Article in Press

Please cite this article in press as: Badri, N., et al.
, A multivariable approach for estimation of vapor cloud explosion frequencies for

independent congested spaces to be used in occupied building risk assessment. Process Safety and Environmental Protection (2012),
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2011.12.002
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PSEP-255; No. of Pages 12
Process Safety and Environmental Protection x x x ( 2 0 1 2 ) xxxxxx
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Process Safety and Environmental Protection
j our nal homepage: www. el sevi er . com/ l ocat e/ psep
A multivariable approach for estimation of vapor cloud
explosion frequencies for independent congested spaces to
be used in occupied building risk assessment
Naser Badri, Farshad Nourai, Davood Rashtchian
Center for Process, Safety and Loss Prevention (CPSL), Department of Chemical and Petroleum Engineering, Sharif University of
Technology, Tehran, Iran
a b s t r a c t
API Recommended Practice 752 is one of the most referenced practices for evaluating vapor cloud explosion (VCE)
impacts to site occupied buildings. This reference introduces generic VCE frequencies for different types of process
units that are based on VCE incidents database. Although these reported VCE frequencies are not capable of illus-
trating all parameters that affect explosion likelihood, they are widely used in risk analysis studies and software
packages. This paper delineates the structure of a more realistic method for estimation of local VCE frequencies
for independent congested spaces or units as a function of process, site, and meteorological variables. Compared to
traditional methods for VCE frequency estimation, the new proposed approach is supported by an obviously more
populated and precisely categorized database of leakage frequencies and features a multi-variable functionality of
process/plant conditions. Contrary to previous procedures that aimed at nding the frequency of occurrence for a
single VCE incident, this proposed methodology characterizes each congested space with a local VCE frequency. This
frequency is an integration of the frequencies pertaining to VCEs that are likely to be initiated by each congested
space. This new VCE frequency can also be used to determine the level of explosion hazard in each unit and in risk
matrix analysis.
2011 The Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Siting; Quantitative risk assessment; Vapor cloud explosion; Frequency; Building
1. Introduction
Although building protection is achievable by proper design
(ASCE, 1997), there is a great tendency to identify safe loca-
tions for buildings in earlier steps of plant development
(AIChE/CCPS, 1999). Building siting studies are mainly aimed
at evaluating hazard scenarios with considerable impacts on
process plant buildings and their occupants. Vapor cloud
explosion (VCE) is the dominant hazard scenario for this kind
of studies, while buildings and their occupants are less vul-
nerable to re and toxic hazards compared to VCE (Melton and
Marx, 2008). The importance of this dominance is more high-
lighted when one considers destruction of buildings and its
subsequent occupant casualties as the main consequences of
major reported VCEs (Lees, 1996; Marsh, 2010). Recalling that
such disasters have never been stopped and still continue to
Corresponding author. Tel.: +98 2166165480; fax: +98 2166022740.

E-mail address: rashtchian@sharif.edu (D. Rashtchian).
Received7 August 2011; Receivedinrevisedform28 November 2011; Accepted9 December 2011
happen (Marsh, 2010; Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2010), it is nec-
essary to performVCE hazard analyses as the basis for nding
the proper distance of buildings from surrounding process
units.
Various recommendations for building locations are
available based on engineering judgment in the form of
generic minimum distances from different hazardous items.
Mecklenburgh (1985) has proposed typical distances between
buildings and hazardous process for preliminary selection of
locations; these distances tend to lie in the range of 3060m.
Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI) (Lees, 1996) have reported some
wider-range distances varying from15 to 100mdepending on
the equipment hazard level. API (2001b) has recommended
15m as the minimum distance between the shell of an LPG
tank and a control room, and 30m distance for other build-
ings that are used for other purposes. AIChE/CCPS (2003b) has
0957-5820/$ see front matter 2011 The Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2011.12.002
Please cite this article in press as: Badri, N., et al., A multivariable approach for estimation of vapor cloud explosion frequencies for
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2011.12.002
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2 Process Safety and Environmental Protection x x x ( 2 0 1 2 ) xxxxxx
Nomenclature
IR
VCE
the individual risk received by each building
(1/yr)
IR
VCE,i
the individual risk received by each building
fromICV (i) (1/yr)
IR (1/yr)
Oc occupancy fraction
C
VCE
(d) VCE consequence function (indoor probability
of fatality) at the locationof building of any leak
size (d)
F
VCE
(d) VCE frequency function (VCE occurrence per
year) of any leak size (d) (mm)
C
VCE
VCE consequence generated by an ICV full of
ammable gas
F
VCE
nal VCE frequency of an ICV (1/yr)
d leak size (mm)
d
min
minimum leak size capable of providing mini-
mumrequired ammable mass (mm)
D maximum connection pipe diameter in each
SPP (mm)
P the overpressure received by the building (kPa)
M total discharged mass for each leak size (kg)
t
d
discharge duration (s)
t
ig
required time for vapor cloud ignition (s)
m the dynamic discharge rate for each leak size
(kg/s)
C
D
the coefcient of discharge
A
L
the leak area (m
2
)
P
0
the initial operating pressure (Pa)
P
atm
the atmospheric pressure (Pa)
the ratio of the specic heats for the gas
M
W
molecular weight (kg/kgmol)
R the universal gas constant (8.314kJ/mol K)
T
0
the gas temperature (K)
the liquid density (kg/m
3
)
t
i
the required isolation time (s)
A
b
the BDV orice area (m
2
)
M
b
the mass remaining in the system when
depressurizing starts (kg)
f (d) the frequency of leaks exceeding size d (per
year for each equipment, per meter year for
pipes and per joint year for other items) (1/yr)
F
k,j
the frequency of each leak size range (j) over
each SPP (k) (1/yr)
n the number of itemsize categories
F
eq,j
the frequency of leaks for size range j in equip-
ments (1/yr)
F
p,i,j
the frequency of leaks for size range j inprocess
pipes of itemsize category (i) (1/myr)
F
In,i,j
the frequency of leaks for size range j in instru-
ments of itemsize category (i) (1/instrument yr)
F
F,i,j
the frequency of leaks for size range j in anges
of itemsize category (i) (1/angeyr)
F
MV,i,j
the frequency of leaks for size range j inmanual
valves of itemsize category (i) (1/valveyr)
F
AV,i,j
the frequency of leaks for size range j in actu-
ated valves of itemsize category (i) (1/valveyr)
P
i
Immediate ignition probability
T
ig
the auto-ignition temperature (F)
E the minimumignition energy (mJ)
P
d
delayed ignition probability
P
VCE
the probability of the ignition, which causes a
VCE rather than a ash re
P
w
the probability of meteorological condition (w)
m the number of all SPPs
N the number of all ICVs
h,i
the indication of overlap between the gas com-
ing fromother ICVs (h) and intended ICV (i)
U
h,i
the probability of wind direction fromeach ICV
(h) toward intended ICV (i)
h,i
the angle that the line connecting ICV (h) to the
ICV (i) forms with horizontal line (degree)
d
LFL
the maximum distances to LFL concentration
at heights less than 10m(m)
prescribed distances in the range of 1570m, based on his-
torical and current data from rening, petrochemical and
chemical sectors. NFPA (2008) has recommended some buffer
distances between tanks and important buildings depending
onthe tank capacity but not exceeding 100m. By analyzing rel-
evant credible codes and standards, a wide range of proposed
distances in the range of 15100m is revealed and this dif-
ference may cause some inconsistencies while building siting
studies.
