American Military Ethics in World War II: The Bombing of German Civilians Author(s): Ronald Schaffer Source: The

Journal of American History, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Sep., 1980), pp. 318-334 Published by: Organization of American Historians Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1890411 . Accessed: 09/07/2011 12:35
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American Ethicsin World Military WarH: The Bombing German of Civilians

RonaldSchaffer DuringWorldWar II the UnitedStatesArmy Forces(AAF)enunciated Air a policyofavoiding indiscriminate attacksagainstGermancivilians.According to thispolicy, American airmen wereto makeselectivestrikes against precise militaryand industrialtargets,avoiding direct attacks on the populace. Although some noncombatants would inevitably killedor wounded,these be casualtieswould be theresultofaccidentsofwar,not of intention. The AAF policyappears a noteworthy as in phenomenon a savage,atrocity-filled It war. seemsto distinguish UnitedStatesfrom the suchnationsas Japan, Germany, and GreatBritain, whichintentionally attackedcivilian-populated areas.' It also seems to tell something about the ethical codes of Americanair force leaders, for officialhistoriansof the United States armed forcesstrongly thatthosemen agreed suggest withthepolicyfor moralreasons.According to theofficial AAFhistory, GeneralCarl Spaatz,commander theUnitedStates of StrategicAir Forces in Europe, consistentlyopposed recommendations "franklyaimed at breakingthe morale of the German people." Spaatz repeatedly "raisedthemoralissue" involved bombing in enemyciviliansand was strongly whenhe did so, byAAFheadquarters Washington. supported, in Another AAFcommander, GeneralIra C. Eaker,statedthat"we shouldnever allow thehistory thiswarto convict ofthrowing strategic of us the bomber at " theman in thestreet. Citingtheofficial AAFhistory, historian KentR. army Greenfieldcontendedthat "the Americansnot only believed [selective bombing]to be more effective: theywere opposed to the mass bombingof '2 civilians.' The views of AAF leadersin WorldWar II appearto providea standard whichto measure ethicsofmilitary against the professionals.
RonaldSchaffer professor history California is of at StateUniversity, Northridge. wishesto He thank the AmericanPhilosophicalSocietyand the CaliforniaState University, Northridge, Foundation supporting oftheresearch. for part ' WesleyFrank Cravenand James Cate, eds. TheArmy Forces World Lea Air in War (7 vols., II Chicago, 1948-1958),I, 78, 95; David Irving, The Destruction Dresden (New York, 1963), of 39-40. 2 Cravenand Cate, eds., Army Air Forces,III, 638, 733; KentRoberts Greenfield, American in Strategy World II: A Reconsideration War (Baltimore, 1963),116.
318 The Journalof American History Volume 67 No. 2 September 1980

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Yet whentheevidenceis examinedclosely,it is clearthatthe ethicalcodes air of thesemen did littleto discourage attackson Germancivilians.Prewar during the of and American plansand doctrine thedevelopment operations air was so broadly bombing policyagainstindiscriminate warrevealthatofficial breachedas to become almost meaningless. and interpreted so frequently of thatsupposedly indicateabhorrence terror Statements air commanders of In verydifferent. the mean something bombing, when analyzedin context, ethicalsupport it amongAAFleaders for end,boththepolicyand theapparent theyare subturnout to be myths;while theycontainelementsof truth, arise?What How didtheseparticular myths fictitious misleading. or stantially of were the actual views of AAF leaderson the morality bombingcivilians? in of reconstruction moralattitudes thewaragainst How does a moreaccurate of of ethics? military affect understanding thehistory American Germany Air Army Corpshad developedunderthe of Prewardoctrine the American particularly Italian Giulio the influence a groupof air powertheorists,3 of aircraft woulddecidethewarofthe that Douhet. Douhet prophesied offensive each other, on the as future. Insteadofsending waves of soldiersto slaughter to vital would use aircraft destroy Western Front WorldWarI, belligerents in junctions,military centersbehind the lines: naval bases, transportation Civilianswouldpanicat themere and of depots,factories, centers population. would lead to the utter warplanes.Repeatedbombings sightof approaching collapseoftheenemy'ssociety.4 manuals wereambivalent UnitedStatesair warfare The authorsofofficial of civilians.A 1935 Air Corps Tactical School about the strategy attacking of manual declared,in a paraphrase Douhet's words,that the moraleof an than the spiritof its troops enemy's populace was even more important because militarymorale could be revivedafterit was damaged, while a in breakdown civilianmoralemight decidethewar.A 1938AirCorpstraining used to breakthe enemy'swill to fight textdeclared thatamongthemethods of were denial of necessitiesof life to civiliansand directintimidation the 5 populace. Nevertheless,prewar doctrinerecommendedagainst striking to at on thatit was inefficient do so. chiefly theground directly civilians, the during yearsbefore the air was Efficiency crucialto American planners for attackon Pearl Harbor, theyunderstood that,at the startof the coming war, the numberof Americanplanes would be severelylimitedwhile the of was extremely large.Most of thesetargets number possibleenemytargets
20, and Air are: 3Names givento theAAFanditspredecessor successor Army Corps,1926-June Air UnitedStates Force. 18, 20, Air June 1941-Sept. 1947;thereafter, 1941;Army Forces, 4 Giulio Douhet, The Command theAir,trans.Dino Ferrari of (New York,1942),22-23; EdMead Earle,ed, in Theories AirWarfare," Edward of Seversky: "Douhet,Mitchell, wardWarner, 1941), fromMachiavellito Hitler (Princeton, MilitaryThought Makersof Modem Strategy: 489-91,498. (Dec. 1, 1935), section28: textbook] 5 Air CorpsTactical School,Air Force [mimeographed F. "Direct Attack,"file 248.101-1,1 Dec. 1935 (Albert SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter, [mimeographed MaxwellAirForceBase, Ala.); AirCorpsTacticalSchool,AirForce:Air Warfare Taylor,"TheyTaught Gray (Feb. 1, 1938),file248.101-1,1 Feb. 1938,ibid.See also Joe textbook] Air XIII (Summer1966), 67-72; Cravenand Cate, eds., Army Tactics!" AerospaceHistorian, I, Forces, 33-71.

