Banksvmbia 6.7 Transcript

In The Matter Of:
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
NYS Supreme Court Reporters
Original File 060712.txt
Min-U-Script with Word Index
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC; SMBC CAPITAL
MARKETS LIMITED; SOCIETE GENERALE;
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USB AG, LONDON BRANCH; and WACHOVIA
BANK, N.A.,
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Petitioners,
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- against 14
ERIC DINALLO, in his capacity as
Superintendent of the New York State
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Insurance Department; the NEW YORK
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT; MBIA INC.; 16
MBIA INSURANCE CORPORATION; and
NATIONAL PUBLIC FINANCE GUARANTEE
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CORPORATION (f/k/a MBIA INSURANCE
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CORP. OF ILLINOIS),
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Respondents.
---------------------X
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Index No.09/601846
Article 78
60 Centre Street
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New York, New York
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June 7, 2012
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BEFORE:
HONORABLE BARBARA R. KAPNICK, 24
Justice.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK: TRIAL TERM PART 39
---------------------X
ABN AMRO BANK N.V.; BARCLAYS BANK PLC;
BNP PARIBAS; CALYON; CANADIAN IMPERIAL
BANK OF COMMERCE; CITIBANK, N.A.; HSBC
BANK USA, N.A.; JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
KBC INVESTMENTS CAYMAN ISLANDS V LTD.;
MERRILL LYNCH INTERNATIONAL; BANK OF
AMERICA, N.A.; MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL
SERVICES INC.; NATIXIS; NATIXIS FINANCIAL
PRODUCTS INC.; COOPERATIEVE CENTRALE
RAIFFEISEN-BOERENLEENBANK B.A., NEW YORK
BRANCH; ROYAL BANK OF CANADA; THE ROYAL
Petitioners-Giuffra
T1
THE COURT: Okay. Good morning.
(All say "Good morning, your Honor.")
THE COURT: Mr. Holgado came a little early
and, to my surprise, I seem to have ended up with a
matrimonial. Amazing what you get around here.
Okay, so I thought we're having Mr. Steinberg.
Not that I care but...

MR. GIUFFRA: He'll be back.
THE COURT: He'll be back?
MR. STEINBERG: I promise, your Honor.
MR. GIUFFRA: His melodious voice will be
back.
THE COURT: So you're going to start off this
morning?
MR. GIUFFRA: This morning.
THE COURT: Very good.
MR. GIUFFRA: Good morning, your Honor.
THE CURT: Good morning.
MR. GIUFFRA: I think, your Honor, as we have
discussed, petitioners believe that the department's
approval of transformation violated four statutes
within the Insurance Law.
That would be 4105, which Mr. Steinberg talked
about on Tuesday, the earned surplus test, 1504, which
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Attorneys for the Petitioners

125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
BY: ROBERT GIUFFRA, ESQ.
MICHAEL H. STEINBERG, JR., ESQ.
MICHAEL T. TOMAINO, JR., ESQ.
BRIAN T. FRAWLEY, ESQ.
MARIE-LOUISE HUTH, ESQ.,
Of Counsel
KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES & FRIEDMAN, L.L.P.
Attorneys for the Respondents

1633 Broadway
New York, New York 10019-6799
BY: MARC E. KASOWITZ, ESQ.
DANIEL R. BENSON, ESQ.
KENNETH R. DAVID, ESQ.
JOSHUA GREENBLATT, ESQ.
Of Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR
THE STATE OF NEW YORK

120 Broadway
New York, New York 10271
BY: DAVID HOLGADO,
MARK E. KLEIN,
Assistant Attorneys General
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Min-U-Script
NINA KOSS,
BARBARA STROH, CSR, CRR, CMR
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
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Petitioners-Giuffra
is the fair and equitable standard, and 1411, which is
fair and reasonable for stock redemptions, and then
1309, which the insolvency statute.

I'll be talking this morning about 1505 and
1411. I think, as every Insurance Department official
who has testified in these proceedings by deposition or
affidavit has said, including former Superintendent

Dinallo, the fundamental purpose of the Insurance Law
is the protection of policyholders.

Each one of the statutes that we've been
talking about are focused on the protection of
policyholders, and I don't think there really can be
much of a dispute that the fundamental purpose of
insurance regulation, among other things, is to protect
insurance companies from holding companies.

Now, respondents have claimed during the
course of this case that the only real evidence or
standard that the court need apply is whether MBIA
Insurance could pay claims as they came due, you know,
literally, for almost 45 years.

On May 21 counsel for the state respondents
first say, quote: "Enough solvency" -- quote, "Enough
solvency is really the only test that matters," at page
755.
Now, on surrebuttal, if we could put up slide
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ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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Petitioners-Giuffra
1, counsel for the state respondents came up with a
nuanced argument which wasn't pure insolvency.
The argument was that, on the facts and
circumstances of this case, the department reasonably
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concluded that the same facts were dispositive on each 6
of the four statutes.
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We, obviously, take issue with that. In fact, 8
an example that was given by the Attorney General's 9
office at page 1689 to 90 proves that, I think, where 10
he said that while the superintendent could declare a 11
transaction as being unfair and inequitable when an 12
insurance company is overcapitalized.
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I think that sort of admits that fair and
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equitable means something more than just pure solvency 15
or bare solvency, in fact, your Honor.
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Put up slide 2. We have discussed the four 17
statutes that are at issue in the case, and under
18
settled law, the court must give effect to each one of 19
those statutes.
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They can't all be treated to mean exactly the 21
same thing. And there's settled law which says that 22
interpretation of a statute that renders the others in 23
the statutory scheme to be meaningless is not one that 24
the court should adopt.
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Clearly, you know, we talked about earned 26
Petitioners-Giuffra
the adoption by the legislature of 1505 focused on the
notion of surplus to surplus.

What is sought is more than solvency in the
traditional sense. "What is sought is more than a
stringent test of soundness. You want something that's
going to be lasting long enough in the future for any
dangerous development to be detected and any surplus
drain resulting from it stopped."

Here, of course, these transactions were
approved in the middle of a financial crisis. I think
the other side is almost advocating a casino view of
insurance whereby all of the risk is placed on the
policyholder, in the economic uncertainty that we were
living through in 2009.

In fact, your Honor, there's a regulation
which has also been ignored by the other side. Slide
4. This is a New York Insurance Department regulation,
no. 108, which makes it quite clear that the ability to
pay claims is not the touchstone under all these

statutes. It's just not.
That regulation says that, quote: "In
connection with affiliated transactions or transactions
where the transferor is insolvent or impaired, the

transaction shall not be approved unless it both
eliminates the impairment or insolvency and if done
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Petitioners-Giuffra
surplus. That's been in the statutes for over a
hundred years. 1411, which deals with stock
redemptions, was added in 1965.
Previously there were no stock redemptions
permitted at all. And the legislature said okay, we'll
allow stock redemptions, but they must be reasonable
and equitable, and "equitable" being a word that we
don't hear much about in the courtroom from the other
side.
We talked about 1505 and about how that was
added to the law in 1969, and then 1309, which is the
insolvency statute has been also for many, many years.
Now, as I mentioned, respondents just focus on
whether their determination -- we question whether
there ever was a determination that MBIA could pay
claims as they came due, whether there was a valid
determination is enough.
But, your Honor, they ignore the legislative
history and ignore the plain language of these
statutes. Reasonable and equitable, fair and equitable
means something other than pure solvency.

For example, your Honor, we showed before and
there was no response to all the detailed legislative

history I went through.
Slide 3. The actual report that resulted in
Min-U-Script
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Petitioners-Giuffra
between affiliates or members of the same holding
company system is fair and equitable to both insurers."
Fair and equitable, language that courts apply
all the time.

Then, your Honor, MBIA's application -- we
went through this already -- described two separate
tests.
They talk about -- this is PX 242. They talk
about whether the reinsurance transaction was fair and
equitable.
Then they also talked about whether it left
the company solvent or otherwise in a hazardous
financial condition.
So, essentially, what the other side has done
is they've tried to defend Superintendent Dinallo's
decision by whether this transaction satisfied one-half
of 1309, the nonreinsurance section part of it.

But that supposedly is enough to satisfy all
the other provisions that we have talked about, all
four provisions that are at issue in this case.
We think that position is legally indefensible
and, as a matter of law, the court should null.
THE COURT: Can I ask you a question. You
don't have to answer it now if you don't want to.
MR. GIUFFRA: No, I'm happy to answer it, your
(2) Page 1941 - Page 1944
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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Petitioners-Giuffra
Honor.
THE COURT: We're trying to figure out, why is
1309 implicated at all? I mean, they mention it
somewhere in their answer and at one point.
You never put it in your petition, I think you
said, didn't you? In your petition did you talk about
1309?
MR. GIUFFRA: We talked about insolvency.
THE COURT: But you didn't talk about 1309.
MR. GIUFFRA: Not in the petition itself, I
don't believe. We talk about insolvency, but, your
Honor, when they answered the petition, they said that
they applied 1309, and they are bound by that

determination.
We filed that petition, your Honor, we had no
discovery. They had refused to allow us any
information about what had happened. All we had -THE COURT: No, I understand. I just don't
really see how 1309 is implicated in this

transformation.
So perhaps at some point later you can try to
explain that, because it seems that really there's
going to be some kind of insolvency, and that's not
what this was about.
This was a transformation of a company. They
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Petitioners-Giuffra
get discovery during the course of a case. It would be
the same in any kind of a civil case.

So, your Honor, under 1505, they have to find
that the transaction was fair and equitable.

We can put up slide 5. The department's
counsel said that -- this was complied with.
MR. HOLGADO: What page?
MR. GIUFFRA: This is at page 1695.
That the department somehow found, quote, that
"the Insurance Law was complied with and found that
policyholders would benefit overall from the

transformation."
That's the statement. Let's put up slide 6.
This is MBIA's counsel. He said, well, there was
specific findings by the superintendent with respect to
these banks, and essentially what Mr. Kasowitz did was
he quoted the press release.

Again, your Honor, I think that's a telling
fact, that, rather than citing the approval letter,
we're now relying upon a press release for the central
finding as to whether this transaction satisfied a

critical provision of the Insurance Law.
That, your Honor, is very revealing as to why
this transaction violated the Insurance Law.

But, your Honor, even the press release
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Petitioners-Giuffra
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were going to put it into liquidation. It seems like 3
that's where that would come into play.
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If you're saying it just didn't play because
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it was talked about in that one portion of the
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answer -7
MR. GIUFFRA: No, Mr. Steinberg is going to 8
talk for quite some time about 1309, but, briefly, your
9
Honor, that is a standard that they have to apply, and 10
to approve a transaction that would leave the insurer 11
insolvent is not something that can be done under the 12
Insurance Law.
13
Our point is that the reinsurance prong must 14
be applied and particularly was a prong that should be 15
applied in the circumstances such as this, where there 16
was a lot of uncertainty as to the markets and, again, 17
it's an investor -- it's a policyholder protection
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provision.
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In addition, your Honor, 1309 was mentioned 20
and referenced in MBIA's application itself, which we 21
had no access to at the time that we filed the
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application.
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So 1309 is front and center in the case. It 24
was in their answer, and obviously, you know, a 25
pleading doesn't bind us forever. You know, we should 26
weren't trying to see whether it was insolvent, or they
Min-U-Script
Petitioners-Giuffra
doesn't say equitable. Let's put up the press release.
What it says -- this is the language that Mr. Kasowitz
quoted. It says, quote: "This deal is fair to all

policyholders- the bank counterparties and other
policyholders of the structured financial and the
owners and issuers of municipal bonds," Mr. Dinallo
said.
What's interesting, your Honor, is that Mr.
Dinallo had the time to put in a press release the day
after the approval letter was signed why it wasn't in
the approval letter itself, but the word equitable,

your Honor, does not appear in this press release.
We, again, don't think the press release is a
legally operative document. It wasn't in the approval
-- it wasn't in the administrative record in this case,
and it's something that they've now, you know, sort of
pointed to at the back end of the case.

But, more importantly, your Honor, if you
actually look at the press release -- and we have
looked at it every which way -- there is not a single,
single benefit to left-behind policyholders, which

includes more than banks, and includes people that own
international public financings, it includes people who
own student loan bonds that were securitized. It

includes a lot more than just banks.
(3) Page 1945 - Page 1948
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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Petitioners-Giuffra
But, your Honor, there's not one word of
benefit, not one word in the press release, not one
word in the -- clearly not in the approval letter as to
how this transaction benefitted the left-behind
policyholders, not one word.
Now, what does the letter talk about? It
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talks about the benefits to the municipal markets. But
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not one word about the benefits to the left-behind 9
policyholders.
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Again, they use the word fair. They didn't 11
use the word equitable. Obviously, the legislature 12
included equitable for a reason.
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Now, on last Monday, when the other side 14
spoke, we had raised the question and, it's sort of -- 15
I think it's a very revealing document, and I think it 16
sort of explains what this was all about:
17
Stockholders versus policyholders, who ultimately 18
loses.
19
Let's put up PX 8, no. 8 -- no. 8, slide 8.
20
This is -- this is the e-mail -- and we have seen it 21
before -- from the analyst. It ultimately goes all the 22
way up to Mr. Jay Brown, I think, in probably the most 23
revealing nine words of the case.
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After the analyst goes through all the
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benefits to MBIA Inc. from this transformation, it 26
Page 1951
Petitioners-Giuffra
Insurance Department. But then he talks further down
about the fact, what else is in National?

He talks about the 2.89 billion paid by
National to get the reinsurance done from the
municipal book.
Then he actually specifies to the dollar how
much he thinks that's worth, and he denominates that as
12 or $13.
I went through this document in some detail.
I won't do it again, your Honor, but these are not
facts that were in the application, and these facts are
incredibly revealing as to what this transaction was
about.
It was a transaction that clearly favored the
stockholders of the holding company, to the detriment
of the policyholders.
Yes, this case is about banks, but the next
one might not be.
So, whatever ruling your Honor issues in this
case will apply to banks and everyone else who buys
insurance from a New York insurance company.

Here, the CEO of MBIA is saying "glad someone
could figure it out" as an analyst is telling him

within days of the approval of this transaction how,
yes, the benefit is $21.50 a share.
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Petitioners-Giuffra
talks about -- can you believe it -- a dividend was
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approved by -- we can put up the full document, can we,
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Roger?
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This is the e-mail at the back, where Mr.
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Brown says "glad someone on the outside could figure it
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out," after he gets the e-mail.
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Let's go to the bottom of the e-mail for Mr.
8
Mehta. He talks about, he describes the transaction. 9
In fact, he goes through, literally, by numbers what 10
the benefit was to MBIA Inc.
11
Now, he talks about, for example, that -- you 12
know, let's look to the second paragraph. Look at what 13
is being put into National. $2 billion is being taken 14
out of the insurance company as a dividend.
15
He said, quote: "Yes, the regulator has given 16
the okay to take this capital and put it out of the 17
reach of the policyholders of insurance companies. 18
This is huge for shareholders."
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Then he says "huge. $9 a share is now
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protected from claims that National does not choose to 21
insure or reinsure."
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Literally, it goes through it to the dollar,
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and the CEO says, "glad someone on the outside could 24
figure it out."
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That wasn't in the application to the
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Min-U-Script
Page 1952
Petitioners-Giuffra
Let's put up -- Mr. Kasowitz sort of, you
know, was complaining about this, but let's put up
slide 10.
I mean there's the math, your Honor. There is
the math. The math comes from an analyst who gets to
be the CEO. He says "glad someone could figure it

out."
The CEO didn't say no, I disagree with that.
He said, I'm glad that someone could figure it out.
So, your Honor, ultimately that demonstrates
that this transaction was about the stockholders and
the fact that in the approval letter, in the press
release nowhere has anyone identified a benefit to the
left-behind policyholders, absolutely nothing.
Let's put up slide 11. Your Honor, after the
transformation was approved -- this is from MBIA's own
public disclosures -- part of the bonus compensation

that was paid to MBIA executives related to their work
on transformation. That's PX 109.

It's expressly stated in the public disclosure
of MBIA. I showed you last week the stock pricing
packet, and counsel for MBIA said, oh, you know, you
didn't provide enough information.

I think the stock right now is almost, you
know, maybe close to $9 a share, but let's put up, you
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ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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Petitioners-Giuffra
know, what it was right after. This is 12. Yes, it
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went down with the rest of the stock market. It went 3
up, had the big burst, and then it went down.
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But then it outperformed through the end of 5
March 2009. MBIA stock outperformed the S & P, and it
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also outperformed the S & P financial index. And that 7
is Mr. Stulz's affidavit, Exhibit 6B.
8
Now, there is also no question that MBIA
9
Insurance was left with the more volatile book of 10
business. That's what Mr. Moriarty testified to at 232 11
of his deposition.
12
There is no question, your Honor, that the 13
purpose of this transaction was plain and simple: To 14
separate, to ring fence the volatile structured finance 15
liabilities from the muni book, to favor one set of 16
policies over another, but, more importantly,
17
ultimately for the benefit of the stockholders of the 18
insurance company, in complete, in complete
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contravention of basic principles of insurance
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regulation.
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Now, let's put up slide 13. Your Honor, we 22
went through this. Mr. Wertheim, general counsel, made 23
it quite clear to the department in December 2003 that 24
National would not subsidize or have any obligation to 25
support MBIA Insurance's operations following 26
Page 1955
PROCEEDINGS - GIUFFRA
T2
MR. GIUFFRA: That's Exhibit 608. Turn to the
next one.
Then, literally both Mr. Dinallo and the CEO, Jay
Brown of MBIA, are on television talking about this.
Mr. Dinallo says quote, I am a big fan of the

immediate ring fencing. Mr. Brown says, quote, it's
totally legally separate. There is no cross liability
going from the new Co. back to the old Co., close quote.
Did anyone in the Insurance Department object when
they heard that, literally the day after this was approved
and the day it became public? No, no, not one word.
We spoke to Mr. Moriarity. That's the next one at
his deposition, September 2, 2010.

"Question: Okay. So, as we sit here today, MBIA
Inc., the holding company, has no obligation legal or moral
or otherwise, to provide further assets to MBIA Insurance
Corporation for the payment of claims of structured

policyholders?
"Answer: MBIA Inc. does not have a legal
obligation to fund MBIA Corp. It may have a business
incentive to do so, but there is no legal obligation.

There is no question that The Department could have
required a back stop, as was done in other transactions
similar to this one.

Let's turn to the next one. This is the notice
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transformation."
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They made it quite clear. Did the department,
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when it got this letter, object? Did it say no? Did 4
it say we want to have a backstop? No.
5
Then let's turn to the next one. The MBIA 6
press release issued, literally, the day that this was 7
publicly announced, made it quite clear that the
8
municipal business -- made it quite clear that, quote:
9
"We intend to operate our municipal business 10
as a separate operating and legal entity that will have 11
no exposure to structured finance business. This split 12
formalizes that commitment," close quote.
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(Continued on next page)
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(End of take 1)
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Min-U-Script
Page 1956
to admit in this case by MBIA, PX 18, making it quite clear
that quote, MBIA Inc. never had, nor does it currently have,
any legal obligation to pay any claims of any of its

Insurance Co. subsidiaries policyholders, close quote.
That's what MBIA -- that's the position they have
taken in this Court. No obligation. Then, put up Mr.
Brown's deposition. He made it quite clear at his

deposition that -"Question: Did you ever have an understanding
from Mr. Dinallo that, in the event Corp. Became insolvent,
The Department could require National or Inc. to put capital
into Corporation?
"Answer: No."
Now, despite all of the uncertainty, your Honor,
surrounding the financial crisis, all of the uncertainty,
the known unknowns, The Department allowed an unprecedented
transaction to be approved without any protection for those

left behind at MBIA Insurance. They bore all the risk, but
an insurance company is not a casino.

Now, Mr. Dinallo, let's put up 19. He thought he
had some sort of an understanding with Mr. Brown. But,
your Honor, that makes no sense, because The Department
repeatedly said, both -- let me restate.

MBIA repeatedly stated to the Department on
December 23rd, made it clear on February 18th, there was no
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ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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such obligation and Mr. Moriarity testified that he
understood that there was no obligation by either Inc. or
insurance to back stop MBIA.

This is the problem, your Honor, with people coming
in years after a transaction is approved and saying well, I
had some sort of an understanding.

First of all, if he had an understanding you, put
it down on paper and make an enforceable agreement and
that's something that former Superintendent Corcoran

testified should have been done here. It was not done.
MR. HOLGADO: Your Honor, if I may, the first time

he used this slide, your Honor made a point to let Mr.
Giuffra know that you would like to see the questions along
with the answers.

If he is not going to read out the answers into the
record, then I will just suggest your Honor read the full
question and answers of the portions of the transcript that
he is citing only portions of the answers to.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HOLGADO: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, we have heard from the
State's counsel that it was important to Mr. Dinallo that
the funds transferred out of MBIA Insurance be kept within
the MBIA family.

But, your Honor , let's put up slide 20. Then we,
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testimony.
They have seized on the word "understanding", the
way they have seized on other words in this hearing.

MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, we put up six documents
where MBIA told the Insurance Department on December 23rd,
they told them literally in a press release on

February 18th, the CEO was on television saying there was no
objection to support, the Deputy Superintendent testified

that there was no obligation of either the holding company
or National to support MBIA Insurance.

Again, all the risk was placed on the left behind
policyholders and there was nothing -- let's assume
everything the other side has said is correct. MBIA
Insurance is wildly solvent -- an issue we strongly disagree
with.
Wildly solvent -- then, put the back stop in place.
Put the back stop protection in place. It won't be used.
It won't be used, but instead, in the middle of the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression, all the risk
was placed on the left behind policyholders and all of the
upside benefit went to the holding company. I am glad
someone on the outside could figure it out.

Now -THE COURT: All of your points have been made
several times, so, I understand that's your position. I
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Inc. to do this reinsurance transaction with an affiliate,
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since that would mean the assets associated with the 6
policies would not go out of the door of the holding company
7
for good, close quote.
8
That makes no sense, because Mr. Dinallo did not 9
put in any sort of express requirement of capital support 10
from National or MBIA Inc. into the approval letter, into 11
the press release, into any documents whatsoever. 12
The best he could do was cite an e-mail that was 13
sent between he and Mr. Brown talking about course 14
directions. His answers at deposition were fairly all over 15
the place as to whether there was any sort of agreement, and 16
Mr. Brown denied any sort of an agreement.
17
MR. HOLGADO: Your Honor, I will take exception to 18
that. I think the, as Mr. Giuffra well knows, the word 19
"understanding", can have the meaning "agreement". It can 20
also have the meaning "awareness".
21
It's, I think, it's clear which meaning Mr. Dinallo 22
was using, which is the latter. And, that what he 23
testified at his deposition was that Mr., in his view, Mr. 24
Brown had an awareness that Mr. Dinallo was taking that 25
position in regard to the Department's powers. That's the 26
according to counsel for the State Respondents, quote, we

have also heard unrebutted testimony from Superintendent
Dinallo as to why it was actually a better solution for MBIA
Min-U-Script
Page 1960
understand that's his position.
MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, they ignore the National
Association of Commissioner guidelines, they ignore what the
other Superintendents have testified to.

In fact, your Honor, this whole question of
providing equity actually came up after the transformation.
Let's put up slide 21. The other side never responded to
this your Honor. PX 572.

I will not go through it again because we have to
speed through this. Hampton Finer literally, in March,
within a month of the approval, was talking about quote,
MBIA will have to offer value to satisfy them that they are
being treated fairly.

And then he talked about, quote, the better
solution could be to allow the banks a share in the equity.
And, your Honor, when that Dow Jones story gets communicated
up to Mr. Brown, his response is "F...K." That's what he

thought about that idea, sharing that, because he knew what
this case was about.

It was the about the stockholders of MBIA Insurance
benefitting from a transaction where all of the risk was

placed on the policyholders and all of the benefits and all
the upside went to the stockholders.

Then, Mr. Kewsong Lee, director of the biggest
shareholder of MBIA, he has a lot of skin in the game,
(6) Page 1957 - Page 1960
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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quote, I am not sharing. Those documents were all ignored
by the other side and the contemporaneous documents, your
Honor, make it quite clear that the purpose of

transformation was to benefit the holding company and to
force left behind policyholders to commute their policies
and allow MBIA Insurance to get out of its obligation at a
substantial discount.
Put up slide 22. Here, your Honor, is Mr.
Kewsong Lee again. He is talking in February of 2008.
This is when they are first talking about transformation.
I won't go through the whole document -- we talked about it
before.
But, he talks about, you know, as we work through
the restructuring plan one key component is that the

negotiations with the bank counterparties with large CDs
exposures, later on, quote we will not tip our hand with
specifics. We want to try to maximize our leverage and
limit their time to respond, close quote. That's PX 306.
Your Honor, this is not a case where Petitioners

are making wild allegations that are unsupported by
contemporaneous documents. I can't imagine a case where I
would have a situation where directors of MBIA Insurance is
talking about using this transaction for leverage in

commutation transactions.
I can't imagine a case where literally, the CEO is
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on anybody's terms. That's why The Department said nothing
about fair and equitable in the approval letter. That's why

they said nothing about fair and equitable in the, even in
their press release.

"Equitable" is not there. They use the word
"fair" and provide no specifics. When you write an opinion,
your Honor, you have to sort of provide the arguments that
support your position.

In this particular case, they could not support
their position, so they didn't write it in the approval
letter. They didn't write it in the press release, because
it would have been laughable.

Now, after the transformation was approved, again,
right around the day it gets publicly announced, you would
think the Insurance Department would have called Mr. Brown
up and said, what are you saying to the press?

Here is Mr. Brown, Dow Jones, quote, I would expect
some of them, some would be far more interested in

commuting. Brown said, quote, they will say oh, my God,
there is only 10 billion instead of 14 or 15 billion. Maybe
I better cut a settlement today, close quote.

That's the CEO, the day this transaction gets
publicly announced. This is the same CEO, you will recall,
on the issue of when the Ackman plan came back in February,
2008, when they were talking about doing a stacked
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literally, they are trying monetize the benefit from MBIA
3
Inc. to this transaction and when the whole question of
4
sharing equity with the policyholders who are left behind 5
comes up, this CEO, in his own words contemporaneously says
6
"all F...K", and then the Director, who represents the 7
biggest shareholder says, "I am not sharing".
8
These are contemporaneous documents that no
9
argument by lawyers can cast aside. They are
10
contemporaneous documents, and I dare say, your Honor, if 11
this was a case involving something other than banks, this 12
would be a slam dunk.
13
The only reason we are even litigating this case at 14
that point, because it involves banks, but justice
15
obviously, must be blind.
16
Let's look at 23. This is Mr. Sonkin, senior 17
person at MBIA. October 2008. That's PX 245. 18
He talks about quote, goal: Separation of muni, 19
and then he talks about leverage for commutations. This is 20
not something that we are just talking about, your Honor, 21
without basis in evidence.
22
They were trying to get The Department to do this 23
transaction to cause policyholders to take less money than 24
they were entitled to. They were trying to do so to 25
benefit the holding company. That's not fair and equitable 26
talking and saying, "glad someone could figure it out", when
Min-U-Script
Page 1964
structure. He said he was a fiduciary for all the
policyholders. That's not the way the fiduciary treats, the
way the fiduciary treats people that are policyholders.

They don't say there is only 10 billion instead of
14 or 15 billion, maybe I better cut a settlement today,
close quote. To try to get around what I think is

devastating contemporaneous evidence, Respondent's
essentially say, well, it was a lot of risk in the muni
book. Put up slide 27.

This was Mr. Kasowitz earlier this week. He said,
you know, quote, as we have seen, and Jack Buchmiller said,
the volatility in the financial markets and the need to

achieve an AAA rating in order to write the business meant
the Superintendent's approval of the transformation,

including the transfer of funds to cover this potential 537
billion in public finance liabilities was more than

rational.
Now, what got ignored by Respondent's, your Honor,
is that the Insurance Department never looked at the muni
book. If this was supposedly some big risk area for MBIA,
you would think they would have looked at the muni book.
Let's put up 28. There is Mr. Buchmiller's famous
backdated February 16th memo. What does he say?

Quote, there was insufficient time to look into
other sectors, which may be of concern, such as CLO and high
(7) Page 1961 - Page 1964
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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yield CDO, future flow or public finance where past, past is
unlikely to be prologue, close quote.

So, your Honor, if they were so concerned about the
muni book, you would have thought they would have got Mr.
Buchmiller or one of the other people at the Department to
look at that book.

And, there is absolutely nothing in the record
indicating that the muni book was a source of great risk at
all. Nothing other than lawyers' argument.

Now, let's look at the January 30th e-mail, which
was seen before. Quote, Mr. Buchmiller, status of my MBIA
review, close quote. Quote, another K/UNK -- " in Mr.

Buchmiller-speak, that's known unknowns -- in their muni
book, close quote.

Now, he didn't look into it. He wasn't concerned
about looking into it. The Department, if they were so
concerned about it, you would think he would have looked at
it. But, they never looked at the muni book at all.

That's Exhibits 51, PX 51 and PX 146.
Now, here is a document that the other side didn't
show you, your Honor. This is MBIA's own document. This
is slide 29.
This is MBIA's own public disclosure. What were
the losses in 2008? $2 million on the muni side. Far,
far less than the massive losses on the structured side.
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times more below investment grade insured exposure than
assets. That's a fact. That's from Mr. Greenspan's

affidavit figure 14.
Now, your Honor, let's turn to slide 32. The
State Respondents said that AAA is really everything in this
industry. That, the whole meaning of AAA you need, in
order to sell insurance.

In fact, my clients and others left behind, thought
they had a AAA company and it was junk by the time the
transaction was announced.

But, your Honor, what's interesting is that MBIA
promised the world capital strength, AAA performance. But,
when they did the transformation they, in fact, told The

Department -- let's put the next slide up 34 -- they told
The Department, it goes to Hampton Finer in December 5,
2008. PX 242.
MR. KASOWITZ: Just objection, your Honor. I
thought I just heard the argument that MBIA promised a
rating.
There is absolutely no doubt that there is no
contractual obligation in these insurance policies for
ratings.
THE COURT: I am not sure if he said they promised
or they thought they had the AAA.
MR. GIUFFRA: Mr. Kasowitz is missing the point of
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In the entire history of MBIA, your Honor, the losses, as of
the date of this approval on the public finance side were
$669 million. Those are facts not argument.

MR. KASOWITZ: One moment. We did show this
Exhibit, your Honor. Counsel just said we didn't, but we
did.
MR. GIUFFRA: Apologies if I made a mistake.
The losses on the structured side were far, far
higher in 2008. They were, you know, approaching one and a
half billion dollars and the losses on the muni side were
$2 million.
And, we heard a lot about oh, this big risk on the
muni side. There was no review done on the muni side and
the facts were that, on the muni side, there hadn't been
serious losses.
Now, let's look at slide 31. More facts.
This is a document that shows the MBIA Insurance
and National pro forma met par insured rated below

investment grade. These are the below investment grade held
at National and MBIA Insurance as of December 31, 2008.
What these documents show are several things.

One, the green is the cash that's left in both
businesses. And then you look, your Honor, at the below
investment grade exposure. The risky, the risky securities,
and post transformation MBIA Insurance was left with four
Min-U-Script
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my argument. The point is -MR. KASOWITZ: Excuse me, your Honor. All I want
to do is make the point, if there was a, if there is an
argument that there is a contractual obligation, there is no
basis for that. There is no contractual obligation.

MR. GIUFFRA: The point, I am making is a different
one.
(Continued on next page.)
(8) Page 1965 - Page 1968
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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Petitioners-Giuffra
T3
MR. GIUFFRA: What we heard from the other
side was triple A was critical to the success of
National, and that was the reason why they had to give
so much money to National versus MBIA Insurance, and
that triple A was critical to success in this business.

Our point, your Honor, is that wasn't even
what they told the department. They told the
department that the best they could do was double A in
December 2008.
So our point is that MBIA in its
transformation application itself -- let's put up 33.
-- made it clear that National would not have a triple
A rating and, in /TPARPLT, let's turn to 34.

MR. KASOWITZ: Objection, your Honor. The
department told MBIA *we mad this morning that MBIA had
to give back to the MBIA Insurance from National $750
million. That's in the record.

MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, what's interesting
about that, which we heard so much about, is that was
done before Mr. Buchmiller's review was done, before
the review was done. They didn't do that after the

review was done, which one would think would make a
little bit more sense.

But this is Mr. Chaplin, the CEO, February 9,
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MR. HOLGADO: Yes, exactly, your Honor.
MR. KASOWITZ: And the only objection, your
Honor, is the record is clear that in order to be able
to get the rating to write new business, that they
needed that rating in order to be able to write new
business.
MR. GIUFFRA: Our point, your Honor, is
simple. At the time they applied, they told the
department they were going to get a double A rating,
not a triple A rating.

Now, last week we showed your Honor that MBIA
could have used its own capital to start this municipal

bond insurer. It could have used its own money, and
they didn't do it. Instead they used money from MBIA
Insurance.
Now let's put up slide 25. This was MBIA's
counsel. He said, quote -- this is speaking to Mr.
Dinallo. Quote: "He made that decision while
explicitly and expressly providing for and taking care
of the interests of policyholders, including these

banks." Close quote.
There is nothing in the approval letter that
says that. There is nothing in the press release that
says that. There is nothing in the administrative
record that says that.
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Page 1972
Petitioners-Giuffra
1
2
3
on the table at this time, and we will follow up with 4
you as capitalization becomes more consistent with that
5
rating level."
6
The point is that this whole notion that we
7
needed to have National wildly overcapitalized so it 8
could get an AAA rating is just not true. They weren't 9
thinking they were going to get an AAA rating. But 10
more importantly, your Honor, the /SHOL till book was 11
left with MBIA Insurance.
12
MR. HOLGADO: Your Honor, if we could just 13
clarify, the document he's showing you is not
14
reflecting the intention that the transaction would 15
facilitate the infusion of additional capital into the 16
muni/PHAOUPB any company, which is /ABSly part of the 17
record, your Honor.
18
In fact, I'd like to clarify that Mr. Giuffra
19
should point out, when he's talking about the rating in 20
MBIA Corp., he should make sure he highlights for your 21
Honor what the rating of MBIA Corp. had gone down to by 22
the time previous to transformation. It was not triple 23
A at that time.
24
THE COURT: No, I think you have that in the 25
record. We talked about that.
26
/TWA*EUPB, quote -- this is P L /KPEFPB 897. Quote:

"We recognize that consideration of a AAA rating is not
Min-U-Script
Petitioners-Giuffra
Now, your Honor, in fact, you need to look no
further than Mr. Dinallo's own words to see what he
thought of -MR. KASOWITZ: Your Honor, the press release

says that. He just said the press release doesn't say
that. It says that. You can read it. So I'm just
going to make that objection. He can't say the press
release doesn't say that. It says it.

MR. GIUFFRA: What the press release says,
your Honor, is, it says it's fair to all policyholders
generically and there are no specifics whatsoever as to
how this transaction will benefit the left-behind

policyholders. But let's -MR. KASOWITZ: It says including these banks.
I'm sorry, your Honor.
THE COURT: Look. I mean, why don't you just
make the points that you're going to make. The press
release clearly, I can look at it, and I can see what

says and what it doesn't say.
MR. GIUFFRA: Correct.
THE COURT: So let's try to make the points
you're making, rather than try to summarize a document
that may not be accurate on either side. I'll look at

this document, I have heard about it a lot, so I will
certainly look at it once again.
(9) Page 1969 - Page 1972
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
Page 1973
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Petitioners-Giuffra
MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, the other side put
up some documents about Mr. Dinallo saying things after
the approval had happened. We saw like the webinar
argument we saw.
Here's what Mr. Dinallo said about this
transaction on August 31, 2010 during the debate when
he was running for public office. This is PX 122.

(The video was played as follows:)
"In my professional capacity as the
superintendent of insurance, I was sued by the Wall
Street banks because I was the insurance superintendent
that stood up to them and made sure they didn't strip
assets out of the bond insurance industry, an important
part of the insurance system that lets municipalities

go to market issue bonds."
MR. HOLGADO: Your Honor, I just want the
briefly point out this is a quote that was carted out
by the banks in trying to argue this bias argument back
in the fall of 2010.

We have responded to this evidence that
they're trying to proffer now in the course of the
papers in connection with that discovery dispute, and I
think your Honor also is aware of how that discovery
dispute turned out with Justice Bradley.

There were no bias documents evidenced that
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Petitioners-Giuffra
context, so I don't know what it was.
MR. HOLGADO: The question actually was, your
Honor, have you ever been arrested or sued.
MR. GIUFFRA: Okay.
THE COURT: Perhaps you could show that,
rather than just taking it -- that's really kind of out
of context when you just put in an answer.
MR. GIUFFRA: He's got it right here.
THE COURT: Okay.
(The tape was played as follows:)
"I've never been arrested" -MR. GIUFFRA: No, go back.
-- "and I guess in my professional capacity as
superintendent of insurance I concede I've been sued by
a Wall Street bank."

THE COURT: I understand. That's the topic,
"have you ever been arrested or sued."
MR. GIUFFRA: That's on the screen.
MR. HOLGADO: It's not what he said.
THE COURT: Is there a question that someone
asked?
MR. HOLGADO: Go up to the question.
MR. GIUFFRA: We'll get it after lunch. He
doesn't have it.
MBIA's counsel made a big point about
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Petitioners-Giuffra
were produced to the petitioners based on Justice
Bradley's review. We refer your Honor to that prior
briefing for our response to that.
MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, in fact, I think
1
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5
first of all, I would take issue with what Mr. Holgado
6
said. The documents are the documents. We argue one 7
thing from documents. They argue another thing from 8
the documents.
9
That's Mr. Dinallo's own words bragging about 10
how he prevented banks from stripping money out of 11
MBIA.
12
That's not his job as the insurance
13
superintendent.
14
MR. KASOWITZ: Objection, your Honor. 15
MR. GIUFFRA: It's not his job, your Honor. 16
MR. KASOWITZ: Objection. He didn't say MBIA. 17
He talked about monolines. He didn't say -18
THE COURT: He didn't specifically -- I mean, 19
he said what said.
20
MR. GIUFFRA: In fact, the question that was 21
asked of him, have you ever been sued. He defended 22
this case, and I believe this is the only one. We can 23
play it again, to be sure.
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THE COURT: All I heard was the one response. 25
Again, I didn't hear what -- it was taken out of
26
Min-U-Script
Page 1976
Petitioners-Giuffra
municipal losses, and how there were huge municipal
losses potentially faced by National.

Let's put on 41. Your Honor, since the
transformation the losses on the MBIA Insurance side of
the ledger have been $9.4 billion. On the municipal
side, $458 million.

This notion that there was some huge municipal
exposure that was out there is just belied by the

facts. But, again, your Honor, we don't even have to
go forward. We can just look at what happened at the
time.
The department didn't look at the municipal
book. The municipal book hadn't suffered large losses,
and notwithstanding that, there was a massive amount of
money taken out of MBIA Insurance. There was a massive
amount of money that was paid by MBIA Insurance to

reinsure municipal book, $2.8 billions, had $2 million
in losses the prior year.