Another method for determination of proper distances is
to use hazard models. These models propose distances at
which overpressure or risk from potential VCE is at a toler-
able level (AIChE/CCPS, 1999). This approach is more specic
and capable of reducing the deciency of conventional empir-
ical ones. Numerous publications, namely API (1995), have
recommended risk analysis procedures for identifying and
managing the hazard by VCE incidents imposed on building
occupants. Althoughthe consequence andriskbasedmethods
both have some uncertainties particularly for VCE simula-
tion (Raman and Grillo, 2005) and frequency of occurrence
(API, 1995), these methods have earned great credit among
researchers because of considering more effective parameters
compared to conventional methods (AIChE/CCPS, 1999).
Despite the progress in VCE impact prediction models, The
VCE frequencies used in quantitative risk assessment (QRA)
studies are normally subject to some measure of uncertainty.
Presently, two different approaches are used to estimate VCE
frequencies. The rst approach characterizes different kinds
of explosive process units by a generic VCE frequency. These
generic frequency data are based on the historical records of
major VCEs and number of operation years. For example, API
has presentedthe most referencedguidance onVCE frequency
for categorized process units in reneries (API, 1995), which is
supported by a worldwide databank of major VCE incidents.
The second approach concentrates on release scenarios as
the only cause of vapor cloud generation and the subsequent
probable VCE. In this approach, all possible release scenarios
with their associated generic frequencies are used to estimate
the frequency of respective VCEs (AIChE/CCPS, 1999). This
approach is mostly applicable in scenario based risk analy-
sis. Although the rst approach has some advantages because
of assigning a single VCE frequency to each independent con-
gested space (ICV) and using simple calculations, estimated
frequencies never reect the effects of process conditions and
site complexity. Furthermore, sparse statistical data on major
VCE incidents is a common problemfor this kind of frequen-
cies. On the other hand, although the second algorithmseems
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2011.12.002
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Process Safety and Environmental Protection x x x ( 2 0 1 2 ) xxxxxx 3
very complicated and time consuming, the obtained frequen-
cies are more realistic because it gives the frequencies as a
function of parameters that affect VCE generation. Besides,
these types of frequencies are supported by a much more
populated statistical database on leakages.
Inthe present study, a newprocedure is introduced inorder
to combine the advantages of the above two approaches. The
new frequencies not only are based on leakage frequencies
and the parameters that affect VCE formation but also have
the capability of characterizing each potential ICV by a spe-
cic local frequency. These advantages have a signicant role
in simplifying QRAstudies and improving the accuracy of pre-
vious generic VCE frequencies.
In this study, the effects of the following factors are also
quantied to nd more precise VCE frequencies:
The availability of ammable gas detection systems.
The performance of isolationanddepressurizationsystems.
The effect of minimumrequired ammable mass to gener-
ate major VCEs.
Finally, in a case study, we will illustrate the necessity of
having more comprehensive approaches for calculating fre-
quencies because of the difference between the newobtained
frequencies and the conventional, generic ones.
2. Quantitative risk assessment for siting
of buildings
QRA provides advanced building evaluation tools in the con-
text of VCE hazards. This method adds the element of VCE
frequency and building occupancy to the building conse-
quence analysis in order to calculate the risk to an individual
within the building in the form of individual risk. In general,
consideration of individual risk reects the need to ensure
that each building occupant is not exposed to inordinate risk
(AIChE/CCPS, 1999).
2.1. Vapor cloud explosion (VCE)
VCEs are likely to occur while releasing a large quantity of
ammable vaporizing liquid or gas from process vessels or
piping. Not all of these releases will necessarily lead to a VCE
unless meeting some conditions. Firstly, vapor cloud with suf-
cient volume must be formed prior to ignition and secondly,
be trapped in a congested enough space. The rst condition is
required to provide adequate ammable mass and the latter
to intensify ame propagation to generate damaging over-
pressures (TNO, 2005). Although very reactive chemicals and
very strong ignition sources can initiate a VCE without pres-
ence of congestion, experiments made with vapor clouds in a
balloon in the absence of congestion showed that explosions
generally do not occur, only ash res. Other experiments
showthat congestion and/or connement are usually needed
for ame acceleration to explosive levels (AIChE/CCPS, 2003a).
Each congested space formed by a group of equipment
items should be treated separately as an ICV if there is a min-
imum separation distance between it and other equipment
groups. Because extending the gas cloudbeyondthe congested
area, the ame acceleration will adequately decay along the
distance. Thus, the considerable rate of decay leads to VCEs
that occur in different times with separate explosion peaks
and no superposition is expected (Fig. 1b). Likewise, in the
case of small separation distances, the coincidence of their
blasts in the far eld may not be correct and the respective
ammable mass should be superimposed that means consol-
idation of different ICVs as a single ICV (Fig. 1a). Therefore,
there is a signicant need to determine a minimum required
separation distance, which in turn has considerable effects on
the number and dimensions of ICVs.
