Transportation Reviewer by Magnolia Masangcay, Marvin Alcantara and Marben Javillo Transportation movement of things or persons from one

e place to another, whether by land, by water or by air. - Includes waiting time, loading and unloading, stopping in transit, and all other accessorial services in connection with the loaded movement Carrier one who undertakes the transfer of persons or property from one place to another for hire, or gratuitously. - May either be a common carrier or private carrier. Contract of Carriage one whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or both from one place to another for a fixed price Common Carrier persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. *The law defining a common carrier makes no distinction whether the carriage of goods or persons is the principal or merely ancillary activity of the carrier. (De Guzman vs CA, 168 SCRA 612) Requisites to be a Common Carrier 1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a pulic employment and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of good for persons generally as a business and not as a casual occupation 2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined 3. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and over his established routes 4. The transportation must be for hire. *A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite to incur liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. (Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs CA, September 28, 1999) Private Carrier one who, without making it a vocation or holding himself out to the public as ready to act for all who desire his services,

undertakes, by special agreement in a particular instance only, to transport property from one place to another either gratuitously or for hire. Common Carrier Engaged in public service to all persons indifferently Private Carrier Carries only for persons with whom he has an initial contract, and assumes no obligation to carry for others.

Test to determine whether the carrier is a common carrier or a private carrier - Whether or not the enterprise is open to the use and service of all members of the public who may require the service to the extent of its capacity - Whether the public may enjoy it by right or only by permission. *As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid. Arrastre - hauling of cargo; - the handling of cargo on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ships tackle. - Not a common carrier - Relationship between arrastre operator and the consignee is akin to that of a warehouseman and a depositor. Stevedoring - the handling of the cargo in the holds of the vessel or between the ships tackle and the holds of the vessel. Degree of Diligence extraordinary diligence *A travel agency not being a common carrier is not required to exercise the same degree of extraordinary diligence of a common carrier. *Passengers should be treated by the employees of an airline carrier with kindness and courtesy and should be protected against indignities, abuses and injurious language from such employees. Are common carriers liable for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods? Yes. Exception:

1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or other natural disaster or calamity 2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil 3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods 4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers 5. An order or act of competent authority Negligence failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Sudden Emergency Rule - one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that maybe adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. *For a common carrier to be exempt from responsibility due to natural disaster, the natural disaster or calamity must be the proximate and only cause of loss, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of the injury or the loss. Doctrine of Limited Liability When does it apply: When the unseaworthiness that caused the loss of the vessel was not due to the fault or negligence of the shipowner, its liability is limited to its pre rata share in the insurance proceeds. When it does not apply: When the shipowner fails to overcome the presumption of negligence. *The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738. Test in determining whether the relation of the shipper and carrier had been established - Whenever the control and possession of goods passes to the carrier and nothing remains to be

done by the shipper, then it can be said with certainty that the relation of shipper and carrier has been established Effect of Contributory Negligence - The common carriers liability for damages shall be reduced equitably. Stipulation between the common carrier and the shipper or owner limiting the iability of the former to less than extraordinary diligence Valid provided: 1. in writing, signed by the shipper/owner 2. supported by valuable consideration other than the service rendered by the common carrier 3. reasonable, just and not contrary to public policy Unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public stipulations: 1. that the goods are transported at the risk of the owner/shipper 2. that the common carrier will not b liable for any loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods 3. that the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the custody of the goods 4. that the common carrier shall exercise a degree of diligence less than that of a good father of a family, or of a man of ordinary prudence in the vigilance over the movables transported 5. that the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omissions of his or its employees 6. that the common carriers liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence 7. that the common carrier is not responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods on account of the defective condition Effect of the delay in transporting the goods or change in the stipulated or usual route w/o just cause - the contract limiting the common carriers liability cannot be availed of in case of the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. Kinds of stipulations made in the bill of lading with regard to the liability of the common carrier 1. exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage occasioned by its own negligence