Your Honor, this gets lost. MBIA Insurance is
still on the hook for the municipal policies if

National can't pay on those policies.
Now, during this argument, MBIA's counsel
talked about something called CIFG, and should have
glossed over some facts, and this was a transaction
that Superintendent Dinallo was involved in.
(10) Page 1973 - Page 1976
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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Petitioners-Giuffra
In that case stockholders gave equity to
1
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policyholders. In addition, counsel for MBIA did not 3
mention, while he was excoriating the banks, that MBIA 4
was a policyholder of CIFG.
5
MBIA is itself was a policyholder alongside
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the banks, that MBIA was a participant in, and
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beneficiary of, the settlement process, that we heard 8
was a poor regulatory practice.
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MR. KASOWITZ: Objection, your Honor. I 10
didn't say it was poor regulatory practice.
11
MR. GIUFFRA: Well, MBIA -12
THE COURT: Wait just a minute.
13
MR. KASOWITZ: I didn't say that that was poor 14
regulatory process. What I said was it was ill behoove 15
the banks to complain about the same superintendent who 16
on the one hand approved the transaction that they 17
liked and, on the other hand, had virtually, at that 18
same time, approved the transaction that they didn't 19
like, and for that, they accused him of complicity and 20
theft. That was my point. I didn't say it was poor 21
regulatory process.
22
Thank you, your Honor.
23
MR. GIUFFRA: Again, your Honor, CIFG, equity 24
was given to policyholders. So equity -- the
25
stockholders didn't win as they did in this case.
26
Page 1979
Petitioners-Giuffra
President Obama is in office at this point. It's a
week before the transaction is going to be publicly
announced. PX 235, and the article says, quote:
"Treasury rejects direct aid to insurers," close quote.
It goes on to say, quote: "Geithner said that
the market has shown some minor improvement, but that
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board are still

looking for ways to help it further. 'We are open to
suggestions,' he said. 'To be honest, I have not yet
seen a good idea,'" close quote.

What we have done on these slides, your
Honor -- I won't go through them, there's a whole
series of them, but Mr. Dinallo in his affidavit and in
his deposition talked about all of the communications
that he had had with Treasury in 2008 and into 2009.
It wasn't as if there hadn't been any

discussions, your Honor. Dinallo affidavit 33, Dinallo
affidavit 41.
Let's go to the next slide: Dinallo
deposition, 169, Dinallo deposition 178, Dinallo
deposition 181. Let's go to the next slide.
So, your Honor, the basic point is that he had
plenty of communication with the Treasury Department
and, as of a week before this became public, the

Secretary of the Treasury was publicly quoted as
Page 1978
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Petitioners-Giuffra
1
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CIFG, your Honor, provided capital.
4
It didn't happen here. The holding company
5
took capital out.
6
And in that case, your Honor -- and this is PX 7
37 and 331 -- CIFG hired BlackRock and FSI to model its
8
book of business.
9
So this is a transaction where Mr. Dinallo was 10
involved, where MBIA was a policyholder, and it was 11
handled in a completely different way than the MBIA 12
transformation in exactly the same time period.
13
Equity infusion -- excuse me -- equity given 14
to policyholders, the holding company doing capital 15
infusion and BlackRock and FSI being involved to model 16
book.
17
Now, the only benefit that I've heard in any 18
way articulated here is some hypothetical possibility 19
that the federal government might come in after the 20
fact and give money to MBIA Insurance; hypothetical 21
possibility.
22
First of all, MBIA itself didn't want that
23
because they would have had to give up equity.
24
Let's put up slide 37. We saw this document. 25
It was put up. February 11 bond buy article.
26
Second, MBIA was a policyholder. MBIA was a

beneficiary of that settlement. The holding company in
Min-U-Script
Page 1980
Petitioners-Giuffra
saying, quote: "I have not yet seen a good idea."
Now, counsel for MBIA brought up the AIG
resolution for no purpose that I can think of other
than to tar the banks, say Societe Generale was somehow
a beneficiary of AIG. It has nothing to do with this

case at all.
It's not something that's ever been in any of
the briefs.
MR. KASOWITZ: It's in the record, your Honor.
In Miller's, Professor Miller's affidavit.
MR. GIUFFRA: There is one key distinguishing
fact that seems to be getting lost here. It's that on
AIG, the holding company was facing a liquidity crisis
and owed money to various counterparties.

Because of this liquidity crisis, AIG secured
a loan from the Treasury Department. That was secured
by the pledge on all of the assets of AIG and, in fact,
the Federal Reserve owned warrants that were redeemable
for 79.9 percent of the common stock.

In other words, they gave up equity in order
to get the money.
So, this transaction was in lieu of stripping
AIG's insurance subsidiaries of cash and securities.
In fact, on March 9, 2009 Mr. Dinallo talked
about the AIG settlement. Among other things, he was
(11) Page 1977 - Page 1980
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
Page 1981
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Petitioners-Giuffra
talking about how this was different.
1
2
He made the point, quote: "In most industries
3
the parent company can reach down and use the assets of
4
the subsidiaries with insurance that is greatly
5
restricted," close quote.
6
That didn't happen here. So to summarize, 7
your Honor -- let's put up slide 35 -- MBIA's
8
transformation was not fair or equitable to the
9
structured finance policyholders who bore all the risk. 10
This approval was in the middle of the
11
greatest financial crisis this country has seen since 12
the Great Depression.
13
They lost $5.1 billion needed to pay claims on 14
a highly volatile book, $233 billion. The cash in 15
investments was reduced of MBIA Insurance from 9.6 16
billion to 4.4, and post transformation MBIA Insurance 17
is still liable for 554 billion in municipal policies. 18
Your Honor they paid, MBIA Insurance, $2.89 19
billion to reinsure this municipal business, even 20
though in the entire history of MBIA they'd only paid 21
669 million in public finance claims.
22
MBIA Insurance got nothing, nothing. They 23
didn't get equity like they got in CIFG. They got 24
nothing, even though they capitalized the entire 25
business.
26
Page 1983
Petitioners-Steinberg
MR. STEINBERG: I'd like to start at the point
where you raised the question about the importance of
section 1309 to this proceeding.

This isn't something that came out of nothing,
your Honor. Back when the original application was
made -- and you will recall, your Honor, that there was
an initial presentation that was made to the department
on November -- on December 3 and or 4, and it's Exhibit
242, PX 242 no. 3.

This was -- you will recall this was first a
meeting, and there was PowerPoint presentation, your
Honor.
Then there was an application that followed on
December 5. In that application, just like in the -in that application, as well as in the PowerPoint
before -- and there was a further PowerPoint on October
30, 2008 -- each time, under the legal section -- let's
pull up 242 no. 3.

This is part of the -- this is the project
transformation. This is the PowerPoint that got
provided. Let's go toward the end in the legal
section.
Here we go. There was in the section on legal
analysis, your Honor, and I want to come back to one
thing in a moment, but in the section of legal
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Page 1984
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out.
5
Let's turn to the next page. All of the
6
benefits of this transaction, your Honor, went to
7
either the stockholders of MBIA Inc., the executives of
8
MBIA, or the public finance policyholders.
9
That, your Honor, is not allowed under the 10
Insurance Law, it's not fair, it's not equitable, and 11
these facts, in fact, are, you know, clear. They're 12
not disputed. The transaction is what the transaction 13
was.
14
So, your Honor, the reason why 105 was not in 15
the approval letter -- in terms of looking at it from a 16
transformation as a whole, the reason why 1505 as to 17
fair and equitable are not seen in that document is 18
because they couldn't write a defensible order on these 19
facts, particularly in light of the way they were
20
handling other monoline restructurings.
21
Mr. Steinberg is now going to cover 1309. 22
Thank you very much.
23
THE COURT: Thank you.
24
MR. STEINBERG: Good morning, your Honor. 25
THE COURT: Good morning.
26
All the benefits, as the CEO of MBIA himself

recognized, I'm glad you could figure it out. Excuse
me. I'm glad someone on the outside could figure it
Min-U-Script
analysis, one of the concerns expressed and was to be
met was that there was a concern of fraudulent

conveyance, that all of this, if there was
nonsufficient capital, could be deemed fraudulent
conveyance.
This was a very important question that the
department had and was going to be analyzed, as stated
here, was going to be analyzed by obtaining an opinion
from Bridge Associates.

You will recall we have talked a lot about
Bridge Associates over the past several days.
Now, what is it, your Honor, that Bridge
Associates, which was a part of the application, said
in connection with 1309?

Let us put up 242-4, which is from the Bridge
opinion that was provided. This was provided by MBIA
in its application. Bridge was retained by Dewey &

LeBoeuf, representing MBIA. MBIA was also one of the
firms retaining Bridge. They were responsible for the
payment.
"Solvency standards under applicable law:
The tests for determination for solvency for a
financial guarantee insurer are based upon the
following sections of New York Insurance Law." The
very first one, your Honor, is 1309.
(12) Page 1981 - Page 1984
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
Page 1985
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Page 1987
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Frankly, very little," that's contradicting the very
5
position that MBIA took when they submitted its 6
application in this case.
7
And that newsflash that this 1309 is somehow
8
irrelevant is inconsistent with the application, it's 9
inconsistent with the standard discussed with the 10
department, it's inconsistent with every essence of the 11
contemporaneous facts.
12
Now, in addition to the solvency determination 13
under 1309, what do we have when the lawsuit was filed? 14
Let's put up the verified answer because there 15
are two points that the verified answer in this case 16
makes. Now, again, this is verified. It is the
17
strongest form of admission under New York law. It is 18
binding.
19
What do they say? They say: "The
20
department's determination of MBIA Corp.'s post 21
transformation solvency was based on the" -- the first 22
part of it they say they had done one.
23
It wasn't hypothetical, it wasn't maybe, if, 24
if we were going to do it. It says it was based on: 25
"The department's determination of MBIA Corp.'s post 26
So when the question is -- when MBIA's counsel

comes before you, as he did, and said on June 5 at page
1808, "What does 1309 have to do with this proceeding?
had done one. Paragraph 87 of the answer says that --
THE COURT: I mean, we have talked about this

a lot of times, so you don't have to read it again.
I'm aware of it. It's in numerous places in my notes.
MR. STEINBERG: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. HOLGADO: I'd just like counsel to explain

what he means by "done one." Done one what?
MR. STEINBERG: Okay. Should I, or, your
Honor, are you just going to read the answer? It says
-THE COURT: I know what's in the answer. I

have the answer.
MR. STEINBERG: It says the transformation
solvency -- that determination of transformation
solvency was based on it. They did one. They said
that they had done one.
What Mr. Holgado is going to say is, which is
where I'm turning to now, where can we find that

solvency determination that they said they made? They
said they made it. Where can we find it?

Let's first talk about what counsel for MBIA
told the court. Counsel for MBIA -- one other thing on
this solvency point, your Honor, which I find to be

ironic.
Ironically, MBIA argues for deference. They
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Page 1988
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insolvency provided for in Insurance Law 1309." 3
And then, and then, if there were any doubt 4
about it, the New York Insurance Department says: "The
5
department was required to utilize 1309 in making its
6
determination."
7
It can't be stronger than that, your Honor.
8
It's not that section 1309 has little to do with this
9
proceeding. It has everything to do with this
10
proceeding.
11
And what is on the other side of the balance? 12
What is it that's in the documents? What is it -- 13
what's the evidence to the contrary? Nothing.
14
Where is that evidence that 1309 was
15
irrelevant at the time? It's in the application, it's 16
in the verified answer, analysis was done.
17
But it's worse than that, your Honor. In the 18
very brief that they provided in this case, the New 19
York Insurance Department's brief, filed on November 20
24, 2009 -- let's pull that up -- this is what they
21
told the court:
22
"However, Insurance Law section 1309, and not 23
the DCL, regulates the standard the superintendent must 24
apply to solvency determinations."
25
Now, that comes back again to, they said they 26
transformation solvency was based on the definition of
Min-U-Script
say we should defer to the administrative agency. I'm
going to talk about that, but the deference should be
to the positions that they've taken. They've taken the
position that 1309 in their verified answer was

required and done.
They take the position in their brief that
they must apply 1309 to the solvency determination.
In the very application which was made in this
case MBIA informed the department that the solvency
determination under 1309 was the applicable one, one of
the three they quoted, your Honor.

Now, where is the solvency determination that
the state says was made? And counsel for MBIA told the
court that applying the plain language of Insurance Law
1309 in this case would require your Honor to

determine, quote, "contrary to the findings of
Superintendent Dinallo and to the findings of Mr.
Buchmiller and contrary to the findings of the
Department of Insurance, that MBIA was, in fact,
insolvent as a result of the approval of the
transformation in February 2009."
And that's from the June 5 transcript at pages
1802, lines 7 through 14.
Further, counsel for MBIA told this court
that, quote: "The department found that MBIA Insurance
(13) Page 1985 - Page 1988
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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Page 1991
would be solvent after the transformation, including
under the definition. This definition of insolvency
found in section 1309."
And that's also on June 5 at 1805, lines 21
through 23.
The fact is, your Honor, that this is just not
so. It didn't do it.
But there's an interesting development now in
1
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8
9
this case. Now, the New York Insurance Department and 10
MBIA do not actually agree as to where the supposed 11
solvency determination is found.
12
In supporting of the assertion that there was 13
a solvency determination, MBIA's counsel but not the 14
New York Insurance Department referred the court to 15
page 6 of the approval letter, which refers to a
16
finding under Insurance Law section 4105A.
17
I'm not going to put it up. I know your Honor 18
has seen it, we talked about the stop sign test. But 19
the determination under Insurance Law 4105A is not the 20
same determination as under Insurance Law 1309A. 21
Otherwise, what would be the point of having 22
two separate provisions?
23
MR. HOLGADO: Your Honor, if I could just 24
interject, first of all, that's the speed limit, not
25
stop sign, that was referred to by MBIA counsel. 26
T4
PROCEEDINGS - STEINBERG
MR. STEINBERG: Now, that does not take into
account therefore, the $1 billion stock redemption, nor does
it give affect to the $2.89 billion reinsurance premium to

National. Those would be excluded from the 4105(a).
So, your Honor, it's not that Section. It's got to

be somewhere else.
MR. HOLGADO: Again, not to quibble, but if we look
at the approval letter language it says after giving effect
to the transformation or the entire transformation. There
is some language in there to that effect, when that finding
is made.
THE COURT: I got an approval letter that you
thought I would probably be referring to that when I write
my -- what is not going to be five page opinion that you
spent four weeks on here, by the way.

MR. HOLGADO: There is a list of three things. One
of them is based on Corp.'s financial condition after
transformation.
THE COURT: You can put it in front of me if that
makes you happy. I have it. I have it.
MR. STEINBERG: Thank you.
MBIA's counsel, but not the Insurance Department,
also referred the Court to a sentence in the February 18,
2009 press release, but there is no reference to 1309 in the
press release either.
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Secondly, their point, I believe, was that
when you find that that speed limit, as you call it,
the will-retain-sufficient-surplus standard of 4105A is
met, that necessarily means solvency as well. It's, in
fact, probably higher than solvency.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, let's go back to
what they're saying. 4105. If they wanted to quote
the statute they said was required, they would have put
it in. They haven't.

We've talked about 4105. If they're now
basing and premising their finding of solvency on 4105,
what's interesting and not mentioned by Mr. Holgado is
that only refers to the dividend. We all agree 4105A
refers to the dividend only.

(End of take 3)
Min-U-Script
Page 1992
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That's really, really where, one, is that really
where one would expect to find the finding that was required
to use the words of the New York Insurance Department's
verified answer? It's a finding, not a description.

Now, Respondents are pointing to these documents
for these findings, despite the fact that the New York
Insurance Department admitted in its answer, that the
approval letter was where the Department quote, the
Department stated the basis of its approval. That's in the
New York Insurance Department verified answer at paragraph
11.
It's telling, your Honor, how Respondents' theories
keep changing even now. At this point in the case, the
party that is typically right, has narrowed its argument to
a few key issues with laser-like focus, while the other
party flails about from one point to the next, and look
where they are trying to play let's hide the finding.

Is it in the approval letter? Is it in the press
release? Maybe it's in the Buchmiller memo, maybe it's in
the report that was done a year and a half after this
transaction was done.
As we have already, and despite the New York
Insurance Department's admission in its verified answer and
opposition brief that it was required to apply 1309, the

only reference to 1309 anywhere in the administrative record
(14) Page 1989 - Page 1992
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
Page 1993
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Page 1995
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solvency opinion. That was prepared by MBIA's supposed
3
solvency expert.
4
And, as we have already seen, your Honor, the 5
Bridge opinion just identified 1309 as the relevant standard
6
for determining MBIA Corp's post transformation solvency.
7
After acknowledging the applicability of the
8
standard that was required in the Bridge opinion, Bridge did
9
not do any analysis of whether MBIA Corp's post 10
transformation assets were sufficient to cover the cost of 11
reinsuring the entire cost of the company's post
12
transformation outstanding risk.
13
Interestingly, Respondents still have never
14
addressed the glaring disconnect between what Mr. Buchmiller 15
said about the Bridge opinion and how Mr. Dinallo thought 16
Department staff viewed the work Bridge did.
17
In all the rhetoric on this point, the Respondents 18
have not referred the Court to any evidence that the New 19
York Insurance Department considered and applied both prongs 20
of Section 1309, because no such evidence exists. 21
Now, counsel for the State Respondents have a 22
different theory than MBIA, and argue that the required 23
solvency determination, which Mr. Moriarity testified would 24
take 12 to 18 months to conclude, can be found in the 25
backdated memo to file prepared by Mr. Buchmiller. 26
compiled by the Department, is the Bridge Associates
did not do so, because I did not.
MR. STEINBERG: That's not exactly what I said.
I sort of feel if words matter, your Honor, and I
suppose they do, then we ought to be accurate.
Now, they have stated that Mr. Moriarity, and we
have shown and Mr. Moriarity testified, that it would take
12 to 18 months to do a solvency test. We put that

evidence before your Honor.
THE COURT: I heard it many times.
MR. STEINBERG: Exactly.
THE COURT: Don't show it to me again.
MR. STEINBERG: I am not going to put it up.
Despite Mr. Holgado's reference to the Buchmiller
memo taking a, quote, few weeks, this memo was not completed
until March or April 2009.

It was never before the Superintendent and it was
not relied on in connection with the decision making
process.
THE COURT: We know that. We know that file memo
came out after.
MR. STEINBERG: But, let's go ahead and look at PX
51U at page 24.
This is where Mr. Holgado told you yesterday, there
was no doubt and -- Mr. Holgado, I will put up what you said
in one moment -- this is in the portion of Mr. Buchmiller's
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MR. HOLGADO: Your Honor, I am sorry. I know I am
standing up a lot. But, I did not say the required
solvency exam that he is referring to, Insurance Law 309, I
made no such assertion whatsoever regarding the back, the
file memo from Mr. Buchmiller that is somehow an insurance
law 309 solvency exam and determination.

That is the sentence -MR. STEINBERG: He is misrepresenting precisely
what he is saying in the proceeding. What is now being
said, it's not what I am arguing. He is taking my argument
and abusing my argument.

THE COURT: All right.
You are making me regret

my having let you have this second round of opposition reply
because I just can't, honestly, I really can't listen to

this, too much more of the back and forth. It will never
end.
So, I know, I have a pretty good sense where there
are some real big disputes amongst you. I think you made
it clear throughout, and I think, I kind of want to get to
the end of this because I am just hearing everything so many
times and everyone is somewhat, maybe mischaracterizing, but
in order to get to your exact words I have to go everything
through a fifth time. I just can't do that.

MR. HOLGADO: Understood. If counsel wants to make
the analogy between two statutes, I just ask that he say I
Min-U-Script
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memo under other structured finance. This is the part of
the materials at MBIA that he didn't get to.

When Mr. Holgado pointed out this language
yesterday, let's look at the paragraph. Go back please.
Key, key up the Buchmiller memo.

We discussed their surveillance and other sectors
at two meetings of several hours each on Friday,

February 6th, but I did not have time to delve into these
extensively prior to the Department's transformation

decision.
Separately, none are as material, from a solvency
standpoint. Nonetheless, they are at risk for future
examination.
Now, counsel for the State Respondents read this
sentence and on June 4th, 2012 at 1646, line 25 through,
1647, line four, said the following -- let's pull it up.

Again, we just looked at this -- this is the
quote -- separately, none are as material from a solvency
standpoint. This is what then Mr. Holgado said thereafter.
"Can there be any doubt, your Honor, this was the

focus of the transformation review and that Mr. Buchmiller
was making findings about solvency in this memo?

That's what they are saying. There is two, your
Honor, there is the one reference that he reads out as a
solvency determination, and yet, there is a different point
(15) Page 1993 - Page 1996
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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Page 1999
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paragraph 31.
3
Mr. Holgado also referred this Court to page 31.
4
Here is the mention of solvency. This is in the context of
5
the stress test, your Honor, and you will recall there are
6
those surplus notes that are outstanding.
7
So, MBIA survives in one of the extreme test 8
scenarios -- we heard that a few times but, quote, no 9
Insurance Department Superintendent would allow dividends or 10
surplus note payments if it meant insolvency.
11
Then, there is a footnote with basically says, this 12
is not to say allowing them to buy back obligations in 13
pennies, which doesn't seem like you would do if you were in 14
a solvent entity call or dimes on the dollar is imprudent. 15
Note 96.
16
Respondents didn't correct the Court to any more 17
helpful language in this memo, undoubtedly because the State 18
doesn't believe any to exist. There is simply no solvency 19
conclusion in the memo.
20
In fact, the only solvency, the only quote
21
conclusion that Mr. Buchmiller said he reached before the 22
transformation transactions were approved, was just that he 23
quote, didn't see any reason not to approve the request. 24
That's at page 93 of Mr. Buchmiller's September 28th, 2010 25
deposition.
26
as well, and let's pull up 51U, the unredacted version at
the May 2010 report on examination confirmed MBIA's
solvency. It's in surrebuttal. It's important to first

think back how we got to this point at all of discussing the
309 exam report, which is PX 84.

First, what was, what were people saying before
this proceeding began?

Before this hearing commenced, the parties
submitted motions in limine to exclude certain evidence.
The State Respondents specifically moved to exclude the exam
report as one example. That's from the State Respondents'
May 4th, 2012 brief at pages 8 through 9, and as well at
appendix A, at 3.
Now, do you remember our initial arguments in the
first week of this proceeding? We showed you how the New
York Insurance Department relied on Bridge, your Honor, and
not Mr. Buchmiller, relied on Bridge, and we showed you why
the Bridge opinion wasn't worth very much.

We also showed you Mr. Buchmiller's testimony that
he didn't do a 1309 solvency analysis in connection with his
review of the transformation transactions. We discussed
that on May 17th, 2012 at page 298 of the transcript.

In response now, Respondents said that Petitioners
were asking you to decide that the New York Insurance
Department could only approve transactions every 3 to
5 years because it had to wait for the completion of the
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These are not solvency determinations.
In fact, as we have already shown, your Honor, both
Mr. Buchmiller and Mr. Moriarity testified that the New York
Insurance Department did not do an independent solvency
assessments.
That testimony can be found in the September 28,
2010 deposition of Mr. Buchmiller, page 93 to 94, and 100
through 101, and in the September 2nd, 2010 deposition of
Mr. Moriarity, at page 262.

MR. KASOWITZ: Sorry, your Honor. I will keep
this very, very brief.
Counsel is, is misrepresenting the difference
between a formal solvency exam that takes 12 to 18 months to
do, and the solvency analysis that Mr. Buchmiller clearly

did, as reflected in all the places that we mentioned on
Tuesday, as well as on page one of, on page one of the
summary of his exam where he said, I did not find evidence
that MBIA Insurance Corporation is inadequately reserved
based on what we know as of today."

Wasn't a formal 18-month solvency exam, but it was
a solvency analysis.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KASOWITZ: Sorry, your Honor.
MR. STEINBERG: In their surrebuttal arguments this
week, Respondents, including Mr. Kasowitz, has argued that
Min-U-Script
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statutory examination required by Insurance Law Section
1309.
But, as we have made clear in our rebuttal
argument -MR. HOLGADO: 309.
MR. STEINBERG: That's not what we are saying. The
exam report, PX 34, doesn't make a forward looking solvency
examination, and was completed in May 2010.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HOLGADO: He said "1309" again. He should have
said "309". The every 3 to 5 years is what is required for
309.
MR. STEINBERG: I said 309.
MR. HOLGADO: You said 1309.
MR. STEINBERG: Okay.
THE COURT: You will see what the record says.
You will give an errata sheet.
MR. STEINBERG: Now, it's surrebuttal.
Respondents' alternatively refer to using the backdated
Buchmiller memo or the exam report, which contradicts the
evidence Mr. Buchmiller gave, contradicts the evidence Mr.
Moriarity gave, contradicts the evidence that Mr. Dinallo
gave.
I will spare you the suspense. The May 2010
report, which the New York Insurance Department wanted
(16) Page 1997 - Page 2000
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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excluded at the beginning of this hearing, doesn't help
them, but now it's claimed that this is somehow vital
evidence.
It's interesting though that, the exam report that
they could not wait for or hire a third-party to speed the
process is now the very evidence on which Respondents want
this Court to rely on.

But unfortunately for the Respondents, there is no
reference anywhere in the exam report to solvency or
Insurance Law 1309. In fact, intuitively, Respondents'
arguments about the report don't make much sense.
The financial exam aims to verify the accuracy of
the report results reported by a company, as of a single
point in time. In contrast, a full solvency review would
evaluate a company's continuity over a future period, which
is what Bridge did, and why Mr. Buchmiller was so skeptical
of it, excluding its errors.

I would like to turn your Honor now to the plain
language of 1309 and the reinsurance prong.

We have established that Insurance Law 1309 is
important in this case and you have heard a lot of argument
around what 1309(a) really means. I am not going to put up
the language of 1309 -- maybe I might, in a moment.

THE COURT: Didn't you just tell me yesterday what
you think it means? Tuesday?
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what they told your Honor in the briefs at the beginning of
this case.
THE COURT: You are referring me to 87? Paragraph
87 now?
MR. STEINBERG: Yes.
THE COURT: I know about paragraph 87. I know
about it.
MR. STEINBERG: I am responding to his argument.
THE COURT: You did that already and anyhow, I
know. I have it written again, highlighted, written yellow
so, you don't have to worry. I am not going to make

reference to it. I get your point on it -- I do.
MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I just identify for you
as well, it's not that we are -- when they are saying this
is somehow our argument, what we are taking back, your
Honor, recall what Mr. Moriarity said in connection with his
affidavit in this case?

In his very first affidavit at paragraph 39, he
identifies what 1309 was interpreted to mean. Your Honor,
would you like to see the language of Mr. Moriarity's
affidavit?
THE COURT: Do whatever you want. No one really
listens to me anyway. Do it.
MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I would like to listen
to you. I would like to help you. This is my job, to
Page 2002
Page 2004
MR. STEINBERG: Yes, so I want to now go -THE COURT: I know what you think it means and I
help you.
THE COURT: Just hearing things too much. Go
1
2
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have it in the record several times. I know, I just don't
4
want you all -- there is too much repetition, I think, at
5
this point.
6
MR. STEINBERG: The banks -- let me bring you to 7
where the New York Insurance Department is now, your Honor.
8
Mr. Holgado, on June 4th, 2012 at 1706 said, quote,
9
the banks are now arguing that it is somehow legal error not 10
to conduct both of these prongs, both of what they call 11
tests. Under SECTION 1309, whenever the Department may 12
happen to either conduct a statutory exam under Section 309 13
or even simply valuate an insurer's financial statement, 14
that every time the Department does either of these things 15
they must conduct both of these tests to make sure that the 16
company passengers both, or else, they are required to find 17
the insurer insolvent under Section 1309. That's what Mr. 18
Holgado said.
19
MR. HOLGADO: What was the next thing I said. 20
MR. STEINBERG: I don't know. It's not in my 21
notes, but I gave your Honor the cite.
22
But, it's not the banks' argument. That's a nice 23
bit of misdirection.
24
The banks' argument is based, word for word, on a 25
verified answer on the New York Insurance Department, and 26
Min-U-Script
ahead. You want to put something up -- I just, when we end
today, you are not coming back tomorrow. So, just be
guided by that accordingly.

MR. STEINBERG: I am on a flight back to visit my
family tomorrow, your Honor.
THE COURT: That's good. I am glad you get to see
your family tomorrow.
MR. STEINBERG: Now, let's put up Mr. Moriarity's
affidavit at paragraph 39.
Again, this is the person that filed a response,
filed this affidavit with the verified answer. He
interprets 1309 in the same way we have interpreted it
entirely through this case, your Honor.

1309 says the insurance -- if is insolvent, if they
have an excess of required reserves and liabilities over
admitted assets or is unable to reinsure all outstanding
risks. That's what he said at the very beginning.

Your Honor, the opposition we have talked about
before, and they filed this answer, makes reference to the
very same description.

As we have talked about last week, the March 1st,
2012 brief filed by the Department and the Executive Life
Insurance Co. of New York matter uses the same language.
(17) Page 2001 - Page 2004
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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identical language we have discussed.
4
Now, there is nothing, according to the State, 5
however, you should disregard the Superintendent's 6
discussion in the Executive Life matter because the 7
Superintendent, when he filed this brief, was wearing his
8
rehabilitator hat, although the Superintendent is still the 9
Superintendent making the determination, albeit not in his 10
rule making hat.
11
There is nothing in 1309 that bears upon that. 12
Whatever hat the Superintendent was wearing, he read the 13
statute and the brief, and he submitted and applied the 14
statute exactly as Petitioners have told you it must be 15
applied.
16
That brief says, the inability, at pages 31 through 17
32, the inability to assume and reinsure all of ELNY's point 18
of impact objections under the reinsurance and assumption 19
agreement, is simply a reflection of the fact that ELNY's 20
assets are insufficient for the reinsurance of all of its 21
policy obligations in a solvent corporation -- the very 22
definition of insolvency under Section 1309 of the New York 23
Insurance Law.
24
Now, your Honor, I have two cases for you that 25
interpret the language in the same way. They are not, 26
We have referred your Honor to the Executive Life brief. I

am not going to go through it. You have it. He uses the
Page 2007
to avoid rehabilitation and insolvency.
The point is that, when you have a market based
test, you have these two tests of 1309. One involves loss
judgements by the insurer. As a check on that, you have
this market based test.

So, we showed you last week the affidavits
submitted by Mr. Moriarity at the outset of this proceeding,
demonstrated that FGIs were, in fact, about to be insolvent
in 2008 and 2009.

Now, counsel for MBIA presented the Court with a
series of hypothetical and really, it became one

hypothetical regarding scenario in which there was, there
were two hypotheticals proposed, as I understood it.

One is a super well capitalized insurer that can't
get reinsurance. That seems, to me, to be not paying
attention to the two different elements here where you have
a market choice or a where a market is not available for

them, reinsurance is not available, that should tell you
something, your Honor.

Look at an insurance policy for a moment. If I
am -- let's do it in the easy context of a life insurance
policy where someone has paid up all their premiums in full.
They have a million dollars life insurance and, let's say,

they are 96 years old. Death is not a question. It is a
question of when.
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analysis of whether or not there is sufficient reinsurance,
3
but those cases are, Stewart versus Citizens Casualty of New
4
York, 23, NY2d, 407, 1968, a New York Court of Appeals case
5
and People versus Feitner, 65 NYS, 523 and this is a Supreme 6
Court, New York County case from 1900.
7
In that case -8
THE COURT: 1900?
9
MR. STEINBERG: 1900 -- this statute has been 10
around for over 100 years, your Honor. It's a well 11
established test.
12
What is the response to the plain meaning of the 13
statute that has been on the books for 100 years?
14
First, the Respondents have told you it makes no 15
sense to focus on the language of the statute during the 16
financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 because, quote, requiring 17
an FGI to be able to reinsure its entire book to prove its 18
solvency, would require that the Department deem every FGI 19
under its regulatory supervision insolvent.
20
That was from the 5/21/2012 transcript, page 760. 21
What is the evidence of that? The Department 22
introduce evidence that every FGI was going to be insolvent? 23
No, they did not. What they did, they called out, in Mr. 24
Moriarity's affidavit, a number of them were on the brink 25
and required the intervention of the Superintendent in order 26
however, interpreting it in the context of valuating an
Min-U-Script
Page 2008
So, if I were to reinsure that particular
$1 million life insurance contract, I am sure I will be
paying pretty close to, pretty close to the million dollars,
if not the million dollars itself, because the only question
is when that insured is going to pass away.

So, that would actually be a really nice indication
of how to value that insurance contract.

If I turn to Met Life and I say would you reinsure
my book on this -- they are going to quote me very much the
limit here. That's the purpose of it, to keep me, as the
insurer, honest about what are my reserves.

Now, one of, some of the hypotheticals are pretty
far-fetched. The one that I thought that was most

interesting was an extreme and complete monopoly, your
Honor, where there was but one great insurer in the great
State of New York, and that one is well capitalized because
undoubtedly it's a monopoly, and charging monopoly rents,
but how strange a hypothetical do we have to get to in this
case -- one insurance company for all the risks of New York?
Just one?
Do we really think that no other company would
enter this field if there was just a monopoly in that way?
Is it rational to think the legislature ever contemplated
one insurer, when that's not been the history of the State
of New York, which has had an active and vibrant market for
(18) Page 2005 - Page 2008
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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insurance?
If it did, why is it so crazy to think that the
Insurance Law would include a provision that would encourage
a market where competitors would be obligated to reinsure
each other's books and keep them honest?

The fact is, the reinsurance test of solvency would
serve as a natural check on growth. Isn't competition, I
thought, what Mr. Dinallo wants in the muni market?
The reinsurance test is important precisely because
it provides a metric, an objective market based metric for
assessing the probability of loss. That's why it was

relied on in Executive Life.
The testimony offered by Professor Stulz is here.
It is important here for precisely the same reason.
As MBIA counsel correctly noted, Mr. Stulz, a
professor in finance, is not offering the New York,
interpretation of the New York Insurance Law. But, Mr.
Stulz has offered an opinion about the cost of reinsurance.
Uncertain of MBIA's outstanding risk, in fact, Mr.,

Professor Stulz testified he didn't even need to offer the
opinion, because MBIA has made the determination for us.
The supposed absence of a market didn't prevent

MBIA from valuating the cost of reinsuring for certain of
its risks.
I direct your Honor to the discussion in the 10K,
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it. This statute is clear. So what are -THE COURT: You do mean 1309?
MR. STEINBERG: 1309.
THE COURT: It's not a statute.
MR. KASOWITZ: You said 1609.
MR. STEINBERG: Sorry. So, why are we talking
about, did he ever recognize, in the terms of the statute,
are clear and unambiguous?

The cases we have cited for your Honor, and I will
cite for your Honor two more cases, saying there is no
deference where the language of the statute is clear.
I will cite Raritan Development Corporation versus
Silva, 91 NY2d, 98, 1997, and that's at page 102; Rosner
versus Metro Mark Liability Insurance Company, 96 NY2d, 475,
2001-case. Both cases were cited in our sur-sur reply at
pages 67 to 68.
The fact is, you don't give deference where the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous. More
importantly, as we have shown, the Superintendent did not
articulate any interpretation of Insurance Law 1309, to
which the Corporation could defer here.

I would cite for your Honor, Zimmerman versus Board
of Education, City School District of New York, 50 AD3rd,
952, a First Department case from 2008.

Let's put that up. This is from the Zimmerman
Page 2010
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Page 2012
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of its liabilities, an amount that MBIA said was based on
3
the cost of reinsuring its outstanding risk, and that was
4
nearly $20 billion.
5
That amount was well in excess of anything that
6
MBIA had the capacity to pay. The 2008 10K, which is PX
7
977 at page 276, shows a derivative liability on its balance
8
sheet of 6.219 billion. But, as the notes 10K make clear,
9
MBIA got to the 6.19, a derivative liability, by reducing 10
the pre tax amount by 13.2, and in the words of the 10K, it 11
did it because of the company's own non -- the risk of the 12
company's own non-performance of paying those amounts and 13
the non-performance risk of its reinsurers.
14
If that is the case, if this is that risk built
15
into those numbers, that seems like a really good reason to 16
require the application of the reinsurance test.
17
Now, I want to address one last thing that got 18
raised by MBIA's counsel, which is, that there is deference 19
to be paid here in connection with an interpretation of 20
1309.
21
Counsel for MBIA referred, I am sort of surprised 22
as we get here, that there would be need for an
23
interpretation of some of this language because, as counsel 24
for MBIA admitted on June 5th, 2012, page 1814, the language 25
of Section 1609 is quote, clear and unambiguous reading of 26
where MBIA, where they estimated the fair value of certain
Min-U-Script
case.
Judicial review, judicial review of the proprietary
of any administrative determination is limited to the
grounds invoked by the agency in making its determination.
In denying Petitioner's request to be reimbursed for

attorney's fees and expenses, Respondents merely said,
quote, a criminal proceeding does not fall within the scope
of Education Law 3028, end quote.

At the agency level, as opposed to their response
to the Petitioners, Respondents made no pronouncement about
the meaning of the phrase, quote, arising out of end quote,
in Education Law 3028.

Thus, while deference is appropriate to an agency's
quote, specific application of a broad statutory term citing
a case, there was no agency interpretation in the instant
case.
(19) Page 2009 - Page 2012
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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There has been no agency interpretation in 3
this case, your Honor. At best, if you take Mr.
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Moriarty's discussion, you will recall Mr. Moriarty had
5
said that they haven't used it in 31 years, although,
6
clearly, his knowledge of the department is limited. 7
But, further, it's also that he said they did
8
offer to consider it one time, but, of course, we were
9
denied discovery as to that.
10
I would say in sort of a Hail Mary cast and in 11
keeping with being on the five-yard line metaphor, I 12
want to respond to one other item.
13
Counsel for MBIA told your Honor yesterday 14
that you can uphold the New York Insurance Department 15
interpretation of the Insurance Law 1309 even if it's 16
wrong.
17
Imagine that. That's a pretty bold assertion. 18
MR. KASOWITZ: I didn't say that, your Honor. 19
MR. STEINBERG: I will provide the precise 20
quote right after lunch. He cited -21
MR. KASOWITZ: And it won't be that.
22
THE COURT: Okay.
23
MR. STEINBERG: As we have seen, the agency -- 24
that certainly can't be the case that you can uphold a 25
wrong analysis of an interpretation, and that's the 26
T5
Page 2015
occasions, and the Tenants Union case has been
expressly limited to its facts throughout the case.
It's a short case, and I'm sure your Honor will review
it.
We submit that to decide in this proceeding
that the Insurance Department is free simply to ignore
the requirements of section 1309A would be to invite
clearer error.
Your Honor, I have another small segment to
do, but I suspect that it would go longer than five or
six minutes, not much longer, but I'm happy to start it
right now, or we can come back after lunch.

THE COURT: Why don't we come back after
lunch. I didn't mean to suggest that I was glad that
you were going back to California.
MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I wasn't taking it
that way. I was thinking that I'm happy to be going
back.
THE COURT: I'm sure you are. Okay. Why
don't we take a break and come back and finish up this
afternoon.
MR. GIUFFRA: Thank you very much, your Honor.
MR. HOLGADO: Thank you, your Honor.
(Luncheon recess taken)
AFTERNOON SESSION
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case the zoning board's interpretation." It's simple 7
as that.
8
Counsel cited the Tenants Union of West Side
9
versus Beame case. The Tenants Union case involves an 10
a -- it has to do with a New York City municipal 11
ordinance related to rent control, the rent
12
rehabilitation law for the City of New York.
13
In that case the literal language of the rent 14
control ordinance at issue appears to require the 15
agency to make individual determinations for each of 16
the nearly 2 million housing units that were then 17
subject to rent control regarding the increases to 18
maximum base rent.
19
The Tenants Union decision permitted the rent 20
control authority to establish a standardized increase 21
based on a statistical sampling, rather than a unified 22
unit evaluation.
23
The Court of Appeals made clear in the Tenants 24
Union case this was an ordinance that the Court of 25
Appeals had already found inadequate on numerous 26
Erin case, E-R-I-N, Estates, Inc. versus McCracken, 84

A.D. 3d 1487, which provides that, quote: "Unambiguous
language is to be construed to give effect to its plain
meaning. Applying these principles to this ordinance,
we find that its plain meaning does not support in this
Min-U-Script
Page 2016
THE COURT: I hope you had a nice break. Even
I had to walk outside and get a little fresh air today.
Why don't you just start, Mr. Steinberg.
MR. STEINBERG: Before we begin I told you -I'd given you the cite for where MBIA's counsel
indicated that the department could still get it wrong.
That's page 1827 of the transcript where they
say that even a, quote: "...good-faith interpretation
of section 1309 would suffice," which is related to the
case, the Tenants Union case we discussed.

