WEB EDITION No. 5 - Oct. 1993 Vol. 41 - pp.

12-18

SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE: A POSITIVE-SUM GAME

Dr. Teodor Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Melescanu

Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in

Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us.

North Atlantic Council, June 1991

Even prior to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council

(NACC), many of the new democracies in Central Europe, including Romania, were already expressing a desire to become NATO members. The upgrading of their relations with the European Communities (EC) and the Western European Union (WEU) has encouraged their expectations that they would also qualify for 'a higher status' with the Alliance. Russian President Boris Yeltsin's declaration on 25 August on the question of NATO's eastward enlargement encouraged the Euro-Atlantic community's expectation that the old perception of enemies that derived from the Cold War, and its paralysing taboos, are fading away.

While

today, enlargement is still only a topic for speculation, tomorrow, it promises to be an item on the Alliance's agenda. There is no doubt that, before taking a decision on when, how and with whom to enlarge NATO, its leaders will first need to assess the ramifications and possible side-effects of the potential options.

Like

other Central European partners within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and as an applicant for future membership, we in Romania are directly interested in the outcome of that assessment. Moreover, we are quite aware that no decision can be implemented without the support of public opinion in the Alliance's member states. Those of us in the Cold War's 'forgotten' part of Europe can therefore help in better acquainting our Western friends with our security needs and concerns, and also with the way in which our eventual membership could serve NATO's values and goals.

What is Europe?

certain mind set, favouring a narrow notion of Europe, usually comes to the fore whenever, as a result of significant changes to the continent's geopolitical map, Europe's institutional architecture has, in its turn, to be altered. The last four decades or so have witnessed two principal periods when a more or less academic exercise in taxonomy over what Europe is and is not, has led to heated political debate.

The

first period began with the onset of the Cold War, whose circumstances prompted scientific and political analyses in Western Europe which redefined the European identity. While trying to adapt to the post-Yalta division of the continent, some of the founding fathers of the European movement looked back to the imperial myths of the Holy Roman Empire as their models of a 'golden age' of European Christendom.

Indeed, the remarkable men and women, whose daring imagination

and efforts led to the creation of such viable institutions as the Council of Europe, the EC and the WEU, cannot be reproached for having tried - at a time when these organizations were still only vague projects - to present every possible argument which could persuade Western nations to join hands in a common project.

In assessing their zealous efforts, it should not be forgotten that most

of those nations had fiercely fought one another during the First and Second World Wars, as well as numerous earlier conflicts. Consequently, any argument that could underpin solidarity against the dangers posed to a weakened post-war Western Europe, threatened by Soviet expansionism, could be defended.

It remains an open question whether the founding fathers could have

dispensed with a controversial European political mythology. However, as was revealed, though perhaps unintentionally, by the assertion of "the primacy of the West", those models encouraged a vision of Europe made up of a 'core' and a few, more or less negligible, 'peripheries'.

With

the Cold War over, Europe has come back to its natural geographic and historical boundaries. With Communism over, democracy, the market economy and full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms have become the main elements of an 'identity card' claimed by every nation throughout Europe. Nevertheless, exercises in taxonomy are once again in fashion. In some scientific and political circles in both Western and former 'East European'

countries, there is an attempt to persuade a confused public opinion that only a few of the new Central European democracies qualify for inclusion in Europe, i.e., in Western structures.

However,

after their respective 1989 revolutions, all the states formerly caged by the Yalta agreements in the Soviet 'external empire' have clearly opted for integration with the West; moreover, all of them, without exception, have embarked on an irreversible process of realigning themselves with genuine European values, practices and goals. That is probably why, short of convincing arguments able to give substance to their narrow notion of today's Europe, the taxonomists in question insist on a cultural-religious kinship test.

