended households, and close family members who were not in the disaster area at the time may form parts of assessments. Pets and toys should also be included whenever practicable. The following points should be noted in family assessments It is critical to ensure that all members of the family and other residents in the household are included assessments, from infants to the older generations. Families may protect vulnerable members from scrutiny, or use them as projections of their own distress. Wider family networks who suffer secondary stress should be assessed in their own right. The same ethics, such as of privacy and confidentiality (Appendix C), apply to family assessments as for those of individuals. Adults While adults are assessed as parts of communities and families, they should be assessed individually as well. Even though execution of roles and responsibilities weigh heavily on adults in their assessments and self-assessments, they may have many personal responses as well. These will be influenced by age, family status, and specific capacities and vulnerabilities.

During assessment the following points should be noted Affected individuals do not always recognise or report their difficulties and may need encouragement to do so. For instance being given information about common stress reactions may lead to people realizing that they are experiencing them too. Individuals may fluctuate in their functioning at different times in different roles, and in different circumstances. Assessment must be undertaken in a manner and space/setting congenial to the person. Privacy, confidentiality, dignity and rights of the person should be respected at all times (Appendix C). Children While assessment of children often utilises information from adults (parents, child carers, teachers, guidance officers), each child should also be assessed individually. Adults often underestimate and even suppress knowledge of childrens distresses. Assessment of children requires knowledge of normal developmental phases, ability to communicate appropriately to the childs age, and use of play and drawing techniques with younger children. During assessment the following points should be noted Children express their distress relatively more in physical symptoms and in actions. They are relatively more likely to associate events with atavistic and personalised meanings such as that they caused the disaster or it was a punishment for their misdeeds (see 5.9.4). Children may express their own vulnerabilities and distress, or they may act as symbolic vehicles to express family distress. Childrens assessments should take similar care for dignity, confidentiality, rights and monitoring of assessments as adult assessments.

TRAUMA:
Disasters occur commonly, and affect individuals as well as their communities. They may be humanmade, caused by deliberate intention, as with terrorism, civil unrest, and war experiences, or caused by people through mishap or neglect, such as a work accident or an apartment fire. In addition disasters may be caused by nature, including earthquakes, floods, wildfires, hurricanes, or tornadoes. Often large numbers of people are affected and they share their experience of trauma and traumatic loss. Many losses may occur after a disaster, including loss of loved ones, coworkers, neighbors, and pets, and loss of homes, workplaces, schools, houses of worship, possessions, and communities. Survivors may also lose their routine way of living and working, going to school, and being with others. Some may lose their confidence in the future.

Some disasters, such as terrorism, continue over a long period. These may create an on-going insecurity and exposure to danger or threat of danger, which may make it more difficult for some people to function in their lives. After a disaster, it is normal to experience a number of stress reactions that may continue for a significant period. And after the sudden, traumatic loss caused by disasters, it is normal for grieving and mourning to be uneven, more intensely felt, and extended over time. In all disasters, the experience of safety, security, and predictability in the world is challenged, and a sense of uncertainty becomes a part of life. What can I expect after experiencing a disaster? Most child, adolescent, adult, and older adult survivors experience some of the following normal stress responses to varying degrees. They may last for many months after the disaster has ended, and even longer. Normal stress reactions include:

Emotional (feeling) reactions: feelings of shock, disbelief, anxiety, fear, grief, anger, resentment, guilt, shame, helplessness, hopelessness, betrayal, depression, emotional numbness (difficulty having feelings, including those of love and intimacy, or taking interest and pleasure in day-to-day activities) Cognitive (thinking) reactions: confusion, disorientation, indecisiveness, worry, shortened attention span, difficulty concentrating, memory loss, unwanted memories, repeated imagery, self-blame Physical (bodily) reactions: tension, fatigue, edginess, difficulty sleeping, nightmares, being startled easily, racing heartbeat, nausea, aches and pains, worsening health conditions, change in appetite, change in sex drive Interpersonal reactions: neediness; dependency; distrust; irritability; conflict; withdrawal; isolation; feeling rejected or abandoned; being distant, judgmental, or over-controlling in friendships marriages, family, or other relationships. Spiritual (meaning) reactions: wondering why, why me, where was God; feeling as if life is not worth living, loss of hope.

What factors increase the risk of lasting vulnerability? During or after massive disasters, many survivors may be directly exposed to or witness things that may make them particularly vulnerable to serious stress reactions. Disaster stress may revive memories or experiences of earlier trauma, as well as possibly intensifying pre-existing social, economic, spiritual, psychological, or medical problems. While trauma reactions can become lasting problems, the shared experience of disasters and people's resiliency can provide support. Being aware of risk factors is important. They include:

Loss of family, neighborhood, or community Life-threatening danger or physical harm (especially to children) Exposure to horrible death, bodily injury, or bodies Extreme environmental or human violence or destruction Loss of home or valued possessions Loss of communication with or support from important people in one's life Intense emotional demands Extreme fatigue, weather exposure, hunger, or sleep deprivation Extended exposure to danger, loss, emotional/physical strain Exposure to toxic contamination (such as gas, fumes, chemicals, radioactivity, or biological agents)

Studies show that some individuals are more vulnerable to serious stress reactions and lasting difficulty, including those whose histories include:

Other traumatic experiences (such as severe accidents, abuse, assault, combat, immigrant and refugee experiences, rescue work) Chronic medical illness or psychological problems Chronic poverty, homelessness, unemployment, or discrimination Recent or earlier major life stressors or emotional strain (such as divorce or job loss).

What can survivors do to reduce vulnerability to serious emotional reactions and to achieve the best recovery from disaster stress? Observations by mental health specialists who assist survivors in the wake of disaster suggest that the following steps help to reduce stress symptoms and to promote post-disaster readjustment:

Protect: find a safe haven that provides shelter, food and water, sanitation, privacy, and opportunities to sit quietly, relax, and sleep, at least briefly Direct: begin working on immediate personal and family priorities to help you and your loved ones preserve or regain a sense of hope, purpose, and self-esteem Connect: maintain or re-establish communication with family, peers, and counselors in order to talk about the experiences. Survivors may want to find opportunities to "tell their stories" to others who express interest and concern and, when they are able, to listen to others as they tell theirs, in order to release the stress a little bit at a time and try to create meaning Select: identify key resources such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, local and state health departments for clean-up, health, housing, and basic emergency assistance. Identify local cultural or community supports to help maintain or reestablish normal activities such as attending religious services.

Taking every day one at a time is essential in disaster's wake. Each day is a new opportunity to take steps toward recovery. People affected by disasters should try to:

Focus on what's most important to themselves and their families today; Try to learn and understand what they and their loved ones are experiencing, to help remember what's important Understand personally what these experiences mean as a part of their lives, so that they will feel able to go on with their lives and even grow personally Take good care of themselves physically, including exercising regularly, eating well, and getting enough sleep, to reduce stress and prevent physical illness Work together with others in their communities to improve conditions, reach out to persons who are marginalized or isolated, and otherwise promote recovery.

How would I decide I need professional help? Most disaster survivors experience many normal responses and for some, their personal resources and capacities may grow and their relationships may strengthen. However, many survivors experience reactions during and after disasters that concern them, often when the disaster was caused by human action or included horror or loss of life. Some problematic responses are as follows:

Intrusive re-experiencing (terrifying memories, nightmares, or flashbacks) Unsafe attempts to avoid disturbing memories (such as through substance use or alcohol) On-going emotional numbing (unable to feel emotion, as if empty) Extended hyper arousal (panic attacks, rage, extreme irritability, intense agitation, exaggerated startle response)

Severe anxiety (paralyzing worry, extreme helplessness) Severe depression (loss of energy, interest, self-worth, or motivation) Loss of meaning and hope Sustained anger or rage Dissociation (feeling unreal or outside oneself, as in a dream; having "blank" periods of time one cannot remember)

STRESS: Stress is the wear and tear our bodies experience as we adjust to our continually changing environment. According to Hans Selye, a pioneer researcher in stress reaction, stress is the human response to changes that occur as a part of daily living. Stress has a physical and emotional effect on us, and it can create positive or negative feelings. Stress comes from any situation or circumstance that requires behavioral adjustment. Any change, either good or bad, is stressful, and whether its a positive or negative change, the physiological response is the same

Symptoms of Stress
When you are stressed, your body creates extra energy to protect itself, which then creates an imbalance within your system. This energy needs to be directed into responses to regain a sense of balance. The American Psychological Association (APA) identifies four different types of stress: acute stress, episodic acute stress, chronic stress, and traumatic stress. Here is a summary of the symptoms for each type of stress . Level 1 - Acute Stress Stressors defined as acute are the things that hamper your plans or your day: transportation problems that make you late to work, a missed deadline, an unexpected meeting with your childs teacher. Acute stress happens to everyone and tends to be manageable. Symptoms of Acute Stress: Emotional distress: worry, anger, irritability, anxiety, frustration, impatience Physical problems: fatigue, headache, back pain, jaw pain, trembling, cold hands and feet, and muscular stiffness that can lead to pulled muscles, tendons, and ligaments Digestive problems: heartburn, acid stomach, diarrhea, constipation, flatulence, irritable bowel syndrome Vital-Sign disturbances: rise in blood pressure, rapid heartbeat, sweaty palms, heart palpitations, dizziness, shortness of breath, chest pain Mental disturbances: confusion, inability to concentrate, indecisiveness, mind racing, mindlessness, or blankness Level 2 - Episodic Acute Stress Episodic acute stress is characterized by intense reaction to everything: the classic type A personality, an excessive competitive drive, aggressiveness, impatience, and having a

sense of time urgency. Episodic acute stress involves worry that a disaster is going to happen any minute. Symptoms of Episodic Acute Stress (In addition to symptoms of acute stress): Persistent headaches Hypertension Asthma Chest pain Heart disease Level 3 - Chronic Stress Chronic stress is the long-standing stress that wears people down. It can be associated with such problems as poverty, illness, dysfunctional families, or work dissatisfaction. Symptoms of Chronic Stress: Loss of appetite, or overeating Feeling of insecurity & inadequacy Weakened immune system Heart disease Chronic pain in joints, back, jaw, or shoulders Pessimism Resentment
Extreme or chronic anger Inability to concentrate Peptic ulcers Diminished coping ability Depression Chronic fatigue Migraine headaches Persistent anxiety Reclusiveness Constant irritability Cynicism Low performance levels Digestive Disorders

Level 4 - Traumatic Stress

Traumatic stress occurs when a person has had a traumatic experience such as being in an accident, witnessing a terrible crime, losing a job, or having extreme financial problems in keeping the farm as a result of a drought or any natural or human disaster. Individuals experience extreme emotional responses. The shock can make you dazed and the denial is the coping mechanism putting off feeling the intensity of the experience. Symptoms of Traumatic Stress: Feelings: unpredictable, intense mood swings; anxiety; nervousness; depression Thoughts: flashbacks; vivid memory of event; inability to concentrate

 Physical reactions: rapid heartbeat; sweating; headache, nausea, chest pain, general pain, and digestive problems Relationship problems: strained, frequent arguments with family members and/or coworkers; withdrawal and isolation from group activity.

