WILDVALLEY vs.

COURT OF APPEALS FACTS OF THE CASE o Sometime in February 1988, a ship named "the Philippine Roxas" owned by Philippine President Lines arrived in Venezuela to transport iron ore. o Pilot of the Ship - Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez o Captain of the Ship - Nicandro Colon o The ship experienced some vibrations but the pilot said it's because the Orinoco River is shallow o At 4:12, they experienced some vibrations once again and asked the Chief Officer of the vessel to check the double bottom tanks o At 4:35, the ship grounded (stopped) and obstructed the path of other ships o The ship The Malandrinon, owned by the Wildvalley Shipping Company, was obstructed o Wildvalley Shipping Company therefore filed a suit against Philippine President Lines for lost profits and damages (400,000 US Dollars) plus attorney's fees etc. @ RTC Manila Branch 3 o RTC Manila Branch 3's decision favored Wildvalley o On the other hand, Philippine President Lines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals o Court of Appeals reversed the decision and went in favor of Philippine President Lines Pinagbabayad pa si WILDVALLEY ng attorney's fees and cost of suit worth 323,042.53 pesos. Lugi pa tuloy siya ngayon. HAHAHA side comment o Wildvalley filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the CA once again o SO WILDVALLEY FILED A PETITION TO THE PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT.

ZE ISSUES IN ZE CASE o That the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding Venezuelan Law. It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved Distinction in proving an unwritten and a written law If unwritten - oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible. Printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted to such courts are also okay. If written - SECTION 24 of RULE 132 of the RULES OF COURT "The record of public documents when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not in the Philippines, with a certificate that such an officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office" IN SHORT - Pag written yung law, kailangan (1) official publication nun or (2) copy nung officer na may custody nung law (or deputy niya). Kung nasa ibang bansa yung may record nung law, pwedeng copy lang basta may certificate na nagpapatunay na siya yung may custody nung kopya nung law na yun. (3) Kung nasa ibang bansa yung office na may copy nung law, pwedeng yung foreign service or embassy nalang yung gumawa nung certificate na mag-au-authenticate nung copy. Kailangan may seal. Ayun Pwede rin ang testimony ng isang witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law. Willamette Iron and Steel Works vs. Muzzal - yung Attorney binasa niya yung section 322 ng California Civil Code. Enough na yun as evidence to prove na yun yung applicable law sa California na may kinalaman sa case. HOWEVER SA CASE NA TO, THOUGH MAY WITNESS (Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots sa Venezuela) NA NAGPAPATUNAY NA MAY NAG-E-EXIST NA VENEZUELAN LAWS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE, HINDI NA PROVE NG MAAYOS NUNG WILDVALLEY AS SPECIFIED SA SECTION 24 NG RULE 132 NG RULES OF COURT. (the one quoted above, yung may certificate chuchu)

PHOTOCOPY LANG NUNG LAWS YUNG PINRESENT NG WILDVALLEY SO HINDI PROPER YUNG PAGKAKA-PROVE NILA. Applicable laws were Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela) and Para la Zona de Pilotaje No. 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the navigation of the Orinoco River) Plus, according to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute Therefore, the Venezuelan laws were not properly pleaded in the Court. And according to Processual Presumption, if the foreign law is not pleaded, it will be presumed that it is the same with our local law. Therefore, the Philippine laws apply in this case.

That the Court erred in saying that there was no negligence on the part of the Captain Applicable law: "If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required" - ARTICLE 1173 of the New Civil Code The Supreme Court agrees that the Captain performed as expected of him (like a good father of a family) which is what an ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own property Another applicable law: Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85 or known as Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. SECTION 11: On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the sevice to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence and fault The Master or captain shall assume responsibility of the ship and any damage caused by the negligence of the captain is the responsibility of the owner. (rephrased) SECTION 32: A pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely: Provided however that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master (captain) neglects or refuses to carry out his order SECTION 8: Compulsory Pilotage Service - as in kailangan may pilot yung ship. In general kasi, pwedeng walang pilot eh. Discretion nalang nung Captain kung mag-e-employ siya ng Pilot. Sa voluntary na pagkuha ng pilot, pag nagkamali yung Pilot, may liability parin yung owner pero in compulsory pilotage cases, pilot lang ang may fault ORINOCO RIVER = Compulsory Pilotage The Supreme Court deemed that the fault rests on the Pilot and not on the Captain because the Captain let the Pilot run the ship because of the Pilot's knowledge of the Orinoco River. Sabi kasi nung pilot, experienced siya at naipapaliwanag naman niya yung mga dahilan nung vibrations na nauna na nilang naramdaman. So hinayaan na nung Captain yung Pilot. Eh since compulsory pilotage ang Orinoco River at kasalanan nung Pilot, therefore, walang kasalanan ang Philippine President Lines. That the Court erred when it said that the ship is "seaworthy" Supreme Court held that while the ship is seaworthy because Lloyd's Register of Shipping deemed it fit to travel. Yes, the ship has some problems. A ship may not need to be perfect in order to be fit to travel. Kailangan niya lang ma-withstand yung 'perils' of traveling. Plus, yung pagkaka sira naman nung ship ay hindi attributable dun sa sira nung ship kundi kasalanan nga nung Pilot kasi nagmagaling siya. Chineck din bago maglayag yung ship - yung engines, auxillaries and all that - okay naman siya so "seaworthy" siya. That the Court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Philippine President Lines

According to Supreme Court, hindi unjust yung awarding ng attorney's fees kasi nga wala namang merits yung case ni Wildvalley therefore na-subject si PPL sa isang bagay na dapat naman hindi kaya just lang yung mag award ng compensation sa attorney's fees.