2. unqualified limitation on such liability to an agreed valuation 3. limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight. *1st and 2nd are invalid as being contrary to public policy, 3rd is valid and enforceable. Fixing of sum recoverable by owner/shipper for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the good - valid if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon. When limitation on carriers liability not binding - when conditions are printed at the back of a ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to read. Failure of carrier to object to questions during trial regarding the amount of damages sustained by passengers General Rule: An air carrier is not liable for the loss of baggage in an amount in excess of the limits specified in the ticket which is binding on the passenger regardless of the passengers lack of knowledge thereof or assent thereto. Exception: Can be waived. Obligation of the common carrier to the passengers Art. 2003. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Airline companies authority to authority over packages and cargoes of the passenger/shipper - They are authorized to open and investigate suspicious packages and cargoes in the presence of passengers/shippers or authorized representatives. - If owner, shipper or representative refuses, airline or carrier is authorized to refuse the loading thereof. Requisites for caso fortuito to exempt the carrier from liability 1. event must be independent of the human will 2. occurrence must be impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner

3. obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor 4. event must have been impossible to foresee, or if it could be foreseen, must have been impossible to avoid. Presumption in case of death of or injuries of passengers - common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence. *A common carrier is responsible for the conduct of its employees. *Responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers as required by law cannot be dispense with. Passenger carried gratuitously - a stipulation limiting the common carriers liability for negligence is valid, but not for willful acts or gross negligence. Children Accompanied by a person who pays fare for himself: child is a passenger even though no fare is paid by him - does not apply when child is unaccompanied or to newsboys or children who are permitted to ride on a car gratuitously who is authorized to do so Degree of diligence that the passenger must observe to avoid injury to himself - diligence of a good father. Extent of the effect of the passengers contributory negligence A contributory negligence of a passenger, while not exempting the carrier from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of amount adjudicated as moral damages. Exemplary damages only allowed in cases where the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Degree of diligence required of a common carrier 1. Transporting goods: extraordinary diligence 2. transporting passengers: utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances 3. in preventing or stopping injuries to a passenger on account of willful act or

negligence of other passengers or of strangers: diligence of a good father of the family *In an action based on culpa contractual, common carrier is primarily liable and may be brought against him alone, without the necessity of including the driver. *A civil action based on the contractual liability of a common carrier is distinct from the criminal action instituted against the carrier or its employee based on the latters criminal negligence. *Driver and carrier are not jointly and severally liable because it would make the breach a personal liability. Damages that may be recovered in case of death of a passenger 1. an indemnity for the death of the victim 2. an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the decease 3. moral damages 4. attorneys fees & expenses of litigation 5. interest in proper case Considerations for fixing a greater amount of damages for death of a passenger other than that provided by law 1. life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter 2. pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or beneficiary 3. loss of support 4. loss of service 5. loss of society 6. mental suffering of beneficiaries 7. medical and funeral expenses How to determine a persons life expectancy 2/3 x (80 age of the decedent) = life expectancy When is a common carrier liable for attorneys fees? In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded; (2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff; (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim; (6) In actions for legal support; (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers; (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws; (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime; (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. Moral Damages General rule: not recoverable in damage actions. Exceptions: 1. Where the mishap results in the death of a passenger 2. Where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if death does not result Last Clear Chance applicable between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. - does not apply where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligation. *Certificate of public convenience may be canceled due to repeated failure to comply with the duty to observe extraordinary diligence.

Case Digests for Common Carriers/Safety of Passengers

Transportation

TOPIC: Common Carrier Mariano, Jr. vs. Callejas

Eliza Jujeurche Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Vicente Calalas for alleged violation of the contract of carriage when she was injured when an Isuzu truck bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney driven by Calalas when Sunga gave way to an outgoing passenger. Issue: 1)W/N Calalas met the degree of diligence required by Art. 1755 of the Civil Code. 2)W/N doctrine of proximate cause applicable to the case. Ruling: 1) No, the jeepney was not properly parked, as its rear portion being exposed about 2 meters from the shoulder of the highway and facing the middle of the hiway in a diagonal angle. Also, Sunga was seated in an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle, placed her in greater peril. Canlalas was not able to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga. 2) No, it is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict and not in actions for breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. Therefore, it is not applicable to this case where there is an existing contractual relations between the parties. Calalas was declared liable for damages to Sunga. Ratio: Art. 1733, 1755 and 1756.

Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages against respondents for failure to transport his wife when the bus she was riding in was bumped by a trailer truck on its left middle portion.

Issue: W/N bus company liable for the death of petitioners wife. Ruling: Negative. Evidence shows that the death of petitioners spouse was caused by the reckless negligence of the driver of the Isuzu trailer truck which lost its brakes and bumped the bus, owned and operated by the respondents herein. The bus was on its rightful lane when the truck, coming from the opposite lane, suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane and bumped the bus. Bus driver has every right to expect that the truck would stay on its proper lane. Also, doubts as to the culpability of the bus driver should be eliminated when truck driver pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple slight physical injuries and damage to property involving the same incident. Petition of deceaseds husband denied. Bus company and its driver were absolved from any liability.

Batangas Transportation Company Caguimbal GR. No. L-22985 January 24, 1968 Topic: Common carrier

vs.

Ratio: Art. 1733, 1755 and 1756

The widow and children of Pedro Caguimbal filed a case for damages for breach of contract against Batangas Transportation Company (BTCO) when Caguimbal was killed in an accident that occurred in Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas when a Bian bus overtook a calesa (both northbound), at full speed, and hit the left side BTCO bus while a passenger was about to alight. Issue/s:W/N diligence. BTCO exercised extraordinary

Calalas vs. CA GR No. 122039 May 31, 2000 Topic: Common Carrier

Ruling:Negative, the common carrier has obligation to avoid a situation hazardous to passengers. The driver of the BTCO bus should not have permitted the passenger to disembark at a time when a calesa is coming from an opposite direction, with a Bian bus cruising at full speed and about to overtake the calesa. In view of exercising extraordinary diligence, the BTCO driver must have completely and fully drive the bus within the shoulder to afford the Bian bus sufficient space to overtake safely. It is true that the driver of the Bian bus should have slowed down or stopped, and hence, was reckless in not doing so, but he has no special obligation to the passengers of the BTCO bus. The BTCO bus driver was under obligation under the contract of carriage to avoid a situation which would be hazardous for his passengers and not make their safety dependent upon the diligence of the other driver. BTCO along with Bian and Bian driver, Marciano Ilagan were all held liable for the death of Caguimbal. Ratio: Art. 1733 Brias vs. People GR No. L-30309 November 25, 1983 Manila Railroad Company conductor, Clemente Brias, was convicted for the crime of double homicide thru reckless imprudence (train driver and assistant conductor were both acquitted) by the CFI-Quezon, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, for the death of passengers Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo, grandmother and granddaughter, respectively. The two deceased went to the door of the train when Brias prematurely called out the station where they will disembark. As a result they stumbled, when the train picked up speed and died. Issue/s:W/N conductor was liable for the death of the passengers. Ruling: Affirmative, the proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of Brias which prompted them to proceed to the nearest exit. Without which, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature and erroneous announcement of Brias and the deaths of the victims is direct and natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes. Action of passengers of going near trains exit door on announcement of flagstop while train still moving is at most merely

contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability. Ratio: Subsection 3 Safety of passengers (Art. 1755 to 1763)