In general, the rate of decay in ame speed upon leav-
ing the congested area is dependent on the interaction of
the expansion ow ahead of the ame with obstacles present
in a congested area (AIChE/CCPS, 2003a). This interaction
increases the turbulence. In the case of low congestion and
subsequent low turbulence, the decay is rapid and the ame
speed may reach a low level within a few meters. Thus, dif-
ferent degrees of congestion provide different amounts of
turbulence and subsequently different minimum required
separation distances. In spite of this evidence, lack of com-
pleted studies is evident for this part and researchers have
published only a wide range of general separation distances.
TNO (2005) has reported 25mas the minimumseparation dis-
tance and also smaller distances at 5m and even 3m have
beenoccasionally proposedby other researchers (AIChE/CCPS,
2003a). Regarding that presently there is no denitive guide-
line on the minimum distance between ICVs at which they
can be assumed to be independent, one has to assume a
greater value for this distance in order to stay at the safe
side and hence, one tends to calculate a greater severity for
a given VCE. Therefore, unfortunately, this unavoidable lim-
itation means that the possible reduction of the predicted
hazards of a VCE using a more realistic value for the min-
imum separation distance cannot be achieved. Thus, being
conservative is an unavoidable necessity for this part of study
to avoid further underestimations. In the present approach,
25mis conservatively considered to distinguish ICVs, because
greater distances may lead to bigger ICV and eventually much
worse consequences.
2.2. Individual risk formulation
A simple mathematical formulation can be derived for esti-
mating the individual risk imposed by VCEs on building
(a) (b)
O
v
e
r
p
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
P
atm
Time
P
atm
O
v
e
r
p
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
Time
Fig. 1 The behavior of explosion peaks in the case of small separation distance (a) and enough separation distance (b).
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2011.12.002
ARTICLE IN PRESS
occupants (IR
VCE
). Theoretically, the IR
VCE
is an integration of
respective VCE consequence and VCE frequency combination
over all possible leak sizes (AIChE/CCPS, 2004), as shown in the
following equation:
IR
VCE
= Oc
d
C
VCE
(d)F
VCE
(d) (1)
where C
VCE
(d) is the representative VCE consequence function
(indoor probability of fatality) at the location of building of
any leak size (d), F
VCE
(d) is the representative VCE frequency
function(VCE occurrence per year) of any leak size (d) and Oc is
the fraction of working time that the most exposed occupant
attends the building.
The above equation is the exact formulation of received
individual risk in the case of having different VCE con-
sequences and frequencies. By making some assumptions,
following simple two-termequation is going to be used in this
study.
IR
VCE
= Oc C
VCE
F
VCE
(2)
It is assumed that leak sizes smaller than a minimumvalue at
d
min
are not capable of adequately lling the inside volume of
the ICV to generate major VCE. This means that, there is not
sufcient ammable mass to lunch a major VCE. Therefore,
the impact of respective VCEs for this leak size range (0d
min
)
is supposed negligible. Onthe other hand, all leak sizes greater
than d
min
providing minimum sufcient ammable mass or
more are characterizedby a single VCE generatedby anICVfull
of ammable gas (C
VCE
) (Fig. 2). Minimumsufcient ammable
mass varies regarding to process/site condition, material reac-
tivity, building type and distance to building.
In summary:
C
VCE
(d) =
_
0
C
VCE
0 < d < d
min
d
min
d
(3)
Thus, hereafter, C
VCE
(d) equals a constant consequence value
of C
VCE
.
Fig. 3 Individual risk received by building occupants.
Under these conditions, the following equation is obtained
by comparing Eqs. (1) and (2) and solving for F
VCE
.
F
VCE
=
D
d
min
F
VCE
(d) (4)
where Dis the maximumconnectiondiameter throughout the
involved equipment in the ICV.
Subsequently, the overall individual risk imposed on occu-
pants (IR
VCE
) is calculated as the summation of all received
individual risks by each building (Fig. 3).
IR =
N
i=1
IR
VCE,i
(5)
where N is the number of all distinguished ICVs.
2.3. VCE consequence on building occupants
VCE consequence on building occupants is normally
expressed in terms of indoor probability of fatality. Con-
sidering the type of building, each received overpressure
generates different consequences due to indirect effects of
overpressure on occupants. Generally, typical gures given
in vulnerability charts (API, 1995; Chamberlain and Puttock,
2006) are used to state consequence vs. overpressure for
different types of buildings. In order to simplify subsequent
mathematical operations, published data on consequence vs.
Fig. 2 The assumed variation of VCE consequence and frequency vs. leak size.
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2011.12.002
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Table 1 Major damage overpressure criteria and vulnerability model parameters for different building types.
Building
type
Building description Major damage
overpressure
criterion (bar)
Pressure range Pressure range
a B a b
B1
Wood frame trailer
or shack
0.07
6.8 Op (kPa) <14 14Op (kPa) <34
0.0441 0.200 0.0294 0.000
B2
Steel-frame/metal siding or
pre-engineered building
0.10
6.8 Op (kPa) <14 14Op (kPa) <34
0.0441 0.200 0.0294 0.000
B3
Unreinforced masonry hearing wall
building
0.09
6.8Op (kPa) <10 10Op (kPa) <20
0.1470 0.900 0.0392 0.200
B4
Steel or concrete framed reinforced
masonry inll or cladding
0.14
6.8 Op (kPa) <14 14Op (kPa) <34
0.0441 0.200 0.0294 0.000
B5
Reinforced concrete or masonry shear
wall building
0.27
27 Op (kPa) <41 41Op (kPa) <82
0.0220 0.500 0.0147 -0.200
overpressure have been correlated in this work in the formof
the following linear equation:
C
VCE
= a P +b (6)
where a and b are constants that depend on building type and
P is the overpressure received by the building (kPa).
Constant values of a and b for different types of buildings
are summarized in Table 1 as a function of received overpres-
sure range by the building.