THEREFORE, the decision of Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED. TALO SI WILDVALLEY\

Bank of America, NT & SA, Petitioner vs. American Realty Corporation and Court of Appeals, Respondent

Summary of Rules Applied: 1. Civil Law, Contracts, Mortgages, Remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. An election off one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. A remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the filing for the suit for collection OR upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage. For extrajudicial foreclosure, remedy is elected by the mortgage creditor upon the filing of the petition with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. 1. Third person who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. There is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third person who secured the fulfillment of anothers obligation by mortgaging his own property, to be solidarily bound with the principal debtor. (Private Respondent ARC- third party mortgagor). The signatory to the principal contract loan remains to be primarily bound. Only upon default of the latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of loan. 1. Filling of a collection suit barred the foreclosure of the mortgage. When the mortgage elects to file a suit for collection, not foreclosure, thereby abandoning the chattel mortgage as basis for relief, he clearly manifests his lack of desire and interest to go after the mortgaged property as security for the promissory note. 1. Filing of an ordinary action for collection operates as a waiver of the mortgage-creditors remedy to foreclose the mortgage. By the filing of the ordinary action for collection against the principal debtors, petitioner elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the other necessarily must arise. 1. Conflicts of Law: In a long line of decisions, the court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of ay foreign law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. If the foreign law is not properly pleaded and proved, courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law Doctrine of Processual Presumption) 1. When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (In the case: public policy protected is splitting up of a single cause of action).

Facts Petitioner BANTSA international banking and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized and existing under and by the virtue of the laws of the State of California, USA. Private Respondent Bank of America International Limited (BAIL) limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of England.

BANTSA and BAIL, granted three major multi-million US Dollar loans to corporate borrowers all of which existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private respondent. BANTSA and the corporate borrowers signed and entered into restructuring agreements. As additional security for the restructured loans, private respondent ARC third party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages located in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Corporate borrowers defaulted in the payment of the loans prompting BANTSA to file civil actions before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loans. In this civil suits, private respondent ARC was not impleaded as party-defendant. December 16, 1992 BANTSA filed before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. January 22, 1993 after due publication and notice, the mortgaged real properties were sold at public auction in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. February 12, 1993 ARC filed before Pasig RTC, action for damages against BANTSA, for the act of foreclosing extrajudicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan. BANTSA answered that the rule prohibiting the mortgagee from foreclosing the mortgage after an ordinary suit for collection has been filed is not applicable because: 1. ARC is a third party mortgagor only. 2. No civil suit for sum of money filed in the Philippines 3. Under English Law, mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing civil actions for sums of money. ARC filed a motion for suspension because the foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties is legally improper and is invalid Granted Decision in favor of ARC Ruling BANTSA should pay ARC the following sums, all with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint up to the date of actual payment. 1. Actual or compensatory damages PHP 99,000,000.00 2. Exemplary damages PHP 5,000,000.00 3. Costs of Suit BANTSA appealed in CA. CA affirmed the assailed decision of the lower court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration denied, petition bereft of merit ISSUES: 1. Whether or not BANTSAs act of filing a collection suit against corporate borrowers for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver for the remedy of foreclosure. (Answer: Rule 1, 3 and 4; refer above) 1. Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and exemplary damages in favor of ARC is proper. (Answer: Rule 2) In the case at bar, BANTSA only has one cause of action non-payment of the debt. It may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the Rule against splitting a cause of action. BANTSA implies English Law. (Answer: Rule 4 and 5) Ruling

Instant petition is denied for lack of merit. CAs decision is affirmed with modification of the amount of exemplary damages. BANTSA is ordered to pay ARC the sum of PHP 99,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages and PHP 50,000.00 as exemplary damage and the costs of suit.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents Note: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, May 19, 1993 in CA-G.R. CV No. 35871 affirming Decision dated October 14, 1991 of the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168 in Civil Case No. 56368 DISMISSED the complaint of petitioner Asiavest Merchant Banker (M) Berhad for the enforcement of money judgement of the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur against private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation. Note: Asiavest: corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia; while PNCC is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws. Sometime in 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya. Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By-Pass Project. September 13, 1985, High Court of Malaya rendered judgment in favour of the petitioner. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated a complaint before RTC of Pasig, to enforce the judgement of the High Court of Malaya. Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss filed on October 5, 1988, contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the revised Rules of Court. The trial court rendered its Decision, dismissing petitioners complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court in a Decision dated May 19, 1993. I. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Malaysian court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over PNCC, notwithstanding that (a) The foreign court had served summons on PNCC at its Malaysia office, and (b) PNCC itself appeared by counsel in the case before that court II. The court of appeals erred in denying recognition and enforcement to (SIC) the Malaysian court judgment. In the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country, however the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Judgement may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Section 3(n), Rule 31 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, one the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, at the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity. In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. (petitioner offered both testimonial and documentary evidence) Since the petitioner, through the foregoing evidence, proved the authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity. The burden fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent to prove otherwise.

Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it- to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment, namely, (a) that jurisdiction was not acquired by the Malaysian Court over the person of private respondent due to the alleged improper service of summons upon private respondent and the alleged lack of authority of its counsel to appear and represent private respondent in the suit; (b) the foreign judgment is allegedly tainted by evident collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact or law; and (c) not only were the requisites for enforcement or recognition allegedly not complied with but also that the Malaysian judgment is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional prescription that the every decision must state the facts and law on which it is based. Private respondent relied on the testimony of its two witnesses, both of who failed to shed light and amplify its defence or claim for no-enforcement of the foreign judgment against it. The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing enforcement and recognition of the Malaysian judgment primarily refers to matters of remedy and procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for collection initiated by petitioner. To stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. Matters of remedy and procedure, are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum In this case the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the service of court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. Note: as to what the Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the law firm of Allen and Gledhill to represent private respondent, not only that the private respondent witness admit that the said law firm were its counsels in transactions in Malaysia, more importantly is the fact that the petitioner offered in evidence relevant to Malaysian jurisprudence. ([a] it is not necessary under Malaysian law for counsel appearing before the High Court to submit special power of attorney authorizing him to represent a client before the said court [2] counsel has the full authority to compromise the suit) On the ground that collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact and law tainted the judgment of the High Court of Malaya, no clear evidence of the same was shown. Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not enforceable in view of the absence of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favour of the petitioner was based. According to the procedural laws of the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered even without stating in the judgment ever fact and law upon which the judgment is based, we cannot invalidate the judgment of foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise. DECISION: The instant petition is granted, the decision of the RTC is REVERSED. Private respondent was ORDERED to pay petitioner. Case Digest on GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent, G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001 FACTS 1987: Rederick Recio (Filipino) married Editha Samson (Australian citizen) in Rizal 1992: Recio (respondent) became Australian citizen; Australian government issued a Certificate of Australian Citizenship 1994: Garcia (petitioner) and Recio were married in Cabanatuan City; Recio was declared as single and Filipino in their application for marriage license 1995: Garcia and Recio began to live separately 1996: While couple was in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided 1998: Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on ground of bigamy. Garcia claimed that she found out Recios marriage to Samson only in 1997, which Recio denied in his answer, stating that in 1993, he already informed Garcia of his previous marriage as well as its dissolution RE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT (TC) TC declared Recio and Samsons marriage dissolved because the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines (p. 444)

