Chinese Ethics

The tradition of Chinese ethical thought is centrally concerned with questions about how one ought to live: what goes into a worthwhile life, how to weigh duties toward family versus duties toward strangers, whether human nature is predisposed to be morally good or bad, how one ought to relate to the nonhuman world, the extent to which one ought to become involved in reforming the larger social and political structures of one's society, and how one ought to conduct oneself when in a position of influence or power. The personal, social, and political are often intertwined in Chinese approaches to the subject. Anyone who wants to draw from the range of important traditions of thought on this subject needs to look seriously at the Chinese tradition. Chinese ethics includes Confucianism, Mohism, Daoism, Legalism, and Chinese Buddhism, of which Confucianism and Daoism are the most widely subscribed-to.

Confucian Ethics
Virtue ethics: the dao, the junzi, and ren Confucian ethics is focused around ideals of character and the constituting traits or virtues. The most frequently discussed ideal is that of the junzi. The Chinese word originally meant prince's son, but in the Analects it refers to ethical nobility. The usual English translation is gentleman. Among the traits connected to ethical nobility are filial piety, a respect for and dedication to the performance of traditional ritual forms of conduct, and the ability to judge what the right thing to do is in the given situation. These traits are virtues in the sense that they are necessary for following the dao, the way human beings ought to live their lives. As Yu (2007) points out, the dao plays the kind of role in ancient Chinese ethics that is analogous to the role played byeudaimonia or flourishing, in ancient Greek ethics. The junzi is the ethical exemplar with the virtues making it possible to follow the dao. Besides the concepts of dao and junzi, the concept of ren is a unifying theme in the Analects. Before Confucius's time, the concept of ren referred to the aristocracy of bloodlines, meaning something like the strong and handsome appearance of an aristocrat. But in the Analects the concept is of a moral excellence that anyone has the potential to achieve. Various translations have been given of ren. Many translations attempt to convey the idea of complete ethical virtue, connoting a comprehensive state of ethical excellence. In a number of places in the Analects the ren person is treated as equivalent to the junzi, indicating that ren has the meaning of complete or comprehensive moral excellence, lacking no particular virtue but having them all.

However, ren in some places in the Analects is treated as one virtue among others such as wisdom and courage. In the narrower sense of being one virtue among others, it is explained in 12.22 in terms of caring for others. It is in light of these passages that other translators, such as D.C. Lau, use benevolence to translate ren. However, others have tried to more explicitly convey the sense of ren in the comprehensive sense of all-encompassing moral virtue through use of the translation Good or Goodness The centrality of li or ritual Analects 1.15 likens the project of cultivating one's character to crafting something fine from raw material: cutting bone, carving a piece of horn, polishing or grinding a piece of jade. The chapter also stresses the importance of li (the rites, ritual) in this project. In the Analects ritual includes ceremonies of ancestor worship, the burial of parents, and the rules governing respectful and appropriate behavior between parents and children. Later the word came to cover a broad range of customs and practices that spelled out courteous and respectful behavior of many different kinds. Engaging in ritual, learning to perform it properly and with the right attitudes of respect while performing it, is to engage in a kind of cutting and carving and polishing and grinding of the self. One of the most distinctive marks of Confucian ethics is the centrality of ritual performance in the ethical cultivation of character. For example, while Aristotelian habituation generally corresponds to the Confucian cultivation of character, there is no comparable emphasis in Aristotle on the role of ritual performance in this process of character transformation. Yet Confucians will say that any complete description of self-cultivation must include a role for the culturally established customs that spell out what it means to express respect for another person in various social contexts. Just how that role is conceived in theAnalects is one of the central interpretive puzzles concerning the Analects. The interpretive question of how li is central to self-cultivation is posed in particular about its relation to the chief virtue of ren or Goodness. In the Analects 3.3 the Master said, A man who is not Goodwhat has he to do with ritual? The implication is that ritual is a means of cultivating and expressing a Goodness that is already there, at least in a raw or unrefined state. This implication about the role of ritual is consistent with passages of the Analects in which Confucius shows flexibility on the question of whether to follow established ritual practice. 9.3 shows him accepting the contemporary practice of wearing a cheaper silk ceremonial cap rather than the traditional