Your Honor, let me turn now for a moment to
issues related to BlackRock. You can see that my three
subjects are as we discussed.

I want to start by talking about conflicts
because MBIA's counsel spends an awful lot of time on
BlackRock and regurgitating its arguments about

supposed conflicts, but did not answer the most basic
question: Why is it a conflict to involve a third

party with some supposed allegiance to a policyholder
in a process that is required to be singularly designed
to protect policyholders?
Nor do they have an answer to the obvious
question that if there were such disqualifying
conflicts, why was Hampton Finer suggesting that MBIA
retain BlackRock in November of 2008?
(20) Page 2013 - Page 2016
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
Page 2017
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The New York Insurance Department -MR. KASOWITZ: He didn't suggest. We'll rely
on the e-mail.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. STEINBERG: Okay. New York Insurance
Department said nothing on the subject at all. In
their presentations neither MBIA nor the Insurance
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Department made any mention of the provisions of the 9
insurance law that recognized that policyholders have 10
no conflict when it comes to questions about their 11
insurer's financial condition.
12
We showed your Honor last week Insurance Law 13
section 310, which recognizes that it's appropriate for 14
the superintendent to make use of third parties with 15
ties to policyholders but not the insurer when
16
evaluating the financial condition of insurers.
17
So not only is the exclusion of BlackRock's 18
conflict or conflict reason inconsistent with the
19
department's primary duty, but it's also inconsistent 20
with New York Insurance Law 310 itself.
21
No mention is made at all of section 310 by 22
respondents.
23
Now, in that regard, nor did respondents offer 24
any explanation why in this monoline restructuring, as 25
distinguished from all other monoline restructures, 26
Page 2019
about other restructurings on the very first day of
this hearing, okay? So, you know, to make the argument
when you haven't given any discovery about it when it
was requested is wrong. But I made my objection. I'm
good.
MR. GIUFFRA: It's not true.
THE COURT: Thank you. Go ahead.
MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, not only is that
not true, but we wouldn't need discovery into the New
York Insurance Department, who hired BlackRock during
this period, and the simple and undisputable fact they
were not engaged in this one, unlike the others.

Now, MBIA never explains why the use of a
third-party valuation firm in these cases did not
amount to some supposed improper delegation of a
regulatory function or why the use of BlackRock in
those instances was acceptable, but here somehow
BlackRock is deeply conflicted.
Likewise, MBIA nowhere explains why it is that
BlackRock's supposed black-box valuations were relevant
and reliable in all other monoline restructurings but

were too opaque to be meaningful here.
So why is it that respondents are so
stridently attacking BlackRock as conflicted or
nontransparent, despite the fact that they were widely
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more third-party valuation experts, segregating this
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from the other monoline restructures.
4
We showed you last week some of the monoline 5
involving BlackRock that were supervised by
6
Superintendent Dinallo, and that includes Mr. Dinallo's
7
approval of the CIFG restructuring on January 22, 2009
8
shortly before the approval here.
9
In fact, MBIA -10
MR. KASOWITZ: I'm going to object, your 11
Honor. The banks wouldn't give us -- we requested 12
discovery on these other monoline restructurings. They 13
refused to give us any discovery on it whatsoever. 14
So to now be making this argument, especially 15
in the last day is just absolutely -- you know, it's 16
just completely unjustified.
17
MR. GIUFFRA: Mr. Kasowitz brought the other 18
monoline restructurings up in these proceedings several 19
days ago, number 1.
20
Number 2, this is the Article 78 case. I
21
believe that's the one we're involved in now. He 22
talked about CIFG and how it was such an awful thing. 23
I made the point earlier that MBIA was part of the CIFG 24
process.
25
MR. KASOWITZ: Banks raised the arguments 26
during the same period, why it was done without one or
Min-U-Script
Page 2020
used in these other monoline restructurings?
It's pretty simple. Respondents have nothing
to say with respect to the only relevant question:
The reliability of the actual loss estimates produced
by BlackRock.
Wouldn't that be the best evidence of
conflict, your Honor? That the numbers are so
outrageous, that they could only be generated by a
conflicted modeling firm and not one of the best of
class modeling firms in which U.S. Treasury secretary
Timothy Geithner places his trust?

Of course, if respondents had any valid
criticisms of the actual loss estimates BlackRock
produced, they or their stable of experts would have
offered them. They didn't because they can't, even on
surrebuttal, not once.

In surreply, your Honor, I'll talk for a
moment about this issue of black box. MBIA again
repeats its black box mantra, but it fails to explain
why that makes the world's leading structured finance
firm's loss estimates irrelevant to a determination of
the reasonableness or reliability of MBIA's

self-serving loss estimates.
As I described last week, different levels of
technology may make one method easier to say but not
(21) Page 2017 - Page 2020
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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better in many instances and, in many instances, far
inferior to a more technological but less transparent
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method. And I described my bike, a car and an airplane
4
engine.
5
MBIA's counsel on Monday said the FAA
6
understands how those jet engines work and, quote: 7
"The FAA is statutorily assigned to make sure that
8
those engines work, and they most certainly do not take
9
it on faith." That's at page 1777.
10
This is true, your Honor. The FAA does not 11
take it on faith. Instead, they instead act on the
12
basis of third-party industry experts who truly do 13
understand the technology and understand how these 14
things work.
15
MBIA should do its homework before they speak 16
up. Your Honor, I would direct your Honor to title 4 17
part 183 of the code of Federal regulations, which 18
describes exactly the model of using a third party to 19
identify and to evaluate these types of issues.
20
Moreover, it's paid for by the manufacturer, 21
precisely the same type of administrative model present 22
in this case.
23
Now, in this case the department has insisted 24
that it is the expert on Insurance Law. Yet it brought 25
in an outside law firm for Insurance Law expertise. 26
Page 2023
Federal Reserve Bank of New York's reliance in February
2009 on BlackRock's loss analysis ran as of November
21, 2008, and relying on performance data from

September 2008 was reasonable."
I am sure your Honor remembers that
discussion.
Again, it would have been nice if MBIA had
actually done its homework here. First of all, the
statement itself, apart from the reasonable part, which
we'll come back to, is unremarkable.

It says that BlackRock did what its client,
the regulator, asked it to do. It asked them to run it
as of November 21, 2008.
Now, here is what the BlackRock -- here's what
the BlackRock retainer agreement with the Federal
Reserve and Mr. Paltrowitz was asked about in the
testimony to which MBIA's counsel referred.
This is what Mr. Geithner hired BlackRock to
do. Let's have this. This is from MRX 12, the
Paltrowitz deposition at Exhibit 5. This is in
schedule A of what BlackRock was to do:
"Mark to market valuation." This was -- there
were two different banks that were going to obtain-considering getting funding from the U.S. Treasury.
BlackRock was being used to identify the
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The department does not plan to be expert in
model structuring, finance products, but it sought no
assistance or independent views. This allowed the
party with the greatest conflict to dominate the
conversation that was being held.
I want to talk for a moment about stale data
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because there was an insinuation that somehow BlackRock
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was using stale data and this could be used, in
9
essence, to justify the fact that MBIA undoubtedly used 10
stale data.
11
What's perhaps most galling about the
12
haphazard mention of BlackRock is that MBIA elected to 13
misrepresent the facts and Mr. Paltrowitz's testimony 14
to justify MBIA's use of stale data.
15
Here's what MBIA's counsel told you yesterday. 16
This is -17
MR. KASOWITZ: Tuesday.
18
MR. STEINBERG: Sorry. Tuesday. It was 19
yesterday when I wrote this. At page 1851: "So 20
here"-- and the "as of is underlined. We did that, and 21
I will come pack to why.
22
"So here, while Mr. Greenspan contends that 23
MBIA's use of data from prior to the fourth quarter of 24
2008 was a modeling error, the banks' other expert, Mr. 25
Paltrowitz, of BlackRock, has testified that the
26
Min-U-Script
Page 2024
collateral and to discuss the valuation of that
collateral.
(End of take 5)
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ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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MR. STEINBERG: This is from page ten. See
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government's overall objectives to the background -- mark to
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market valuation.
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Citigroup provided the USG, United States
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Government parties, with its valuations for the mark to 6
market assets as of November 21, 2008. The USG parties 7
seek an independent valuation and review of the mark to
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market assets.
9
Now, November 21st was the date that they requested 10
because that was the measurement date that the government 11
and these, Citibank in this instance, were looking at to 12
value the collateral.
13
Now, so Black Rock performed for The Federal 14
Reserve what The Federal Reserve asked of it. A valuation 15
as of a specified date by the client, using the most recent 16
data then available. In other words, Mr. Geithner wanted 17
Black Rock to test the veracity of what Citibank had told 18
it.
19
Although Respondents point to the sentences of Mr. 20
Paltrowitz' deposition out of context, we would ask you 21
review pages 232 to 234 of his deposition to understand what 22
was agreed to by The Federal Reserve.
23
The Federal Reserve, Black Rock used the most 24
current data that was available as of November 23rd, as of 25
the date. That testimony is at pages 106 through 119 of 26
T6
Page 2027
this -- and for the assistance provided to Citigroup and
Bank of America, Bank of America later did not take the
loan, FRBNY, The Federal Reserve Bank of New York and FRB
Richmond, that's the FRBR. Coordinated with Treasury and
FDIC to negotiate similar types of loss projections.

In contrast to the Maiden Lane transactions, which
we don't have to go into, FRBNY and FRBR agreed to provide
loans, under certain circumstances, but did not anticipate
having to lend, and ultimately, did not lend to these

institutions under these agreements.
Then, it goes on and talks about the loss sharing
agreement on a designated portfolio and how the transaction
was structured, but I want to focus on the highlighted
language after footnote 114.

Based on the analysis conducted by Black Rock,
FRBNY concluded that losses on Citigroup assets reached the
point at which FRBNY could be required to lend one were
unlikely. FRBR staff said they reached a similar

conclusion on Bank of America, based on analysis performed
by PIMCO. PIMCO is the other world class modeling firm we
have been chatting about.

In both cases, the reserve banks hired external
audit firms to conduct due diligence on the asset portfolio.
FBRNY did not complete due diligence before signing a final
lending agreement with Citibank in January 2009.
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preparing models at year end 2008 that rely upon stale data,
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including data at least five months old, and in many cases,
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much older, at a critical time of accelerating decline in
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our economy and representing it to the New York Insurance
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Department as the most current information.
7
So, what exactly did Mr. Paltrowitz say what MBIA 8
asked him about MBIA's use of stale data? He compared it
9
to the act of, I compared it to the act of not updating the 10
data to the most current information as, quote, putting your 11
head in the sand. I would direct the Court to Mr. 12
Paltrowitz' deposition transcript at pages 232 to 233. 13
Of course, given MBIA's counsel's argument, you 14
would have thought Mr. Geithner blindly relied on the 15
valuation report as of November 23, 2008 to loan taxpayer 16
money to Citibank in January of 2009, not February, as MBIA 17
said. Again, MBIA did not do their homework.
18
Let's take a look at what the GAO report, the same 19
GAO report that MBIA's counsel showed to the Court, and that 20
MBIA misdescribed earlier, to see exactly what Mr. Geithner 21
did with Black Rock's valuation as of November 23rd. 22
Put that up. Now, this is the GAO report,
23
analyzing various retentions by The Federal Reserve during 24
the period of the financial crisis.
25
One of the agreements that got evaluated was 26
Mr. Paltrowitz' testimony. This isn't the same as MBIA
Min-U-Script
Page 2028
They didn't finish it, but what they did
incorporated protections into this agreement that allowed
FRBNY to reject specific assets based on additional due
diligence.
Following approximately 11 months of due diligence
by FRBNY vendor Block Rock, FRBNY, Treasury, FDIC and
Citigroup, agreed to a final set of assets to be included in
the portfolio.
Then, as discussed earlier, Bank of America
requested a termination of the term sheet before a final
agreement was executed.

So, let's sort of think about that for a moment.
Unlike the situation here, The Federal Reserve used Black
Rock to challenge the information provided by its regulated
entity.
It recognized the limitations, stale data and
shortness of time, and its agreement, this lending
agreement, expressly took into account those limitations to
protect the public -- as the New York Insurance Department
was supposed to do, but failed to do here.

They conducted 11 months of due diligence. Sounds
like a good, sound way to proceed, to me.

Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Steinberg.
(23) Page 2025 - Page 2028
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
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en he
MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, I have some good news.
at issue need to change the agency's decision. But, your
1
2
I am all that is standing between the conclusion of my 3
presentation and the end of this 409 proceeding. So, I will
4
try to be as expeditious as I possibly can.
5
I want to focus first on the issue of errors, which 6
we heard a lot about.
7
As your Honor knows, the approval letter notes 8
eight times that the Department was acting in reliance on
9
the accuracy of the information that got it got from MBIA. 10
The issue that we are focused on, there is no dispute that 11
MBIA has identified an error that caused its policyholders 12
surplus under extreme stress to shift from positive 362 13
million to negative 291 million.
14
As we discussed last time I was speaking about this 15
subject, extreme stress is the focus of Mr. Buchmiller's 16
review.
17
I would like to talk about the Byrne case, which 18
got a lot of attention from Mr. Holgado, when he was 19
speaking several days ago.
20
That is the First Department case from 2004, that 21
we think is an important case to focus on here. And, the 22
argument was made by Mr. Holgado at 1664, 1666 of the 23
transcript that inconsequential errors were not enough to 24
require annulment of a decision on your Article 78, and we 25
agree with that.
26
en he
Honor, in the Byrne case, the Board of Standards and Appeals
didn't seek to revoke the certificate of occupancy. In
fact, opposed the revocation of the certificate of

occupancy.
In that case, even though there were errors and
what happened in Byrne was, a tenant brought a lawsuit.
That tenant had complained about the fact that the landlord
tried to raise the tenant's rent and the landlord hadn't

done certain things, like complying with a C of O, putting a
sink in, dealing with a smoke detector, and the agency
wanted to basically overlook those issues.

The First Department and the trial Court said no,
you can't do that.

So, your Honor, the notion somehow that, you know,
the mere fact that an agency is opposed requires the Court
not to act? That's not the standard of materiality.

The standard of materiality is not a but for
decision. It has to be something with the information being
important, and we think there is no doubt that the

information was important here.
The other thing that the State Respondents rely on,
statements by Mr. Buchmiller and Mr. Dinallo. And, the
issue there is whether these errors, which they didn't know
about back when they were at the Department, would have
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obviously what needs to be shown.
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To escape the Byrne case, the State Respondents say
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that that case involved quote, total outright fabrication of
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facts. But, the Department cites no authority for the 7
proposition that only the outright fabrication of facts
8
provided to an agency requires annulment.
9
We have maintained all along, your Honor, we stand 10
by the position, we think if you mislead an agency, that 11
clearly is something that would require annulment under 12
Article 78.
13
But, if you put up slide two, which is, these are 14
all the various cases, First Department cases, and other 15
Departments making quite clear, that agencies cannot act on 16
the basis of factually incorrect information and that no 17
judicial deference is required when there is, an agency acts 18
on an erroneous factual conclusion.
19
I think the Basile case is an important case. 20
That's the Third Department case when an agency acts on 21
quote, false assumptions. That's another case where the 22
Court must annul.
23
Waterhouse, Fourth Department, 1980, erroneous 24
assumptions.
25
Now, to avoid annulment, MBIA claims that the facts 26
We maintained from the beginning of this proceeding

and went back and looked at the transcript, materiality is
Min-U-Script
Page 2032
en he
changed their position on transformation.
Now, there has been no law cited -- I will answer
your Honor's question that you asked the other day -- about
the ability of former officials testifying about facts that

weren't before those officials when they were working at the
agency and, whether those facts would have changed, caused
them to change their decision.

Now, Mr. Kasowitz talked about a case called Price,
which was a Third Department case from 1999. We went back
and looked at the Price case.

That's a situation where a former official
submitted an affidavit in an agency proceeding before the
agency, about historical facts relating to agency practice
and there, it was a secretary and she said that the agency,
at the agency hearing, that the Petitioner had been told
about the option to join this retirement plan.

So, the affidavits were at the agency level, they
were prior to the agency decision, and they were about
historical facts.
Here, on the other hand, your Honor, what the other
side would like the Court to do is rely on affidavits that
are talking about events that happened after the approval,
facts that were learned after the approval, facts that

weren't before the agency at the time when it made its
decision, and they want the Court essentially to allow
(24) Page 2029 - Page 2032
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
Page 2033
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former government officials to clean up the situation.
There is absolutely no case that anyone has

presented, that supports that notion. The Price case is
clearly not on point. And, the appropriate action by the
Court, when an agency acts on erroneous information, is to
annul the decision, and as I have said before, they can,

MBIA can go back and apply, based on current information,
and this is not a situation where National or MBIA Insurance
have written materially new business and it's essentially a

case that would involve, to quote Mr. Brown, moving the
money across the bank vault.

If a Judge were to leave the bench, the Judge can't
be retained by a party in a case to submit an affidavit
about what the Judge meant, or if there was an error in the
Judge's opinion or say the factual error wouldn't have
changed my opinion.
But, your Honor, even if someone is a current
agency official, a current agency official can't provide a
new rationale. The Court of Appeals decision in Scanlon
versus Buffalo Public Schools, 90 NY2d, 662, 1997 makes that
quite clear.
I mean, this is a situation, to cut to the chase,
where there was an error of $1.4 billion. It clearly went
to an analysis that was reflected in multiple documents that
were discussed at the highest level of this agency. The
Page 2035
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raise a fact issue.
We don't think, on the undisputed facts here, there
is a question -- this is a huge, huge error, and in and of
itself supports annulment.

If you are going to rule for the other side, it's a
fact issue that has to be dealt with.
So, the notion that a, that this $1.4 billion is
somehow irrelevant to this proceeding, it's just not
something that is supported by the facts.
And, one of the arguments that was made by the
Insurance Department counsel, was that MBIA focused on the
so-called base scenario, not the extreme stress scenario.

There was no cite given for that. This was 1667, 68.
There is no question that Mr. Buchmiller's work is
important. I think slide three makes it quite clear. This
is the backdated, unredacted full memo. In multiple
places -- this is PX 51 -- Mr. Buchmiller is talking about
the worst case scenario is more appropriately our concern
regarding transformation. That was because of the economic
issues that the country and MBIA was dealing with.

He said, I focused on the extreme stress or break
the bank scenario and I think, your Honor, probably one of
the most important parts of this memo that was unredacted
and is the most, in some ways, the most telling line about
what Mr. Buchmiller was about, is the line where he says,
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en he
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Lord knows there is enough lawyers working on this case who
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would have found it -- where a former official can come in
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and say it wouldn't have changed my decision.
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First of all, wouldn't have changed my decision is
7
not a materiality standard that is accepted in a fraud case, 8
securities case or any other kind of case, that I am aware
9
of.
10
It's way too low a burden, but in addition to 11
giving someone who no longer works in the government, the 12
ability to say oh, it wouldn't have effected my decision, 13
the Court of Appeals said even a current official can't do 14
that. Once you have the error, the only appropriate 15
resolution is to annul the decision.
16
Now, as we have indicated before, this deferred tax 17
error was $1.4 billion. Even accepting all of the 18
corrections by the other side, which we dispute as a factual 19
matter, you are talking about a change from positive to 20
negative that runs in the neighborhood of $650 million. 21
This is a not a typographical mistake on an
22
application form. Our experts have all said that the error 23
was material. We have pointed out what Mr. Buttner said 24
about it, and in any event, your Honor, if there is a 25
question about the materiality of that, that would obviously 26
error came to light years after the approval and there is

not a single case that we have seen or by the other side --
Min-U-Script
en he
quote, when a choice was available, I opted for the most
pessimistic scenario, close quote.

So, the notion that he was focused on the base
case, makes no sense. It's belied by Mr. Buchmiller's own
memo.
In fact, your Honor let's put up four. When Mr.
Buchmiller got the extreme stress scenario on the 29th, the
next morning, by 10:37, he was reporting it to his

superiors. He was talking about the quote, they actually
survived in one of the four resulting extreme scenario
outcomes, with surplus fallen to 300 to 350 million.

So, what they are asking you to do, your Honor,
say, well, basically, Mr. Buchmiller can now say years later
that something he told his superiors wouldn't have changed
his decision. We don't know about his superiors' decisions,
because this information was obviously communicated to his
superiors.
He made a big point out of the fact that they
actually survive one of the four resulting extreme scenario
outcomes.
Then, going down, he says quote, given that they
are reasonably demonstrated corporation, old Corp. New York
can survive with a reasonable expectation of viability.

So, the notion this is some inconsequential error is absurd.
It's belied by Mr. Buchmiller's own documentation.
(25) Page 2033 - Page 2036
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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true.
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Slide five.
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The error was, is a $1.2 billion error on the face 6
of the application. If the information was not important, 7
why was it on the face of the application?
8
If the extreme stress scenario was not important, 9
why did Mr. Buchmiller have MBIA run the extreme stress 10
scenario?
11
If the extreme stress scenario was not important, 12
why Mr. Buchmiller report to superiors about the result of 13
the extreme stress scenario? The facts speak volumes. 14
Now, one of the arguments that's been made is 15
somehow, the extreme stress scenario was hypothetical. 16
Well, Mr. Buchmiller didn't assign a probability to any of 17
scenarios he looked at.
18
Let's put up seven.
19
So, I have shown this before. He didn't do that 20
with any of them, your Honor. The facts are what the facts 21
are.
22
In addition, your Honor, there was an argument made 23
that the extreme stress scenario was solving backward. The 24
question was, how many months could they survive before the 25
surplus would fall below 65 million positive. Made a big 26
In addition, your Honor, the point was made that

this was just, the error just effected extreme stress. Not
en he
outcomes with surplus falling to 300 to 350 million. That's
just factually wrong.

That's an undisputed fact. It's wrong.
Now, let's talk about policyholder surplus because
it gets glossed over so much. Let's focus on Buchmiller 11.
That's his affidavit.

Asking him, you know -"Question: Would it be fair to say again, in
connection with your financial review of MBIA, you pay close
attention to the policyholders' surplus projections that

would be made by MBIA in connection with the various stress
scenarios that were provided to you?

"Answer: Generally, yes, I did.
"Why was that?
"Answer: Well again, it is a threshold.
"Question: When you say a threshold, what do you
mean specifically?
Mr. Buchmiller, "Answer, quote, well, if it falls
below 65 million, the best I recall, the statute allows the
Department or the Superintendent to instruct the insurer to
stop writing business and repair its surplus.

"Similarly, if it's below zero, surplus is
negative. They would also want a plan or action to restore
surplus to its proper level -- minimal level, I should say."
Now, your Honor, that's Mr. Buchmiller's words.
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point in that January 30th e-mail that the fact that they
survived one of the four extreme stress scenarios, we won't
know if it changed anyone's decision if they had known at
that moment time. They failed, by the end of the year.

That's why the Courts repeatedly said, when there
is an error of this magnitude, the Courts annul and the
applicant can reapply.

Rather than having this Court rely upon an
affidavit submitted by people who don't even work in the
government any more, and they can't cite a single case in
the history of New York State where that's ever been done,
they are asking your Honor to do something, to essentially
go where no Judge has ever gone before -- to quote Star
Trek. But, that's not just something that any Court has
every done.
They have also made the point, your Honor -- we can
look at slide nine.

Again, we emphasize the importance of it. Slide
ten.
Mr. Buchmiller is, in his memo, made the point
again. They actually put the same language, the same
language that was in that January 30th e-mail gets
incorporated verbatim almost, in his backdated memo.
Again, talking about how MBIA survives, actually
survives in one of the four resulting extreme scenario
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It's not a lawyer's words. This was important to him, and
the notion that it wasn't, is just again belied by the

facts.
In essence, your Honor, what Respondents are asking
the Court to do is to hold, that error, into the many

hundreds of millions of dollars, in a scenario that was
indisputably important to Mr. Buchmiller -- those just don't
matter, and your Honor, we don't see how that can happen.
Let me turn to the third-party analysis.

As I mentioned, put up 14 again.
Again, Mr. Buchmiller was focused on when he had a
choice, his words, "when a choice was available, I opted for
the most pessimistic scenario."

This is a key statement by Mr. Buchmiller
unredacted as a result of your Honor's Order.
When he had a choice, he picked the most
pessimistic scenario. That was because this review was
being done in the middle of the financial crisis, a logical
action by Mr. Buchmiller.

Now, on the question of the Lehman report, the
Lehman CDO report, the analysis that was done by MBIA in
September 2009, the other side ignores what Mr. Buchmiller
said at his deposition.

Put up 15.
Mr. Buchmiller tried to make it quite clear, made
(26) Page 2037 - Page 2040
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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en he
it quite clear, that he was, quote, interested in obtaining
as much information as I could have.

"Question: So, you would want to be the person
making a decision as to whether the Broderick III valuation
that was done by Lehman Brothers was relevant to your
review, correct?
Objections.
"Answer: Yes, I would be interested in that."
Again, Broderick III was the one CDO he was looking
at in detail. The folks at MBIA, Mr. McKiernan, were

sitting with Mr. Buchmiller while he was on that computer
working hard, trying to understand that valuation, and they
did not disclose to Mr. Buchmiller about, notwithstanding
the hyperbole about him being an embedded employee and
transparency, they had valuation of the very CDO he was
looking at, that was much more negative than their own
valuation.
Now, MBIA essentially has two arguments about
Lehman, neither of which work.

First was, somehow this was, you know, this is a
very thick comprehensive report and the report was an
analysis of losses. Let's put it up. Next slide.

Basically describes what was done by Lehman
Brothers, page two of the report.
Quote, at MBIA's request Lehman has analyzed ten
Page 2043
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en he
explained to Mr. Buchmiller what the black box was, how it
worked. They could have had the Lehman folks come and meet
with Mr. Buchmiller and they could have talked it all
through.
Mr. Buchmiller could have been the one to make the
decision. Instead, the decision was made for him by MBIA,
people who clearly had an interest in seeing this

transaction go through.
Now, the argument that was made was somehow that
Barclays and Lehman did some sort of special analyses

because they were trying to do these special structures.
First of all, the September 2008 analysis about
Broderick III, was a straight up analysis of the losses that
were expected on those 15 CDOs, because MBIA wanted to see
what were the 15 worst CDOs they had, so they could make a
judgment about the ones they should settle. Rational
business decision.
The September analysis had nothing to do with
commutation structures.
Now, the later analysis that was done by Barclays
wasn't in connection with three big commutations that were
done. But, if you put up PX 177 -- which is 17.

This is analysis, this comes directly from
Barclays, the same team that worked at Lehman, and instead
of MBIA writing memos to their business people and making
Page 2042
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Page 2044
en he
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for timely payment, and ultimate payment of principal in
3
five high grade multi sector CDOs on which MBIA wrote 4
protection for ultimate payment of principal, close quote. 5
Broderick III was one of those.
6
Further on, MBIA says, quote, Lehman says, quote,
7
Lehman Brothers has provided MBIA with a spread sheet
8
summarizing our analysis that contains projected per period
9
claims by contract, close quote.
10
These were, they gave them cash flow information 11
that would have allowed someone to compare the information 12
that was coming out of Lehman Brothers with MBIA's own loss 13
reserve.
14
There is no evidence in this record, other than 15
speculation, that Lehman didn't do anything other than give 16
its best estimate, or that Lehman somehow inflated the loss 17
projections -- nothing.
18
Now, the second argument that's made.
19
MR. KASOWITZ: Quickly, sorry. There was an 20
argument that it was a black box and not transparent, so -- 21
MR. GIUFFRA: The problem of course is the black 22
box.
23
MR. KASOWITZ: Note my objection.
24
MR. GIUFFRA: The black box argument is 25
essentially, I don't like the results. They could have 26
high grade multi sector CDOs on which MBIA wrote protection
Min-U-Script
en he
judgment about spending literally hundreds of millions of
dollars to set the CDOs, they rely on the Barclays Lehman
numbers. They literally cut and paste them into the memo of
senior management.
It talks about the claims avoiding, it talks about
a discount rate that would be applied, and gives different
scenarios and shows what the losses would be.

Let's turn to 18.
Again, this memo goes to Jay Brown and other senior
management at MBIA, and Mr. McKiernan is on the memo -- same
person who is dealing with Mr. Buchmiller on a daily basis.
And, your Honor, the most interesting fact is that

you look at the net impairment, it's only $116 million.
That's MBIA's loss reserve to that particular transaction.
They are paying 225 million to remediate.

Your Honor, this is December 8, 2008, right when
the application has been filed with the New York Insurance
Department. Go back to, let's go back to the other side.

The numbers that Barclays was coming up with were way, way
higher.
Yet, they are making the decision to commute and
pay hundreds of millions of dollars, not based on their own
financial modeling, but on Barclays and Lehman's.

Another, your Honor, as we mentioned previously --
MR. KASOWITZ: Just quickly, sorry.
(27) Page 2041 - Page 2044
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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en he
I will object to this. It's all been explained -McKiernan deposition which is contrary to what counsel is
arguing.
MR. GIUFFRA: Mr. McKiernan said -THE COURT: We will take a look.
MR. KASOWITZ: I know you will, your Honor.
MR. GIUFFRA: We would urge your Honor to look at
Mr. Buchmiller's testimony about what he would have wanted
to see, how he would have wanted to be the one to make the
decision.
He was interested in the most pessimistic cases and
then, you have a self interested MBIA executive, who is
trying to basically downplay, downplay the importance of
this analysis.
And, you know, the basic answer is, if he had
unfettered access and they were completely transparent with
him, why did they not share this information with him?
Similarly, your Honor, there is AFSI Capital. They
did an analysis for MBIA on RMBS. They had losses of
$3.4 billion. MBIA, on the same RMBS, had losses of 1.1.
Again, like the Lehman study, it should have been
shared with Mr. Buchmiller.

So, you have a situation here where no third-party
review was done. To the extent there were third-party
reviews, they did have them in their files, they didn't
Page 2047
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Petitioners-Giuffra
T7
MR. GIUFFRA: They weren't shown all of the
other internal analyses within the files at MBIA that
had losses as high as $20 billion.

Mr. Kasowitz will stand up and say, oh, no,
Mr. MMcKiernan said that he showed Mr. Buchmiller, you
know, the ones that are marked in yellow, and the

testimony, which I urge the court to look at, Mr.
MMcKiernan, I said, well, did Mr. Buchmiller keep
copies of them?
No, I showed it to him for 20 minutes. Are
any of these analyses reflected in Mr. Buchmiller's
backdated memorandum?
No.
Aldo's Italian restaurant? Yes. Analyses as
high as, you know, $15 billion? No.
And so, now, your Honor, the real issue here
is, you know, they were taking zero reserves on CMBS,
on a $45 billion portfolio.

Mr. Buchmiller was rushing to complete the
CMBS review. He was doing it in early February, right
before the approval.

They, obviously, understood that if they had
shown all this to Mr. Buchmiller, obviously, he would
have, you know, raised his hand and said this is a
Page 2046
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en he
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have explained it to Mr. Buchmiller and he would have made 4
the decision.
5
Now, let's talk about CMBS.
6
Put up Buchmiller slide 19.
7
In their surrebuttal, Respondents had nothing to 8
say about this chart and these analyses. Your Honor, based
9
on our belief is that the Department was shown five internal 10
analyses that were run on CMBS.
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share it with the Department. I don't care whether you

call it a black box, a green box or a red box. You should
Min-U-Script
Page 2048
Petitioners-Giuffra
problem.
I mean the notion that they wouldn't have is
absurd.
MR. KASOWITZ: I mean there is nothing in the
record about that, but that's -MR. GIUFFRA: Yes, the reason there is nothing
in the record about that, your Honor, is because they
never provided the information to him.

MR. KASOWITZ: Objection, your Honor. He just
testified that -- he just argued that Mr. McKiernan
testified that he did provide the information.
MR. GIUFFRA: You know what?
MR. KASOWITZ: I'm just going to note the
objection for the record. I don't mind argument, but I
mind misrepresentation of what the record says.

MR. GIUFFRA: So do I, Mr. Kasowitz.
Let's put up trial Max Buchmiller 20. Your
Honor, this last exchange is critical.
Quote -- this is Mr. Buchmiller's deposition,
September 28, 2010, September 28, 2010 in this case:
"Question: Am I correct that the CMBS loss
projections that you saw from MBIA showed zero losses?
"Answer: I believe they showed no losses in

the CDOs."
So the very notion that he had an opportunity
(28) Page 2045 - Page 2048
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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Petitioners-Giuffra
to see all those internal analyses is belied by Mr.
Buchmiller's sworn deposition testimony.
Let's turn to Buchmiller 21. When Mr.
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Buchmiller in his report -- I should give you the page
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on that deposition, your Honor.
6
It's Buchmiller's first deposition, okay,
7
before anybody knew what these issues were, before we
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knew about all the internal analyses, okay, when he 9
just was asked the question.
10
At page 354 he said: "All I saw were things 11
are zero losses."
12
And the zero losses support the fact that
13
that's what MBIA said the losses were.
14
Now, your Honor, we can turn to the next one. 15
The court has that one.
16
In his backdated memo, "When the choice was 17
available, I opted for the most pessimistic scenario," 18
he actually give us an example: "For example, Lehman 19
stress case for CMBS and MBIA's stress and extreme 20
cases."
21
Now, the only CMBS analysis that's reflected 22
in Mr. Buchmiller's memo is the June/July Lehman public 23
research from the record here, which is quite clear as 24
to what happened here, your Honor.
25
Now, your Honor, we talked about manual 26
Page 2051
Petitioners-Giuffra
That's a fact. Let's go to the next line.
Gone. There is nothing about $949 million in manual
override, you know, impact on loss reserves.

The loss reserves of MBIA Insurance, your
Honor, as of the time of the transformation, just to
put it in perspective, were about $1.7 billion, okay?
$1.7 billion.
949 million in additional reserves is not a
small number. It's a significant number.
Yet, Mr. McKiernan deleted the information
before he gave it to the department. It's hard to
think of clearer proof.
Your Honor, I stand by the position I took
previously: If you mislead a government agency,
Article 78 should be granted.
In fact, MBIA took that position with the
Court of Appeals.
But this is the situation that I think, your
Honor, there is no excuse for. Given all of the facts
in this case.
So there is no question that Mr. Buchmiller
never saw the rationale for any of these manual
overrides, the subjective manual overrides.
And without understanding what they were
doing, it was impossible to make a judgment that zero
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the CMBS, and that's essentially where MBIA was able to
3
take the information that came out of the models and 4
make judgments and reduce the reserve.
5
We know, your Honor, that they did that on
6
individual loans, on CMBS and the $45 billion portfolio
7
to the tune of $5 billion.
8
We know that the loss reserves that were
9
reduced were to the tune of $949 million. Those are 10
facts.
11
What we do know is that Mr. McKiernan -- let's 12
put it up, 22 and 23 -- had an internal analysis that 13
he had prepared.
14
In fact, he was preparing to tell the
15
department -- look at the document PX 91: "Update for 16
New York State ID." "Update for New York State ID," PX 17
91.
18
It's in bold, your Honor, that the overrides 19
could be $949 million, in bold.
20
In fact, it was in bold in the conclusion,
21
your Honor. What did Mr. McKiernan do? What Mr. 22
McKiernan did was he sent the document to his house. 23
Let's go back. He sent it to his house, to
24
his wife's account, made edits to the document, took it 25
out and showed it to Mr. Buchmiller, okay?
26
overrides, and the importance of manual overrides on
Min-U-Script
Page 2052
Petitioners-Giuffra
losses on an a $45 billion -- billion portfolio was
reasonable.
Now let's turn to the question of stale data
and, secondly, RMBS. Another significant area. These
things all have to do with -- I agree with the other

side. Look at all the circumstances. Look at all the
memos, look at all the documents.
The story is pretty clear about what was going
on here. Let's look at Buchmiller 24. Your Honor, I'm
not going to read these cases again. Two Court of

Appeals decisions, one from 1937 at the height of bad
economic times. 1971, New York Telephone.

Both of those cases stand for the proposition
that an agency cannot rely upon stale data,
particularly after a drastic change in economic
circumstances.
The other side ignored these cases in their
rebuttal, and there is no question, your Honor, that
the fourth quarter of 2008 was the worst financial
crisis since the Depression.
If there was ever a time to use the most
current data, this was it.
Let's turn up 25. This is, again, from Mr.
Buchmiller's memo. Respondents never addressed the
fact revealed in Mr. Buchmiller's redacted final memo
(29) Page 2049 - Page 2052
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
Page 2053
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relied on overrun assumptions. He's referring to the 3
fact there that they were talking about the June/July 4
Lehman analysis.
5
I think it's important just to sort of put it
6
all in perspective. Various investment banks had 7
different assumptions and rating agencies as to losses
8
that were likely to occur with respect to these
9
sophisticated products.
10
You could change the assumptions that you 11
would run through the model and get different results. 12
MBIA did that for internal purposes on CMBS, 13
and they had all the output, and they didn't share it 14
with Mr. Buchmiller. They only showed him zero losses 15
in his own words, zero losses.
16
They had dozens -- not dozens, maybe 25 others 17
that showed big losses, and they did not share it with 18
Mr. Buchmiller.
19
And we talked, your Honor -- Buchmiller 26 -- 20
about how there was a later MBIA -- excuse me, a later 21
Lehman Brothers analysis that was in MBIA's files, not 22
reflecting Mr. Buchmiller's final memo.
23
Again, under Malteie, M-A-L-T-E-I-E, v. New 24
York telephone, the department could not rely upon 25
outdated information.
26
that Mr. Buchmiller knew that MBIA's CMBS analyses
Page 2055
Petitioners-Giuffra
Common sense would say that if you're
experiencing losses like that in the middle of a
financial crisis, that you want to run the most current
information.
In addition, the claim was that, oh, the
short-term spike, the 28 percent increase, well, that
doesn't change the projections.
But, in fact, MBIA itself in the third quarter
had increased its reserves by a billion dollars based
on a 12 percent spike, not a 28 percent spike.
And the 28 percent spike happened in the
middle of a financial crisis. So it was not something
that, you know, you just wonder why it happened. You
would expect such an increase.

MR. KASOWITZ: Objection, your Honor.
just one thing.

MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, Mr. Finkel also
said, well, the fourth-quarter claims were tracking the
third-quarter projections.
But as I indicated to the court last week and
I showed you the actual testimony from Mr. McKiernan,
that didn't matter because there was a six-month lag

between the rise in early delinquencies and people
actually, you know, not paying their mortgages and
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that if you used the information that was available as 4
of year end 2008, that would increase the extreme 5
stress losses just for the second RMBS.
6
I think it's only for a limited number of them 7
by -- how many is it? 17, $1.9 billion. These are big
8
numbers, because, your Honor, the loss reserves at the 9
time were 1.7.
10
Now, MBIS' RMBS models were run into the third 11
quarter of 2008, notwithstanding the fact that this 12
transaction was approved in February 2009. Those 13
models assume that mortgage delinquencies reached their 14
peak in August 2008 or earlier.
15
But, in fact, MBIA had information that
16
fourth-quarter mortgage delinquencies had increased by 17
another 28 percent.
18
During surrebuttal MBIA's counsel at
19
transcript page 1846 to 49 cited Mr. Finkel, their 20
expert, is trying to justify the use of stale data.
21
The first thing Mr. Finkel said was, well,
22
even if a model projects a billion dollars in losses 23
over 30 years, if you lose 500 million in the first 24
three months, that doesn't mean that the model is 25
wrong?
26
Now, with respect to MBIA's use of August 2008

data to run RMBS models, respondents did not dispute
Min-U-Script
They
based that reserve on a bunch of different things, not
Page 2056
Petitioners-Giuffra
having claims and going through the system.
That proves nothing. In fact, by January 2009
the trend was clear. Delinquencies had risen every
single month from August '08 to December '08, which
would be consistent with what anyone would think, given
the financial crisis we were dealing with.