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a that linked together moderninwere connectedby the web of functions purposeof Americanair power the dustrialsociety.Accordingly, primary the wouldbe to disintegrate enemysociety striking mostvitalpointsin by the would bombers and the web, such as oil refineries powerstations.American power,such as tankfactories, sourcesofmilitary also attackmoreimmediate plants,andwarships.6 aircraft engine Direct attacks on civilians employedair power resourcesinefficiently, In at to the of reducing ability theairforce strike morevitaltargets. 1941AAF commanderHenry H. Arnold and Eaker stated that, except in special in targets."Bombers fargreater humanbeingswerenot "priority situations, to wouldbe required "wipe numbers thanwerethenavailable,theyobserved, out" enoughpeople to breakthe will ofa wholenation.The AAF's 1941 war of at less plan,AWPD/1,also gaveciviliantargets thantoppriority thestart a the with Germany, AAF future war. Its authorsproposedthat in a conflict had German industry begunto crumble, might beginmoraleattacksonlyafter after structure the statewas breaking the of the apart,and after populacewas permanent Neither Arnold-Eaker the studynorthe AAFwarplan promised became impliedthatwhenbombers for safeguards enemycivilians.The first in couldbe used against availablein far numbers thanexisted 1941they greater fabric beganto thatafter industrial Germany's civilians.The secondsuggested bomb demoralized, AAFmight the come apartand herpeoplewerebecoming moralecompletely. would appear,then,thatthe It Germancitiesto destroy in of menwhodeveloped prewar the strategy theAAFhadno objections princinoncombatants. ple to theuse ofairpoweragainst are before PearlHarbor thatemerged doctrine Prewar plansandtheairpower as testsof the ethicsofAAFleaders.Whathas to be not obviously sufficient is analyzed thewaythoseleadersactedas theairwarevolved. AAFactionsin Europeseemsto upholdthe of Atfirst glancetherecord early wishedto avoid bombing enemy air view thatAmerican forcecommanders in daylight hitprecise to theirplanes civilians.It showsthattheydispatched askedthemto join in and and targets thatwhentheBritish military industrial The RoyalAirForce(RAF) areas theyrefused. raidson urbanresidential night raidsbut found It to was committed urbanarea bombing. had triedprecision on the thatits own losses far outweighed damageinflicted theenemy.Unable decidedto attackresidential the factories to bombGerman effectively, British workers, hopingto "dehouse" and otherwiseincapacitatefactory districts, the and demoralizing its laborforce the Germaneconomy at through striking enemypopulation.PrimeMinisterWinstonChurchilland Britishmilitary Air the leadersthought U.S. Eighth Forceshouldsend some of its planes on 1943 the of raids,but at the Casablanca Conference January nightsaturation raidscontinue. AAFpersuaded Alliedleadersto let its precision the daylight
6

despondent.7

Jr., The Air Plan thatDefeated Hitler (Atlanta, 1972), 85, 92-93.

"TheyTaught Tactics!" 68. 7 H. H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker,Winged Warfare (New York,1941),134; HaywoodS. Hansell,

PerryMcCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans forPeace, 1943-1945 (Baltimore, 1970), 29; Taylor,

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"We had won a majorvictory," wroteabout this agreement, "forwe Arnold for withAmerican wouldbombin accordance principles, usingmethods which " ourplanesweredesigned. 8 did to These principles not includemoralobjections bombing residents the of Germancities, a factthat emergesfromthe arguments that Eaker,then commander the EighthAir Force,used to persuadeChurchillto agreeto of continued Eakerobserved, American day attacks.American heavybombers, were designedfor daylightoperationsand were equipped with precision bombsightsthat worked correctly only when the targetcould be seen. American crews,who weretrained precision for bombing, could hit small but Whentheyflewin daylight installations. important theywould drawout and bombedat destroy enemyday fighters. Attacking day, while the British by night, they would,in Eaker'swords,"givethedevilsno rest."9 Every ofEaker'sarguments pragmatic. one was None impliedanysolicitude forthe welfare Germancivilians.Indeed,Eakertold an AirForcehistorian of after warthathis colleaguesin theAAFneverobjected moralgrounds the on to the "I bombing peopleofGermany. neverfeltthere was anymoralsentiment man has to be trained amongleadersofthe AAF," he explained."A military After CasablancaConference, Arnold the madeit clearthathe didnotintend to exemptGermanciviliansfrom American attacks.In April1943he tolda air officer theEighth Forcewas goingto use incendiary that Air bombsto logistics burndenselybuilt-upsectionsof townsand cities in daylight raids. Shortly he members theAirStaff Washington of in that afterward, had an aide inform "this is a brutal warand . . . thewayto stopthekilling civiliansis to cause of so muchdamageanddestruction deaththatthecivilianswill demandthat and theirgovernment cease fighting. This doesn't mean that we are making civilians or civilian institutions war objective,but we cannot 'pull our a " punches'because someofthemmaygetkilled. l1 The meaning Arnold's pointwas brought of last hometo German civilians when Americanplanes bombed outside the targetarea-something that happened frequently whenweather was pooror enemyopposition was strong and that occasionally occurred when there was no opposition at all. Sometimes killing civilianswas notentirely the of accidental. October10, On Air 1943,236 Eighth ForceplanesbombedMdnster clearweather, in usingthe centerof the town as theiraimingpoint.At a conference eleven days later,
8 Noble Frankland, Bombing (LonOutlinesand Perspectives againstGermany: The Offensive Air of Destruction Dresden,35-40; Cravenand Cate, eds., Army don, 1965),59, 61-62; Irving, GlobalMission(NewYork,1949),397. II, Forces, 301; H. H. Arnold, 9 Ira C. Eaker, "The Case forDay Bombing,"file 520.547C, Jan.43 (SimpsonHistorical Research Center). and CharlesHildreth, May 22, 1962, United 10Ira C. Eakerinterview with Alfred Goldberg Center). Historical Research (Simpson Collection Air OralHistory States Force 11 Henry Arnold Assistant April and Maintenance Distribution, Materiel, H. to Chiefof Staff, to T. of Papers(Library Congress); J.Hanley,Jr., Assistant 26, 1943,box 38, HenryH. Arnold of 30, et Personnel, al., April 1943,box 114,ibid. Chiefs AirStaff,