As such, there should be no more marriage to annul; However, Garcia raised five issues in her petition RE ISSUES IN RECIOS PETITION The present case gives attention to only two issues (p. 445): Whether the divorce between *Recio+ and Samson was proven Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner RULING OF SUPREME COURT (SC) RE FIRST ISSUE: PROVING DIVORCE BETWEEN RECIO AND SAMSON Garcia claims that the divorce decree may be recognized only if the ff are proven: (1) the gorein law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself (p. 446) Garcia also cites par. 1, Art. 26 of Family Code: marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis) (Ibid.) SCs comments: Absolute divorce is NOT recognized in Philippine laws Art. 15 and 17 of Civil Code: a divorce obtained abroad cannot dissolve marriage between two Filipinos (Ibid.) Art. 26 of Family Code: in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to remarry if the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry (p. 447) Mere presentation of the divorce decree is not enough; for it to be recognized by Philippine courts, party pleading it must prove that the divorce is consistent with the foreign law that allowed it [In this case, Recio must prove that his divorce with Samson is valid under Australian law.] RE THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE DIVORCE DECREE BETWEEN RECIO AND SAMSON (DIVORCE AS A QUESTION OF FACT, p. 448-451) Garcia argues that a divorce decree must first satisfy requirements under Arts. 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code before it can be admitted in evidence (p. 448) Recio argues that the Australian divorce decree no longer requires any proof because it is a public document or a written official act of an Australian family court (Ibid.) SCs COMMENTS: a foreign document (in this case, the divorce decree) must be presented and admitted in evidence before it is given presumptive evidentiary value (p. 448) According to secs. 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication, or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issues by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office *italics mine+ The aforementioned rules on evidence must be satisfied; mere appearance of divorce decree is not enough Good news for Recio is that when divorce decree was submitted in evidence, Garcias counsel objected only because the decree had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City *where Recio and Garcia where married+ (p. 450) The improper objection by Garcias counsel rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia (p. 450) Because of petitioners improper/inappropriate objection, Recio is no longer required to comply with Arts. 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code; by virtue of his naturalization as an Australian citizen in 1992, he was no longer bound by Philippine laws (p. 450) Naturalization is defined as the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen (pp. 450-451) Re who has the Burden of Proving Australian Law Recio argues that Recio has the burden to prove Australian divorce law because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment (p. 451) SC disagrees with Recios claim. According to SC, the burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action (p. 451. Italics mine). In connection with the previous bullet: in civil cases, plaintiff is responsible for proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; defendant is responsible for proving these allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters (p. 451)

In this case, since Recio was the one who introduced the divorce decree as his defense, he has the burden to prove Australian law. RE SECOND ISSUE: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry Garcia argues that Recios marriage to her in 1994 was illegal because the divorce was not proven; thus their marriage is considered void ab initio (literally, void from the beginning *Guandolo 1968: 6+) Recio, on the other hand, claims that the Australian divorce decree, in itself, already rendered him legally capacitated to marry under the Australian law SC disagrees with Recio. Divorce is legally defined as the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage (p. 452). There are two types of divorce: Absolute divorce (a vinculo matrimonii), which terminates the marriage (Ibid.) Limited divorce (a mensa et thoro), which just suspends the marriage but still renders it binding 1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy. *it may be that Recios divorce was not yet absolute when he married Garcia+ In this case, Recio was not able to show which type of divorce he obtained Recio only showed a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree which pertains to a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce (p. 452) The Court, however, may still restrict marriage under some foreign statutes and practices even if the divorce is absolute (p. 452-453); for instance, the court may prohibit a divorcee from remarrying if he/she was guilty of adultery. The divorcee may only remarry after exhibiting good behavior for a certain period of time (p. 453). The following excerpt from the Australian divorce decree supports the Courts claim that Recios divorce may have been restricted (p. 453): Hence, in light of the aforementioned excerpt, SC claims that the decree failed to establish Recios legal capacity to marry according to Australian law RE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF LEGAL CAPACITY (CLC) Garcia claims that Recio failed to submit CLC as required by Art 21 of the Family Code; she claims that the absence of CLC proves Recios lack of legal capacity to marry (p. 453-454) SCs clarification: the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned (p. 454) No such evidence was presented to prove Recios legal capacity to marry Garcia *refer to p. 454 for the list of evidences presented] Hence, SC concludes that Recio, a naturalized Australian citizen, had no legal capacity to marry Garcia in 1994; SC agrees with Garcias claim However, SC could not also grant Garcias prayer to declare her marriage to Recio as null and void on ground of bigamy, because Recios marriage with her may be considered legal under Australian law (p. 455) SC decides this case to be REMANDED to the trial court so as to obtain evidence that would show that Recio has the legal capacity to marry Garcia; if this is not achieved, trial court shall declare their marriage null and void on ground of bigamy (p. 455-456) *remand means to order or send back (Guandolo 1968: 172)]

PAULA T. LLORENTE (petitioner) vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND ALICIA LLORENTE (respondents) THE CASE The case raises a conflict of laws issue. The case is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the RTC, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City declaring Alicia F. Llorente as co-owner of whatever property she and deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente may have acquired during the 25 years as husband and wife. THE FACTS Deceased Lorenzo Llorente- enlisted serviceman of US Navy from March 10, 1927 to Sept. 30, 1957 Feb. 22, 1937- Lorenzo and Paula were married in CamSur Before outbreak of Pacific War- Lorenzo went to US; Paula stayed in CamSur