LRTA & Rodolfo Roman vs. Marjorie Navidad, Heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad & Prudent Security Agency GR No. 145804 February 6, 2003 Topic: Safety of passengers Case stemmed from the death of Mr. Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, at the EDSA LRT station when he had an altercation with guard Junelito Escartin and fell at the LRT tracks and a train, operated by Rodolfo Roman, struck him. A complaint for damages was filed by the heirs of Navidad against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, the Metro Transit and Prudent Security Agency, agency of Escartin. The trial court held security agency and Escartin liable to Navidad. CA exonerated Prudent from liability and held LRTA and Roman liable. Issue/s: W/N LRTA can be held liable for the death of Navidad. Ruling: Affirmative, the law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) thru the negligence or willful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either

case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. LRTA held liable, Roman was acquitted. Ratio: Art.1755, 1756, 1759 & 1763. Tiu vs. Arriesgado GR No. 138060 September 1, 2004 Topic:Common Carrier, Safety of passengers Case stemmed from an accident between a D Rough Riders bus bound for Cebu City and a truck of Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise which resulted to the death of Felisa Arriesgado and injured Pedro Arriesgado when the latter was stalled over a bridge in Compostela, Cebu. Respondent Arriesgado filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages, and attorneys fees before RTC-Cebu City against petitioners. Trial court ruled in favor of respondent, CA affirmed with modification. Issue/s: W/N bus company liable to Arriesgado. Ruling: Yes, petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the Arriesgados, under the contract of carriage, to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances. Any injury suffered by passengers is immediately attributable to negligence of carrier. It must be stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. Petition partially granted. Ratio: Art. 1733, 1755 and 1756 Note: Doctrine of last clear chance-a common law notion which permits courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. The doctrine is not applicable to the case since it only applies in a suit between owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. Rosito Bacarro, et. Al vs. Gerundio Castao and CA. GR No. L-34597 November 5, 1982 Topic: Common Carriers, Safety of passengers Respondent Castano boarded a jeep driven by Petitioner Montefalcon who thereafter drove it at

around 40 kilometers per hour. While approaching Sumasap Bridge at the said speed, a cargo truck coming from behind, blowing its horn to signal its intention to overtake the jeep. The jeep, without changing its speed, gave way by swerving to the right, such that both vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around 20 meters. Thereafter as the jeep was left behind, its driver was unable to return it to its former lane and instead it obliquely or diagonally ran down an inclined terrain towards the right until it fell into a ditch pinning down and crushing Castanos right leg in the process. Castano filed a case for damages against Rosita Bacarro, William Sevilla, and Felario Montefalcon. Defendants alleged that the jeepney was sideswiped by the overtaking cargo truck. After trial, the CFI of Misamis Oriental ordered Bacarro, et.al. to jointly and severally pay Castano. It was affirmed by the CA upon appeal. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there was a contributory negligence on the part of the jeepney driver. 2. Whether or not extraordinary diligence is required of the jeepney driver. 3. Whether or not the sideswiping is a fortuitous event. HELD: 1.) Yes. X x x. The fact is, petitioner-driver Montefalcon did not slacken his speed but instead continued to run the jeep at about forty (40) kilometers per hour even at the time the overtaking cargo truck was running side by side for about twenty (20) meters and at which time he even shouted to the driver of the truck. Thus, had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck was overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there would have been no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the road was getting narrower the truck would be to close to the jeep and would eventually sideswiped it. Otherwise stated, he should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right to give way to the truck because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge at the same time. 2.) Yes. x x x [T]he fact is, there was a contract of carriage between the private respondent and the herein petitioners in which case the Court of

Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code which require the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon. Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide "using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault. 3.) The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault upon respondent court in not freeing petitioners from any liability, since the accident was due to a fortuitous event. But, We repeat that the alleged fortuitous event in this case - the sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck, was something which could have been avoided considering the narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which was not wide enough to admit two vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon contributed to the occurrence of the mishap. Case Digests for Damages Cathay Pacific Airways v. Spouses Vasquez G.R. No. 150843 March 14, 2003

their friends with whom they had traveled and Dr. Vasquez had business matters he wanted to discuss with them. The attendant, however, insisted that they take the seats because the flight has been overbooked and the only way for them to get in this flight was to take the first class upgrade. They took in reluctantly for want to be with their friends. When they returned back to Manila, they demanded from Cathay Pacific damages of up to P1M, including Moral Damages.

