The Elusiveness of Arendtian Judgment Author(s): Bryan Garsten Reviewed work(s): Source: Social Research, Vol. 74, No.

4, Hannah Arendt's Centenary: Political and Philosophical Perspectives, Part II (WINTER 2007), pp. 1071-1108 Published by: The New School Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972041 . Accessed: 04/06/2012 20:10
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BryanGarsten The Elusiveness of ArendtianJudgment

be at activities. . cannot performed all with. Truly political a without public,without the of out the presence others, by spaceconstituted themany. in -Arendt,"TheCrisis Culture" the of As a spectator mayunderstand "truth" whatthe you spectacleis about;but the priceyou have to pay is within drawal from participating it.
-Arendt, TheLife theMind of

. Exclusion from politicsshouldnot be derogatory.. selffar would exclusion, from discrimination, beingarbitrary in fact and to givesubstance reality one ofthemostimportantnegativeliberties have enjoyedsince the end of we the ancientworld,namelyfreedom which from politics, was unknown Romeor Athens to and whichis politically the perhaps mostrelevant ofourChristian part heritage.

- Arendt,OnRevolution

ONE OF THE FREEDOMS THAT REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY PROTECTS IS

the freedom to actively not in the to participate politics, freedom stand In on the sidelines and watch.* modern liberaldemocracies mostcitizenstakeadvantage thisfreedom of mostofthetime. participating Not seemstobe themostcommon of activity democratic citizenship today. and the Amongpoliticalscientists politicaltheorists, overwhelming

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is thisstateofaffairs to longfor moreparticiand a tendency to lament Thisessayemerges a from different on patory politics. perspective how best to defenddemocratic in politics.I am interested understanding and defending kindofcitizenship is closerto whatmostcitizens a that do in modern liberaldemocracies. be clear,thisis nota defense To of is that passivity. Passivity nottheonlykindofnonparticipation we find in our politics, and it is clearly not the best kind.Butmanycitizens whodo notparticipate also notentirely are watch Instead, passive. they judge what is goingon. A certaintypeofwatching politicsand they andjudging it seemsto me,a defensible ofbeinga democratic is, way there also unattractive are citizen. course, Of versions thisactivity of the combination watching judgingthatI wantto exploremust of and be distinguished closecousins, suchas judging from without watching In and watching without judging (beingentertained). order (prejudice) we establishthe to adequatelymake such distinctions, have to first and understood a judgingspectator, as of dignity the citizen potential whatthefaculty judgment is. of to do thatwe haveto explainprecisely Hannah is Arendt's reflections on Thesuggestion thisessay that of be of can judgment fruitfully readas partofsucha defense thecitizen She be thesisaboutArendt. This as spectator-judge. might a surprising and not as of is bestknown a theorist action, spectatorship, herconcepin senseofthewordwas one thatseemedto tionofpolitics the strong and whojoined the controversy debate to givepriority thosecitizens actionin themselves others taking to life ofpolitical and disclosed by in whomshe admired revolutionaries thepublicarena.The American a action. created realmofpolitics were OnRevolution thosewho through theorists mostobviousamong is And her influence amongpolitical in of a thosewhodefend participatory conception politics whichactive thatmy the So is contestation central.1 I mustadmitfrom beginning of anykindof nonaction in to effort enlistArendt the defense pulls the and of a majorstrain herthought, against mostimportant against behind. seemsto haveleft thatherthought legacy Still,it seems to me thatthe emphasison politicalaction as facets Arendt's of interesting politicsleaves out certain participatory

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her on and with to thinking mayinterfere efforts understand writings in Arendt wrotethather interest judgmentemergedout judgment. withthe Eichmanntrial,and in thisessayI draw of her experience in with the from essaysand lectures whichshe was grappling mostly was notthathe Her aboutEichmann thatexperience.2 mainconcern in no was availhad failedto actively participate politics; truepolitics him himto participate Nordoes she seemto haveexpected in. able for in revoluto createa realmoftruepolitics thewaythattheAmerican tionaries had; thatwouldseemto be askingtoo muchofthe subjects blame Eichmannforhaving of the Nazi regime.She did, however, and refusdeclined judgetheTightness hisactions himself, for to of for for she thatmany to takeresponsibility them.Moreover, thought ing her an on ofthosewhocriticized initial report histrialoften displayed to thatwas analogousto Eichmann's unwillingness render judgment "Whoam I to judge?"askedhercritics, own attitude. readyto underactions.Arendt said she foundthis stand,ifnot excuse,Eichmann's herwriting She thatthe responseto particularly troubling. thought disinclination judge was an attitude to on by modernmass brought and one thatpavedthewayfortotalitarianism. interHer democracy, est in judgment was rootedin an effort undermine philosophito the cal tendency thought behind the disinclination judge.3Thus, of to her effort defend possibility the dignity judgment to the and of was a as important responseto the perilsof mass democracy was her as defense participatory of action. Sincetheroleofa spectator moreprominent modern is in representative democracies thanit was in ancientparticipatory republics, a defenseof it in Arendt's to rescueher finding thought might help the from accusation thatshewas lostin nostalgia theGreek for polis.4 Theimportance citizens' of to liberal-democratic judgment themodern tradition rootednot primarily Aristotelian is in but phronesis in John inanswer thequestion, to "Whoshallbejudge?"at theend Locke, who, oftheSecond offered inspiring an "The shall judge" Treatise, reply: people be can 1967,sec. 240).IfArendt's (Locke, writings helpto explainwhatit meansforthepeopletojudge,or tojudge well,thenthey wouldoffer

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but of a resource onlyfornostalgic not republicans, also fordefenders modern liberty. we on Once we turnto Arendt's however, writings judgment, thatwhilehertheory judgment of is the cannot avoidconfronting fact difficult understand; stanthe it to very suggestive is also notoriously difficult describe capture; or to dardsofjudgment in heraccount, are, in thatthe elusiveness Arendt's In are elusive. thisessayI suggest they to account of judgmentarises fromher effort deal withwhat she confrontas philosophical problem regarded a deep and fundamental Howis itpossible judgewithout to of putting inganytheory judgment: to of of intoa relation obedience thegrounds one'sjudgments? oneself havesomeauthority over of Ifwe saythatthegrounds ourjudgments to and us, thenwe seem to cede authority, thusresponsibility, those of and the To grounds. defend dignity responsibility a citizen-judge of and thusto defendthe possibility the role thatEichmannshould to felt havetakenon- Arendt thatshehad to showhowitwas possible or to cedingresponsibility theprinciples rulesthatone judgewithout judgesby. of In thefirst section thepaperI arguethatwe can see thisprobher if on Arendt's lem shaping thoughts judgment we read carefully moraland politicaltheory, stancetowardKant'sstandard especially Kohn editedrecently Jerome in the lectures moralphilosophy on by 2003). Thereis roomto debate the weightthatone should (Arendt, but in to work, in place on theselectures relation therestofArendt's I adviceabouthowto readArendt: Bernstein's thispaperI takeRichard that Thetrain one follow ofArendt's 1996). (Bernstein, "thought-trains" that on in is mostapparent theselectures moralphilosophy suggests as to turned theCritiqueJudgmenta sourceof thereasonthatArendt of thattheCritique was moraland political theory thatshe had concluded withtheiremphasison the associated and Reason writings, ofPractical intoexcusesfornonjudgment. weretoo easilyturned rule-following, in couldbe found A primeexampleofthismisuseofKantian thought of notion following the whichconfused Kantian Eichmann's testimony, Nazi laws.In thesecond to follow ruleswiththeFhrer's requirement

