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From Dualism to Monism

Popper or KuhnHow can we explain the progress from Body- Mind Dualism to Monism?

Nadja- Raphaela Baer I 6015944 Philosopy of Science COR 1002 Ceren Pekdemir

Maastricht, 16.12.2011

Nadja- Raphaela Baer, I 6015944; Philosophy of Science, COR1002

16.11.2011

Agenda

Introduction

p. 2

Main Part

p. 2-8

o Body- Mind Dualism versus Monism o Popper versus Kuhn o Kuhn or PopperWhich account is more suitable in explaining the progress from Dualism to Monism?

p.2-3 p.4 p.5-8

Conclusion

p.8

References

p.9

Nadja- Raphaela Baer, I 6015944; Philosophy of Science, COR1002

16.11.2011

Kuhn or Popper? How can we explain the progress from Body- Mind Dualism to Monism?

Introduction My concern deals with the Dualistic notion with which Descartes separates the mind [] from the body1(Damasio, 1999, p. 328). This quotation entails the major issue with which Antnio R. Damsio has been involved in his book on Descartes error. Thereby, he has opposed his assumption about the ontology of human nature to the past Dualistic view. The question underlying the present paper is how this opposition came about. Why did the progress from Dualism towards Monism occur? In order to answer this question this essay will explain the scientific progress from Descartes Dualism to Damsios Monism by applying and contrasting two accounts stemming from the philosophy of science. It will be dealt with the theories provided by Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. These coeval philosophers are elementary of the present essay as they have put forward different accounts of how science progresses. Thus, the research core of the present essay concerns which of the two accounts is more suitable for explaining why the shift from Descartes Dualism towards the Monistic view supported by Damsio has proceeded. It will be concluded that Kuhns view is more appropriate than Poppers theory for illustrating the transition from Dualism to Monism.

Main Part Body- Mind Dualism versus Monism Investigations of the human nature have often put special emphasis on the question in how far body and mind are related. This question is also known as the body- mind problem and is central to the two approaches called Dualism and Monism. These two views are hold to be opposing as each of them views the relation between body and mind in completely different ways. On the one hand, Body- Mind Dualism may be defined as the belief that the mind is strictly separated from physical entities and therefore separated from those on an ontological level. Thus, the mind and the
1

Translated by the author.

Nadja- Raphaela Baer, I 6015944; Philosophy of Science, COR1002

16.11.2011

physical entity do not interact with each other. On the other hand, Monism holds that mind and body together build one entity and cannot be distinguished from each other. Consequently, there is a reciprocal dependence between mind and body, according to the Monist view (Damasio, 1999; Mcleod, 2007; Passer, 2009; Robinson & Howard, 2011). The present paper focuses on two influential scientists2, Descartes and Damsio which serve as agents for Body- Mind Dualism and Monism. It is crucial to mention that there have been various streams within both approaches. Hence, there are many deviant attitudes among influential scientists and philosophers who could account for investigating the progress from Body- Mind Dualism towards Monism (Robinson & Howard, 2011; Passer, Smith, Holt, & Bremner, 2009; Damasio, 1999; Garber, 2002). However, this essay puts the emphasis on the approaches according to Descartes and Damsio because the research for this essay has been triggered by Damsios criticism towards Descartes view on body and mind (Damasio, 1999). Descartes Dualism can be referred to the general definition stated above. However, he has deviated from the view that mind and body do not interact. Instead, he has stressed that those two entities are connected to each other through the pineal gland suited in the brain. But this linkage does not affect the separation of body and mind. In contrast to Descartes, Damsio has stressed the interaction of the physical entity and the mind as having an actual effect on human behavior and consciousness. This has been demonstrated by Damsio by means of modern neuroscientific methods. Fundamentally, he used the popular case of Phineas Gage3 to show that Descartes Dualistic approach has been wrong (Robinson & Howard, 2011; Passer et al., 2009; Damasio, 1999; Garber, 2002). In order to integrate Damsios critique towards Descartes into the debate of progress in science, the following paragraph will introduce the notions of scientific progress hold by Popper and Kuhn.