As a result, one learns that only the so-called northern tier of former
Eastern Europe would 'fit in' with Western standards and projects, while 'the rest' - which, not being part of Western Christianity, would inevitably be 'undemocratic' and 'unable to democratize' - deserve a different destiny. We, however, believe that today's Europe is to be found wherever its democratic, liberal and humanist values and practices succeed in shutting the door on the nightmare of authoritarian regimes, command economies, and a disregard for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Were

a mythology of this sort to somehow encourage within the Alliance a certain disposition to play off cultural ties against crucial security interests, then rather than favouring the fulfilment of its selfproclaimed role of projecting stability beyond its initial area, NATO itself might precipitate new tensions within an already unsteady region.

Has Central Europe contracted?

A milder form of the 'cultural-religious' line of thinking, which hardly

matches a Europe heading towards the 21st century, is the inclination to narrow the definition of the term 'Central Europe', so as to include only a limited number of states.

Fortunately,

this tendency to treat Central Europe as a shrinking region is not unanimously shared. Since early 1990, a number of prestigious Western political scientists have recalled forgotten truths about the non-Soviet members of the extinct Warsaw Treaty Organization. That is, with the collapse of the post-Yalta division of the continent, an area misleadingly labelled for almost half a century

as 'Eastern Europe' has again become what it has always been historically, culturally and philosophically - Central Europe.

More significantly, decision-makers in crucial European structures the EC, WEU and the Council of Europe - have not subscribed to the 'contracting approach', which blatantly contradicts the aspiration of those institutions to extend the values, practices and goals to which they have been devoted as far eastwards as possible. In this connection, it is worth recalling that the first paragraph of The Declaration of the Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with States of Central Europe (Bonn, 19 June, 1992) identifies Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (now, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania as 'States of Central Europe'. For its part, the Council of Europe, emphasizing once again that its criteria for admission do not include a "religious condition", did not have any difficulty in admitting as full members Eastern Christian countries like Bulgaria and Romania. Similarly, by signing association agreements with six of the former East European countries, the European Communities have rejected the notion that a narrowly conceived 'Central Europe', reduced to a few countries lying in the area between the united Germany and the exUSSR, would somehow be 'more entitled' to closer ties with Western structures. It is our strongest hope that any eventual decisions by NATO will further strengthen the line taken by these other 'interlocking institutions'.

Close to the Balkans

According to the post-Cold War commonly accepted wisdom, Romania is either an East European or a Balkan country. We Romanians prefer to describe ourselves as a Central European country close to the Balkans. Besides the arguments presented earlier, which do not apply only to Romania, there are also more specific reasons for this choice. Examination of a map of our continent will show that Romania, being located north of the Danube, does not belong geographically to the Balkan region. Of course, by defining Romania as a Central European state close to the Balkans, we do not have in mind its geographic location alone. However unorthodox it might sound, it can be said that, geopolitically, a country belongs to the area where its problems lie. As is well known, Romania has no problems in its relationships with any of the Balkan countries, including the successor states to the former Yugoslavia. This clarification might help our friends to the south to understand that the way we characterize Romania implies neither a denial of enduring

economic, political and cultural ties, nor a diminution of the important Balkan dimension of our foreign policy. Too long a history would mock us if we dared such irreverence. Our choice of the richer locution "close to", instead of the colder "bordering on", implies just the opposite. Furthermore, we do not share the view that economic and political options depend on geographic location. In describing Romania as a Central European country close to the Balkans, we simply aim at an accurate definition of our position, with its assets and liabilities. We also want to reveal to our fellow Europeans and to our North American friends that, while strengthening the assets might enhance the security and stability of the whole continent, any augmentation of the liabilities would have costly consequences. This description should not be mistaken for an attempt to 'escape from the periphery' which would only generate more trouble than hope for the future of the new Europe. In respect to the Balkans, we think that to merely write them off as a 'powder keg' is to offer an incomplete and inaccurate picture of the complex and contradictory reality of this region. As a matter of fact, NATO Review has already published a number of valuable articles signed by political leaders and military men from different countries in the area, which corroborate this viewpoint. Thebloody conflicts in former Yugoslavia are just part of the story. The other, too frequently ignored aspect, is the democratic development of all the neighbouring post-Communist states, an encouraging evolution which does not deserve to be ignored. None of the new democracies bordering former Yugoslavia - Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania - should be punished by neglect. Each of them has played an important part in preventing the war from spreading throughout the area and beyond. These states' ability to preserve - against heavy odds - their domestic stability, and their contribution to the international efforts to curb and stop the conflict, should not be overlooked. Nor should it be forgotten that, among the new European democracies, these countries have been the most economically affected by the embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and they surely deserve as much encouragement and support from Western structures as their counterparts in less troubled areas. In this connection, it might be useful to recall some lessons drawn from the 'wave of democratization' during the Cold War, i.e., the successful transition to, and consolidation of, democratic regimes in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey. While none of these was