linen cap. 9.3 also shows Confucius rejecting the contemporary practice of bowing after one ascends the stairs leading up to the ruler's dais, and maintaining the traditional practice of bowing before one ascends the stairs. The implication is that the contemporary practice expresses the wrong attitude toward the rulerpresumptuousness in assuming permission to ascend. 9.3 suggests that it is something like the right attitude that is cultivated and expressed by ritual. Kwong-loi Shun (1993) has called this kind of understanding of ritual the instrumental interpretation. However, in other places of the Analects, ritual seems to take on a more central role in the achievement of goodness. Indeed, it seems to be presented as the key. A very common translation of 12.1 has Confucius telling his favorite student Yan Hui that Restraining yourself and returning to the rites constitutes Goodness. If for one day you managed to restrain yourself and return to the rites, in this way you could lead the entire world back to Goodness. The key to achieving Goodness lies within yourselfhow could it come from others? (translation from Slingerland, 2003, though see Li, 2007, for a different translation of the wordwei usually translated as constitutes, with different implications for the question of the relation between li and ren). Such passages have given rise to the constitutive interpretation, as Shun calls it, which makes li somehow the whole of ren. Obviously the instrumental and constitutive interpretations cannot both be true. There are good philosophical reasons for resisting the reduction of ren to li. Analects 9.3 suggests that the attitudes of respect and reverence that are expressed by ritual forms are not reducible to any particular set of such forms. The fact that we can distinguish the attitude from the ritual forms that we use to express them allows us to consider alternative ritual forms that could express the same attitude. Ceremonial caps that are made of more economical material are acceptable, perhaps, because wearing such caps rather than the material ones need not affect the spirit of the ceremony. By contrast, bowing after one ascends the stairs constitutes an unacceptable change in attitude. To maintain that particular ritual forms do not constitute the respect and reverence they are intended to express is not to underestimate their importance for cultivating and strengthening these attitudes. Acting in ways that express respect given the conventionally established meanings of accepted ritual forms helps to strengthen the agent's disposition to have respect. The ethical development of character does involve strengthening some emotional dispositions over others. We strengthen

dispositions by acting on them. By providing conventionally established, symbolic ways to express respect for others, ritual forms give participants ways to act on and therefore to strengthen the right dispositions. On the other hand, there is good reason to resist the reduction of li simply to the role of expressing and cultivating a set of attitudes and emotional dispositions. In his influential interpretation (1972) of the Analects, Herbert Fingarette construes ritual performance as an end in itself, as beautiful and dignified, open and shared participation in ceremonies that celebrate human community. Ritual performance, internalized so that it becomes second nature, such that it is gracefully and spontaneously performed, is a crucial constituent of a fully realized human life. There are nonconventional dimensions of what it is to show respect, such as providing food for one's parents (see Analects 2.7), but the particular way the agent does this will be deeply influenced by custom. Indeed, custom specifies what is a respectful way of serving food. On the Confucian view, doing so in a graceful and wholehearted fashion as spelled out by the customs of one's community is part of what it is to live a fully human life. Ritual constitutes an important part of what Goodness is, and hence it is not merely an instrument for refining the substance of goodness. At the same time it is not the whole of Goodness. Consider that part of Goodness that involves attitudinal dispositions. Attitude is not reducible to ritual form even if acting on that form can cultivate and sustain attitude. Moreover, 7.30 emphasizes the connection between desire for goodness and its achievement (If I simply desire Goodness, I find that it is already there). The achievement of goodness is of course a difficult and long journey, and so 7.30 implies that coming to truly desire it lies at the heart of that achievement. Ren and li as relational values in contrast to values of individual autonomy Consider ren in its meaning as the particular virtue of caring for others and li in its aspect as the valued human dance. These values are the basis for characterizing Confucian ethics as a relational ethic, meaning that it is in part distinguished by its placement of relationships at the center of a well-lived life. Confucian ethics are often taken to stand in contrast to ethics that place individual autonomy and freedom to choose how to live. While there is much that is true about this contrast, it must be carefully described so as to