Nov. 30, 1943- Lorenzo was admitted to US Citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization by US District Court, New York. 1945 (liberation of Philippines by American Forces)- Lorenzo granted accrued leave by US Navy to visit wife; L visited Philippines, discovered that wife Paula was pregnant and living in, having adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente Dec. 4, 1945- Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente; certificate: child is not legitimate, fathers name was blank; Lorenzo refused to forgive and live with Paula. Feb. 2, 1946- Written Agreement (signed by Lorenzo and Paula; witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother; notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel) 1. All family allowances (part of Lorenzos salary) allocated by US Navy and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended 2. They would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings 3. They would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life 4. Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act (since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate with Lorenzo peacefully) Lorenzo returned to US Nov. 16, 1951- Lorenzo filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego; Paula represented by counsel John Riley and actively participated; Nov. 27, 1951- SCSC and CSD found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. Dec. 4, 1952- divorce decree became final In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. J Jan. 16, 1958- Lorenzo married ALICIA LLORENTE in Manila; Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage (same town with Paula, Paula did not oppose) 1958 to 1985- Lorenzo and Paula lived as husband and wife; 25yrs union: 3 children- Raul, Luz and Beverly- all surnamed to Llorente March 13, 1981- Lorenzo executed Last Will and Testament: bequeath all property to Alicia and their 3 Children 1. Wife Alicia- residential house and lot (CamSur) + all personal properties 2. Alicia, Children Raul, Luz and Beverly- equal shares: real properties in CamSur (4) 3. Wife Alicia, Children Raul, Luz and Beverly- equal shares all real properties in QC, all lands in Antipolo, Rizal 4. Shares in above mentioned properties, real or personal, shall not be disposed of, ceded and conveyed to other persons, only to themselves 5. Wife Alicia, sole executor of Last Will and Testament; wifes incapacity: children according to age 6. Executor or lawful substitute should served without (sic) bond 7. Revoke any other wills 8. No relatives of Lorenzo in any degree should disturb wife Alicia and children regarding properties given through Will Dec. 14, 1983- Lorenzo filed in RTC Iriga CamSur: petition for the probate and allowance of Last Will where Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratix of his estate Jan. 18, 1984- RTC denied- Lorenzo is still alive! Jan. 24, 1984- finding that the will was duly executed, RTC admitted the will to probate June 11, 1985- Before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. L Sept. 4, 1985- Paula (UNANG ASAWA NA NANGALIWA!!) filed in RTC a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favour. Paula contended: 1. She was Lorenzos surviving spouse 2. Various property were acquired during their marriage 3. Lorenzos will give all his property to Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitimate and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. Dec. 13, 1985- Alicia filed in the estate proceeding, a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary Oct. 14, 1985- Without terminating the testate proceedings, RTC gave due course to Paulas petition Nov. 6, 13 and 20, 1985- order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star

RULING May 18, 1987- RTC issued a joint decision, thus: 1. Divorce decree granted to Lorenzo is inapplicable to Philippines > Marriage with Alicia (SECOND WIFE) is void > Petition of Alicia for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied >Alicia is not entitled to receive any share from the estate (even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).) 2. Petition of Paula (UNANG ASAWA!) is meritorious and intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo (March 13, 1981) as void > Paula is entitled a conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties > Paula is the primary compulsory heir: she is entitled to one-third of the estate > Another one-third of estate: illegitimate children (Children of Alicia) Raul, Luz and Beverly (equal shares and remaining free portion in equal shares) 3. Paula is appointed legal administrator of Lorenzos estate > Letters of administration in Paulas favour upon filing a bond of 100,000 (conditioned to return to court w/in 3 months inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits and estates which shall at any time come to her possession) Alicia filed motion for reconsideration Set. 14, 1987- RTC denied Alicias motion for reconsideration; modified earlier decision: Raul and Luz are not children legitimate or otherwise (not legally adopted); RTC declare Beverly as the only illegitimate child (1/3 of the estate and 1/3 of the free portion of the estate) Sept. 28, 1987- Alicia appealed to Court of Appeals July 31, 1995- Court of Appeals promulgated decision: decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that ALICIA (SECOND WIFE) is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and Lorenzo may have acquired during the 25 years of cohabitation. Aug. 25, 1995- Paula filed with Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration March 21, 1996- Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit THE ISSUE: WHO ARE ENTITLED TO INHERIT FROM LORENZO LLORENTE? We do not agree with the decision of CA. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased. THE APPLICABLE LAW: THIS IS THE IMPORTANT PART!!!!! J Lorenzo became an American Citizen at the time of: 1. Divorce from Paula 2. Marriage to Alicia 3. Execution of his will 4. Death, duly established, admitted and undisputed THUS, ISSUES ARISING FROM THESE INCIDENTS ARE NECESSARILY GOVERNED BY FOREIGN LAW The CIVIL LAW clearly provides: ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. ART. 16 Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, interstate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever maybe the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. CA- did not admit the foreign law. CA and RTC called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile: Philippine law. Philippine Law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will. (RTC stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, American law follows the domiciliary theory)

First: No such thing as American law. National law in Art. 16 of Civil Code cant possibly apply to general American law. Second: No showing that the application of renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law. RTC: will is intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favour of Alice-> mere paramour in courts opinion. RTC threw will out; Alice and 2 children Raul and Luz, with nothing. CA: disregarded the will. Alice: 1/2 of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during cohabitation, applying Art. 144 of the Civil Code. *Hasty application of Phil. Law and complete disregard of the will= fatal (especially in the light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining) Validity of the Foreign Divorce For failing to apply these doctrines [Van Dorn vs. Romillo (only Filipinos are covered by the policy against absolute divorces), Quita v. Court of Appeals (no longer Filipino citizen when divorced, petitioner will lose right to inherit from him) and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera (respondent obtained divorce in his country Germany; divorced recognized by Philippines when respondent is concerned in the view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons)], the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. Divorce obtained by Lorenzo from Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. The effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of this trial court. Validity of the Will The Civil Code provides: Art. 17 The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republoc of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours) The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Phil. Law. In fact, the will was duly probated. As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedents national law. Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised. The Fallo WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. The decision of Court of Appeals on July 13, 1995 is SET ASIDE. The Court REVERSES the decision of the RTC and RECOGNIZES as VALID the divorce of Lorenzo. The Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will and determination of parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of Lorenzo w/in framework of the Rules of Court. Case No. 5: Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. vs. Guerrero Note: This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Court of Appeals decision (Aug. 24, 1998) and Resolution (Dec. 14, 1998) which affirmed the courts denial of petitioners (Hanover and/or Bank) motion for partial summary judgment. Summary Judgment (def.) a court may grant summary judgment to settle a case expeditiously if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are