In order to nalize vulnerability studies,
BakerStrehlowTang model (Casal, 2008) is used to predict
the generated P on buildings by each ICV. This method is
based on the assumption that only those parts of a ammable
vapor cloudthat are congestedor partially connedcontribute
to the build-up of P.
2.4. VCE frequency
Nevertheless, different models are available for predicting
the VCE impacts in terms of received overpressure. There is
no comprehensive and clear procedure to evaluate VCE fre-
quency. Althoughsome relative hazard estimates canbe made
for specic chemical processes (API, 1995) to arrive at fre-
quency values, presently reliable generic frequencies for VCE
incidents are not available. To overcome this lack of data issue,
the following methodology is proposed for determining VCE
frequency.
3. VCE frequency estimation for ICVs
To establish a methodology for estimation of VCE frequencies,
one needs to investigate the path that leads to VCE gener-
ation. The route illustrated in Fig. 4 is followed in order to
expect VCE occurrence assuming that all VCEs are the results
of ammable material leakages.
It is clear that VCE frequency strongly depends on leak-
age frequency. Therefore, the present study is focused on VCE
frequency estimation by considering the dened sequence in
order to improve its accuracy by incorporation of likely effec-
tive parameters such as:
Process conditions (phase, material composition and pres-
sure).
Flammable gas detection systems.
Isolation and depressurizing systems.
Degree of complexity in terms of piping length and ttings
density.
Ignition probability.
Material reactivity.
Meteorological conditions.
In order to develop this approach, rstly, all ICVs are iden-
tied and then each ICV is divided into one or more process
parts that create different release conditions. Possible loca-
tions of release that are outside of ICVs (e.g. intermediate
transfer pipes) are not considered for the subsequent studies.
Because, the density of items that are likely to lead ammable
gas release is extremely lower than those located in ICVs. Sub-
sequently, a release study for a spectrumof leaksizes is carried
out to screen those leakages capable of generating major VCEs
by adequately lling the ICV. After this screening, the respec-
tive release frequencies estimated for failures of pipes, ttings
and equipment are integrated to estimate frequency of each
leak. Theneachleak size frequency is fedto anevent tree anal-
ysis in order to nd the equivalent VCE frequency. Finally, all
obtained VCE frequencies are aggregated to estimate the VCE
frequency of each ICV.
The above VCE frequency only features the effect of those
leakages that are located inside the intended ICV. Therefore, a
dispersion study is required to add the effect of adjacent ICVs,
whichis a functionof site meteorological conditions including
wind-rose data. The introduced approach is briey illustrated
in Fig. 5.
3.1. ICV identication and release scenarios
Normally, ICVs are created by groups of equipment that can
trap considerable volume of released gas in the empty spaces
among equipment. The involved equipment items are also
assumed as the location of potential leaks. Then, sufcient
number of release scenarios are determined for each ICV
regarding that release scenarios are chiey distinguished by
two main indicators: (1) discharge ow rate and (2) discharge
Fig. 4 The path of VCE generation.
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ICV Identification Major Equipment Layout
Release Scenarios in ICVs
Process Condition
Isolation and Depressurizing
Scenario Screening Minimum Flammable Mass
Overall Leak Frequency
Fitting/Piping Sizes
Generic Leakage Frequencies
VCE Frequency Modification
Dispersion Modeling for
Scenarios Located in ICVs
Final VCE Frequency
Event Tree Analysis
Ignition Probabilities
VCE Probability
Fig. 5 A schematic of VCE frequency estimation approach.
duration. Therefore, each ICV equipment items are classied
into similar process parts (SPP) each of which has identi-
cal release indicators for a predetermined leak size (Fig. 6).
This classication is done considering signicant changes in
effective parameters on release conditions including phase,
material composition and pressure.
Subsequently, it is required to estimate the provided
ammable mass of different leak sizes (d) through each
SPP before the ignition. This ammable mass is dened as
the present mass in the ammable region within the ICV.
Flammable mass can determined relatively precise using
ICV
SPP-1
Phase 1
1 Composition
Pressure 2 Pressure 1
Phase 2
Composition 2
h
avg
Fig. 6 ICV classication to similar process parts (SPPs).
complex dispersion studies by taking into account the avail-
able geometries for each release scenario and different
meteorological conditions. Roughly and in the absence of dis-
persion models, it is empirically known that the fraction of
total discharged mass which will undergo in ammable region
well ranges to 10% (or less) (AIChE/CCPS, 2003b). Considering
that discharges often impinge upon nearby surfaces such as
the ground, a wall, a tank, or piping especially for interior ICV
releases, the momentum of the jet is considerably reduced
and subsequently the vapor cloud is prone to be trapped in
the ICV and ammable mass will be larger. Thus, the upper
bound of the range (10%) is used to estimate the fraction of
total discharged material that will be in the ammable region.
Total discharged mass for each leak size (M) is calculated
by integrating discharge rate over the discharge duration as
below:
M = M
0
+
_
t
d
0
mdt (7)
where M
0
is the initial inventory of blocked material after suc-
cessful isolation (kg), t
d
is discharge duration (s) that never
exceeds maximumrequired time for vapor cloud ignition (t
ig
)
or discharge duration, whichever is smaller, and m is the
dynamic discharge rate for each leak size (kg/s).
Although major VCEs with ignition delays as low as a few
seconds andgreater than30min have beendocumented(TNO,
2005), a time of 5min is used for ignition delays in this study,
considering that about 60% of reported vapor cloud ignitions
occurred within 5min after the release (Lees, 1996).