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led toward thatthisworry aboutKantianism Arendt sectionI suggest of aboutthe advantage a deeply Nietzchean a fundamentally insight When Nietzsche accountofjudgment. asserted, "myjudgsubjective he createda tightlinkbetweenan agent mentsare my judgments," the for and and hisorherjudgments, thusensured agent'sresponsibility 1990:71). thosejudgments (Nietzsche, UnlikeNietzsche, wanted she was ButArendt nota Nietzschean. She moral thusfaced for tomakeagents' judgments responsibility their her Nietzchean to the difficult oftrying remoralize post-Kantian, task Whatpossiblegrounds could a moralbut postaccountofjudgment. kindofjudgment upon?One proposed rest offered to Kantian answer, and others, thatintersubjectivity an Arendt Habermas is provides by In section thepaper of alternative for suchjudgments. thethird ground I suggest abovehelpsto thattheworry aboutresponsibility mentioned She did explainwhyArendt notadoptthisstrategy. couldnotpropose Habermasianintersubjectivity, communicative or as rationality, a the Nietzschean for without threatening ground judgments responsithatshewanted preserve. to Arendt's understanding interown of bility or had subjectivity, "representative thinking," to remainultimately a subjective form thinking; had to remaingrounded it of withinthe individual of that judge. A form intersubjectivity locatedthe ground ofjudgment outsideoneself too easilyhavecometo be partially might viewedas an alternative sourceofresponsibility ourjudgments; for it too might easilyhave becomean excuseforour own bad judgments, too easilyhave been used to justify same sortofunthinkingness the thatArendt worried had been the unintended legacyofKant'smoral Arendt's therefore to remain had theory. "representative thinking" in within an subjective, the senseofultimately grounding judgments in the full for individual, orderto preserve individual's responsibility those judgments. Arendt'swritingson representative Nevertheless, thinking describea certain sort subjectivity, in the finalsectionof this of and moreprecisely character thisthinking howit the of and essayI explore was linked theresponsible to that wishedEichmann, judgment Arendt

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in moreoften. keypoint The about andcitizens general, wouldexercise thatArendt wantedto emphasize the mode of imaginative thinking The to us to was thatitrequired not be fully present ourselves. perspecme outside tiveofjudge is one thatrequires to imaginemyself partly to and and belonging the myself mycommitments, yetstillessentially Arendt was struggling with that selfdoingthejudging.The problem was howwe couldstepoutsideour selvesin thiswaywithout thereby forourjudgments. a measureof our individual responsibility ceding involved of I was Herview, willsuggest, thattheelement self-alienation us in representative relying upon any thinking helpsto protect from our personal and so helps to preserve one set of externalstandards responsibility. EICHMANN'S CONFUSED KANTIANISM and mostpowerful One of the simplest responsesthatreadershave finda "nonwritten" effort to politicalphilosophy givento Arendt's is in Kant'sCritique Judgmentto pointout thatKanthad a political of down.The written thatwas written politicalphilosophy philosophy of withthe moralphilosophy his and was congruent from emerged in was articulated some detailnot onlyin the occasionalessayssuch but and Peaceand Theory Practice, also in the moresystemas Perpetual At Morals. the heartofKant'spolitical aticand complete of Metaphysics was politicsmustpay philosophy the viewthatin the finalanalysis, was the and homageto morality; at the heartofKant'smoraltheory Thus Kanthimself of the categorical imperative. objectivestandard and aesthetic betweenmoraljudgment judgcarefully distinguished in a existed "definite there In ment. therealmofmorals concept" light was no needto search Thusthere ofwhichwe couldjudgeouractions. commonsense in standard the intersubjective fora moralor political out have of as ofaesthetic judgment, a number commentators pointed 1986:232-33).5 1984;Bernstein, 1987;Galston, (Riley, in seemsright, one sense, Thisresponseto Arendt's enterprise tooktheapproach to It butalsoinadequate. fails investigate Arendt why
and the Groundwork theMetaphysics Morals,and it second Critique of of

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she did.Forofcourseshe knewas well as we do aboutKant'swritten in To her moraland political philosophy. understand interest finding for we an alternate judgments have to grounding moraland political the understand sheregarded standard Kantian as first why theory inadequate. Arendt's dissatisfaction Kant'sown accountofhis with Though have a number theoretical of the moraltheory roots, nub ofthe may matter itappearsinthelectures moralphilosophy be summaas on can rizedwithreference herreflections Eichmann. illustrated to on She the reasonfor Kant'sproposed the standard, categoridismissing objective cal imperative, pointing Eichmann's out statement the by during trial totheeffect whenhe hadfollowed Naziorders participated that the and inthework extermination, hadbeenbehaving accordance of he in with Kant's moraltheory, at leastin accordance or witha version thecateof thatwas appropriate "fora smallman's domestic goricalimperative use."Eichmann stated popularized the version thecategorical of imperativeas the following "Trueto the law,obedient, proper a principle: not with WhileEichmann's life, tocomeintoconflict thelaw." personal showsthathe recognized actionsdid not accordwith his testimony Kantian Arendt's of morality, interpretation histestimony emphasized thewayinwhichhe seemsto havemisread Kantianism a prescripinto tionfor rulesor laws.She thought thatEichmann made had following theterrible mistake substituting Fhrer's for generalized of the will the willofthecategorical imperative.6 Arendt was not content simply to But,somewhat surprisingly, dismissEichmann's moveas a crudemistake. Insteadshe thought it revealed fatal a flaw Kant'sownmoraltheory, flawassociated in a with Kant'semphasison rule-following. observed She thatthoseGermans who had been most likelyto followlaws, those who had been the mosttraditional respectable and and sort,the churchgoers the secular moralists, been theones mostlikely obeythenew lawsand had to codes ofthe Nazis: "Theysimply one system values for of exchanged she The ones who resisted, the otherhand,were on another," wrote. "those whoseconsciences notfunction this, itwere, did in as automatic

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we way as though disposeof a set oflearnedor innateruleswhich case the we thenapplyto theparticular as it arises." Instead, resisters "werethe onlyones who daredjudge by themselves" 1964: (Arendt, and doubters, because theywerenot in the habit 44). These skeptics had of oftreating moralsas a matter rule-application, notbeen as tied to or dependent upon the presenceofrulesor codes;theyhad not so of easilyacceptedthe substitution "thoushaltkiir foritsoppositein the Eichmann (Arendt, had thewaythatArendt suggested thoughtless 1971:178). as viewofmorality a set the or Rejecting automatic unthinking For thematter responsibility Arendt. for of ofcodeswas also linkedto insofar we thinkof ourselvesas following as rules,we can pass off Arendt muchhaunted was to for responsibility ouractions thoserules. offered thatthey suchas Eichmann thatwarcriminals bythedefense their or orders lawsandthuswerefulfilling duties. wereonly following thatthe ordersand laws in to But she was not content simply reply a of She thiscase werewrong. sought deeperexplanation themistake and rules orders The to madebythewarcriminals. disposition follow could be a human for was itself misguided, it impliedthatobedience at a was thatobedience never virtue, leastnotfor Arendt virtue. argued oblifree from world secular wholivedin themodern, religious anyone and and Whatorganizations governments require, are entitled gation. - theonlyform of but or to seek,is notobedience "consent" "support" that awaytheir giving following adulthumanscan engagein without into themselves slaves. without as and turning dignity status humans, in as "there no suchthing obedience politiis Arendt as Andif, insisted, or orders follow thenthe peoplewho merely cal and moralmatters," for the laws cannotshift responsibility theiractionsontothe laws or 1964:48). (Arendt, lawgivers Now it seemsto me thatwe mustadmitthatmanyofArendt's of in so mentioned farseemto follow thespirit Kanthimself, concerns as of Arendt's ifwe readKantsympathetically. description theresisters in echoedKant'schallenge thosewho "daredtojudge forthemselves" aude(dareto know)- and herinsis"Whatis Enlightenment?"sapere

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than obeying tenceon takingresponsibility one's actionsrather for Eichmann's claim seemsa wayofaskingforautonomy. outsideforces will to thathisdeference theFhrer's was parallel, to somehow, Kant's the did to then, Arendt Why, injunction follow morallawis nottenable. as Eichmann's of position illustrative a deep flawin pause to consider Kantian moraltheory? claimrevealed, thought, thatKant's she was WhatEichmann's morallaw could come to play the same role thatreligiouslaw had in earliertimes thatofcommanding obedienceto a normand thus in owndeepest that intentions, moralteaching, perhaps spiteofKant's a laws.In Arendt's was primarily matter obeying of view,Kanthad ity failedto fully In "Some Questionsof from separatemorality legality. she MoralPhilosophy" tracedthisaspectof Kant'sthought carefully. she the First identified ethicofobedienceas a distinctively religious view- "theall-important thatin religion, notin moralbut principle sin understood disobedience." defined as She moral ity, is primarily as a field thatexisted from reliphilosophy onlywhere"emancipation commands" occurred, shespecifically had and credited Kant with gious tried introduce emancipation to this 1966:66-67). While having (Arendt, Kantallowedforthenecessity obediencein religion in politics, of and he did not mean forthe morallaw,the categorical to imperative, be as understood requiring "obedience" anything to one'sownwill. except he thathe couldnotavoidusingthe languageof Nevertheless, found law.The use ofthislanguagewas not incidental, Arendt argued.The from Kant's obsession with problem how the of legallanguage emerged to makemorality Arendt thisas theproblem of "obligatory." explained howto explain thewillshouldfollow dictates reason.In the the of why Kantdefined goodwillas one thatfollowed the the end,sheconcluded, dictates reasonunquestioningly, thefaculty will,as he underof for of stoodit,didnotitself contain ability question. the to Thisis why gave he "theform theimperative" "brought of and backtheconcept of morality a backdooras itwere"(Arendt, 1966:72).In bringobedience, through of to Arendt aimedto question Kant's ingtheelement obedience light, of on From perspective the understanding autonomy Kantian grounds.