differentiate it from some other contrasts. For example, the value of individual autonomy usually includes several different dimensions that do not necessarily accompany one another: (1) prioritizing of individual interests over group or collective interests when these conflict; (2) giving moral permission to the individual to choose from a significantly wide range (within certain moral boundaries) of ways to live; and (3) emphasizing the importance of living according to one's own understanding of what is right and good even if others do not see it the same way. Confucian ethics in significant part, though not in all parts, accepts autonomy in the sense of (3) (see Shun, 2004). Confucius is often depicted in the Analects as emphasizing the importance of cultivating one's own character even when others do not recognize or appreciate one's efforts (e.g., 4.14) and of acting independently of what is conventionally approved or disapproved (e.g., 5.1). The texts associated with Mencius (Mengzi, best known in the West under his Latinized name, lived in the 4th century B.C.E.) and Xunzi (4th and 3rd centuries B.C.E.), the most pivotal thinkers in the classical Confucian tradition after Confucius, both articulate the necessity to speak up when one believes the ruler one is serving is on a wrong course of action (e.g., Mencius 1A3 and Xunzi 29.2). On the other hand, none of these classical thinkers argue for the necessity of protecting a frank subordinate from a ruler who is made angry by criticism, and it could be argued that Confucianism does not fully endorse autonomy in sense (3) without endorsing such protection for those who wish to engage in moral criticism of the powerful. The centrality of filial piety in Confucian ethics and the doctrine of love with distinctions Along with the emphasis on li, the centrality of filial piety is one of the most distinctive characteristics of Confucian ethics. TheAnalects 2.6 says to give parents no cause for anxiety other than illness, whereas 2.7, as mentioned earlier, emphasizes the need for the material support of parents to be carried out in a respectful manner. 2.8 emphasizes that it is the expression on one's face that is filial and not just taking on the burden of work or letting elders partake of the wine and food before others. Is obedience to parents always required of the filial child? What if the child believes that parents are wrong and their wishes run contrary to what is right or to Goodness? In those cases where one thinks them wrong, what is one to

do? The Analects 2.5 portrays Confucius as saying, Do not disobey, but when queried further as to his meaning, he explains obedience in terms of conformance to the rites for burying and sacrificing to deceased parents. In 4.18 Confucius says that when one disagrees with one's parents, one should remonstrate with them gently. Most translations of what follows have Confucius concluding that if parents are not persuaded, one should not oppose them (e.g., Lau, 1979; Slingerland, 2003; Waley, 1938), but it is possible to read the spare and ambiguously worded passage as requiring instead that one not abandon one's purpose in respectfully trying to change one's parents' minds (Legge, 1971). In other Confucian texts, the question of whether obedience is required has received different answers in the Confucian tradition. Chapters 1 and 2 of the Record of Ritual (Legge, 1967, vol. 1) say that one must obey if one fails to persuade one's parent. On the other hand, Xunzi declares that following the requirements of morality rather than the wishes of one's father is part of the highest standard of conduct (29.1 of the Xunzi; for a translation see Knoblock, 198894) and moreover that if following the course of action mandated by one's father would bring disgrace to the family and not following it would bring honor, then not following is to act morally (29.2 of the Xunzi). Xunzi's position is supported in part by the distinction between service to parents and obedience to them. It might very well fail to be of service to parents if following their wishes is to bring moral disgrace to them and the family. Lao Tzus critique of Confucian Ethics Lao Tzu was not only a critic of society, he was also a critic of ideology, especially that of Confucian ethics. Confucianism, as another main current of Chinese philosophy, contains in itself many philosophical and ethical truths: therefore it is not to be treated as mere ideology. But it could be ideologized when used by political community to maintain social order and to serve political control, through transforming its system of ideas into a kind of false consciousness. Thus was the aspect of Confucian ethics criticized by Lao Tzu. Confucius himself had endeavored to maintain the ancient social order instituted by Chou li. In pre-Confucian China, Chou li embraced both the religious, ethical, political ideality and reality of Chinese life. It represented a cultural tradition, and even a comprehensive ideal of human life in general, as did the concept of Paideia for the ancient Greek people. But in the time of Confucius, Chou li began to lose this latter deeper meaning while still keeping its superficial meaning as a code of behaviour, institution and ceremonies. Confucius tried to revitalize Chou li by translating its ideal meaning into the concept of Jen/Ren, which represents the inner sensitive connection between man's inner self and nature, other men and Heaven. Jen manifests man's