and inured to do the job.... all."10

The business of sentimentnever enters into it at

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some of the officers involvedexplainedthathouses as well as factories were to goodaimingpointsbecause theyenabledairmen "put downenoughbombs the to destroy town." This made it unnecessary go back and hit the target to again.12 As a direct attackon a civilianareain goodweather, Munster the raidwas an it after took exceptionto AAF practiceat this stageof the war. But shortly cloudcoverthatwere place,theAmericans begana seriesofbombings through tantamount urbanareaattacks.European to weather was unusually foulin the felt fallof 1943, and AAFplanners theywould have to abandonthe strategic if offensive their bombing planes could onlyattackin clearskies. Theychose insteadto guide the bombers towardtheirobjectiveswithradar.Since radar could not distinguish targets precisely thattime,theresultwas the killing at 13 of of andwounding largenumbers noncombatants. This lack of precision looked like a virtueto some American officers who wantedto finda way to launch massivedirectattackson civilians.Colonel A. an on thatradarHenry Berliner, intelligence officer Arnold's staff, thought assistedattackson Germancities would disperseLuftwaffe fighter defenses, weaken enemymorale,and by driving civiliansfromtheirhomes in winforce Nazi government use up resources the to tertime, caring thevictims for ofbombardment. believedthat,without He the diminishing precision bombthe ingoffensive, AAFcould stageat least one raida monthlike theHamburg attacksin the summerof 1943 operation-a seriesof jointBritish-American thathad killedat least 60,000Germans incinerated largepartofthecity. a and radar erodeenemy moralewhen Eakeralso thought bombing shouldbe used to weatherprevented raids on higherpriority precisionobjectives."We learn from "and from from secretsources,"he toldanother enemyreaction officer, his squealingand pressand propaganda, thathe abhorsthese attackson his cities. They cause greatgloomin Germany."On November1, 1943,Arnold directedthat when daytimeprecisionraids were impossible,heavy bom14 bardment unitsshouldattackareatargets Germany in usingradar. A fewweeksafter Arnold AAFplanners a issuedthisorder, beganto consider further step: makingcivilian morale an explicittarget system.Officers apfor pointedto studybombing programs the nextphase in the war examined thispossibility concludedthatmoralewould not be a suitableobjective. but
12 C. Portal Eaker, to folder, ibid.; MeldenE. Smith, "The Jr., April 1943,box 41, bombing 21, in Decision Making" (Ph.D. diss., Boston Bombing DresdenReconsidered: Study Wartime of A The Strategic Offensive Air and University, 1971), 206-07; CharlesWebster Noble Frankland, against Germany, 1939-1945(4 vols.,London,1961),II, 37; MinutesofCombatWingand Group of Commanders Meeting, Oct. 21, 1943,box 138, CurtisE. LeMay Papers(Library Congress). againstrailroads and WesleyFrankCravenand James Lea Cate describethe raid as directed Air whytheseofficers waterways. Cravenand Cate, eds., Army Forces,II, 850. To understand planeshad taken wantedto avoidreturning a target, shouldnotethaton August17 their to one Yet daysafter losses in attacks Schweinfurt Regensburg. on October14,four on and tremendous again. theMunster raid,they togobackto Schweinfurt had 13 Craven andCate,eds.,ArnyAir III, Forces, 13-14,666-68. 14 H. A. Berliner forJoseph Oct. 11, 1943, container Ira C. EakerPapers 17, Loutzenheiser, of Eakerto Barney Giles,Dec. 13, 1943,ibid.;Arnold Combined M. Chiefs for (Library Congress); ofStaff, Nov. 1, 1943,box39, Strategy Command and folder, Arnold Papers.

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Theybelievedthatbombing might actuallystrengthen civiliandetermination to fight. even ifit werepossibleto destroy But civilianmorale,theythought thatthefeelings thepopulacecouldnotbring earlyend to the war since of an in no group combination groups Germany strong or of was enough overcome to Nazi control.One memberof the committee, told that morale was bad in Berlin, remarked thatthe "onlymoraleworthconsidering now is themorale ofthepeoplein highplaces-the peoplein power, HighCommand."'5 the While none of these officers raised anything pragmatic but objectionsto morale bombing,other persons,outside the armed forces,had begun to criticize areaattacksas immoral, their and had effect complaints an important on the AAF. In March 1944 twenty-eight noted clergymen antiwaracand tivistssignedan introduction an articlein Fellowship, to the journalof the pacifist organizationFellowship of Reconciliation,stating,among other things,that "Christian people should be moved to examine themselves " in their of concerning participation thiscarnival death. The New YorkTimes printeda front page storyabout the incidentand a flurry controversy of in followed religious secular and media.16 This showofdissentalarmed in officials theWarDepartment theAAF. and P. of denounced protestors, the Undersecretary WarRobert Patterson publicly the enemy. RobertA. Lovett, the claiming that they were encouraging assistantsecretary war forair, visitedAAF leadersin Europeand briefed of themon the problem adversepublicity home. Shortly of at after D-Day, he informed Spaatzat theheadquarters theUnitedStatesStrategic Forcesin of Air and in Europe (USSTAF),7 that therewas genuinefeelingin the country abouttheinhumanity indiscriminate of and Congress bombing advisedutmost caution in pursuing such a program. Lovettpredicted serioustroubleif indiscriminate attacks becametheannounced policyoftheAAF.18 Lovetttouchedon an issue ofthe highest to importance air commanders thepublicimageoftheAAF.Duringtheyearsbetweenthewars,officers like to Spaatz, Eaker,and William L. ("Billy") Mitchellhad workeddiligently at develop a favorableimage, testifying congressionalhearings,staging of exhibitions flight endurance bombing and and demonstrations, cultivating who could help themmake the American journalists people feel positively
'5 Office Assistant of "The Strategic Chiefof Air Staff, Intelligence, AerialBombardment of Europe," Dec. 10, 1943: "Morale," file 142.042-11,1 July-15 Nov. 1943, vol. 3 (Simpson F. Historical Research to Hughes, al., Feb. 12, 1944, et Center); L. Anderson ColonelsWilliamson, file519.4511-14, Feb-Aug1944,ibid.; "Prospect Ending for Warby AirAttackagainstGerman Morale,"March5, 1944,file519.318-1, ibid.; interview Richard HughesbyBruceHopper, of D. March20, 1944,box 135,CarlSpaatzPapers(Library Congress). of 16 New York X Times,March6, 1944,p. 1; VeraBrittain, "MassacrebyBombing," Fellowship, (March1944),50-64. II UnitedStatesStrategic Forces, Air formed January in 1944,coordinated strategic bombing by theU.S. Eighth Fifteenth Forces.In April passedfrom and Air it formal control theCombined by of Chiefs Staff control thesupreme to Alliedcommander. September reverted In it by backto the CombinedChiefsof Staff. Even after thatdate,however, continued DwightD. Eisenhower to influence activities its through understandings CarlSpaatz. with '8 New York Times,March11, 1944,p. 7; Daily Journal June 1944,box 15,Spaatz 9, (Personal), fromHughes, July5, 1944 (POINTBLANK folder),file 519.4511-14, Papers; Memorandum 1944(Simpson Historical Feb-Aug Research Center).