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and thatis external of ofourwill,thedictates reasonappearas a force And as 1966:71,277-78n9). insofar we identify, (Arendt, heteronymous Kantian or dictates reason, of withourwills,we mayregard as agents, sources authority. of morallaws,as external the It is at thispointthatArendt thought notionofjudgment from obediencedepends thatiffreedom She noticed couldbe useful. a of upon us having faculty thewillthatis one of "purespontaneity," must then one thatis notboundto an external authority, thatfaculty It in factperform one buttwofunctions. mustnotonlyspurus to not without between reasons actionbutmustalso "arbitrate beingsubject "is function infact Thissecond, 1966:131). tothem" arbitrating (Arendt, be whichshe suggested thesameas judgment," sepamight a capacity this of from ratefrom reasonand,ultimately, will.Shedescribed faculty faculties as will, arbitrating orjudgment, "one ofthemostmysterious the ofthehumanmind." lay Presumably mystery in howitwas possible What reasons. without reasons between to tolisten andarbitrate obeying reasonas one'sown?The a to one'sdecision endorse particular grounds and so there in cannotbe formulated thelanguageofreasons, answer Arendt so aboutjudgment understood. inscrutable is something quoted decent to toldus he neededreasons remain here:"Ifsomeone Nietzsche 1966: 131).Andin fact himanylonger" trust we couldhardly (Arendt, that of in Nietzschean thesuspicion reasons there something is deeply Kantian would A at she entertained thispointin the argument. truer is pointoutthatthelanguageofspontaneity one thatcomesprecisely of of Kant'sdescription thefaculty reason,and thatthefreedom from and theoretical of the stemsfrom unity practical ofmoralautonomy thanreigning the reasonhelpsto constitute willrather reason: despotiof the lookingat reasonfrom perspective a callyoverit. ButArendt, be a sourceof saw appearto faculty, howreasonmight willing separate and to and so a threat spontaneity freedom. command of of talk about the mysteriousness the faculty judgArendt's of on to is ment linked herruminations theinsufficiencyphilosophical volumeofThe of of accounts thewillin thelastsection thesecond Life volumeon judgthatwas to lead intoherfinal the section Mind, ofthe

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ment. Thereshe spokeofthefactthatno theorist exceptDuns Scotus for of hadbeen"ready paythepriceofcontingency thegift freedom" to indeedcan be 1978: 195,cf.198).Thiswas because "nothing (Arendt, - the 'feeling' than freedom morefrightening thenotionofsolipsistic isolated from thatmystanding else,is due to free will, apart, everyone can thatnothing nobody be heldresponsible itbutme myself and for 1978: 196).Contingency, and freedom, responsi(Arendt, spontaneity, all and all arethreatened here, bility go handin handin heraccount by offreedom try givejustifications that to philosophical understandings had forour actions.Philosophers almostall, in one way or another, failed appreciate to "thebewildering of spontaneity a freeact."An act can onlybe freeifit is notcausedby something But prior. ifan act is the itself justified, justification "willhaveto showtheactas thecontinuationofa preceding thatis, renegeon thevery of series, experience and freedom novelty" 1978:210).Arendt endedherfinal work (Arendt, to byreturning the direct philosophical questionabout "theabyssof towhatdegree we be at homewitha freedom can so purespontaneity": linked withcontingency? question The aboutwhether could we closely be at homewitha freedom remained that inscrutable philosophical to came downto askingwhether thatfreedom justification pleased us, she asserted, and thusthe questioncould onlybe pursuedby openan investigation the basis of our likesand dislikes, invesinto an ing intothefaculty tasteorjudgment of 1978: 217).This tigation (Arendt, was theinvestigation sheplanned never that but was able towrite. The Mind enough, are to however, help passagesat theend ofThe ofthe Life fleshout the discussion the mysteriousness the faculty judgof of of mentin the earlierlectures moralphilosophy at leasthelp to on and castlight whatshe regarded the central on as dilemma. philosophical Themysterious of free thattroubled at her "contingency" truly actions theendofherlife was closely related themystery hadmentioned to she in the earlier lectures: mystery how the arbitrating ofour the of part can to will,or ourjudgment, respond reasons without to beingsubject them. Thisis thequestion thatshe thought Kant'smoraltheory could notadequately answer.

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hereis notthevalidity Arendt's interWhileourmainconcern of out of pretation Kant,it is worthpointing twowaysin whichKant's does seem to open itselfto the sortof moraland politicalthought on that was criticism Arendt advancing. First, theissueofresponsibilfor thereis thefactthatKantmakesan actorfully responsible his ity, the from morallaw.To be sure,the actions onlywhenhe or she departs themorallaw is a prerequisite moral of autonomy gainedbyfollowing if will in responsibilityone sense.Only we havea free canwe be praised ofour But for or blamedforouractions. responsibility theconsequences the matter. Kant,following morallaw actuFor actionsis a different We for us responsibility thoseconsequences. can be allyinsulates from of for heldresponsible theoutcomes ouractionsonlyifwe haveacted clear as the imperative, Kantmakesperfectly in the against categorical "If lectures Ethics: we do eithermoreor less thanis requiredof us on but for we can be heldresponsible theconsequences, nototherwise neither morenor less. . ." (Kant, not ifwe do onlywhat is required, does seem to 1963: 59; cf.Kant,1996: 6:228).Thus,Kantianmorality in himself a waythatrecalls within to an encourage individual retreat "I self-defense: have done myduty, Eichmann's obeyedthe laws,and can't be blamedforwhatthe worlddoes withthat,"seemsto be, in falls modeofthinking. at abstract form least,a Kantian Responsibility them. not on theprinciples, on theindividual following to The secondplace in whichKant'swritings open themselves is criticism in his explicitly Arendt's Notoriously, politicalthought. Kant allows forno rightof resistanceor rebellionand asks us to whatever consider happensto existas ifitwerelegitimate government in is Thisrecipeforquietism found our enoughto warrant obedience. in of but thefamous "argue obey"principle "Whatis Enlightenment?" in and theMetaphysics Morals, in thefollowing passage unambiguous of and "Theory Practice": resistance power,all againstthe supremelegislative [A]ll of to of incitement thesubjects violent expressions disconis whichbreaksout intorebellion, the tent,all defiance

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and crimein a commonwealth, greatest mostpunishable for destroys very it its foundation. prohibition absoThis is lute.And even ifthe powerof the stateor its agent,the head ofstate, violatedthe original has contract authoby the to and rizing government acttyrannically, has thereby, in the eyesofthe subject, forfeited right legislate, the to the subjectis stillnot entitled offer to counterresistance 1991b:81). (Kant, Thereis actually morecompelling a for argument thisviewthanmight at first apparent: be Kantthinks have a dutyto act morally, we that we can onlydo so whenliving undersome form government, of and thatresisting is essentially destructive a actionthatputs government us outsideofgovernment without assuranceofputting new or a any better one in itsplace. Thuswhatseemsto be a requestforunconditionalobedience in fact wayofpreserving preconditions our is a the of moralaction, in Kantian a wayofprotecting freedom.7 our and, terms, Thisis whyArendt' criticism s musttarget conception freedom his of of itself, through callingintoquestionhis understanding the relation betweenreasonand will.Still,seeingthe defense obediencein his of - and the directness withwhichit couldbe explicitly political theory as an excuse forEichmann can onlymake her concerns deployed about standardKantianmorals and politics seem more plausible. Obedience an integral ofKant'spolitical is part theory. Thereis in Kant'sthought one apparentexception, partial or to theban on disobedience. Thisis his enthusiasm the for exception, in revolutionaries France, enthusiasm strong to have earned an so as himthe nickname "theOld Jacobin." call thisa "partialexception" I as because, has beenmuchcommented his upon,Kantdefended enthusiasmas appropriate of He onlyforspectators the revolution. insisted that as actorsthe revolutionaries themselves were actingwrongly was enoughto attract (Kant,1991a: 182). Still,the partialexception and intrigue and withthe perspective Arendt, it was bybeginning of thespectator she aimedto arrive a wholenewKantian that at political