Finally, Mr. Finkel says, well, you know,
maybe MBIA thought it was dealing with idiosyncratic
losses on eligible loans.

That's shear speculation. MBIS' models don't
look at individual loans. They don't do a bottoms-up
analysis like BlackRock. They look at things on a more
30,000-foot level.
One of the arguments that's been made by the
other side, your Honor, is that this is just all a big

battle of experts. And, your Honor, that's simply not
true.
The Court of Appeals decisions, Malteie v. New
York Telephone, says agencies cannot rely upon stale
factually incorrect information.

Your Honor, I want to just -- we had this, and
I just wanted to hand it out to everyone, so the court
has it. This is a binder which we made up.

THE COURT: This is new one?
MR. GIUFFRA: A new one, yes, your Honor.
One
(30) Page 2053 - Page 2056
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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more, and then I'm done.
2
This is the binder, your Honor, where courts
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have granted Article $78 petitions based on expert 4
testimony.
5
So the notion that because there's a battle of 6
the experts, supposedly in the trial court, that you 7
don't grant a petition is just wrong.
8
Now, your Honor, Mr. Steinberg touched on 9
this, but just to make the point, Mr. Buchmiller, his 10
analysis was, I didn't see a reason not to approve the
11
request.
12
But Mr. Buchmiller didn't have access to all 13
the information. He only saw the CMBS that showed zero
losses. He didn't see the CMBS that showed enormous

multi-billion-dollar losses at a time when MBIA had
zero losses on CMBS.

Your Honor, that, independent, in and of
itself, we think requires annulment of this decision.
Independently requires annulment of the
decision.
Your Honor, we don't see how -- we think you
can rule for us on the undisputed facts. We do not
believe your Honor can rule against us without having
to resolve fact issues, including the scope of the

review, what conclusion could be drawn from Mr.
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Buchmiller knew those assumptions, those June/July
assumptions were overrun.

Now, one of the things that was said, your
Honor, by the other side was that Mr. Kasowitz cited
audit opinions from PWC for year end 2008 and later.
These are audit opinions issued after

transformation.
In fact, your Honor, Mr. Kasowitz and MBIA
moved to exclude on May 4, quote: "Evidence concerning
facts arising after the February 17, 2009 approval."

That was their position for this proceeding.
Your Honor, we think -MR. KASOWITZ: My motion excluded that from
the motion, your Honor. We didn't move to exclude
either the PWC report or the result of the triannual
exam. That's inaccurate.
MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, again, the law is
clear. The record the court needs to look at is the
record as of the time of the decision, not things that
happened after the fact, not when the other side is
saying, you know, they want to exclude on May 4, quote:
"Evidence concerning facts arising after the February
17 approval."
Clearly, an audit opinion that came afterward
would be after that approval.
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But, in any event, your Honor, I think if you
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just look at Mr. Buchmiller's own words on CMBS, he was
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only shown the zero loss CMBS, even though there were
6
many, many more that were far more negative, and you've
7
got Mr. McKiernan, your Honor, saying, oh, I showed him
8
five or six of them, and I let him look at them for 20
9
minutes. That's not what Mr. Buchmiller testified to. 10
Your Honor, we think that you can rule for us 11
on a variety of grounds separate and independent: 12
1, that Mr. Buchmiller, in his own words, was 13
interested in the most pessimistic scenarios, but he 14
was not shown the most pessimistic RMBS, CDO or CMBS 15
projections that MBIA had in its files.
16
He did not spend a year looking at this. He 17
spent days looking at CMBS. We've been through that. 18
He was not given access to all the information 19
he should have seen. MBIA only gave him RMBS loss 20
projections based on third-quarter data, even though 21
they could have given him the stuff that went up to 22
year end.
23
Another reason, your Honor, is that they only 24
gave him CMBS loss projections that predated the 25
September 2008 collapse of Lehman and which even Mr. 26
Buchmiller's review and whether Mr. Din allo accurately

understood the scope of what Mr. Buchmiller was doing.
Min-U-Script
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Petitioners-Giuffra
In fact, your Honor, you may recall that Mr.
Buchmiller was talking about why don't we wait for the
audit opinion. He said, well, the career people would
be made fun of, and the political people.

But they didn't wait. So you can't come in
here now and say let's use all the stuff that comes
afterward.
Your Honor, our expert has looked at the audit
opinions, and there are many issues with the audit

opinions. I would direct the court to Richard
Hershman, paragraphs 142 to 161 and 170 to 174. Among
other things, PWC did not review MBIS' CMBS models, and
that's reflected at 105 of Mr. Hershman's affidavit.

More importantly, your Honor, I think it would
be inviting error for the court to rely upon an audit

opinion that came after an approval.
In any event, your Honor, to the extent that
post transformation events are somehow relevant -- and
we heard Mr. Holgado repeatedly describe MBIA's extreme
stress test as "near apocalyptic." We've heard that.

Well, in fact, since the approval we know that
the losses that they've suffered have been far greater
than under the extreme stress scenario.
Let's put up 36. Your Honor, the actual MBIA
losses are $9.5 billion. The projected extreme stress
(31) Page 2057 - Page 2060
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DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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losses were $3.5 billion.
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So if Mr. Kasowitz and every one would like to 3
on things that happened after the approval, I think 4
that this chart is fairly damning, but, again, your
5
Honor, our position is you just need to focus on the
6
fact that what was Mr. Buchmiller shown, what wasn't he 7
shown, what was Mr. Buchmiller interested in, and was
8
the information complete, was it accurate, or was he 9
shown a cropped picture?
10
In our view, your Honor, under settled New 11
York law there is little doubt as to the result your 12
Honor should reach with respect to these issues. 13
Ultimately the responsibility lays at the
14
doorstep of MBIA because they didn't provide
15
information to Mr. Buchmiller that he should have seen. 16
I'm going to turn, now, your Honor, and I'm 17
going to conclude on sort of Article 78 and the
18
administrative law issue.
19
Now, this case should begin and end with the 20
approval letter. I think that's a question your Honor 21
has to ask when you sort of sit back in your chambers 22
thinking about, well, who should I rule for.
23
They sort of say the state always wins; you 24
know, the court's a rubberstamp.
25
We've had a 12-day hearing here. Your Honor 26
Page 2063
Petitioners-Giuffra
approval letter and make a judgment.
Instead, here we're relying on affidavits
written after the fact, press releases, footnotes,
webcasts by the former superintendent several months
after the approval.

Your Honor, there is no question -- and this
is an important point. I can't pronounce this very
well. My team has been trying to help me. Scherbyn,
S-C-H-E-R-B-Y-N. It's a very important Court of

Appeals decision by Justice -- Judge Hancock.
It makes the point -- this case is a mandamus
review this. That case basically applies the same
reasoning that was applied in certiorari, cases arising
out of agency proceedings where there is, you know, a
full proceeding before the agency, to both kinds of

cases.
Here, your Honor, it's just quite clear that-let's put up slide 3 -- the grounds invoked in the
approval letter are those that should be considered by
the court. That's just consistent with basic logic.
In each one of the cases we cite on this slide
is a mandamus-to-review case, each and every one of
them.
Let's put up slide 4. Courts have made
clear -- let's just take Montauk Improvements. Again,
Page 2062
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Petitioners-Giuffra
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2
greatly appreciate that.
3
But normally in Article 78 cases you look to 4
the approval letter. Here we're talking about press 5
releases and footnotes, and everyone is trying so
6
desperately, on the other side, to justify indefensible
7
decisions.
8
The law is clear, your Honor, that respondents
9
cannot sustain this approval on any other grounds other 10
than those that were invoked by the agency at the time 11
of the approval.
12
Slide 2. Court of Appeals decision 2011, 13
quote: "Courts must judge the propriety of an agency's 14
action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. 15
"If the reasons an agency relies on do not 16
reasonably support its determination, the
17
administrative order must be overturned, and it
18
cannot"-- this is the key part -- "it cannot be
19
affirmed on an alternative ground that would have been 20
adequate if sited by the agency."
21
There's a good reason for that rule. We want 22
agencies to write their reasons in reports. The public 23
has a right to know the basis for an agency decision. 24
Courts like your Honor, who are reviewing 25
Article 78 petitions, want to be able to look to the 26
is, obviously, taking this very, very seriously, and we
Min-U-Script
Page 2064
Petitioners-Giuffra
the Scherbyn case applies -- this is case is a
certiorari-to-review case, Montauk Improvements.
The analysis gets applied more broadly in the
Scherbyn case which comes later. It states the basic
rule of administrative law, quote: "Failure of the

agency to set forth an adequate statement of the basis
for the determination forecloses the possibility of

their judicial review and deprives the petitioner of
the statutory right to such review.
What we've been struggling with, your Honor,
in this case now for four weeks is trying to discern
what the basis was for this approval, and the fact that
it's not in the approval letter is very telling.
If this was a lawful transaction, one that
there was plenty of factual support for, it wouldn't
have been too hard for the same people who spent time
writing a press release to put in an approval letter.

These cases, your Honor, make it just clear
that you can't consider things that are -- you know,
that go beyond the approval letter.
This approval letter has, you know, very few
factual findings, formalistic recitations of statutes,
doesn't mention the word solvency, doesn't mention the
1309, it doesn't tell us why these transactions were

fair, equitable, reasonable for purposes of 1411 and
(32) Page 2061 - Page 2064
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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The word earned surplus doesn't even appear in 3
the letter and/or the admittedly mandatory earned 4
surplus test of 4105. Not in the approval letter.
5
There is not a single word, your Honor, in the 6
approval letter about how this transaction was done on 7
a simultaneous basis.
8
What would have been so difficult to write 9
that down? Well, in fact, if you read the approval 10
letter, it says the opposite.
11
There is no mention in this approval letter of 12
the municipal finance markets, a supposed desire to 13
facilitate MBIA's insurance stability to get aid from 14
the federal government. It's not in the approval
15
letter.
16
There is no mention of a backstop in the
17
approval letter. These are all things that have been 18
sort of coming up after the fact.
19
But the basic requirement under New York law 20
is that the approval letter must set forth the grounds 21
for the decision. They can't sit and try to correct 22
this approval years after the fact with after-the-fact 23
grounds, and the Court of Appeals in 2011 once again 24
reaffirmed that basic opposition.
25
In addition, your Honor, we don't have to 26
1505.
Page 2067
Petitioners-Giuffra
incomplete information, that's arbitrary and
capricious, and courts have held that.
Your Honor, you can rule for us on any one of
these grounds. In terms of errors of law, the other
side glosses over what's in the approval letter, and
they just sort of say the mantra of deference.
But if an agency approval is affected by an
error of law, it's invalid. It's a question of law for
the court to be decided de novo.
In their approval letter respondents have not
even identified a legal interpretation of the Insurance
Law that was applicable that they applied in this
transaction.
So all the approval letter does is basically
parrot the language of statutes and declares them to be
met.
There is no legal analysis, there is no
precedent. You know, the now famous approval of NCIC
which has been running around this courtroom? That's

not cited as a precedent. And how that overruled the
general counsel opinion. That's not in the approval

letter.
All of the positions that have been asserted
before your Honor were developed for purposes of
litigation. In many respects, your Honor, they have
Page 2066
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2
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going to play out.
5
But the position taken by the department -- 6
slide 5 -- in their answer, they just have no way
7
around this. They are bound by this. It is the law 8
that they must follow.
9
It says: "The approval letter is the basis
10
for the approval...that "the approval letter is the
11
best statement of the standards applied by the
12
department." Says it repeatedly.
13
Now, your Honor, they're saying no, no, no, 14
that's not where you look. You look at Mr. Dinallo's 15
affidavit written in 2011, or look at his press
16
release.
17
Your Honor, that's not what a court should do. 18
Let's turn to the core principles we're dealing with in 19
this case.
20
Under Article 78, the approval letter must be 21
annulled if it affected by an error of law, just one. 22
It doesn't say, you know, just one, your Honor.
23
If it was arbitrary and capricious, there was 24
an abuse of discretion.
25
Your position is if you act on inaccurate
26
debate the importance of the approval letter because-and it's always interesting what people do before they
know what the other side is actually -- how the case is
Min-U-Script
Page 2068
Petitioners-Giuffra
morphed over the course of this litigation.
None have been shown to be part of a
department regulation or imbedded in a new form of
longstanding prior practice of the New York Insurance
Department.
In fact, your Honor, we know the opposite. I
think probably the best example is the general counsel
opinion, which somehow they're running away from.
Let's put up slide 7. No. 1, the law is,

clear, your Honor, that deference is not required on an
issue of pure interpretation.

The court must effectuate the plain language
of the statute, and a court -- this is important.
First Department 1987. The court need, quote, "to give
due consideration to an agency's practical construction
of a statute over a period of time."

Your Honor, I said I had one more book, and
this is the last one. I wouldn't want the paper to go
to waste.
(End of take 7)
(33) Page 2065 - Page 2068
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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MR. GIUFFRA: So, your Honor, the law is clear,
there is no deference to use illegal interpretations
developed during the course of this litigation.
And, your Honor, let's look at the cases, the other
cites. Slide 8.
Each and everyone of these cases, your Honor,
involves regulations, the interpretation of a regulation,
and the Courts defer to the interpretations of the

regulations and, in fact, in the Kurscic's case, the Court
of Appeals rejected the Department's, the Department's
regulation. This is not a regulation case.

MR. HOLGADO: Your Honor, I have to take exception.
The Court in Kurscics rejected the Superintendent's
regulation as contrary to a statute, and contrasted that
with broad statutory terms.

Thank you.
THE COURT: I just want to assure you, to make you
feel better, if I am going to cite any cases, I will read
the whole case from beginning to the end and interpret it.
I won't just take your little snippets and highlighted

parts. I have that copy.
MR. GIUFFRA: That's, your Honor, why we have given
you the full cases, because we think the law supports us.
We think the law overwhelmingly supports us in this case.
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not, as a matter of law, fair and equitable and reasonable
and equitable under Sections 1411(d) and 1505, simply
because one prong of the solvency test in Section 1309 was
met.
Again, their interpretation would render Sections
1411 and 1505 entirely superfluous and violate well settled
New York law on the interpretation of statutes.

The dividend here was not paid out of earned
surplus, as required by Section 4105 and, your Honor, the
approval letter was arbitrary and capricious, as a matter of
law, for several reasons.

One, the agency's action here was premised on
incorrect and incomplete facts, false assumptions.
Slide 11.
Again, the Courts repeatedly grant Petitioners,
when agency action is based on factually incorrect
information.
Slide 12.
Your Honor, this slide goes through all of the
material errors and omissions. $1.4 billion determined --
2006 error -- the concealed MBIA loss estimates.

I think, your Honor, when you sit back and think
about this case, Mr. Buchmiller, at his first deposition
said, I only saw CMBS internal analyses prepared by MBIA
that showed zero losses.
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Now, arbitrary and capricious does not insulate a
decision from review. Again, legal questions are legal
questions. But, if a decision is taken without regard to
the facts, and is information that doesn't reflect a full
and complete review, I think, your Honor, the case to focus
on is what the Court of Appeals said in Grady.

My clients were effected by this decision, clients
that settled were effected by the decision, the insurance
policyholders at MBIA Insurance, maybe did student loans or
foreign debt, they are effected by this decision, all the

people in the courtroom. There is a reason people come to
these hearings.
But, your Honor, the Court of Appeals in Grady said
that and an agency, to have its decision sustained, quote,
must make a careful and painstaking assessment of all the
available evidence." Available evidence -- "careful and
painstaking assessment of all the available evidence."

The Court of Appeals has also said in a decision,
this is in Brady, that a decision should not be made until
quote, all the evidence has been fully and finally

considered." Not preliminary decisions, not incomplete
information.
Your Honor, on slide 10 this approval can be, these
approvals can be struck down under unambiguous statutory
provisions, because these transformation transactions were
Min-U-Script
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There is no question that Mr. McKiernan played
games with those manual overrides. We have -- I couldn't
have better evidence than that.

MR. KASOWITZ: I will object, your Honor.
Look, it's all right if counsel wants to rehash 75
times all his arguments. It's terrific, but with respect to
this particular piece, these -- it's not supported by the
record.
There is plenty of evidence in the record about Mr.
Buchmiller's knowledge about what was happening in CMBS
markets, lots and lots of testimony by him about all of the

pessimistic views about the CMBS market that he, and the
like, so I am noting my objection for the record.

MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, the facts on that, I will
just lay it out, he wasn't told about the internal negative
reviews. His position was, I wasn't told the amount of the
impact of the manual overrides.

We put it up before. I won't do it again.
Then, the other side, there is an MBIA official, I
told him the number and I let him look at the documents for
twenty minutes, and none of it is in Mr. Buchmiller's

reports.
I think the inescapable conclusion one can reach,
your Honor, the other side would have the Court -- this is
14 -- ignore past NYID practice, NAIC guidance, that would
(34) Page 2069 - Page 2072
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
Page 2073
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have you view fair and equitable meaning something -- not
meaning, not what those words mean -- reading statutes of
the law.
Let's put up 15.
Again, your Honor, these are all the reasons why
there was not sufficient proof to satisfy a reasonable
person of all the facts necessary and to justify a decision
and, your Honor, there can be little doubt -- put up slide
16 -- that the approval was not based on a careful and
painstaking assessment of all the evidence. Lists all the
different reasons in the slide.

Look, I will conclude on the following: This is
undoubtedly, an important case in the history of Article 78
for the New York Insurance Department.

I think the case needs to be decided with that
history in mind, for the benefit of all policyholders and
all future citizens of this State, who can potentially be
adversely effected by agency action.

Yes, your Honor, this case involves banks, and it
was almost as if, your Honor, the other side kept saying
banks, banks, banks, so many times, as if your Honor would
forget they were policyholders.

I have said this before, but I think it's a telling
point. This time it's banks. Next time, it will be
hurricane victims, victims of a toxic drug or someone else
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MR. KASOWITZ: Only that we were going to put in
the compilation of cases for our side. Just gotten two new
sets of them today. We were going to put them in either
tonight or tomorrow morning, so I think, if it's okay, we
will put them in unless you rule over the weekend.

THE COURT: Don't count on it.
MR. KASOWITZ: I thought we would put them in on
Monday morning, so we can take into account what we got
today.
THE COURT: Are you each doing separately or
together?
MR. HOLGADO: Your Honor, I haven't decided yet.
I didn't know we were going to do that ourselves, but we may
sign on to what MBIA does.

MR. KASOWITZ: We will have it for you on Monday.
THE COURT: Why don't you guys keep in touch?
MR. KASOWITZ: We will keep it tight, your Honor.
THE COURT: That would be good.
Look, it is going to take awhile for us. You have
all asked me numerous times, please, look at this full case,
please read this transcript, please look at this affidavit
carefully, please look at all these documents.

You have asked me to do that and I will do that in
the case, but there are a lot documents here you are asking
us to look at.
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Page 2076
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2
insurance regulation is to protect policyholders.
3
This case, your Honor, is one clearly where the 4
both the law and the evidence overwhelmingly support the
5
annulment of this approval, and with that, your Honor, our
6
presentation in the 409 hearing concludes.
7
Thank you very much for your time.
8
THE COURT: Thank you.
9
Well, let's see. It has taken you, as you know, 10
over three years to put together the material and however 11
many days, I will take your word for it, 12 days over the 12
course of four weeks, to attempt to try to, as I have said 13
at the beginning, walk me through these papers to try to 14
make it easier.
15
I am not sure that's exactly what happened. Seems 16
to me, it just added some more things and there was a lot of 17
stuff to go through here.
18
So, I think you have everything except maybe the 19
slides from today, maybe some errata sheets that you can 20
prepare a day or two after the presentations.
21
You want to say something?
22
MR. GIUFFRA: That's our plan. We will provide the 23
errata sheets and all the slides, and then I think it's for 24
your Honor to consider.
25
THE COURT: What do you want to say?
26
So, it would be nice, if it was the only thing I
who is injured, and again, the fundamental purpose of
Min-U-Script
had to do for the next six weeks or something, but I know

you know, that's hardly the way our schedules work here.
So, we will do the best that we can. I don't

think you will probably be calling us on a daily basis to
find out when there is a decision. It's an important

decision. It's a big Article 78.
It's an important decision under any circumstances,
but you have to give us a little time to get it together and
work on it, which we will try to do after we take care of
some of the other things that need to get taken care of in
the Part before that.

So, I thank you for a most interesting -- most of
the time -- hearing.

I do feel everybody handled this in a very
professional way. We had a fully packed house here every
day.
I think everyone worked very efficiently to put it
together and get us things we needed. I think our staff
tried to work with your staff to try to make this as

efficient as possible.
Under all the circumstances, I think we did as best
we could possibly do.

I thank all of you for that.
So, I just I don't know if you are going to be able
(35) Page 2073 - Page 2076
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
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NK
to clean up everything that is here and in the next hour or
so, but speak to Ray. If you need some assistance, if you
are not able to get everything out of here today, then we
will try to, somebody else will be assigned in here tomorrow
to take care of it. We don't have anything on until, I

think 11, so you will be able to take care of this.
If there is not anything else, Mr. Steinberg, thank
you, nice to meet you. Have a safe trip back. It's
California?
MR. STEINBERG: Yes, it is. Thank you, your Honor.
It's been a pleasure.
THE COURT: The rest of you I recognize from being
around here, so I am sure I will see you again.
I thank everybody very much and you know it will
get uploaded when we decide it, but I don't think you should
be looking for that little five page decision -- just don't

think that will be able to encompass everything -- no matter
which way I go. I thank you all very much.

XXX.
THE FOREGOING IS CERTIFIED TO BE A
TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPTION OF
THE ORIGINAL STENOGRAPHIC NOTES.