ISSUES:W/N Spouses Vasquez are entitled to MORAL DAMAGES, if not should they be indemnified in another manner?

HELD: SPOUSES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES AS THEREWAS NO BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF CATHAY PACIFIC OR ITS ATTENDANTS.

FACTS: The Spouses Vasquez went to Hong Kong via Cathay Pacific Airlines. Included inthe trip was their maid who rode in the tourist class, and 2 friends who rode with them in the business class cabin. On the way back to Manila, the spouses presented their boarding passes to the attendant. The attendant informed them that their seats have been upgraded to first class because they were Marco Polo Club Members (frequent flyer club) and they had such the privilege of a free upgrade in seating accommodations when such is available. The spouses did not want to change their seats because they felt that they should be seated with

The spouses knew that they were members of the Marco Polo Club and that they had such privileged. But privileges, as known to us, can be waived. The flight attendant would have consulted the spouses if they wanted to avail of that privilege before their business class seats were given to someone else and not surprise them, as like what happened in this case. The spouses clearly waived such privilege, therefore Cathay Pacific breached the contract of carriage. It is essential, however, that there exists bad faith or malice when in breach of the contract of carriage. The attendants changed the seat accommodations without such malice. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity which was not present in this case. SPOUSES MAY ENTITLED ONLY TO NOMINAL DAMAGES The court did not award them even nominal damages, they just made mention that Nominal Damages is the most the spouses may claim: According to article 2221: Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the

defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus 110 PHIL 346

Facts: Edgardo Cariaga, a fourth year medical student at the University of Santo Tomas suffered physical injuries from a collision between a train of Manila Railroad and the Laguna Tayabas Bus (LTB)which he was on board. The bus collided with the train while the former was about to cross the railroad. He suffered a severe head injury which diminished his intelligence and he will no longer be able to continue his studies as a medical student. The said injury that he sustained also made him physically and mentally incapable of working. All of the medical expenses were paid LTB plus allowances. A case was filed by Edgardos parents against LTB and Manila Railroad to recover actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages amounting to 312,000 pesos. LTB filed a crosscomplaint alleging that it was MRR who was negligent by not blowing its whistle as a warning for the vehicles that were crossing the railroad and that there was no crossing bar at the said crossing. The lower court held that LTB was negligent in crossing and the injuries sustained by Edgardo Cariaga was due to the said negligence of the driver of the bus. The cross-complaint was dismissed by the lower court and ordered LTB to pay 10,490 pesos as compensatory damages plus interest. Hence this petition by LTB.

of the bus ignored the whistle of the train. He should have exercised utmost diligence in crossing the railroad tracks. The collision between the bus and the train even caused the latter to be derailed. Therefore LTB should be solely liable for the payment of damages to the Cariagas. As to the award of damages, the Court held that the amount of 10,490 pesos is inadequate. Article 2201 of the NCC provides that a common carrier shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages, those which are natural and probable consequences of the breach of the contract of common carriage and which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted, provided such damages have been duly provided. This means tha t, actual or compensatory damages are not only limited to medical and other expenses. It includes the possible income that Edgardo would have earned after graduating from medical school. Considering that Edgardo was already a fourth year med student at the time that he boarded the bus, such income could be foreseen. These circumstances would make it sufficient to presume that he would have finished school and passed the board exam. The award of actual damages should be increased to 25,000 pesos assuming that the income of Edgardo would have been 300 pesos a month. The parents of Edgardo are not parties in this case because the contract of common carriage was between LTB and Edgardo. They were not injured in the accident therefore their claim for damages is without merit. No award of moral damages may be given because the circumstances of this case do not fall under the enumeration provided in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the NCC. Attorneys fees cannot be granted as well for the same reason that the circumstances do not fall under Article 2208 of the NCC.