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one for by philosophy, thatwouldescapethedemand obedience giving the exercised mostofall byspectators, capacity to thecapacity priority 1978:94-96). ofjudgment (Arendt, BEYOND NIETZSCHE TO GOOD AND EVIL onto as IfKantian rulesand reasons couldfunction excuses, scapegoats Arendt's for which Eichmann hopewas placedresponsibility hisactions, Because of couldnotbe so misused. thattheKantian faculty judgment as be cannot fully ourjudgments consequence explained thenecessary for the ofanysetofrulesor principles, responsibility themcannotbe Ifwe wantto explaina particular judgment, placedon anysuchrules.8 on to we cannotdo so simply pointing the principles the basis of by thanthose are whichit was made;judgments alwaysmoreparticular or not so principles, the individual, the principles rules,mustremain sincenothof thefinal Therefore, judgment. explanation anyparticular the for is responsible the finaljudgment, to ing external the person with individthe lies for judgment inescapably responsibility a person's In was Arendt quiteclosetoNietzsche. Beyond On ual himself. thispoint as the had described freespirit someonewho Nietzsche Good Evil, and and of constraint reasoning explaining the from external was liberated suchself-explathecallsfor andwhoinsisted, himself others, to against to and aremy nation, judgments judgments, no one else is entitled "My them" 1990,43: 71). (Nietzsche, evidentin this of Butthe inscrutability Nietzschean judgment are also irresponthe reveals sensein whichsuchjudgments statement makesan agentmore"responsible" WhileNietzschean sible. judgment the in forhisjudgments one sensebytightening linkbetweenagent else. to it and judgment, does notmakehimresponsible anyone To the to seems described that the designed dissocontrary, liberation Nietzsche Nietzsche from suchinterpersonal ciatethefree obligations. any spirit social that of the to wanted unlock inner vitality individuals he thought This explains normsof consciencehad stifled. ties and internalized Her couldnotsimply judgment. intenadoptNietzschean whyArendt from According tion,as we have seen,was quitedifferent Nietzsche's.

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to thelineofthought we havetraced that "SomeQuestions of through at anyrate, goalwas to refute excuseof"just her the Moral Philosophy," the following laws" thatEichmannhad adoptedfromKant'smoral the the of reasonwas theory. Freeing agentfrom imperative Kantian Arendt's oftaking awaytheexcusethatreasoncouldprovide, way tightin actorandjudgment actiontogether order and eningtheknottying fixresponsibility on the actor.She wantedto do this to unmistakably for old-fashioned the reasonthatshewanted preserve possibility to the of a ofblamingEichmann, delivering moralverdict his behavior. on She couldnotfollow Nietzsche simply in thatall judgments asserting are merely of subjective expressions an individual'spowerbecause she wantedto claim thatEichmannwas, in fact,wrong.Observing the "banality" evilwas nevermeantto raiseanydoubtaboutevil's of badness.Arendt notseek to bring to a supra-moral did us perspective to the "beyond goodandevil"but,on thecontrary, vindicate possibility ofa moralperspective thatdistinguished evil.She sought good from a perspective couldremoralize judgment had freed that the she from Kantian moraltheory without standards grounds or that introducing couldbe usedto excusean agentfrom full for taking responsibility his in or heractions thewaythatshe feared Kantian and reasoncould law be used. The distancebetweenArendt and Nietzschecan be seen most in thatthey tookprecisely stances thevalue on clearly thefact opposite ofKant'sthird in a devoted Nietzsche, The Critique.9 GenealogyMorals, of section ridiculing CritiqueJudgment lamenting influence to the and its of on Schopenhauer. problem The thatNietzsche in Kant'sapproach saw was that"instead envisaging aesthetic of the from point the problem ofview of the artist(the creator), considered and the beautiart [it] fulpurely from thatofthe 'spectator,' unconsciously and introduced the 'spectator' intothe concept'beautiful'" 1967,6: 104). (Nietzsche, The spectator's ofview was a disinterested, one. For point impartial this in Nietzsche, meantthatit did violenceto the beautiful. Arendt, was to this In contrast, attracted precisely partofKant's account. Kant's of couldemerge evenifthere description howa disinterested judgment

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had wereno definite thateveryone toacceptas a grounding for concept a Arendt found wayofthinking aboutdisinterestedsucha judgment, standard nessthatshe hopedcouldreplacetheobjectionable objective thatKanthad relieduponin hismoraltheory. The validity moraljudgments of was, in Arendt's view,"neither and universal, subjective, nor on personal whim, depending objective 1966: 141).The interbut intersubjective representative" or (Arendt, thatare notbased moraljudgments ofviewgrounds subjective point to set on a definite ofreasonsor rulesand yetare also notinscrutable in ourselves the place of othersand It others. arisesfrom imagining Anditestithattheseimagined others couldaccept. seeking judgments or not matesthatacceptability referring toconcepts rulesorabstract by or drawneither from but forms, to particular history from examples, 1966: 145). Butthismeans thatone's moraljudgliterature (Arendt, of mentsdependon theimagined community peoplewithwhomone cases.Thosewho regard ofparticular sharesparticular understandings for as of Achilles an exemplar courage, example,makeup a different "common with sense,"thanthosewho regard community, a different concluded Thus of Achilles an exemplar adolescent as obstinacy. Arendt that with of "SomeQuestions MoralPhilosophy" thethought "ourdeciwilldependuponourchoiceofcompany" and wrong sionsaboutright the aboutchoosing Andwhilewe might 1966: 146-47). worry (Arendt, that Arendt set or suggested wrong company thewrong ofexemplars, at theworsedanger in notchoosing company all. Neartheend any lay a she in ofheressayon "TheCrisis Culture" defined cultivated person, withtaste,as "one who knowshow to choosehis company" someone 1968a: 226). Puttingthese two passages about choosing (Arendt, and tasteare thatculture at we together arrive herthought company in the to thepreconditions choosing imagined community engagement The and wrong. one's decisionsabout right withwhichone justifies set overthissuggestive ofideasis,Inwhatsenseis thatlingers question In moral? whatsensedoes our act theimaginative ofchoosing company offer one'scompany of to, theexercise imagining guidance orsetlimits whim? on,one'spersonal, subjective

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THE SUBJECTIVITY OF ARENDT'S INTERSUBJECTIVITY It is helpful thinkthrough to how the faculty representafor exactly tivethinking How would might to workin a case likeEichmann's. go theadviceto chooseone's imagined and "woo the consent" company in ofeveryone it actually and how might have awakened it proceed, his conscience? no for wouldhave Certainly remedy his collaboration been found askinghimto imagine in himself the consulting opinions ofhis actualcommunity. Arendt thatthecommunal norms presumed of those aroundhim had themselves been perverted. The strength of representative comes insteadfrom way in whichit the thinking one can stepoutside suchnorms the suggests through use oftheimagia broader whosecommon sense nation, creating different, community can inform ground and that from thosesupported judgments depart by one's actualcommunity. articulating we can bring In how before our minds thatare notactually Arendt showedhowone examples present, could and thuscouldbe expected - leavebehindthenarrowness to of one's particular situation context adoptan "enlarged and and mentalEichmann could and shouldhave imaginedhimself partof a as ity." whosecommon sensewouldhaverevolted theactions at he community was askedto perform. whatcommunity that? But was Whatdirects the as this for The imagination itconstructs newgrounding itsjudgments? is an dangeris thatthisworkofimagination purely negative, escape from context offers positive that no on newhoriguidance howtocreate zons ofmeaning. Arendt wrotethatthe moreperspectives imagone inesand consults woos,themorevalidone'sjudgments be. This or will is notso mucha questionofnumbers it is a movement as toward the broadest that as possible imagined community, of"humanity" a whole. Thejudgment Arendt that to was,after all, ultimately sought vindicate that Eichmann others committed and had "crimes against humanity."10 Butitis important see thathumanity suchis an imagined to as commuIt of becauseitis not nity. mustbe a product "representative" thinking Weknowhumanity through we present anywhere. only examples; know and is rule humans, there no definite orconcept onlyparticular simple to apply determine to whether particular a is or is nothuman specimen