subjectivity and responsibility in and through moral awareness. By doing this Confucius had given a transcendental foundation to our interaction with nature, with other men and even with Heaven. Then, from the concept of Jen, Confucius deduced that of Yi ( ), which represented for him moral norms, moral obligations, our consciousness of them and even the virtue of acting always according to them. From the concept of Yi, Confucius deduced that of Li ( ~ ) which represented codes of behaviour, religious and political ceremonies and social institutions. Through this procedure of transcendental deduction, Confucius tried to reconstitute and thereby to revitalize the ethical and social order once concretized in the Chou li. As critic of ideology, Lao Tzu proclaimed that li, as code of behaviour and social institutions, was not transcendentally grounded in human nature. Rather they were merely formalistic constraints devoid of any positive meaning and were considered by him as a means of social domination from which man needed to be emancipated in order to regain his free existence. Lao Tzu said that it is only when Tao is lost that virtue arises. When virtue is lost, only then does Jen arises. When Jen is lost, only then does Yi arises. When Yi is lost, only then doesLi arises. Li is superficial expression of loyalty and faithfulness, and the beginning of disorder. Those who are the first to know it have the appearance of Tao but are the beginning of ignorance (ch. 38). Lao Tzu criticized all means of domination as expressions of losing the profound co-belongingness of all men to Tao and of immobilizing the spontaneous virtue of each individual. The Confucian Jen, Yi, and Li are for him but specific determinations of ontological origin, Tao and its virtues. Often they lead to superficial and external developments which forget totally their origin and thereby separate from Tao.

Taoist Ethics
Ethical perspectives drawn from the Daodejing: the soft style of action and social primitivism In the Daodejing (the text is associated with Laozi and is thought to have originated sometime in the period of 6th-3rd century B.C.E.) and Zhuangzi (a text associated with the historical Zhuangzi who lived in the 4th century B.C.E.) the focus shifts from the human social world to the cosmos, in which that human world often appears to be tiny and insignificant or even comically and absurdly self-important. It may seem that such a distanced and detached perspective has no ethical content or implications, but that is to assume an overly narrow vision of the ethical. In its own way, Daoism addresses as much as Confucianism does questions as to how one ought to live one's life. Daoist

ethics emphasizes appropriate responsiveness to the broader world that shapes and enfolds the human social world. The three treasures of Taoism are compassion, moderation and humility. One of the more prominent themes in the Daodejing is the rejection of moralism: a preoccupation with and striving to become good or virtuous. Chapter 19 says to exterminate ren and discard yi (righteousness or rectitude), and the people will recover filial love. The ethics of the Daodejing is in these respects less radical and iconoclastic than some of its anti-moralistic language might suggest. If we are not to strive after goodness, it is there nevertheless as something that we must recover. Ethical perspectives from Zhuangzi: skeptical questioning, attunement to the grain of things, inclusion and acceptance Interpretations of the Zhuangzi tend to give primacy either to the skeptical passages or to the passages suggesting special access to the grain of things. On the first option, Zhuangzi simply appreciates the many perspectives on the world one could have, the many ways of dividing the world up by sets of distinctions, none of which can be shown in a non-question-begging manner to be superior to the others (Hansen, 1992, 2003). On the second option, Zhuangzi is often taken to hold in a kind of ineffable and nonconceptual access to the world, an access that makes possible the efficacy of activities such as Cook Ding's (the story of how Cook Ding manages to carve up an ox with his eyes closed) (Ivanhoe, 1996; Roth 1999, 2000). A third possibility is that the text demonstrates a kind of continuing dialectic between skepticism and the conviction that one has genuine knowledge, and that the dialectic has no envisioned end. The dialectic includes a stage of skeptical questioning of whatever one's current beliefs are, but the aim is not merely to undermine but to reveal something about the way the world that is occluded by one's current beliefs. However, one is not allowed to rest content with the new beliefs but is led to question their comprehensiveness and adequacy precisely because they are suspected of occluding still something else about the world (Wong, 2005). It also presents an ethic in supporting the idea of inclusiveness and acceptance. Here skeptical questioning of what we think we know, especially what we think we know about people and who is good and has something to offer to us are questioned in the chapter featuring stigmatized individuals, often with feet amputated (a common criminal punishment of the time), who turn out to be masters drawing as many students as Confucius. The Zhuangzi also urges identification and acceptance of the whole and of any

and all of the changes that its creatures undergo. We should not be so sure that life is great and death is evil, and accept everything that comes our way, marveling at the possibility that upon our death we might be made into a fly's foreleg the next time around. The Zhuangzi, like the Daodejing, calls upon human beings to identify with the whole of the cosmos and its transformations, and such identification involves acceptance, even celebration of death and loss, because in dying one participates in the next transformation of the cosmos and becomes something else to marvel at, such as a fly's foreleg. Such a call may hold deep appeal, especially for those who cannot see any form of monotheism as a viable object for belief and yet desire some sort of spiritual connection that stretches beyond the merely human community.

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