Discharge rate through a leak depends mainly on the pres-
sure inside the equipment, the size of the hole and the phase
of the release. The discharge rate usually begins froma max-
imum initial rate and decreases with time as the equipment
depressurizes. The following equations (AIChE/CCPS, 2004) are
used to estimate initial discharge rates for gas and liquid
phase:
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2011.12.002
ARTICLE IN PRESS
For gas phase (sonic, critical ow):
m
0
= C
D
P
0
A
L
_
M
W
RT
0
_
2
+1
_
(+1)/(1)
_
1/2
(8)
For liquid phase:
m
0
= C
D
A
L
[2(P
0
P
atm
)]
1/2
(9)
where m
0
is initial discharge rate (kg/s), C
D
is coefcient of dis-
charge, A
L
is leak area (m
2
), P
0
is the initial operating pressure
(Pa), P
atm
is the atmospheric pressure (Pa), is the ratio of the
specic heats for the gas, M
W
is molecular weight (kg/kgmol), R
is universal gas constant (8.314kJ/mol K), T
0
is gas temperature
(K) and is the liquid density (kg/m
3
).
The discharge rate reduction depends mainly on the mate-
rial inventory and the action taken to isolate the leak and
depressurize the process equipment. Therefore, the variation
of discharge rate by time should be investigated in follow-
ing two different common cases in order to obtain the total
discharge mass:
With isolation systems/without depressurizing systems.
With isolation systems/with depressurizing systems.
3.1.1. With isolation systems/without depressurizing
systems
Material isolation in process equipment is normally achiev-
able by activating emergency shutdownvalves (ESDVs) which
divide process systeminto small sections and block themsep-
arately. Modeling of emergency shutdown effect is carried
out by assuming that the discharge rate remains constant at
its initial value especially for small/medium leakages. This
assumption is due to the constant upstream pressure and
continues until emergency shutdown occurs (t
i
). Although in
case of a major leak the systemmay depressurize sooner, such
leak sizes normally ll the ICV space sufciently in very short
times. On the other hand, major leak sizes have small leak fre-
quencies and nally are not effective on nal VCE frequency.
Once the ESDV is closed, discharge rate decreases following a
rough exponential trend as shown below:
_
m = m
0
, t < t
i
m = m
0
exp
_
m
0
M
0
(t t
i
)
_
, t t
i
(10)
Although required isolation time (t
i
) after the leak varies for
different facilities, some typical durations have been recom-
mended in literatures. For example, 90s (TOTAL, 2005) and 45s
(API, 2001a) (including gas detection, and ESDV activation and
closure) have been reported for onshore and offshore units,
respectively.
Considering above two-termequation, the following equa-
tion is derived for both gas and liquid phases in order to
calculate the total discharged mass (M):
M = m
0
t
i
+M
0
_
1 exp
_
m
0
M
0
(t
ig
t
i
)
__
(11)
3.1.2. With isolation systems/without depressurizing
systems
The depressurizing systems are usually designed to depres-
surize the process vessels storing gas to the half of initial
pressure in 15min (ANSI/API, 2007) by blowdown valves
(BDVs) measured from the beginning of depressurizing (t
b
).
BDVs are normally activated in few seconds after isolation;
this activationtime is at most inrange of 3060s (TOTAL, 2005).
Once the BDVorice area is known, the discharge rate through
leak can be calculated as below for gas phase:
m = m
0
, t < t
i
m = m
0
exp
_
m
0
M
0
(t t
i
)
_
, t
i
t < t
b
m =
A
L
A
L
+A
b
m
T
exp
_
m
T
M
b
(t t
b
)
_
, t
b
t < t
ig
(12)
where A
b
is the BDV orice area (m
2
), m
T
is the total ow rate
through leak and BDVorice when depressurizing starts (kg/s)
and M
b
is the mass remaining when depressurizing starts (kg).
The total ow rate through leak and BDV orice is shown
in the following equation:
m
T
= C
D
P
b
(A
L
+A
b
)
_
M
W
RT
0
_
2
+1
_
(+1)/(1)
_
1/2
(13)
where
P
b
= P
0
exp
_
m
0
M
0
(t
b
t
i
)
_
(14)
and
M
b
= M
0
exp
_
m
0
M
0
(t
b
t
i
)
_
(15)
Considering above three-termequation, following equation is
derived for gas phase in order to calculate the total discharged
mass (M):
M = m
0
t
i
+M
0
_
1 exp
_
m
0
M
0
(t
b
t
i
)
__
+
A
L
A
L
+A
b
M
b
_
1 exp
_
m
T
M
b
(t
ig
t
b
)
__
(16)
The escaping material may be a gas or liquid. In the case of liq-
uid discharge, because of high volatility of typical ammable
liquids, it is assumed that all the liquid turns into vapor and
spray. Otherwise and for the ammable chemicals with high
atmospheric boiling points, the material reactivity is normally
low and it is unlikely to generate VCEs (Vlchez et al., 2011).
3.2. Scenario screening
Different leak sizes through each SPP will provide different
ammable masses because of different discharge rates and
durations. This difference is mostly imposed by the behavior
of isolation and depressurization systems. Therefore, it is
required to calculate the ammable mass for all possible
leak sizes ranging from pinhole (1mm) to maximum t-
ting/piping diameter (D). Each leak size that is capable of
providing ammable mass more than minimum required
will be screened. Otherwise, it is assumed that there is not
enough ammable mass to launch a major VCE and the
corresponding scenario is excluded. Therefore, there is a leak
range for each SPP that starts from d
min
(the minimum leak
size capable of providing minimumrequired ammable mass)
up to D (the maximum connection diameter) (Fig. 2). Vessel
collapse scenarios are excluded for this part. Because, rstly,
their frequencies are extremely low compared to leakages
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2011.12.002
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 2 Pipe length, instrument, and tting density for all size ranges (i) for each SPP (k).
Itemsize category (i) Pipe length (m) Instrument Fitting density (number of items)
Flange Manual valve Actuated valve
Category (1) {D
1
=d
min
} L
k,1
N
in,k,1
N
F,k,1
N
MV,k,1
N
AV,k,1
Category (i) {D
i
} L
k,i
N
in,k,i
N
F,k,i
N
MV,k,i
N
AV,k,i
Category (n) {D
n
=D} L
k,n
N
in,k,n
N
F,k,n
N
MV,k,n
N
AV,k,n
and secondly, they have almost the same consequences with
large leak sizes that lead to short time depressurization.