________________________________
NINA J. KOSS, C.S.R., C.M.
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
Min-U-Script
(36) Page 2077
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
June 7, 2012
$
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1991:3;2008:3
$1.2 (1)
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$1.4 (4)
2033:24;2034:18;
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$15 (1)
2047:17
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1966:12;1976:18
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1976:18
$2.89 (2)
1981:19;1991:4
$20 (2)
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$233 (1)
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2045:21
$3.5 (1)
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$45 (3)
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$5 (1)
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$5.1 (1)
1981:14
$650 (1)
2034:21
$669 (1)
1966:4
$750 (1)
1969:18
$78 (1)
2057:4
$9 (2)
1950:20;1952:26
$9.4 (1)
1976:6
$9.5 (1)
2060:26
$949 (3)
2050:10,20;2051:3
Min-U-Script
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122 (1)
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2064:25;2071:4
10 (4)
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1695 (1)
1947:9
16th (1)
1964:24
17 (4)
2043:23;2054:8;
2059:11,24
170 (1)
2060:12
1706 (1)
2002:9
174 (1)
2060:12
177 (1)
2043:23
1777 (1)
2021:10
178 (1)
1979:21
17th (1)
1999:22
18 (6)
1956:2;1991:24;
1993:25;1995:8;
1998:14;2044:9
1802 (1)
1988:24
1805 (1)
1989:5
1808 (1)
1985:4
181 (1)
1979:22
1814 (1)
2010:25
1827 (1)
2016:8
183 (1)
2021:18
1846 (1)
2054:20
1851 (1)
2022:20
18-month (1)
1998:21
18th (2)
1956:26;1959:8
19 (2)
1956:21;2046:7
1900 (3)
2006:7,9,10
1937 (1)
2052:12
1965 (1)
1942:4
1968 (1)
2006:5
1969 (1)
1942:12
1971 (1)
2052:13
1980 (1)
2030:24
1987 (1)
2068:15
1997 (2)
2011:14;2033:21
1999 (1)
2032:10
1st (1)
2004:24
2
2 (5)
1941:17;1955:14;
2014:17;2018:21;
2062:13
2.89 (1)
1951:4
20 (4)
1957:26;2047:12;
2048:18;2058:9
2001-case (1)
2011:16
2003 (1)
1953:24
2004 (1)
2029:21
2006 (1)
2071:22
2008 (31)
1961:10;1962:18;
1963:26;1965:25;
1966:10,21;1967:17;
1969:11;1979:16;
1983:18;2006:17;
2007:10;2010:7;
2011:25;2016:26;
2022:25;2023:4,5,14;
2025:7;2026:3,16;
2043:13;2044:17;
2052:20;2054:2,5,12,15;
2058:26;2059:6
(1) $1 - 2008
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
2009 (18)
1943:15;1953:6;
1979:16;1980:25;
1986:21;1988:22;
1991:25;1995:16;
2006:17;2007:10;
2018:8;2023:3;2026:17;
2027:26;2040:23;
2054:13;2056:3;
2059:11
2010 (11)
1955:14;1973:7,20;
1997:25;1998:8,9;
1999:2;2000:9,25;
2048:21,21
2011 (3)
2062:13;2065:24;
2066:16
2012 (7)
1937:21;1996:16;
1999:12,22;2002:9;
2004:25;2010:25
21 (7)
1940:22;1960:8;
1989:5;2023:4,14;
2025:7;2049:4
21st (1)
2025:10
22 (3)
1961:9;2018:8;
2050:13
225 (1)
2044:16
23 (5)
1962:17;1989:6;
2006:5;2026:16;
2050:13
232 (3)
1953:11;2025:22;
2026:13
233 (1)
2026:13
234 (1)
2025:22
235 (1)
1979:4
23rd (4)
1956:26;1959:6;
2025:25;2026:22
24 (3)
1986:21;1995:23;
2052:10
242 (5)
1944:9;1967:17;
1983:10,10,19
242-4 (1)
1984:16
245 (1)
1962:18
25 (4)
1971:17;1996:16;
2052:24;2053:17
26 (1)
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
2053:20
262 (1)
1998:10
27 (1)
1964:10
276 (1)
2010:8
28 (8)
1964:23;1998:7;
2048:21,21;2054:18;
2055:7,11,12
28th (1)
1997:25
29 (1)
1965:23
291 (1)
2029:14
298 (1)
1999:22
29th (1)
2036:8
2nd (1)
1998:9
350 (2)
2036:12;2039:2
354 (1)
2049:11
36 (1)
2060:25
362 (1)
2029:13
37 (2)
1978:8,25
39 (2)
2003:19;2004:12
3d (1)
2014:3
4 (6)
1943:18;1983:9;
2021:17;2059:10,22;
2063:25
4.4 (1)
1981:17
407 (1)
3
2006:5
409 (2)
3 (9)
2029:4;2074:7
1942:26;1983:9,10,
41 (2)
19;1990:18;1999:13,25;
1976:4;1979:19
2000:12;2063:19
4105 (6)
30 (2)
1939:25;1990:9,12,
1983:18;2054:24
13;2065:5;2071:10
30,000-foot (1)
4105A (5)
2056:14
1989:17,20;1990:4,
300 (2)
15;1991:5
2036:12;2039:2
45 (1)
3028 (2)
1940:21
2012:9,13
475 (1)
306 (1)
2011:15
1961:19
49 (1)
309 (8)
2054:20
1994:4,7;1999:5;
4th (3)
2000:6,12,13,14;
1996:16;1999:12;
2002:13
2002:9
30th (3)
1965:11;2038:2,23
5
31 (7)
1966:17,21;1973:7;
5 (11)
1997:3,4;2005:17;
1947:6;1967:16;
2013:6
1983:15;1985:3;
310 (3)
1988:23;1989:5;
2017:14,21,22
1999:26;2000:12;
32 (2)
2023:21;2024:5;2066:7
1967:5;2005:18
5/21/2012 (1)
33 (2)
2006:21
1969:13;1979:18
50 (1)
331 (1)
2011:24
1978:8
500 (1)
34 (3)
2054:24
1967:15;1969:15;
51 (3)
2000:8
1965:20,20;2035:18
35 (1)
51U (2)
1981:8
1995:23;1997:2
523 (1)
2006:6
537 (1)
1964:16
554 (1)
1981:18
572 (1)
1960:9
5th (1)
2010:25
1999:12;2044:17;
2069:7
84 (2)
1999:5;2014:2
87 (4)
1987:2;2003:4,5,7
897 (1)
1970:2
9
6
6 (2)
1947:14;1989:16
6.19 (1)
2010:10
6.219 (1)
2010:9
60 (1)
1937:20
608 (1)
1955:2
65 (3)
2006:6;2037:26;
2039:20
662 (1)
2033:21
669 (1)
1981:22
67 (1)
2011:17
68 (2)
2011:17;2035:14
6B (1)
1953:8
6th (1)
1996:9
7
7 (4)
1937:21;1988:24;
2068:10,22
75 (1)
2072:6
755 (1)
1940:25
760 (1)
2006:21
78 (11)
1937:20;2018:21;
2029:25;2030:13;
2051:16;2061:18;
2062:4,26;2066:21;
2073:14;2076:8
79.9 (1)
1980:20
8
8 (7)
1949:20,20,20,20;
9 (3)
1969:26;1980:25;
1999:12
9.6 (1)
1981:16
90 (2)
1941:10;2033:21
91 (3)
2011:14;2050:16,18
93 (2)
1997:25;1998:8
94 (1)
1998:8
949 (1)
2051:9
952 (1)
2011:25
96 (3)
1997:16;2007:25;
2011:15
977 (1)
2010:8
98 (1)
2011:14
A
AAA (9)
1964:14;1967:6,7,10,
13,25;1970:3,9,10
ability (3)
1943:19;2032:5;
2034:13
able (9)
1971:4,6;2006:18;
2050:3;2062:26;
2076:26;2077:4,7,18
absence (1)
2009:23
absolutely (5)
1952:15;1965:8;
1967:21;2018:16;
2033:3
absurd (2)
2036:25;2048:4
abuse (1)
2066:25
abusing (1)
1994:12
accelerating (1)
2026:5
acceptable (1)
(2) 2009 - acceptable
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
2019:18
accepted (1)
2034:8
accepting (1)
2034:18
access (4)
1946:22;2045:17;
2057:13;2058:19
according (2)
1958:2;2005:5
accordingly (1)
2004:6
account (4)
1991:3;2028:19;
2050:25;2075:9
accuracy (2)
2001:13;2029:10
accurate (4)
1972:24;1995:5;
2061:9;2077:22
accurately (1)
2058:2
accused (1)
1977:20
achieve (1)
1964:14
Ackman (1)
1963:25
acknowledging (1)
1993:8
across (1)
2033:12
act (6)
2021:12;2026:10,10;
2030:16;2031:18;
2066:26
acting (1)
2029:9
action (7)
2033:5;2039:24;
2040:20;2062:15;
2071:13,17;2073:19
active (1)
2008:26
acts (3)
2030:18,21;2033:6
actual (5)
1942:26;2020:5,14;
2055:23;2060:25
actually (15)
1948:20;1951:7;
1958:4;1960:7;1975:3;
1989:11;2008:7;2023:9;
2036:10,20;2038:22,25;
2049:19;2055:26;
2066:4
AD (1)
2014:3
AD3rd (1)
2011:24
added (3)
1942:4,12;2074:17
addition (8)
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
1946:20;1977:3;
1985:13;2034:11;
2037:2,23;2055:6;
2065:26
additional (3)
1970:16;2028:4;
2051:9
address (1)
2010:18
addressed (2)
1993:15;2052:25
adequate (2)
2062:21;2064:7
administrative (9)
1948:16;1971:25;
afternoon (2)
2015:22,26
after-the-fact (1)
2065:23
afterward (2)
2059:25;2060:8
AG (1)
1937:10
again (51)
1946:17;1947:19;
1948:14;1949:11;
1951:11;1959:12;
1960:10;1961:10;
1963:14;1972:26;
1974:24,26;1976:10;
1988:2;1992:26;2012:4;
1977:24;1985:17;
2021:22;2061:19;
1986:26;1987:4;1991:8;
2062:18;2064:6
1995:12;1996:18;
admission (2)
2000:11;2003:11;
1985:18;1992:24
2004:13;2020:19;
admit (1)
2023:8;2026:18;
1956:2
2038:19,22,25;2039:9,
admits (1)
16;2040:3,11,12;
1941:14
2041:10;2044:10;
admitted (3)
2045:22;2052:11,24;
1992:8;2004:19;
2053:24;2059:18;
2010:25
2061:5;2063:26;
admittedly (1)
2065:24;2070:3;2071:6,
2065:4
16;2072:19;2073:6;
adopt (1)
2074:2;2077:14
1941:25
against (1)
adoption (1)
2057:24
1943:2
agencies (4)
adversely (1)
2030:16;2053:8;
2073:19
2056:20;2062:23
advocating (1)
agency (40)
1943:12
1988:2;2012:5,10,16;
affect (1)
2013:3,24;2014:16;
1991:4
2030:9,11,18,21;
affected (2)
2031:12,17;2032:7,13,
2066:22;2067:8
14,14,15,16,18,19,25;
affidavit (20)
2033:6,19,19,26;
1940:8;1953:8;
2051:15;2052:15;
1967:4;1979:14,18,19;
2062:11,15,16,21,24;
1980:11;2003:18,19,22;
2063:15,16;2064:7;
2004:12,14;2006:25;
2067:8;2070:15;
2032:13;2033:14;
2071:17;2073:19
2038:10;2039:7;
agency's (5)
2060:14;2066:16;
2012:14;2031:2;
2075:22
2062:14;2068:16;
affidavits (4)
2071:13
2007:7;2032:18,22;
ago (2)
2063:3
2018:20;2029:20
affiliate (1)
agree (4)
1958:5
1989:11;1990:15;
affiliated (1)
2029:26;2052:6
1943:23
agreed (3)
affiliates (1)
2025:23;2027:8;
1944:2
2028:8
affirmed (1)
agreement (12)
2062:20
1957:9;1958:16,17,
AFSI (1)
20;2005:20;2023:16;
2045:19
2027:13,26;2028:3,12,
18,19
agreements (2)
2026:26;2027:11
ahead (3)
1995:22;2004:4;
2019:8
aid (2)
1979:5;2065:14
AIG (6)
1980:3,6,14,16,18,26
AIG's (1)
1980:24
aims (1)
2001:13
air (1)
2016:3
airplane (1)
2021:4
albeit (1)
2005:10
Aldo's (1)
2047:16
allegations (1)
1961:21
allegiance (1)
2016:20
allo (1)
2058:2
allow (6)
1942:7;1945:17;
1960:16;1961:7;
1997:10;2032:26
allowed (5)
1956:17;1982:10;
2022:4;2028:3;2042:12
allowing (1)
1997:13
allows (1)
2039:20
almost (5)
1940:21;1943:12;
1952:25;2038:24;
2073:21
along (2)
1957:14;2030:10
alongside (1)
1977:6
alternative (1)
2062:20
alternatively (1)
2000:20
although (3)
2005:9;2013:6;
2025:20
always (2)
2061:24;2066:3
Amazing (1)
1939:7
America (4)
2027:3,3,20;2028:10
among (3)
1940:15;1980:26;
2060:12
amongst (1)
1994:19
amount (7)
1976:15,17;2010:3,6,
11;2019:16;2072:17
amounts (1)
2010:13
analogy (1)
1994:26
analyses (10)
2043:11;2046:9,11;
2047:4,13,16;2049:2,9;
2053:2;2071:25
analysis (32)
1983:25;1984:2;
1986:17;1993:10;
1998:15,22;1999:20;
2006:3;2013:26;2023:3;
2027:16,20;2033:25;
2040:10,22;2041:23;
2042:9;2043:13,14,19,
21,24;2045:15,20;
2049:22;2050:13;
2053:5,22;2056:13;
2057:11;2064:4;
2067:18
analyst (4)
1949:22,25;1951:24;
1952:6
analyzed (3)
1984:8,9;2041:26
analyzing (1)
2026:24
and/or (1)
2065:4
announced (5)
1954:8;1963:15,24;
1967:11;1979:4
annul (4)
2030:23;2033:7;
2034:16;2038:7
annulled (1)
2066:22
annulment (8)
2029:25;2030:9,12,
26;2035:5;2057:19,20;
2074:6
answered (1)
1945:13
anticipate (1)
2027:9
apart (1)
2023:10
apocalyptic (1)
2060:21
Apologies (1)
1966:8
Appeals (16)
2006:5;2014:24,26;
2031:3;2033:20;
2034:14;2051:18;
2052:12;2056:19;
2062:13;2063:11;
(3) accepted - Appeals
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
2065:24;2069:12;
2070:7,14,19
appear (2)
1948:13;2065:3
appears (1)
2014:15
appendix (1)
1999:13
applicability (1)
1993:8
applicable (3)
1984:22;1988:11;
2067:13
applicant (1)
2038:8
application (22)
1944:6;1946:21,23;
1950:26;1951:12;
1969:13;1983:6,14,15,
16;1984:14,18;1985:7,9;
1986:16;1988:9;
2010:17;2012:15;
2034:23;2037:7,8;
2044:18
applied (12)
1945:14;1946:15,16;
1971:9;1993:20;
2005:14,16;2044:7;
2063:14;2064:4;
2066:12;2067:13
applies (2)
2063:13;2064:2
apply (8)
1940:19;1944:4;
1946:10;1951:21;
1986:25;1988:8;
1992:25;2033:8
applying (2)
1988:15;2014:5
appreciate (1)
2062:3
approaching (1)
1966:10
appropriate (4)
2012:14;2017:14;
2033:5;2034:15
appropriately (1)
2035:19
approval (72)
1939:23;1947:20;
1948:11,12,15;1949:4;
1951:25;1952:13;
1958:11;1960:12;
1963:3,11;1964:15;
1966:3;1971:23;1973:4;
1981:11;1982:16;
1988:21;1989:16;
1991:9,13;1992:9,10,19;
2018:8,9;2029:8;
2032:23,24;2034:2;
2047:23;2059:11,24,26;
2060:17,22;2061:4,21;
2062:5,10,12;2063:2,6,
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
2006:11;2066:8;
2067:20;2077:14
23;2066:2,10,11,21;
arrested (3)
2067:6,8,11,15,19,22;
1975:4,12,18
2070:24;2071:11;
Article (14)
2073:10;2074:6
1937:20;1978:26;
approvals (1)
1979:4;2018:21;
2070:25
2029:25;2030:13;
approvalthat (1)
2051:16;2057:4;
2066:11
2061:18;2062:4,26;
approve (4)
2066:21;2073:14;
1946:11;1997:24;
2076:8
1999:25;2057:11
articulate (1)
approved (12)
2011:21
1943:11,25;1950:3;
articulated (1)
1952:17;1955:11;
1978:19
1956:18;1957:6;
aside (1)
1963:14;1977:17,19;
1962:10
1997:23;2054:13
asserted (1)
approximately (1)
2067:24
2028:6
assertion (3)
April (1)
1989:13;1994:5;
1995:16
2013:18
arbitrary (4)
assessing (1)
2066:24;2067:2;
2009:12
2070:2;2071:11
assessment (3)
area (2)
2070:16,18;2073:11
1964:21;2052:5
assessments (1)
argue (4)
1998:6
1973:19;1974:7,8;
asset (1)
1993:23
2027:24
argued (2)
assets (14)
1998:26;2048:11
1955:17;1958:6;
argues (1)
1967:3;1973:14;
1987:26
1980:18;1981:4;
arguing (3)
1993:11;2004:19;
1994:11;2002:10;
2005:21;2025:7,9;
2045:4
2027:17;2028:4,8
argument (30)
assign (1)
1941:3,4;1962:10;
2037:17
1965:10;1966:4;
assigned (2)
1967:19;1968:2,5;
2021:8;2077:5
1973:5,19;1976:23;
assistance (3)
1992:15;1994:11,12;
2022:4;2027:2;2077:3
2000:5;2001:22;
Assistant (1)
2002:23,25;2003:9,16;
1938:20
2018:15;2019:3;
associated (1)
2026:14;2029:23;
1958:6
2037:23;2042:19,21,25; Associates (4)
2043:10;2048:15
1984:10,12,14;1993:2
arguments (11)
Association (1)
1963:8;1998:25;
1960:4
1999:14;2001:12;
assume (3)
2016:17;2018:26;
1959:13;2005:18;
2035:11;2037:15;
2054:14
2041:19;2056:15;
assumption (1)
2072:7
2005:19
arising (4)
assumptions (8)
2012:12;2059:11,23;
2030:22,25;2053:3,8,
2063:14
11;2059:2,3;2071:14
around (8)
assure (1)
1939:7;1963:15;
2069:19
1964:7;2001:23;
attacking (1)
20;2064:13,14,18,21,22;
2065:5,7,10,12,15,18,21,
2019:25
attempt (1)
2074:13
attention (3)
2007:17;2029:19;
2039:11
ATTORNEY (2)
1938:17;1941:9
Attorneys (2)
1938:5,20
attorney's (1)
2012:7
audit (8)
2027:24;2059:6,7,25;
2060:4,9,10,16
August (4)
1973:7;2054:2,15;
2056:5
authority (2)
2014:21;2030:7
available (11)
2007:18,19;2025:17,
25;2036:2;2040:13;
2049:18;2054:4;
2070:17,17,18
avoid (2)
2007:2;2030:26
avoiding (1)
2044:6
aware (3)
1973:24;1987:5;
2034:9
awareness (2)
1958:21,25
away (2)
2008:6;2068:9
awful (2)
2016:16;2018:23
awhile (1)
2075:20
2000:20;2035:17;
2038:24;2047:14;
2049:17
background (1)
2025:3
backstop (2)
1954:5;2065:17
backward (1)
2037:24
bad (1)
2052:12
balance (2)
1986:12;2010:8
BANK (15)
1937:5,5,6,9;1948:5;
1961:16;1975:16;
2023:2;2027:3,3,4,20;
2028:10;2033:12;
2035:23
banks (29)
1947:17;1948:23,26;
1951:18,21;1960:16;
1962:12,15;1971:22;
1972:15;1973:12,19;
1974:11;1977:4,7,16;
1980:5;2002:7,10;
2018:12,26;2023:24;
2027:23;2053:7;
2073:20,22,22,22,25
banks' (3)
2002:23,25;2022:25
BARBARA (1)
1938:24
Barclays (6)
2043:11,21,25;2044:3,
20,24
bare (1)
1941:16
base (3)
2014:19;2035:13;
2036:4
B
based (26)
1974:2;1984:24;
1985:22,25;1986:2;
BA (1)
1987:16;1991:18;
1937:8
1998:20;2002:25;
back (42)
2007:3,6;2009:11;
1939:10,11,14;
2010:3;2014:22;
1948:18;1950:5;1955:9,
2027:16,20;2028:4;
24;1957:4;1959:17,18;
2033:8;2044:23;2046:9;
1963:25;1969:18;
2055:10,17;2057:4;
1973:19;1975:13;
2058:21;2071:17;
1983:6,25;1986:26;
2073:10
1990:8;1994:5,16;
1996:5;1997:13;1999:4; basic (8)
1953:20;1979:23;
2003:16;2004:5,7;
2016:18;2045:16;
2015:13,14,16,19,21;
2063:21;2064:5;
2023:11;2030:3;
2065:20,25
2031:26;2032:10;
basically (7)
2033:8;2044:19,19;
1997:12;2031:13;
2050:24;2061:22;
2036:14;2041:24;
2071:23;2077:9
2045:14;2063:13;
backdated (7)
2067:15
1964:24;1993:26;
(4) appear - basically
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
Basile (1)
2030:20
basing (1)
1990:13
basis (12)
1962:22;1968:6;
1992:10;2021:13;
2030:17;2044:12;
2062:24;2064:7,13;
2065:8;2066:10;2076:6
battle (2)
2056:17;2057:6
Beame (1)
2014:10
bears (1)
2005:12
became (4)
1955:12;1956:11;
1979:25;2007:12
because- (1)
2066:2
becomes (1)
1970:5
began (1)
1999:7
begin (2)
2016:5;2061:20
beginning (6)
2001:2;2003:2;
2004:20;2030:2;
2069:21;2074:14
behind (6)
1956:19;1959:12,21;
1961:6;1962:5;1967:9
behoove (1)
1977:15
belied (5)
1976:9;2036:5,26;
2040:3;2049:2
belief (1)
2046:10
below (7)
1966:19,20,24;
1967:2;2037:26;
2039:20,23
bench (1)
2033:13
beneficiary (3)
1977:8;1978:3;1980:6
benefit (14)
1947:12;1948:22;
1949:3;1950:11;
1951:26;1952:14;
1953:18;1959:22;
1961:5;1962:3,26;
1972:13;1978:18;
2073:17
benefits (6)
1949:8,9,26;1960:23;
1982:2,7
benefitted (1)
1949:5
benefitting (1)
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
1960:22
BENSON (1)
1938:11
best (11)
1958:13;1969:10;
2013:4;2020:7,10;
2039:20;2042:17;
22,26;2056:13
BlackRock's (3)
2017:18;2019:21;
2023:3
blind (1)
1962:16
blindly (1)
2066:12;2068:8;2076:5,
2026:15
23
Block (1)
better (7)
2028:7
1958:4;1960:15;
BNP (1)
1963:22;1964:6;2021:2;
1937:4
2069:20;2072:4
Board (3)
beyond (1)
1979:8;2011:23;
2064:21
2031:3
bias (2)
board's (1)
1973:19,26
2014:7
big (13)
bold (4)
1953:4;1955:6;
2013:18;2050:19,20,
1964:21;1966:13;
21
1975:26;1994:19;
bond (3)
2036:19;2037:26;
1971:14;1973:14;
2043:22;2053:18;
1978:26
2054:8;2056:16;2076:8 bonds (3)
biggest (2)
1948:7,25;1973:16
1960:25;1962:8
bonus (1)
bike (1)
1952:18
2021:4
book (21)
billion (38)
1951:6;1953:10,16;
1950:14;1951:4;
1964:10,21,22;1965:5,7,
1963:21,21;1964:5,6,17;
9,15,19;1970:11;
1966:11;1976:6;
1976:14,14,18;1978:9,
1981:14,15,17,18,20;
17;1981:15;2006:18;
1991:3,4;2010:5,9;
2008:10;2068:18
2033:24;2034:18;
books (2)
2035:8;2037:6;2045:21;
2006:14;2009:6
2047:5,17,20;2050:7,8; bore (2)
2051:7,8;2052:2,2;
1956:19;1981:10
2054:8,23;2055:10;
both (16)
2060:26;2061:2;
1943:25;1944:3;
2071:21
1955:4;1956:24;
billions (1)
1966:23;1993:20;
1976:18
1998:3;2002:11,11,16,
bind (1)
17;2011:16;2027:23;
1946:26
2052:14;2063:16;
binder (2)
2074:5
2056:24;2057:3
bottom (1)
binding (1)
1950:8
1985:19
bottoms-up (1)
bit (2)
2056:12
1969:25;2002:24
bound (2)
black (13)
1945:14;2066:8
2020:19,20;2025:14,
box (9)
18,24;2026:22;2027:16;
2020:19,20;2042:21,
2028:14;2042:21,22,25;
2043:2;2046:3
black-box (1)
2019:21
BlackRock (22)
1978:8,16;2016:13,17,
26;2018:6;2019:11,17,
19,25;2020:6,14;2022:8,
13,26;2023:12,15,16,19,
BRANCH (1)
1937:10
break (3)
2015:21;2016:2;
2035:22
BRIAN (1)
1938:8
Bridge (16)
1984:10,12,13,16,18,
20;1993:2,6,9,9,16,17;
1999:16,17,18;2001:17
brief (11)
1986:19,20;1988:7;
1992:25;1998:12;
1999:12;2004:25;
2005:2,8,14,17
briefing (1)
1974:4
briefly (2)
1946:9;1973:18
briefs (2)
1980:9;2003:2
bring (1)
2002:7
brink (1)
2006:25
broad (2)
2012:15;2069:17
broadly (1)
2064:4
Broadway (2)
1938:12,18
Broderick (4)
2041:5,10;2042:6;
2043:14
Brothers (5)
2041:6,25;2042:8,13;
2053:22
brought (4)
1980:3;2018:18;
2021:25;2031:8
Brown (14)
1949:23;1950:6;
1955:5,7;1956:22;
2047:7,10,21,25;
2048:18;2049:4,5;
2050:26;2051:22;
2052:10;2053:2,15,19,
20;2057:10,13;2058:3,
10,13;2059:2;2060:3;
2061:7,8,16;2071:24
Buchmiller's (23)
1964:23;1969:22;
1995:26;1997:25;
1999:19;2029:16;
2035:15;2036:5,26;
2039:26;2045:9;
2047:13;2048:20;
2049:3,7,23;2052:25,26;
2053:23;2058:2,5;
2072:11,22
Buchmiller-speak (1)
1965:14
Buffalo (1)
2033:21
built (1)
2010:15
bunch (1)
2055:17
burden (1)
2034:11
burst (1)
1953:4
business (16)
1953:11;1954:9,10,
12;1955:21;1964:14;
1969:7;1971:5,7;
1978:9;1981:20,26;
2033:10;2039:22;
2043:18,26
businesses (1)
1966:24
Buttner (1)
2034:24
buy (2)
1978:26;1997:13
buys (1)
1951:21
1958:14,17,25;1960:18; Byrne (4)
1963:16,18,20;2033:11;
2029:18;2030:5;
2044:10
2031:3,8
Brown's (1)
1956:8
C
Buchmiller (70)
1964:12;1965:6,12;
California (2)
1988:19;1992:20;
2015:16;2077:10
1993:15,26;1994:6;
call (4)
1995:14;1996:6,22;
1990:3;1997:15;
23,25;2043:2;2046:3,3,3
1997:22;1998:4,8,15;
2002:11;2046:3
Bradley (1)
1999:17;2000:21,22;
called (4)
1973:25
2001:17;2031:24;
1963:16;1976:24;
Bradley's (1)
2035:18,26;2036:8,14;
2006:24;2032:9
1974:3
2037:10,13,17;2038:21; calling (1)
Brady (1)
2039:6,19;2040:8,12,15,
2076:6
2070:20
20,23,26;2041:12,14; CALYON (1)
bragging (1)
2043:2,4,6;2044:12;
1937:4
1974:10
2045:23;2046:4,7;
came (12)
(5) Basile - came
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
1939:5;1940:20;
1941:2;1942:17;1960:7;
1963:25;1983:5;
1995:21;2034:2;2050:4;
2059:25;2060:17
can (50)
1940:13;1944:24;
1945:22;1946:12;
1947:6;1950:2,3,3;
1958:20,20;1962:10;
1972:7,19,19;1974:23;
1976:11;1980:4;1981:4;
1987:19,21;1991:20;
1993:25;1996:21;
1998:7;2013:15,25;
2015:13;2016:13;
2029:5;2033:7,8;
2034:5;2036:14,24;
2038:8,17;2040:9;
2049:15;2057:23,24;
2058:11;2067:4;
2070:24,25;2072:24;
2073:9,18;2074:20;
2075:9;2076:5
CANADIAN (1)
1937:4
cannot- (1)
2062:19
capacity (3)
1973:10;1975:14;
2010:7
CAPITAL (12)
1937:9;1950:17;
1956:12;1958:10;
1967:13;1970:16;
1971:13;1978:4,6,15;
1984:5;2045:19
capitalization (1)
1970:5
capitalized (3)
1981:25;2007:15;
2008:17
capricious (4)
2066:24;2067:3;
2070:2;2071:11
car (1)
2021:4
care (7)
1939:9;1971:20;
2046:2;2076:11,12;
2077:6,7
career (1)
2060:4
careful (3)
2070:16,17;2073:10
carefully (1)
2075:23
carted (1)
1973:18
case (113)
1940:18;1941:5,18;
1944:21;1946:24;
1947:2,3;1948:16,18;
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
1949:24;1951:18,21;
1956:2;1960:20;
1961:20,22,26;1962:12,
14;1963:10;1974:23;
1977:2,26;1978:7;
1980:7;1985:7,16;
1986:19;1988:10,16;
1989:10;1992:14;
2001:22;2003:3,18;
2004:16;2006:5,7,8;
2008:20;2010:15;
2011:25;2012:2,16,17;
2013:4,25;2014:2,7,10,
10,14,25;2015:2,3,4;
2016:11,11;2018:21;
2021:23,24;2029:18,21,
22;2030:5,6,20,20,21,
22;2031:3,7;2032:9,10,
11;2033:3,4,11,14;
2034:3,4,8,9,9;2035:19;
2036:5;2038:11;
2048:21;2049:20;
2051:21;2061:20;
2063:12,13,23;2064:2,2,
3,5,12;2066:4,20;
2069:11,13,21,26;
2070:6;2071:24;
2073:14,16,20;2074:4;
2075:21,25
cases (25)
2005:25;2006:4;
2011:10,11,16;2019:15;
2026:4;2027:23;
2030:15,15;2045:12;
2049:21;2052:11,14,18;
2062:4;2063:14,17,22;
2064:19;2069:6,8,20,25;
2075:3
cash (4)
1966:23;1980:24;
1981:15;2042:11
casino (2)
1943:12;1956:20
cast (2)
1962:10;2013:11
Casualty (1)
2006:4
cause (1)
1962:24
caused (2)
2029:12;2032:7
CDO (5)
1965:2;2040:22;
2041:10,16;2058:15
CDOs (6)
2042:2,4;2043:15,16;
2044:3;2048:25
CDs (1)
1961:16
center (1)
1946:24
central (1)
1947:21
Centre (1)
1937:20
CEO (12)
1950:24;1951:23;
1952:7,9;1955:4;
2011:11,13,23;2016:6;
2035:14;2038:11;
2063:22;2069:20
cited (8)
2011:10,16;2013:21;
1959:8;1961:26;1962:6;
2014:9;2032:3;2054:20;
1963:23,24;1969:26;
2059:5;2067:21
1982:2
cites (2)
certain (5)
2030:7;2069:7
1999:9;2009:24;
Citibank (4)
2010:2;2027:9;2031:11
2025:12,18;2026:17;
certainly (3)
2027:26
1972:26;2013:25;
Citigroup (4)
2021:9
2025:5;2027:2,17;
certificate (2)
2028:8
2031:4,5
citing (3)
CERTIFIED (1)
1947:20;1957:19;
2077:21
2012:15
certiorari (1)
Citizens (2)
2063:14
2006:4;2073:18
certiorari-to-review (1) City (3)
2064:3
2011:24;2014:11,13
challenge (1)
civil (1)
2028:15
1947:3
chambers (1)
claim (1)
2061:22
2055:6
change (6)
claimed (2)
2031:2;2032:8;
1940:17;2001:3
2034:20;2052:16;
claims (13)
2053:11;2055:8
1940:20;1942:17;
changed (7)
1943:20;1950:21;
2032:2,7;2033:17;
1955:18;1956:4;
2034:6,7;2036:15;
1981:14,22;2030:26;
2038:4
2042:10;2044:6;
changing (1)
2055:20;2056:2
1992:14
clarify (2)
Chaplin (1)
1970:14,19
1969:26
class (2)
charging (1)
2020:11;2027:21
2008:18
clean (2)
chart (2)
2033:2;2077:2
2046:9;2061:5
clear (37)
CHASE (2)
1943:19;1953:24;
1937:5;2033:23
1954:3,8,9;1956:2,8,26;
chatting (1)
1958:22;1961:4;
2027:22
1969:14;1971:4;
check (2)
1982:12;1994:20;
2007:5;2009:8
2000:4;2010:9,26;
choice (6)
2011:2,9,12,19;2014:24;
2007:18;2036:2;
2030:16;2033:22;
2040:13,13,17;2049:17
2035:16;2040:26;
choose (1)
2041:2;2049:24;2052:9;
1950:21
2056:4;2059:19;2062:9;
CIFG (9)
2063:18,26;2064:19;
1976:24;1977:5,24;
2068:11;2069:3
1978:4,8;1981:24;
clearer (2)
2018:8,23,24
2015:9;2051:13
circumstances (7)
Clearly (12)
1941:5;1946:16;
1941:26;1949:4;
2027:9;2052:7,17;
1951:15;1972:19;
2076:9,23
1998:15;2013:7;
cite (10)
2030:12;2033:5,24;
1958:13;2002:22;
2043:8;2059:25;2074:4
client (2)
2023:12;2025:16
clients (3)
1967:9;2070:8,8
CLO (1)
1964:26
close (21)
1952:26;1954:13;
1955:9;1956:5;1958:8;
1961:19;1963:22;
1964:7;1965:3,13,15;
1971:22;1979:5,11;
1981:6;2008:4,4;
2036:3;2039:10;2042:5,
10
CM (1)
2077:25
CMBS (23)
2046:6,11;2047:19,
22;2048:22;2049:20,22;
2050:3,7;2053:2,13;
2057:14,15,17;2058:5,6,
15,18,25;2060:13;
2071:25;2072:11,13
CMR (1)
1938:24
Co (4)
1955:9,9;1956:5;
2004:26
code (1)
2021:18
collapse (1)
2058:26
collateral (3)
2024:2,3;2025:13
coming (5)
1957:5;2004:5;
2042:13;2044:20;
2065:19
commenced (1)
1999:8
Commissioner (1)
1960:4
commitment (1)
1954:13
common (2)
1980:20;2055:2
communicated (2)
1960:17;2036:17
communication (1)
1979:24
communications (1)
1979:15
commutation (2)
1961:25;2043:20
commutations (2)
1962:20;2043:22
commute (2)
1961:6;2044:22
commuting (1)
1963:20
companies (3)
1940:16,16;1950:18
(6) can - companies
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
company (27)
1941:13;1944:3,13;
1945:26;1950:15;
1951:16,22;1953:19;
1955:16;1956:20;
1958:7;1959:10,22;
1961:5;1962:26;
1967:10;1970:17;
1978:3,5,15;1980:14;
1981:4;2001:14;
2002:17;2008:20,22;
2011:15
company's (4)
1993:12;2001:16;
2010:12,13
compare (1)
2042:12
compared (2)
2026:9,10
compensation (1)
1952:18
competition (1)
2009:8
competitors (1)
2009:5
compilation (1)
2075:3
compiled (1)
1993:2
complain (1)
1977:16
complained (1)
2031:9
complaining (1)
1952:3
complete (7)
1953:19,19;2008:15;
2027:25;2047:21;
2061:9;2070:6
completed (2)
1995:15;2000:9
completely (3)
1978:12;2018:17;
2045:17
completion (1)
1999:26
complicity (1)
1977:20
complied (2)
1947:7,11
complying (1)
2031:11
component (1)
1961:15
comprehensive (1)
2041:22
computer (1)
2041:12
concealed (1)
2071:22
concede (1)
1975:15
concern (3)
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
1964:26;1984:3;
2035:19
concerned (3)
1965:4,16,18
concerning (2)
2059:10,23
concerns (1)
1984:2
conclude (3)
1993:25;2061:18;
2073:13
concluded (2)
1941:6;2027:17
concludes (1)
2074:7
conclusion (8)
1997:20,22;2027:20;
2029:3;2030:19;
2050:21;2057:26;
2072:24
condition (4)
1944:14;1991:18;
2017:12,17
conduct (4)
2002:11,13,16;
2027:24
conducted (2)
2027:16;2028:22
confirmed (1)
1999:2
conflict (6)
2016:19;2017:11,19,
19;2020:8;2022:5
conflicted (3)
2019:19,25;2020:10
conflicts (3)
2016:15,18,25
connection (10)
1943:23;1973:23;
1984:15;1995:18;
1999:20;2003:17;
2010:20;2039:10,12;
2043:22
consider (3)
2013:9;2064:20;
2074:25
consideration (2)
1970:3;2068:16
considered (3)
1993:20;2063:20;
2070:22
considering (1)
2023:25
consistent (3)
1970:5;2056:6;
2063:21
construction (1)
2068:16
construed (1)
2014:4
contains (1)
2042:9
contemplated (1)
2008:24
contemporaneous (6)
1961:3,22;1962:9,11;
1964:8;1985:12
contemporaneously (1)
1962:6
contends (1)
2022:23
context (6)
1975:2,8;1997:5;
2006:2;2007:22;
2025:21
Continued (7)
1954:14;1968:9;
1990:17;2012:18;
2024:4;2046:12;
2068:21
continuity (1)
2001:16
contract (3)
2008:3,8;2042:10
contractual (3)
1967:22;1968:5,6
contradicting (1)
1985:5
contradicts (3)
2000:21,22,23
contrary (5)
1986:14;1988:17,19;
2045:3;2069:16
contrast (2)
2001:15;2027:7
contrasted (1)
2069:16
contravention (1)
1953:20
control (4)
2014:12,15,18,21
conversation (1)
2022:6
conveyance (2)
1984:4,6
Coordinated (1)
2027:5
copies (1)
2047:11
copy (1)
2069:23
Corcoran (1)
1957:10
core (1)
2066:19
CORP (6)
1937:17;1955:21;
1956:11;1970:21,22;
2036:23
Corporation (7)
1955:18;1956:13;
1998:19;2005:22;
2011:13,22;2036:23
Corp's (5)
1985:21,26;1991:18;
1993:7,10
corrections (1)
2034:19
correctly (1)
2009:16
cost (5)
1993:11,12;2009:19,
24;2010:4
Counsel (48)
1938:9,15;1940:22;
1941:2;1947:7,15;
1952:23;1953:23;
1957:23;1958:2;1966:6;
1971:18;1975:26;
1976:23;1977:3;1980:3;
1985:2;1987:7,22,23;
1988:14,25;1989:14,26;
1991:23;1993:22;
1994:25;1996:15;
1998:13;2007:11;
2009:16;2010:19,22,24;
2013:14;2014:9;2016:6,
16;2021:6;2022:16;
2023:18;2026:20;
2035:12;2045:3;
2054:19;2067:22;
2068:8;2072:6
counsel's (1)
2026:14
count (1)
2075:7
counterparties (3)
1948:5;1961:16;
1980:15
country (2)
1981:12;2035:21
County (1)
2006:7
course (12)
1940:18;1943:10;
1947:2;1958:14;
1973:22;2013:9;
2020:13;2026:14;
2042:22;2068:2;2069:5;
2074:13
COURT (125)
1937:2;1939:3,5,11,
15,18;1940:19;1941:19,
25;1944:23,24;1945:3,
10,19;1956:7;1957:20;
1959:25;1967:24;
1970:25;1972:17,22;
1974:19,25;1975:6,10,
17,21;1977:13;1982:24,
26;1986:22;1987:3,12,
23;1988:15,25;1989:15;
1990:7;1991:13,20,24;
1993:19;1994:13;
1995:10,12,20;1997:4,
17;1998:23;2000:10,17;
2001:8,25;2002:3;
2003:4,7,10,23;2004:3,
9;2006:5,7,9;2007:11;
2011:3,5;2013:23;
2014:24,25;2015:14,20;
2016:2;2017:5;2019:8;
2026:12,20;2028:25;
2030:23;2031:14,17;
2032:22,26;2033:6,20;
2034:14;2038:9,15;
2040:6;2045:6;2047:9;
2049:16;2051:18;
2052:11;2055:22;
2056:19,23,25;2057:7;
2059:19;2060:11,16;
2062:13;2063:10,21;
2065:24;2066:18;
2067:10;2068:13,14,15;
2069:11,15,19;2070:7,
14,19;2072:25;2074:9,
26;2075:7,11,17,19;
2077:13,26
courtroom (3)
1942:9;2067:20;
2070:12
courts (10)
1944:4;2038:6,7;
2057:3;2062:14,25;
2063:25;2067:3;
2069:10;2071:16
court's (1)
2061:25
cover (3)
1964:16;1982:22;
1993:11
crazy (1)
2009:3
criminal (1)
2012:8
crisis (13)
1943:11;1956:16;
1959:20;1980:14,16;
1981:12;2006:17;
2026:25;2040:19;
2052:21;2055:4,13;
2056:7
critical (5)
1947:23;1969:4,7;
2026:5;2048:19
criticisms (1)
2020:14
cropped (1)
2061:10
cross (1)
1955:8
CRR (1)
1938:24
CSR (2)
1938:24;2077:25
current (9)
2025:25;2026:7,11;
2033:8,18,19;2034:14;
2052:23;2055:4
currently (1)
1956:3
CURT (1)
1939:20
(7) company - CURT
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
cut (4)
1963:22;1964:6;
2033:23;2044:4
D
daily (2)
2044:12;2076:6
damning (1)
2061:5
dangerous (1)
1943:8
dare (1)
1962:11
data (19)
2022:7,9,11,15,24;
2023:4;2025:17,25;
2026:3,4,9,11;2028:17;
2052:4,15,23;2054:3,21;
2058:21
date (5)
1966:3;2025:10,11,16,
26
DAVID (2)
1938:14,19
day (11)
1948:10;1954:7;
1955:11,12;1963:15,23;
2018:16;2019:2;2032:4;
2074:21;2076:18
days (7)
1951:25;1984:12;
2018:20;2029:20;
2058:18;2074:12,12
DCL (1)
1986:24
de (1)
2067:10
deal (1)
1948:4
dealing (6)
2031:12;2035:21;
2044:12;2056:7,9;
2066:19
deals (1)
1942:3
dealt (1)
2035:7
Death (1)
2007:25
debate (2)
1973:7;2066:2
debt (1)
2070:11
December (10)
1953:24;1956:26;
1959:6;1966:21;
1967:16;1969:11;
1983:9,15;2044:17;
2056:5
decide (3)
1999:24;2015:6;
2077:16
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
decided (3)
2067:10;2073:16;
2075:13
decision (46)
1944:17;1971:19;
1995:18;1996:11;
2014:20;2029:25;
2007:9;2036:23
demonstrates (1)
1952:11
denied (2)
1958:17;2013:10
denominates (1)
1951:8
2031:2,20;2032:8,19,26; denying (1)
2033:7,20;2034:6,7,13,
2012:6
16;2036:16;2038:4;
DEPARTMENT (96)
2041:5;2043:7,7,18;
1937:15;1940:6;
2044:22;2045:11;
1941:5;1943:18;
2046:5;2057:19,21;
1947:10;1951:2;
2059:20;2062:13,24;
1953:24;1954:3;
2063:11;2065:22;
1955:10,23;1956:12,17,
2070:3,4,8,9,11,15,19,
23,25;1959:6;1962:23;
20;2073:8;2076:7,8,9;
1963:2,16;1964:20;
2077:17
1965:6,17;1967:15,16;
decisions (5)
1969:9,10,17;1971:10;
2036:16;2052:12;
1976:13;1979:24;
2056:19;2062:8;
1980:17;1983:8;1984:8;
2070:22
1985:11;1986:5,6;
declare (1)
1988:10,20,26;1989:10,
1941:11
15;1991:23;1992:8,9,10,
declares (1)
11;1993:2,17,20;
2067:16
1997:10;1998:5;
decline (1)
1999:16,25;2000:26;
2026:5
2002:8,12,15,26;
deem (1)
2004:25;2006:19,22;
2006:19
2011:25;2013:7,15;
deemed (1)
2015:7;2016:7;2017:2,7,
1984:5
9;2019:11;2021:24;
deeply (1)
2022:2;2026:7;2028:20;
2019:19
2029:9,21;2030:7,15,21,
defend (1)
24;2031:14,26;2032:10;
1944:16
2035:12;2039:21;
defended (1)
2044:19;2046:2,10;
1974:22
2050:16;2051:12;
defensible (1)
2053:25;2066:6,13;
1982:19
2068:4,6,15;2073:15
defer (3)
Departments (1)
1988:2;2011:22;
2030:16
2069:10
department's (12)
deference (10)
1939:22;1947:6;
1987:26;1988:3;
1958:26;1985:21,26;
2010:19;2011:12,18;
1986:20;1992:4,24;
2012:14;2030:18;
1996:10;2017:20;
2067:7;2068:11;2069:4
2069:12,12
deferred (1)
deposition (25)
2034:17
1940:7;1953:12;
definition (4)
1955:14;1956:8,9;
1986:2;1989:3,3;
1958:15,24;1979:15,21,
2005:23
21,22;1997:26;1998:8,9;
delegation (1)
2023:21;2025:21,22;
2019:16
2026:13;2040:24;
deleted (1)
2045:3;2048:20;2049:3,
2051:11
6,7;2071:24
delinquencies (4)
Depression (3)
2054:14,17;2055:25;
1959:20;1981:13;
2056:4
2052:21
delve (1)
deprives (1)
1996:9
2064:9
demonstrated (2)
Deputy (1)
1959:9
derivative (2)
2010:8,10
describe (1)
2060:20
described (3)
1944:7;2020:25;
2021:4
describes (3)
1950:9;2021:19;
2041:24
description (2)
1992:5;2004:23
designated (1)
2027:13
designed (1)
2016:21
desire (1)
2065:13
desperately (1)
2062:7
despite (5)
1956:15;1992:7,23;
1995:14;2019:26
detail (2)
1951:10;2041:11
detailed (1)
1942:24
detected (1)
1943:8
detector (1)
2031:12
determination (28)
1942:15,16,18;
1945:15;1984:23;
1985:13,21,26;1986:7;
1987:15,20;1988:8,11,
13;1989:12,14,20,21;
1993:24;1994:7;
1996:26;2005:10;
2009:22;2012:4,5;
2020:22;2062:17;
2064:8
determinations (3)
1986:25;1998:2;
2014:16
determine (1)
1988:17
determined (1)
2071:21
determining (1)
1993:7
detriment (1)
1951:16
devastating (1)
1964:8
developed (2)
2067:25;2069:5
development (3)
1943:8;1989:9;
2011:13
Dewey (1)
1984:18
difference (1)
1998:13
different (13)
1968:7;1978:12;
1981:2;1993:23;
1996:26;2007:17;
2020:25;2023:24;
2044:7;2053:8,12;
2055:17;2073:12
difficult (1)
2065:9
diligence (5)
2027:24,25;2028:5,6,
22
dimes (1)
1997:15
Din (1)
2058:2
Dinallo (30)
1940:9;1948:7,10;
1955:4,6;1956:11,21;
1957:23;1958:4,9,22,25;
1971:19;1973:3,6;
1976:26;1978:10;
1979:14,18,18,20,21,21;
1980:25;1988:18;
1993:16;2000:23;
2009:9;2018:7;2031:24
Dinallo's (5)
1944:16;1972:3;
1974:10;2018:7;
2066:15
direct (5)
1979:5;2009:26;
2021:17;2026:12;
2060:11
directions (1)
1958:15
directly (1)
2043:24
director (2)
1960:25;1962:7
directors (1)
1961:23
disagree (2)
1952:9;1959:15
discern (1)
2064:12
disclose (1)
2041:14
disclosure (2)
1952:21;1965:24
disclosures (1)
1952:18
disconnect (1)
1993:15
discount (2)
1961:8;2044:7
discovery (9)
1945:17;1947:2;
1973:23,24;2013:10;
2018:13,14;2019:4,10
discretion (1)
(8) cut - discretion
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
2066:25
discuss (1)
2024:2
discussed (11)
1939:22;1941:17;
1985:10;1996:7;
1999:21;2005:4;
2016:11,14;2028:10;
2029:15;2033:26
discussing (1)
1999:4
discussion (4)
2005:7;2009:26;
2013:5;2023:7
discussions (1)
1979:18
dispositive (1)
1941:6
dispute (6)
1940:14;1973:23,25;
2029:11;2034:19;
2054:3
disputed (1)
1982:13
disputes (1)
1994:19
disqualifying (1)
2016:24
disregard (1)
2005:6
distinguished (1)
2017:26
distinguishing (1)
1980:12
District (1)
2011:24
dividend (5)
1950:2,15;1990:15,
16;2071:9
dividends (1)
1997:10
document (16)
1948:15;1949:16;
1950:3;1951:10;
1961:12;1965:21,22;
1966:18;1970:14;
1972:23,25;1978:25;
1982:18;2050:16,23,25
documentation (1)
2036:26
documents (21)
1958:12;1959:5;
1961:2,3,22;1962:9,11;
1966:22;1973:3,26;
1974:7,7,8,9;1986:13;
1992:6;2033:25;2052:8;
2072:21;2075:23,25
dollar (3)
1950:23;1951:7;
1997:15
dollars (9)
1966:11;2007:24;
2008:4,5;2040:7;2044:3,
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
23;2054:23;2055:10
1964:11;2018:24;
dominate (1)
2026:21;2028:10;
2022:5
2054:15
done (36)
early (3)
1943:26;1944:15;
1939:5;2047:22;
1946:12;1951:5;
2055:25
1955:24;1957:11,11;
earned (5)
1966:14;1969:22,22,23,
1939:26;1941:26;
24;1979:12;1985:23;
2065:3,4;2071:9
1986:17;1987:2,8,8,17; easier (2)
1988:6;1992:21,22;
2020:26;2074:15
2018:2;2023:9;2031:11; easy (1)
2038:12,16;2040:19,22;
2007:22
2041:6,24;2043:21,23; economic (4)
2045:25;2057:2;2065:7
1943:14;2035:20;
door (1)
2052:13,16
1958:7
economy (1)
doorstep (1)
2026:6
2061:15
edits (1)
double (2)
2050:25
1969:10;1971:10
Education (3)
doubt (7)
2011:24;2012:9,13
1967:21;1986:4;
effect (4)
1995:25;1996:21;
1941:19;1991:9,11;
2031:21;2061:12;
2014:4
2073:9
effected (6)
Dow (2)
2034:13;2037:3;
1960:17;1963:18
2070:8,9,11;2073:19
down (9)
effectuate (1)
1951:2;1953:3,4;
2068:13
1957:9;1970:22;1981:4; efficient (1)
2036:22;2065:10;
2076:22
2070:25
efficiently (1)
downplay (2)
2076:19
2045:14,14
eight (1)
dozens (2)
2029:9
2053:17,17
either (9)
drain (1)
1957:3;1959:10;
1943:9
1972:24;1982:8;
drastic (1)
1991:26;2002:13,15;
2052:16
2059:16;2075:4
drawn (1)
elected (1)
2057:26
2022:13
drug (1)
elements (1)
2073:26
2007:17
due (8)
eligible (1)
1940:20;1942:17;
2056:10
2027:24,25;2028:4,6,22; eliminates (1)
2068:16
1943:26
dunk (1)
ELNY's (2)
1962:13
2005:18,20
during (10)
else (7)
1940:17;1947:2;
1951:3,21;1991:7;
1973:7;1976:23;
2002:17;2073:26;
2006:16;2018:2;
2077:5,8
2019:11;2026:24;
e-mail (9)
2054:19;2069:5
1949:21;1950:5,7,8;
duty (1)
1958:13;1965:11;
2017:20
2017:4;2038:2,23
embedded (1)
2041:15
E
emphasize (1)
2038:19
earlier (5)
employee (1)
2041:15
en (18)
2029:1;2030:1;
2031:1;2032:1;2033:1;
2034:1;2035:1;2036:1;
2037:1;2038:1;2039:1;
2040:1;2041:1;2042:1;
2043:1;2044:1;2045:1;
2046:1
encompass (1)
2077:18
encourage (1)
2009:4
end (20)
1948:18;1953:5;
1954:15;1983:22;
1990:18;1994:17,21;
2004:4;2012:9,12;
2024:5;2026:3;2029:4;
1977:2,24,25;1978:14,
14,24;1980:21;1981:24
Erin (1)
2014:2
E-R-I-N (1)
2014:2
errata (3)
2000:18;2074:20,24
erroneous (3)
2030:19,24;2033:6
error (22)
2002:10;2015:9;
2022:25;2029:12;
2033:15,16,24;2034:2,
15,18,23;2035:4;
2036:25;2037:3,6,6;
2038:7;2040:6;2060:16;
2066:22;2067:9;
2071:22
errors (7)
2038:5;2054:5;2058:23;
2001:18;2029:6,24;
2059:6;2061:20;
2031:7,25;2067:5;
2068:22;2069:21
2071:21
ended (1)
escape (1)
1939:6
2030:5
enforceable (1)
especially (1)
1957:9
2018:15
engaged (1)
ESQ (4)
2019:13
1938:7,8,13,14
engine (1)
essence (3)
2021:5
1985:11;2022:10;
engines (2)
2040:5
2021:7,9
essentially (9)
enormous (1)
1944:15;1947:17;
2057:15
1964:9;2032:26;
Enough (8)
2033:10;2038:13;
1940:23,23;1942:18;
2041:19;2042:26;
1943:7;1944:19;
2050:3
1952:24;2029:24;
establish (1)
2034:4
2014:21
enter (1)
established (2)
2008:23
2001:21;2006:12
entire (6)
Estates (1)
1966:2;1981:21,25;
2014:2
1991:10;1993:12;
estimate (1)
2006:18
2042:17
entirely (2)
estimated (1)
2004:16;2071:7
2010:2
entitled (1)
estimates (5)
1962:25
2020:5,14,22,24;
entity (3)
2071:22
1954:11;1997:15;
evaluate (2)
2028:16
2001:16;2021:20
equitable (25)
evaluated (1)
1940:2;1941:15;
2026:26
1942:8,8,21,21;1944:3, evaluating (1)
4,11;1947:5;1948:2,12;
2017:17
1949:12,13;1962:26;
evaluation (1)
1963:3,4,6;1981:9;
2014:23
1982:11,18;2064:26;
even (25)
2071:2,3;2073:2
1947:26;1962:14;
equity (11)
1963:4;1969:8;1976:10;
1960:7,16;1962:5;
1981:20,25;1992:14;
(9) discuss - even
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
2002:14;2009:21;
2013:16;2016:2,9;
2020:16;2031:7;
2033:18;2034:14,18;
2038:10;2054:23;
2058:6,21,26;2065:3;
2067:12
event (4)
1956:11;2034:25;
2058:4;2060:18
events (2)
2032:23;2060:19
everybody (2)
2076:16;2077:15
everyone (6)
1951:21;1994:22;
2056:23;2062:6;2069:8;
2076:19
evidence (30)
1940:18;1962:22;
1964:8;1973:21;
1986:14,15;1993:19,21;
1995:9;1998:18;1999:9;
2000:22,22,23;2001:4,7;
2006:22,23;2020:7;
2042:15;2059:10,23;
2070:17,17,18,21;
2072:4,10;2073:11;
2074:5
evidenced (1)
1973:26
exact (1)
1994:23
exactly (10)
1941:21;1971:2;
1978:13;1995:3,11;
2005:15;2021:19;
2026:8,21;2074:16
exam (14)
1994:4,7;1998:14,18,
21;1999:5,10;2000:8,21;
2001:5,10,13;2002:13;
2059:17
examination (4)
1996:14;1999:2;
2000:2,9
example (7)
1941:9;1942:23;
1950:12;1999:11;
2049:19,19;2068:8
except (1)
2074:19
exception (2)
1958:18;2069:14
excess (2)
2004:18;2010:6
exchange (1)
2048:19
exclude (5)
1999:9,10;2059:10,15,
22
excluded (3)
1991:5;2001:2;
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
2059:14
excluding (1)
2001:18
exclusion (1)
2017:18
excoriating (1)
1977:4
Excuse (5)
1968:3;1978:14;
1982:3;2051:20;
2053:21
executed (1)
2028:12
Executive (5)
2004:25;2005:2,7;
2009:13;2045:13
executives (2)
1952:19;1982:8
Exhibit (5)
1953:8;1955:2;
1966:6;1983:9;2023:21
Exhibits (1)
1965:20
exist (1)
1997:19
exists (1)
1993:21
expect (3)
1963:18;1992:3;
2055:15
expectation (1)