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air aboutthe aircorpsand thedoctrine strategic power.After of PearlHarbor, publicrelations was just as important theair commanders, not onlydid to for as of theywant to contribute much as possibleto the winning the war, but theyhoped thatby makinga massivedisplayof effective strategic bombing, in wouldinsuretheir establishment as they preeminence thepostwar military an independent force.As Arnoldtold Eakerin June1943, "We want the air " in peopleto understand havefaith ourwayofmaking and war. 19 Eakerwas so concerned aboutpublicperceptions theAAFthathe sought of to controlthe way its history in would be written. warnedan officer ArHe nold's headquarters no criticism the conductofthe warin anytheater that of ofoperations shouldappearin official correspondence without clearance from "war chiefs."To GeneralClaytonL. Bissell,theassistant the chief airstaff of forintelligence, Eakerwrote:"We have gota mass ofhistorians bothends at watching this correspondence these things all and cannotbut creepinto the '20 official documents unlesswe areall on guard.' Even beforeLovett's warning, AAF leaders had begun to fearthat area of bombingmight jeopardizethe reputation their service at home. Large numbers Americans not appearto hate the Germanpeople,even after of did theNazi government declared war.Therewere,ofcourse, millionsofGermanAmericans theUnitedStatesand manycitizens, in of felt regardless ancestry, theircountry shouldnot have becomeinvolvedin war withGermany the in first feltthat makingwar place. AAF generalsknew about these attitudes, withnationalideals, and worried againstciviliansconflicted about the way Americans might reactto stories American of attackson Germanwomenand It was this concernforthe image of the AAF,together withreluctance to divertresourcesfromthe precisionbombingoffensive, that led Spaatz, in summer1944, to turndown proposalsformorale bombing.Some of these with the British,while otherswere developedin Spaatz's own originated where the deputydirector intelligence, headquarters of Colonel Lowell P. a Weicker, promoted psychological warfare bombing plan. Weicker wantedto broadcast thatparticular warnings Germantownsand citieswereaboutto be thenissue blackpropaganda, to destroyed, purporting originate withtheNazi government, that would tell the inhabitants that the Americanscould not harm them. Finally,Americanplanes would bomb the designated places, could no longerdefend showingthe Germanpeople that theirgovernment them.
19 Eaker interview withArthur Marmor, 1966,UnitedStates ForceOralHistory Jan. Air Collection; Cravenand Cate, eds., Army Forces,I, 22-28; Smith, ForcePlans, 15; Arnold Air Air to Eaker, June 1943,container EakerPapers. 29, 16, 20 Eaker Bissell, to Jan. 194[41, 8, container EakerPapers. 18, 21 Richard W. Steele,"American Popular Opinionand theWarAgainst Germany: Issue of The LXV (Dec. 1978),704-23;Eakerinterview Negotiated Peace, 1942,"Journal American of History, L. withGoldberg Hildreth, and May 22, 1962,UnitedStatesAirForceOralHistory Collection; S. Kuter Anderson, to Aug. 12, 1944,file145.161-7, 44-May45, Miscellaneous Apr Correspondence L. ofFrederick Anderson, andL. S. Kuter (Simpson Historical Research Jr., Center).

children.2'

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The chiefBritish proposalwas fora massive Allied air attackon Berlin, operation THUNDERCLAP, thatwould supposedly bringdown the German the to government through collapseofcivilianmorale."I have been subjected some pressure the partof the AirMinistry," on Spaatz told Arnold,"to join I handswiththemin moralebombing. discussedthismatter. . . withLovett will whenhe was hereand have maintained firm a positionthatourbombing doubtin my mindthatthe RAFwantverymuch to have the U.S. AirForces 122 withthemoralebombing tarred aftermath whichwe feelwillbe terrific." If,as the official historians say, Spaatz raisedthe moralissue in opposing frankly statedrecommendations breakGermanmoralebybombing, did to he "It so with practicalintentions. wasn't forreligiousor moral reasons," he the explainedafter war, "that I didn'tgo along withurbanarea bombing." the Although official history claims thatAAFheadquarters backedup Spaatz whenhe raisedthemoralissue,therecord showsthatthiswas notbecausethe Whenthe British chiefofthe AAFrejected terror bombing. offered proposals he forattacking morale,Arnolddid not turnthemdown. Rather, asked his to staff studythem.Arnold had what an aide called an "open mind" on the For a while Spaatz's viewpointprevailed.Dwight D. Eisenhower,the supremeallied commanderwho then held controlover the activitiesof USSTAF, at first supported Spaatz's wish to avoidopen war againstcivilians. But at the end ofAugust, withAlliedarmiesstalledon theWestern Front, he changed mind."WhileI have alwaysinsisted,"Eisenhower his toldSpaatzon August "thatU.S. Strategic Forces directed 28, Air be against precision targets, I am alwaysprepared takepartin anything givesrealpromise ending to that to the war quickly." Less thantwo weeks later,he notified Spaatz to have the Air Eighth Forcereadyto bombBerlinat a moment'snotice. Spaatz theninAir structed Eighth Forcecommander the "thatwe wouldno longer plan to hit on definite but military objectives be readyto dropbombsindiscriminately" 24 theNazi capitalwhenEisenhower gavetheorder. levels. At the for Preparations THUNDERCLAP continuedat different 14 Arnold of September meeting the CombinedChiefsof Staff, brought a up morale whichwouldhave British to havethechiefs endorse proposal bombing, giventhe sanctionofthe highest Anglo-American military bodyto raidslike
22 Memorandum, folder), file George McDonaldto Williamson, 5, 1944 (POINTBLANK C. July 519.4511-14, Feb-Aug1944; [CarlSpaatzlto Arnold, Aug.27, 1944,Diary(Personal), Aug. 1944, box 15, SpaatzPapers;CravenandCate, eds.,Army Forces, 638-39. FortheroleofLowell Air HI, P. Weicker, LowellP. Weicker McDonald,July 1944,and CharlesM. Taylor Williamsee to 6, to son [undated] (POINTBLANKfolder), 519.4511-14, file Feb-Aug1944 (SimpsonHistorical Research Center). 23 Spaatzinterview withNoel F. Parrish Goldberg, and Feb. 21, 1962,UnitedStatesAirForce Oral HistoryCollection;Kuterto Anderson, Aug. 8, 1944, file 145.161-7,Apr 44-May 45, Miscellaneous Correspondence Anderson Kuter. of and 24 Diary(Personal), July 1944,box 15,SpaatzPapers; D. E. to Spaatz,Aug.28, 1944,ibid.; 21, D. Spaatzto DwightD. Eisenhower, Aug.24, 1944,ibid.; Diary(Official), 18,ibid.; Diary(Perbox sonal),Sept.9, 1944,ibid.

continue to be precision bombing against militaryobjectivels]....