straightforward, cultural or religious differences did not constitute obstacles as such to their democratization. Furthermore, once the transition began, certain external factors played an important role in securing both the consolidation and the irreversibility of the process. It is not difficult to guess that 'the second wave' of transitions will be more painful and more unpredictable than the first. In the latter case, the domestic prerequisites for a successful transition are considerably weaker. The democratic forces in these societies have not been able to capitalize on pre-existing market economies and civil societies. Thus, a firm and even-handed attitude of support by the European states with solid democratic traditions could make all the difference. Bilateral relations are, and will be, an essential part of such an endeavour. But given the current situation in the Balkans, and some bad historical memories, collective support - extended by organizations such as the EC, WEU, and NATO - should continuously complement bilateral relations. Because of the presence of the US in NATO, whose balancing role in Europe is as necessary as ever, NATO is a privileged actor in this respect.

Romania and the new arcs of crisis

With the dismantlement of the USSR, and the promising evolutions in both the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the pressures on what was previously called NATO's 'central front' have eased considerably, ceasing to be the Alliance's "first, second and third priority". According to many analysts, Europe's new strategic challenges come simultaneously from the eastern and southern arcs of crisis. As a riparian state on the Black Sea and the Danube (controlling 1,000 kilometres of its navigable course) - a position to which the new Rhine-Main-Danube connection, and the Black Sea-Danube Channel on Romanian territory give new relevance - Romania is one of the few post-Communist democracies which, by enjoying an increased security investment from NATO, could play a positive role in preventing a dangerous mutual reinforcement of these two arcs of crisis. Together with Albania, Hungary and Bulgaria, Romania could fill in the gap in the 'southern flank' of the Alliance. Thus, once the war in former Yugoslavia is over - and we hope that it will be over soon - these states could offer a more favourable security environment for positive post-conflict evolution and eventual reinsertion of all the Yugoslav successor states into mainstream Europe. The continuing cooperation between the Western European Union and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in monitoring the embargo on the Danube is

quite instructive in this respect. In demographic and territorial terms, Romania occupies the ninth place among European states; consequently, it is one of the biggest Central European NATO partners within NACC. Romania's good relations with all the countries in the Balkans confer on it a unique position in its part of the continent. Last but not least, the internal stability of our country, which has allowed us to keep two zones of open or latent conflict physically apart, has benefited the whole of Europe. It is therefore in the best interests of both our NATO partners and of all our neighbours to help us in strengthening Romania's stability and security. Indeed, had Romania not resisted the dangerous 'virus of instability and disintegration', the problems currently confronting the main pillars of European and Euro-Atlantic security would have been considerably greater, perhaps even unmanageable.