2036:24
expected (1)
2043:15
expeditious (1)
2029:5
expenses (1)
2012:7
experiencing (1)
2055:3
expert (7)
1993:4;2021:25;
2022:2,25;2054:21;
2057:4;2060:9
expertise (1)
2021:26
experts (6)
2018:3;2020:15;
2021:13;2034:23;
2056:17;2057:7
explain (3)
1945:23;1987:7;
2020:20
explained (3)
2043:2;2045:2;2046:4
explains (3)
1949:17;2019:14,20
explanation (1)
2017:25
explicitly (1)
1971:20
exposure (4)
1954:12;1966:25;
1967:2;1976:9
exposures (1)
1961:17
express (1)
1958:10
expressed (1)
1984:2
expressly (4)
1952:21;1971:20;
2015:3;2028:19
extensively (1)
1996:10
extent (2)
2045:25;2060:18
external (1)
2027:23
extreme (23)
1997:8;2008:15;
2029:13,16;2035:13,22;
2036:8,11,20;2037:3,9,
10,12,14,16,24;2038:3,
26;2049:20;2054:5;
2060:20,24,26
F
FAA (3)
2021:6,8,11
fabrication (2)
2030:6,8
face (2)
2037:6,8
faced (1)
1976:3
facilitate (2)
1970:16;2065:14
facing (1)
1980:14
fact (70)
1941:8,16;1943:16;
1947:20;1950:10;
1951:3;1952:13;1960:6;
1967:3,9,14;1970:19;
1972:2;1974:5,21;
1978:21;1980:13,18,25;
1982:12;1988:20;
1989:7;1990:6;1992:7;
1997:21;1998:3;
2001:11;2005:20;
2007:9;2009:7,20;
2011:18;2018:10;
2019:12,26;2022:10;
2031:5,9,17;2035:2,7;
2036:7,19;2038:2;
2039:4;2044:13;
2049:13;2050:15,21;
2051:2,17;2052:26;
2053:4;2054:12,16;
2055:9;2056:3;2057:25;
2059:9,21;2060:2,22;
2061:7;2063:4;2064:13;
2065:10,19,23;2068:7;
2069:11
facts (38)
favored (1)
1941:4,6;1951:12,12;
1951:15
1966:4,15,17;1976:10, FBRNY (1)
25;1982:12,20;1985:12;
2027:25
2015:3;2022:14;2030:7, FDIC (2)
8,26;2032:5,7,14,20,24,
2027:6;2028:7
24;2035:3,10;2037:14, February (16)
21,21;2040:4;2050:11;
1956:26;1959:8;
2051:20;2057:23;
1961:10;1963:25;
2059:11,23;2070:5;
1964:24;1969:26;
2071:14;2072:15;
1978:26;1988:22;
2073:8
1991:24;1996:9;2023:2;
factual (5)
2026:17;2047:22;
2030:19;2033:16;
2054:13;2059:11,23
2034:19;2064:16,23
federal (14)
factually (4)
1978:20;1979:8;
2030:17;2039:3;
1980:19;2021:18;
2056:21;2071:17
2023:2,16;2025:14,15,
failed (2)
23,24;2026:24;2027:4;
2028:21;2038:5
2028:14;2065:15
fails (1)
feel (3)
2020:20
1995:4;2069:20;
Failure (1)
2076:16
2064:6
fees (1)
fair (23)
2012:7
1940:2,3;1941:14;
Feitner (1)
1942:21;1944:3,4,10;
2006:6
1947:5;1948:4;1949:11; fence (1)
1962:26;1963:3,4,7;
1953:15
1972:11;1981:9;
fencing (1)
1982:11,18;2010:2;
1955:7
2039:9;2064:26;2071:2; few (4)
2073:2
1992:16;1995:15;
fairly (3)
1997:9;2064:22
1958:15;1960:14;
FGI (3)
2061:5
2006:18,19,23
faith (2)
FGIs (1)
2021:10,12
2007:9
fall (3)
fiduciary (3)
1973:20;2012:8;
1964:2,3,4
2037:26
field (1)
fallen (1)
2008:23
2036:12
fifth (1)
falling (1)
1994:24
2039:2
figure (11)
falls (1)
1945:3;1950:6,25;
2039:19
1951:24;1952:7,10;
false (2)
1959:23;1962:2;1967:4;
2030:22;2071:14
1982:3,4
family (3)
file (3)
1957:25;2004:8,10
1993:26;1994:6;
famous (2)
1995:20
1964:23;2067:19
filed (10)
fan (1)
1945:16;1946:22;
1955:6
1985:14;1986:20;
far (8)
2004:13,14,22,25;
1963:19;1965:25,26;
2005:8;2044:18
1966:9,9;2021:2;
files (4)
2058:7;2060:23
2045:26;2047:4;
far-fetched (1)
2053:22;2058:16
2008:14
final (5)
favor (1)
2027:25;2028:8,11;
1953:16
2052:26;2053:23
(10) event - final
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
Finally (2)
2056:8;2070:21
FINANCE (14)
1937:16;1953:15;
1954:12;1964:17;
1965:2;1966:3;1981:10,
22;1982:9;1996:2;
2009:17;2020:21;
2022:3;2065:13
FINANCIAL (24)
1937:7;1943:11;
1944:14;1948:6;1953:7;
1956:16;1959:20;
1964:13;1981:12;
1984:24;1991:18;
2001:13;2002:14;
2006:17;2017:12,17;
2026:25;2039:10;
2040:19;2044:24;
2052:20;2055:4,13;
2056:7
financings (1)
1948:24
find (10)
1947:4;1987:19,21,
24;1990:3;1992:3;
1998:18;2002:17;
2014:6;2076:7
finding (7)
1947:22;1989:17;
1990:13;1991:11;
1992:3,5,18
findings (7)
1947:16;1988:17,18,
19;1992:7;1996:23;
2064:23
Finer (3)
1960:11;1967:16;
2016:25
finish (2)
2015:21;2028:2
Finkel (4)
2054:20,22;2055:19;
2056:8
firm (4)
2019:15;2020:10;
2021:26;2027:21
firms (3)
1984:20;2020:11;
2027:24
firm's (1)
2020:22
first (31)
1940:23;1957:8,12;
1961:11;1974:6;
1978:23;1983:11;
1984:26;1985:22;
1987:22;1989:25;
1999:3,6,15;2003:19;
2006:15;2011:25;
2019:2;2023:9;2029:6,
21;2030:15;2031:14;
2034:7;2041:21;
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
2043:13;2049:7;
2054:22,24;2068:15;
2071:24
five (8)
1991:15;2015:11;
2026:4;2037:5;2042:4;
2046:10;2058:9;
2077:17
five-yard (1)
2013:12
FK (2)
1960:18;1962:7
flails (1)
1992:17
flight (1)
2004:7
flow (2)
1965:2;2042:11
focus (11)
1942:14;1992:16;
1996:22;2006:16;
2027:14;2029:6,16,22;
2039:6;2061:6;2070:6
focused (7)
1940:12;1943:2;
2029:11;2035:12,22;
2036:4;2040:12
folks (2)
2041:11;2043:3
follow (2)
1970:4;2066:9
followed (1)
1983:14
following (5)
1953:26;1984:25;
1996:17;2028:6;
2073:13
follows (2)
1973:9;1975:11
footnote (2)
1997:12;2027:15
footnotes (2)
2062:6;2063:4
force (1)
1961:6
forecloses (1)
2064:8
FOREGOING (1)
2077:21
foreign (1)
2070:11
forever (1)
1946:26
forget (1)
2073:23
form (3)
1985:18;2034:23;
2068:4
forma (1)
1966:19
formal (2)
1998:14,21
formalistic (1)
2064:23
formalizes (1)
1954:13
former (7)
1940:8;1957:10;
2032:5,12;2033:2;
2034:5;2063:5
forth (3)
1994:16;2064:7;
2065:21
forward (2)
1976:11;2000:8
found (9)
1947:10,11;1988:26;
1989:4,12;1993:25;
1998:7;2014:26;2034:5
four (14)
1939:23;1941:7,17;
1944:21;1966:26;
1991:16;1996:17;
2060:5
function (1)
2019:17
fund (1)
1955:21
fundamental (3)
1940:9,14;2074:2
funding (1)
2023:25
funds (2)
1957:24;1964:16
further (8)
1951:2;1955:17;
1965:1;1966:1,8;1967:1,
26;1968:1,7;1969:3,20;
1970:19;1971:8;
1972:10,21;1973:2;
1974:5,16,21;1975:5,9,
13,19,24;1977:12,24;
1980:12;2015:23;
2018:18;2019:7;2029:2;
2042:22,25;2045:5,8;
2047:3;2048:7,13,17;
2055:19;2056:26;
1972:3;1979:9;1983:17;
2059:18;2069:1,3,24;
1988:25;2013:8;2042:7
2070:1;2071:1;2072:1,
future (5)
15;2073:1;2074:1,23;
1943:7;1965:2;
2075:1;2076:1
1996:13;2001:16;
given (14)
2073:18
1941:9;1950:16;
1977:25;1978:14;
2036:7,11,20;2038:3,26;
2064:12;2074:13
fourth (3)
2022:24;2030:24;
2052:20
fourth-quarter (2)
2054:17;2055:20
Frankly (1)
1985:5
fraud (1)
2034:8
fraudulent (2)
1984:3,5
FRAWLEY (1)
1938:8
FRB (1)
2027:4
FRBNY (7)
2027:4,8,17,18;
2028:4,7,7
FRBR (3)
2027:5,8,19
free (1)
2015:7
fresh (1)
2016:3
Friday (1)
1996:8
FRIEDMAN (1)
1938:11
front (2)
1946:24;1991:20
FSI (2)
1978:8,16
full (9)
1950:3;1957:17;
2001:15;2007:23;
2035:17;2063:16;
2069:25;2070:5;
2075:21
fully (2)
2070:21;2076:17
fun (1)
1960:1,3;1961:1;
1962:1;1963:1;1964:1;
2016:6;2019:4;2026:14;
2035:14;2036:22;
2051:20;2056:6;
2058:19,22;2069:24
gives (1)
2044:7
giving (2)
1991:9;2034:12
glad (11)
1950:6,24;1951:23;
1952:7,10;1959:22;
1962:2;1982:3,4;
2004:9;2015:15
2000:22,23,24;2002:22;
glaring (1)
2042:11;2051:12;
1993:15
2058:20,25
glossed (2)
Geithner (6)
1976:25;2039:6
1979:6;2020:12;
glosses (1)
2023:19;2025:17;
2067:6
2026:15,21
goal (1)
GENERAL (5)
1962:19
1938:17,20;1953:23;
God (1)
2067:22;2068:8
1963:20
Generale (1)
goes (9)
1980:5
1949:22,25;1950:10,
Generally (1)
23;1967:16;1979:6;
2039:14
2027:12;2044:10;
General's (1)
2071:20
1941:9
Good (18)
generated (1)
1939:3,4,18,19,20;
2020:9
1958:8;1979:11;1980:2;
generically (1)
1982:25,26;1994:18;
1972:12
2004:9;2010:16;2019:6;
gets (9)
2028:23;2029:2;
1950:7;1952:6;
2062:22;2075:19
1960:17;1963:15,23;
good-faith (1)
1976:20;2038:23;
2016:9
2039:6;2064:4
government (8)
GIUFFRA (78)
1978:20;2025:6,11;
1939:10,13,17,19,21;
2033:2;2034:12;
1944:26;1945:9,11;
2038:11;2051:15;
1946:8;1947:9;1955:1,
2065:15
2;1956:1;1957:1,14,22;
government's (1)
1958:1,19;1959:1,5;
galling (1)
2022:12
game (1)
1960:26
games (1)
2072:3
GAO (3)
2026:19,20,23
gave (10)
1977:2;1980:21;
(11) Finally - government's
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
2025:3
grade (6)
1966:20,20,25;
1967:2;2042:2,4
Grady (2)
2070:7,14
grant (2)
2057:8;2071:16
granted (2)
2051:16;2057:4
Great (5)
1959:20;1965:9;
1981:13;2008:16,16
greater (1)
2060:23
greatest (2)
1981:12;2022:5
greatly (2)
1981:5;2062:3
green (2)
1966:23;2046:3
Greenspan (1)
2022:23
Greenspan's (1)
1967:3
ground (1)
2062:20
grounds (8)
2012:5;2058:12;
2062:10,15;2063:19;
2065:21,24;2067:5
growth (1)
2009:8
GUARANTEE (2)
1937:16;1984:24
guess (1)
1975:14
guidance (1)
2072:26
guided (1)
2004:6
guidelines (1)
1960:4
guys (1)
2075:17
H
Hail (1)
2013:11
half (2)
1966:11;1992:21
Hampton (3)
1960:11;1967:16;
2016:25
Hancock (1)
2063:11
hand (6)
1961:17;1977:17,18;
2032:21;2047:26;
2056:23
handled (2)
1978:12;2076:16
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
handling (1)
1982:21
haphazard (1)
2022:13
happen (4)
1978:5;1981:7;
2002:13;2040:9
happened (11)
1945:18;1973:4;
1976:11;2031:8;
2032:23;2049:25;
2055:12,14;2059:21;
2061:4;2074:16
happening (1)
2072:11
happy (4)
1944:26;1991:21;
2015:12,18
hard (3)
2041:13;2051:12;
2064:17
hardly (1)
2076:4
hat (3)
2005:9,11,13
hazardous (1)
1944:13
head (1)
2026:12
hear (2)
1942:9;1974:26
heard (17)
1955:11;1957:22;
1958:3;1966:13;
1967:19;1969:3,21;
1972:25;1974:25;
1977:8;1978:18;
1995:10;1997:9;
2001:22;2029:7;
2060:20,21
hearing (10)
1959:4;1994:21;
1999:8;2001:2;2004:3;
2019:3;2032:16;
2061:26;2074:7;
2076:15
hearings (1)
2070:13
height (1)
2052:12
held (3)
1966:20;2022:6;
2067:3
help (5)
1979:9;2001:2;
2003:26;2004:2;2063:9
helpful (1)
1997:18
here- (1)
2022:21
Here's (3)
1973:6;2022:16;
2023:15
Hershman (1)
2060:12
Hershman's (1)
2060:14
hide (1)
1992:18
high (5)
1964:26;2042:2,4;
2047:5,17
higher (3)
1966:10;1990:6;
2044:21
highest (1)
2033:26
highlighted (3)
2003:11;2027:14;
2069:22
highlights (1)
1970:21
highly (1)
1981:15
himself (1)
1982:2
hire (1)
2001:6
hired (4)
1978:8;2019:11;
2023:19;2027:23
historical (2)
2032:14,20
history (8)
1942:20,25;1966:2;
1981:21;2008:25;
2038:12;2073:14,17
hold (1)
2040:6
holding (13)
1940:16;1944:2;
1951:16;1955:16;
1958:7;1959:10,22;
honestly (1)
1994:15
Honor (287)
1939:4,12,19,21;
1941:16;1942:19,23;
1961:5;1962:26;1978:3,
5,15;1980:14
HOLGADO (38)
1938:19;1939:5;
1947:8;1957:12,21;
1958:18;1970:13;
1971:2;1973:17;1974:6;
1975:3,20,23;1987:7,18;
1989:24;1990:14;
1991:8,17;1994:2,25;
1995:24,25;1996:4,20;
1997:4;2000:6,11,15;
2002:9,19,20;2015:24;
2029:19,23;2060:20;
2069:14;2075:13
Holgado's (1)
1995:14
homework (3)
2021:16;2023:9;
2026:18
honest (3)
1979:10;2008:12;
2009:6
18;2064:11,19;2065:6,
26;2066:14,18,23;
2067:4,25,26;2068:7,11,
13,16;1946:10,20;
18;2069:3,6,8,14,24;
2070:6,14,24;2071:10,
20,23;2072:5,15,25;
2073:6,9,20,21,22;
1947:4,19,24,26;1948:9,
2074:4,6,25;2075:13,18;
1943:16;1944:6;1945:2,
13,19;1949:2;1951:11,
20;1952:5,11,16;
1953:13,22;1956:15,23;
1957:5,12,13,17,21,22,
26;1958:18;1959:5;
1960:3,6,9,17;1961:4,9,
20;1962:11,21;1963:8;
1964:19;1965:4,22;
1966:2,6,24;1967:5,12,
18;1968:3;1969:8,16,20;
1970:11,13,18,22;
1971:2,4,8,12;1972:2,5,
11,16;1973:2,17,24;
1974:3,5,15,16;1975:4;
1976:4,10,20;1977:10,
23,24;1978:4,7;1979:13,
18,23;1980:10;1981:8,
19;1982:7,10,15,25;
1983:6,7,13,25;1984:13,
26;1986:8,18;1987:6,10,
24;1988:12,16;1989:7,
18,24;1990:8;1991:6;
1992:13;1993:5;1994:2;
1995:4,9;1996:21,25;
1997:6;1998:3,11,24;
1999:16;2001:19;
2002:8,22;2003:2,14,17,
20,25;2004:8,16,21;
2005:2,25;2006:11;
2007:20;2008:16;
2009:26;2011:10,11,23;
2013:4,14,19;2015:4,10,
17,23,24;2016:12;
2017:13;2018:12;
2019:9;2020:8,18;
2021:11,17,17;2023:6;
2028:24;2029:2,8;
2030:10;2031:3,16;
2032:21;2033:18;
2034:25;2035:23;
2036:7,13;2037:2,21,23;
2038:13,17;2039:26;
2040:5,9;2044:13,17,25;
2045:7,8,19;2046:9;
2047:18;2048:8,10,19;
2049:6,15,25,26;2050:6,
19,22;2051:6,14,20;
2052:10,19;2053:20;
2054:9;2055:16,19;
2056:16,17,22,26;
2057:3,9,18,22,24;
2058:4,8,11,24;2059:5,
9,13,15,18;2060:2,9,15,
18,25;2061:6,11,13,17,
21,26;2062:9,25;2063:7,
2077:11
Honor's (2)
2032:4;2040:16
hook (1)
1976:21
hope (1)
2016:2
hour (1)
2077:2
hours (1)
1996:8
house (3)
2050:23,24;2076:17
housing (1)
2014:17
huge (6)
1950:19,20;1976:2,8;
2035:4,4
hundred (1)
1942:3
hundreds (3)
2040:7;2044:2,23
hurricane (1)
2073:26
hyperbole (1)
2041:15
hypothetical (7)
1978:19,21;1985:24;
2007:12,13;2008:19;
2037:16
hypotheticals (2)
2007:14;2008:13
I
ID (2)
2050:17,17
idea (2)
1960:19;1980:2
idea' (1)
1979:11
identical (1)
2005:4
identified (4)
1952:14;1993:6;
2029:12;2067:12
identifies (1)
2003:20
identify (3)
2003:14;2021:20;
2023:26
idiosyncratic (1)
2056:9
ignore (6)
1942:19,20;1960:3,4;
(12) grade - ignore
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
2015:7;2072:26
ignored (4)
1943:17;1961:2;
1964:19;2052:18
ignores (1)
2040:23
III (4)
2041:5,10;2042:6;
2043:14
ill (1)
1977:15
illegal (1)
2069:4
ILLINOIS (1)
1937:17
imagine (3)
1961:22,26;2013:18
imbedded (1)
2068:4
immediate (1)
1955:7
impact (3)
2005:19;2051:4;
2072:18
impaired (1)
1943:24
impairment (2)
1943:26;2044:14
IMPERIAL (1)
1937:4
implicated (2)
1945:4,20
importance (5)
1983:3;2038:19;
2045:14;2050:2;2066:2
important (25)
1957:23;1973:14;
1984:7;1999:3;2001:22;
2009:10,15;2029:22;
2030:20;2031:21,22;
2035:16,24;2037:7,9,12;
2040:2,8;2053:6;2063:8,
10;2068:14;2073:14;
2076:7,9
importantly (5)
1948:19;1953:17;
1970:11;2011:20;
2060:15
impossible (1)
2051:26
improper (1)
2019:16
improvement (1)
1979:7
Improvements (2)
2063:26;2064:3
imprudent (1)
1997:15
inability (2)
2005:17,18
inaccurate (2)
2059:17;2066:26
inadequate (1)
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
2014:26
inadequately (1)
1998:19
INC (14)
1937:7,15;1949:26;
1950:11;1955:16,20;
1956:3,12;1957:3;
1958:5,11;1962:4;
1982:8;2014:2
incentive (1)
1955:22
include (1)
2009:4
included (2)
1949:13;2028:8
includes (5)
1948:23,23,24,26;
2018:7
including (8)
1940:8;1964:16;
1971:21;1972:15;
2040:8
individual (3)
2014:16;2050:7;
2056:12
industries (1)
1981:3
industry (3)
1967:7;1973:14;
2021:13
inequitable (1)
1941:12
inescapable (1)
2072:24
inferior (1)
2021:3
inflated (1)
2042:17
information (34)
1945:18;1952:24;
2026:7,11;2028:15;
2029:10;2030:17;
1989:2;1998:26;2026:4;
2031:20,22;2033:6,8;
2057:25
2036:17;2037:7;2041:3;
incomplete (3)
2042:11,12;2045:18;
2067:2;2070:22;
2048:9,12;2050:4;
2071:14
2051:11;2053:26;
inconsequential (2)
2054:4,16;2055:5;
2029:24;2036:25
2056:21;2057:14;
inconsistent (5)
2058:19;2061:9,16;
1985:9,10,11;2017:19,
2067:2;2070:5,23;
20
2071:18
incorporated (2)
informed (1)
2028:3;2038:24
1988:10
incorrect (4)
infusion (3)
2030:17;2056:21;
1970:16;1978:14,16
2071:14,17
initial (2)
increase (4)
1983:8;1999:14
2014:21;2054:5;
injured (1)
2055:7,15
2074:2
increased (2)
insinuation (1)
2054:17;2055:10
2022:8
increases (1)
insisted (1)
2014:18
2021:24
incredibly (1)
insolvency (12)
1951:13
1940:4;1941:3;
indefensible (2)
1942:13;1943:26;
1944:22;2062:7
1945:9,12,24;1986:3;
independent (5)
1989:3;1997:11;
1998:5;2022:4;
2005:23;2007:2
2025:8;2057:18;
insolvent (10)
2058:12
1943:24;1946:2,12;
Independently (1)
1956:11;1988:21;
2057:20
2002:18;2004:17;
index (1)
2006:20,23;2007:9
1953:7
instance (1)
indicated (3)
2025:12
2016:7;2034:17;
instances (3)
2055:22
2019:18;2021:2,2
indicating (1)
instant (1)
1965:9
2012:16
indication (1)
instead (9)
2008:7
1959:19;1963:21;
indisputably (1)
1964:5;1971:15;
2021:12,12;2043:7,25;
2063:3
institutions (1)
2027:11
instruct (1)
2039:21
insufficient (2)
1964:25;2005:21
insulate (1)
2070:2
INSURANCE (135)
1937:15;1939:24;
1940:6,9,15,16,20;
1941:13;1943:13,18;
1946:13;1947:11,23,25;
1950:15,18;1951:2,22,
22;1953:10,19,20;
1955:10,17;1956:5,19,
20;1957:4,24;1959:6,11,
15;1960:21;1961:7,23;
1963:16;1964:20;
1966:18,21,26;1967:8,
22;1969:6,18;1970:12;
1971:16;1973:11,12,14,
15;1974:13;1975:15;
1976:5,16,17,20;
1978:21;1980:24;
1981:5,16,17,19,23;
1982:11;1984:25;
1986:3,5,20,23;1988:15,
20,26;1989:10,15,17,20,
21;1991:23;1992:4,8,11,
24;1993:20;1994:4,6;
1997:10;1998:5,19;
1999:16,24;2000:2,26;
2001:11,21;2002:8,26;
2004:17,26;2005:24;
2007:21,22,24;2008:3,8,
20;2009:2,4,18;2011:15,
21;2013:15,16;2015:7;
2017:2,6,8,10,13,21;
2019:11;2021:25,26;
2026:6;2028:20;2033:9;
2035:12;2044:18;
2051:5;2065:14;
2067:12;2068:5;2070:9,
10;2073:15;2074:3
Insurance's (1)
1953:26
insure (1)
1950:22
insured (3)
1966:19;1967:2;
2008:6
insurer (11)
1946:11;1971:14;
1984:24;2002:18;
2007:5,15;2008:12,16,
25;2017:16;2039:21
insurers (3)
1944:3;1979:5;
2017:17
insurer's (2)
2002:14;2017:12
intend (1)
1954:10
intention (1)
1970:15
interest (1)
2043:8
interested (7)
1963:19;2041:2,9;
2045:12,13;2058:14;
2061:8
interesting (10)
1948:9;1967:12;
1969:20;1989:9;
1990:14;2001:5;
2008:15;2044:13;
2066:3;2076:14
Interestingly (1)
1993:14
interests (1)
1971:21
interject (1)
1989:25
internal (8)
2046:10;2047:4;
2049:2,9;2050:13;
2053:13;2071:25;
2072:16
INTERNATIONAL (2)
1937:6;1948:24
interpret (2)
2005:26;2069:21
interpretation (16)
1941:23;2009:18;
2010:20,24;2011:21;
2012:16;2013:3,16,26;
2014:7;2016:9;2067:12;
2068:12;2069:9;2071:6,
8
interpretations (2)
2069:4,10
interpreted (2)
2003:20;2004:15
interpreting (1)
2006:2
interprets (1)
2004:15
intervention (1)
2006:26
into (24)
1946:3,4;1950:14;
1956:13;1957:16;
1958:11,11,12;1964:25;
1965:16,17;1970:16;
1979:16;1991:2;1996:9;
2010:16;2019:10;
2027:8;2028:3,19;
2040:6;2044:4;2054:11;
2075:9
introduce (1)
2006:23
intuitively (1)
2001:11
(13) ignored - intuitively
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
invalid (1)
2067:9
investment (5)
1966:20,20,25;
1967:2;2053:7
investments (1)
1981:16
investor (1)
1946:18
invite (1)
2015:8
inviting (1)
2060:16
invoked (4)
2012:5;2062:11,15;
2063:19
involve (2)
2016:19;2033:11
involved (5)
1976:26;1978:11,16;
2018:22;2030:6
involves (5)
1962:15;2007:4;
2014:10;2069:9;
2073:20
involving (2)
1962:12;2018:6
ironic (1)
1987:25
Ironically (1)
1987:26
irrelevant (4)
1985:9;1986:16;
2020:22;2035:9
issue (18)
1941:8,18;1944:21;
1959:15;1963:25;
1973:16;1974:6;
2014:15;2020:19;
2029:6,11;2031:2,25;
2035:2,7;2047:18;
2061:19;2068:12
issued (2)
1954:7;2059:7
issuers (1)
1948:7
issues (10)
1951:20;1992:16;
2016:13;2021:20;
2031:13;2035:21;
2049:8;2057:25;
2060:10;2061:13
Italian (1)
2047:16
item (1)
2013:13
June 7, 2012
2026:17;2027:26;
2038:2,23;2056:3
Jay (3)
1949:23;1955:4;
2044:10
jet (1)
2021:7
job (3)
1974:13,16;2003:26
join (1)
2032:17
Jones (2)
1960:17;1963:18
JPMORGAN (1)
1937:5
JR (1)
1938:7
Judge (6)
2033:13,13,15;
2038:14;2062:14;
2063:11
judgements (1)
2007:5
Judge's (1)
2033:16
judgment (4)
2043:17;2044:2;
2051:26;2063:2
judgments (1)
2050:5
judicial (4)
2012:3,3;2030:18;
2064:9
June (7)
1937:21;1985:3;
1988:23;1989:5;
1996:16;2002:9;
2010:25
June/July (3)
2049:23;2053:4;
2059:2
junk (1)
1967:10
Justice (5)
1937:24;1962:15;
1973:25;1974:2;
2063:11
justify (5)
2022:10,15;2054:21;
2062:7;2073:8
K
K/UNK (1)
1965:13
KASOWITZ (50)
1938:11,13;1947:17;
1948:3;1952:2;1964:11;
1966:5;1967:18,26;
Jack (1)
1964:12
January (7)
1965:11;2018:8;
Min-U-Script
1968:3;1969:16;1971:3;
1972:5,15;1974:15,17;
1977:10,14;1980:10;
1998:11,24,26;2011:6;
2013:19,22;2017:3;
2027:15;2038:22,23;
2067:16;2068:13
2032:9;2042:20,24;
large (2)
2044:26;2045:7;2047:6;
1961:16;1976:14
2048:5,10,14,17;
laser-like (1)
2055:16;2059:5,9,14;
1992:16
2061:3;2072:5;2075:2,8, last (14)
16,18
1949:14;1952:22;
keep (7)
1971:12;2004:24;
1992:14;1998:11;
2007:7;2010:18;
2008:11;2009:6;
2017:13;2018:5,16;
2047:10;2075:17,18
2020:25;2029:15;
keeping (1)
2048:19;2055:22;
2013:12
2068:19
KENNETH (1)
lasting (1)
1938:14
1943:7
kept (2)
later (9)
1957:24;2073:21
1945:22;1961:17;
Kewsong (2)
2027:3;2036:14;
1960:25;1961:10
2043:21;2053:21,21;
key (7)
2059:6;2064:5
1961:15;1980:12;
latter (1)
1992:16;1996:6,6;
1958:23
2040:15;2062:19
laughable (1)
kind (5)
1963:13
1945:24;1947:3;
Law (61)
1975:7;1994:20;2034:9
1939:24;1940:9;
kinds (1)
1941:19,22;1942:12;
2063:16
1944:23;1946:13;
knew (5)
1947:11,23,25;1982:11;
1960:19;2049:8,9;
1984:22,25;1985:18;
2053:2;2059:2
1986:3,23;1988:15;
knowledge (2)
1989:17,20,21;1994:4,7;
2013:7;2072:11
2000:2;2001:11,21;
known (3)
2005:24;2009:4,18;
1956:17;1965:14;
2011:21;2012:9,13;
2038:4
2013:16;2014:13;
knows (3)
2017:10,13,21;2021:25,
1958:19;2029:8;
26,26;2032:3;2059:18;
2034:4
2061:12,19;2062:9;
KOSS (1)
2064:6;2065:20;2066:8,
2077:25
22;2067:5,9,9,13;
Kurscics (1)
2068:10;2069:3,25,26;
2069:15
2071:2,8,12;2073:4;
Kurscic's (1)
2074:5
2069:11
lawful (1)
2064:15
lawsuit (2)
L
1985:14;2031:8
lawyers (2)
lag (1)
1962:10;2034:4
2055:24
lawyers' (1)
landlord (2)
1965:10
2031:9,10
lawyer's (1)
Lane (1)
2040:2
2027:7
lay (1)
language (26)
2072:16
1942:20;1944:4;
1948:3;1988:15;1991:9, lays (1)
2061:14
11;1996:4;1997:18;
leading (1)
2001:20,24;2003:21;
2020:21
2004:26;2005:4,26;
learned (1)
2006:16;2010:24,25;
2032:24
2011:12,19;2014:4,14;
2018:11,18,26;2022:18;
least (1)
2026:4
leave (2)
1946:11;2033:13
LeBoeuf (1)
1984:19
ledger (1)
1976:6
Lee (2)
1960:25;1961:10
left (11)
1944:12;1953:10;
1956:19;1959:12,21;
1961:6;1962:5;1966:23,
26;1967:9;1970:12
left-behind (5)
1948:22;1949:5,9;
1952:15;1972:13
legal (14)
1954:11;1955:16,20,
22;1956:4;1983:18,22,
24,26;2002:10;2067:12,
18;2070:3,3
legally (3)
1944:22;1948:15;
1955:8
legislative (2)
1942:19,24
legislature (4)
1942:6;1943:2;
1949:12;2008:24
Lehman (21)
2040:21,22;2041:6,20,
24,26;2042:7,8,13,16,
17;2043:3,11,25;2044:3;
2045:22;2049:19,23;
2053:5,22;2058:26
Lehman's (1)
2044:24
lend (3)
2027:10,10,18
lending (2)
2027:26;2028:18
less (3)
1962:24;1965:26;
2021:3
lets (1)
1973:15
letter (43)
1947:20;1948:11,12;
1949:4,7;1952:13;
1954:4;1958:11;1963:3,
12;1971:23;1982:16;
1989:16;1991:9,13;
1992:9,19;2029:8;
2061:21;2062:5;2063:2,
20;2064:14,18,21,22;
2065:4,5,7,11,12,16,18,
21;2066:2,10,11,21;
2067:6,11,15,23;
2071:11
level (7)
1970:6;2012:10;
(14) invalid - level
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
2032:18;2033:26;
2039:25,25;2056:14
levels (1)
2020:25
leverage (3)
1961:18,24;1962:20
liabilities (4)
1953:16;1964:17;
2004:18;2010:3
liability (4)
1955:8;2010:8,10;
2011:15
liable (1)
1981:18
lieu (1)
1980:23
Life (8)
2004:25;2005:2,7;
2007:22,24;2008:3,9;
2009:13
light (2)
1982:20;2034:2
liked (1)
1977:18
likely (1)
2053:9
Likewise (1)
2019:20
limine (1)
1999:9
limit (4)
1961:19;1989:25;
1990:3;2008:11
limitations (2)
2028:17,19
limited (4)
2012:4;2013:7;
2015:3;2054:7
line (6)
1996:16,17;2013:12;
2035:25,26;2051:2
lines (2)
1988:24;1989:5
liquidation (1)
1946:3
liquidity (2)
1980:14,16
list (1)
1991:17
listen (2)
1994:15;2003:25
listens (1)
2003:24
Lists (1)
2073:11
literal (1)
2014:14
literally (12)
1940:21;1950:10,23;
1954:7;1955:4,11;
1959:7;1960:11;
1961:26;1962:3;2044:2,
4
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
litigating (1)
1962:14
litigation (3)
2067:26;2068:2;
2069:5
little (10)
1939:5;1969:25;
1985:5;1986:9;2016:3;
2061:12;2069:22;
2073:9;2076:10;
2077:17
living (1)
1943:15
LLP (1)
1938:11
loan (4)
1948:25;1980:17;
2026:16;2027:4
loans (5)
2027:9;2050:7;
2056:10,12;2070:10
logic (1)
2063:21
logical (1)
2040:19
LONDON (1)
1937:10
long (1)
1943:7
longer (3)
2015:11,12;2034:12
longstanding (1)
2068:5
look (52)
1948:20;1950:13,13;
1962:17;1964:25;
1965:7,11,16;1966:17,
24;1972:2,17,19,24,26;
1976:11,13;1991:8;
1992:17;1995:22;
1996:5;2007:21;
2026:19;2038:18;
2044:14;2045:6,8;
2054:24
loses (1)
1949:19
loss (21)
2007:4;2009:12;
2020:5,14,22,24;2023:3;
2027:6,12;2042:13,17;
2044:15;2048:22;
2050:9;2051:4,5;
2054:9;2058:6,20,25;
2071:22
losses (39)
1965:25,26;1966:2,9,
11,16;1976:2,3,5,14,19;
2027:17;2041:23;
2043:14;2044:8;
2045:20,21;2047:5;
2048:23,24;2049:12,13,
14;2052:2;2053:8,15,16,
18;2054:6,23;2055:3;
2056:10;2057:15,16,17;
2060:23,26;2061:2;
2071:26
lost (3)
1976:20;1980:13;
1981:14
lot (15)
1946:17;1948:26;
1960:26;1964:9;
1966:13;1972:25;
making (16)
1956:2;1961:21;
1968:7;1972:23;1986:6;
1994:13;1995:18;
1996:23;2005:10,11;
2012:5;2018:15;
2030:16;2041:5;
2043:26;2044:22
Malteie (2)
2053:24;2056:19
M-A-L-T-E-I-E (1)
2053:24
management (2)
2044:5,11
mandamus (1)
2063:12
mandamus-to-review (1)
2063:23
mandatory (1)
2065:4
mantra (2)
2020:20;2067:7
manual (7)
2049:26;2050:2;
2051:3,23,24;2072:3,18
manufacturer (1)
2021:21
many (16)
1942:13,13;1994:21;
1995:10;2021:2,2;
1984:11;1987:4;1994:3;
2001:22;2016:16;
2029:7,19;2074:17;
2075:25
lots (2)
2072:12,12
low (1)
2034:11
lunch (4)
1975:24;2013:21;
2015:13,15
Luncheon (1)
2015:25
2047:9;2050:16;2052:7, LYNCH (1)
7,8,10;2056:12,13;
1937:6
2058:5,9;2059:19;
2062:4,26;2066:15,15,
M
16;2069:6;2072:6,21;
2073:13;2075:20,21,22, mad (1)
23,26
1969:17
looked (10)
magnitude (1)
1948:21;1964:20,22;
2038:7
1965:18,19;1996:18;
Maiden (1)
2030:3;2032:11;
2027:7
2037:18;2060:9
maintained (2)
looking (10)
2030:2,10
1965:17;1979:9;
makes (12)
1982:16;2000:8;
1943:19;1956:23;
2025:12;2041:10,17;
1958:9;1985:17;
2058:17,18;2077:17
1991:21;2004:22;
Lord (1)
2006:15;2020:21;
2034:4
2033:21;2035:16;
lose (1)
2036:5;2063:12
2026:4;2037:25;2040:6;
2054:8;2058:7,7;
2060:10;2067:26;
2073:22;2074:12
MARC (1)
1938:13
March (5)
1953:6;1960:11;
1980:25;1995:16;
2004:24
Mark (5)
2011:15;2023:23;
2025:3,6,8
marked (1)
2047:8
market (17)
1953:3;1973:16;
1979:7;2007:3,6,18,18;
2008:26;2009:5,9,11,23;
2023:23;2025:4,7,9;
2072:13
markets (5)
1946:17;1949:8;
1964:13;2065:13;
2072:12
Mary (1)
2013:11
massive (3)
1965:26;1976:15,16
material (5)
1996:12,19;2034:24;
2071:21;2074:11
materiality (5)
2030:3;2031:18,19;
2034:8,26
materially (1)
2033:10
materials (1)
1996:3
math (3)
1952:5,6,6
matrimonial (1)
1939:7
matter (10)
1944:23;1995:4;
2004:26;2005:7;
2034:20;2040:9;
2055:24;2071:2,11;
2077:18
matters (1)
1940:24
Max (1)
2048:18
maximize (1)
1961:18
maximum (1)
2014:19
May (16)
1940:22;1955:21;
1957:12;1964:26;
1972:24;1999:2,12,22;
2000:9,25;2002:12;
2020:26;2059:10,22;
2060:2;2075:14
maybe (13)
1952:26;1963:21;
1964:6;1985:24;
1992:20,20;1994:22;
2001:24;2053:17;
2056:9;2070:10;
2074:19,20
MBIA (178)
1937:15;1940:19;
1942:16;1949:26;
1950:11;1951:23;
1952:19,22,23;1953:6,9,
26;1954:6;1955:5,15,17,
20,21;1956:2,3,6,19,25;
1957:4,24,25;1958:4,11;
1959:6,11,14;1960:13,
21,26;1961:7,23;1962:3,
18;1964:21;1965:12;
1966:2,18,21,26;
1967:12,19;1969:6,12,
17,17,18;1970:12,21,22;
1971:12,15;1974:12,17;
1976:5,16,17,20;1977:3,
4,6,7,12;1978:2,2,11,12,
21,23;1980:3;1981:16,
17,19,21,23;1982:2,8,9;
1984:17,19,19;1985:6,
21,26;1987:22,23,26;
1988:10,14,20,25,26;
1989:11,26;1993:7,10,
23;1996:3;1997:8;
1998:19;2007:11;
(15) levels - MBIA
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
2009:16,22,24;2010:2,3,
7,10,22,25;2013:14;
2016:25;2017:8;
2018:10,24;2019:14,20;
2020:19;2021:16;
2022:10,13;2023:8;
2026:2,8,17,18,21;
2029:10,12;2030:26;
2033:8,9;2035:12,21;
2037:10;2038:25;
2039:10,12;2040:22;
2041:11,19;2042:2,4,7,
8;2043:7,15,26;2044:11;
2045:13,20,21;2047:4;
2048:23;2049:14;
2050:3;2051:5,17;
2053:13,21;2054:16;
2055:9;2056:9;2057:16;
2058:16,20;2059:9;
2060:25;2061:15;
2070:10;2071:22,25;
2072:20;2075:15
MBIA's (38)
1944:6;1946:21;
1947:15;1952:17;
1965:22,24;1971:17;
1975:26;1976:23;
1981:8;1985:2;1989:14;
1991:23;1993:3;1999:2;
2009:20;2010:19;
2016:6,16;2020:23;
2021:6;2022:15,16,24;
2023:18;2026:9,14,20;
2041:26;2042:13;
2044:15;2049:20;
2053:2,22;2054:2,19;
2060:20;2065:14
MBIS' (3)
2054:11;2056:11;
2060:13
McCracken (1)
2014:2
McKiernan (12)
2041:11;2044:11;
2045:3,5;2048:11;
2050:12,22,23;2051:11;
2055:23;2058:8;2072:2
mean (16)
1941:21;1945:4;
1952:5;1958:6;1972:17;
1974:19;1987:3;
2003:20;2011:3;
2015:15;2033:23;
2039:18;2048:3,5;
2054:25;2073:3
meaning (10)
1958:20,21,22;
1967:7;2006:13;
2012:12;2014:5,6;
2073:2,3
meaningful (1)
2019:23
meaningless (1)
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
1941:24
means (7)
1941:15;1942:22;
1987:8;1990:5;2001:23,
26;2002:3
meant (3)
1964:14;1997:11;
2033:15
measurement (1)
2025:11
meet (2)
2043:3;2077:9
meeting (1)
1983:12
meetings (1)
1996:8
Mehta (1)
1950:9
melodious (1)
1939:13
members (1)
1944:2
memo (26)
1964:24;1992:20;
1993:26;1994:6;
1995:15,15,20;1996:2,6,
23;1997:18,20;2000:21;
2035:17,24;2036:6;
2038:21,24;2044:4,10,
11;2049:17,23;2052:25,
26;2053:23
memorandum (1)
2047:14
memos (2)
2043:26;2052:8
mention (10)
1945:4;1977:4;
1997:5;2017:9,22;
2022:13;2064:24,24;
2065:12,17
mentioned (6)
1942:14;1946:20;
1990:14;1998:16;
2040:11;2044:25
mere (1)
2031:17
merely (1)
2012:7
MERRILL (1)
1937:6
met (6)
1966:19;1984:3;
1990:5;2008:9;2067:17;
2071:5
metaphor (1)
2013:12
method (2)
2020:26;2021:4
metric (2)
2009:11,11
Metro (1)
2011:15
MICHAEL (1)
1938:7
middle (6)
1943:11;1959:19;
1981:11;2040:19;
2055:3,13
might (3)
1951:19;1978:20;
2001:24
Miller's (2)
1980:11,11
million (26)
1965:25;1966:4,12;
1969:19;1976:7,18;
1981:22;2007:24;
2008:3,4,5;2014:17;
2029:14,14;2034:21;
2036:12;2037:26;
2039:2,20;2044:14,16;
2050:10,20;2051:3,9;
2054:24
millions (3)
2040:7;2044:2,23
mind (3)
2048:15,16;2073:17
minimal (1)
2039:25
minor (1)
1979:7
minute (1)
1977:13
minutes (4)
2015:12;2047:12;
2058:10;2072:22
mischaracterizing (1)
1994:22
misdescribed (1)
2026:21
misdirection (1)
2002:24
mislead (2)
2030:11;2051:15
misrepresent (1)
2022:14
misrepresentation (1)
2048:16
misrepresenting (2)
1994:9;1998:13
missing (1)
1967:26
mistake (2)
1966:8;2034:22
MMcKiernan (2)
2047:7,10
model (8)
1978:8,16;2021:19,
22;2022:3;2053:12;
2054:23,25
modeling (5)
2020:10,11;2022:25;
2027:21;2044:24
models (7)
2026:3;2050:4;
2054:3,11,14;2056:11;
2060:13
moment (10)
1966:5;1983:26;
1995:26;2001:24;
2007:21;2016:12;
2020:19;2022:7;
2028:13;2038:5
Monday (4)
1949:14;2021:6;
2075:9,16
monetize (1)
1962:3
money (12)
1962:24;1969:6;
1971:14,15;1974:11;
1976:16,17;1978:21;
1980:15,22;2026:17;
2033:12
monoline (9)
1982:21;2017:25,26;
2013:5
morning (13)
1939:3,4,16,17,19,20;
1940:5;1969:17;
1982:25,26;2036:9;
2075:5,9
morphed (1)
2068:2
mortgage (2)
2054:14,17
mortgages (1)
2055:26
most (25)
1949:23;1981:3;
2008:14;2016:18;
2021:9;2022:12;
2025:16,24;2026:7,11;
2035:24,25,25;2036:2;
2040:14,17;2044:13;
2045:12;2049:18;
2018:4,5,13,19;2019:22;
2052:22;2055:4;
2020:2
2058:14,15;2076:14,14
monolines (1)
motion (2)
1974:18
2059:14,15
monopoly (4)
motions (1)
2008:15,18,18,23
1999:9
Montauk (2)
move (1)
2063:26;2064:3
2059:15
month (2)
moved (2)
1960:12;2056:5
1999:10;2059:10
months (9)
moving (1)
1993:25;1995:8;
2033:11
1998:14;2026:4;2028:6, MRX (1)
22;2037:25;2054:25;
2023:20
2063:5
much (21)
moral (1)
1940:14;1942:9;
1955:16
1951:8;1969:6,21;
more (32)
1982:23;1994:16;
1941:15;1943:4,5;
1999:18;2001:12;
1948:19,23,26;1953:10,
2002:5;2004:3;2008:10;
17;1963:19;1964:17;
2015:12,23;2026:5;
1966:17;1967:2;
2039:6;2041:3,17;
1969:25;1970:5,11;
2074:8;2077:15,19
1994:16;1997:17;
multi (2)
2011:11,19;2018:3;
2042:2,4
2021:3;2035:19;
multi-billion-dollar (1)
2038:11;2041:17;
2057:16
2056:13;2057:2;2058:7, multiple (2)
7;2060:15;2064:4;
2033:25;2035:17
2068:18;2074:17
muni (15)
Moreover (1)
1953:16;1962:19;
2021:21
1964:9,20,22;1965:5,9,
Moriarity (10)
14,19,25;1966:11,14,14,
1955:13;1957:2;
15;2009:9
1993:24;1995:6,7;
muni/PHAOUPB (1)
1998:4,10;2000:23;
1970:17
2003:17;2007:8
municipal (18)
Moriarity's (3)
1948:7;1949:8;
2003:21;2004:11;
1951:6;1954:9,10;
2006:25
1971:13;1976:2,2,6,8,
Moriarty (2)
13,14,18,21;1981:18,20;
1953:11;2013:5
2014:11;2065:13
Moriarty's (1)
municipalities (1)
(16) MBIA's - municipalities
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
1973:15
must (16)
1941:19;1942:7;
1946:14;1962:16;
1986:24;1988:8;
2002:16;2005:15;
2030:23;2062:14,18;
2065:21;2066:9,21;
2068:13;2070:16
N
NA (2)
1937:5,5
NAIC (1)
2072:26
narrowed (1)
1992:15
NATIONAL (21)
1937:16;1950:14,21;
1951:3,5;1953:25;
1956:12;1958:11;
1959:11;1960:3;
1966:19,21;1969:5,6,14,
18;1970:8;1976:3,22;
1991:5;2033:9
NATIXIS (2)
1937:7,7
natural (1)
2009:8
NCIC (1)
2067:19
near (1)
2060:21
nearly (2)
2010:5;2014:17
necessarily (1)
1990:5
necessary (1)
2073:8
need (12)
1940:19;1964:13;
1967:7;1972:2;2009:21;
2010:23;2019:10;
2031:2;2061:6;2068:15;
2076:12;2077:3
needed (4)
1970:8;1971:6;
1981:14;2076:20
needs (3)
2030:4;2059:19;
2073:16
negative (6)
2029:14;2034:21;
2039:24;2041:17;
2058:7;2072:16
negotiate (1)
2027:6
negotiations (1)
1961:16
neighborhood (1)
2034:21
neither (2)
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
2017:8;2041:20
net (1)
2044:14
NEW (68)
1937:2,8,14;1938:6,6;
1943:18;1951:22;
1955:9;1971:5,6;
1984:25;1985:18;
1986:5,19;1989:10,15;
nontransparent (1)
2019:26
nor (5)
1956:3;1991:3;
2016:23;2017:8,24
normally (1)
2062:4
note (4)
1997:11,16;2042:24;
1992:4,7,11,23;1993:19;
2048:14
1998:4;1999:15,24;
noted (1)
2000:26;2002:8,26;
2009:16
2004:26;2005:23;
notes (6)
2006:4,5,7;2008:17,20,
1987:5;1997:7;
26;2009:17,18;2011:24;
2013:15;2014:11,13;
2017:2,6,21;2019:10;
2023:2;2026:6;2027:4;
2028:20;2033:10,20;
2036:23;2038:12;
2044:18;2050:17,17;
2052:13;2053:24;
2056:19,25,26;2061:11;
2065:20;2068:4,5;
2071:8;2073:15;2075:3
news (1)
2029:2
newsflash (1)
1985:8
next (25)
1951:18;1954:6,14;
1955:3,13,26;1967:15;
1968:9;1979:20,22;
1982:6;1990:17;
1992:17;2002:20;
2012:18;2024:4;2036:9;
2041:23;2046:12;
2049:15;2051:2;
2068:21;2073:25;
2076:3;2077:2
nice (6)
2002:23;2008:7;
2016:2;2023:8;2076:2;
2077:9
NINA (1)
2077:25
nine (2)
1949:24;2038:18
NK (1)
2077:1
non (1)
2010:12
none (4)
1996:12,19;2068:3;
2072:22
Nonetheless (1)
1996:13
non-performance (2)
2010:13,14
nonreinsurance (1)
1944:18
nonsufficient (1)
1984:5
Obama (1)
officials (3)
1979:2
2032:5,6;2033:2
object (5)
old (4)
1954:4;1955:10;
1955:9;2007:25;
2018:11;2045:2;2072:5
2026:4;2036:23
objection (14)
older (1)
1959:9;1967:18;
2026:5
1969:16;1971:3;1972:8; omissions (1)
1974:15,17;1977:10;
2071:21
2019:5;2042:24;
once (4)
2048:10,15;2055:16;
1972:26;2020:17;
2072:14
2034:15;2065:24
objections (2)
one (107)
2005:19;2041:8
1940:11;1941:19,24;
2002:22;2010:9;2029:8; objective (1)
1945:5;1946:6;1949:2,3,
2077:23
2009:11
3,6,9;1951:19;1953:16;
notice (1)
objectives (1)
1954:6;1955:3,12,13,25,
1955:26
2025:3
26;1961:15;1965:6;
noting (1)
obligated (1)
1966:5,10,23;1968:8;
2072:14
2009:5
1969:24;1974:7,23,25;
notion (12)
obligation (13)
1977:17;1980:12;
1943:3;1970:7;
1953:25;1955:16,21,
1983:25;1984:2,19,26;
1976:8;2031:16;2033:4;
22;1956:4,7;1957:2,3;
1985:23;1987:2,8,8,16,
2035:8;2036:4,25;
1959:10;1961:7;
17,23;1988:11,11;
2040:3;2048:3,26;
1967:22;1968:5,6
1991:17;1992:2,3,17;
2057:6
obligations (2)
1995:26;1996:25;
notwithstanding (3)
1997:13;2005:22
1997:8;1998:17,17;
1976:15;2041:14;
obtain- (1)
1999:11;2003:23;
2054:12
2023:24
2007:4,12,15;2008:13,
November (10)
obtaining (2)
14,16,17,20,21,25;
1983:9;1986:20;
1984:9;2041:2
2010:18;2013:9,13;
2016:26;2023:3,14;
obvious (1)
2018:2,22;2019:13;
2025:7,10,25;2026:16,
2016:23
2020:10,26;2026:26;
22
obviously (10)
2027:18;2035:11,23;
novo (1)
1941:8;1946:25;
2036:11,20;2037:15;
2067:10
1949:12;1962:16;
2038:3,26;2041:10;
nowhere (2)
2030:4;2034:26;
2042:6;2043:6;2045:10;
1952:14;2019:20
2036:17;2047:24,25;
2049:15,16;2052:12;
nuanced (1)
2062:2
2055:18;2056:15,25,26,
1941:3
occasions (1)
26;2059:4;2061:3;
null (1)
2015:2
2063:22,23;2064:15;
1944:23
occupancy (2)
2066:22,23;2067:4;
number (7)
2031:4,6
2068:18,19;2071:4,13;
2006:25;2018:20,21;
occur (1)
2072:24;2074:4
2051:10,10;2054:7;
2053:9
one-half (1)
2072:21
October (2)
1944:17
numbers (6)
1962:18;1983:17
ones (2)
1950:10;2010:16;
off (1)
2043:17;2047:8
2020:8;2044:4,20;
1939:15
only (34)
2054:9
offer (4)
1940:18,24;1957:19;
numerous (3)
1960:13;2009:21;
1962:14;1963:21;
1987:5;2014:26;
2013:9;2017:24
1964:5;1971:3;1974:23;
2075:21
offered (3)
1978:18;1981:21;
NY2d (4)
2009:14,19;2020:16
1990:15,16;1992:26;
2006:5;2011:14,15;
offering (1)
1997:21,21;1999:25;
2033:21
2009:17
2008:5;2017:18;2019:9;
NYID (1)
OFFICE (4)
2020:4,9;2030:8;
2072:26
1938:17;1941:10;
2034:15;2044:14;
NYS (1)
1973:8;1979:2
2049:22;2053:15;
2006:6
official (8)
2054:7;2057:14;2058:6,
1940:6;2032:12;
20,24;2071:25;2075:2;
O
2033:19,19;2034:5,14;
2076:2
2072:20;2077:26
opaque (1)
(17) must - opaque
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
2019:23
open (1)
1979:9
operate (1)
1954:10
operating (1)
1954:11
operations (1)
1953:26
operative (1)
1948:15
opinion (18)
1963:7;1984:9,17;
1991:15;1993:3,6,9,16;
1999:18;2009:19,22;
2033:16,17;2059:25;
2060:4,17;2067:22;
2068:9
opinions (4)
2059:6,7;2060:10,11
opportunity (1)
2048:26
opposed (3)
2012:10;2031:5,17
opposite (2)
2065:11;2068:7
opposition (4)
1992:25;1994:14;
2004:21;2065:25
opted (3)
2036:2;2040:13;
2049:18
option (1)
2032:17
order (10)
1964:14;1967:8;
1971:4,6;1980:21;
1982:19;1994:23;
2006:26;2040:16;
2062:18
ordinance (4)
2014:5,12,15,25
original (2)
1983:6;2077:23
others (4)
1941:23;1967:9;
2019:13;2053:17
other's (1)
2009:6
otherwise (3)
1944:13;1955:17;
1989:22
ought (1)
1995:5
ourselves (1)
2075:14
out (46)
1945:3;1950:7,15,17,
25;1951:24;1952:8,10;
1957:16,24;1958:7;
1959:23;1961:7;1962:2;
1970:20;1973:14,18,18,
25;1974:11,26;1975:7;
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
1976:9,16;1978:6;
1982:3,5;1983:5;
1995:21;1996:4,25;
2006:24;2012:12;
2025:21;2034:24;
2036:19;2042:13;
2050:4,26;2056:23;
1974:10;2010:12,13;
2036:5,26;2041:17;
2042:13;2044:23;
2053:16;2058:5,13
owned (1)
1980:19
owners (1)
2063:15;2066:5;2071:9;
1948:7
2072:16;2076:7;2077:4
outcomes (3)
P
2036:12,21;2039:2
outdated (1)
pack (1)
2053:26
2022:22
outperformed (3)
packed (1)
1953:5,6,7
2076:17
output (1)
packet (1)
2053:14
1952:23
outrageous (1)
page (36)
2020:9
1940:24;1941:10;
outright (2)
1947:8,9;1954:14;
2030:6,8
1968:9;1982:6;1985:3;
outset (1)
1989:16;1990:17;
2007:8
1991:15;1995:23;
outside (6)
1997:4,25;1998:8,10,17,
1950:6,24;1959:23;
17;1999:22;2006:21;
1982:4;2016:3;2021:26
2010:8,25;2011:14;
outstanding (5)
2012:18;2016:8;
1993:13;1997:7;
2021:10;2022:20;
2004:19;2009:20;
2024:4;2025:2;2041:25;
2010:4
2046:12;2049:5,11;
over (16)
2054:20;2068:21;
1942:2;1953:17;
2077:17
1958:15;1976:25;
pages (7)
1984:12;2001:16;
1988:23;1999:12;
2004:18;2006:11;
2005:17;2011:17;
2039:6;2054:24;2067:6;
2025:22,26;2026:13
2068:2,17;2074:11,12; paid (9)
2075:6
1951:4;1952:19;
overall (2)
1976:17;1981:19,21;
1947:12;2025:3
2007:23;2010:20;
overcapitalized (2)
2021:21;2071:9
1941:13;1970:8
painstaking (3)
overlook (1)
2070:16,18;2073:11
2031:13
Paltrowitz (4)
override (1)
2022:26;2023:17,21;
2051:4
2026:8
overrides (7)
Paltrowitz' (3)
2050:2,2,19;2051:24,
2025:21;2026:2,13
24;2072:3,18
Paltrowitz's (1)
overruled (1)
2022:14
2067:21
paper (2)
overrun (2)
1957:9;2068:19
2053:3;2059:3
papers (2)
overturned (1)
1973:23;2074:14
2062:18
par (1)
overwhelmingly (2)
1966:19
2069:26;2074:5
paragraph (9)
owed (1)
1950:13;1987:2;
1980:15
1992:11;1996:5;1997:3;
own (20)
2003:4,7,19;2004:12
1948:23,25;1952:17;
paragraphs (1)
1962:6;1965:22,24;
2060:12
1971:13,14;1972:3;
parent (1)
1981:4
PARIBAS (1)
1937:4
parrot (1)
2067:16
part (14)
1944:18;1952:18;
1970:17;1973:15;
1983:20;1984:14;
1985:23;1996:2;
2018:24;2021:18;
2023:10;2062:19;
2068:3;2076:13
participant (1)
1977:7
particular (4)
1963:10;2008:2;
2044:15;2072:8
particularly (3)
1946:15;1982:20;
2052:16
parties (4)
1999:8;2017:15;
2025:6,7
parts (2)
2035:24;2069:23
party (6)
1992:15,17;2016:20;
2021:19;2022:5;
2033:14
pass (1)
2008:6
passengers (1)
2002:17
past (4)
1965:2,2;1984:12;
2072:26
paste (1)
2044:4
pay (9)
1940:20;1942:16;
1943:20;1956:4;
1976:22;1981:14;
2010:7;2039:10;
2044:23
paying (5)
2007:16;2008:4;
2010:13;2044:16;
2055:26
payment (5)
1955:18;1984:21;
2042:3,3,5
payments (1)
1997:11
peak (1)
2054:15
pennies (1)
1997:14
people (17)
1948:23,24;1957:5;
1964:4;1965:6;1999:6;
2064:17;2066:3;
2070:12,12
per (1)
2042:9