Issue: 1.Whether or not LTB should be held solely liable for the injuries of Edgardo Cariaga.2.Whether or not the award of damages by the lower court is proper. Held: The Court held that it was LTB that was negligent and not the driver of the train. The driver

Soberano v. Manila Railroad & Benguet Auto Line 18 SCRA 732

Facts: Juana Soberano was a passenger of a Benguet Auto line bus bound for Baguio from Ilocos Sur. She has brought on board the bus some eggs which was her business. When the bus reached Naguilian road it hit a stone embankment, this caused the bus to fall from a 65-foot precipice. As a result of the accident 2 passengers died and several passengers were injured. Soberano was also injured in the said accident. All of her belongings were lost and destroyed as a result of the accident. The defendant in this case offered to pay 5,000 pesos for the injury and loss caused by the accident. However, Soberano rejected the offer and instituted a case to recover damages in the amount of 76,757.76 pesos. The lower court awarded 5,000 pesos for actual or compensatory damages. Petitioner herein claims that the award of damages is not enough and that the defendant herein was in bad faith for not satisfying her claim. Hence this petition.

SINGSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS G.R. No. 119995. November 18, 1997

Issue: Whether or not Soberano is entitled to recover a higher amount as to damages for the injury and loss she sustained.

Held: The Court held that the award of actual damages, in relation to loss of earning capacity should be increased from 5,000 to 15,000 pesos. Petitioner herein suffered physical injuries which resulted in a loss of positive economic values. She had been a merchant since 1950 and she has been earning 1,500pesos a year. Therefore, the award of damages with regard to her loss of earning capacity should be increased to 15,000 pesos. In addition to this amount, the defendant herein shall also pay for the unpaid allowances and the loss of profit for the eggs which were damaged in the accident. Defendant herein cannot be held to be in bad faith for not satisfying the claim of the petitioner. It was justified in rejecting the claim of the petitioner because the amount asked of them was too much. The defendant in this case did not compel Soberano to file a case, she rejected the offer of the former and decided to push through with this case. Therefore, no other damages should be awarded to the petitioner.

FACTS: Petitioner CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin Crescentino Tiongson bought from respondent Cathay Pacific Airways two (2) opendated, identically routed, round trip plane tickets (Manila to LA and vice versa). Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight coupons, each would be detached at the start of each leg of the trip. Singson failed to obtain a booking in LA for their to Manila; apparently, the coupon corresponding to the 5th leg of the trip was missing and instead the 3rd was still attached. It was not until few days later that the defendant finally was able to arrange for his return to Manila. Singson commenced an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage against CATHAY before the Regional Trial Court. CATHAY alleged that there was no contract of carriage yet existing such that CATHAYs refusal to immediately book him could not be construed as breach of contract of carriage. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding that CATHAY was guilty of gross negligence amounting to malice and bad faith for which it was adjudged to pay petitioner P20,000.00 for actual damages with interest at the legal rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from 26 August 1988 when the complaint was filed until fully paid, P500,000.00 for moral damages, P400,000.00 for exemplary damages, P100,000.00 for attorneys fees, and, to pay the costs. On appeal by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts finding that there was gross negligence amounting to bad faith or fraud and, accordingly, modified its judgment by deleting the awards for moral and exemplary damages, and the attorneys fees as well. ISSUES: 1.) whether a breach of contract was committed by

CATHAY when it failed to confirm the booking of petitioner. 2.) whether the carrier was liable not only for actual damages but also for moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. HELD: 1.) Yes. the round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete written contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the elements of a complete written contract, to wit: (a) the consent of the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger agreed to be transported by the carrier to and from Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hong Kong back to the Philippines, and the carriers acceptance to bring him to his destination and then back home; (b) cause or consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated in his ticket; and, (c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger from the place of departure to the place of destination and back, which are also stated in his ticket. In fact, the contract of carriage in the instant case was already partially executed as the carrier complied with its obligation to transport the passenger to his destination, i.e., Los Angeles. the loss of the coupon was attributable to the negligence of CATHAYs agents and was the proximate cause of the non-confirmation of petitioner's return flight. 2.) Yes. Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap results in the death of a passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, there are situations where the negligence of the carrier is so gross and reckless as to virtually amount to bad faith, in which case, the passenger likewise becomes entitled to recover moral damages. These circumstances reflect the carriers utter lack of care and sensitivity to the needs of its passengers, clearly constitutive of gross negligence, recklessness and wanton disregard of the rights of the latter, acts evidently indistinguishable or no different from fraud, malice and bad faith. As the rule now stands, where in breaching the contract of