Emotional intelligence
Defining emotional intelligence
Substantial disagreement exists regarding the definition of EI, with respect to both terminology and operationalizations. There has been much confusion regarding the exact meaning of this construct. The definitions are so varied, and the field is growing so rapidly, that researchers are constantly amending even their own definitions of the construct. At the present time, there are three main models of EI:

Ability EI models Mixed models of EI Trait EI model

The ability-based model

Salovey and Mayer's conception of EI strives to define EI within the confines of the standard criteria for a new intelligence. Following their continuing research, their initial definition of EI was revised to "The ability to perceive emotion, integrate emotion to facilitate thought, understand emotions and to regulate emotions to promote personal growth." The ability based model views emotions as useful sources of information that help one to make sense of and navigate the social environment. The model proposes that individuals vary in their ability to process information of an emotional nature and in their ability to relate emotional processing to a wider cognition. This ability is seen to manifest itself in certain adaptive behaviors. The model claims that EI includes 4 types of abilities:

1. Perceiving emotions the ability to detect and decipher emotions in faces, pictures, voices, and cultural artifacts including the ability to identify ones own emotions. Perceiving emotions represents a basic aspect of emotional intelligence, as it makes all other processing of emotional information possible. 2. Using emotions the ability to harness emotions to facilitate various cognitive activities, such as thinking and problem solving. The emotionally intelligent person can capitalize fully upon his or her changing moods in order to best fit the task at hand. 3. Understanding emotions the ability to comprehend emotion language and to appreciate complicated relationships among emotions. For example, understanding emotions encompasses the ability to be sensitive to slight variations between emotions, and the ability to recognize and describe how emotions evolve over time. 4. Managing emotions the ability to regulate emotions in both ourselves and in others. Therefore, the emotionally intelligent person can harness emotions, even negative ones, and manage them to achieve intended goals.

The ability-based model has been criticized in the research for lacking face and predictive validity in the workplace.[12] Measurement of the ability-based model] Different models of EI have led to the development of various instruments for the assessment of the construct. While some of these measures may overlap, most researchers agree that they tap slightly different constructs. The current measure of Mayer and Saloveys model of EI, the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) is based on a series of emotion-based problem-solving items. Consistent with the model's claim of EI as a type of intelligence, the test is modeled on ability-based IQ tests. By testing a persons abilities on each of the four branches of emotional intelligence, it generates scores for each of the branches as well as a total score. Central to the four-branch model is the idea that EI requires attunement to social norms. Therefore, the MSCEIT is scored in a consensus fashion, with higher scores indicating higher overlap between an individuals answers and those provided by a worldwide sample of respondents. The MSCEIT can also be expert-scored, so that the amount of overlap is calculated between an individuals answers and those provided by a group of 21 emotion researchers. Although promoted as an ability test, the MSCEIT is most unlike standard IQ tests in that its items do not have objectively correct responses. Among other problems, the consensus scoring criterion means that it is impossible to create items (questions) that only a minority of respondents can solve, because, by definition, responses are deemed emotionally 'intelligent' only if the majority of the sample has endorsed them. This and other similar problems have led cognitive ability experts to question the definition of EI as a genuine intelligence. In a study by Fllesdal, the MSCEIT test results of 111 business leaders were compared with how their employees described their leader. It was found that there were no correlations between a leader's test results and how he or she was rated by the employees, with regard to empathy, ability to motivate, and leader effectiveness. Fllesdal also criticized the Canadian company Multi-Health Systems, which administers the MSCEIT test. The test contains 141 questions but it was found after publishing the test that 19 of these did not give the expected answers. This has led Multi-Health Systems to remove answers to these 19 questions before scoring, but without stating this officially. ELECTRONIC WARNING SYSTEM: Sudden natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes, can strike in minutes. Although they cannot be prevented, some can be forecast. Their effects can be reduced if communities are warned and prepared. Although the UK does experience natural disasters, this note addresses its role in Early Warnings (EWs) in developing countries, where sophisticated EW systems may be difficult to implement and maintain1. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) and others, emphasise that EWs should be integrated in a wider disaster risk reduction strategy, rather than be a stand alone solution.

Background Rapid onset natural hazards affecting human populations are listed in Box 1. Weatherrelated events are more frequent than geophysical events, and affect more people.2 Slow onset natural disasters (such as drought, famine, or extreme temperatures), which affect even more people,2 are not covered in this note, as their longer timescales do not demand such rapid communication of warnings and mobilisation of humanitarian aid resources. Rapid onset disasters have a high impact in a very short amount of time. For example, both the 1970 tropical cyclone in Bangladesh and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami killed more than 300,000 people in just hours to days. Early warning systems For an early warning of a natural disaster to reach vulnerable populations, there must be bodies responsible for the following tasks: scientific monitoring, data processing, and event forecasting (see Box 2). Local knowledge can ensure that these activities are appropriately focused; Box 1. Natural hazards Weather related hazards Tropical cyclones - violent rotating windstorms with torrential rains originating over tropical oceans, with wind speeds up to 300kmph, circulating over 100s to 1,000s of km. They are also called tropical depressions, tropical storms, hurricanes, or typhoons, depending on their size and location. Other windstorms are less severe, or on a smaller scale. Tornadoes localised, violently rotating funnel shaped windstorms that extend from a cloud to the ground. Storm surges extremely high sea levels, caused by strong winds and low pressures, producing severe coastal flooding, especially if coinciding with high tides. Floods inundations of normally dry land, caused by heavy rain, dam failure, snow melt, glacial lake outburst or a combination of these factors. The impact and speed of onset of flooding will vary according to its cause and the local topography and rock types. Geophysical hazards Landslides downward movements of a large volume of rocks, earth, or debris. They are usually triggered by heavy rainfall, but can also result from earthquakes, volcanic activity, and erosion. They are more likely to occur on weakened or steep slopes. Earthquakes sudden movements of the earths crust due to release of stress built up along geologic faults.

 Volcanic eruptions - ranging from the quiet flow of liquid rock to the violent expulsion of hot gas, ash and rocks. Tsunamis huge destructive waves triggered by an underwater earthquake, volcano, or landslide. They travel across the deep ocean at 100s of kmph, and slow down, gaining height as they reach coasts. translation of scientific information into public warnings that are meaningful to their targets; the widest possible dissemination of warnings to those who could be affected by the hazard. Box 2 Costs of scientific monitoring and forecasts Weather hazards Meteorological data can be obtained from ground based observations, weather balloons, satellites, weather radars, and aircraft. This information is fed into computer models to forecast weather patterns. Most of these observations and forecasts are shared globally through the Global Telecommunication System (GTS),coordinated by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). Weather forecasts must be combined with local risk knowledge to assess flood and landslide hazards. Sophisticated National Meteorological Services (NMS) in developed countries have annual running costs of 100s of millions. NMSs in developing countries, where only ground based and weather balloon observations are made and computing is limited, have annual costs of 100s of thousands. Geophysical hazards Volcanoes - monitoring systems vary from rudimentary visual observations to sophisticated networks of monitoring equipment. The minimum instrumentation for a quiet volcano that starts showing signs of unrest is basic equipment to monitor earthquakes, ground deformation and gas emissions; and a computer to integrate the data. This would cost ~100,000 to set up, and 20,000 a year to run, plus staffing costs. Earthquakes a large earthquake occurring anywhere in the world will be recorded on hundreds of instruments, and its size and location determined within minutes. Although it is possible to identify regions at risk of earthquakes, specific predictions of the time, location. and size of occurrence are not possible. Therefore earthquake risk reduction must focus on preparedness rather than reliance on warnings. Tsunamis - their triggers are usually located within minutes of occurring. If ocean depths are also known, tsunami arrival times can be calculated. However, it is more difficult to determine the size of the tsunami. This requires sea level monitoring to detect and measure the wave, and computer modelling of ocean depth and coastal data to calculate how different coasts will be affected. There are many tide gauges already operational in the worlds oceans, whose primary function is tide monitoring. Some of

these could be upgraded for use in tsunami warnings. The monitoring system for the Indian Ocean proposed by the UN would cost 15M plus 1M per year to run.3 For rapid onset events, warnings must reach people within minutes to hours of the event or its precursor being detected. It is thus important that all responsible agencies are on call 24 hours a day and that each task is carried out as quickly as possible. In particular, communication of data and warnings between agencies must be rapid. This requires established and regularly tested protocols for each stage of data transfer. UK natural disaster policies Several recent natural disasters have focused attention on the need to improve planning for these events, and on the possible role of early warning systems. They include: a devastating hurricane season in the Caribbean in August and September 2004, causing thousands of deaths in Grenada and Haiti. This led to questions in Parliament as to why Grenada was not warned in time, and what could be done to warn politically unstable states such as Haiti;4 the Indian Ocean Tsunami on 26 December 2004. The Prime Minister, the UK Parliament (as well as other national Parliaments), and the UN have all called for a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean.5 Further discussions have noted the need for tsunami warnings in other oceans, as well as integrated warnings for other natural disasters. In January 2005, the Government Chief Scientific Adviser convened a group of experts to advise the Prime Minister on detection and early warning of global natural hazards. This has debated the need for an intergovernmental panel on natural disasters. The UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) recommends national advisory bodies for natural disasters known as National Platforms.6 The UK is one of the few developed countries without such a body. DFID attributes this to a lack of clarity from the UN on whether these bodies should focus on national issues or on issues affecting developing countries. Other EU countries have taken their own initiatives, resulting in National Platforms with widely differing roles. Nevertheless, many UK bodies are involved in disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities in developing countries. DFID currently provides 5 million a year to multilateral and bilateral DRR schemes, in addition to 100s of millions a year on humanitarian aid channelled through civil society and UN organisations. DFID is now committed to spending 10% of its funding /in response to each natural disaster on preparation for and mitigation of future natural disasters, and is working towards integrating DRR into development programmes for individual countries.