There is no

subject.23

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D. the one proposed Berlin.President for Franklin Roosevelt'schiefmilitary advisor,AdmiralWilliam Leahy, told the chiefsit would be a mistake to "record"such a decision. (He did not,as the AAFhistory states,express opposition to morale bombing.)At USSTAF headquarters, Spaatz's deputy commanderfor operations,General Frederick Anderson,Jr.,told the C. planners incorporate THUNDERCLAP Weicker's to into proposal breaking for morale with preannouncedraids and black propaganda. Execution of THUNDERCLAP was delayed, however, until1945,notforethicalreasonsor because of the AAF policy againstindiscriminate but because of bombing, in problems assembling required the forces.25 on whichoffer The AAF had started working, meanwhile, otherprograms additionalproofthatthe official policydid not conform practice.One of to thesewas theWarWeary Bomber project, designed takehundreds wornto of fill out bombers, themwithexplosives, aim themat enemytargets. and After thecrews bailedoutoverfriendly deviceswoulddirect the automatic territory, This project was America's to bombstoward their winged objectives. response the GermanV-1and V-2missiles,whichwerefalling on indiscriminately the and English.The robotplanes were intendedto blow up industrial targets such as theV-1launching sites.AAFleadersalso hoped military installations, the the theywould disrupt Germaneconomy, force enemyto mobilizelarge and reducethe Germanwill to resist.They numbersof people fordefense, as could serve,in addition, prototypes guidedmissilesto be used against for It was obvious to air forcecommanders that the employment robot of bombers was reallyindiscriminate warfare, it is equallyevidentthat air and thegenerals had no moralobjectionto usingthem. "I can see verylittledifwroteSpaatz in November ference," Arnold 1944, "betweentheBritish night a and area bombing our taking warwearyairplane, launching at say, 50 or it, 60 miles awayfrom it in Cologneand letting fallsomewhere thecitylimits." thensuggested Arnold turning robotplanesloose all overGermany the the so Germans not wouldbe as afraid them, knowing wherethey wouldhit,as the of on Englishwere of V-is and V-2s. "I thinkthatthe psychological effect the moraleoftheGerman this peoplewouldbe muchgreater way." Spaatzreplied thatwar-weary aircraft would have the greatest chanceof success if directed towns. While he did not thinkthey against reasonablylarge,undefended would affect outcomeof the war significantly, saw no reasonfornot the he
25 Minutes,joint Chiefsof Staff 176thmeeting, Sept. 14, 1944, CombinedChiefsof Staff decimalfile, box 179,Papers theUnitedStatesJoint of Chiefs Staff, 218 (National of RG Archives); Cravenand Cate, eds.,Army Forces, 639; Anderson Director Plans,Nov. 7, 1944on Air IN, to of Carrier Sheet (POINTBLANKfolder), 519.4511-14, file Feb-Aug1944 (SimpsonHistoricalResearch Center). 26 William D. Leahyto thePresident, March26, 1945,fileABC 384.5 Germany May 44), (13 of RG Memorandum theCommanding sec. 2, Records theArmy Staff, 319 (National by Archives); Air Chiefsof Staff 190th General,Army Forces,JCS 1150,Nov. 4, 1944,ibid.; Minutes,Joint Feb. 8, 1945,fileCCS 373.11 (Germany) meeting, Papersof the UnitedStatesJoint (11-4-44), of Chiefs Staff. 26 Japan.

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or attacking those towns with robotplanes if theyhad military industrial 127 with targets "associated them." Early modelsofwar-weary bombers wereso inaccurate thatLeahydescribed theiruse as an "inhumaneand barbarous typeof warfare with which the the AAF equipped the United States should not be associated." Even after experimental robotplaneswithradar guidancelate in thewarwithGermany, withina mile and a halfoftheir theywereestimated likelyto hit somewhere targets, leadingthe War Department wonderif theydid not violate the to official Arnold's staff able to allay was policyagainstindiscriminate bombing. this concern by redefining indiscriminate bombing. It notifiedthe War Department robotaircraft that weremoreaccurate thanradar bombing (which theAAFhad employed a largescale since thefallof 1943),and sincerobot on wereboundto affect when theyexplodedwithin bombers enemyproduction largeindustrial targets, theywould notbe indiscriminate. Reassured thatthe the weapon was accurateenoughto use in Germany, War Department apits proved employment. Only a fewoftherobotplanes everflew,forthe British government feared of thatthe Germans wouldretaliate againstLondonwithrobotbombers their own and inducedthemilitary untilthelastfewdays chiefs delaytheproject to of the war.28 But another even moredeadlyto civilians,did go into program, and effect: operationCLARION, which sent American fighters bombersall overGermany attacktargets smalltownsandvillages.Its purpose to in was to the weredefenseless persuade German peoplethatthey againstairattacksand thatadditional resistance futile-inother was to words, breakcivilianmorale. in Airplanners to workon thisproject earnest set the of during late summer 1944. In September, Colonel Charles G. Williamson,a USSTAF planning told chief plansat AAFheadquarters, of about officer, GeneralLaurence Kuter, the kindofattacksWilliamson's group had in mind.The targets shouldbe in in areas" and shouldincludetransportation facilities small "relatively virgin small machine shops, and other targets,no matterhow small, towns, " knownindustrial establishments.A fewdayslater, a meeting at "resembling withKuterand Williamson, Arnold thatplanning proposed beginforattacks six German Arnold thatif felt lasting or sevendaysagainst widespread targets. time theymightdecidethe war. He theseraidswere carried at the right out attacksaimed at the people of statedthat theywere not to be obliteration of and shouldhitnumerous Germany. Rather, groups roving fighters bombers
2-Arnold Spaatz,Nov. 23, 1944,Diary (Personal), 16, SpaatzPapers;Spaatzto Arnold, to box Dec. 10, 1944,ibid. 28 Minutes, Joint ChiefsofStaff 190th meeting, Feb. 8, 1945,PapersoftheUnitedStatesJoint of G.A.L. to theAssistant War Chiefs Staff; Memorandum, Secretary, Department GeneralStaff, Mar. 23, 1945,fileABC 384.5 Germany May 44), sec. 2, Records theArmy of Staff; Leahyto (13 the President, March 26, 1945,ibid.; Giles to Spaatz,April27, 1945, file 519.9701-1544-45, B. to Historical Research GeneralCorrespondence Center);Robert Satterwhite C. G., (Simpson 3rdAirBombardment V2, to Div., Jan. 1945,file527.431A-19, 1 Jan.1945,ibid.;E. E. Partridge 2, Commanding General,Eighth Force,Jan.20, 1945,APHRODITE,file527.431A-1 1945 Air Jan (Simpson Historical Research Center).