involved, except the amount of damages. In short, the crucial question in a motion for summary judgment is: are the issues raised in the pleadings genuine? or sham or fictitious? Facts: May 17, 1994 - Respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank with the Manila RTC. Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for: 1. illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank 2. a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems 3. unauthorized conversion of his account April 18, 1995 - Guerrero amended his complaint September 1, 1995 the Bank filed its answer: alleging that Guerreros account is governed by New York law which does not permit any of Guerreros claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (in short, PSJ na lang) seeking the dismissal of Guerreros claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees on the same ground alleged in its answer (na yung account ni Guerrero ay governed by New York law na ang pine-permit ay actual damages lamang). Guerrero opposed the motion. The affidavit of Alyssa Walden (or simply the Walden affidavit), a New York attorney, supported the Banks motion for PSJ. It stated that Guerreros New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of Guerreros claims except actual damages. (paulit-ulit @.@) The Phil. Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit. March 6, 1996 RTC denied the Banks Motion for PSJ. July 17, 1996 RTC denied the Banks Motion for Reconsideration. Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CoA) assailing the RTC orders. August 24, 1998 CoA dismissed the petition. (antagal ah, 2 years. @.@) December 14, 1998 CoA denied the Banks motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari of a decision and resolution of the CoA. The Ruling of the CoA: The CoA sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for PSJ. It ruled that the Walden affidavit does not serve as proof of the NY law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its motion. The CoA considered the NY law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence: Sec. 19. Classes of Documents documents are either public or private. Public docs. are a) written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies, and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Phils., or of a foreign country. The CoA opined that the procedure outlined in Sec. 24, Rule 132 should be followed in proving foreign law; Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Sec. 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Phils., with a

certificate that such officer has the custody. Of the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent, or by any officer in the foreign service of the Phils. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The CoA rejected the Banks argument that Sec. 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court allows the Bank to move with the supporting Walden affidavit for PSJ in its favor. Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. It clarified that the Walden affidavit is not the supporting affidavit referred to in Sec. 2, Rule 34 that would prove the lack of genuine issue between the parties. It then concluded that even if the Walden affidavit is used for purposes of SJ, the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rules to prove the foreign law. Issues: The Bank contends that the CoA committed reversible error in: 1. holding that (the Banks) proof of facts to support its motion for summary judgment (SJ na lang) may not be given by affidavit 2. holding that (the Banks) affidavit, which proves foreign law as a fact, is hearsay and thereby cannot serve as proof of the NY law relied upon by petitioners (the Bank) in their motion for SJ. The Bank argues that in moving for PSJ, it was entitled to use the Walden affidavit to prove that the stipulated foreign law bars the claims of Guerrero except for actual damages. Consequently, outright dismissal by SJ of these claims is warranted. The Bank also claims that the CoA mixed up the requirements of Rule 35 on SJs (lalabas to sa next part) and those of a trial on the merits in considering the Walden affidavit as hearsay. It points out that the said affidavit is not hearsay since Rule 35 expressly permits the use of affidavits. Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing affidavit to refute the facts contained in the Walden affidavit, he failed to show the need for a trial on his claims for damages except for actual (damages). The Courts Ruling: The petition is devoid of merit. The Bank filed its motion for PSJ pursuant of Sec. 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court (nasabi ito kanina, tingnan niyo na lang sa taas). A court may grant summary judgment to settle a case expeditiously if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In a motion for SJ, the crucial question is: Are the issues raised in the pleadings genuine? Or sham or fictitious? - as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions accompanying the motion. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The parties respective pleadings showed that there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial. Guerreros complaint before the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for damages (yung 3

reasons na binanggit kanina - taxes, returned check, unauthorized account conversion). In its Answer, the Bank defended that the agreed foreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the recovery of damages except actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerreros complaint while specific demands and affirmative defenses are in the Banks answer. It is true that the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case based merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. However, the Banks motion for PSJ as supported by the Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that Guerreros claims are sham, fictitious, or contrived, but instead shows that the facts and material allegations pleaded by the parties are disputed and that there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial. There can be no SJ where questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute. The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice, but like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. And the conflicting allegations as to whether NY law or Phil. law applies to Guerreros claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits. Under Section 24 of Rule 132 (nabanggit na ito sa taas, tingnan niyo na lang uli), the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved However, there are certain exceptions to this rule that were recognized in Asiavest Limited vs. CoA. In this particular case, the Supreme Court listed previous decisions/cases which did not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law, although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance to the above rule. It includes the ff. cases: Willamette Iron and Steel Works vs. Muzzal - SC considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, Cali., who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Fisher et. al. SC upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law of Cali. as proved by the respondents witness who testified as an active member of the Cali. Bar since 1951 (thus making him familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of that state). The witness cited the pertinent Cali. law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties (Art. 4 Sec. 13851 of the Cali. Internal and Revenue Code). And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence by respondents. And several naturalization cases (not that important anyway, hindi ko na sinama) The Bank, however, cannot rely on both the Willamette or Collector cases to support its cause because these cases involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Phils. and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad and the affiant never testified in open court. It cannot be considered as a proof of NY law on damages not only because it is self-serving, but also because it does not state the specific NY law on damages. The Walden affidavit merely states conclusions from the affiants personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis-a-vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the said affidavit of various US court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the US courts. While the Bank attached copies of some of the US court decisions cited in the same affidavit, these copies do not comply with Sec. 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts. Thus, due to the failure to comply with the above rule, the Bank only alleged, but not proved, what NY law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.