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in the moralsense- thatis a matter reflective for But judgment. here becomedifficult: Withregard whichcommunity's to common things senseis this aboutwhatcountsas "human" be made?The to judgment to sense of onlypossibleanswerseemsto be, withregard humanity's whathumanity Butthatcan meannothing is. other thanthefollowing: in deciding keepcompany to withhumanity a whole,I mustimagine as whathumanity's senseofitself for couldbe. The ultimate critemyself rionuponwhichI base mychoiceofcompany mustbe nothing other thanmyownimagined senseofhumanity. Nowtwoobservations be made aboutthisexercise reprecan in sentative both and thinking, ofwhichmayseemdisappointing yetboth is aboutthe emptiofwhichseemtrue.The first a familiar complaint Arendtian ness or formality judgment conceived. of so representative account howto distinguish of offers substantive no thinking goodfrom of evil,no hierarchy ends in lightof whichto evaluateparticulars. such definite have alreadyseen whyArendt avoidedintroducing We we but by grounds, nevertheless maybe disappointed thelackofguidraisedthisworry nearthe herself ance heralternative Arendt provides. of end of "SomeQuestions MoralPhilosophy" askingthe question by to thereis reallynothing hold ontowhenwe are called of "whether as and thatthisis right thisis wrong we decidethatthis uponto decide 1966: 143).Heranswer-and her and is beautiful thisis ugly"(Arendt, in statement thelecture is thatwhilethere final and mostconclusive are "We to is nostandard holdontoorbe guided there examples: judge by, in and tellright from present ourmindsomeincident by wrong having absentin timeorspace,thathavebecomeexamples" and someperson, workrequired 1966:145).Butas we haveseen,theimaginative (Arendt, countas examplesofwhat,the work whichparticulars to determine the seemsto require one's imagined ofchoosing precisely community, of The to thatwe are attempting ground. circularity sortofjudgments of guidedby exampleis linkedto the formality judgment, judgment still of and it has the effect leavingcertainfoundational judgments in herself at Arendt gestured thisdifficulty Again, seeming groundless. about that"ourdecisions After of thefinalmoments heressay. saying

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in and willdependon ourchoiceofcompany" wrote, she right wrong case thatsomeone a crucialand remarkable passage,"In theunlikely Bluebeard company, for shouldcomeand tellus thathe wouldprefer and hencetake himas his example,the onlything could do is to we make surehe nevercomes near us" (Arendt, 1966: 146). And thatis all she can find sayaboutthisfinaldecisionaboutwhosecompany to to keepin ourimaginative reconstruction "humanity." implicaof The tionis thatthereis nothing morethatcan be saidtojustify ground or thisjudgment. Hereis the Nietzschean moment finaland inescapof able individual in on responsibility Arendt's thought judgment.My and morethat is, judgment in theend,my judgment, thereis nothing can be said importantly, more"wooing" persuading can be no or that of expected us on thispoint.11 The secondtruebut perhapsdisappointing observation about Arendt's of is understanding representative thinking thatthe "intercharacter the grounds validity of of thatArendt's account subjective" is not a genuinethird betweenobjectivity subjecand provides way is stillsubjective the following in sense: the tivity. Intersubjectivity individual mustin the end choose his community co-interpreters of or co-judges grounds on thatmayremain,to a largeextent, inscrutable to others; mustchoose whose consentto woo, whomto try he to persuadeor to imaginehimself persuading or,whatamountsto the same thing, choosehis interpretation humanity. ensurehis of To for there be no source grounding it can or for responsibility thischoice, outside himself. Arendt's of In ownwords:"Morality concerns indithe vidualin his singularity. criterion right wrong, answer The of and the to thequestion whatought to do?depends thelastanalysis I in neither on habitsand customs, whichI sharewiththosearoundme,noron a command either of divine humanorigin, on whatI decidewith or but to In because regard myself. otherwords,I cannotdo certainthings donethemI can no longer able to livewithmyself" be having (Arendt, 1978:97). It is truethatArendt seemsto have aspiredto findin intersuba shared worldofappearances jectivity (Biskowski, 1993).Buttheline

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ofthought so thatshe wouldhave explored farin thispapersuggests final had to be very aboutgranting moralauthority thatworld. to wary that in Certainly worldcouldnotbe viewedas a sourceofmorality the Kantian of sense,a sourceofauthority analogousto theobligation the morallaw.Ifthe sharedworldwas to be viewedin thatway,thenits their wouldoffer however dictates, intersubjective modeofderivation, and makingexcuses:"I the same possibility shifting of responsibility the is was onlyfollowing commonsenseofthe community" notvery in different formfromthe excuse that Eichmanngave, and seems a of to equallywellsuitedto rationalizing refusal judge.Ifthepurpose weremerely replace"themorallaw" to of Arendt's theory judgment with"thecommon world"or "common sense,"thenthe "arbitrating" takenon thefunction wouldhavesimply partofthewill,orjudgment, to ofreasonwithrespect the "instigating" ofthewill,and Arendt part of morethan changethe terminology the would have done nothing had led herto reject. Kantian thatEichmann's example categories consultathe ifwe can identify outcomeofintersubjective Only The our tionas wholly owncan we avoidthispredicament. importance and and actionas ours,eventhrough after on ofinsisting a judgment Arendt herself is the processofintersubjective reflection, something whenjudgwhileI takeintoaccountothers "Furthermore, suggested: I in to thisdoes notmeanthatI conform myjudgment theirs. still ing, at to speakwithmyownvoiceand I do notcountnosesin order arrive is "Butmyjudgment no longer She whatI thinkis right." continued, at in either, thesensethatI arrive myconclusions taking by subjective 1968b:241). 1966: 141; cf.Arendt, intoaccount"(Arendt, onlymyself sincea "subjective" I am notsurewhatto makeofthislast sentence, of can view certainly take intoaccountthe responses others. Onlyif wouldthey from distinct someground created thoseresponses myself - but ifthey to a constitute real alternative the subjective perspective the also wouldnecessarily threaten responthenthey claimed authority that sibility comesalongwithsubjectivity. did Arendt nottakethe Thislineofthought why helpsto explain views has thatHabermas urgeduponher.Habermas viewofjudgment

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the intersubjectively validated of thatArendt drew ground judgment the from third as "a first to a concept communicaof Critique approach tiverationality whichis builtintospeechand actionitself" (Habermas, 1980:130;cf.Benhabib, 2003:199-203). laments fact He the that Arendt didnotquitetakethisstepherself thatshe shiedawayfrom and assertcould in factprovide"a cognitive ing that"representative thinking" foundation forthe power of commonconvictions" ... (Habermas, 1977: 23). Butthe veryessaythatHabermasquotes,Arendt's "Truth and Politics," the in suggests reasonthatshe shiedawayfrom finding like In representative thinking anything communicative rationality. thatessayshe was deeplyconcerned withthe coerciveness truthof claimsin politics.Communicative insofar it claimsto as rationality, a rather firm sortofvalidity, nottechnically an asserbe ground may tion of "truth" it cannothelp but exerta similarforcein moral but and political Insofar communicative life. as claimsto reveal rationality thedictates reasonin moralsand politics, might of it well seem(from Arendt's tothreaten spontaneity, the and freedom, responperspective) ofan individual's inthesamewaythatKant's dictates sibility judgment ofreasondid.Communicative wouldseemto dictate what rationality is right a from perspective external theindividual oftheperson to will doingthejudging. to be Arendt wrong viewreason was to Again, be clear:itmay that as something external theindividual thisway.BothKantians to in and Habermasians wouldargue,in different ways,thatthe thought-train I am following Arendt in failsto understand way in whichthe the willcan itself shapedbyreason,thatit failsto fully be understand or whatKantcalled the "practicality" reason,and thatit overof accept estimates problem motivation. the of that Theywouldargue,I think, shewaswrong viewthewill'srelation reasonas one ofobedience. to to ButwhileI cannotsettlethisdifficult issue here,it seemsto me that Arendt's viewofthematter at leastnotimplausible. is Thereis a sense in whichherperspective illuminates deep dilemma the nature a in of itself: judgments basedon nonsubjective Can be foundations judgment without the and of thereby threatening freedom responsibility those