The road to integration

In Romania's quest to extend and deepen relations with the Alliance, with a view to eventually joining its ranks, we do not think that the exclusion of other countries would give us a better chance. On the contrary, we firmly believe that extending NATO's security umbrella to just a part of the area Romania belongs to could undermine this region's opportunities to become a network of democratic stability. The positive effect of the EC's clear signals to its six new Central European associates - pointing to the fact that the sooner they adapt to the rules of a positive-sum game, the better their chances of qualifying in the foreseeable future for an upgrading of their current status needs reinforcement. In an area where states have been taught by history to behave almost exclusively like players in a zero-sum game, this is a must. That is why, even before the Summit in January 1994, a preliminary statement on the criteria for closer ties to NATO could help these states focus on meeting objective requirements, and improving their relations, rather than wondering "who is going to be first in line?". Accession to full membership will, obviously, be an evolutionary process; therefore, if the successive steps leading to inclusion in NATO's security arrangements are clarified, this could, in turn, tone down journalistic speculation on the imminent admission of certain countries. With the decisions taken at the June 1993 NACC ministerial meeting, a new step on the road to integration has been taken. The development

of a common understanding of the political principles of, and the tools for, peacekeeping, the sharing of experience, and the development of common practical approaches and cooperation in peacekeeping have given partner countries new opportunities to gradually adjust to NATO standards. Poland's cooperation with Germany, and soon with Denmark, in the military field, has set a precedent for further steps. It would be very helpful, however, for all aspirants to be extended the opportunity to take part in a joint assessment of other possible ways to satisfy, in a shorter time span, the essential compatibility requirement. Therefore, consultations among NATO members and their partners in Central Europe (not 'Central Europe' in its more restrictive sense), on both these and related matters, should be envisaged. Given that all the actors on the European scene are interested in the consolidation of the democratic option chosen by the Russian Federation and Ukraine - and this is especially the case for those countries which are geographically closer to them - the possible concerns of these two countries should be addressed. Neither of them should fear that an extension of NATO's security arrangements, in whatever form, will entail their isolation from Western Europe. By increasing the security dialogue between the Alliance and Russia and Ukraine, these two countries will come to see that their vital interests will not be harmed, but fairly served, by the growing integration of the countries in their vicinity into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The democratic reconstruction of Central Europe will give support and added impetus to the historic transformations taking place within both Ukraine and the great Euro-Asian power that is Russia. Of course, it is not surprising that President Yeltsin's statement in Warsaw on the question of NATO's enlargement has been used by non-democratic forces in Russia as a pretext to frighten public opinion with Cold War slogans about the Alliance and its 'hidden' agenda. It has been aptly remarked that amendments to the previous encouraging signal, hardly justified by the historical changes in Europe, seem to echo the old fashioned policy of 'spheres of influence' which had affected for such a long time the fate of nations in Central Europe. It is our firm belief that, while defusing possible Russian concerns, NATO member states will positively respond to the quests for closer ties and integration expressed by all the Central European democracies, including Romania. The more so because the Russian Federation's internationally recognized role in world affairs underpinned by its permanent seat on the UN Security Council as well as its democratic partnership with the US - are solid guarantees that no state or organization in the world could ever afford to engage in any

hostile anti-Russian activities. The Russian Federation is also the only post-Communist country able to provide comprehensively for its own security.

Integration versus disintegration

What is at stake in Europe is not the fate of a handful of states but the future of the entire continent, and together with it, of the whole world. Today's narrow options could, sooner rather than later, pave the way for a gloomy future. In recent years, it has become obvious that Europe's political destiny will be decided by the outcome of the current ideological struggle between the forces of integration and those of disintegration. By making clear that NATO exists, and will continue to exist, not only because of what it is against but also because of what it is for freedom, security and stability in Europe - the Alliance is crucial to the outcome of that struggle. Consequently, any decision concerning NATO's enlargement must have as an essential prerequisite a clear-cut set of objective criteria. In all probability, among the criteria to be met by aspirants to closer relations, the Alliance will focus on compliance with certain standards, more or less similar to those already required by the other Western institutions along with the candidates' potential to contribute to the achievement of the goals of the Alliance and the state of their relations with neighbouring countries. Romania's Association Agreement with the EC, its status with the WEU, and recent inclusion among the fully fledged members of the Council of Europe, clearly indicate that it belongs to the like-minded group of countries in Central Europe. Along with its obvious assets, this recommends it as one of the candidates that could bring a useful contribution to the achievement of the Alliance's goals. Understandably, good relations with neighbouring countries might be a decisive 'qualifying' criterion. Bringing states which have tense relations with their neighbours closer to the Alliance would mean putting NATO in an undesirable position. Of course there are at least two parties to a strained relationship. Though not unique in our region, the relationship between Romania and Hungary is frequently mentioned as a case in point. In certain respects, our political dialogue and cooperation could be better but objective common interests and growing self-restraint - the benefits of