Lastly, the Bank makes much of Guerreros failure to submit an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit. However, the pertinent provision of Sec. 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court did not make the submission of an opposing affidavit mandatory, thus: Sec. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon The motion shall be served at least ten days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits It is obvious that the term may as used in remedial law, is only permissive and not mandatory. Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Banks motion for PSJ and the Walden affidavit just because he failed to file an opposing affidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion for PSJ, although he did not present an opposing affidavit. He may not have presented an opposing affidavit, as there was no need for one, because the Walden affidavit did not establish what the Bank intended to prove (proving NY law and jurisprudence, as well as demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact). Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for Guerrero to submit an opposing affidavit since what the Bank seeks to be opposed is the very subject matter of his/the complaint, or in other words, the complain itself controverts the matters set forth in the Banks motion and the Walden affidavit. A party should not be made to deny matters already averred in his complaint. Note: This case has been delayed long enough by the Banks resort to a motion for PSJ. Ironically, it successfully defeated the very purpose for which SJs were devised, which is to aid parties in avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. Wherefore, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision (Aug. 24, 1998) and resolution (Dec. 14, 1998) of the CoA is AFFIRMED. (Wong Woo Yiu alias Ng Yao, petitioner-appellee, v. Hon. Martiniano P. Vivo, etc. et al., respondents-appellants) No. L-21076 March 31, 1965 *Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Facts/Issues: - On June 28, 1961, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant. Petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas whom she married in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader - July 12, 1961, decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly informed in a letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of Board. - However, on June 28, 1962, the same Board of Commissioners, but composed entirely of a new set of members, rendered a new decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country. The petitioners claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in evidence as it was bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship In the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas on January 23, 1947, he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936 (it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929) - August 9, 1962, petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an opportunity to clarify certain points taken in the decision, but the same was denied for lack of merit. - September 14, 1962, petitioner initiated the instant petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the court of First Instance of Manila which incidentally was considered by it as a petition for certiorari.

* Not only there is no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured only with so many inconsistencies which cannot lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. * This claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family relations - Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it may be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or a minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum. - Even if we assume that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country. - No proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same of our own. * Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioners marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. * Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. As a corollary, the petition for mandamus filed before the court a quo is hereby dismissed. No costs. DECISION REVERSED. BANK OF AMERICA NT&SA, BANK OF AMERICA INTERNATIONAL, LTD. Petitioners vs COURT OF APPEALS Factual Background of case May 10, 1993: Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua filed Complaint before the RTC of Pasig against defendant banks Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua were engaged in shipping business and owned two vessels: Don Aurelio and El Champion through their wholly owned corporations The two deposited their revenues from said business together with other funds with the branches of said banks in UK and Hongkong up to 1979 Defendant banks induced them to increase the number of their ships in operation offering them easy loans to acquire said vessels and thereafter acquired, the vessels registered in the names of their corporations Litonjuas claimed that defendant banks as trustees did not fully render an account of all the income derived from the operation of the vessels as well as of the proceeds of the subsequent foreclosure sale Respondent banks breach of the fiduciary duties led to decline of revenues As to answer all the obligations incurred for and in behalf of the operation of vessels, the six vessels were sold at public auction Litonjuas prayed for the accounting of the six vessels and of the proceeds instituted by petitioners; damages for breach of trust ; exemplary damages and attorneys fees Defendant bank filed MOTION TO DISMISS on grounds of FORUM NON CONVENIENS and LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION against them December 3, 1993: trial court issued an order DENYING MOTION DISMISS Motion to dismiss is hereby denied **Instead of filing an answer, the defendant banks went to Court of Appeals for petition for certiorari** Issues Held: 1. Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendants since plaintiffs are merely stockholders of corporations which are registered owners of the vessels and the borrowers of petitioners?

NO. merely stockholders of corporations which are registered owners of the vessels and the borrowers of petitioners UNTENABLE Lack of personality to sue can be used as a ground for Motion to Dismiss based on the fact that the complaint evidently states no CAUSE OF ACTION FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION vs LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION Essential elements of cause of action: 1. legal right of plaintiff 2. correlative obligation of the defendant 3. act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION refers to insufficiency of allegation in the pleading LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION refers to insufficiency of factual basis for the action Private respondents maintain that corporations are wholly owned by them and prior to the incorporation of such entities, they were clients of petitioners which induced them to acquire loans from said petitioners to invest on the additional ships 2. Should the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens? NO. forum is inconvenient to deter global forum shopping Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court Philippine court may assume jurisdiction if it chooses so, provided that: 1. Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to 2. Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and facts 3. Philippine court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision All these requisites are present in the instant case Moreover forum non-conveniens cannot be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss; Sec 1 Rule 16 of Rules of Court does not include the doctrine as a ground 3. Are the private respondents guilty of forum shopping because of the pendency of foreign action? NO. Forum shopping exists where elements of LITIS PENDENTIA are present and where a final judgement in one case will amount to RES JUDICATA in the other. LITIS PENDENTIA should include (for it to be a ground for motion to dismiss): 1. identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions 2. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts 3. the identity in two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would regardless of which party is successful amount to RES JUDICATA in the other Not all requirement of LITIS PENDENTIA were fulfilled, only 2 and 3 Merely mentioned of civil cases filed in Hongkong and England without however showing the identity of rights asserted and the relief sought for as well as the presence of elements of RES JUDICATA should one of the cases be adjudged. MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents Facts of the Case

In 1978, plaintiff applied for employment with defendant company. September 30, 1978, defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two years. Plaintiff accepted and started working on January 20, 1979. After passing the 6-month probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979.

July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his contract to five years (January 21, 1979 January 20, 1984) subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract of employment. Plaintiff accepted. August 24, 1980, plaintiff (while in command of a flight) committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport. The offense was a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended and investigated by a board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded. (I dunno, though, if these are important. Sinama ko na lang.) September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training in France. He became captain of the Airbus A-300 and then appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet. 1982, defendant initiated cross-cutting measures (they were hit by a recession). They decided to terminate its excess personnel. However, it reviewed first the qualifications of the A-300 pilots for possible promotion to B-474 fleet. Out of 17 reviewed, 12 lang yung qualified at hindi kasama dun yung plaintiff. October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982. June 29, 1983, plaintiff instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter, but it was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract services before the court a quo. February 11, 1987, defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; The Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that since plaintiff was employed in Singapore its laws therefore should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendants motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. April 10, 1991, trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff (with amounts for damages). Singapore Airlines appealed before respondent court. October 29, 1993, appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court (w/c is yun nga, yung in favor of the plaintiff). Ito yung sabi: In the instant case (which is yung damage due to illegal termination), finile lang yun ng plaintiff on Jan. 8, 1987, w/c is more than four years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Therefore, his action has already prescribed. Issue of the Case The petitioner poses three questions before the present court. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ART. 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER ART. 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE? CAN AN EMPLOYEE W/ A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER? CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT INCURRING LOSES? Una muna, the present court cleared that Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9 has jurisdiction on the subject matter (taliwas dun sa sinasabi nung defendant). Ito yung sabi: The defendant failed to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to the case. The Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. Defendant has failed to do so, therefore, Philippine law should be applied. Yung Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said court. In answer dun sa 1st question nung petitioner, ito yung nangyari: Petitioner raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Art. 1144 or on Art. 1146 of the Civil Code. Sabi niya, his termination of employment (effective Nov. 1, 1982) was based on employment contract w/c is under Art. 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years (as provided for in said art.). Thus, he claims na yung ruling ng appellate court (w/c is based on Art. 1146 where prescription is only 4 years) is an error. (The petitioner argues na ang dapat in-apply na Art. in making the decision e yung 1144, not 1146). In the view of the present court, neither articles applied. Ang dapat daw eh yung Art. 291 of the Labor Code: Money claims. All money claims arising from employee-employer relations shall be filed w/in 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued.