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typesof military objectivesthroughout Germany"to give everycitizen an to of " opportunity see positive proof Alliedairpower. 29 of meant Giventheprobable accuracy theattacking planes,thisdistinction virtuallynothing,for there was no way that the attackerscould avoid if obliterating villagesor partsof largercommunities theystruckat small targets. Spaatz machineshopsor at railroad stations and othertransportation and othershad made exactlythis pointbeforethe D-Day invasion,arguing in and Belgiantowns facilities French againstproposalsto hit transportation AAF because too manycivilianswould be killedand wounded.Furthermore, of plannershad long regarded transportation bombingas a form antimorale warfare becauseofitseffects nearby on civilians.30 Nevertheless,in response to Arnold's wishes, USSTAF developed the CLARION plan, givingit the euphemisticsubtitle:GENERAL PLAN FOR MAXIMUM EFFORT ATTACK AGAINST TRANSPORTATION OBwhatwas really AAFcommanders no difficulty had understanding JECTIVES. and severalof themprotested. GeneralJamesH. Doolittle, beingprepared, who thencommanded the EighthAirForce,warnedSpaatz thatwidespread of civiliansbehindthebattlelinesmight enrage enemy so the strafing German of populace that theywould retaliateagainstAllied prisoners war. German and if the propagandists would use CLARION to justifyNazi brutality, led Alliedlosses, theAmerican beginto operation to substantial peoplemight Air ask whytheAAFhad changed strategy. commander theFifteenth The of its Force, General Nathan F. Twining,added his own cautions, warningof how the and potential heavylosses fortheattackers urging Spaatzto consider enemy and the Americanpeople would react to the inevitablecivilian casualties31 Eakeroffered most vehement the objections.In a letterforSpaatz's eyes that CLARION would absolutelyconvincethe Germans only,he predicted "thatwe are thebarbarians obvious theysay we are,forit wouldbe perfectly to themthatthisis primarily largescale attackon civilians,as, in fact,it of a course will be." Eaker remindedSpaatz that CLARION was completely targets added and contrary whatLovetthad said aboutsticking military to to thatit entailedan inefficient excessively of and riskyemployment strategic bombers. Eakerwrote: Ifthetime ever with viewto a comes when wantto attack civilian we the populace have are and however, become completely convinced youandBobLovett right we that should never of us the allowthehistory thiswarto convict ofthrowing strategic at I bomber themanin thestreet. think there a better we can do ourshare is way
CharlesG. Williamson Kuter, for to Sept.4, 1944;Williamson Anderson, Sept.12, 1944,Box 18,SpaatzPapers. 30 Craven andCate,eds.,Army Forces, 144;Anderson Williamson, Air to et HII, Hughes, al., Feb. 12, 1944attachment: "Strategic Target Systems Appropriate Study Committee Reviewfor by in ingC.B.O. Plan," file519.4511-14, Feb-Aug 1944(Simpson Historical Research Center). 31 Plan in Special Projects, CLARION, file 519.430A Dec 44-Mar 45 (SimpsonHistorical Research Center); H. Doolittleto Commanding J. General, USSTAF,Dec. 27, 1944,ibid.;Nathan F. Twining Eaker, 4, 1945,ibid. to Jan.
29

civil morale,such a plan . . . is probably way to do it. I personally, breaking the

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the populationam I but toward defeat theenemy, ifwe areto attack civilian the of breaking point until and its is nearer certain should we waituntil morale much [thel or more thanit willat anytimein thewinter early theweather favors operation the 32 spring. was pragmatic.Eaker It should be noted that each of these arguments and excessive risks and losses. He exworriedabout Germanpropaganda pressed,not moral objectionsto bombingcivilians,but concernover the of overthetiming moreefficient modesofwarfare, shifting resources of from theoperation, overtheway CLARIONwouldmake theAAFappearin the and of denied,severalyearslater,thathe history the war.In fact,Eakerexplicitly had meantto indicatein thisletter thatendangered thathe opposedbombing national leaders in war, he enemy civilians. The civilian who supported was man.33 as contended, justas responsible themilitary out CLARION, therewas While Spaatz seemed hesitantabout carrying considerableenthusiasmat higherlevels forsendingUnited States planes against large and small Germantargetsin a series of widespreadsweeps. John McCloyfound L. and Secretary Secretary WarHenry Stimson Assistant of ChiefofStaff GeorgeC. Marshall theidea, in Stimson'swords,"intriguing." 9, declaredthathe wantedto see attacksall over Germany. And on January "If Arnold begintheoperation. thepowerofthe to 1945,Lovetthimself urged "it German reduced,"Lovettexplained, seems peopleto resistis to be further of intothe smallercities likelythatwe mustspreadthe destruction industry underthe Germansystemof disand townsnow beingused forproduction persal.''34 Eisenhower's headquartersfinally ordered CLARION to proceed. On 22 23, hours of February thousandsof February and in the earlymorning of Air and bombers fighters theEighth, Ninth,and Fifteenth Forces,joinedby obtransportation RAF units, rangedover Germany, bombingand strafing of jectivesandtargets opportunity.35 in described CLARION was onlyone ofa seriesofoperations 1945 officially as attacks on transportation really aimed largelyat reducingcivilian but morale. GeneralHaywood S. Hansell, one of the designers the pre-Pearl of Harborplan AWPD/1, observedthat duringthe last weeks of the war, the of air greatquantities bombson Germanmarshalling strategic forces dropped the some of themin cities,although Germanrail system yardsand stations, the were was already wrecked. reality, In Hansell observed, marshalling yards area bombingtargets.36 this time the conditionsforarea bombingthat By
32 34 Daily Diary of General David M. Schlatter, Feb. 5, 1945, file 168.7052-5 44/10/21Nov. 19, 1944 (Yale L. DiaryofHenry Stimson, Research Historical 45/07/11(Simpson Center); to New Haven);Anderson Spaatz,Feb.2, 1945,box20, SpaatzPapers;R. A. L. Library, University ibid. Jan. toArnold, 9, 1945[copy], 35 Air Staff SHAEF to HQ USSTAF et al, Feb. 21, 1945, Special Projects-CLARION,file Mueller, and Kit Research Historical 519.430ADec 44-Mar45 (Simpson Center); C. Carter Robert 1941-1945 (Washington, Air comps., The Army Forcesin WorldWarII: CombatChronology 1973),578-80. 36 Hansell, 269. AirPlanthat Hitler, Defeated

33Eaker RonaldSchaffer, 11, 1979. to Jan.

1, Eakerto Spaatz,Jan. 1945,box20, SpaatzPapers.