Usually, the amount of discharged ammable gas is limited
because of the availability of gas detection systems. Because,
such systems lead to prompt gas isolation that signicantly
decreases the discharge duration. Thus, in the case of highly
efcient gas detectionsystems, only larger leak sizes are capa-
ble of providing the minimum required ammable mass. On
the other hand, when there is no gas detection system or
the detection system is not so highly efcient, even low leak
sizes are likely to provide the minimum required minimum
ammable mass. Therefore, no further scenario screening is
required for such cases.
Considering that numerous reportedmajor VCEs have been
the result of partial lling of congested process units, a min-
imum ammable mass should be estimated for each ICV in
which a major VCE is expectable (or the ICV is adequately
lled). In the present study, a major VCE is dened as those
explosions that are strong enough to generate overpressures
slightly less than major damage overpressure criterion at the
building location (90% of overpressure criterion). These crite-
ria for different building types are shown in Table 1 (API, 1995).
Following this denition, minimum ammable mass is back-
calculated using VCE model and some input data such as ICV
parameters (material reactivity, degree of congestion and con-
nement), building type and the distance between building
and ICV edge. For ammable masses more than the minimum
requiredone, the generatedVCE will be major too. Thus, a con-
stant VCE consequence represented by a completely lled ICV
(C
VCE
) is assigned to each leak size larger than d
min
(Fig. 2).
When the required mass to ll the ICV is less than minimum
ammable mass the major VCE is unlikely to occur. In order to
nd the amount of congested space withineachICV, a detailed
procedure has beenpublishedby TNO(2005). Roughly, it canbe
approximately dened as a combination of ICV covered area
and the area weighted average of obstacle heights.
3.3. Overall leak frequency
Selected leak sizes ranging from d
min
to D are used to cal-
culate different leak size frequencies for each SPP by using
generic frequency data. Assuming equipment, piping and
ttings (instruments, anges, actuated valves, and manual
valves) as the most likely locations of leakages, there is a need
to prepare a complete list of these items with their respec-
tive sizes (Table 2) in order to integrate the frequency of each
leak size over the number of items. Then, selected items are
categorized based on their size (OGP, 2010b) and those items
that are smaller than the minimumsize (d
min
) are excluded. It
is important that all selected items should contain ammable
material. Otherwise, they donot have any contributiontoover-
all leak frequency.
The used leak frequencies for the main process equipment
items are based on an analysis of the HSE-UK hydrocarbon
release database (HCRD) for 19922006 (OGP, 2010b). This rep-
resents the leak size distribution by an analytical frequency
function, which introduces non-zero leak frequencies for all
leak sizes between 1mm and the diameter of the inlet pipe
(D) in the formthe following equation (Spouge, 2005).
f (d) = C(1 +aD
n
)d
m
(17)
The above equation is for the cases where the frequency
depends on the itemsize (process pipes, anges, manual and
actuated valves). Otherwise, and for the main equipments,
following equation is used:
f (d) = Cd
m
(18)
where f (d) is the frequency of leaks exceeding size d (per year
for each equipment, per meter year for pipes and per joint
year for other items), d is leak size (mm), D is the maximum
connection diameter (mm) and C, a, n and m are constants
specic to the equipment type (OGP, 2010b).
In order to cover the effects of all possible leak sizes, ve
leak size ranges (Table 3) are selected to calculate the respec-
tive VCE consequences and frequencies (OGP, 2010b). This
leak size categorization will increase the accuracy of results
throughout the process while considering different probable
combinations of VCE consequences and frequencies.
Hence, the frequency of holes, F, within any range d
1
to d
2
is (Spouge, 2005):
F = f (d
1
) f (d
2
) = C(1 +aD
n
)(d
1
m
d
2
m
) (19)
Table 3 Leak size ranges.
Leak size range (j) Leak size interval Representative leak size for
discharge modeling (mm)
d
j,1
(mm) d
j,2
(mm)
Range (1) 1 3 2
Range (2) 3 10 5
Range (3) 10 50 30
Range (4) 50 150 100
Range (5) 150 More Maximumconnection diameter
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ARTICLE IN PRESS
Leakage
Immediate
Ignition?
Delayed
Ignition?
VCE? Consequence
Yes (P
i
) Jet Fire Metrological Condition (1), (P
1
)
Yes (P
VCE
) VCE Metrological Condition (2), (P
2
)
Leakage (F
j
) Yes (P
d
) Metrological Condition (w), (P
w
)
No (1-P
i
) No (1-P
VCE
) Flash Fire
No (1-P
d
) Dispersion
Fig. 7 A general event tree analysis.
Finally, F
k,j
, the frequency of each leak size range (j) over
each SPP (k) is calculated by the following equation:
F
k,j
= F
eq,j
+
n
i=1
(L
k,i
F
p,i,j
+N
In,k,i
F
In,i,j
+N
F,k,i
F
F,i,j
+N
MV,k,i
F
MV,i,j
+N
AV,k,i
F
AV,i,j
), where d
j,2
D
i
(20)
where n is the number of itemsize categories, F
eq,j
, F
p,i,j
, F
In,i,j
,
F
F,i,j
, F
MV,i,j
and F
AV,i,j
are the frequency of leaks for size range
j in equipments, process pipes, instruments, anges, manual
valves and actuated valves of itemsize category (i).
3.4. Event tree analysis
Inorder to predict the sequence of the events that nally cause
VCE and for estimation of the respective VCE frequency, a gen-
eral event tree is used, as shown in Fig. 7.
Immediate ignition probability (P
i
) for ammable gases is
dependent on the release ow rate ( m
0
) and material reac-
tivity. P
i
is roughly 0.2 if m
0
< 10kg/s; 0.5 if 10kg/s m
0
<
100kg/s; 0.7 if m
0
100kg/s for average/high reactive mate-
rials, and 0.02 if m
0
< 10kg/s; 0.04 if 10kg/s m
0
< 100kg/s;
0.09 if m
0
100kg/s for low reactive materials (BEVI, 2009).
A more detailed procedure (Moosemiller, 2011) states the P
i
as a linear combination of potential for auto-ignition and the
potential for static discharge using following equation:
P
i
=
_
1 5000 exp
_
9.5
T
T
ig
__
Auto-ignition effect
+[0.0024 P
1/3
E
2/3
]
Static discharge
(21)
where T is temperature (F), T
ig
is auto-ignition temperature (F),
P is pressure (psig), and E is minimumignition energy (mJ).