1. 2.

1.

2. 3.

In illegal dismissal, it is settled that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Art. 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioner for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Art. 291 of the Labor Code is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations. It prevails over Art. 1144. Ang basic rule raw kasi, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should prevail. Therefore, the present court agreed with the appellate courts conclusion that petitioners action for damages due to illegal termination has already prescribed. But it based its decision not on Art. 1144, but on Art. 291 of the Labor Code which sets the prescription period at 3 years. In answer dun sa 2nd question: The present court said that the appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pretermination of employment. So it agreed with appellate courts decision, saying: Contracts have the force of law between parties. When plaintiff accepted the offer, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, which includes the right of mutual termination. In answer dun sa 3rd question: VALID daw yung retrenchment. The present court also agreed on the appellate courts decision. So in the end, the present court find sufficient and legal basis to conclude that petitioners termination from employment was for an authorized cause by respondent company. No error or grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to respondent appellate court. Decision THE INSTANT PETITION IS DISMISSED. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED. Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed. Case 7 Soorajmull Nagarmull, plaintiff-appelee, vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. Defendant-appellant Issue: Breach of contract Note: Remedy for aggrieved party in case of breach of contract - right to rescind the contractor to ask for specific performance, in either case with right to demand damages Facts: May 6, 1949 - Under Contract G/4370 plaintiff (Indian company) would sell 1,700,000 pieces of Hessian bags at $26.20 per bag 100 bags. (Yuck parang math problem :P). Ginawa nilang instalment ang pagshi-ship. So 425,000 pieces yong kelangang i-ship per month. Equivalent ito sa 425 bales dahil 1000 pcs per bale. Gets? 425 bales per month ang kelangang i-ship from July to October 1949. September 8, 1949 Plaintiff advised defendant that the plaintiff was only able to ship 310 bales of the 850 bales scheduled for July and August. September 29, 1949 defendant requested plaintiff to ship 100 bales from the 540 bales defaulted from July and August shipments. In the September shipment, of the 425 bales, 54 bales have not been shipped. All in all, 154 bales yong object of controversy (yong 100 na dine-demand ng defendant from the plaintiff from the 540 bales na hindi na-ship nung July at August at yong 54 bales na hindi na-ship nong September). Defendant requested plaintiff to pay 5% of the value of the 154 bales defaulted as penalty which plaintiff did. Oct.1, 1949 Government of India increased the export duty of jute bags from 80 to 350 rupees per ton. Plaintiff requested defendant to shoulder the enhanced rate of export duty since it was under their agreement. October 25, 2949 defendant sent $10,986.25 to cover for the increase in the shipment duty. Pero para sa 425 bales lang ito na scheduled sa October shipment. October 27, 1949 plaintiff wrote to defendant for a further increase of $4,000 to cover the shipment of 154 bales which should have been shipped in July, August and September.

Feb 6, 1951 defendant received notification from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Tribunal of Arbitration in Calcutta, India, because on Dec. 28, 1950, plaintiff applied to the Tribunal for arbitration regarding their claim. March 1, 1951 defendant sent its version of the case thru former Justice Pompeyo Diaz (Govt Corporate Counsel) Case: whether or not defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the payment of increased export taxes imposed by the Indian Govt on the shipments. Defendant contended that if the bales were delivered on time, they should have not been subject to the increase in tax since the increase took effect on October. Decision of the Tribunal of Arbitration: decided in favour of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to pay the sum of 18,562 rupees and 8 annas. September 22, 1952 plaintiff thru the DFA sought to enforce its claim. August 11, 1952 defendant replied that they are not bound by the decision Feb. 3, 1956 defendants counsel replied to Atty. Calmas letter (sent Jan 26, 1956 regarding the claim) that the defendant refuses to pay because it has no foundation in law and in fact. Appeal was elevated to the Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court Appellant claims that the lower court committed the following errors: 1. The lower court erred in holding that plaintiff-appellee, being a foreign corporation not licensed to transact in the Ph has the right to sue in the Ph courts. 2. ... when it failed to consider plaintiff-appellees default and relied solely on the award of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce Tribunal of Arbitration. 3. ... when it held that plaintiff-appellee was not guilty of laches (laches unreasonable delay to claim a right) Main issue to be resolved: Whether the foreign decision is enforceable in the Philippines What SC said: Assuming that the appellee has the right to sue in Ph courts, it is not guilty of laches. However, under Section 50 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a judgment for a sum of money rendered by a foreign court is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title but when suit for its enforcement is brought in the Ph court, said judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law of or fact. The decision sought to be enforeced was rendered upon a clear mistake of law making the appellant suffer the consequences of the default or breach of contract committed by appellee. Asking the appellant to shoulder the increase in the tax for the shipment of bales for July, August and September is illogical and contrary to known principles of fairness and justice. When appellant demanded the appellee to deliver the default 154 bales (as according to the letter written by the appellant on Sept.29, 1949), it was only a demand entitled as a matter of right. The breach of contract done by appelle gave the appellant, under the general principles of fairness, the right to rescind the contract or to ask for its specific performance, in either case with the right to demand damages. Decision of the Tribunal of Arbitration committed a clear mistake of law and enforcing it would work injustice upon the appellant. Decision of SC: appealed judgment is reversed and set aside, with costs.