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before warhad beenmet. Since the Arnold, Eaker,and Hansellhad predicated the wereavailablein greater bombers numbers thanwererequired eliminate to remaining important precisiontargets, theycould be used againstcivilians The withno loss of efficiency. Germanindustrial systemwas so devastated that the AAF could devote a substantialpart of its resourcesto breaking civilianmorale. The mostpublicized instances thenowfully of formed program American of area bombing weretheraids,earlyin 1945,on Berlin, east Dresden,and other Germancities. Substantial impetusforthese raids came froma Russian offensiveinto Germany thatbegan the second week of January. Addedto the Nazi adhope of endingthe war by breaking enemymorale and destroying centers ministrative was a beliefthatAAF and RAFbombers could assist the Sovietadvance.By battering remnants Germantransportation by the of and dislocatingthe Germanrear,Americanand Britishaircraft could make it harder the Germansto bring suppliesand reinforcements resistthe for up to RedArmy. In addition,some staff officers thoughtthe attacks would be useful in Allies. A week before Yalta towardthe Western the shapingSovietattitudes General David M. Schlatter, the deputychief of air staffat Conference, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), noted in his SupremeHeadquarters, are diary:"I feelthatourairforces theblue chipswithwhichwe will approach thepost-war treaty table,and thatthisoperation massivebombardment of [a to or Berlin]will add immeasurably theirstrength, ratherto the Russian " knowledgeof their strength. The BritishJointIntelligenceCommittee likewise believedthat raids in east Germancities would be politicallyadvantageous a showofAnglo-American as support theRussians.37 for of First thesehugeattacks wouldbe THUNDERCLAP, theoperation against the Germancapitalthathad been suspended months before. Doolittle,whose Air Eighth Forcewouldhave to bombtheadministrative of center thecity,did not like THUNDERCLAP at all. He pointedout to Spaatz that American planeswouldhaveto fly within rangeofhundreds heavyantiaircraft to of guns reachan areawherethere wereno important strictly military targets. Evenas a terror operation raid would not be successful, the because Germancivilians wouldhave amplewarning takeshelter. to Besides,terror inducedbyfear was oftheunknown, byintensifying thepeopleofBerlin experienced not what had foryears.Andas perhaps last and best-remembered force the air operation of the war, THUNDERCLAP would "violate the basic Americanprincipleof of precisionbombingof targets strictly military significance which our for tacticswere developedand our crewstrainedand indoctrinated." Doolittle recommended that the RAF be assigned to area bomb Berlin while the hit Americans precise military targets.38
37 Schlatter, Daily Diary,Jan.28, 1945; Irving, Destruction Dresden,94, 95, 101. Forthe of idea thattheatomicbombshouldbe used to impress Russians, Martin Sherwin, parallel the see J. A World Destroyed: Atomic The Bomband theGrand Alliance(NewYork,1975),197-202. 38 Doolittle to Spaatz, CS93JD,Jan. 1945, THUNDERCLAP, file 520.422, Sept 44-Feb 45 Historical Research (Simpson Center).

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of about the effects the raid on the way people Spaatz was also worried to his from suggestion Doolittlethat thought about the AAF. This is evident to news summariesof the operationstressthe effort create administrative morale, aboutbreaking He and reinforcements. saidnothing confusion disrupt was one of the chiefobjectivesforthose who adthoughhe knew thatthis vocated THUNDERCLAP. The Britishfeltthat way and so, as Spaatz had Marshall.Not onlydidMarshallwantto hit did learned, ChiefofStaff recently were evacuatedto places like Munich, he Berlin,but when its inhabitants was no hope. the wantedto attackMunichtoo,showing evacueesthere Aftersome hesitation Spaatz proceeded with the bombing of Berlin, He blind-bombing operation. also for arranging it to occuras a radar-guided, for had his staff prepare the attackon MunichthatMarshallhad requested.39 in nearlya thousandB-17s blasted targets FollowingSpaatz's instructions, were able to do bombardiers American 3, Berlinon February 1945. Although targets, holes in the clouds and hit severalmilitary through visual bombing 25,000civilianswerekilled. perhaps 13 February and 14 in climaxing citiesfollowed, Otherraidson east German a that planescreated vastfirestorm swept an attackon Dresden,whereBritish bombers roared hundred American high acrossthecity.Then morethanthree dense clouds at the marshalling ruins,aimingthrough overthe still flaming strafed targets downbelow.40 moving whileAmerican fighters yards, just produced the the raids,particularly attackon Dresden, The east German kindofpublicity thatSpaatz and Doolittlewishedto avoid. At Eisenhower's that told a pressbriefing C. RAFAirCommodore M. Grierson headquarters, the the raidswas to disrupt Germaneconomyby forcing one objectof these bombed-out to civilians, to German government movesuppliesaround carefor places whichrelief was beingsent,and bydestroying townsfrom by attacking to which refugeeswere evacuated. An Associated Press storybased on interview was passed by a SHAEF censor,and soon people in the Grierson's have made the longthat"Allied air commanders UnitedStateswerereading bombingof the great German awaited decision to adopt deliberateterror to '41 centers a ruthless as expedient hastenHitler'sdoom." population caused considerable correct, both essentially The briefing news story, and "Whatdo we say?" Arnold'schiefofinformation alarmat AAFheadquarters. seriouseffect the Air on to asked Spaatz. "This is certain have a nation-wide against bombing the preached gospelofprecision Forcesas we have steadfastly for and industrial Anderson, Spaatz's deputycommander targets." military
39 Spaatzto Doolittle,JD104CS, to 30, Jan. 1945,and UA53649,Feb. 2, 1945,ibid.; Anderson Feb. of Minutes staff meeting, 2, 1945,ibid.;Anderson Spaatz,Feb.2, 1945,box20, SpaatzPapers; to Spaatz,Feb. 1, 1945, Special Projects-CLARION,file 519.430A,Dec 44-Mar 45 (Simpson Research Historical Center). 40 Cravenand Cate, eds., Army Destruction Dresden,155, of AirForces,HI, 725-26; Irving, 164-67,196-97. Feb. 41 Howard Raids,"St.LouisPost-Dispatch, of Cowan,"AlliesDecideon New Policy Terror quoted an almost identicalversionof this storyfromthe 18, 1945, p. 1. AAF Headquarters Star in Rex Smithto Spaatz, WAR 39722, Feb. 18, 1945, box 20, Spaatz Papers. Washington to is Grierson quotedin F. L. Anderson WarDept.,UA 64471,Feb. 19, 1945,ibid.