The word Disaster has derived from the French word Desastre which means evil star. Disaster is an unpredictable and sudden event in devastating nature, which causes human sufferings and loss of property, plants and animals etc. This damage is immeasurable and varies according to the geographical location and the degree of vulnerability. Therefore, disaster completely disturbs the normal life. A devastating event cannot be disaster unless it disturbs the normal life causing damage to life (plant and animal) and property within society. Since most of the major disasters are

unavoidable and it is almost impossible to fully recover the loss there is an urgent need of disaster management to minimize the loss. The experience of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2001 Gujarat earthquake, 1999 earthquake in Turkey, 2001 coastal earthquake in Central America and 2001 earthquake in Indonesia, show that disasters cause human sufferings, environmental smash-up, disruption of economic development etc. With a total death toll 3 lakh human beings, the Indian Ocean tsunami caused by the deep-sea earthquake near northern Sumatra on 26th December, 2004, was the worst natural disaster of that kind in recorded human history. Apart from the huge number of human killings, the devastating nature of this tsunami makes it a valuable platform for the study of disaster management in this century to achieve towards one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The previous deadliest disasters were (estimated death tolls are in parentheses): Indonesia, 27 August 1883 (36,000); Portugal, 1 November 1755 (30,000); Japan, 15 June 1896 (27,000); Japan, 21 May 1792 (14,000); and Japan 27 March 1933 (3,000). Therefore, it has become an urgent need to mitigate disaster by adopting innovative technologies as it is not possible to avoid completely. Loss minimization caused by disaster is possible through the innovative use of the existing technologies. Information is one of the most important requirements for disaster management. Information-sharing among different disaster management stakeholders is essential for coordinated management, particularly at the response phase. The concept of World Wide Web is an emerging trend in the arena of disaster management. The advancement of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), specially space technologies, have enabled to enhance the systems like Geographical Information System (GIS), Remote Sensing etc. which can be a great help in planning and implementation of hazards reduction measures. Disaster management is a cyclical process consisting of disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. Spatial data and GIS play a crucial role in preparing for, mitigating, detecting and responding to and recovering disasters (Amdahel, 2002). Without the help of spatial data effective disaster management is not possible as the spatial data are the essential inputs for the application of Geographical Information System. The application of spatial data management and engineering technologies in disaster management, Global Positioning System (GPS), Remote Sensing (RS) and Geographical Information Systems has made disaster management more effective. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in the USA was an example of the wide application of spatial data and related technologies for effective disaster response. In addition to that, Information Exchange, Early Warning System, Knowledge management and Data mining and Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) are also helpful in disaster management. Therefore, the focus of the present book is to capture as to how the existing technologies like GIS, RS, ICT, GPS, Data Information Exchange, Data Mining, VSAT,

Early Warning System and Knowledge Management etc. help in disaster management. Finally, it concludes that the decision-makers should put appropriate steps to work closely with scientists for implementation of the required policies. Sometimes, disasters have no boundaries, therefore, international collaboration and advancement of technology usage should be the first step. The first article Disaster Management: Use of Technologies by Subir Ghosh gives an overview of disaster management through the application of the existing technologies. Disaster is an unpredictable and sudden event in devastating nature, which causes human sufferings and loss of property, plants and animals etc. This damage is immeasurable and varies according to the geographical location and the degree of vulnerability. Deadly disasters have increased the importance of disaster management. This article highlights what is disaster, what are its types, importance of disaster management, stages of disaster management, recent trends of disaster and its Management A cross country analysis, use of the existing technologies in disaster management etc. This article also discusses how as to the existing technologies help in disaster management. The second article Early Warnings for Natural Disasters by Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology provides disaster management mechanism through Early Warning System. Sudden natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods and earthquakes can strike in minutes. Although they cannot be prevented, some can be forecast. Their effects can be reduced if communities are warned and prepared. Therefore, this article highlights how early warning can help in natural disaster preparedness. For an early warning of a natural disaster to reach vulnerable populations, there must be bodies responsible for the following tasks: Scientific monitoring, data processing and event forecasting. Translation of scientific information into public warnings that are meaningful to their targets. The widest possible dissemination of warnings to those who could be affected by the hazard. To hold the discussion better, this article also gives the example of natural disaster management in the United Kingdom (UK). The UK Department for International Development (DFID) and others emphasize that Early Warnings should be integrated in a wider disaster risk reduction strategy rather than be a stand alone solution. The third article Disaster Management: The Challenges for a National Geographic Information Provider by Chris Parker and Mark Stileman discusses effective disaster management through the delivering of right information to the right place at the right time. Effective disaster management requires getting the right

information (often geographically related) to the right place at the right time. Minimizing response times to incidents are, therefore, critical. Recent and anticipated (often disruptive) developments in spatial databases, GPS, wireless, mobile and computing technologies have changed, and will continue to change, the way in which Geographic Information (GI) can be collected, maintained, analyzed, integrated and delivered to the end user in disaster management and other domains. GI is increasing part of the information mainstream. These developments have changed the role of Ordnance Survey from being the nations map maker to being the geographic information provider, with a substantial role in developing a geographic framework in which both geographic and related information can be efficiently integrated, exchanged and understood. Therefore, this article includes a number of research challenges within the domain of disaster management. Three of them are considered and illustrated: The application of user-centered design techniques to user requirements and behaviors in order to identify where GI adds value in contributing to task efficiency Considerations of database modeling in 3 and 4 dimensions Exploring GI portrayal with new technology. The fourth article Hurricanes and Global Warming by R A Pielke Jr., C Landsea, M Mayfield, J Laver and R Pasch examines the tropical cyclone in the context of global warning and how to mitigate this hazard with the help of technology. Debate over climate change frequently conflates issues of science and politics. Because of their significant and visceral impacts, discussion of extreme events is a frequent locus of such conflation. Therefore, this article focuses on a particular type of extreme event the tropical cyclone (tropical cyclones are better known as hurricanes) in the context of global warming and how to mitigate this hazard with the help of technology. This article distinguishes between event risk and outcome risk. Event risk refers to the occurrence of a particular phenomenon, and in the context of hurricanes it focuses on trends and projections of storm frequencies and intensities. Vulnerability refers to the inherent characteristics of a system that create the potential for harm, but are independent of event risk. In the context of the economic impacts of tropical cyclones vulnerability has been characterized in terms of trends in population and wealth that set the stage for storms to cause damage. Outcome risk integrates considerations of vulnerability with event risk to characterize an event that causes loss. To calculate probability of both vulnerability and event risk, this article discusses hurricanes and global warming from both of these perspectives. The fifth article Digital Typhoon: The Way for Disaster Mitigation (Summarized version by Mahua Maity of the article titled Digital typhoon: near realtime aggregation, recombination and delivery of typhoon-related information authored by Asanobu Kitamoto) discusses about disaster mitigation through Digital

Typhoon website. This paper introduces the Digital Typhoon project, whose goal is to establish the study of meteoinformatics and to develop emergency information systems in the domain of typhoon-related information. It first proposes the models of emergency information systems and uses flat-source model as the model of emergency information systems, and explains the concepts of information aggregation, recombination and delivery to the recipients. The basic principle of information recombination is the relationship that data plus context equals information, and it introduces the notion of context generation with real examples. Information aggregation deals with content management systems for aggregating information and it hypothesizes that the effective emergency information aggregation systems need to have the hub of information, following the proposal of information aggregation system using weblog track backs. Finally, information delivery describes information needs and delivery tools for Digital Typhoon, which has received more than 13 million page views since July 2003. The sixth article Managing Information in the Disaster Coordination Centre: Lessons and Opportunities by Renato Iannella and Karen Henricksen shows the current scope of ICT in disaster coordination and management. The current scope of ICT support for disaster coordination is primarily focused at either the network or data levels. There is significant opportunity for ICT to play an important role for disaster coordination at the information level. This paper reviews the information structures and requirements gathered from disaster coordination centre based on exercise observations. Such coordination of information is usually based on national frameworks that document structures, roles and responsibilities, but is seldom supported by the relevant ICT infrastructure or systems. This paper uses the lessons learned from the exercise observations to identify future opportunities for information management software to support disaster centre operations. In particular, the paper introduces a prototypical Crisis Information Management System and has tried to develop to support two challenges incident notification and resource messaging. The seventh article Disaster Response Using Distributed Geospatial Web Services by Ali Mansourian and Mohammad Taleai discusses how the geospatial Web services help in disaster mitigation. Information is one of the most important requirements for disaster management. Information-sharing among different disaster management stakeholders is essential for coordinated disaster management, particularly at the response phase. In IT world, Web services technologies are presented as the best solution for providing interoperability among heterogeneous systems in distributed and decentralized environments. Considering the particular characteristics of spatial information, Geospatial Web services (community specific kinds of online services called geospatial Web services) have been developed with the goal of sharing geospatial data and services among heterogeneous geospatial processing systems. With respect to above description, this article intends to address using geospatial Web services and Web services technologies to facilitate and improve disaster management, particularly disaster response. The article says that

geospatial Web services which are developed using cutting-edge Web services technologies can technically resolve interoperability problem among different systems in a disaster response. Such system enables managers and responders to share information seamlessly among organizations (or even different countries in the case of regional disasters) for better coordination and planning purposes that leads to facilitating and improving disaster management. The eighth article Remote Sensing and GIS for Monitoring Coastal Hazards and Disasters by Debashis Mitra shows Remote Sensing and Geographical Information System monitor coastal hazards. The coastal zone occupies less than 15% of the earths land surface. Only 40% of the one million km of coast-line is accessible and temperate enough to be habitable, yet it accommodates more than 60% of the worlds population.The coastal zone is subject to various cyclic and random processes, both natural and anthropogenic, that continuously modify the region. Protection of human life, property and natural ecosystems from various hazards is a major concern. The major hazards are cyclones and associated tidal floods, coastal erosion, pollution and sea level rise and its impact. Because of the dynamic nature of the coastal zone, it needs to monitor regularly to effective planning and management. Satellite remote sensing because of its synoptic view and repetitive coverage is one of the best tools to monitor the development of a coastal zone in temporal domain. During natural disasters like cyclone, flooding or tsunami, both active and passive remote-sensing data help to monitor the event, relief dispersal, evacuation route and rehabilitation. GIS has the ability to handle much larger databases and to integrate and synthesize data from a much wider range of relevant criteria than might be achieved by manual methods. This in turn helps to achieve more balanced and coordinated management strategies for considerably longer lengths of coast. The ninth article Science and Technology Trends in Fire Protection and Disaster Management: A Consideration of Characteristics and Directions in Science and Technology for Safety and Peace of Mind by Yoshiyuki Matsubara and Kuniko Urashima shows how the science and technology are used in fire protection and disaster management. This article includes fire protection and disaster management prevention and response, strategic plan for fire protection, environment-friendly fire retardation and innovations in firefighting technology. Fire protection and disaster management with the help of science and technology should form a proactive cycle that includes prior response, post-response and analysis of causes. Expectations are high for the use of new technologies such as information technology, sensor technology etc. for fire protection and disaster prevention. The strategic plan organizes topics related to fire protection and disaster management with the help of science and technology into the following main areas: Enhancement of disaster information communications systems