carriage the defendant airline is shown to have acted fraudulently, with malice or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary damages, in addition to actual damages, is proper. However, the P500,000.00 moral damages and P400,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the trial court have to be reduced. The well-entrenched principle is that the grant of moral damages depends upon the discretion of the court based on the circumstances of each case. This discretion is limited by the principle that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. Damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to alleviate the moral suffering that the injured party had undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable action. There is no hardand-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. In the instant case, the injury suffered by petitioner is not so serious or extensive as to warrant an award amounting to P900,000.00. The assessment of P200,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and realistic. On the issue of actual damages, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of P20,000.00 granted by the trial court to petitioner should not be disturbed. As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. It was therefore erroneous for the Court of Appeals to delete the award made by the trial court; consequently, petitioner should be awarded attorney's fees and the amount of P25,000.00, instead of P100,000.00 earlier awarded, may be considered rational, fair and reasonable.

Collin Morris and Thomas Whittier v CA, Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) G.R. No. 127957 February 21, 2001

ISSUES: W/N SAS is liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage?

FACTS: Petitioners Collin A. Morris and Thomas P. Whittier were American citizens; the vice-president for technical service and the director for quality assurance, respectively, of Sterling Asia, a foreign corporation with regional headquarters at No. 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Respondent Scandinavian Airline System(SAS for brevity) has been engaged in the commercial air transport of passengers globally. Petitioners had a series of business meetings in Japan from Feb 14-22 1978, thusthey made travel arrangements with their agent in Staats Travel Service. They were book in 1st class, SAS Flight SK893, Manila-Tokyo for Feb 14, 3:50 pm. On the day of the flight, the limo service agency fetched Morris at Urdaneta and Whittier in Merville. They arrived at MIA at 230pm. They were at the counter around 310pm and gave their travel documents to Erlinda Ponce at the reception desk. Later they realized that their travel documents is not being processed. They called their agent to find out the problem. They learned that they were bumped off the flight. They insisted to get their flight from Ponce and her supervisor, Mr. Basa. Later, they learned the economy section was overbooked, and those who came early were given the option to upgrade to 1st class. Their seats were given away and the flight manifest marked NOSH (no show) after their name, because the check-in counter closed already 40mins before departure. Petitioners were advised to be at the airport an hour before the flight. They came late, and SAS simply followed company policies. Petitioners filed a complaint for damages. RTC awarded: Moral damages: Morris, 1M; Whittier, 750K exempl ary: 200K attys fees: 300K. Petitioners filed an MR to the RTC to increase award, moral damages increased to1.5M and 1M. CA reversed, hence this petition.

HELD: It must be emphasized that a contract to transport passengers is quite different kind and degree from any other contractual relations, and this is because relation, which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended wit h a pubic duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages." In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be Want on and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages are generally not recoverable in Culpa contractual except when bad faith had been proven. However, the same damages may be recovered when breach of contract of carriage results in the death of a passenger: No moral damages when arising from contract of carriage, 1191 is the remedy on breach of contract? EXCEPT: if someone died on the plane. The award of exemplary damages has likewise no factual basis. It is Requisite that the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner. Circumstances which are absent in this case. In addition, exemplary damages cannot be

awarded as the requisite element of compensatory damages was not present. In the instant case, assuming that breach of contract of carriage may be attributed to respondent, petitioners' travails were directly traceable to their failure to check-in on time, which lewd to respondent's refusal to accommodate them on the flight. CA decision affirmed. Petition dismissed.