percent (6)
1980:20;2054:18;
2055:7,11,11,12
performance (2)
1967:13;2023:4
performed (2)
2025:14;2027:20
perhaps (3)
1945:22;1975:6;
2022:12
period (7)
1978:13;2001:16;
2018:2;2019:12;
2026:25;2042:9;
2068:17
permitted (2)
1942:6;2014:20
person (5)
1962:18;2004:13;
2041:4;2044:12;2073:8
perspective (2)
2051:7;2053:7
pessimistic (8)
2036:3;2040:14,18;
2045:12;2049:18;
2058:14,15;2072:13
petition (6)
1945:6,7,11,13,16;
2057:8
Petitioner (2)
2032:16;2064:9
Petitioners (8)
1938:5;1939:22;
1961:20;1974:2;
1999:23;2005:15;
2012:11;2071:16
Petitioner's (1)
2012:6
Petitioners-Giuffra (51)
1939:1;1940:1;
1941:1;1942:1;1943:1;
1944:1;1945:1;1946:1;
1947:1;1948:1;1949:1;
1950:1;1951:1;1952:1;
1953:1;1954:1;1969:1;
1970:1;1971:1;1972:1;
1973:1;1974:1;1975:1;
1976:1;1977:1;1978:1;
1979:1;1980:1;1981:1;
2047:1;2048:1;2049:1;
2050:1;2051:1;2052:1;
2053:1;2054:1;2055:1;
2056:1;2057:1;2058:1;
2059:1;2060:1;2061:1;
2062:1;2063:1;2064:1;
2065:1;2066:1;2067:1;
2068:1
2006:6;2038:10;2043:8, Petitioners-Steinberg (21)
26;2055:25;2060:4,5;
1982:1;1983:1;
(18) open - Petitioners-Steinberg
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
1984:1;1985:1;1986:1;
1987:1;1988:1;1989:1;
1990:1;2013:1;2014:1;
2015:1;2016:1;2017:1;
2018:1;2019:1;2020:1;
2021:1;2022:1;2023:1;
2024:1
petitions (2)
2057:4;2062:26
phrase (1)
2012:12
picked (1)
2040:17
picture (1)
2061:10
piece (1)
2072:8
PIMCO (2)
2027:21,21
place (3)
1958:16;1959:17,18
placed (4)
1943:13;1959:12,21;
1960:23
places (4)
1987:5;1998:16;
2020:12;2035:18
plain (8)
1942:20;1953:14;
1988:15;2001:19;
2006:13;2014:4,6;
2068:13
plan (6)
1961:15;1963:25;
2022:2;2032:17;
2039:24;2074:23
play (5)
1946:4,5;1974:24;
1992:18;2066:5
played (3)
1973:9;1975:11;
2072:2
PLC (1)
1937:9
pleading (1)
1946:26
please (5)
1996:5;2075:21,22,22,
23
pleasure (1)
2077:12
pledge (1)
1980:18
plenty (3)
1979:24;2064:16;
2072:10
point (47)
1945:5,22;1946:14;
1957:13;1962:15;
1967:26;1968:2,4,7;
1969:8,12;1970:7,20;
1971:8;1973:18;
1975:26;1977:21;
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
1979:2,23;1981:3;
1983:2;1987:24;
1989:22;1990:2;
1992:14,17;1993:18;
1996:26;1999:4;
2001:15;2002:6;
2003:13;2005:18;
2007:3;2018:24;
2025:20;2027:18;
2033:5;2036:19;2037:2;
2038:2,17,21;2057:10;
2063:8,12;2073:25
pointed (3)
1948:18;1996:4;
2034:24
pointing (1)
1992:6
points (4)
1959:25;1972:18,22;
1985:16
policies (7)
1953:17;1958:7;
1961:6;1967:22;
1976:21,22;1981:18
policy (3)
2005:22;2007:21,23
policyholder (8)
1943:14;1946:18;
1977:5,6;1978:2,11;
2016:20;2039:5
policyholders (37)
1940:10,13;1947:12;
1948:6,22;1949:6,10,18;
1950:18;1951:17;
1952:15;1955:19;
1956:5;1959:13,21;
1960:23;1961:6;1962:5,
24;1964:3,4;1971:21;
1972:11,14;1977:3,25;
1978:15;1981:10;
1982:9;2016:22;
2017:10,16;2029:12;
2070:10;2073:17,23;
2074:3
policyholders' (1)
2039:11
policyholders- (1)
1948:5
political (1)
2060:5
poor (4)
1977:9,11,14,21
portfolio (6)
2027:13,24;2028:9;
2047:20;2050:7;2052:2
portion (2)
1946:6;1995:26
portions (2)
1957:18,19
position (19)
1944:22;1956:6;
1958:26;1959:26;
1960:2;1963:9,11;
1985:6;1988:5,7;
2030:11;2032:2;
2051:14,17;2059:12;
2061:6;2066:6,26;
2072:17
positions (2)
1988:4;2067:24
positive (3)
2029:13;2034:20;
2037:26
possibility (3)
1978:19,22;2064:8
possible (1)
2076:22
possibly (2)
2029:5;2076:24
post (8)
1966:26;1981:17;
1985:21,26;1993:7,10,
12;2060:19
potential (1)
1964:16
potentially (2)
1976:3;2073:18
PowerPoint (4)
1983:12,16,17,21
powers (1)
1958:26
practical (1)
2068:16
practice (5)
1977:9,11;2032:14;
2068:5;2072:26
pre (1)
2010:11
precedent (2)
2067:19,21
precise (1)
2013:20
precisely (4)
1994:9;2009:10,15;
2021:22
predated (1)
2058:25
preliminary (1)
2070:22
premised (1)
2071:13
premising (1)
1990:13
premium (1)
1991:4
premiums (1)
2007:23
prepare (1)
2074:21
prepared (4)
1993:3,26;2050:14;
2071:25
preparing (2)
2026:3;2050:15
present (1)
2021:22
presentation (4)
2030:2;2032:13;2035:9;
1983:8,12;2029:4;
2059:12;2063:16
2074:7
proceedings (51)
presentations (2)
1940:7;1955:1;
2017:8;2074:21
1956:1;1957:1;1958:1;
presented (2)
1959:1;1960:1;1961:1;
2007:11;2033:4
1962:1;1963:1;1964:1;
President (1)
1965:1;1966:1;1967:1;
1979:2
1968:1;1991:1;1992:1;
press (29)
1993:1;1994:1;1995:1;
1947:18,21,26;1948:2,
1996:1;1997:1;1998:1;
10,13,14,20;1949:3;
1999:1;2000:1;2001:1;
1952:13;1954:7;
2002:1;2003:1;2004:1;
1958:12;1959:7;1963:5,
2005:1;2006:1;2007:1;
12,17;1971:24;1972:5,6,
2008:1;2009:1;2010:1;
8,10,18;1991:25,26;
2011:1;2012:1;2018:19;
1992:19;2062:5;2063:4;
2025:1;2026:1;2027:1;
2064:18;2066:16
2028:1;2063:15;2069:1;
pretty (7)
2070:1;2071:1;2072:1;
1994:18;2008:4,4,13;
2073:1;2074:1;2075:1;
2013:18;2020:3;2052:9
2076:1
prevent (1)
process (7)
2009:23
1977:8,15,22;
prevented (1)
1995:19;2001:7;
1974:11
2016:21;2018:25
previous (1)
produced (3)
1970:23
1974:2;2020:5,15
Previously (3)
products (2)
1942:5;2044:25;
2022:3;2053:10
2051:15
professional (3)
Price (3)
1973:10;1975:14;
2032:9,11;2033:4
2076:17
pricing (1)
Professor (4)
1952:22
1980:11;2009:14,17,
primary (1)
21
2017:20
proffer (1)
principal (2)
1973:22
2042:3,5
project (1)
principles (3)
1983:20
1953:20;2014:5;
projected (2)
2066:19
2042:9;2060:26
prior (6)
projections (9)
1974:3;1976:19;
2027:6;2039:11;
1996:10;2022:24;
2042:18;2048:23;
2032:19;2068:5
2055:8,21;2058:16,21,
pro (1)
25
1966:19
projects (1)
probability (2)
2054:23
2009:12;2037:17
prologue (1)
probably (6)
1965:3
1949:23;1990:6;
promise (1)
1991:14;2035:23;
1939:12
2068:8;2076:6
promised (3)
problem (3)
1967:13,19,24
1957:5;2042:22;
prong (4)
2048:2
1946:14,15;2001:20;
proceed (1)
2071:4
2028:23
prongs (2)
proceeding (16)
1993:20;2002:11
1983:4;1985:4;
pronounce (1)
1986:10,11;1994:10;
2063:8
1999:7,15;2007:8;
pronouncement (1)
2012:8;2015:6;2029:4;
2012:11
(19) petitions - pronouncement
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
proof (2)
2051:13;2073:7
proper (1)
2039:25
proposed (1)
2007:14
proposition (2)
2030:8;2052:14
proprietary (1)
2012:3
propriety (1)
2062:14
protect (4)
1940:15;2016:22;
2028:20;2074:3
protected (1)
1950:21
protection (7)
1940:10,12;1946:18;
1956:18;1959:18;
2042:2,5
protections (1)
2028:3
prove (1)
2006:18
proves (2)
1941:10;2056:3
provide (10)
1952:24;1955:17;
1963:7,8;2013:20;
2027:8;2033:19;
2048:12;2061:15;
2074:23
provided (13)
1978:4;1983:22;
1984:17,17;1986:3,19;
2025:5;2027:2;2028:15;
2030:9;2039:13;2042:8;
2048:9
provides (2)
2009:11;2014:3
providing (2)
1960:7;1971:20
provision (3)
1946:19;1947:23;
2009:4
provisions (5)
1944:20,21;1989:23;
2017:9;2070:26
PUBLIC (17)
1937:16;1948:24;
1952:18,21;1955:12;
1964:17;1965:2,24;
1966:3;1973:8;1979:25;
1981:22;1982:9;
2028:20;2033:21;
2049:23;2062:23
publicly (5)
1954:8;1963:15,24;
1979:3,26
pull (4)
1983:19;1986:21;
1996:17;1997:2
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
pure (4)
1941:3,15;1942:22;
2068:12
purpose (7)
1940:9,14;1953:14;
1961:4;1980:4;2008:11;
2074:2
purposes (3)
2053:13;2064:26;
2067:25
put (79)
1940:26;1941:17;
1945:6;1946:3;1947:6,
14;1948:2,10;1949:20;
1950:3,14,17;1952:2,3,
16,26;1953:22;1956:7,
12,21;1957:8,26;
1958:10;1959:5,17,18;
1943:19;1946:9;
1953:24;1954:3,8,9;
1956:2,8;1961:4;
2030:16;2033:22;
2035:16;2040:26;
2041:2;2049:24;
2063:18
quote (91)
1940:23,23;1943:22;
1947:10;1948:4;
1950:16;1954:9,13;
1955:6,7,9;1956:3,5;
1958:2,8;1960:12,15;
1961:2,17,19;1962:19;
1963:18,20,22;1964:7,
12,25;1965:3,12,13,13,
15;1970:2,2;1971:18,19,
22;1973:18;1979:4,5,6,
11;1980:2;1981:3,6;
23;1967:15;1969:13;
1988:17,26;1990:9;
1971:17;1973:2;1975:8;
1992:9;1995:15;
1976:4;1978:25,26;
1996:19;1997:9,21,24;
1981:8;1984:16;
2002:9;2006:17;
1985:15;1989:18;
2008:10;2010:26;
1990:10;1991:20;
2012:8,9,12,12,15;
1995:8,13,25;2001:23;
2013:21;2014:3;2016:9;
2004:4,11;2011:26;
2021:7;2026:11;2030:6,
2026:23;2030:14;
22;2033:11;2036:2,3,10,
2036:7;2037:19;
22;2038:14;2039:19;
2038:22;2040:11,25;
2041:2,26;2042:5,7,7,
2041:23;2043:23;
10;2048:20;2059:10,22;
2046:7;2048:18;
2062:14;2064:6;
2050:13;2051:7;2053:6;
2068:15;2070:15,21
2060:25;2063:19,25;
quoted (4)
2064:18;2068:10;
1947:18;1948:4;
2072:19;2073:5,9;
1979:26;1988:12
2074:11;2075:2,4,6,8;
2076:19
R
putting (2)
2026:11;2031:11
RAIFFEISEN-BOERENLEENBANK (1)
PWC (3)
1937:8
2059:6,16;2060:13
raise (2)
PX (22)
2031:10;2035:2
1944:9;1949:20;
raised (5)
1952:20;1956:2;1960:9;
1949:15;1983:3;
1961:19;1962:18;
2010:19;2018:26;
1965:20,20;1967:17;
2047:26
1973:8;1978:7;1979:4; ran (1)
1983:10;1995:22;
2023:3
1999:5;2000:8;2010:7; Raritan (1)
2035:18;2043:23;
2011:13
2050:16,17
rate (1)
2044:7
Q
rated (1)
1966:19
quarter (4)
rather (5)
2022:24;2052:20;
1947:20;1972:23;
2054:12;2055:9
1975:7;2014:22;2038:9
quibble (1)
rating (14)
1991:8
1964:14;1967:20;
Quickly (2)
1969:15;1970:3,6,9,10,
2042:20;2044:26
20,22;1971:5,6,10,11;
quite (16)
2053:8
1960:8;1961:9;1964:10,
ratings (1)
1967:23
rational (3)
1964:18;2008:24;
2043:17
rationale (2)
2033:20;2051:23
Ray (1)
2077:3
reach (4)
1950:18;1981:4;
2061:13;2072:24
reached (4)
1997:22;2027:17,19;
2054:14
read (11)
1957:16,17;1972:7;
1987:4,10;1996:15;
2005:13;2052:11;
2065:10;2069:20;
2075:22
reading (2)
2010:26;2073:3
reads (1)
1996:25
reaffirmed (1)
2065:25
real (3)
1940:18;1994:19;
2047:18
really (16)
1940:13,24;1945:20,
23;1967:6;1975:7;
1992:2,2,2;1994:15;
2001:23;2003:23;
2007:12;2008:7,22;
2010:16
reapply (1)
2038:8
reason (14)
1949:13;1962:14;
1969:5;1982:15,17;
1997:24;2009:15;
2010:16;2017:19;
2048:7;2057:11;
2058:24;2062:22;
2070:12
reasonable (10)
1940:3;1942:7,21;
2023:5,10;2036:24;
2000:4;2052:19
recall (9)
1963:24;1983:7,11;
1984:11;1997:6;
2003:17;2013:5;
2039:20;2060:2
recent (1)
2025:16
recess (1)
2015:25
recitations (1)
2064:23
recognize (3)
1970:3;2011:8;
2077:13
recognized (3)
1982:3;2017:10;
2028:17
recognizes (1)
2017:14
record (23)
1948:16;1957:17;
1965:8;1969:19;
1970:18,26;1971:4,26;
1980:10;1992:26;
2000:17;2002:4;
2042:15;2048:6,8,15,16;
2049:24;2059:19,20;
2072:9,10,14
red (1)
2046:3
redacted (1)
2052:26
redeemable (1)
1980:19
redemption (1)
1991:3
redemptions (4)
1940:3;1942:4,5,7
reduce (1)
2050:5
reduced (2)
1981:16;2050:10
reducing (1)
2010:10
refer (2)
1974:3;2000:20
reference (7)
1991:25;1992:26;
1995:14;1996:25;
2052:3;2064:26;2071:2;
2001:10;2003:13;
2073:7
2004:22
reasonableness (1)
referenced (1)
2020:23
1946:21
reasonably (3)
referred (8)
1941:5;2036:23;
1989:15,26;1991:24;
2062:17
1993:19;1997:4;2005:2;
reasoning (1)
2010:22;2023:18
2063:14
referring (4)
reasons (5)
1991:14;1994:4;
2062:16,23;2071:12;
2003:4;2053:3
2073:6,12
refers (3)
rebuttal (2)
1989:16;1990:15,16
(20) proof - refers
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
reflect (1)
2070:5
reflected (5)
1998:16;2033:25;
2047:13;2049:22;
2060:14
reflecting (2)
1970:15;2053:23
reflection (1)
2005:20
refused (2)
1945:17;2018:14
regard (3)
1958:26;2017:24;
2070:4
regarding (4)
1994:5;2007:13;
2014:18;2035:20
regret (1)
1994:13
regulated (1)
2028:15
regulates (1)
1986:24
regulation (11)
1940:15;1943:16,18,
22;1953:21;2068:4;
2069:9,13,13,16;2074:3
regulations (3)
2021:18;2069:9,11
regulator (2)
1950:16;2023:13
regulatory (6)
1977:9,11,15,22;
2006:20;2019:17
regurgitating (1)
2016:17
rehabilitation (2)
2007:2;2014:13
rehabilitator (1)
2005:9
rehash (1)
2072:6
reimbursed (1)
2012:6
reinsurance (15)
1944:10;1946:14;
1951:5;1958:5;1991:4;
2001:20;2005:19,21;
2006:3;2007:16,19;
2009:7,10,19;2010:17
reinsure (9)
1950:22;1976:18;
1981:20;2004:19;
2005:18;2006:18;
2008:2,9;2009:5
reinsurers (1)
2010:14
reinsuring (3)
1993:12;2009:24;
2010:4
reject (1)
2028:4
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
rejected (2)
2069:12,15
rejects (1)
1979:5
related (4)
1952:19;2014:12;
2016:10,13
relating (1)
2032:14
release (26)
1947:18,21,26;1948:2,
10,13,14,20;1949:3;
1952:14;1954:7;
1958:12;1959:7;1963:5,
12;1971:24;1972:5,6,9,
10,19;1991:25,26;
1992:20;2064:18;
2066:17
releases (2)
2062:6;2063:4
relevant (5)
1993:6;2019:21;
2020:4;2041:6;2060:19
reliability (2)
2020:5,23
reliable (1)
2019:22
reliance (2)
2023:2;2029:9
relied (6)
1995:18;1999:16,17;
2009:13;2026:15;
2053:3
relies (1)
2062:16
rely (11)
2001:8;2017:3;
2026:3;2031:23;
2060:20;2066:13;
2071:16
repeats (1)
2020:20
repetition (1)
2002:5
reply (2)
1994:14;2011:16
report (24)
1942:26;1992:21;
1999:2,5,11;2000:8,21,
26;2001:5,10,12,14;
2026:16,19,20,23;
2037:13;2040:21,22;
2041:22,22,25;2049:5;
2059:16
reported (1)
2001:14
REPORTER (1)
2077:26
reporting (1)
2036:9
reports (2)
2062:23;2072:23
representing (2)
1984:19;2026:6
represents (1)
1962:7
request (4)
1997:24;2012:6;
2041:26;2057:12
requested (4)
2018:12;2019:5;
2025:10;2028:11
require (7)
1956:12;1988:16;
2006:19;2010:17;
2014:15;2029:25;
2030:12
required (19)
1955:24;1986:6;
23;2028:14;2042:14;
2044:15;2050:5;
2055:17
reserved (1)
1998:19
reserves (9)
2004:18;2008:12;
2047:19;2050:9;2051:4,
5,9;2054:9;2055:10
resolution (2)
1980:4;2034:16
resolve (1)
2057:25
respect (6)
1947:16;2020:4;
2053:9;2054:2;2061:13;
2072:7
respects (1)
2067:26
respond (2)
1961:19;2013:13
responded (2)
1960:8;1973:21
respondents (34)
1940:17,22;1941:2;
1942:14;1958:2;1967:6;
1992:6;1993:14,18,22;
1996:15;1997:17;
1998:26;1999:10,23;
2001:7,9;2006:15;
2012:7,11;2017:23,24;
2019:24;2020:3,13;
2025:20;2030:5;
2031:23;2040:5;2046:8;
2052:25;2054:3;2062:9;
2067:11
Respondents' (4)
1992:13;1999:11;
2032:22;2038:9;2044:3;
2000:20;2001:11
2052:15;2053:25;
Respondent's (2)
2056:20;2060:16
1964:8,19
relying (3)
1988:6;1990:10;1992:3, responding (1)
1947:21;2023:4;
25;1993:9,23;1994:3;
2003:9
2063:3
2000:2,12;2002:17;
response (8)
remediate (1)
2004:18;2006:26;
1942:24;1960:18;
2044:16
2016:21;2027:18;
1974:4,25;1999:23;
remember (1)
2030:18;2068:11;
2004:13;2006:13;
1999:14
2071:10
2012:10
remembers (1)
requirement (2)
responsibility (1)
2023:6
1958:10;2065:20
2061:14
render (1)
requirements (1)
responsible (1)
2071:6
2015:8
1984:20
renders (1)
requires (4)
rest (2)
1941:23
2030:9;2031:17;
1953:3;2077:13
rent (7)
2057:19,20
restate (1)
2014:12,12,14,18,19, requiring (1)
1956:24
20;2031:10
2006:17
restaurant (1)
rents (1)
research (1)
2047:16
2008:18
2049:24
restore (1)
repair (1)
Reserve (16)
2039:24
2039:22
1979:8;1980:19;
restricted (1)
repeatedly (6)
2023:2,17;2025:15,15,
1981:6
1956:24,25;2038:6;
23,24;2026:24;2027:4, restructures (2)
2017:26;2018:4
restructuring (3)
1961:15;2017:25;
2018:8
restructurings (6)
1982:21;2018:13,19;
2019:2,22;2020:2
result (5)
1988:21;2037:13;
2040:16;2059:16;
2061:12
resulted (1)
1942:26
resulting (4)
1943:9;2036:11,20;
2038:26
results (3)
2001:14;2042:26;
2053:12
retain (1)
2016:26
retained (2)
1984:18;2033:14
retainer (1)
2023:16
retaining (1)
1984:20
retentions (1)
2026:24
retirement (1)
2032:17
revealed (1)
2052:26
revealing (4)
1947:24;1949:16,24;
1951:13
review (28)
1965:13;1966:14;
1969:22,23,24;1974:3;
1996:22;1999:21;
2001:15;2012:3,3;
2015:4;2025:8,22;
2029:17;2039:10;
2040:18;2041:7;
2045:25;2047:22;
2057:26;2058:2;
2060:13;2063:13;
2064:9,10;2070:3,6
reviewing (1)
2062:25
reviews (2)
2045:26;2072:17
revocation (1)
2031:5
revoke (1)
2031:4
rhetoric (1)
1993:18
Richard (1)
2060:11
Richmond (1)
2027:5
right (13)
(21) reflect - right
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
1952:25;1953:2;
1963:15;1975:9;
1992:15;1994:13;
2013:21;2015:13;
2044:17;2047:22;
2062:24;2064:10;
2072:6
ring (2)
1953:15;1955:7
rise (1)
2055:25
risen (1)
2056:4
risk (17)
1943:13;1956:19;
1959:12,20;1960:22;
1964:9,21;1965:9;
1966:13;1981:10;
1993:13;1996:13;
2009:20;2010:4,12,14,
15
risks (3)
2004:20;2008:20;
2009:25
risky (2)
1966:25,25
RMBS (8)
2045:20,21;2052:5;
2054:3,6,11;2058:15,20
Rock (6)
2025:14,18,24;
2027:16;2028:7,15
Rock's (1)
2026:22
Roger (1)
1950:4
Rosner (1)
2011:14
round (1)
1994:14
rubberstamp (1)
2061:25
rule (10)
2005:11;2035:6;
2057:23,24;2058:11;
2061:23;2062:22;
2064:6;2067:4;2075:6
ruling (1)
1951:20
run (7)
2023:13;2037:10;
2046:11;2053:12;
2054:3,11;2055:4
running (3)
1973:8;2067:20;
2068:9
runs (1)
2034:21
rushing (1)
2047:21
S
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
safe (1)
2077:9
same (25)
1941:6,22;1944:2;
1947:3;1963:24;
1977:16,19;1978:13;
2058:3
SCOTLAND (1)
1937:9
screen (1)
1975:19
second (5)
1989:21;2004:15,23,26;
1950:13;1978:2;
2005:26;2009:15;
1994:14;2042:19;
2018:2;2021:22;2026:2,
2054:6
19;2038:22,22;2043:25; Secondly (2)
2044:11;2045:21;
1990:2;2052:5
2063:13;2064:17
Secretary (3)
sampling (1)
1979:26;2020:11;
2014:22
2032:15
sand (1)
section (24)
2026:12
1944:18;1983:4,18,23,
satisfied (2)
24,26;1986:9,23;1989:4,
1944:17;1947:22
17;1991:6;1993:21;
satisfy (3)
2000:2;2002:12,13,18;
1944:19;1960:13;
2005:23;2010:26;
2073:7
2015:8;2016:10;
saw (8)
2017:14,22;2071:4,10
1973:4,5;1978:25;
sections (3)
2048:23;2049:11;
1984:25;2071:3,6
2051:23;2057:14;
sector (2)
2071:25
2042:2,4
saying (19)
sectors (2)
1946:5;1951:23;
1964:26;1996:7
1957:6;1959:8;1962:2; secured (2)
1963:17;1973:3;1980:2;
1980:16,17
1990:9;1994:10;
securities (3)
1996:24;1999:6;2000:7;
1966:25;1980:24;
2003:15;2011:11;
2034:9
2058:8;2059:22;
securitized (1)
2066:14;2073:21
1948:25
Scanlon (1)
seeing (1)
2033:20
2043:8
scenario (21)
seek (2)
2007:13;2035:13,13,
2025:8;2031:4
19,23;2036:3,8,11,20; seem (2)
2037:9,11,12,14,16,24;
1939:6;1997:14
2038:26;2040:7,14,18; seems (6)
2049:18;2060:24
1945:23;1946:3;
scenarios (6)
1980:13;2007:16;
1997:9;2037:18;
2010:16;2074:16
2038:3;2039:13;2044:8; segment (1)
2058:14
2015:10
schedule (1)
segregating (1)
2023:22
2018:3
schedules (1)
seized (2)
2076:4
1959:3,4
scheme (1)
self (1)
1941:24
2045:13
Scherbyn (3)
self-serving (1)
2063:9;2064:2,5
2020:24
S-C-H-E-R-B-Y-N (1)
sell (1)
2063:10
1967:8
School (1)
senior (3)
2011:24
1962:17;2044:5,10
Schools (1)
sense (9)
2033:21
1943:5;1956:23;
scope (3)
1958:9;1969:25;
2012:8;2057:25;
1994:18;2001:12;
2006:16;2036:5;2055:2
sent (3)
1958:14;2050:23,24
sentence (3)
1991:24;1994:8;
1996:16
sentences (1)
2025:20
separate (6)
1944:7;1953:15;
1954:11;1955:8;
1989:23;2058:12
Separately (3)
1996:12,19;2075:11
Separation (1)
1962:19
September (11)
1955:14;1997:25;
1998:7,9;2023:5;
2040:23;2043:13,19;
2048:21,21;2058:26
series (2)
1979:14;2007:12
serious (1)
1966:16
seriously (1)
2062:2
serve (1)
2009:8
SERVICES (1)
1937:7
SESSION (1)
2015:26
set (5)
1953:16;2028:8;
2044:3;2064:7;2065:21
sets (1)
2075:4
settle (1)
2043:17
settled (5)
1941:19,22;2061:11;
2070:9;2071:7
settlement (5)
1963:22;1964:6;
1977:8;1978:3;1980:26
seven (1)
2037:19
several (9)
1959:26;1966:22;
1984:12;1996:8;2002:4;
2018:19;2029:20;
2063:5;2071:12
shall (1)
1943:25
share (8)
1950:20;1951:26;
1952:26;1960:16;
2045:18;2046:2;
2053:14,18
shared (1)
2045:23
shareholder (2)
1960:26;1962:8
shareholders (1)
1950:19
sharing (5)
1960:19;1961:2;
1962:5,8;2027:12
shear (1)
2056:11
sheet (4)
2000:18;2010:9;
2028:11;2042:8
sheets (2)
2074:20,24
shift (1)
2029:13
short (1)
2015:4
shortly (1)
2018:9
shortness (1)
2028:18
short-term (1)
2055:7
show (5)
1965:22;1966:5,22;
1975:6;1995:12
showed (22)
1942:23;1952:22;
1971:12;1999:15,17,19;
2007:7;2017:13;2018:5;
2026:20;2047:7,12;
2048:23,24;2050:26;
2053:15,18;2055:23;
2057:14,15;2058:8;
2071:26
showing (1)
1970:14
shown (15)
1979:7;1995:7;
1998:3;2011:20;2030:4;
2037:20;2046:10;
2047:3,25;2058:6,15;
2061:7,8,10;2068:3
shows (3)
1966:18;2010:8;
2044:8
side (42)
1942:10;1943:12,17;
1944:15;1949:14;
1959:14;1960:8;1961:3;
1965:21,25,26;1966:3,9,
11,14,14,15;1969:4;
1972:24;1973:2;1976:5,
7;1986:12;2014:9;
2032:22;2034:3,19;
2035:6;2040:23;
2044:19;2052:7,18;
2056:16;2059:5,21;
2062:7;2066:4;2067:6;
2072:20,25;2073:21;
2075:3
sign (3)
1989:19,26;2075:15
(22) ring - sign
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
signed (1)
1948:11
significant (2)
2051:10;2052:5
signing (1)
2027:25
Silva (1)
2011:14
similar (3)
1955:25;2027:6,19
Similarly (2)
2039:23;2045:19
simple (5)
1953:14;1971:9;
2014:7;2019:12;2020:3
simply (6)
1997:19;2002:14;
2005:20;2015:7;
2056:17;2071:3
simultaneous (1)
2065:8
single (7)
1948:21,22;2001:14;
2034:3;2038:11;2056:5;
2065:6
singularly (1)
2016:21
sink (1)
2031:12
sit (4)
1955:15;2061:22;
2065:22;2071:23
sited (1)
2062:21
sitting (1)
2041:12
situation (8)
1961:23;2028:14;
2032:12;2033:2,9,23;
2045:24;2051:19
six (4)
1959:5;2015:12;
2058:9;2076:3
six-month (1)
2055:24
skeptical (1)
2001:17
skin (1)
1960:26
slam (1)
1962:13
slide (44)
1940:26;1941:17;
1942:26;1943:17;
1947:6,14;1949:20;
1952:4,16;1953:22;
1957:13,26;1960:8;
1961:9;1964:10;
1965:23;1966:17;
1967:5,15;1971:17;
1978:25;1979:20,22;
1981:8;2030:14;
2035:16;2037:5;
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
2038:18,19;2041:23;
1994:22
2046:7;2062:13;
somewhere (2)
2063:19,22,25;2066:7;
1945:5;1991:7
2068:10;2069:7;
Sonkin (1)
2070:24;2071:15,19,20;
1962:17
2073:9,12
sophisticated (1)
slides (3)
2053:10
1979:12;2074:20,24
sorry (8)
small (2)
1972:16;1994:2;
2015:10;2051:10
1998:11,24;2011:7;
SMBC (1)
2022:19;2042:20;
1937:9
2044:26
smoke (1)
sort (22)
2031:12
1941:14;1948:17;
snippets (1)
1949:15,17;1952:2;
2069:22
1956:22;1957:7;
so-called (1)
1958:10,16,17;1963:8;
2035:13
1995:4;2010:22;
Societe (1)
2013:11;2028:13;
1980:5
2043:11;2053:6;
solely (1)
2061:18,22,24;2065:19;
2062:15
2067:7
solution (2)
sought (3)
1958:4;1960:16
1943:4,5;2022:3
solvency (53)
sound (1)
1940:23,24;1941:15,
2028:23
16;1942:22;1943:4;
soundness (1)
1984:22,23;1985:13,22;
1943:6
1986:2,25;1987:15,16, Sounds (1)
20,24;1988:8,10,13;
2028:22
1989:12,14;1990:5,6,13; source (1)
1993:3,4,7,24;1994:4,7;
1965:9
1995:8;1996:12,19,23, spare (1)
26;1997:5,19,21;1998:2,
2000:25
5,14,15,21,22;1999:3, speak (3)
20;2000:8;2001:10,15;
2021:16;2037:14;
2006:19;2009:7;
2077:3
2064:24;2071:4
speaking (3)
solvent (6)
1971:18;2029:15,20
1944:13;1959:15,17;
special (2)
1989:2;1997:15;
2043:11,12
2005:22
specific (3)
solving (1)
1947:16;2012:15;
2037:24
2028:4
somebody (1)
specifically (3)
2077:5
1974:19;1999:10;
somehow (17)
2039:18
1947:10;1980:5;
specifics (3)
1985:8;1994:6;2001:3;
1961:18;1963:7;
2002:10;2003:16;
1972:12
2019:18;2022:8;
specified (1)
2031:16;2035:9;
2025:16
2037:16;2041:21;
specifies (1)
2042:17;2043:10;
1951:7
2060:19;2068:9
speculation (2)
someone (14)
2042:16;2056:11
1950:6,24;1951:23;
speed (4)
1952:7,10;1959:23;
1960:11;1989:25;
1962:2;1975:21;1982:4;
1990:3;2001:6
2007:23;2033:18;
spend (1)
2034:12;2042:12;
2058:17
2073:26
spending (1)
somewhat (1)
2044:2
spends (1)
2016:16
spent (3)
1991:16;2058:18;
2064:17
spike (4)
2055:7,11,11,12
split (1)
1954:12
spoke (2)
1949:15;1955:13
spread (1)
2042:8
stability (1)
2065:14
stable (1)
2020:15
stacked (1)
1963:26
staff (4)
1993:17;2027:19;
2076:20,21
stale (11)
2022:7,9,11,15;
2026:3,9;2028:17;
2052:4,15;2054:21;
2056:20
stand (4)
2030:10;2047:6;
2051:14;2052:14
standard (11)
1940:2,19;1946:10;
1985:10;1986:24;
1990:4;1993:6,9;
2031:18,19;2034:8
standardized (1)
2014:21
standards (3)
1984:22;2031:3;
2066:12
standing (2)
1994:3;2029:3
standpoint (2)
1996:13,20
Star (1)
2038:14
start (6)
1939:15;1971:13;
statement (6)
1947:14;2002:14;
2023:10;2040:15;
2064:7;2066:12
statements (1)
2031:24
States (2)
2025:5;2064:5
State's (1)
1957:23
statistical (1)
2014:22
status (1)
1965:12
statute (17)
1940:4;1941:23;
1942:13;1990:10;
2005:14,15;2006:10,14,
16;2011:2,5,8,12;
2039:20;2068:14,17;
2069:16
statutes (13)
1939:23;1940:11;
1941:7,18,20;1942:2,21;
1943:21;1994:26;
2064:23;2067:16;
2071:8;2073:3
statutorily (1)
2021:8
statutory (8)
1941:24;2000:2;
2002:13;2011:19;
2012:15;2064:10;
2069:17;2070:25
STEINBERG (75)
1938:7;1939:8,12,25;
1946:8;1982:22,25;
1983:2;1987:6,9,14;
1990:8;1991:1,2,22;
1992:1;1993:1;1994:1,
9;1995:1,3,11,13,22;
1996:1;1997:1;1998:1,
25;1999:1;2000:1,7,14,
16,19;2001:1;2002:1,2,
7,21;2003:1,6,9,14,25;
2004:1,7,11;2005:1;
2006:1,10;2007:1;
2008:1;2009:1;2010:1;
1983:2;2015:12;2016:4,
2011:1,4,7;2012:1;
15
2013:20,24;2015:17;
STATE (23)
2016:4,5;2017:6;
1937:2,14,15;
2019:9;2022:19;2025:1,
1940:22;1941:2;1958:2;
2;2026:1;2027:1;
1967:6;1988:14;
2028:1,25;2057:9;
1993:22;1996:15;
2077:8,11
1997:18;1999:10,11;
STENOGRAPHIC (1)
2005:5;2008:17,25;
2077:23
2030:5;2031:23;
Stewart (1)
2038:12;2050:17,17;
2006:4
2061:24;2073:18
still (6)
stated (5)
1976:21;1979:8;
1952:21;1956:25;
1981:18;1993:14;
1984:8;1992:10;1995:6
2005:9;2016:7
(23) signed - still
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
stock (10)
1940:3;1942:3,5,7;
1952:22,25;1953:3,6;
1980:20;1991:3
Stockholders (9)
1949:18;1951:16;
1952:12;1953:18;
1960:21,24;1977:2,26;
1982:8
stood (1)
1973:13
stop (7)
1955:24;1957:4;
1959:17,18;1989:19,26;
2039:22
stopped (1)
1943:9
story (2)
1960:17;2052:9
straight (1)
2043:14
strange (1)
2008:19
Street (3)
1937:20;1973:12;
1975:16
strength (1)
1967:13
stress (21)
1997:6;2029:13,16;
2035:13,22;2036:8;
structuring (1)
2022:3
struggling (1)
2064:11
student (2)
1948:25;2070:10
study (1)
2045:22
stuff (3)
2058:22;2060:7;
2074:18
Stulz (4)
2009:14,16,19,21
Stulz's (1)
1953:8
subject (3)
2014:18;2017:7;
2029:16
subjective (1)
2051:24
subjects (1)
2016:14
submit (2)
2015:6;2033:14
submitted (6)
1985:6;1999:9;
2005:14;2007:8;
2032:13;2038:10
subsidiaries (3)
1956:5;1980:24;
1981:5
2037:3,9,10,12,14,16,24; subsidize (1)
2038:3;2039:12;
1953:25
2049:20,20;2054:6;
substantial (1)
2060:21,24,26
1961:8
stridently (1)
success (2)
2019:25
1969:4,7
stringent (1)
sued (5)
1943:6
1973:11;1974:22;
strip (1)
1975:4,15,18
1973:13
suffered (2)
stripping (2)
1976:14;2060:23
1974:11;1980:23
suffice (1)
STROH (1)
2016:10
1938:24
sufficient (3)
stronger (1)
1993:11;2006:3;
1986:8
2073:7
strongest (1)
suggest (3)
1985:18
1957:17;2015:15;
strongly (1)
2017:3
1959:15
suggesting (1)
struck (1)
2016:25
2070:25
suggestions' (1)
structure (1)
1979:10
1964:2
summarize (2)
structured (10)
1972:23;1981:7
1948:6;1953:15;
summarizing (1)
1954:12;1955:18;
2042:9
1965:26;1966:9;
summary (1)
1981:10;1996:2;
1998:18
2020:21;2027:14
super (1)
structures (2)
2007:15
2043:12,20
superfluous (1)
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
2071:7
Superintendent (28)
1937:14;1940:8;
1941:11;1944:16;
1947:16;1957:10;
23,25;2065:3,5;2071:10
surprise (1)
1939:6
surprised (1)
2010:22
1958:3;1959:9;1973:11, surrebuttal (7)
12;1974:14;1975:15;
1940:26;1998:25;
1976:26;1977:16;
1999:3;2000:19;
1986:24;1988:18;
2020:17;2046:8;
1995:17;1997:10;
2054:19
2005:8,9,10,13;2006:26; surreply (1)
2011:20;2017:15;
2020:18
2018:7;2039:21;2063:5 surrounding (1)
Superintendents (1)
1956:16
1960:5
sur-sur (1)
Superintendent's (3)
2011:16
1964:15;2005:6;
surveillance (1)
2069:15
1996:7
superiors (4)
survive (3)
2036:10,15,18;
2036:20,24;2037:25
2037:13
survived (2)
superiors' (1)
2036:11;2038:3
2036:16
survives (3)
supervised (1)
1997:8;2038:25,26
2018:6
suspect (1)
supervision (1)
2015:11
2006:20
suspense (1)
support (11)
2000:25
1953:26;1958:10;
sustain (1)
1959:9,11;1963:9,10;
2062:10
2014:6;2049:13;
sustained (1)
2062:17;2064:16;
2070:15
2074:5
sworn (1)
supported (2)
2049:3
2035:10;2072:8
system (3)
supporting (1)
1944:3;1973:15;
1989:13
2056:2
supports (4)
2033:4;2035:5;
T
2069:25,26
suppose (1)
T1 (1)
1995:5
1939:2
supposed (9)
T2 (1)
1989:11;1993:3;
1955:2
2009:23;2016:18,20;
T3 (1)
2019:16,21;2028:21;
1969:2
2065:13
T4 (1)
supposedly (3)
1991:2
1944:19;1964:21;
T5 (1)
2057:7
2013:2
SUPREME (2)
T6 (1)
1937:2;2006:6
2025:2
sure (12)
T7 (1)
1967:24;1970:21;
2047:2
1973:13;1974:24;
T8 (1)
2002:16;2008:3;2015:4,
2069:2
20;2021:8;2023:6;
table (1)
2074:16;2077:14
1970:4
surplus (19)
talk (14)
1939:26;1942:2;
1944:9,9;1945:7,10,
1943:3,3,8;1997:7,11;
12;1946:9;1949:7;
2029:13;2036:12;
1987:22;1988:3;
2037:26;2039:2,5,11,22,
2020:18;2022:7;
2029:18;2039:5;2046:6
talked (25)
1939:25;1941:26;
1942:11;1944:12,20;
1945:9;1946:6;1960:15;
1961:12;1970:26;
1974:18;1976:24;
1979:15;1980:25;
1984:11;1987:3;
1989:19;1990:12;
2004:21,24;2018:23;
2032:9;2043:4;2049:26;
2053:20
talking (23)
1940:5,12;1955:5;
1958:14;1960:12;
1961:10,11,24;1962:2,
21;1963:26;1970:20;
1981:2;2011:7;2016:15;
2032:23;2034:20;
2035:18;2036:10;
2038:25;2053:4;2060:3;
2062:5
talks (12)
1949:8;1950:2,9,12;
1951:2,4;1961:14;
1962:19,20;2027:12;
2044:6,6
tape (1)
1975:11
tar (1)
1980:5
tax (2)
2010:11;2034:17
taxpayer (1)
2026:16
team (2)
2043:25;2063:9
technological (1)
2021:3
technology (2)
2020:26;2021:14
Telephone (3)
2052:13;2053:25;
2056:20
television (2)
1955:5;1959:8
telling (6)
1947:19;1951:24;
1992:13;2035:25;
2064:14;2073:24
ten (3)
2025:2;2038:20;
2041:26
tenant (2)
2031:8,9
Tenants (6)
2014:9,10,20,24;
2015:2;2016:11
tenant's (1)
2031:10
term (2)
2012:15;2028:11
(24) stock - term
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
termination (1)
2028:11
terms (5)
1963:2;1982:16;
2011:8;2067:5;2069:17
terrific (1)
2072:7
test (17)
1939:26;1940:24;
1943:6;1989:19;1995:8;
1997:6,8;2006:12;
2007:4,6;2009:7,10;
2010:17;2025:18;
2060:21;2065:5;2071:4
testified (15)
1940:7;1953:11;
1957:2,11;1958:24;
1959:9;1960:5;1993:24;
1995:7;1998:4;2009:21;
2022:26;2048:11,12;
2058:10
testifying (1)
2032:5
testimony (15)
1958:3;1959:2;
1998:7;1999:19;
2009:14;2022:14;
2023:18;2025:26;
2026:2;2045:9;2047:9;
2049:3;2055:23;2057:5;
2072:12
tests (5)
1944:8;1984:23;
2002:12,16;2007:4
that- (1)
2063:18
theft (1)
1977:21
theories (1)
1992:13
theory (1)
1993:23
thereafter (1)
1996:20
therefore (1)
1991:3
thick (1)
2041:22
thinking (3)
1970:10;2015:18;
2061:23
third (7)
2016:19;2017:15;
2021:19;2030:21;
2032:10;2054:11;
2055:9
third-party (7)
2001:6;2018:3;
2019:15;2021:13;
2040:10;2045:24,25
third-quarter (2)
2055:21;2058:21
though (6)
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
1981:21,25;2001:5;
2031:7;2058:6,21
thought (15)
1939:8;1956:21;
1960:19;1965:5;1967:9,
19,25;1972:4;1991:14;
1993:16;2008:14;
2009:9;2026:15;2056:9;
2075:8
three (7)
1988:12;1991:17;
2016:13;2035:16;
2043:22;2054:25;
2074:11
threshold (2)
2039:16,17
throughout (2)
1994:20;2015:3
Thus (1)
2012:14
ties (1)
2017:16
tight (1)
2075:18
till (1)
1970:11
timely (1)
2042:3
times (12)
1959:26;1967:2;
1987:4;1994:22;
1995:10;1997:9;2002:4;
2029:9;2052:13;2072:7;
2073:22;2075:21
Timothy (1)
2020:12
tip (1)
1961:17
title (1)
2021:17
today (10)
1955:15;1963:22;
1964:6;1998:20;2004:5;
2016:3;2074:20;2075:4,
10;2077:4
together (4)
2074:11;2075:12;
2076:10,20
told (25)
1959:6,7;1967:14,15;
1969:9,9,17;1971:9;
1986:22;1987:23;
1988:14,25;1995:24;
2003:2;2005:15;
2006:15;2013:14;
2016:5;2022:16;
2025:18;2032:16;
2036:15;2072:16,17,21
tomorrow (5)
2004:5,8,10;2075:5;
2077:5
tonight (1)
2075:5
took (6)
1978:6;1985:6;
2028:19;2050:25;
2051:14,17
topic (1)
1975:17
TORRES (1)
1938:11
total (1)
2030:6
totally (1)
1955:8
touch (1)
2075:17
touched (1)
2057:9
touchstone (1)
1943:20
toward (1)
1983:22
toxic (1)
2073:26
tracking (1)
2055:20
traditional (1)
1943:5
transaction (44)
1941:12;1943:25;
1944:10,17;1946:11;
1947:5,22,25;1949:5;
1950:9;1951:13,15,25;
1952:12;1953:14;
1957:24
transformation (45)
1939:23;1945:21,26;
1947:13;1949:26;
1952:17,20;1954:2;
1960:7;1961:5,11;
1963:14;1964:15;
1966:26;1967:14;
1969:13;1970:23;
trying (15)
1945:3;1946:2;
1962:3,23,25;1973:19,
22;1992:18;2041:13;
2043:12;2045:14;
2054:21;2062:6;2063:9;
2064:12
Tuesday (5)
1939:26;1998:17;
1976:5;1978:13;1981:9,
2001:26;2022:18,19
17;1982:17;1983:21;
tune (2)
1985:22;1986:2;
2050:8,10
1987:14,15;1988:22;
turn (17)
1989:2;1991:10,10,19;
1954:6;1955:2,26;
1993:7,11,13;1996:10,
1967:5;1969:15;1982:6;
22;1997:23;1999:21;
2001:19;2008:9;
2032:2;2035:20;2051:6;
2016:12;2040:10;
2059:8;2060:19;
2044:9;2049:4,15;
2070:26
2052:4,24;2061:17;
transparency (1)
2066:19
2041:16
turned (1)
transparent (3)
1973:25
2021:3;2042:21;
turning (1)
2045:17
1987:19
Treasury (10)
twenty (1)
1979:5,8,16,24,26;
2072:22
1980:17;2020:11;
two (18)
2023:25;2027:5;2028:7
1944:7;1985:16;
treated (2)
1989:23;1994:26;
1941:21;1960:14
1996:8,24;2005:25;
treats (2)
2007:4,14,17;2011:11;
1964:3,4
2023:24;2030:14;
1956:18;1957:6;1958:5; Trek (1)
2041:19,25;2052:11;
1960:22;1961:24;
2038:15
2074:21;2075:3
1962:4,24;1963:23;
trend (1)
type (1)
1967:11;1970:15;
2056:4
2021:22
1972:13;1973:7;
trial (3)
types (2)
1976:25;1977:17,19;
2031:14;2048:18;
2021:20;2027:6
1978:10;1979:3;
2057:7
typically (1)
1980:23;1982:7,13,13; triannual (1)
1992:15
1992:22;2027:13;
2059:16
typographical (1)
2043:9;2044:15;
tried (4)
2034:22
2054:13;2064:15;
1944:16;2031:10;
2065:7;2067:14
2040:26;2076:21
U
transactions (11)
trip (1)
1943:10,23,23;
2077:9
ultimate (2)
1955:24;1961:25;
triple (5)
2042:3,5
1997:23;1999:21,25;
1969:4,7,14;1970:23; ultimately (6)
2027:7;2064:25;
1971:11
1949:18,22;1952:11;
2070:26
true (7)
1953:18;2027:10;
transcript (10)
1970:9;2019:7,10;
2061:14
1957:18;1988:23;
2021:11;2037:4;
unable (1)
1999:22;2006:21;
2056:18;2077:22
2004:19
2016:8;2026:13;
truly (1)
unambiguous (5)
2029:24;2030:3;
2021:13
2010:26;2011:9,19;
2054:20;2075:22
trust (1)
2014:3;2070:25
TRANSCRIPTION (1)
2020:12
Uncertain (1)
2077:22
try (12)
2009:20
transfer (1)
1945:22;1961:18;
uncertainty (4)
1964:16
1964:7;1972:22,23;
1943:14;1946:17;
transferor (1)
2029:5;2065:22;
1956:15,16
1943:24
2074:13,14;2076:11,21; under (34)
transferred (1)
2077:5
1941:18;1943:20;
(25) termination - under
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
1946:12;1947:4;
1982:10;1983:18;
1984:22;1985:14,18;
1988:11;1989:3,17,20,
21;1996:2;2002:12,13,
18;2005:19,23;2006:20;
2027:9,11;2029:13;
2030:12;2053:24;
2060:24;2061:11;
2065:20;2066:21;
2070:25;2071:3;2076:9,
23
underlined (1)
2022:21
understands (1)
2021:7
understood (5)
1957:3;1994:25;
2007:14;2047:24;
2058:3
undisputable (1)
2019:12
undisputed (3)
2035:3;2039:4;
2057:23
undoubtedly (4)
1997:18;2008:18;
2022:10;2073:14
unfair (1)
1941:12
unfettered (1)
2045:17
unfortunately (1)
2001:9
unified (1)
2014:22
Union (6)
2014:9,10,20,25;
2015:2;2016:11
unit (1)
2014:23
United (1)
2025:5
units (1)
2014:17
unjustified (1)
2018:17
unknowns (2)
1956:17;1965:14
unless (2)
1943:25;2075:6
unlike (2)
2019:13;2028:14
unlikely (2)
1965:3;2027:19
unprecedented (1)
1956:17
unrebutted (1)
1958:3
unredacted (4)
1997:2;2035:17,24;
2040:16
unremarkable (1)
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
2023:11
1971:13,14,15;2013:6;
unsupported (1)
2020:2;2022:9,10;
1961:21
2023:26;2025:24;
up (87)
2028:14;2054:4
1939:6;1940:26;
uses (2)
1941:2,17;1947:6,14;
2004:26;2005:3
1948:2;1949:20,23;
USG (2)
1950:3;1952:2,3,16,26;
2025:5,7
1953:4,22;1956:7,21; using (6)
1957:26;1959:5;1960:7,
1958:23;1961:24;
8,18;1961:9;1962:6;
2000:20;2021:19;
1963:17;1964:10,23;
2022:9;2025:16
1967:15;1969:13;
utilize (1)
1970:4;1971:17;1973:3,
1986:6
13;1975:23;1978:24,25,
26;1980:3,21;1981:8;
1983:19;1984:16;
1985:15;1986:21;
1989:18;1994:3;
1995:13,25;1996:6,17;
1997:2;2001:23;2004:4,
11;2007:23;2011:26;
2015:21;2018:19;
2021:17;2026:23;
2030:14;2033:2;2036:7;
2037:19;2040:11,25;
2041:23;2043:14,23;
2044:20;2046:7;2047:6;
2048:18;2050:13;
2052:24;2056:24;
2058:22;2060:25;
2063:19,25;2065:19;
2068:10;2072:19;
2073:5,9;2077:2
Update (2)
2050:16,17
updating (1)
2026:10
uphold (2)
2013:15,25
uploaded (1)
2077:16
upon (9)
1947:21;1984:24;
2005:12;2026:3;2038:9;
2052:15;2053:25;
2056:20;2060:16
upside (2)
1959:22;1960:24
urge (2)
2045:8;2047:9
USA (1)
1937:5
USB (1)
1937:10
use (16)
1949:11,12;1963:6;
1981:4;1992:4;2017:15;
2019:14,17;2022:15,24;
2026:9;2052:22;2054:2,
21;2060:7;2069:4
used (14)
1957:13;1959:18,19;
victims (2)
2073:26,26
video (1)
1973:9
view (4)
1943:12;1958:24;
2061:11;2073:2
viewed (1)
1993:17
views (2)
2022:4;2072:13
violate (1)
2071:7
violated (2)
1939:23;1947:25
V
virtually (1)
1977:18
visit (1)
valid (2)
2004:7
1942:17;2020:13
vital (1)
valuate (1)
2001:3
2002:14
voice (1)
valuating (2)
1939:13
2006:2;2009:24
volatile (3)
valuation (13)
1953:10,15;1981:15
2018:3;2019:15;
2023:23;2024:2;2025:4, volatility (1)
1964:13
8,15;2026:16,22;2041:5,
volumes (1)
13,16,18
2037:14
valuations (2)
2019:21;2025:6
W
value (4)
1960:13;2008:8;
2010:2;2025:13
WACHOVIA (1)
variety (1)
1937:10
2058:12
Wait (5)
various (5)
1977:13;1999:26;
1980:15;2026:24;
2001:6;2060:3,6
2030:15;2039:12;
walk (2)
2053:7
2016:3;2074:14
vault (1)
Wall (2)
2033:12
1973:11;1975:16
vendor (1)
wants (3)
2028:7
1994:25;2009:9;
veracity (1)
2072:6
2025:18
warrants (1)
verbatim (1)
1980:19
2038:24
waste (1)
verified (10)
2068:20
1985:15,16,17;
Waterhouse (1)
1986:17;1988:5;1992:5,
2030:24
11,24;2002:26;2004:14 way (21)
verify (1)
1948:21;1949:23;
2001:13
1959:4;1964:3,4;
version (1)
1978:12,19;1982:20;
1997:2
1991:16;2004:15;
versus (10)
2005:26;2008:23;
1949:18;1969:6;
2015:18;2028:23;
2006:4,6;2011:13,15,23;
2034:11;2044:20,20;
2014:2,10;2033:21
2066:7;2076:4,17;
viability (1)
2077:19
2036:24
ways (2)
vibrant (1)
1979:9;2035:25
2008:26
wearing (2)
2005:8,13
webcasts (1)
2063:5
webinar (1)
1973:4
week (13)
1952:22;1964:11;
1971:12;1979:3,25;
1998:26;1999:15;
2004:24;2007:7;
2017:13;2018:5;
2020:25;2055:22
weekend (1)
2075:6
weeks (5)
1991:16;1995:15;
2064:12;2074:13;
2076:3
weren't (5)
1946:2;1970:9;
2032:6,25;2047:3
Wertheim (1)
1953:23
West (1)
2014:9
What's (8)
1948:9;1967:12;
1969:20;1986:14;
1987:12;1990:14;
2022:12;2067:6
whatsoever (4)
1958:12;1972:12;
1994:5;2018:14
whenever (1)
2002:12
whereby (1)
1943:13
whole (8)
1960:6;1961:12;
1962:4;1967:7;1970:7;
1979:13;1982:17;
2069:21
widely (1)
2019:26
wife's (1)
2050:25
wild (1)
1961:21
wildly (3)
1959:15,17;1970:8
will-retain-sufficient-surplus (1)
1990:4
win (1)
1977:26
wins (1)
2061:24
within (6)
1939:24;1951:25;
1957:24;1960:12;
2012:8;2047:4
without (6)
1956:18;1962:22;
2018:2;2051:25;
(26) underlined - without
ABN AMRO v.
DINALLO, MBIA
2057:24;2070:4
wonder (1)
2055:14
word (19)
1942:8;1948:12;
1949:2,3,4,6,9,11,12;
1955:12;1958:19;
1959:3;1963:6;2002:25,
25;2064:24;2065:3,6;
2074:12
words (18)
1949:24;1959:4;
1962:6;1972:3;1974:10;
1980:21;1992:4;
1994:23;1995:4;
2010:11;2025:17;
2039:26;2040:2,13;
2053:16;2058:5,13;
2073:3
work (12)
1952:19;1961:14;
1993:17;2021:7,9,15;
2035:15;2038:10;
2041:20;2076:4,11,21
worked (3)
2043:3,25;2076:19
working (3)
2032:6;2034:4;
2041:13
works (1)
2034:12
world (2)
1967:13;2027:21
world's (1)
2020:21
worry (1)
2003:12
worse (1)
1986:18
worst (4)
1959:19;2035:19;
2043:16;2052:20
worth (2)
1951:8;1999:18
write (10)
1963:7,11,12;
1964:14;1971:5,6;
1982:19;1991:14;
2062:23;2065:9
writing (3)
2039:22;2043:26;
2064:18
written (5)
2003:11,11;2033:10;
2063:4;2066:16
wrong (8)
2013:17,26;2016:7;
2019:5;2039:3,4;
2054:26;2057:8
wrote (3)
2022:20;2042:2,4
Min-U-Script
June 7, 2012
X
XXX (1)
2077:20
Y
year (8)
1976:19;1992:21;
2026:3;2038:5;2054:5;
2058:17,23;2059:6
years (15)
1940:21;1942:3,13;
1957:6;1999:26;
2000:12;2006:11,14;
2007:25;2013:6;2034:2;
2036:14;2054:24;
2065:23;2074:11
yellow (2)
2003:11;2047:8
yesterday (6)
1995:24;1996:5;
2001:25;2013:14;
2022:16,20
yield (1)
1965:2
YORK (58)
1937:2,8,14;1938:6,6;
1943:18;1951:22;
1984:25;1985:18;
1986:5,20;1989:10,15;
1992:4,7,11,23;1993:20;
1998:4;1999:16,24;
2000:26;2002:8,26;
2004:26;2005:23;
2006:5,5,7;2008:17,20,
26;2009:17,18;2011:24;
2013:15;2014:11,13;
2017:2,6,21;2019:11;
2026:6;2027:4;2028:20;
2036:23;2038:12;
2044:18;2050:17,17;
2052:13;2053:25;
2056:20;2061:12;
2065:20;2068:5;2071:8;
2073:15
York's (1)
2023:2
Z
zero (12)
2039:23;2047:19;
2048:23;2049:12,13;
2051:26;2053:15,16;
2057:14,17;2058:6;
2071:26
Zimmerman (2)
2011:23,26
zoning (1)
2014:7
(27) wonder - zoning