 Promotion of household fire prevention measures Improvement of disaster prevention capability Enhancement of fire protection support Enhancement of first-aid and rescue work. The tenth article Remote Sensing and Geographical Information System for Natural Disaster Management by Samir Kumar Banger examines how Remote Sensing and GIS help in natural disaster management. Natural disasters are inevitable and it is almost impossible to fully recoup the damage caused by disasters. But it is possible to minimize the potential risk by developing knowledge management, disaster early warning strategies etc. Space technologies also play a crucial role in efficient mitigation and management of disasters. Knowledge Management is about applying the collective knowledge of the entire workforce to achieve specific goals. It is all about getting the right knowledge in the right place at the right time. This paper describes the role of RS and GIS, knowledge management in evolving a suitable strategy for disaster management and occupational framework for their monitoring, assessment and mitigation. It also identifies the gap areas and recommends appropriate strategies for disaster management using these technologies. The eleventh article Recent Trends in Earthquake Disaster Management in Japan by Katsutoshi Suganuma focuses on recent trends and future issues in earthquake disaster management in Japan. Despite the fact that Japan and the seas around it account for only about 1 percent of the earth surface, approximately 10 percent of the worlds earthquakes of magnitude 8 or greater during the 20th century had occurred in Japan or its vicinity. It shows Japan is one of the most earthquakeprone countries in the world. Japan is also a leader in earthquake disaster management. Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of January, 1995, various technologies for earthquake disaster management have been developed. This article also includes lessons learned from Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and subsequent earthquakes, status of measures since the earthquake, current and future issues. In order to reduce earthquake damage, this article highlights completion of a seafloor seismograph network, replacement of seismograph and improvement of the reception system, establishment of preferential treatment to promote earthquake resistance, creation and distribution of hazard maps and promotion of multipurpose conducts. The twelfth article Role of Earth System Sciences in Disaster Management by Ravindra Kumar examines how earth system sciences help in disaster management. Geologic events are distinctive for the extremely rapid onset impacting over larger areas. Knowledge of geological sciences could greatly help in managing disasters. Landslides, unstable slopes, forest fire etc. cause loss of life and property.

Therefore, it is an urgent need to undertake multidisciplinary research programmes on geological hazards and risk assessment through the application of technologies. So, this article focuses on temporal components of disaster management, and suggests that natural hazard evaluation has to be done in time to influence the original formulation of the project like Environmental Impact Assessment through the avoidance of forest fire etc. The thirteenth article Disaster Forensics: Leveraging Crisis Information Systems for Social Science by Mitchell L Moss and Anthony M Townsend gives an account of crisis management by providing an overview of emerging technologies for sensing and recording sociological data about disasters. These technologies are transforming the capacity to gather data about what happens during disasters, and the ability to reconstruct the social dynamics of affected communities. The approach takes a broad review of disaster research literature, current research efforts and new reports from recent disasters, especially Hurricane Katrina and the Indian Ocean Tsunami. This article forecasts that the sensor networks will revolutionize conceptual and empirical approaches to research in the social science, by providing unprecedented volumes of high-quality data on movements, communication and response activities by both formal and informal actors. It concludes with a set of recommendations to designers of crisis management information systems to design systems that can support social science research, and argue for the inclusion of postdisaster social research as a design consideration in such systems. The fourteenth article Application of GIS and Remote Sensing Technologies in Disaster Management in Algeria by Youcef Smara, Aichouche Belhadj-Aissa and Mostefa Belhadj-Aissa discusses about how Algeria has used GIS and Remote Sensing technologies in disaster management. Algeria is affected by fourteen major risks (earthquakes, landslides, floods, forest fires, oil spill etc.) and the means for management of these disasters are limited and often inadequate. In recent years, RS and GIS have been the object of considerable interest to all bodies concerned with space and in particular emergency services and disaster management in Algeria. The use of remote sensing and GIS has become an integrated, well developed and successful tool in disaster management in Algeria. For the risk of oil pollution, RS and GIS have been used for the detection and characterisation of oil spills and for the large earthquake (occurred in May, 2003), Synthetic Aperture Radar Interferometry (InSAR) has been used as a valuable tool for monitoring relative surface displacement. Every year about 30,000 hectares of forests are destroyed by fires in Algeria. Therefore, the Algerian Government is aiming at setting up of GIS integrating remote sensing data for the prevention and management of forest fires. Finally, this book also includes an annexure, entitled Disasters: Consequences and Combating Strategies by Subir Ghosh focusing on the dangers of disasters, past disaster experiences and the reasons for application of technologies to combat disaster.

GEO INFORMATICS: India has the highest occurrence of natural disasters in south-east Asia with about 85 percent of the country liable to be affected by one or the other disaster viz avalanches cyclone, drought, earthquake, flood, landslides, etc. There are also many environmental hazards, spontaneous or human-induced related to the natural forest or soil cover or over-exploitation of agricultural land. Of these about 63 percent of the total agricultural area is drought prone, while area devastated by annual or flash floods is estimated to be about 12 to 15 percent of the area. The long coastline and the coastal areas are exposed to one or two pre or post monsoon cyclones every year. More than 50 percent of India.s geographical area is vulnerable to seismic or geodynamical activity of varying intensity. An area of 2,000 sq. km in the Himalayas in different locations is exposed to snow avalanche hazards. These natural hazards are so frequent and so devastating that these affect the economic development. Social stability gets severely disturbed and inflicts untold human miseries leading to health hazards. Although the occurrence of such disasters cannot be prevented or regulated, the proper application of scientific knowledge based on past experience can minimize the economic and health consequences of the population. Due to severe drought in 1987, India.s entire population was affected due to severe shortages of food grain production and water scarcity leading to economic hardship. This was followed in 1988 by a large scale devastating floods in major flood-prone basins in the country. The natural hazards can be listed as avalanches and landslides in Himalayas, cyclones in coastal areas, drought in rain-scarcity areas, earthquakes in seismic and tectonic activities affected areas and floods in heavy rainfall area. While satellite communication has improved significantly the possibility of real-time dissemination of information and early warning system, earth observation satellites enable continuous monitoring of atmospheric as well as earth surface parameters attributing to natural disaster phenomena. Space technology, combined with satellite remote sensing and related use of information technology, PCs and many software packages provide the modern cartographers with more accurate and faster methods of map-making to depict the physically devastated areas- all of which assist in early warning systems, estimates of occurrence, likely damages and loss of lives, impact assessment, damage assessment, quick dissemination of disaster information to the people of the country and the world and to the government and international agencies for decision about early support and relief for disaster mitigation measures. India is one of the two countries of the world, which uses space technology for nearreal-time monitoring of drought, cyclone and flood as a national programme and thus provide the modern cartographers with the latest technological tools to assist in disaster management. India faced a severe drought in 1987. India.s entire population

was affected due to severe shortages of food grain production and water scarcity leading to economic hardship. This was followed by a large scale devastating floods in 1988. Since then major technological programmes have been launched by the government of India including space technology and information technology for monitoring and quick appraisal of drought and flood damages. Jurio and van Zuider of National University of Comahue, Argentina and of ITC, The Netherlands respectively, reported a study of use of remote sensing (RS) and geographical information system (GIS) for desertification analysis in north-west Patagonia, Argentina (1998). Betts and DeRose reported the use of digital elevation model constructed from aerial photographs, as a tool for measuring gully erosion in New Zealand (1999). Studies were spread over 14 to 33 years, and concluded that this method resulted in considerable cost saving and added efficiency compared to ground methods. Shrimali, et al, 2001 reported a study of prioritising erosion prone areas in hills using RS with GIS in the Sukhna lake catchment, Shivalik hills near Chandigarh. Spillage of oil in coastal waters can be a catastrophic event causing damage to the environment and economy of the area affected. Marghany, 2001 reported the use of RADARSAT images and two types of algorithm (Lee and Gamma) for oil spill detection based on texture analysis and concluded that the use of RS helps in speeding up oil spill information and at a lesser cost but more accurately.

RECENT TRENDS IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT:

One considerable difficulty in assessment of vulnerability is the differing methods of classifying human elements in the collecting-reporting process. To be a disaster an event has (at least) to be a 'killing event'. The agencies below use from 1 fatality to 10, and "considerable" (subjective) to determine inclusion in the database. A single or several fatality event is rarely reported in media, but considered in the annual aggregate, for example fatalities from lightning strikes. How are 'casualties' and 'affected' defined? In one case it is documented from medical reports, be it a minor out-patient injury, or a serious in-patient injury is unclear. 'Affected' is variously defined as homeless, without essential services, loss of employment, in differing combinations. 'Damages' proportional to the 'Intensity' of an event (as opposed to measured magnitude) also share a subjective qualitative approach that differs across agencies. It is none the better with the earth systems hazards behind the disaster; with no common classification scheme. For example, EMDAT and UNISDR have separate criteria for inclusion in the 'windstorms' and 'hydrometeorological', categories, and in some cases separate cyclones from other severe weather. In addition, none of the sources indicate clearly how composite disaster events are reported. Another difficulty in assessment of vulnerability is the differing time frames used by reporting sources. Drawing statistical inferences across these data-sets would be a cross-sectional fallacy and spurious. Census data quantity and quality vary widely. Therefore, it is suggested that we adhere to descriptive statistics and logical inferences based upon ranks and averages, and geographic relationships over time in our interpretations and analyses. if we adhere to a one decade or three decade window from one database we can make valid statistical inferences, but we may overlook the impact of long-term trends, and singular outlying (punctuating) disaster events found in other databases. Synthesizing-Interpreting the various data-sets and maps with our knowledge & understanding of historical global earth systems and cultural trends (as related to Natural Disasters) is the art of the science.