which have become evident against the background of the tragic events in the former Yugoslavia - have led to improvements. There is also a growing awareness on both sides that integration with Western structures could largely depend on the quality of our bilateral relations. In this respect, the official visit to Romania of a delegation headed by the distinguished Hungarian Foreign Minister, Dr. Geza Jezsensky in September - the first such visit since December 1989 - represents an important step forward. The political will of our respective governments to enlarge and deepen contacts and cooperation in all fields was convincingly illustrated by the realistic spirit that prevailed during these talks and by the fact that a number of intergovernmental agreements were signed. In addition, the warm reception given to Dr. Jezsensky by the people of Romania, irrespective of their ethnic origin or region, showed that normal relations between the two countries are within reach, particularly if these efforts are underpinned in a firm and even-handed way by Western states and structures. Any decision by NATO to establish closer relations with only Romania or Hungary, excluding the other, would represent neither an adequate basis for the improvement of our bilateral relations, nor an incentive for a better political climate throughout Central Europe. By clearly stating this, we have the long-term interests of both of our countries, of our area, and of Europe as a whole in mind. NATO's own history sheds useful light on such an approach. It is thanks to the Alliance that we can evoke Franco-German reconciliation as an encouraging precedent. Moreover, the membership of two states in NATO's 'southern flank' has very much helped them, in spite of certain disagreements, to keep their bilateral relations on the right track. When compared with what could have happened if one of those countries, or both, had not been in NATO, their verbal confrontations sound like the music of the angels. Among other things, this article has attempted to spell out why Romania should be considered a valuable candidate for membership, as well as our political desire to enjoy, as soon as possible, an upgrading of Romania's status with the Alliance - a status analogous to that eventually extended to other Central European states. It is worth underlining that the Romanian message has been - during these last three years or so - as consistent as any sent to NATO headquarters by other countries in our area. But we have not exerted daily pressure on any of our Western friends, nor did we even make use of well-founded security concerns to plead for an immediate, formal security guarantee. In so acting, we thought it fair not to overburden the Alliance's decision-makers, allowing them enough time to better adjust NATO to

its new tasks in the face of new risks and security challenges confronting Europe as we approach the turn of the century. This attitude of restraint should not, however, be mistaken for 'reluctance' concerning closer relations and eventual membership. Romania's desire for closer integration - which enjoys the consensus of all political forces in the country - has been clearly expressed on every possible occasion both during our dialogue with the Alliance and its member states - in Brussels, Bucharest and other capitals - as well as within the NACC framework. When visiting our country, all the senior officials of the Alliance - NATO's Secretary General, the Chairman of the Military Committee, members of the Political Committee, the President and Secretary General of the North Atlantic Assembly, to mention just a few - have learned that Romania's ambition to become a member is genuine. President Iliescu conveyed an equally clear message during his visit to NATO's headquarters earlier this year. We have been repeatedly assured that the Alliance has no intention of differentiating among its cooperation partners, least of all among the EC's new associates. In spite of the still unstable environment in our part of Europe, we remain optimists. In this respect, the clear-cut attitude taken by each of the new Central European democracies during the recent confrontation in Moscow reconfirms their irreversible option for integration with the West as well as their full support for the democratic forces in Russia. At the same time, this attitude augurs well for a much-needed understanding that by behaving like partners in a positive-sum game, these countries can better accomplish their own national interests. A crucial foundation for our optimism is the firm belief that, as far as the question of enlargement is concerned, the Alliance's decisionmakers will choose, from among all possible options, the one that most favours stability, democracy and reinforced security in our region, thereby bolstering security throughout the Old Continent