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it operations, repliedthat,after discussing matter the with Eisenhower, had and that all been decidedthatUSSTAF would issue no official explanation on questions thesubjectwouldbe answered saying: by
A. Thatthere beenno changein bombing has policy; B. The UnitedStatesStrategic Forceshave always directed Air theirattacksagainst and to military objectives will continue do so; was C. The story erroneously passedbycensor.

of informed on thatwhilethebombing Anderson Washington, Spaatz'sbehalf, Berlinhad not been expectedto be precise,it was justified the city's by and military significance that the same was trueof Dresden and the other "It citiesin eastern Germany. has alwaysbeenmypolicy,"he toldArnold (in Spaatz's name), "that civilian populationsare not suitable militaryobdid had "42 jectives. Anderson notsaywhatSpaatz'spractice been-which was to permitindiscriminate bombingof Germancivilianswhen his superiors required himto. We are now in a positionto explainhow the mytharoseof an AAFpolicy Therewas a policy-on paper.Sometimes it againstindiscriminate bombing. was adheredto; oftenit was not, or it was so broadlyreinterpreted to as officers sent officialmessages to one become meaningless.High-ranking to another whichcaused the record suggest thatAAFpractice fitted withthe official knew this was not the case. Thus, in the policy. Yet these officers of aftermath theraidsintoeastern Anderson cabledArnold thatthe Germany, civiliansas appropriate even commander USSTAF did not regard of targets though Andersonhimself,three months earlier,had requested USSTAF for plannersto include a terrorbombingproposal in their preparations THUNDERCLAP. Anderson and his colleagueswereprotecting image of the historians other theAAFfrom and investigators. of The official historians theAAFnotedsome ofthedeviations from stated that weresometimes directives issuedfor the policy.Theyremarked bombing recordand that bombardiers and air forcecommanders sometimesignored them.Buttheydidnotpursuesystematically questionofhow meaningful the thepolicywas to AAFleaders.Had theydoneso, they wouldhave presumably concludedthat,regardless whatthe leaderssaid forthe record, official of the of restraints thebombing German on civilians.43 policyplacedinsignificant Whatever restraints therewere did not arise out of the consciencesof the the thattheyobjected menwhorantheAAF,for record no provides indication to on moralgrounds radarbombing, inaccurate robotplane attacks,sweeps
42 Anderson Arnold, Feb. 18, to UA64484,Feb. 19, 1945and [Anderson] WarDept.,UA64462, to of General Special and 1945,Records theWarDepartment file, Jan.-Feb., 1945,CM-INTop Secret himselfas the authorof the above described Staffs, RG 165 (NationalArchives).Anderson to message. Memorandum Spaatz,Feb. 19, 1945,box20, SpaatzPapers. 43 Craven Air Air study prepared and Cate, eds.,Army Forces, 721, 726. A secret University II, were not much concerned about civilian in 1969 makes the pointmorebluntly:"Americans A. from on in and attacks objectives theReich." [Charles Ravenstein Maurer resulting casualties on "Constraints AAFOperations"(MaxwellAirForceBase, Ala., 1969),4. A copyis Maurer], Historical Research at Center. available Simpson

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of againstsmall towns and villages,or the devastation cities calculatedto breakmorale.Whilethesemendidprefer to precision bombing areaattacks, at least until the last weeks of the war, it was not forreasonsof conscience. Rather,it was because they consideredselective bombingmore efficient militarily, bettersuitedto the image theywishedto project, morelikelyto verify theirtheory strategic powerand, forall these reasons,a more of air effective way of establishing preeminence theirserviceafter war. the of the When Spaatz and his colleagues "raised the moral issue," they were expressing personalrepugnance the bombing noncombatants, apnot to of but prehension over the way otherswould regard actionsof the AAF. Their the to approach thebusinessofwarwas essentially pragmatic. This does not mean thattheyneverthought aboutthe ethicalimplications ofairwarfare. did. Arnold In June 1943he senta memorandum his Certainly to in combatcommanders whichhe warnedthatbombing was boundto add to the horrors war and likelyto intensify of of feelings hatredin the "victim populations"thatcouldpoisoninternational relations after warended.As the a "spurto conscience,"he reminded commanders increased the that accuracy ofbombing meantlives saved (though whether meantenemyor American he lives is not clear). The bomber,he observed,"when used with the proper on weapons" and,depending how it was employed, couldbe either "the savior orthescourge humanity."44 of These sentiments withArnold's appearto conflict to willingness burndown fall enemycities,his desireto see robotbombers indiscriminately amongthe German of people,and his acceptance moraleattacks.Yet theyaremorethan a record. lip serviceor wordsforthehistorical Theyrepresent moralattitude in inherent air powertheory, positionthatgoes back to WorldWarI-the a idea thatbombing a way ofpreserving is lives by ending warsquicklyand by thathad killedso many a for warfare providing substitute the kindofground soldiers quarter a earlier. Anderson reflected view whenhe wrote, century this in July1943, that his EighthBomberCommand would so devastate the Germaneconomythat therewould be no necessityof an invasion of the continent"with the consequentloss of thousandsand possiblymillionsof "'4 lives. Eventually, American airmenweresentto attackGermancivilians and the Germaneconomyas a way ofrapidly the ending war (and savingthe livesofthosewhowouldotherwise killed). be Eaker Despite his claim thatAAFleadersneverevincedmoralsentiments, himself defended area bombing witha moralargument-that civilianscould be legitimately killedin air attacksbecause theysupported enemy'swar the As effort. Eakerput it, the man who buildsa weaponis as responsible its for use as the man who carriesit into battle. Eaker also contendedthat the evil the avoidanceof a greater justified he endangering civilians,for regarded
of box 194,Records theArmy E. 21, to 45 Anderson George Stratemeyer, July 1943,file312.1-E, AirForces. 10, Zones,June 1943,box41, Arnold Papers. in ForceCommanders Combat 44ArnoldtoAllAir

degree of understanding .

. becomes, in effect, the most humane of all

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entireconflict with Nazi Germanyas a war against evil in which it was necessary attackbad peoplein order save thegood,therighteous, the to to and just.46 WhileEaker offered thesearguments longafter endofthewar,there the is no reasonto doubtthatsomething thesame sentiments like occurred him to while it was goingon. If so, thenhe, like otherAAF leadersheld moralattitudesabout the bombingof civilians,attitudesthat did not forbid such but bombing rather madeitpermissible. This reinterpretation WorldWar II bombing of policyand moralattitudes has severalconsequences thehistory American for of military ethics.It makes it somewhat harder distinguish ethicalconductofthe UnitedStatesin to the WorldWar II fromits conductin Vietnamand in otherwars and fromthe of nationsthatpracticed morality other terror It bombing. raisesthe question whether for feelings the welfareof enemycivilianscan ever be compatible with military success. And it invitesus to scan the history American of warfare see what othermythsaffect perception the role of moral to our of constraints.
46Eaker Schaffer, 11, 1979. to Jan.