GEO INFORMATICS:
India has the highest occurrence of natural disasters in south-east Asia with about 85 percent of the country liable to be affected by one or the other disaster viz avalanches cyclone, drought, earthquake, flood, landslides, etc. There are also many environmental hazards, spontaneous or human-induced related to the natural forest or soil cover or over-exploitation of agricultural land. Of these about 63 percent of the total agricultural area is drought prone, while area devastated by annual or flash floods is estimated to be about 12 to 15 percent of the area. The long coastline and the coastal areas are exposed to one or two pre or post monsoon cyclones every year. More than 50 percent of India.s geographical area is vulnerable to seismic or geodynamical activity of varying intensity. An area of 2,000 sq. km in the Himalayas in different locations is exposed to snow avalanche hazards. These natural hazards are so frequent and so devastating that these affect the economic development. Social stability gets severely disturbed and inflicts untold human miseries leading to health hazards. Although the occurrence of such disasters cannot be prevented or regulated, the proper application of scientific knowledge based on past experience can minimize the economic and health consequences of the population. Due to severe drought in 1987, India.s entire population was affected due to severe shortages of food grain production and water scarcity leading to economic hardship. This was followed in 1988 by a large scale devastating floods in major flood-prone basins in the country. The natural hazards can be listed as avalanches and landslides in Himalayas, cyclones in coastal areas, drought in rain-scarcity areas, earthquakes in seismic and tectonic activities affected areas and floods in heavy rainfall area. While satellite communication has improved significantly the possibility of real-time dissemination of information and early warning system, earth observation satellites enable continuous monitoring of atmospheric as well as earth surface parameters attributing to natural disaster phenomena. Space technology, combined with satellite remote sensing and related use of information technology, PCs and many software packages provide the modern cartographers with more accurate and faster methods of map-making to depict the physically devastated areas- all of which assist in early warning systems, estimates of occurrence, likely damages and loss of lives, impact assessment, damage assessment, quick dissemination of disaster information to the people of the country and the world and to the government and international agencies for decision about early support and relief for disaster mitigation measures. India is one of the two countries of the world, which uses space technology for near-real-time monitoring of drought, cyclone and flood as a national programme and thus provide the modern cartographers with the latest technological tools to assist in disaster management. India faced a severe drought in 1987. India.s entire population was affected due to severe shortages of food grain production and water scarcity leading to economic hardship. This was followed by a large scale devastating floods in 1988. Since then major technological programmes have been launched by the government of India including space technology and information technology for monitoring and quick appraisal of drought and flood damages. Jurio and van Zuider of National University of Comahue, Argentina and of ITC, The Netherlands respectively, reported a study of use of remote sensing (RS) and geographical information system (GIS) for desertification analysis in north-west Patagonia, Argentina (1998). Betts and DeRose reported the use of digital elevation model constructed from aerial photographs, as a tool for measuring gully erosion in New Zealand (1999). Studies were spread over 14 to 33 years, and concluded that this method resulted in considerable cost saving and added efficiency compared to ground methods. Shrimali, et al, 2001 reported a study of prioritising erosion prone areas in hills using RS with GIS in the Sukhna lake catchment, Shivalik hills near Chandigarh. Spillage of oil in coastal waters can be a catastrophic event causing damage to the environment and economy of the area affected. Marghany, 2001 reported the use of RADARSAT images and two types of algorithm (Lee and Gamma) for oil spill detection based on texture analysis and concluded that the use of RS helps in speeding up oil spill information and at a lesser cost but more accurately. Chakraborti, 1999 reported drought damage assessments using coarse resolution NOAA - AVHRR and IRS-1C & ID WiFS sensor data both at district and sub-district level. He reported that agriculture drought assessment can be best done by the use of infrared and red bands of NOAAAVHRR, combined

with satellite laser ranging. Shrestha, 1999 reported the use of GIS for land degradation assessment in the middle Himalayan mountain of Nepal. A watershed belonging to Likhu Khola river was studied which concluded that human intervention leads to soil erosion and degradation. Rautela, et al, 1990 carried out Indian Cartographer, 2002 MFDM-08 207 studies of Kali, Kaliganga and Madhya Mahashwar river valleys in Garhwal Kumaun Himalaya, Uttaranchal, landslide hazard zonation using GIS analysis supported by field check. They concluded that such studies help in timely soil conservation programmes in the watersheds.

A few cases of national and international studies of natural and human induced hazards using remote sensing, geographical information system, PCs and GPS have been reported above. It is proved beyond doubt that the RS and GIS based methods using space technology has placed a new tool in the hand of modern cartographers to assist in disaster management. It is therefore, recommended that the modern cartographers may be trained in this new space technology assisted by information technology to be of greater service to the society and nation.

CYBER TERRORISM:
Cyber-warfare conjures up images of information warriors unleashing vicious attacks against an unsuspecting opponents computer networks, wreaking havoc and paralyzing nations. This a frightening scenario, but how likely is it to occur? What would the effects of a cyber attack be on a potential opponent? Cyber attacks, network security and information pose complex problems that reach into new areas for national security and public policy. This paper looks at one set of issues those related to cyber-terrorism and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and their implications for national security. Cyber-terrorism is the use of computer network tools to shut down critical national infrastructures (such as energy, transportation, government operations) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population. The premise of cyber terrorism is that as nations and critical infrastructure became more dependent on computer networks for their operation, new vulnerabilities are created a massive electronic Achilles' heel. A hostile nation or group could exploit these vulnerabilities to penetrate a poorly secured computer network and disrupt or even shut down critical functions. Much of the literature on cyber-terrorism assumes that the vulnerability of computer networks and the vulnerability of critical infrastructures are the same, and that these vulnerabilities put national security at a significant risk. Given the newness of computer network technology and the rapidity with which it spread into economic activity, these assumptions are not surprising. A closer look at the relationships between computer networks and critical infrastructures, their vulnerability to attack, and the effect on national security, suggests that the assumption of vulnerability is wrong. A full reassessment is outside the scope of

this paper, but a brief review suggests that while many computer networks remain very vulnerable to attack, few critical infrastructures are equally vulnerable. A reassessment of the cyber threat has four elements. First, we need to put cyber-warfare and cyber-terrorism in the historical context of attacks against infrastructure. Strategies that emphasize attacks on critical civil infrastructures have discussed for more than eighty years. Second, we need to examine cyber attacks against a backdrop of routine infrastructure failures. There is extensive data on power outages, flight delays and communications disruptions that occur normally and the consequences of these routine failures can be used to gage the effect cyber-warfare and cyber-terrorism. Third, we need to measure the dependence of infrastructure on computer networks and the redundancy already present in these systems. Finally, for the case of cyber-terrorism, we must consider the use of cyber-weapons in the context of the political goals and motivations of terrorists, and whether cyber-weapons are likely to achieve these goals. A preliminary review of these factors suggests that computer network vulnerabilities are an increasingly serious business problem but that their threat to national security is overstated. Modern industrial societies are more robust than they appear at first glance. Critical infrastructures, especially in large market economies, are more distributed, diverse, redundant and self-healing than a cursory assessment may suggest, rendering them less vulnerable to attack. In all cases, cyber attacks are less effective and less disruptive than physical attacks. Their only advantage is that they are cheaper and easier to carry out than a physical attack. Infrastructure as Target Cyber-terrorism is not the first time a new technology has been seized upon as creating a strategic vulnerability. While the match between theories of cyberwarfare and air power is not precise, a comparison of the two is useful. In reaction to the First World War, European strategists like Douhet and Trenchard argued that aerial bombing attacks against critical infrastructure well behind the front lines would disrupt and cripple an enemies capacity to wage war. Their theories were put to the test by the U.S. Army and Royal Air Forces during World War II in strategic bombing campaigns aimed at destroying electrical power, transportation and manufacturing facilities. Much of the first tranche of literature on cyber attacks resembles in many ways (and owes an unspoken debt to) the early literature on strategic bombing.

A key document for understanding how attacks on infrastructure affect societies is the Strategic Bombing Survey conducted by the United State during and after World War II. During the war, Britain and America launched thousands of heavy bombers that dropped millions of tons of high explosives on Germany, seeking to cripple its infrastructure, destroy its industrial base and break the will of the population to continue the war. Early theorists of air warfare had predicted that such an onslaught would paralyze or cripple the target. What the survey found, however, is that industrial societies are impressively resilient. Industrial production actually increased for two years under the bombing and it was not until ground forces occupied Germany that resistance ceased: As the air offensive gained in tempo, the Germans were unable to prevent the decline and eventual collapse of their economy. Nevertheless, the recuperative and defensive powers of Germany were immense; the speed and ingenuity with which they rebuilt and maintained essential war industries in operation clearly surpassed Allied expectations. Germany resorted to almost every means an ingenious people could devise to avoid the attacks upon her economy and to minimize their effects. The mental reaction of the German people to air attack is significant. Under ruthless Nazi control, they showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated air attack, to the destruction of their homes and belongings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced to live. Their morale, their belief in ultimate victory or satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the physical means of production remained.1 The U.S. found similar results from aerial bombardment during the Vietnam War. Counter-intuitively, the effect of aerial attack was often to harden and increase popular support for continued resistance. The advent of nuclear weapons (and perhaps large precision-guided munitions) gave air power the ability to disrupt civil infrastructures needed to achieve the visions of Douhet, Trenchard or Mitchell, but cyber attacks do not pose the same level of lethality. One of the Strategic Bombing Surveys conclusions was that The German experience showed that, whatever the target system, no indispensable industry was permanently put out of commission by a single attack. Persistent re-attack was necessary. However, cyber attacks are likely to be single attacks. Once a hacker has gained access and the damage done, the target usually responds quickly to close off the vulnerability that allowed that line of attack and to bring systems back on line. Cyber attackers would continually need to exploit new

vulnerabilities and new tactics to ensure sustained disruption. Cyber attacks also seldom if ever produce physical damage that requires time-consuming repairs.

Routine Failure versus Cyber Attack Critical infrastructure protection creates a new set of problems for national security. Different actors are involved. The focus is on civilian and commercial systems and services. Military force is less important. The scope of these new problems depends on how we define national security and how we set thresholds for acceptable damage. From a legal or public safety perspective, no country will accept even a single attack on infrastructure or interruption of services. If the goal is to prevent cyber-attacks from costing a single day of electric power or water service, we have set a very high standard for security. However, from a strategic military perspective, attacks that do not degrade national capabilities are not significant. From this perspective, if a cyber-attack does not cause damage that rises above the threshold of the routine disruptions that every economy experiences, it does not pose an immediate or significant risk to national security. It is particularly important to consider that in the larger context of economic activity, water system failures, power outages, air traffic disruptions and other cyber-terror scenarios are routine events that do not affect national security. On a national level, where dozens or even hundreds of different systems provide critical infrastructure services, failure is a routine occurrence at the system or regional level, with service denied to customers for hours or days. Cyberterrorists would need to attack multiple targets simultaneously for long periods of time to create terror, achieve strategic goals or to have any noticeable effect. For most of the critical infrastructure, multiple sustained attacks are not a feasible scenario for hackers, terrorist groups or nation states (particularly for nation states, where the risk of discovery of what would be universally seen as an act of war far outweigh the limited advantages gained from cyber attacks on infrastructure). Weapons of Mass Annoyance A detailed examination of some of the scenarios for attacks on critical infrastructures helps place cyber-attacks more accurately in a strategic or national security context. For example, dams used for water storage and for power generation are often cited as a likely target for cyber attack. The