In the first place, Ren Descartes is mostly associated with philosophy, but one can also call him a scientist due to his influential works in the domain of science. 3 Phineas Gage, one patient of Damsio, survived an accident in which an iron rod was driven through his head. Thereby, severe lesions in his prefrontal cortex were caused which is one part of the physical entity. This injury led to significant changes in Gages behavior and personality and hence in his mental entity. On the basis of this and subsequent similar occurrences, Damsio has established that the physical and mental entities of humans interact with each other and thus are interrelated.

Nadja- Raphaela Baer, I 6015944; Philosophy of Science, COR1002

16.11.2011

Popper versus Kuhn Concerning progress in science Kuhn as well as Popper have prevailed as two of the greatest 20th century philosophers of science (Notturno, 2000; p. 225). Both have reflected on how scientific progress can be achieved based on the replacement of one established theory by improved one. Whereas Kuhn has put forward his theory on scientific revolution, Popper has emphasized falsification as methodology to come approximate truth4 and hence achieve progress in science (Chalmers, 1999; Notturno, 2000). Thereby, the method of falsification is based on logic. As soon as any observation is incongruent with a particular theory, this logical inconsistency must be immediately ruled out by means of falsification. Popper has stated that those theories are preferable over others which are best testable and have not been falsified yet. As a consequence, preferable theories constitute to good science. Popper has used the term demarcation to distinguish those theories from falsified ones which cannot lead to progress (Chalmers, 1999; Curd, 1998; Popper, 1959; Popper, 1971). According to Kuhn, scientific progress is achieved through scientific revolutions that are caused by serious anomalies inherent to a paradigm. Anomalies are present in each paradigm, but they become serious if they are striking at the fundamentals of the paradigm and stand the attempts of the scientific community to be removed. Those serious anomalies are detected within a phase of normal science where scientists engage in solving problems posed by anomalies. If the scientists cannot solve those defects they lose confidence in the current paradigm and a crisis sets in. Within the state of crisis the old paradigm is usually rejected and an alternative proposed. This shift from one paradigm to a new, incompatible one is what Kuhn terms scientific revolution (Garber, 2002; Kuhn, 1973; Kuhn, 1959; Kuhn,1970). When a paradigm shift has taken place the particular scientific community views the world from a completely different viewpoint. This context is what Kuhn calls incommensurability (Chalmers, 1999; Curd, 1998; Kuhn, 1970; Kuhn, 1973). Both, Popper and Kuhn, focus on scientific progress, but they have divergent underlying explanations for this assumption (Curd, 1998; Garber, 2002; Kuhn, 1970).

According to Popper, there is truth, but mankind does not have access to it. However, by falsification one can come closer to truth.

Nadja- Raphaela Baer, I 6015944; Philosophy of Science, COR1002

16.11.2011

Kuhn or Popper- which account is more suitable in explaining the progress from Dualism to Monism? As the two philosophical approaches of Popper and Kuhn are aimed at scientific progress, both may account in some way for the transition from Descartes Dualism to Damsios contributions to the Monistic view. However, as Popper and Kuhn have provided different explanations for progress in science, the two accounts are partially incongruent (Notturno, 2000; Chalmers, 1999). Moreover, Kuhns theory emerges as being more appropriate than Poppers one to account for the progress in neuroscience. To start with, let us view the neuroscientific progress from Poppers and Kuhns point of views. Popper would argue that the progress in neuroscience based on Damasios findings must have involved falsification as a tool to approximate truth. Therefore the case of Phineas Gage has displayed an observation that is logically inconsistent with the theory that body and mind are two separated entities. Thus, Descartes theory must necessarily have been false. Due to this emerged problem falsification has been necessary to ensure scientific progress. According to the notion of demarcation, Damsios theory must be preferred over Descartes Dualism as it has been more testable due to neuroscientific techniques and advanced knowledge. Furthermore, as Monism has not been falsified yet, Popper would argue that it is still preferable to the overthrown Dualistic approach. According to Kuhn, the scientific community surrounding Descartes had confidence in the paradigm holding the mind as ontologically separated from the body. Before Descartes has stated that body and mind are linked via the pineal gland there appeared to be no connection between the mental and physical entities at all. From the Kuhnian point of view, Descartes linkage of those entities was an addition to the already existing paradigm, but did not pose a threat to it because it was still consistent with the basic assumption that body and mind are independent entities. Thus, in a phase of normal science, Descartes and his fellow researchers have solved the problem that there is some kind of connection between body and mind in the brain and have enabled the paradigm to persist. However, as Kuhn would claim, with the advent of modern neuroscience5 the scientific community supporting Descartes Dualism has lost confidence in this paradigm. For this reason Damasios findings concerning the relation between body and mind have constituted
5