A minimumvalue of 0 is allowed for T.
For
T
T
ig
< 0.9, the auto-ignition part is 0.
For
T
T
ig
< 1.2, the auto-ignition part is 1.
P
i
cannot be greater than 1.
Presented methodology by UKOOA (OGP, 2010a) is used for
estimating delayed ignition probability (P
d
) which relates the
P
d
as a function of release rate, material phase and site condi-
tion.
When a cloud of ammable vapor burns, the combustion
may or may not give rise to an overpressure. If there is no
overpressure, the event is a ash re. The probability of the
ignition, which causes a VCE (P
VCE
) rather than a ash re,
depends on many factors such as release rate. In a statisti-
cal study on some 150 vapor cloud ignitions carried out by
Wiekema (Lees, 1996), in nearly 60% of these cases the igni-
tion resulted in a VCE; in other cases a ash re occurred.
Therefore, P
VCE
is roughly considered 0.6 regarding to histori-
cal analysis. In a more updated procedure (Moosemiller, 2011),
a modied version of the Cox, Lees and Ang correlation for
gas releases is used to estimate P
VCE
. The unmodied version
(Lees, 1996) is correlated as below:
P
VCE
= 0.0178 m
0.435
0
(22)
Regarding that, the above equation is for materials with
medium reactivity (Lees, 1996). It is expected that materials
with higher or lower reactivity will have a greater or lesser
propensity to ignite explosively than other materials. These
materials are considered to have the following effect on the
P
VCE
(Moosemiller, 2011):
Low reactivity: multiply by 0.3.
Mediumreactivity: no modier.
High reactivity: multiply by 3.
Obviously, the upper limit to P
VCE
is 1.
In the case of using dispersion modeling to nd the
ammable mass, different possible meteorological conditions
(w) with their respective probability (P
w
) should be used.
Finally and in accordance with the event tree shown in
Fig. 7, F
VCE
, The frequency of VCE in each ICV is calculated
as:
F
VCE
=
W
w=1
m
k=1
5
j=1
[P
w
F
k,j
(1 P
i
)
k,j
(P
d
)
k,j
P
VCE k,j
] (23)
where mis the number of all SPPs ineachICVand Wis number
of all determined meteorological conditions.
3.5. VCE frequency modication
A feature of a vapor cloud is that it may drift some distance
from the point where the leak has occurred and may thus
threatena considerable area (Lees, 1996). Thus, any gas release
fromlikely leakages may ll other ICVs in addition to the ICV
where the leak is located.
To consider this effect, a dispersion study is carried out
to nd out whether any release from other ICVs (h) can pro-
vide sufcient ammable mass to ll the intended ICV (i) or
not. Thus, the areas covered by released ammable gas from
ICVs (h) at LFL concentration are determined to estimate the
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2011.12.002
ARTICLE IN PRESS
LFL
h,i
=0
h,i
=1
ICV (i)
ICV (h)
h,i
LFL
For this scenario the coverage is complete ?
h,i
=1
For this scenario the coverage is not complete ?
h,i
=0
Fig. 8 Degree of LFL vapor cloud overlap and the effect of wind direction.
degree of overlap with intended ICV(i). In the case of adequate
overlap, these outside sources are taken into account in calcu-
lating the VCE frequency of ICV(i). If the released gas fromany
ICV (h) is capable of completely covering intended ICV (i), the
adequate overlap is fullled. The adequacy of this overlap is
indicated by
h,i
, in which
h,i
=1 conrms complete coverage
and
h,i
=0 rejects it (Fig. 8).
On the other hand, the probability of cloud movement
should be determined for all directions. Thus, U
h,i
presents
the probability of wind direction from each ICV (h) toward
intended ICV (i). This probability can be extracted fromyearly
wind rose data according to the angle that the line connecting
ICV (h) to the ICV (i) forms with horizontal line (
h,i
) (Fig. 8).
Therefore, the modied VCE frequency can be formulated as
below:
F
VCEi,modied
= F
VCEi
+
N
h=1,h / = i
W
w=1
m
k=1
5
j=1
[P
w
(
h,i
)
k,j
U
h,i
F
k,j
(1 P
i
)
k,j
(P
d
)
k,j
P
VCEk,j
]
(24)
where N is the number of all ICVs in plant.
This modication seems important in cases that an inde-
pendent congested space may not handle any ammable
material by its own equipment, but this congested space is
counted as an ICV because it may be adequately lled by
ammable gas coming fromadjacent ICV. On the other hand,
by applying this modication those ICVs that are located in
downwind areas, are more likely to be lled by ammable gas
and subsequently have more frequency rise after modica-
tion.
Some dispersion modeling results are correlated in this
study in the form of the following equation for some of
the most common materials in process industries, namely:
hydrogen, methane, ethane and propane in gas phase and
two-phase LPG. The numerical results were obtained using
DNVs PHAST Risk 6.6 software package and then were cor-
related in order to simplify calculations in three frequent
weather categories including F 2m/s, D 2m/s and D 5m/s, in
whichF and Drefer to stable and neutral atmospheres, respec-
tively. The ambient temperature is considered at 25C for all
weather categories.
d
LFL
= m
(25)
Table 4 Constant parameters for dispersion
correlations.
F 2m/s D 2m/s D 5m/s
Hydrogen (gas)
27.330 27.740 25.350
0.080 0.125 0.198
Methane (gas)
8.667 7.860 6.309
0.511 0.549 0.594
Ethane (gas)
9.131 7.989 6.285
0.766 0.760 0.785
Propane (gas)
13.020 10.940 8.342
0.672 0.688 0.673
LPG (two phase)
23.650 22.750 12.890
0.482 0.473 0.538
where d
LFL
is the maximumdistances to LFL concentration at
heights less than 10m, m is leak rate (kg/s) and and are
constant parameters, as shown in Table 4.