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individuals are or doingthejudging? Judgments inscrutable incommuare nicableifthey based entirely an individual's on solipsistic perspective theyare nottruly Butiftheyare based on anything judgments. then outside thatperspective they threaten becomeirresponsible to (in the Nietzsche's sense ofbeingalienatedfrom agent)and coercive(in The Arendt's senseofbeingsomething of obeyed). elusiveness Arendt's in account judgment of stems partfrom seriousness the with whichshe At an treated dilemma. timesshe seemsto lean toward accountof this thatwas closerto Habermas's view,but at othermoments judgment the of she seemsto have caughtherself, noticing coercivepotential a and pulledback toward viewmoreresponsive to suchan approach, that at In thethought-train I am following, least,she Nietzsche's point. than seemsto have caredmoreaboutresponsibility aboutcommunithatpreserves our character judgment of It cability. is the subjective on sourceofauthority whichwe might distance from set,external any the intersubjective be tempted blame our judgments. to Therefore, that modeofthinking she described representative thinking is ultia form subjective of thinking.12 mately particular is Another intersubjectivitysubjecwayof seeingthatArendt's tivein thissense is to noticethe variousplaces in whichshe emphashe in of sized the loneliness thejudgingcitizen.In Eichmann Jerusalem had that noticed peoplecapableofdistinguishing from wrong only right often to theirownjudgments guide them,and thattheir judgments as whatthey must at to regard the "happened] be completely oddswith 1994:294).Her unanimous opinionofall thosearoundthem"(Arendt, Kantin askingthejudge followed ofrepresentative account thinking rather thanthe of to to refer thepossible others, judgments imagined and In others. thatworkofimagination of actualjudgments concrete in moments Arendt's At is there a kindofloneliness. certain abstraction if of theloneliness thejudge is almostincomprehensiblenot writings of understood againstthe background the dilemmaaboutjudgment and above. In her essay"Thinking MoralConsiderations," described the whichbegan once again with Eichmann,she investigated link an and betweenthoughtfiilness moraljudgment through analysisof

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thenotion conscience, of whichsheetymologically defined knowing as "with bymyself" and 1971:160).She linkedconscience the to (Arendt, Socratic in neverto becomeout of injunction, reported Plato'sGorgias, withoneself. Severalcommentators havevoiceddissatisfacharmony tionwithArendt's of Plato here.SeylaBenhabibpointsout that use the desire"to be at home with putting emphasison our individual ourselves" seemsto lead Arendt towards subjective, a "quasi-intuitionistconception moraljudgment," position of a thatseemsto fly the in faceofArendt's in interest plurality intersubjectivity and (Benhabib, 1988: 44-45;cf.Benhabib, 2003: 190-98). a GeorgeKateb,from differentperspective, is to concurs, noting, "Subjectivity intrinsic [Arendt's Socratic conscience: contains principle can It no that understanding of] be generalized'"(Kateb,1983: 102). Whywas Arendt so trying hard hereto finda basis formoraljudgments the activities thinking in of and judgingthemselves, activities thatoccurwithin psycheofan the individual alone?One wayofunderstanding motivated what Arendt at theseotherwise in herargument to emphasize is her perplexing points aboutrelying anyexternal on for anxianxiety grounds ourjudgments, etiesabout the lack of responsibility can arise from that leavingthe subjective pointofviewbehind. REPRESENTATIVE THINKING AND JUDGINGSPECTATORSHIP Ifit is truethatArendt's is representative thinking ultimately subjectivein thissense,in spiteofherown occasionalprotestations otherit is nevertheless thatwhenwe go on to explorethe content true wise, ofthe singular of Arendt perspective the lonely judge,we do notfind a or describing narrow unified pointofview.She did notleavebehind her interest plurality intersubjectivity in and when she turnedfrom to moralquestions 1988:44). The mostinteresting political (Benhabib, ofheranalysisof Socrates'view of conscienceas harmony with part for is oneself, example, herobservation a certain that sortofplurality enters intoeven the Socratic of soul: understanding the harmonious thatis identical withitself, and one "Nothing truly absolutely likeA is A,

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in withitself; always needat least can be either or outofharmony you sound"(Arendt, 1971: 183). The two tonesto producea harmonious as therefore should be described a desire not Socratic desire harmony for Human forunity; unisonis in some sense the oppositeof harmony. for within psyche, otherwise the itself assumesplurality consciousness as a beingwould notbe possible;one of explicit recognition oneself the and can onlysee oneselfas a selffrom outside.Difference otherbut of werenotonlycharacteristic thepublicworld Arendt ness, wrote, 1971: of for were also "conditions the existence man's ego" (Arendt, if she beings we werenot"two-in-one," 184).We couldnotbe conscious an explicitdialogue and thoughtfulness asserted. presume Thinking that contrasted dialoguewith and withoneself, whileshe sometimes thatit was the publicdebatesofthe political world,she also insisted 1966: 96, 105). She was than a monologue(Arendt, rather a dialogue thata democratic WaltWhitman's from notso far, then, insight lovely that insisted she could "contain multitudes"; merely singleindividual of in had themultitudes to be able to livewithone another someform 1988:44). or, (Benhabib, friendship harmony to use herword, in to to Itwas theability divideourselves thisway, see ourselves to fromthe outside- to become spectators and our commitments in interest the notionof disinourselves thatlay behindArendt's She foundin Kant'sthird terestedness Critique. wantedto divideand whichis whyshe of the dissolve unity thesoulthatNietzsche admired, thanattacking rather and defended thoughtfulness self-consciousness her she in Culture" justified interest had.In "TheCrisis itas Nietzsche could thatthe spectator's in disinterestedness saying perspective by the that the us rescue from means-end mentality accompanied maker's the and helpedtoprevent perspective perspective, thusthat spectator's modesofexpeall other from on themodern eclipsing emphasis poesis and Politics" 1968a: 217-19).In "Truth the world(Arendt, riencing It for she gavea different argument disinterestedness:was the condition of the use of imagination thinking. requiredby representative and interests ourlocal our us liberated from private Disinterestedness of the us freed to imagine perspective others, and thereby partialities

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freedus to approachthe "enlargedmentality" thatKantdescribed. Behindthe interest disinterestedness Arendt's in that conviction lay bothmoraland political, judgment, requiredus to regardourselves a from distance.In a sense,disinterestedness to serves,forArendt, and consciencethe space injectintoone's own lonelyconsciousness or capaciousnessnecessary judge. Considering viewpoints to the of others a workofimagination, "theonlycondition is and for potential thisexertion the imagination disinterestedness, liberation of is the from one's ownprivate interests. all or Hence,even I shun company am if
isolated while an 1 completely forming opinion,am notsimply together with only in myself thesolitude philosophical of (Arendt,1968b: 241-42; cf. thought"

1968a:210). Arendt, It was vitalforArendt thatthe imaginative workof representative was to for thinking notdesigned createa new identity oneself. she that whenI engagein representative I Instead, argued thinkingaim at "beingand thinking myown identity in whereactually am not" I 1968b:241).Thiscrucialand fascinating (Arendt, phraseexplainswhy shereferred theform thinking "representative." to of as Representation is necessary putoneself to whereone is not.The formality Arendt's of modeofjudgment be criticized removing from concrete can for us our circumstances spiteoftheconcern withparticulars), itspurpose but (in is to makeroomfor workofrepresentation. emptiness such the The of a formalistic modeofjudgment designed createan inner is to absence. Ifone weresimply to in unmediated that present oneself thedirect, way Nietzsche's freespirit therewouldbe no opportuis, playful, strong, to workofrepresentation. Hannah As nity engagein the imaginative Pitkin outin herclassicstudy theparadox within the pointed years ago, idea ofrepresentationthatitpositssomething is in very beingpresent somesenseevenwhereit is actually absent(Pitkin 1967:8-9). Arendt's notionofrepresentative is of thinking one in whichthe perspectives othersare somehowmade presentsomeplacewherein facttheydo not exist insideof us. If those otherpeople actuallyexistedinside of us, we would be- literally someone else. So insteadtheymust be re-presented. Arendt's accountdoes notquiteremovethe mysteri-

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but ousnessofthisre-presentation, she at least suggests whysuch a mustbe possibleifan individual is phenomenon psyche to be capable The work making of ofobserving itself from somedistance. imaginative and ofemptying oneselfenoughto absentotherspresent oneself, to is admit thoserepresented others, theworkofrepresentative thinking an What for individual. andis whatmakes judgment possible judgment the so was shethought, precisely lackofan identity singular presumed, or closedto suchrepresentations imaginations. orunified to remain as one of Thispointaboutidentity suggests understanding thelink and persuasion, effort the often made between thatArendt judgment seemsto The of of towoo theconsent others. phenomenon persuasion as insofar it requires like thinking, requiresomething representative in of or a certain flexibility capaciousness ourconception whatconstiwe tutesour selves.To be open to persuasion mustbe able to imagine and different yetstillbeingourselves. ourselves something believing and if all our convictions beliefschangedwe would no Presumably, be therefore seen to effort persuademight be every longer ourselves; Arendt defended life But as an assaulton ouridentity. thepolitical that And had to remaina real possibility. a was one in whichpersuasion oneself toimagine seemstobe thecapacity ofthat condition possibility to the and otherthanoneself, yetstilloneself, capacity as something made betweenpersuathat The distinction Arendt oneself. re-present sionand "coercion truth" dependsuponthisfactaboutpersuasion, by nevertheless selvesthatremain alternate to it for is theability imagine as new opinions our assimilate us to actively thesame selfthatallows 1968a: 223).Our be thanmerely coercedbythem(Arendt, own rather dictates reasononly of thanKantian are ownjudgments less coercive and assimilating role because we playa moresignificant in creating without cannotbe understood of them,and thatactivity assimilation workofre-presentation.13 to referring theimaginative account,was the interior WhatEichmannlacked,on Arendt's the workcould occur, internal space space in whichthatimaginative too his with ownidentity, comfortToo that requires. satisfied judgment in consisted a lackofimaginaable in hisownprivate hisbanality life,