PAWI vs. FASGI [Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. vs. FASGI Enterprise, Inc.] (Case 8) FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Plaintiff- FASGI (US corporation in California, USA) Defendant- PAWI (Philippine Corporation in the Philippines)

Agreement- purchase, importation and distributorship in the United States of the aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWIPAWI shipped 8, 594 wheels to FASGI (cost was $216, 444.30) Cause of Action- FASGI found out that the shipment was defective and in non-compliance with the requirements stated in their agreement Country of origin not stamped on the wheels No load limits stamped on the wheels No label on what type of automobiles the wheels will fit (many of the wheels) Wheels did not fit with the model of automobiles to which they were designed (many of the wheels) Wheels do not fit any model of automobiles in US (some) No Specialty Equipment Manufacturer's Association (SEMA) approval Court of Jurisdiction-US District Court, Central District of California Sept.21, 1979-FASGI instituted action against PAWI for Breach of Contract and Recovery of Damages January 1980- the parties entered into a settlement, entitled "Transaction" dahil ma-trabaho pa pag may litigation PAWI and FPS (Italian corporation, owned and controlled by the same shareholders and managers of PAWI; used interchangeably by the respondents that the plaintiff has found it impossible to ascertain with which entity it is dealing with at any one time, kaya the US Judgment is against both FPS and PAWI, pero yung enforcement ng judgment ay either FPS or PAWI lang) would accept the return of not less than 8,100 wheels after returning the purchase price to FASGI via 4 Letters of credit PAWI expressed their inability to comply with the agreement and proposed to revise the schedule of payment which is originally January-April 1980 to April 1980-November 1980 due to currency regulations and restrictions imposed by the Philippine government daw on the outflow of foreign currency from the country But on April 1980, nag-express ulit ng inability to comply yung PAWI FASGI replied and insisted that PAWI shoul meet the terms of the proposed schedule of payments, and that "If the letter of credit is not opened by April 30, 1980, FASGI will immediately take all necessary legal action to protest its position" PAWI still failed to open the first LC on Aril 30, 1980 allegedly due to 'central bank inquiries and restrictions' FASGI pursue its complaint for damages against PAWI before the California District Court The parties realized the protracted process of litigation so they entered another agreement after the pre-trial conference, entitle "Supplemental Settlement Agreement" on November 1980 executed by FASGI President and PAWI counsel, Mr. Thomas Ready It provided that FASGI would deliver to PAWI a container of wheels for every LC opened and paid by PAWI Upon execution of the SSA, limited na lang sa pag-store nung wheels yung FASGI sa present warehouse nila, and imemaintain yung insurance; and from and after feb 28, 1981, unless the delivery of the LC are delayed past the date na napag-usapan sa agreement (June 1980, September 1980, November 1980, January 1981) they will not be liable sa pagstore, maintain, and deliver nung mga wheels sa PAWI In the event of breach of the SSA, FASGI shall have the right to apply immediately to the Court for entry of judgment; shall have the right to enforce the judgment against PAWI and FPS in the US and in any other country where assets of PAWI and FPS are located; and FPS and PAWI hereby waive all defenses in any such country to execution or enforcement of the judgment by FASGI--that FPS and PAWI will consent to the jurisdiction of Italian and Philippine courts in any action brought by FASGI to seek a judgment in those countries based upon a judgment against FPS or PAWI PAWI, again, did not comply with the agreement It opened the first LC but only paid 9 months after FASGI, notwithstanding, shipped the first container of wheels PAWI was delayed again in opening the second LC, but FASGI still delivered the second container of wheels PWI defaulted in opening and paying the third and fourth LCs FASGI filed with the California District court stipulations for judgment against PAWI Move the court for entry of judgment against defendant PAWI Motion made under Rule 54 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to the SSA filed by the two parties on November 1980 Grounds: the defendant PAWI has breached its obligations as set forth in SSA and that the SSA permits FASGI to enter stipulation for judgment incase PAWI has not performed under the SSA February 1983- FASGI filed a complaint for ''enforcement of foreign judgment'' before the Makati RTC Branch 61 Makati RTC dismissed the case, denying the enforcement of foreign judgment within Philippine jurisdiction GROUNDS: The decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake or law and fact

Ruled that: the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of parties While the foreign judgment ordered the return by PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI the third and fourth container of wheels The SSA and the subsequent motion for the entry of judgment upon which the California court had entered its judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready without PAWI's authorization FASGI appealed the decision of the trial court to the court of appeals The court of Appeals reversed the decision of RTC Makati and ordered the full enforcement of the California court judgment ISSUES Rule 39, section 48 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines Effect of foreign judgments or final orders- the effect of a judgment or a final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final orderagainst a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest be a subsequent title. In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. It is clear in this jurisdiction that an attorney cannot, without a client's authorization, settle the action of litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his client's interest Mr. Ready signed the SSA on behalf of the PAWI. If he was not authorized by PAWI to enter into the SSA, PAWI could have signified to FASGI a disclaimer of the settlement. Instead, more than a year after the execution of the SSA, the PAWI president failed to mention to FASGI president mr. Ready's supposed lack of authority IT IS AN ACCEPTED RULE THAT WHEN A CLIENT, UPON BECOMING AWARE OF THE COMPROMISE AND THE JUDGMENT THEREON, FAILS TO PROMPTLY REPUDIATE THE ACTION OF HIS ATTORNEY, HE WILL NOT AFTERWARDS BE HEARD TO COMPLAIN ABOUT IT. PAWI, should not, after its opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the agreement, be allowed to later disown the arrangement when the terms thereof would prove to operate against its hopeful expectations PAWI assailed not only Mr. Ready's authority to sign on its behalf the SSA but denounced likewise his authority to enter into a stipulation for judgment before the California court on the ground that it had by then already terminated Mr. Ready's services Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within its jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e. fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend action to which he has meritorious case or defense. Even while the US judgment was against both FPs and PAWI, FASGI had every right to seek enforcement of the judgment solely against PAWI or, for that matter, only against FPS. PAWI would argue that it was incumbent upon FASGI to first return the second and the third containers of defective wheels before it could be required to return to FASGI the purchase price of the wheels But, PAWI defaulted/ did not comply with the SSA. UNDER paragraph 3.4 of the SSA, any further default by PAWI would release FASGI from any obligation to maintain, store or deliver the rejected wheels THEREFORE, the decision of Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED. walang reversible error on the part ng Court of appeals sa judgment nya. Hindi na nireverse ng SC yung decision ng Court of Appeals na nag-reverse sa decision ng Makati RTC. Talo yung PAWI.