is liable thereof and so Pantranco filed this petition for certiorari, charging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court. ISSUE: whether, in an action for damages for breach of contract of carriage, proof of the financial standing of the defendant is necessary so as to justify a request for the production of the financial statements relating to the business of the defendant? HELD: Under Section 1 of Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court., a party may ask for the production of documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, "which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control." The objection here is that the documents, consisting of general ledgers and financial statements of the company, are immaterial and irrelevant to the issue of negligence and that to allow their production would be to sanction inquisition or "fishing expedition" into the financial records of the company. Article 2206 of the Civil Code states: The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. ... Article 2206 applies in case of death caused by the breach of contract by the common carrier (Art. 1764). It fixes the minimum indemnity for death at P3,000, which the courts may increase according to the circumstances. It is in fixing a greater amount of indemnity that courts may consider the financial capacity of the common carrier, along with such other factors as (1) the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, (2) pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or beneficiary, (3) loss of support, (4) loss of service, (5) loss of society, (6) mental suffering of beneficiaries, and (7) medical and funeral expenses. In Commonwealth Act No. 284, it is provided that the civil liability or the death of a person shall be fixed by the competent court at a reasonable sum, upon consideration of the pecuniary situation of the party liable and other circumstances, but it shall in

G.R. No. L-20916-17 December 23, 1964 PANTRANCO vs. HON. GREGORIO A. LEGASPI, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, PUA PIAN, ROLLY PUA, AIDA PUA, GLORIA PUA, CHUA TECK and CRISPINA BREGUERA FACTS: In separate complaints, respondents alleged that Aurora Breguera, Welly Pua and Memia Chua boarded at Dasol, Pangasinan, Pantranco Bus No. 334, bound for the town of Alaminos of the same province. They averred that before reaching Alaminos and just after rounding a blind curve, the bus driver, Arsenio Osorio, "by reason of his gross negligence collided with another oncoming passenger truck, likewise owned and operated by defendant (Pantranco)," causing Bus No. 334 to turn turtle several times and that as a result of the accident, Aurora Breguera and the child Welly Pua suffered injuries from which they died shortly after the accident, while Memia Chua died instantaneously. Respondents prayed for various amounts of damages and alleged in their complaints "that defendant (Pantranco) is financially well-established having enormous assets and a huge income." Pantranco contended that the accident was purely a force majeure beyond its control. It also alleged that "it is an established concern." The Court, is of the opinion that while the financial capacity of the defendant in these cases may not be necessary in the determination of the bare fact of whether or not it is liable for the death of three victims, but that such financial capacity becomes relevant and necessary in determining a reasonable equitable amount of compensation or damages that may be awarded to the heirs of the victims should the court be convinced that the defendant company

no case be less than two thousand pesos as the minimum amount as fixed in this law, but the point is that in fixing a greater amount of indemnity, the pecuniary situation of the party liable may well be considered along with other elements. This point should dispose of petitioner's contention that the liability of the common carrier cannot be made to depend on its pecuniary capacity. Of course, independently of its financial capacity, the common carrier, if liable, must be made to pay the minimum amount. But if its financial ability is such that it can pay a greater amount of indemnity as demanded by the circumstances of the case, then certainly it should be made to pay more than P3,000. Its financial standing in such a case is material. This is what respondents, as plaintiffs in the civil cases below, have sought to do. As earlier stated, they sought the production of the ledgers and financial statements of Pantranco in connection with their allegation that "defendant (Pantranco) is financially well-established having enormous assets and a huge income." That is why in the prayer of their complaints, they asked the court, not for the minimum indemnity of P3,000, but for such indemnity for the death of Aurora Breguera, Welly Pua and Memia Chua, as the Court may find proper and reasonable." Their request therefore was for a good cause and the respondent Judge committed no abuse of discretion in granting it. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction is dissolved without pronouncement as to costs.