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In The Matter Of:

NYS Supreme Court Reporters

Original File 060712.txt

Min-U-Script with Word Index

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Not that I care but...

Attorneys for the Petitioners

Attorneys for the Respondents

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR

THE STATE OF NEW YORK

1309, which the insolvency statute.

affidavit has said, including former Superintendent

is the protection of policyholders.

insurance companies from holding companies.

literally, for almost 45 years.

NYS Supreme Court Reporters

(1) Page 1937 - Page 1940

notion of surplus to surplus.

drain resulting from it stopped."

living through in 2009.

no. 108, which makes it quite clear that the ability to

pay claims is not the touchstone under all these

where the transferor is insolvent or impaired, the

means something other than pure solvency.

there was no response to all the detailed legislative

all the time.

of 1309, the nonreinsurance section part of it.

NYS Supreme Court Reporters

(2) Page 1941 - Page 1944

they applied 1309, and they are bound by that

really see how 1309 is implicated in this

the same in any kind of a civil case.

that the transaction was fair and equitable.

policyholders would benefit overall from the

he quoted the press release.

finding as to whether this transaction satisfied a

this transaction violated the Insurance Law.

weren't trying to see whether it was insolvent, or they

quoted. It says, quote: "This deal is fair to all

the approval letter itself, but the word equitable,

pointed to at the back end of the case.

single benefit to left-behind policyholders, which

own student loan bonds that were securitized. It

NYS Supreme Court Reporters

(3) Page 1945 - Page 1948

about the fact, what else is in National?

insurance from a New York insurance company.

could figure it out" as an analyst is telling him

be the CEO. He says "glad someone could figure it

public disclosures -- part of the bonus compensation

on transformation. That's PX 109.

didn't provide enough information.

NYS Supreme Court Reporters

(4) Page 1949 - Page 1952

Mr. Dinallo says quote, I am a big fan of the

his deposition, September 2, 2010.

Corporation for the payment of claims of structured

incentive to do so, but there is no legal obligation.

required a back stop, as was done in other transactions

similar to this one.

any legal obligation to pay any claims of any of its

Brown's deposition. He made it quite clear at his

transaction to be approved without any protection for those