Washington Post recently wrote that unnamed U.S. analysts believe that by disabling or taking command of the floodgates in a dam, for example, or of substations handling 300,000 volts of electric power, an intruder could use virtual tools to destroy real-world lives and property.2 In the United States, the water supply infrastructure would be an elusive target for cyber attack. There are 54,064 separate water systems in the U.S. Of these, 3,769 water systems serve eighty one percent of the population and 353 systems served forty-four percent of the population. However, the uneven spread of diverse network technologies complicates the terrorists task. Many of these water supply systems in the U.S., even in large cities, continue to rely on technologies not easily disrupted by network attacks. There have been cases in the U.S. when a communitys water supply has been knocked out for days at a time (usually as a result of flooding), but these have produced neither terror nor paralysis. A cyber terrorist or cyber warrior would need to carry out a sustained attack that would simultaneously disrupt several hundred of these systems to gain any strategic benefit. Assuming that a terrorist could find a vulnerability in a water supply system that would allow him to shut down one citys water for a brief period, this vulnerability could be exploited to increase the damage of a physical attack (by denying fire fighters access to water). In general, a cyber attack that alone might pass unnoticed in the normal clutter of daily life could have useful multiplier effects if undertaken simultaneously with a physical attack. This sort of simultaneous combination of physical and cyber attacks might be the only way in which cyber weapons could be attractive to terrorists. The American Waterworks Association assessment of the terrorist threat to water supplies placed physical destruction of the system's components to disrupt the supply of water as the most likely source of infrastructure attack.3 Comparing aerial and cyber attacks on hydroelectric dams helps provide a measure for cyber-threats. Early in World War II, the Royal Air Force mounted a daring attack on dams in the Ruhr, a chief source of electrical power for German industry. The raid was a success, the dams breached by bombs and, for a period of time, the electrical supply in the region was disrupted.4 A comparable cyber attack occurred when a young hacker reportedly gained access to the computer controls for a dam in the U.S. Southwest, but did not disrupt service or cause physical damage.5 In neither attack was the damage or the reduction in electrical power paralyzing. Of the two, the cyber attack was less effective in that it caused no physical damage and could be classed more as an annoyance than a threat. The aerial attack resulted in physical damage that needed to be repaired. The only advantage of a cyber attack is that it is less expensive - a

teen-ager and a desktop computer rather than valuable aircrews and expensive aircraft. Many analyses have cyber-terrorists shutting down the electrical power system. One of the better cyber security surveys found that power companies are a primary target for cyber attacks and that seventy percent of these companies had suffered a severe attack in the first six months of 2002.6 The U.S. electrical power grid is a desirable target, but it is a network of multiple, redundant systems that are used to routine system failure and disruption. The national electrical grid is a highly interconnected system of over 3,000 public and private utilities and cooperatives. These 3,000 electrical power providers use a variety of different information technologies to operate their controls for power generation and transmission. A hacker or even a large group of hackers would need to find vulnerabilities in multiple systems to significantly disrupt the power supply and even then, an attack might only disrupt service for a few hours. The North American Electric Reliability Council, an industry group formed after the 1965 New York blackout, has been working with the Federal government since the 1980s to improve the security of the electrical system and to develop rapid responses to large outages. In Congressional testimony, NERC officials have said that in the last few years, neither viruses nor Distributed Denial of Service attacks against the U.S. electrical system have interrupted service.7 While industry sources can paint an over-optimistic picture at times, it remains true that falling trees have caused many electric system disruptions while cyber attacks have caused none. A risk assessment by the Information Assurance Task Force of the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee concluded Physical destruction is still the greatest threat facing the electric power infrastructure. Compared to this, electronic intrusion represents an emerging, but still relatively minor, threat.8 The U.S. has already run a large-scale experiment on the effects of disrupting electrical power supplies, thanks to Californias experience with deregulation last year. Californias efforts to de-regulate the electrical power market resulted in months of blackouts and rolling brownouts across the state. Deregulation was a more powerful attack on the electrical infrastructure than anything a cyberterrorist could mount. There was clearly economic cost to the California regulatory event, but it was not crippling nor did it strike terror into the hearts of Americans. Similarly, power outages across the country in 1999 affected millions of people and cost electrical power customers millions of dollars in lost business and productivity. These outages were the result of increased electricity use prompted by sustained high summer temperatures. In contrast to Californias

State government or hot weather, the number of blackouts in U.S. caused by hackers or cyber-terrorists remains zero. Interference with national air traffic systems to disrupt flights, shut down air transport and endanger passenger and crews is another frequently cited cyberthreat.9 We are not yet at a stage where computer networks operate aircraft remotely, so it is not possible for a cyber-attacker to take over an aircraft. Aircraft still carry pilots who are trained to operate the plane in an emergency. Similarly, the Federal Aviation Authority does not depend solely on computer networks to manage air traffic, nor are its communications dependent on the Internet. The high level of human involvement in the control and decision making process for air traffic reduces the risk of any cyber attack. In a normal month storms, electrical failures and programming glitches all ensure a consistently high level of disruption in air traffic. Pilots and air traffic controllers are accustomed to unexpected disruptions and have adapted their practices to minimize the effect. Airlines and travelers are also accustomed to and expect a high degree of disruption in the system. In the United States, it is normal for 15,000 to 20,000 flights to be delayed or cancelled every month. A cyber attack that degraded the air traffic system would create delays and annoyance, but it would not pose a risk to national security. The FAA has 90 major computer systems and nine different communications networks. These networks rely on elderly equipment and use proprietary software that make them difficult for outsiders to hack. This may explain why the few reported attacks have not affected air traffic. In one reported incident, a young hacker interrupting local phone service in a New England, cutting off a regional airports control tower and the ability to turn on runway lights. Although the interruption lasted six hours, there were no accidents at the airport. In other cases, FAA headquarters computer networks have been penetrated, allowing hackers to make public unpublished information on airport passenger screening activities, and in another case, a hacker was able to enter an FAA mail server. None of these cases resulted in any disruption to flight.10 Ironically, modernization could actually increase FAA vulnerability if greater attention is not given to security. A recent attack on the Internet illustrates the nature of vulnerabilities from cyber attack. For a one-hour period in October 2002, unknown parties launched a Distributed Denial of Service attack on the thirteen root servers that form the basis of the domain names system that governs Internet addresses. Eight of the thirteen servers were force off-line because of the attacks. The attack itself was invisible and without effect on Internet users. The attack on the DNS system did not noticeably degrade Internet performance. Most DNS data needed for the daily operation o f the Internet is stored locally and updated daily. Very few

requests require assistance from the root servers. Additionally, the presence of thirteen servers (of which five were not affected by the attack) gives a degree of redundancy that suggests that if there are vulnerabilities to the Internet, the DNS servers are not one of them. In contrast to the DNS attack, shortly after it occurred thousands of Internet customers in the western United States experienced serious delays when their service provider had routing problems due to programming errors. Unlike the attack, this DNS failure actually disrupted service, but it had no effect on national security. While the Internet may have a few points of failure that offer the possibility for system-wide disruption, it was designed to be a robust, distributed communications network capable of continuing operations after a strategic nuclear exchange. Packet switching and Internet protocols were developed to allow communications to be maintained even when some nodes in the network were eliminated and the Internet itself was designed to automatically route around damage to allow for continued communications. Additionally, computer networks rely on a backbone of high capacity telecommunications systems that are relatively secure from cyber-attack. The introduction of new communications technologies also enhances survivability. Wireless and satellite communications also provide some redundancy for landline systems. Most industrial countries now have access to three or four different modes of communications, making the system considerably more robust than it was a decade ago. Increased use of ultra wideband and mesh radio networks will also increase redundancy and survivability against cyber attack in communications networks. The 911 emergency response system, a specialized communications network that relies on local telephone service, is also a favorite target for theorists of cyber-terrorism, but like other infrastructures, it is a robust target. The U.S. for example, does not use a single 911 system in but instead has several thousand local systems using different technologies and procedures. No 911 system in a major city has been hacked. It might be possible to send a flood of email messages instructing people to call 911 for important information and thus overload the system (this was the technique used in the 1997 U.S. cyber exercise Eligible Receiver). This sort of technique usually works only once but made in conjunction with a bombing or other physical attack they could act as a force multiplier for a terrorist event. Manufacturing and economic activity are increasingly dependent on computer networks, and cyber crime and industrial espionage are new dangers for economic activity. However, the evidence is mixed as to the vulnerability of manufacturing to cyber attack. A virus in 2000 infected 1,000 computers at Ford Motor Company. Ford received 140,000 contaminated e-mail messages in three hours before it shut down its network. E-mail service was disrupted for almost a

week within the company. Yet, Ford reported, the rogue program appears to have caused only limited permanent damage. None of its 114 factories stopped, according to the automaker. Computerized engineering blueprints and other technical data were unaffected. Ford was still able to post information for dealers and auto parts suppliers on Web sites that it uses for that purpose. 11 Companies now report that the defensive measures they have taken meant that viruses that were exceptionally damaging when they first appeared are now only nuisances.12 Cyber attacks are often presented as a threat to military forces and the Internet has major implications for espionage and warfare. Information warfare covers a range of activities of which cyber attacks may be the least important. While information operations and information superiority have become critical elements in successful military operations, no nation has placed its military forces in a position where they are dependent on computer networks that are vulnerable to outside attack. This greatly limits the effectiveness of cyber weapons (code sent over computer networks). The many reports of military computer networks being hacked usually do not explain whether these networks are used for critical military functions. It is indicative, however, that despite regular reports of tens of thousands of network attacks every year on the Department of Defense, there has been no degradation of U.S. military capabilities. For example, while there were many attack against U.S. military computer networks during operations in Kosovo, these attacks did not result in sorties being cancelled or in a single casualty. Similarly, a foreign power that used cyber-weapons to try to prevent a carrier battle group from leaving the U.S. would be unlikely to succeed. A recent attack by a British hacker neither compromised classified information nor disrupted military operations. A Rand study conducted for the U.S. Air Force on military operations and information vulnerabilities noted while most of the current topical interests has focused on the newer, trendier threats to information systems, particularly computer hacking and associated disruption and manipulationour analysis showed that some of the old-fashioned threats pose a greater danger.13 Hacking and Terror Much of the early work on the cyber threat depicted hackers, terrorists, foreign spies and criminal gangs who, by typing a few commands into a computer, can take over or disrupt the critical infrastructure of entire nations. This frightening scenario is not supported by any evidence. Terrorist groups like Al Qaeda do make significant use of the Internet, but as a tool for intra-group communications, fund-raising and public relations. Cyber terrorist could also