4. Case study
The proposed methodology is demonstrated through a case
study of a process plant consisting of two similar gas com-
pression stations (GCS-1 and 2) and a control room. Control
roomis constructed of reinforced concrete (Building type: B5)
and its location relative to process units is shown in Fig. 9.
GCS-1 and 2 are fed by 180,000kg/h natural gas at 2bar and
this gas is supposed to be compressed up to 25bar through
two compressors in series. Both GCS-1 and 2 are protected by
automatic isolation using ESDVs, which are closed in almost
Fig. 9 Gas compression stations (GCS-1 and 2) and control
roomlayout.
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2011.12.002
ARTICLE IN PRESS
C-101
A-101
C-100
A-100
V
-
1
0
0

V
-
1
0
1
V-103
SPP-01 SPP-02 SPP-03
Fig. 10 Gas compression station (GCS) process ow diagramand distinguished SPPs.
90s. The plant is protected with ammable gas detection sys-
tems and the company individual risk criterion is assumed
1.00e51/yr.
Because of adequate free spaces between GCS-1 and 2
(more than 25m); both of them are assumed as independent
ICVs witha volume of about 2700m
3
(30m30m3m), andit
is assumedthat the process onlycontains methane. Therefore,
pressure change is the only major parameter to distinguish
appropriate number of SPPs. For this case, three SPPs are dis-
tinguished in order to consider all pressure changes at 2, 6,
and 23bar, respectively for each GCS as shown in Fig. 10.
After determination of piping length, and instrument
and tting densities for all SPPs, 24
was determined
as the maximum connection size (D) for all SPPs. Then,
BakerStrehlowTang model is used to estimate the mini-
mum required ammable mass regarding that methane is a
low reactive chemical, the process unit space is almost low
conned and highly congested, the overpressure criterion for
major damage on building is 0.27bar, and building is located
at a distance of 45mfromICVs. In accordance with these con-
ditions, the minimum required ammable mass to expect a
major VCE is about 40.0kg using BakerStrehlowTang model.
Subsequently, discharge modeling shows that 83mm(3in.),
48mm (2in.) and 25mm (1in.) are the minimum leak
diameters (d
min
) that are capable of providing the minimum
ammable masses for SPP-01, SPP-02 and SPP-03, respectively.
Regarding these leak sizes, VCE frequency has been calculated
as 9.80e51/yr for bothGCS-1 and2. These values are modied
to 9.89e51/yr for GCS-1 and 9.94e51/yr for GCS-2 by taking
into account the role of coming gas fromthe adjacent ICV in a
single prevailing meteorological condition(stable atmosphere,
average wind speed: 2m/s) and wind-rose data as shown in
N
NE
E
SE
S
SW
W
NW
10%
20%
30%
Calm
24%
Fig. 11 Wind-rose for the case study.
Fig. 11. These values are about 4.3e41/yr in accordance with
reported generic VCE frequencies by API (1995).
BakerStrehlowTang model is used to predict the over-
pressures received by control roomfromboth ICVs. Consider-
ing the ICV full of stoichiometric gas (77.0kg) and explosion
center at the nearest point of ICV (45m), overpressures of
29.0kPa from GCS-1 and 2 on control room have been cal-
culated. Using vulnerability model of reinforced concrete
buildings and considering individual occupancy fraction at
0.26, the nal value of individual risk received by control room
occupants is 7.12e61/yr. The estimated individual risk is
smaller than company individual risk criterion (1.00e5 1/yr),
which means that risk reduction is not required.
5. Conclusion
In this study, a simple formulation of individual risk imposed
on building occupants is presented in which a single conse-
quence and frequency pair characterizes each independent
congested volume. VCE consequence is calculated using
BakerStrehlowTang model assuming that all major VCEs
are represented by a full of ammable gas at stoichiometric
concentration (LFL), although all releases that are capable of
providing the minimum required ammable mass are taken
into account for frequency estimation. Moreover, a system-
atic approach is introduced to calculate VCE frequency for
each congested volume. The proposed method is capable of
integrating the effects of main parameters identied theo-
retically and empirically as the constituting VCE frequency
elements (process condition, isolationanddepressurizing sys-
tems, piping length, tting density, ignition probability and
meteorological conditions). For example, smaller VCE fre-
quencies are empirically expected in the case of having lower
operating pressures and automatic isolation systems. These
parameters will cause lower leak rates and durations respec-
tively and, in accordance with presented methodology, only
larger leak sizes with lower leak frequencies are capable of
lling the congested volumes. Thus, the nal VCE frequency
is predicted with smaller values. In addition, more complex
process units that include greater piping length or tting den-
sity have apparently higher VCE frequencies. This effect is also
predicted by the introduced methodology through integrat-
ing the leak frequencies over more extensive piping lengths
and tting numbers. The new VCE frequency is also capable
of being modied in order to consider the effects of likely
received ammable gas from outdoor release sources. This
modication is based on whether any congested volume can
be lled by dispersed ammable gas from outdoor release
sources or not. This is strictly dependent on meteorological
conditions and wind rose data. For example, two similar pro-
cess units may have different VCE frequencies, because one
of them is located in downwind location and may be lled
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2011.12.002
ARTICLE IN PRESS
by ammable gas coming from the adjacent process unit.
Therefore, the presented multi-variable function is markedly
more practical and realistic than the traditional method for
comparing the potential (or frequency) of different process
units of launching destructive VCEs. Such comparisons were
impossible previously because the generic VCE frequency data
had no reference to process conditions. Onthe other hand, the
results of the new approach are more reliable to be combined
with VCE consequences in order to carry out QRA studies for
building siting. This increased accuracy is mainly due to using
greatly more populated and comprehensive statistical data on
generic leakage frequencies rather than the sparse popula-
tion of VCE incidents data. These two advantages decrease
the uncertainties of QRA studies and consequently improve
the reliability of buildings siting studies.
Furthermore, it is recommendedto apply this newmethod-
ology ontypical process units withdifferent capacities inorder
to estimate newupdated generic VCE frequencies. These new
generic frequencies will help subsequent studies to be carried
out more rapidly. On the other hand, following this method-
ology there are more adjustable variables to for risk reduction
purposes.
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