In fact there have already been notions of monism before Damasio has discovered the interaction between body and mind. However, those streams of monism are not dealt with in this paper as it is Damasios work are commonly used as basis for criticism towards Descartes Dualism.

Nadja- Raphaela Baer, I 6015944; Philosophy of Science, COR1002

16.11.2011

to a serious anomaly threatening the existence of the prevalent paradigm. Modern neuroscientific techniques6 have been used as evidence for the Monistic view on the human nature (Raichle, 2009; Passer et al, 2009). Due to the occurrence of the serious anomaly a period of crisis has set in and the paradigm holding Body- Mind Dualism has been rejected. Thereby, the replacement of Descartes Dualism by the modern notion of Monism has had revolutionary character and in this sense this paradigm shift has contributed significantly to scientific progress in a non- cumulative way. Popper and Kuhn both stress some kind of noncumulative nature of progress (Chalmers, 1999). In how far does this property account for progress in neuroscience? According to Popper, there would have been a mere replacement of the Dualist approach by Monism. This replacement concerns a change in general laws (Notturno, 2000). Thus, the law of the separation of body and mind has been overthrown by Damasio by illustrating that the human nature acts in congruence with laws of Monism. However, it is questionable whether the progress from Dualism to Monism entailed more than a replacement of general laws. If it was only this change in lawful principles, how can we explain the far-reaching character of the transition from Dualism towards Monism? Is it not the case that our present world view is heavily affected by the way we define the ontology of body and mind? Whereas Poppers approach falls short to deal with these questions, Kuhn has put forward that a revolution involves a severe change in the way mankind views the world. Thus, the progress from Dualism to Monism has affected us not only in scientific practice based on established laws, but also in the way we perceive human nature7. When taking Poppers view on science it is worth questioning why the theory of Dualism has not been falsified after the discovery of Descartes that body and mind are somehow connected via the pineal gland. As this discovery has been literally inconsistent with the theory that body and mind are separated entities, it would have been necessary to immediately abandon the existing Dualist approach in order to progress towards truth. However, this was not
6

One example for modern neuroscientific test methods is Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. This technique detects changes in blood flow in the brain and thereby indicates certain kinds of neural activity. By using this method Damsio has discovered empirically that there have been changes in the neural activity of Phineas Gage since he has suffered from the lesion in the prefrontal cortex. 7 One example for this shift is the increasing trend of alternative medicine which is based on the view that body and mind are dependent on each other. If a patient has physical pain a treatment psychopathological investigation may be an effective treatment. Hence, our changed worldview has affected the way we deal with body and mind.