take advantage of the Internet to steal credit card numbers or valuable data to provide financial support for their operations. Cyber-terrorism has attracted considerable attention, but to date, it has meant little more than propaganda, intelligence collection or the digital equivalent of graffiti, with groups defacing each others websites. No critical infrastructures have been shut down by cyber attacks. Terrorists seek to make a political statement and to inflict psychological and physical damage on their targets. If terrorism is an act of violence to achieve political objects, how useful will terrorists find an economic weapon whose effects are gradual and cumulative? One of Al Qaedas training manuals, Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants notes that explosives are the preferred weapon of terrorist because explosives strike the enemy with sheer terror and fright. Explosions are dramatic, strike fear into the hearts of opponents and do lasting damage. Cyber attacks would not have the same dramatic and political effect that terrorists seek. A cyber attack, which might not even be noticed by its victims, or attributed to routine delays or outages, will not be their preferred weapon. If terrorism is an act of violence to create shock and achieve political objects, how useful will terrorists find an economic tool whose effects are at best gradual and cumulative? An analysis of the risk of cyber terrorism is also complicated by the tendency to initially attribute cyber events to military or terrorist efforts when their actual source is civilian recreational hackers. When DOD computer networks were penetrated in an attack that occurred in the late 1990s, the U.S. was quick to suspect potential opponents, particularly Iraq or China, as the culprit. U.S. officials debated the merits of an active defense and whether this was an act of war, justifying a counter-attack. As tension mounted, the U.S. discovered that far from being a hostile power, the source of the attack was two high school students in southern California. It is difficult, especially in the early stages of an incident, to determine if the attacker is a, terrorist, group, foreign state, criminals, or a teenager in California. However, a quick survey of incidents over the last four years suggests that criminals and bored teenagers are the most likely sources of attack. To this day, the vast majority of hacking incidents result from the actions of recreational hackers. While the press has reported that government officials are concerned over Al Qaeda plans to use the Internet to wage cyber-terrorism, these stories often recycle the same hypothetical scenarios previously attributed to foreign governments cyber-warfare efforts. The risk remains hypothetical but the antagonist has changed from hostile states to groups like Al Qaeda. The only new element attributed to Al Qaeda is that the group might use cyber attacks to disrupt emergency services in order to reinforce and multiply the effect of a

physical attack. If cyber-attacks were feasible, the greatest risk they might pose to national security is as corollaries to more traditional modes of attacks. Espionage opportunities created by a greater reliance on internet-accessible computer networks will create greater risk for national security than cyber attacks. Terrorist groups are likely to use the Internet to collect information on potential targets, and intelligence services can not only benefit from information openly available on the web but,14 more importantly, can benefit from the ability to clandestinely penetrate computer networks and collect information that is not publicly available. This is very different from hacking, in that in the event of a successful penetration of a hostile network, a terrorist group or an intelligence service will want to be as unobtrusive as possible. A sophisticated opponent might hack into a system and sit there, collecting intelligence and working to remain unnoticed. It will not disrupt essential services or leave embarrassing messages on websites, but remain quietly in the background collecting information. Collection techniques for the Internet differ significantly from earlier signals and communications intercept techniques, and while different kinds of data will be collected, the overall effect may be to make some espionage activities much more rewarding. This topic, the implications for espionage of the greater use of computer networks and Internet protocols, deserves further study. Cyber Crime and the Economy Cyber attacks do pose a very real risk in their potential for crime and for imposing economic costs far out of proportion to the price of launching the attack. Hurricane Andrew, the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history, caused $25 billion dollars in damage and the average annual cost from tornadoes, hurricanes, and flood damage in the U.S. is estimated to be $11 billion. In contrast, the Love Bug virus is estimated to have cost computer users around the world somewhere between $3 billion and $15 billion. Putting aside for the moment the question of how the estimates of the Love Bugs cost were calculated (these figures are probably over-estimates), the ability of a single university student in the Philippines to produce this level of damage using inexpensive equipment shows the potential risk from cyber crime to the global economy. 15 The financial costs to economies from cyber attack include the loss of intellectual property, financial fraud, damage to reputation, lower productivity, and third party liability. Opportunity cost (lost sales, lower productivity, etc) make up a large proportion of the reported cost of cyber attacks and viruses. However, opportunity costs do not translate directly into costs to the national economy. For example, if a Distributed Denial of Service attack prevents

customers from reaching one online bookseller, they may instead go to another to purchase their books. The aggregate national sale of books could remain the same although the first booksellers market share would decline. A small number of customers may choose not to bother going to another site if their first choice is unavailable, but some of these lost sales may well be recouped by later return to the sight by the customer. Businesses face greater damage from financial fraud and theft of intellectual property over the Internet, crimes that continue to grow in number.16 Emphasizing the transnational nature of cyber security issues, the last few years have seen the emergence of highly sophisticated criminal gangs capable of exploiting vulnerabilities in business networks. Their aim is not terror, but fraud or the collection of economically valuable information. Theft of proprietary information remains the source of the most serious losses, according to surveys of large corporations and computer crime.17 These crimes must be differentiated from the denial of service attacks and the launching of viruses. Denial of services or viruses, while potentially damaging to business operations, do not pose the same level of risk. Cyber crime is a serious and growing threat, but the risk to a nation-state in deploying cyber-weapons against a potential opponents economy are probably too great for any country to contemplate these measures. For example, writers in some of Chinas military journals speculated that cyber attacks could disable American financial markets. The dilemma for this kind of attack is that China is as dependent on the same financial markets as the United States, and could suffer even more from disruption. With other critical infrastructures, the amount of damage that can be done is, from a strategic viewpoint, trivial, while the costs of discovery for a nation state could be very great. These constraints, however, do not apply to non-state actors like Al Qaeda. Cyber attacks could potentially be a useful tool (albeit not a fatal or determinative tool) for non-state actors who reject the global market economy. Conclusion The Internet is a new thing, and new things can appear more frightening than they really are. Much of the early analysis of cyber-threats and cyber security appears to have The Sky is Falling as its theme. The sky is not falling, and cyber weapons seem to be of limited value in attacking national power or intimidating citizens. The examples presented in this paper suggest that nations are more robust and resilient than the early theories of cyber terror assumed. To understand the vulnerability of critical infrastructures to cyber attack, we would need for each target infrastructure a much more detailed assessment of redundancy, normal rates of failure and response, the degree to which critical

functions are accessible from public networks and the level of human control, monitoring and intervention in critical operations. This initial assessment suggests that infrastructures in large industrial countries are resistant to cyber attack.Terrorists or foreign militaries may well launch cyber attacks, but they are likely to be disappointed in the effect. Nations are more robust than the early analysts of cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare give them credit for, and cyber attacks are less damaging than physical attacks. Digital Pearl Harbors are unlikely. Infrastructure systems, because they have to deal with failure on a routine basis, are also more flexible and responsive in restoring service than early analysts realized. Cyber attacks, unless accompanied by a simultaneous physical attack that achieves physical damage, are short lived and ineffective. However, if the risks of cyber-terrorism and cyber-war are overstated, the risk of espionage and cyber crime may be not be fully appreciated by many observers. This is not a static situation, and the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cyber attack could change if three things occur. Vulnerability could increase as societies move to a ubiquitous computing environment19 when more daily activities have become automated and rely on remote computer networks. The second is that vulnerability could increase as more industrial and infrastructure applications, especially those used for SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), move from relying on dedicated, proprietary networks to using the Internet and Internet protocols for their operations. This move to greater reliance on networks seems guaranteed given the cost advantage of Internet communications protocols (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), but it also creates new avenues of access. These changes will lead to increased vulnerabilities if countries do not balance the move to become more networked and more dependent on Internet protocols with efforts to improve network security, make law enforcement more effective, and ensure that critical infrastructures are robust and resilient. From a broader security perspective, nations now face a range of amorphous threats to their safety that are difficult for the traditional tools of national security to reach. The lines between domestic and foreign, private and public, or police and military are blurring, and the nature and requirements of national security are changing rapidly. The most important implications of these changes for cyber security may well be that national policies must adjust to growing interdependence among economies and emphasize the need for cooperation among nations to defeat cyber threats. REMOTE SENSING:
Remote sensing can be defined as the collection of data about an object from a distance. Humans and many other types of animals accomplish this task with aid of

eyes or by the sense of smell or hearing. Geographers use the technique of remote sensing to monitor or measure phenomena found in the Earth's lithosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere. Remote sensing of the environment by geographers is usually done with the help of mechanical devices known as remote sensors. These gadgets have a greatly improved ability to receive and record information about an object without any physical contact. Often, these sensors are positioned away from the object of interest by using helicopters, planes, and satellites. Most sensing devices record information about an object by measuring an object's transmission of electromagnetic energy from reflecting and radiating surfaces. Remote sensing imagery has many applications in mapping land-use and cover, agriculture, soils mapping, forestry, city planning, archaeological investigations, military observation, and geomorphological surveying, among other uses. For example, foresters use aerial photographs for preparing forest cover maps, locating possible access roads, and measuring quantities of trees harvested. Specialized photography using color infrared film has also been used to detect disease and insect damage in forest trees The simplest form of remote sensing uses photographic cameras to record information from visible or near infrared wavelengths (Table 2e-1). In the late 1800s, cameras were positioned above the Earth's surface in balloons or kites to take oblique aerial photographs. of the landscape. During World War I, aerial photography played an important role in gathering information about the position and movements of enemy troops. These photographs were often taken from airplanes. After the war, civilian use of aerial photography from airplanes began with the systematic vertical imaging of large areas of Canada, the United States, and Europe. Many of these images were used to construct topographic and other types of reference maps of the natural and humanmade features found on the Earth's surface.

Major regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Region Name

Gamma Ray

Wavelengt Comments h
< 0.03 nanometers 0.03 to 30 nanometers 0.03 to 0.4 micrometers 0.3 to 0.4 micrometers Entirely absorbed by the Earth's atmosphere and not available for remote sensing. Entirely absorbed by the Earth's atmosphere and not available for remote sensing. Wavelengths from 0.03 to 0.3 micrometers absorbed by ozone in the Earth's atmosphere. Available for remote sensing the Earth. Can be imaged with photographic film.

X-ray

Ultraviolet

Photographic Ultraviolet

Visible

0.4 to 0.7 micrometers 0.7 to 100 micrometers 0.7 to 3.0 micrometers

Available for remote sensing the Earth. Can be imaged with photographic film. Available for remote sensing the Earth. Can be imaged with photographic film. Available for remote sensing the Earth. Near Infrared 0.7 to 0.9 micrometers. Can be imaged with photographic film. Available for remote sensing the Earth. This wavelength cannot be captured with photographic film. Instead, mechanical sensors are used to image this wavelength band. Longer wavelengths of this band can pass through clouds, fog, and rain. Images using this band can be made with sensors that actively emit microwaves. Not normally used for remote sensing the Earth.

Infrared

Reflected Infrared

Thermal Infrared

3.0 to 14 micrometers

Microwave or Radar

0.1 to 100 centimeters

Radio

> 100 centimeters

Geographic Information Systems (GIS):

The advent of cheap and powerful computers over the last few decades has allowed for the development of innovative software applications for the storage, analysis, and display of geographic data. Many of these applications belong to a group of software known as Geographic Information Systems(GIS). Many definitions have been proposed for what constitutes a GIS. Each of these definitions conforms to the particular task that is being performed. Instead of repeating each of these definitions, I would like to broadly define GIS according to what it does. Thus, the activities normally carried out on a GIS include:

The measurement of natural and human made phenomena and processes from a spatial perspective. These measurements emphasize three types of properties commonly associated with these types of systems: elements, attributes, and relationships. The storage of measurements in digital form in a computer database. These measurements are often linked to features on a digital map. The features can be of three types: points, lines, or areas (polygons). The analysis of collected measurements to produce more data and to discover new relationships by numerically manipulating and modeling different pieces of data. The depiction of the measured or analyzed data in some type of display - maps, graphs, lists, or summary statistics.