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did in the tion.His failure notlie,she thought, simply choosing wrong standards use whenjudging. to Nordid his failure in notknowing lie whichstandards use. Instead, failed notjudgingat all,bynot to he by able to see himself from spectator's a and bynot being vantage point, within himself plurality capaciousness the and thatjudgingcreating needs.Andthosewriters who had condemned Arendt's spectatorship ownwritings toojudgmental, as thosecritics who had asked,"whoam I tojudge?"wereguilty the same sortoferror. of LikeEichmann, they wereplaguedbya disinclination judgebornnotultimately doubt to of aboutthe standards thebasis ofwhichone might on judge,but ofan settled too itself toolittle and comfortable, overly identity at homewith to see andjudgeitself from outside. the provoked JUDGING-SPECTATORSHIP AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT We are nowin a position return theopening to to themeofthisessay. is oftensaid to tragically lock citizens Representative government outsidethe realmof participatory themmostof politicsby trapping thetimein theroleofspectators. withthepreceding But reflections in mindone might readthisfeature representative of more government institutionalizes role of the positively. Representative government and so encourages in citizens viewing existing orders or spectator any codesfrom certain a distance witha certain and detachment. doing In aims to institutionalize so, representative whatArendt government described theprecondition judgment.14also seemsto modelthe as of It stance thatcitizens should takewith to owncommitments, regard their us to see themas partial and provisional, fully not constiencouraging tutive one'sidentity, to persuasion. of ifthere any is Furthermore, open truth Kant'ssensethatpeoplewatching French in the Revolution could revealtheir moralnatures their enthusiastic about through judgments it in a waythattheycould not through theiractions,representative wouldseemto provide place fortheexpression their a of government moralnatures institutionalizing roleas spectators. their by Similarly, RonaldBeiner suggested Arendt's has that on in emphasis history her

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seemtodistance faculty judgthe later reflections judgment on of might render their the of sincehistorians ment from work politics, judgments after factand rescuethe meaningof eventsonlywithhindthe only related politics, to can seemonlymarginally sight. Judgment therefore in a our "a kindofvicarious action, wayofrecouping citizenship default 1982: 153).Butagain,the perspeca genuinepublicrealm"(Beiner, of here tivethatI am suggesting wouldunderstand governrepresentative in the a mentas an effort protect place for historian's to judgment the to for an of providing opportunity citizen-historians practice politics, the sidelines. from theirjudgments dignify politicalactionthrough as that described an integral The publicspace and recognition Arendt and life partofpolitical onlyexistifan audienceexists, thosecitizens morethanwatchand who seemto do nothing in liberaldemocracies citizens moreactive the True, judgearetheoneswhoprovide audience. are too but canwatchandjudgeone another, they often busywatching role is a distinct in themselves theeyesofothers. Judging-spectatorship whoarenotactively of for great the participating. majority citizens a In promoting certainalienationfrom representative politics, But kindofself-alienation. ifArendt a also government promotes certain totalitariancan thatdemocracy veertoward aboutthereasons is right of ism,thenthisfeature representative may government be a blessing that Arendt in In in disguise. heressay"TheCrisis Culture," suggested in culture notbeingshapedbythe faculty differs from entertainment declineto judge is therefore in A ofjudgment. politics whichcitizens viewedsuch a politicsas a grave Arendt a politicsof entertainment. she in threat mass democracies; fearedthe consequencesof citizens to their without responsibility judge it.Of accepting watching politics does institutions notguarantee of the course, presence representative that and of theexercise judgment, the disinterestedness theseinstitua or can tionspromote easilyslideintolackofinterest apathy, propenin morethanentertainment politicallife.In this to sity findnothing about how the purposeof an essayI mean onlyto suggest argument not bestbe understood, to examine might government representative The its achieves purpose. of to theextent whichthatform government

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will of so government eludeourunderstanding purpose representative the is as we think onlyoppositeofapathy participatory politics. long ofapathy-attentive judging-spectatorand Thereis another opposite The challenge thatArendt's on alerts to is us thoughts judgment ship. a in thatoffinding wayto conceive citizenship massrepresentative of a that of democracies, wayofthinking concedesthe dominance specin citizens'experience without a defense into of tatorship collapsing and subjection.15 passivity Thisessayhas not resolved philosophical the issuesthatmake Arendt's accountofjudgment seemso elusive.Especially, grounds the ofparticular remain elusive.In factit mayseemfair ask to judgments whether Arendt's worries aboutresponsibility her,at least in the led trainofthought the of here,to underemphasize importance explored in otherfactors evaluating moraljudgments. Eichmann was culpable notonlybecausehe refused takeresponsibility his actions, to for but also becausehisactions werewrong.16 the of Nevertheless, elusiveness Arendt's account thiswrongness central herpoint.She thought of is to thatno longer eludedus threatened becomea source to anystandard ofunthinkingness an excuse not to judge forourselves. and Elusive standards judgment of havethe effect preventing from of us blaming theprinciples dictates reasonfor actions or of our and opinions. say To thatthestandards judgment elusiveis to saythatanyparticular of are standard that alwaysseemssomehowincomplete, one can alwayssee thematter from outsidetheperspective as provided thatstandard, by a spectator. Seenin itsbestlight, elusiveness judgment the of provokes continued and imagination insures continued and the thoughtfiilness need formaking calls ourselves. Arendt's thus judgment perspective a and provides surprisingly compelling ofunderstanding appreciway and of To atingthestrength assertiveness judging-spectators.judge,to from safety rules, the of to on codes,and principles, insist one's depart own personalstakein one's evaluations, a bold spirit thatis requires different from apatheticsubmissiveness the oftenascribedto quite those citizensof representative democracies who do nothingmore than watch politicsand renderjudgmentsabout what theysee. If

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a Arendt's accountofjudgmentdoes not offer completeor satisfacit its account judgment, nevertheless, of elusiveness, through very tory and of part worthy attention helpsto highlight ofwhatmakesjudging respect. APPENDIX on FromEichmann's imperatestimony, his viewofKant'scategorical tive:* The Accusedwill now answerquestionsfromthe Presiding Judge: Judges. in Do I Raveh: shallaskyoua fewquestions German. yourememJudge abouttheKantian berat one pointin yourpoliceinterrogation talking to life that and your imperative, saying throughout entire youhad tried to liveaccording theKantian imperative? Yes. Accused: it Q. Thereis no needto showthistoyou;do youremember clearly? it A.Yes,I remember clearly. whenyousaidthat? imperative Q. WhatdidyoumeanbytheKantian of and of A. I meantbythisthattheprinciple myvolition theprinciple it couldat anytimebe raisedto be theprinmylifemustbe suchthat as legislation, Kantmoreor less putsit in his categoricipleofgeneral cal imperative. awareof that Q. I see,therefore, whenyousaidthisyouwereprecisely Kant'scategorical imperative? A.Yes,I was. in Q. Andso, do youmeanto saybythisthatyouractivities thecourse to ofdeporting corresponded theKantian imperative? categorical Jews ... A.No,certainly becausetheseactivities at thattimeI hadtolive not, of and andactunder during person, compulsion, thecompulsion a third