Nadja- Raphaela Baer, I 6015944; Philosophy of Science, COR1002

16.11.2011

the case as the Dualistic approach has further existed until the onset of Monism. Thus, at this point Poppers falsificationism has failed to be appropriately applied to the progress from Dualism to Monism. The Kuhnian view, holding that there are always anomalies present within a paradigm, appears to be more applicable to the shift from Descartes to Damsio. The seemingly fact that body and mind are linked by the pineal gland was no serious anomaly and hence did not evoke a crisis. Thereby it was possible for the Dualist paradigm to endure and develop further in a period of normal science until Damsios findings have evoked serious anomalies. Another problem with Poppers account can be explained by the Quine- Duhem Thesis. This thesis holds that a theory cannot be conclusively falsified as there is the possibility that some part of the complex test situation other than the theory has been responsible for an emerging error (Chalmers, 1999; Curd, 1998). Was it really Descartes theory that was wrong? Or were the underlying laws and instruments crucial for the failure of dualism? It must not have been conclusively the theory proposed by Descartes that was erroneous, but also the auxiliary assumptions or initial conditions that have constituted to the progress from Dualism to Monism. For example, Damsio has made use of advanced neuroscientific techniques and knowledge to discover the body- mind problem by means of investigating the case of Phineas Gage. At Descartes time research depended on mere broad conjectures, instead of our modern sense of empirical testing (Damasio, 1999). It might have been the fact that Descartes Dualism was based on bold conjectures which made it falsifiable from Poppers point of view (Chalmers, 1999; Popper,1959; Popper,1971). Rather than the theory itself, it could have been that the lack of empirical testing has constituted to the shortcomings of Dualism. Thus, the Quine- Duhem Thesis demonstrates that Poppers point of view may not adequately account for the shift from Dualism to Monism. Instead, Kuhns approach encompasses the complexity of testing situations as it holds that the paradigm changes due to the occurrences of serious anomalies as opposed to anomalies that are present in every paradigm (Kuhn, 1970; Chalmers, 1999). Consequently, rather than rejecting Descartes theory conclusively when facing the first problems, a complex process of shifting from Dualism to Monism may account for the transition from Descartes Dualism to the modern view on body and mind. To conclude this section it is worth mentioning that the two approaches by Popper and Kuhn can be both applied to the progress from
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Nadja- Raphaela Baer, I 6015944; Philosophy of Science, COR1002

16.11.2011

Dualism towards Monism. However, it is Poppers view which falls short at some points and therefore it appears to be more suitable to base on Kuhns notion of scientific revolution when dealing with the transition from the body- mind separation to the Monistic ontology.

Conclusion The present paper has shown that the progress from Descartes Dualism towards the Monism hold by Damsio can be illuminated from different perspectives. Thereby, the focus has been put on the coeval philosophers Popper and Kuhn which both have stressed scientific progress. According to Poppers approach, Descartes theory had to be falsified as it was inconsistent with the findings of Damsio. This view entails some shortcomings concerning the progress from Dualism towards Monism. In order to avoid those deficiencies, one can also apply Kuhns theory of scientific revolution based on paradigm shifts. This application has shown to be more suitable for illustrating the transition from Dualism to Monism. Kuhn comprises complex shifts from one paradigm to an incompatible new one and thereby accounts for possible inconsistencies that do not threaten the belief in a paradigm. This approach is congruent with the history of the progress from Dualism to Monism and therefore more suitable than Poppers view. However, there is no need to completely dismiss the latter as it can explain at least some parts of the scientific progress concerning the mind- body problem. To conclude, it is worth remarking that, according to both accounts having put forward in this paper, the present state of neuroscience is not at its finite end, but will still progress in some way.

Nadja- Raphaela Baer, I 6015944; Philosophy of Science, COR1002

16.11.2011

References Chalmers, A. (1999). What is this thing called science? New York: Open University Press (3rd ed), pp.59-86, 104-129. Curd, M. C. (1998). Philosophy of Science- the central issues. New York & London : W.W. Norton & Company, pp.86- 136. Damasio, A. (1999). Descartes' Irrtum- Fhlen, Denken und das menschliche Gehirn . Mnchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. Garber, D. (2002). Descartes and the Scientific Revolution: Some Kuhnian Reflections. Perspectives of Science; Princeton University, 9 (4), pp.405-422. Kuhn, T. (1959). The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research. In University of Utah Research Conference on the Identification of Scientific Talent. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, pp.225-239. Kuhn, T. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.183- 190. Kuhn, T. (1973). Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.320-339. Mcleod, S. (2007). Mind Body Problem. Simple Psychology, retrieved from: http://www.simplypsychology.org/mindbodydebate.html. Notturno, M. (2000). Science and the Open Society- The future of Karl Popper's Philosophy. New York: Central Euorpean University Press, pp.225- 245. Passer, M., Smith, R., Holt, N., & A. Bremner, E. M. (2009). Psychology- The Science of Mind and Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill Education, p.9. Popper, K. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 27-59; 78- 93. Popper, K. (1971). Conjectural Knowledge: my Solution to the Problem of Induction. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 95, pp.1-31. Raichle, M. (2009 ). A Paradigm Shift in Functional Brain Imaging . The Journal of Neuroscience, 29(41), pp.12729- 12734. Robinson, & Howard. (2011). Edward N. Zalta (ed.)"Dualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/dualism/.

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