The first computerized GIS began its life in 1964 as a project of the Rehabilitation and Development Agency Program within the government of Canada. The Canada Geographic Information System (CGIS) was designed to analyze Canada's national land inventory data to aid in the development of land for agriculture. The CGIS project was completed in 1971 and the software is still in use today. The CGIS project also involved a number of key innovations that have found their way into the feature set of many subsequent software developments. From the mid-1960s to 1970s, developments in GIS were mainly occurring at government agencies and at universities. In 1964, Howard Fisher established the Harvard Lab for Computer Graphics where many of the industries early leaders studied. The Harvard Lab produced a number of mainframe GIS applications including: SYMAP (Synagraphic Mapping System),CALFORM, SYMVU, GRID, POLYVRT, and ODYSSEY. ODYSSEY was first modern vector GIS and many of its features would form the basis for future commercial applications. Automatic Mapping System was developed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the late 1960s. This project then spawned the CIA's World Data Bank, a collection of coastlines, rivers, and political boundaries, and the CAM software package that created maps at different scales from this data. This development was one of the first systematic map databases. In 1969, Jack Dangermond, who studied at the Harvard Lab for Computer Graphics, cofounded Environmental Systems Research Institute(ESRI) with his wife Laura. ESRI would become in a few years the dominate force in the GIS marketplace and create ArcInfo and ArcView software. The first conference dealing with GIS took place in 1970 and was organized by Roger Tomlinson (key individual in the development of CGIS) and Duane Marble (professor at Northwestern University and early GIS innovator). Today, numerous conferences dealing with GIS run every year attracting thousands of attendants. In the 1980s and 1990s, many GIS applications underwent substantial evolution in terms of features and analysis power. Many of these packages were being refined by private companies who could see the future commercial potential of this software. Some of the popular commercial applications launched during this period include: ArcInfo, ArcView, MapInfo, SPANS GIS, PAMAP GIS, INTERGRAPH, and SMALLWORLD. It was also during this period that many GIS applications moved from expensive minicomputer workstations to personal computer hardware.

Components of a GIS A Geographic Information System combines computer cartography with a database management system. Figure 2f-1 describes some of the major components common to a GIS. This diagram suggests that a GIS consists of three subsystems: (1) an input system that allows for the collection of data to be used and analyzed for some purpose; (2) computer hardware and software systems that store the data, allow for data management and analysis, and can be used to display data manipulations on a computer monitor; (3) an output system that generates hard copy maps, images, and other types of output. Two basic types of data are normally entered into a GIS. The first type of data consists of real world phenomena and features that have some kind of spatial dimension. Usually, these data elements are depicted mathematically in the GIS as

points, lines, or polygons that are referenced geographically (or geocoded) to some type of coordinate system. This type data is entered into the GIS by devices like scanners, digitizers, GPS, air photos, and satellite imagery. The other type of data is sometimes referred to as an attribute. Attributes are pieces of data that are connected or related to the points, lines, or polygons mapped in the GIS. This attribute data can be analyzed to determine patterns of importance. Attribute data is entered directly into a database where it is associated with element data.

Figure 2f-1: Three major components of a Geographic Information System. These components consist of input, computer hardware and software, and output subsystems.

The difference between element and attribute data can be illustrated in Figures 2f-2 and 2f-3. Figure 2f-2 shows the location of some of the earthquakes that have occurred in the last century. These plotted data points can be defined as elements because their main purpose is to describe the location of the earthquakes. For each of the earthquakes plotted on this map, the GIS also has data on their depth. These measurements can be defined as attribute data because they are connected to the plotted earthquake locations in Figure 2f-2. Figure 2f-3 shows the attribute earthquake depth organized into three categories: shallow; intermediate; and deep. This analysis indicates a possible relationship between earthquake depth and spatial location - deep earthquakes do not occur at the mid-oceanic ridges.

LASER SCANNING:

The Laser scanning technology has been well developed in recent years. The scan speed exceeds tens of thousand points per second. High performance scanners are used widely not only to reserve fault information, structural damage during earthquakes, but in educational purposes also. The detail information of a fault as well as the remaining portion of the structures after seismic events recorded by the 3D laser scanners can be used in a digital format. The digitized image can be further manipulated using coloring schemes to magnify the fault movements. Not to mention the animation of the digital images makes the earthquake activities more vivid and suitable for educators in demonstrating the seismic mitigation and training. The environmental technologists find this technique extremely valuable in overlapping images through long term monitoring. Geologists investigated the earthquake damages and visited the ground rupture after the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake in TaiChung County. The location where the fault ruptured has been preserved and rebuilt as 921 Earthquake Museum of Taiwan. The museum keeps the ground rupture and damaged structures in place to promote education in earthquake prevention. It has become a commonwealth of a living teaching material in earthquake awareness [Wang and Chang, 2007]. Buildings are evident of human civilization. The documentation of damaging structures after earthquakes advances a fundamental understanding of earthquake characteristics. It is important not to cause any damages at those structures when conducting field investigation and taking measurements. Some of the devastating structures are vulnerable under current condition. It is therefore advisable to invest more manpower, higher precision instrumentation and sophisticate technology to attain certain accuracy when taking measurements. For those structures deemed unstable, it is impossible to take measurements unless remote sensing technology is applied. The traditional surveying techniques fall short of such demand. D LASER SCANNERS Theoretical Background of 3-D Laser Technology A Scanning Laser Ranger is commonly named Laser Scanners. It is also called Light Detection and Ranging System, LiDAR in other applications. 3-D Laser Scanners are equipped with a total station that is equivalent to a laser surveyor except its electronic and opto-electrical components are somewhat different from a laser surveyor making the 3-D laser scanner a high speed scanning machine. There are two types of scanners categorized by ground-based and airborne LiDAR. The effective distances are classified into four ranges: short distance (< 1 meter), mid-distance (between 1 to 30 meters), and long distance (from 30 meter to 1 kilometer), and aviation range (> 1 kilometer). [Chang, et al., 2005a]

A 3-D laser scanner is a high speed, accurate laser surveying machine with a set of guiding reflectors. The skew angles can be measured from each station to designated points. Given the horizontal and vertical angles of the reflector the coordinating system of each scanned point can be calculated automatically. There are three main components of a laser scanner: 1. Laser Surveyor: it consists of optoemission, receiver, wave assessor, scale magnifier, timer, and other related electronic devices. The overall system starts from one opto-signal to the end to ensure the scanning object stays within the Field of View, namely the limits of the scanner. 2. Opto- or mechanical scanning components: a special lighting pattern guide that varies from manufacturers, such as: swaying mirrors, parallel turning reflector, or hosting motors etc. 3. data acquisition and processing mechanism: including computer, software operation system, post processors The center of 3-D laser scanners is identified by a self-adjusting coordinating system. It scans millions of points under interference-free condition in just a second. The distance and elevation of each point scanned can be immediately calculated taking into account of the skew and angles of the machine. The precision of a 3-D data clouds is less than a millimeter depending upon the scanning range. The detail theoretical background of the laser scanner can be found in Fig. 2.1 Scan under a dark condition can be overcome by activating the adjustable lighting. To show the progress in scanning, some of the machines are equipped with visible lights, such as MENSi GS100 system of France that uses green light [MENSi Co. web site], the system introduced by Riegl Company of Austria uses infrared [Riegl Co. web site]. POST PROCESSING SOFTWARE The post-process software used by the Riegl Company of Austria is called RiSCAN PRO. It combined and overlapped the geometry transformation and data collections from scanning operation and the post processors. The system also links the direct adjustment and modeling function through a conversion of data information and Microstation/AutoCAD 3D Plug-in. The project file uses an XML format that is easy for end users. Data analysts are able to customize binary data clouds using supplementary RiSCANLib software that complements Visual C++ and any other COM languages. One of the examples of the image process function is shown in Fig. 2.2. Through implementing Riegl LPM-2K Long range laser scanner software, 3DLM Company developed a 3DLM Remote and 3DLM Volume to perform data mining techniques and volume calculation, respectively. These software are valuable in enhancing the functions of the Riegl laser scanners for the company only focused on developing the hardware [Riegl Co. web site]. FUNCTIONS OF 3-D LASER SCANNERS The 3-D laser scanners are a fast data acquisition system installing a high-speed laser surveying machine without reflectors to obtain accurate three dimensional coordination data point per second. It speeds up the measuring time in traditional

spatial surveying. Additionally, it provides a safer working environment for surveyors. There is a great market demand in the near future. The best way to use a 3-D laser scanner is where spaces are limited and the measuring object is surrounded by obstacles that can not be easily moved or relocated. Any unstable state or having difficulties in solid measuring condition a 3-D laser scanner can perform well. The applicability of 3-D laser scanner is wider than ever through massive production and well defined scope of work. It has been used in civil engineering, building construction, disaster mitigation, damage assessment, historical preservation, geodetic surveying, channels and caverns investigation, life lines allocation, objects modeling, remote monitoring, traffic condition reports, mining excavations and as-built plans. More applications can be found at manufacturer websites. Several typical cases are as follows: 1. Archeologists use 3-D laser scanners to digitize historical sites and precious remains. The data files are reserve for future study and information management. 2. Surveyors use 3-D laser scanners to construct as-built plans. The information collected through 3-D laser scanners in a long term monitoring such as the displacement of a high-voltage transmission tower is used to estimate the wind and earthquake damage to structures. Managerial steps can be taken once related information is provided. 3. Tunnel and bridge engineers use 3-D laser scanner to build up polygonal models of structures to quantity construction progress. The total volume of earth removed and placed in the construction sites can be estimated through 3-D laser scanners. As for bridge engineer, a monitoring system using 3-D laser scanner can provide vital information onbridge long term performance under the influences of changing environment [Chang, et. al, 2003]. 4. Preservation of infrastructure can be done using 3-D laser scanning techniques providing information in relation to the strengthening and reconstruction. 5. Speleologists use 3-D laser scanner in modeling caverns and providing foundation in scientific research or exploration [Ono, et al., 2000; Hsiao, et al., 2003]. 6. Topography mapping precision is greatly enhanced by using 3-D laser scanners [Nagihara, et al., 2002]. 7. Reconstruction of a scene at traffic accident using 3-D laser scanner can help prosecutor make good judgment. The 3-D laser scanner is also a great tool in forensic investigation of an airplane disaster.