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I times. meantbythis, the... bythisliving to exceptional by according theKantian totheextent I am myownmaster ableto that and principle, to and to organize lifeaccording myvolition according mywishes. my in Thisis also quiteobvious, factit couldnotbe meantanyother way, becauseifI am subjected a higher to thenmy force, poweranda higher free as suchis eliminated, then, will and sinceI can no longer master be ofmyfree willandvolition, cannotin fact I whatadoptanyprinciples whichI cannotinfluence, on thecontrary, soever I must, and also but, buildobedience theauthorities thisconcept, thenthe to into and may, bearthe responsibility. myjudgment, authorities In thatalso belongs toit. the orders Q. Do you mean to sayby thisthatfollowing authorities' the blindly signifies realizing Kantian categorical imperative? A. Sincethe Kantian was imperative laid down,therehad neverbeen sucha destructive unprecedented and order from head ofstate. a That is whyit was new,and thatis whythereis no possibility compariof and no ... one cannot haveanyidea ofhowitwas.Therewas the sons, I War. hadtodojustone thing. hadtoobey, I becauseI couldnotchange And as anything. so I just placedmylife, faras I could,in theservice I wouldput it thisway- ofthisKantiandemand.AndI have already saidthatin fact others to answer thefundamental had for As aspect. a minor oforders, had to obey, couldnotevadethat. I I recipient from first ofyouranswer the thatyoumeantthat Q. I understood part theseyearsin whichyou were a blindrecipient orderswould be of excluded from according theKantian life to And imperative. I intended to ask you about this,from when tillwhen did it last?Butthenyou added something, thatagain changedthewholething. and Now I do notknowwhatyour final is position on this. A.Killing cannot according thespirit theKantian be to of peopleviolently becausein principle is notsomething it imperative, God-given. was a timewhenyoudidnotlivebythecateQ. Thatmeansthatthere gorical imperative?

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madeit impossible me to for A. Couldnotlive,becausehigher powers livebyit. whento whenwas this? Q. From whenI was transferred that the A. Strictly speaking, was from moment to my against will,and against wishes, Berlin. my Q. Tillwhen? A.Until end. the thatperiod this Q. Andthroughout timeitwas clearto youthatduring although youhad in imperative, youcouldnotlivebythe categorical life to actually liveyour byit? arranged principle Reason. this A. During timeI readKant'sCritiquePractical of time? Q. Forthefirst time. A.Thenwas thefirst the Q. So thatit was onlythenthatyou encountered idea ofthe cateconcept? gorical but A. I had comeacrossthisearlier, I had notconcerned myself particwas disposed theKantian withit;instead, imperative categorical ularly a to "True thelaw,obedient, proper life, as ofshortly follows: personal was thecatewiththelaw."This,I wouldsay, notto comeintoconflict use. for imperative a smallman'sdomestic gorical of wherehad youtakenthisdefinition thecategorical imperaQ. From it did the tivefor smallman?WhenyoureadKantlater, youfind correto sponded hisdefinition? it someonelikemyself is not A. No,I sensedthisearlier becausefor on, I instead, all possibleto understand ofthe subjectofKantcompletely; and whatI couldunderstand, whatmy thesewritings onlytookfrom couldsomehow grasp. imagination that Q. So I understand you learnedthe trueconceptat the timeyou of withthedeportation Jews? weredealing
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it A.Astowhether was thegenuine of complete concept thecategorical but I imperative,am stillnotable to graspeventoday, I havegrasped head ofstatecannot suchorders a supreme one thing thatgiving by order. nowI was trying cometo But to withthespirit a divine of accord and withmyself, I sawthatI was unableto changeanything and terms unableto do anything. me in whenyou then, theyears Q. Whatinterests morenowis whether - against - until1945,whether came to Berlin yourwill,as youput it thatperiod wereaware, becameaware, or that werenot during you you to Kant'scategorical according living imperative? A. I first becameawareofthisin Kulm. itwouldnotbe right me But for to sayI becameawarethatI was notlivingaccording thisKantian to but I the live requirement, I saidto myself:cannotfor present entirely I to according it,although wouldliketo do so. remained withyouup untilthe end?Untilthe Q. Andthisrealization endof1944? A. I didnotthink itevery butwhenI travel, is myhabitnotto of it day, speaka lot,butto reflect. then:Whenyouthought over, it thendid it becomeclear Q. Allright, toyou? A.In fact, theendthat in was also thedirect reasonfor approaching my Mueller from timeto time. * Available at <http://www.nizkor.Org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/ transcripts/Sessions/Session-105-04.html>.
NOTES

* Theauthor wouldliketo acknowledge following the their peoplefor comments earlierdrafts thispaper: RonaldBeiner, on of helpful Green, Kateb, SeylaBenhabib, Frank, Jill Jeffrey GayeIlhan,George Daniel Mahoney, BlaiseMisztal, Kronman, Anthony James Sleeper, Elizabeth those at Young-Bruehl, whoaskedquestions theColumbia

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Seminar Political for and Social Thought and at the New England Political Science and of at of Association, many theattendees "Crises Hannah OurRepublics: Arendt OneHundred,"conference Yale at a at University. 1. WhenHabermas summarized Arendt's in to position remarks the NewSchoolhe identified herkeyphilosophical as pointa "concept of actionas 'praxis'whicharticulates historical the experiences and thenormative call ofwhatwe today participatory perspectives 1980: 128).Fora morecomplete (Habermas, democracy" summary ofhisviewofArendt, Habermas see Kateb's (1977).Similarly, George asserts thatparticipation the coreofher is classicbook on Arendt "Direct citizen is common to philosophy: participation theelement and 1983:7). herancient modern commitments" (Kateb, 2. Arendt's abouttheissuescentral judgment to musings philosophical the but do predate Eichmann trial, RonaldBeiner givespersuasive on the themewere evidencethather most significant thoughts on 1982: intertwined herreflections Eichmann with (Beiner, closely 97-101). of defense judgof to 3. Andrew Noms points theimportance Arendt's in of ment hertreatment totalitarianismNorris to (1996:174-75). to Arendt's relation representative 4. Katebalso explores democracy, the of does buthisargument notchallenge supremacy participatory instead thatshe underemphaHe scheme. argues actionin Arendt's of is thatrepresentative sizedthefact government hometo a variety andcivil disobeeconomic of action, activity including types political and 1983:40-41, chap.4). dience(Kateb, 1972: Nowit from November of 5. See also theresponse HansJonas He made appeal tojudgment. also is notthecase thatKantsimply in Beiner(1982: made appeal to the conceptofthe good."Quoted 114-15). was out to has he 6. "What [Eichmann] failed point in court thatin this as legalizedbythe state,' he calledit,he had not 'periodofcrimes he as no longer formula the dismissed Kantian applicable, had simply werethe of it distorted to read:Actas iftheprinciple youractions

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of sameas that thelegislator thelawoftheland orinHansFrank's of which formulation 'thecategorical of of Reich,' imperative theThird if haveknown: 'Act sucha waythattheFhrer, in Eichmann might he knewofyour wouldapprove (Arendt, it'" 1994:136).The action, itself and confused; relevant of testimony is complex portions it are included an appendix thisessay. as to 7. HereI follow Korsgaard (1997). 8. Elizabeth notesthatArendt was lookingfora form Young-Bruehl ofjudging"thatdoes not surrender reflexivity imperatives" its to 2006: (Young-Bruehl, 207). 9. Bonnie to for fact of Honig neglects account this inherreading Arendt as a Nietzschean (Honig, 1993). 10. Young-Bruehl outthaton Arendt's is account, points "judgment the that a ideal:a worldcitifaculty prepares personto be theKantian zen"(Young-Bruehl, 166). 2006: 11. Compare Christine "The moments Korsgaard: morallifecan contain whenresponsibilityso deepthatevena justification deniedus" is is 1997:322). (Korsgaard, 12. Thus I agreewithYoung-Bruehl's effort to emphasison Arendt's a of 2006: develop "standard theself"(Young-Bruehl, 200ff). 13. 1offer accountofthelinkbetween an and in persuasion judgment Garsten (2006). 14. Fora recent effort makejudgment to central an understanding to of see representative government, Urbinati (2006). 15. One projectforpoliticalscientists thatmightemergefromthis would be a rvaluation theoretical of understandperspective ofthe act ofvoting. Insteadof seeingvoting a moment as of ings in ruling,as manycontemporary science participation political treatments it mightbe more fruitful thinkof votingas a to do, momentof judging-spectatorship those who are not ruling. by Morris Fiorina's"retrospective comes closerto thisthan, voting" forexample,accountsof civicengagement participation or that include activities suchas campaigning organizor voting alongside Another for scientists would ing.See Fiorina (1981). project political

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in analobe an effort classify of to types nonparticipation,a manner haveclassified of scientists types gousto thewayin whichpolitical participation. 16. In this sense Katebis probably rightthat "judgingis too fraila 1983:38). for (Kateb, support" morality
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